Order Code RS22323
Updated July 25, 2008
Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iran is materially assisting and influencing major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq,
most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. Among these
factions is that of hardline anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia,
according to some observers, serves as a proxy force for Tehran against the United
States. This report will be updated. See CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and
Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Background
Iran’s influence in Iraq affects the U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq and heightens U.S.
concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions. With the conventional
military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam Hussein removed,
Iran’s strategy in Iraq has been to perpetuate domination of Iraq’s government by pro-
Iranian Shiite Islamists, while also aiding Shiite militias that are willing to combat U.S.
forces. Because of their ability to cause U.S. casualties, these militias give Iran leverage
in the event of a broader confrontation with the United States. However, Iran has
increasingly faced a dilemma in Iraq as its protege Shiite leaders, formerly united, are
both competing politically and even fighting each other.
During 2003-2005, Iran’s leaders supported the decision by Iraqi Shiite Islamist
factions to enter a U.S.-led election process, because the number of Shiites in Iraq (about
60% of the population) virtually ensured Shiite dominance of an elected government. To
this extent, Iran’s goals coincided with U.S. policy, which was to establish democracy.
A Shiite Islamist bloc (“United Iraqi Alliance”), encompassing the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Da’wa (Islamic Call) party, and the faction of the 33-year-old
Moqtada Al Sadr — won 128 of the 275 seats in the December 15, 2005, election for a
full term parliament. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is from the Da’wa Party, whose
leaders were in exile mostly in Syria. Most leaders of ISCI spent their years of exile in
Iran and its former leader, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim (killed in an August
2003 car bomb in Najaf). In 1982, he was anointed by then Iranian leader Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini to head an Islamic republic of Iraq, if one were formed. ISCI’s
militia, the “Badr Brigades” (now renamed the “Badr Organization”), numbered about
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15,000. The Badr Brigades were recruited, trained, and armed by Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard, which is politically aligned with Iran’s hardliners, during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war. Badr guerrillas conducted attacks from Iran into southern Iraq against Baath Party
officials, but did not shake the regime. During 2005-6, with the help of an ISCI member
(Bayan Jabr) as Interior Minister, the militia burrowed into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Badr fighters in and outside the ISF were purportedly involved in sectarian killings of
Sunnis, although to a lesser extent than Sadr’s JAM. These killings accelerated after the
February 2006 bombing of the Al Askari Mosque in Samarra.
The Sadr faction’s ties to Iran were initially limited because his family remained in
Iraq during Saddam’s rule. Still, the Sadr clan has ideological ties to Iran; Moqtada’s
cousin, Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, was founder of the Da’wa Party, a political ally of
Ayatollah Khomeini, and was hung by Saddam Hussein in 1980. Iran later came to see
political value in Sadr’s faction — which has 29 seats in parliament and a large and
dedicated following, particularly among lower-class Iraqi Shiites. He built a “Mahdi
Army” (Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM) after Saddam’s fall, which grew to about 60,000
fighters. U.S. military operations put down JAM uprisings in April 2004 and August 2004
in “Sadr City” (Sadr stronghold in east Baghdad), Najaf, and other Shiite cities. In those
cases, fighting was ended with compromises under which JAM forces stopped fighting
in exchange for amnesty for Sadr. Seeing the JAM as useful against the United States in
the event of a U.S.-Iran confrontation, in 2005, Iran began supplying arms to the JAM
through the “Qods (Jerusalem) Force” of the Revolutionary Guard, the most politically
powerful component of Iran’s military. The Qods Force is its unit that assists Iranian
protege forces abroad.
Iran’s efforts to promote Shiite solidarity began to unravel in 2007 when Maliki
agreed to cooperate with the U.S. “troop surge” and to accept U.S. military pressure
against Sadr’s JAM militia. As a result of that decision, Maliki’s alliance with Sadr
ended, and by August 2007 Sadr had pulled his five ministers out of the cabinet and his
parliamentarians out of the UIA bloc. As the rift widened, JAM fighters increasingly
battled Badr-dominated Iraqi forces, and U.S., and British forces for control of such Shiite
cities as Diwaniyah, Karbala, Hilla, Nassiryah, Basra, Kut, and Amarah. This caused a
backlash among Iraqi Shiite civilians often victimized by the fighting, particularly August
2007 JAM- ISCI clashes in Karbala, and that month Sadr declared a six month
“suspension” of JAM activities. (He extended the ceasefire in February 2008 for another
six months.) The intra-Shiite fighting expanded as Britain drew down its forces the Basra
area from 7,000 to 4,000 in concert with a withdrawal from Basra city to the airport, and
the transfer of Basra Province to ISF control on December 16, 2007.
