Order Code RL32593
Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
Updated July 24, 2008
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

---

Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
U.S.-Thailand relations are of interest to Congress because of Thailand’s status
as a long-time military ally and a significant trade and economic partner. The
currently-stalled proposed U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would
require implementing legislation to take effect. However, the ouster of Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by a military coup in September 2006 and subsequent
economic and political instability complicated bilateral ties. After parliamentary
elections in December 2007 returned many of Thaksin’s supporters to power, the
U.S. government lifted the restrictions on aid imposed after the coup and worked to
restore bilateral ties. Questions remain on how the U.S.-Thai relationship will fare
as Bangkok seeks political stability.
Despite differences on Burma policy and human rights issues, shared economic
and security interests have long provided the basis for U.S.-Thai cooperation.
Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military operations in both
Afghanistan and Iraq and was designated as a major non-NATO ally by President
Bush in December 2003. Thailand’s airfields and ports play a particularly important
role in U.S. global military strategy, including having served as the primary hub of
the relief effort following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The high-profile arrest of
radical Islamic leader Hambali in a joint Thai-U.S. operation in 2003 underscores
Thailand’s role in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. The U.S.-Thai bilateral trade total
in 2006 was over $30 billion.
Until the political turmoil of 2006 and 2007, Thaksin and his populist Thai Rak
Thai party had consolidated broad control of Thai politics. Following elections in
December 2007, new Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej has struggled to govern
effectively in the face of accusations that he is a puppet of Thaksin, who returned
from exile abroad. Like Thaksin, Samak has not been able to stem the violence of an
insurgency in the southern majority-Muslim provinces. A series of attacks by
insurgents and counter-attacks by security forces has reportedly claimed over 3,300
lives since January 2004.
With its favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand has
traditionally been considered among the most likely countries to play a major
leadership role in Southeast Asia and has been an aggressive advocate of increased
economic integration in the region. A founding member of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand maintains close ties with China and is
pursuing FTAs with a number of other countries. Given its ties with the United
States, Thailand’s stature in the region may affect broader U.S. foreign policy
objectives and prospects for further multilateral economic and security cooperation
in Southeast Asia. In the context of the Pentagon’s transformation and realignment
initiatives, current logistical facilities in Thailand could become more important to
U.S. strategy in the region. This report will be updated periodically.

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Conditions in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
December 2007 Election Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Prospects for Political Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Violence Continues in the Southern Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Background to the Current Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Thaksin and Surayud’s Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current Government’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Recent Patterns in the Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Little Evidence of Transnational Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thailand Politics and Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thaksin’s Rise and Fall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Military Coup Ousts Thaksin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
U.S. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Aftermath of the Coup: Thai Politics in Upheaval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
TRT Disbanded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Constitutional Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Concern About Eroding Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Thaksin’s Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Coup and Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
New Government Approach? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Support for U.S. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Asia Pacific Military Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Bilateral Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Military Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Counter-Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Human Rights Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A Difficult Road for U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
An Aggressive FTA Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Thailand in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Growing Ties with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Divergence with United States on Burma (Myanmar) Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Refugee Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ASEAN Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

---

List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2005-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

---

Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
Introduction
A long-time American ally in Asia, Thailand has continued to pursue close ties
to the United States as the political landscape of the region has evolved. Solidified
during the Cold War, the U.S.-Thai relationship strengthened on the basis of shared
economic and trade interests and was further bolstered after the September 11, 2001
attacks by a common commitment to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia. At the same
time, Thailand enjoys a strong economic and political relationship with China,
positioning itself as a potential battleground for influence in the region.
Thailand has been a significant partner for the United States and an important
element of U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific. Designated as a major non-
NATO ally in 2003, Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Thailand has been an active partner in the
U.S.-led war on terrorism, a role highlighted by the high-profile 2003 arrest of a
radical Islamic leader in a joint Thai-U.S. operation. Other bilateral cooperation on
transnational issues such as narcotics trafficking has reinforced Thailand’s standing
as a primary partner of the United States in maintaining stability in Southeast Asia.
With the suspension of U.S. military aid to Thailand following the military
coup, that cooperation was largely put on hold, although the annual Cobra Gold
multinational exercises went forward in May 2007. U.S. policymakers faced a
difficult balance of pressuring Bangkok to restore democracy and attempting to
maintain good relations with a key power in Southeast Asia that affects the stability
of the region as a whole. The restoration of a democratically elected government in
early 2008 provides a new platform on which to re-launch the U.S.-Thai relationship.
Suspended aid was reinstated in February 2008, but concerns remain on the stability
of the government in Bangkok and the ongoing violence in the southern provinces.
The start of negotiations in June 2004 for a U.S.-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) marked Thailand’s possible entry into the expanding American
web of trade pacts with political allies. The United States and Thailand exchanged
about $30 billion in total trade in 2006, a figure that was expected to rise if a
proposed free trade agreement (FTA) could be successfully concluded. However,
FTA negotiations had already been difficult, and they were suspended following the
political crisis that erupted in April 2006.

---

CRS-2
Political Conditions in Thailand
Politics in Thailand have been in a state of turmoil since early 2006, particularly
after a military coup ousted Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister in September
2006. The military government that seized power installed a civilian caretaker
government, which passed a constitutional referendum and held new parliamentary
elections in December 2007. Since then, new Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej has
struggled to govern effectively in the face of accusations that he is a puppet of
Thaksin, who returned to Thailand from exile in April 2008. Several ministers have
been forced to resign, including Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama, Thaksin’s
former lawyer. Prospects for a quick resolution appear dim, as over 20 court cases
involving Thaksin and his former party are pending.
December 2007 Election Results. On December 23, Thailand held its
first parliamentary elections since the military coup. (For details on the coup and
aftermath, see “Thailand Government and Politics” section below.) The results were
a resounding defeat for the military government that had ruled since the coup: the
People’s Power Party (PPP), the successor party to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
party, won 233 seats, only eight short of an outright majority in Thailand’s Lower
House. The military government-backed Democrat Party won 165 seats, with the
remaining seats divided between five smaller parties. On January 28, the new
parliament elected Samak Sundaravej to head a coalition government. A week later,
Samak announced his cabinet, which included several Thaksin loyalists. Samak,
although resisting the title of “puppet,” readily acknowledged — even promoted —
his close contact with the deposed leader.
U.S. Reaction. On February 6, 2008, the U.S. State Department announced
that Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte had certified to Congress that
Thailand had restored a democratically elected government, thereby removing legal
restrictions on assistance that had been imposed after the coup under Section 508 of
the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102). A statement from the
U.S. Ambassador said that funds were reinstated for programs that include the
International Military Exchange Training (IMET) programs, Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI).
Prospects for Political Stability
The PPP’s surprisingly strong electoral victory may have quelled some fears
about Thailand returning to a model of weak, short-lived coalition governments, but
deep fractures in Thai society remain. The interim government, appointed by the
military junta that seized power in the coup, had openly supported the Democrat
Party in the elections, but were soundly rebuffed by the Thai electorate, particularly
by voters from the rural and poorer areas of the country. The military and palace
loyalists, who largely opposed Thaksin, appear to have recognized a need for
stability, particularly to help revive an economy that has faltered with the political
uncertainty of the past few years. However, some analysts say that another coup in
the future is not an impossible scenario if the political elite feel threatened, as they
did by Thaksin. With Thaksin back in the country and rumors rife about his possible
return to politics, similar dynamics could develop once again.