Assertions of Iranian Support to Armed Groups
Iran’s arming and training of Shiite militias in Iraq has added to U.S.-Iran tensions
over Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions, such as its aid to Lebanese Hezbollah
and the Palestinian organization Hamas, which now controls the Gaza Strip. Iran may be
seeking to develop a broad range of options in Iraq that includes pressuring U.S. and
British forces to leave Iraq, to bog down the United States militarily, and to deter it from
military or diplomatic action against Iran’s nuclear program. In August 2007, Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad heightened U.S. concerns by saying that Iran would fill
a “vacuum” that would be left by U.S. withdrawal. U.S. officials have, over the past few
years, provided specific information on Qods Force and Hezbollah aid to Iraqi Shiite
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militias. No firm information exists on how many Iranian agents are in Iraq, but one press
report has said there are 150 Qods and intelligence personnel in Iraq.1 Qods Force officers
often do not wear uniforms and their main role is not combat, but rather identifying Iraqi
trainees and organizing safe passage for weapons shipments into Iraq.
! On February 11, 2007, U.S. military briefers in Baghdad provided what
they said was specific evidence that Iran had supplied armor-piercing
“explosively formed projectiles” (EFPs) to Shiite (Sadrist) militiamen.
EFPs have been responsible for over 200 U.S. combat deaths since 2003.
In August 2007, Gen. Raymond Odierno, then the second in command
and who in September 2008 will become overall commander in Iraq, said
that Iran had supplied the Shiite militias with 122 millimeter mortars that
are used to fire on the Green Zone in Baghdad. (On July 10, 2008, the
Washington Post reported that pro-Sadr militias were now also using
“Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions” — bombs propelled by Iranian-
supplied 107 mm rockets.)
! On July 2, 2007, Brig. Gen. Kevin Begner said that Lebanese Hezbollah
was assisting the Qods Force in aiding Iraqi Shiite militias, an assertion
repeated several time subsequently. He added that Iran gives about $3
million per month to these Iraqi militias. He based the statement on the
March 2007 capture — in connection with a January 2007 attack that
killed five U.S. forces in Karbala — of former Sadr aide Qais Khazali
and Lebanese Hezbollah operative Ali Musa Daqduq.
! In his September 10 and 11, 2007, testimony to Congress — and repeated
in similar comments in testimony during April 8-9, 2008 — General
Petraeus said that the Qods Force is seeking to turn the “Special Groups”
— purportedly radical and possibly breakaway elements of the JAM —
into a “Hezbollah-like force to serve [Iran’s] interests and fight a proxy
war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces....” On October 7, 2007,
Gen. Petraeus told journalists that Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan
Kazemi-Qomi, is a member of the Qods Force.
According to testimony by General David Petraeus (overall U.S. commander in Iraq)
on April 8-9, 2008, Iran continues to arm, train, and direct the Special Groups, who are
attacking U.S. installations in Baghdad. That testimony was delivered amidst an ISF
offensive, launched by Maliki on March 26, 2008, to clear JAM and Fadhila militiamen
from Basra, particularly the port area which these militias controlled and used for their
own financial benefit. Maliki decided on the offensive in part to reduce Sadrist strength
in provincial elections planned for the fall of 2008. In the initial assault — which General
Petraeus called “poorly planned” — the ISF units (dominated by Badr loyalists) failed to
defeat the militias. At least 1,300 of the 7,000 ISF sent in for the assault (bringing the ISF
force to 30,000 in Basra) defected or refused to fight. Later, U.S. and British forces
intervened with air strikes and military advice helped the ISF eventually gain the upper
hand and restore relative normality. Sadr, who reportedly received Iranian aid during the
1 Linzer, Dafna. “Troops Authorized To Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post,
January 26, 2007.
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fighting, agreed to an Iran-brokered “ceasefire” on March 30, 2008, but not to disarm.
Some fighting and JAM rocketing of U.S. installations in Baghdad continued
subsequently, in some cases killing U.S. soldiers, and U.S. forces continued to fight JAM
elements in Sadr City until another Sadr-government agreement in mid-May 2008. In
responding to Maliki’s moves, Sadr: (1) announced on June 13, 2008 that most of the
JAM would now orient toward peaceful activities; (2) that a small corps of “special
companies” would be formed from the JAM to actively combat U.S. forces in Iraq; and
(3) in order to circumvent the government’s demand that the JAM be disbanded as a
condition for Sadrist participation in the provincial elections, the Sadr movement would
not offer a separate list for the fall 2008 provincial elections. The movement would
instead back technocrats and independents from other party lists.
Subsequently, the ISF moved into Amarah on June 16, 2008, and has quieted the
city, while prompting Sadrists protests about ISF arrests of the Amarah governor and
other Sadr supporters. Other arrests of pro-Sadrists have taken place in Sadr’s former
stronghold of Diwaniyah, the capital of Qadisiyah Province. The weakening of Sadr
facilitated the handed over of that province to Iraqi control in July 2008. Some accounts
say the successful ISF crackdowns have increased the political popularity of ISCI as Iraqi
Shiite citizens increasingly view it as dominant compared to Sadr’s faction.
Amid increasingly strong statements by U.S. military leaders about Iran’s “malign”
influence in Iraq, General Petraeus said in May 2008 there would be a U.S. briefing on
new information on Iranian aid to the JAM. The briefing has been postponed reportedly
at the request of Iraqi leaders who do not want to draw Iraq into a U.S.-Iran dispute. An
Iraqi parliamentary group visited Iran in April 2008 but to no obvious major result on this
issue; an Iraqi commission reportedly is investigating Iran’s aid to the JAM.
In moving to curb Qods Force activity in Iraq, from December 2006-October 2007,
U.S. forces arrested a total of 20 Iranians in Iraq, many of whom are alleged to be Qods
Forces officers. Of these, five were arrested in January 2007 in a liaison office in the
Kurdish city of Irbil. On November 9, 2007, the U.S. military released nine of them, and
another on December 20, but continue to hold ten believed of the most intelligence value.
On March 24, 2007, with U.S. backing, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1747 (on the Iran nuclear issue), with a provision banning arms exports by Iran
— a provision clearly directed at Iran’s arms supplies to Iraq’s Shiite militias and
Lebanese Hezbollah. In September 2007, the U.S. military said that, to stop the flow of
Iranian weaponry, it had built a base near the Iranian border in Wasit Province, east of
Baghdad. The base and related high technology border checkpoints are manned, in part,
by the 2,000 forces sent by Georgia. In July 2008, U.S. forces, in concert with U.S.
civilian border security professionals, established new bases near the Iran border in
Maysan Province, to increase pressure on Iranian smuggling routes into Iraq.
In an effort to financially squeeze the Qods Force, on October 25, 2007, the Bush
Administration designated the Qods Force (Executive Order 13224) as a provider of
support to terrorist organizations. On January 9, 2008, the Treasury Department took
action against suspected Iranian and pro-Iranian operatives in Iraq by designating them
as a threat to stability in Iraq under a July 17, 2007 Executive Order 13438. The penalties
are a freeze on their assets and a ban on transactions with them. The named entities are:
Ahmad Forouzandeh, Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters, who is
accused of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and of organizing training in Iran for Iraqi
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Shiite militia fighters; Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, the Iran-based leader of network that
funnels Iranian arms to Shiite militias in Iraq; and Isma’il al-Lami (Abu Dura), a Shiite
miltia leader — who has broken from the JAM — alleged to have committed mass
kidnappings and planned assassination attempts against Iraqi Sunni politicians. At the
same time, the Administration designated the Revolutionary Guard and several affiliated
entities and persons, under Executive Order 13382, as of proliferation concern. The
designations had the effect of freezing any U.S.-based assets of the designees and
preventing any transactions with them by U.S. persons, but neither the Guard or the Qods
Force was named a Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), as was recommended by
H.R. 1400, passed by the House on September 25, 2007, and the FY2008 defense
authorization bill (P.L. 110-181). The effect on the Qods Force and the Guard is likely
limited because they have few, if any, U.S.-based assets.
Efforts to Negotiate With Iran. The Administration has confronted Iran inside
Iraq in part to bolster diplomacy with Iran on the Iraq issue. The report of the Iraq Study
Group (December 2006) recommended that the United States include Iran (and Syria) in
multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq. Previously, U.S. officials had offered to engage Iran
on the issue, but U.S. officials opposed Iran’s efforts to expand discussions to bilateral
U.S.-Iran issues and no talks were held. In a shift that might have been caused by
Administration assessments that U.S. military and economic pressure on Iran was
increasing U.S. leverage, the United States attended regional conferences “Expanded
Neighbors Conference”) in Baghdad on March 10, 2007, in Egypt during May 3-4, 2007,
and in Kuwait on April 22, 2008. Secretary of State Rice and Iranian Foreign Minister
Mottaki held no substantive discussions at any of these meetings. As an outgrowth of the
regional meetings, the United States and Iran held bilateral meetings in Baghdad on the
Iraq issue, led by U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Iranian Ambassador
Kazemi-Qomi. The first was on May 28, 2007. A second round, held on July 24, resulted
in establishment of a working group to discuss ways to stabilize Iraq; it met for the first
time on August 6, 2007. In consideration of more recent assessments that Iran was
reducing its weapons shipments into Iraq, talks in Baghdad scheduled for December 18,
2007, were postponed because Iran wanted them at the ambassador level, not the working
group level. On May 6, 2008, Iran said it would not continue the dialogue because U.S.
forces are causing civilian casualties in the continuing Sadr City fighting.