---

CRS-3

Samak, a sometimes cantankerous figure known for his staunchly anti-
Communist views during the Cold War, faces a difficult balancing act in trying to
restore political stability to Thailand. He also serves as Minister of Defense, an
unusual but not unprecedented arrangement. Some observers speculate that this
indicates his desire to keep the military under close tabs, while others think it is an
attempt to avoid a power struggle among different factions of the military. His
cabinet selections have been criticized as being ill-prepared for their posts, possibly
a result of over 100 former TRT officials being banned from politics after the coup
by a junta-appointed court. Some observers say that the ruling party lacks policy
expertise because of the purging. Samak will likely face pressure to reverse the court
decision and reinstate the banned politicians.
Violence Continues in the Southern Provinces
Thailand has endured a persistent separatist insurgency in its majority-Muslim
southern provinces, which includes the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and
— to a lesser extent — Songhkla, while dealing with political instability in its
capital. Since January 2004, sectarian violence between insurgents and security
forces in Thailand’s majority-Muslim provinces has left over 3,300 people dead,
according to press reports. The groups that have led this surge in violence are
generally poorly understood, and their motives are difficult to characterize. Many
believe they are mostly focused on local autonomy, but even the Thai government
has poor understanding of the diverse groups active in the South. The successive
administrations have taken somewhat different approaches to curbing the violence
in the south, but none appear to have found a way to resolve the ongoing insurgency.
Background to the Current Conflict. The southern region has a history
of separatist violence, though the major movements were thought to have died out
in the early 1990s. Thai Muslims have long expressed grievances for being
marginalized and discriminated against, and the area has lagged behind the rest of
Thailand in economic development. The death toll of over 3,300 includes suspected
insurgents killed by security forces, as well as victims of the insurgents. This includes
both Buddhist Thais, particularly monks and teachers, and local Muslims.

After a series of apparently coordinated attacks by the insurgents in early 2004,
the central government declared martial law in the region. Moreover, a pattern of
insurgent attacks — targeted shootings or small bombs that claim a few victims at a
time and counter-attacks by the security forces — has developed. The pattern
crystallized into two major outbreaks of violence in 2004: on April 28, Thai soldiers
killed 108 insurgents, including 34 lightly armed gunmen in a historic mosque, after
they attempted to storm several military and police outposts in coordinated attacks;
and on October 25, 84 local Muslims were killed: 6 shot during an erupting
demonstration at the Tak Bai police station and 78 apparently asphyxiated from being
piled into trucks after their arrest. The insurgents retaliated with a series of more
gruesome killings, including beheadings, following the Tak Bai incident.
Thaksin and Surayud’s Approaches. The Thaksin government’s handling
of the violence was widely criticized as ineffective and inflammatory. Critics charged
that the Thaksin Administration never put forth a sustained strategy to define and

---

CRS-4
address the problem, that it repeatedly and arbitrarily shuffled leadership positions
of those charged with overseeing the region, and that it failed to implement adequate
coordination between the many security and intelligence services on the ground.
Under the military government, interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont took
a more conciliatory approach by publicly apologizing to Muslim leaders for past
government policies in the South and resurrecting a civilian agency responsible for
improving relations between the security forces, the government, and southern
Muslims that Thaksin had abolished. General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, leader of the
coup and the first Muslim commander of the Army, advocated negotiations with the
separatist groups as opposed to the more confrontational strategy pursed by Thaksin.
However, the violence increased in the months following the coup.1 Some analysts
said that a younger generation of more radicalized insurgents resisted the more
conciliatory approach of the new leadership in Bangkok. Criticism emerged that
Surayud’s policies were insufficiently implemented, law enforcement was unable to
effectively prosecute cases, and that intelligence coordination remained abysmal.
Current Government’s Approach. The Samak government has claimed
that the South is a priority, but critics maintain that his administration has not focused
adequate resources on the area as it has struggled to maintain its hold on power in
Bangkok. The region remains under martial law, which allows security forces to
arrest suspects without warrants and detain them for up to 30 days. Since June 2007,
a more concentrated counter-insurgency campaign know as “Operation Southern
Protection” had led to far more arrests, but many analysts see the mass arrests as
fueling local resentment. Daily violence had ebbed somewhat as a result of the
military crackdown, but observers note an increase in more lethal and bold attacks.
The Samak government has announced that it will try to curb the violence by
encouraging investment in the region as the poverty rate has increased and industries
have shut down.2 Human rights groups have continued to criticize the military for
its mistreatment of Muslim suspects; in March 2008, Human Rights Watch accused
the army of torturing an arrested Muslim cleric who later died in police custody.3