Iranian Influence Over Iraqi Political Leaders
Iran has exercised substantial political and economic influence on the post-Saddam
Iraqi government, although Iran’s initiatives do not necessarily conflict with the U.S. goal
of reconstructing Iraq. During exchanges of high-level visits in July 2005, Iraqi officials
took responsibility for starting the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and indirectly blamed
Saddam Hussein for using chemical weapons against Iranian forces during that conflict.
During a related defense exchange, the two signed military cooperation agreements, as
well as agreements to open diplomatic facilities in Basra and Karbala and to begin
transportation and energy links (oil swaps, provision of cooking fuels and 2 million liters
per day of kerosene to Iraqis and future oil pipeline connections). In response to U.S.
complaints, Iraqi officials have said that any Iran-Iraq military cooperation would be
limited to border security, landmine removal, and information sharing. In 2005, Iran
extended Iraq a $1 billion credit line as well, some of which is being used to build roads
in the Kurdish north and a new airport near Najaf, a key entry point for the estimated
20,000 Iranian pilgrims visiting the Imam Ali Shrine there each month. The two countries
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have developed a free trade zone around Basra, which buys electricity from Iran, and Iraq
is now Iran’s second largest non-oil export market, buying about $2 billion worth of
goods from Iran during 2007. Iran has opened consulates in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah.
After the Maliki government took office on May 20, 2006, Iran’s Foreign Minister
Manuchehr Mottaki visited Iraq, during which Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari,
supported Iran’s right to pursue “peaceful” nuclear technology, while also stating that Iraq
does not want “any of [its] neighbors to have weapons of mass destruction.”2 Maliki
visited Iran during September 13-14, 2006, signing agreements to on cross border
immigration, intelligence sharing, and commerce, and threatening to expel the 3,400
members of the Iranian opposition group People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran
(PMOI), based in Iraq during Saddam’s rule and now confined by U.S.-led forces to a
camp (Ashraf) near the Iranian border. During Maliki’s visit to Iran during August 8-9,
2007, Iran pledged to curb aid to Shiite militias, and agreements were signed to build
pipelines between Basra and Iran’s city of Abadan to transport crude and oil products for
their swap arrangements; the agreement was finalized on November 8, 2007. In response
to Maliki’s invitation, Ahmadinejad visited Iraq, a first since the 1979 Islamic revolution,
on March 2-3, 2008. In conjunction, Iran announced $1 billion in credits for Iranian
exports to Iraq, and the two sides signed seven agreements for cooperation in the areas of
insurance, customs treatment, industry, education, environmental protection, and
transportation. In conjunction with another Maliki visit to Iran (June 8, 2008), Iran’s
Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i said that a U.S.-Iraq defense pact, under negotiation,
would perpetuate U.S. interference in Iraq. Additional defense agreements to cooperate
on mine clearance and searches for missing Iran-Iraq war soldiers were signed in the
course of that visit. In May 2008, Iran agreed to build more power lines into Iraq.
Prospects
Although Iranian influence is still extensive, some believe it is fading as Iraq asserts
its nationhood and as Arab-Persian differences reemerge. Iraq’s Najaf might also
eventually return to preeminence over Iran’s Qom as a Shiite theological center. Iraqi
Shiites generally stayed loyal to the Iraqi regime during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.
Although exchanges of prisoners and remains from the Iran-Iraq war are mostly
completed, Iran has not returned the 153 Iraqi military and civilian aircraft flown to Iran
at the start of the 1991 Gulf War, although it allowed an Iraqi technical team to assess the
aircraft in August 2005. Another dispute is Iran’s shelling of border towns in northern Iraq
that Iran says are the sites where the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), an Iranian
Kurdish separatist group, is staging incursions into Iran. However, most territorial issues
are resolved as a result of an October 2000 rededication to recognize the thalweg, or
median line of the Shatt al Arab waterway as the water border. (This was a provision of
the 1975 Algiers Accords between the Shah of Iran and the Baathist government of Iraq,
abrogated by Iraq prior to its September 1980 invasion of Iran.) The water border is
subject to interpretation, but the two sides agreed to renovate water and land border posts
during the March 2008 Ahmadinejad visit.
2 “Clarification Statement” issued by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari. May 29, 2006.