Recent Patterns in the Insurgency. Close observers note that attacks have
become more provocative, more deaths are caused by increasingly powerful
explosions, and the insurgents have directed more attacks at economic targets,
particularly those owned by ethnic Chinese. Some analysts describe a movement
increasingly driven by an Islamist agenda: the insurgents appear intent on driving a
harsher ideological line and labeling conciliatory Muslims as collaborators. Because
of the repeated attacks on state-run schools, many citizens have chosen to send their
children to private Islamic schools. The insurgents’ village-level network has
1 “Thailand’s Leaders Struggle for Solution as Separatists’ Violence Increases,” The New
York Times. February 26, 2007.
2 “Thailand to Encourage Investment in Restive South,” Dow Jones International News.
March 21, 2008.
3 “Thailand: Imam’s Killing Highlights Army Abuse in South,” from Human Rights Watch
webpage at [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/03/26/thaila18346.htm].

---

CRS-5
expanded, perhaps driving more local support.4 As the attacks have become more
sophisticated and coordinated, a climate of fear has developed and division along
religious lines has accelerated. According to some reports, 15% of the Buddhist
population has left the region.5
Little Evidence of Transnational Elements. Most regional observers
stress that there is no convincing evidence to date of serious Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces, and that the overall long-term
goal of the movement in the south remains the creation of an independent state with
Islamic governance. Many experts characterize the movement as a confluence of
different groups: local separatists, Islamic radicals, organized crime, and corrupt
police forces. They stress, however, that sectarian violence involving local Muslim
grievances provides a ripe environment for foreign groups to become more engaged
in the struggle. Some of the older insurgent organizations earlier were linked to JI,
have reportedly received financial support from foreign Islamic groups, and have
leaders who have trained in camps in Libya and Afghanistan. Despite these links,
foreign elements apparently have not engaged significantly in the violence.
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear. Identifying the groups directing the
insurgency has been challenging, but most analysis suggests that there is no one
organization with authority over the others. Some reports suggest that the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) has coordinated other groups that operate
largely autonomously. Other actors are older Islamist separatist groups, including the
Pattani United Liberation Organization (Pulo) and Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani
(GMIP). An organization called Bersatu at one point claimed to be an umbrella
grouping for all the insurgent factions, but appears to have very limited authority over
the disparate networks. The failure of the Thai government to establish an authority
with whom to negotiate limits its ability to resolve the conflict peacefully.
Thailand Politics and Government
The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form
of government, is marked by an important historical dissimilarity from its regional
neighbors. Although occupied by Japan during World War II, Thailand was the only
country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized by Europeans, and it also avoided
the wave of communist revolutions that took control of the neighboring governments
of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. Thailand followed a
troubled path to democracy, enduring a series of mostly bloodless coups and multiple
changes of government in its modern history. Although Thailand became a
constitutional monarchy in 1932, it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until
the early 1990s. A military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics during this
period, denying room for civilian democratic institutions to develop. Brief periods
of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s ended with reassertions of military rule. After
4 “Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,” International Crisis Group. March 15,
2007.
5 Zach Abuza, “Wake Up Call,” e-newsletter. March 20, 2007.

---

CRS-6
Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in demonstrations demanding an end to
military dominance of the government, international and domestic pressure led to
new elections in 1992. The 2006 coup was the first in 15 years.
Thailand’s government is composed of the executive branch (prime minister
as head of government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National
Assembly, and a judicial branch of three court systems. Until Thaksin’s election in
2001, the Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of reforms
that enhanced transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers, tackled
corruption, and introduced a broad range of constitutional rights. King Bhumiphol,
who has served since 1946, commands tremendous respect and loyalty from the Thai
public and continues to exercise influence over politics in Thailand.
Thaksin’s Rise and Fall. The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, formed by
Thaksin in 1999, benefitted politically from the devastation of the 1997 Asian
financial crisis on Thailand’s economy, and the subsequent loss of support for the
ruling Democrats. Thaksin’s populist platform appealed to a wide cross-section of
Thais, and many analysts contended that Thaksin and his party enjoyed power
unprecedented in modern Thai politics.6 In February 2005, the TRT won
parliamentary elections outright — a first in Thai politics — and swiftly dropped its
former coalition partners to form a single-party government.
Shortly after TRT’s impressive victory, however, Thaksin’s popularity faltered
due to a weak economy, corruption scandals involving Cabinet members, and his
failure to stem violence in the South. In early 2006, large public demonstrations
calling for his ouster gained momentum. The protestors, mostly members of the
urban, educated class, were reportedly unhappy with his authoritarian style, perceived
attacks on the free press, mishandling of the violence in the south, and most of all,
the tax-free sale of his family’s telecommunications firm to a Singapore state
company in a $1.9 billion deal that many suspected was not taxed because of
Thaksin’s clout.
Widespread protests led Thaksin to call for a new round of parliamentary
elections in April 2006. After a less-than-convincing victory by his Thai Rak Thai
(TRT) party in an election boycotted by the opposition, Thaksin resigned, then
quickly stepped back into power as a “caretaker” prime minister. After Thailand’s
king called for the courts to resolve the crisis, the Constitutional Court ruled the
elections invalid, and new elections were set for November 2006. Despite
widespread discontent with Thaksin among the country’s middle class and urban
dwellers, Thaksin’s strong support in rural areas was expected to propel the TRT to
a win in the elections.
Military Coup Ousts Thaksin
On September 19, 2006, Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi
Boonyaratglin led a bloodless military coup in Bangkok, ousting Thaksin and
6 See Ganesan, N. “Thaksin and the Politics of Domestic and Regional Consolidation in
Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 1 (April 2004).

---

CRS-7
declaring martial law. The coup was the 18th since the formation of the constitutional
monarchy in 1932, but the first in 15 years. The new leaders formed the Council for
Democratic Reform (CDR), later changing the name to the Council for National
Security (CNS). The revered King Bhumibol reportedly endorsed the takeover after
it occurred.
U.S. Response. Following the coup, U.S. officials faced the challenge of
expressing disapproval for the rollback of democracy while not sacrificing what
many view as a crucial relationship in the competition for influence with China in
Southeast Asia. Many observers saw the response as relatively mild. On September
28, 2006, the U.S. State Department announced the suspension of several assistance
programs under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L.
109-102): Foreign Military Financing (FMF, for defense procurement), International
Military Education Training funds (IMET, provides training to professionalize the
Thai military), and peace-keeping operation programs. Also suspended were funds
for counterterrorism and other operations appropriated under Section 1206 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006. The suspended programs totaled
over $29 million. Other programs deemed to be in the U.S. interest continued,
according to the State Department. After Surayud was appointed, U.S. Ambassador
Ralph Boyce was reportedly the first foreign diplomat to meet with him.
Aftermath of the Coup: Thai Politics in Upheaval
Under interim prime minister Surayud Chulanont, a former Army commander,
the ruling military government struggled to establish credibility and legitimacy in the
months that followed. Although Thaksin was formally indicted on charges of
corruption and abuse of power, no charges (part of the coup leaders’ justification for
usurping power) were proven, and a series of economic policy moves unnerved
investors. Thaksin remained out of Thailand, but highly visible in his international
travels.
TRT Disbanded. After the coup, the bureaucratic and military elite — with
the royal imprimatur — controlled Thailand, while the political parties appeared
marginalized and disorganized. Then, on May 30, 2007, a junta-appointed
constitutional tribunal ruled that the TRT must disband because it had violated
election laws in the April 2006 polls and that Thaksin and 110 party executives were
banned from politics for five years. The same day, the court acquitted the
Democratic Party of a series of other election violation charges, setting the stage for
a strong comeback by the opposition party. Many observers criticized the rulings as
further delaying the return to democracy by disenfranchising the most popular and
by far the largest political party in Thailand.
Constitutional Referendum. In August 2007, a nation-wide referendum on
the constitution drafted by a junta-appointed committee passed narrowly amid tepid
turnout. The constitution came under criticism for reversing many of the democratic
principles enshrined in the 1997 charter: under it, the number of parliamentary seats
are reduced, nearly half of the Senate is appointed by a panel of judges and
bureaucrats, and the coup leaders are granted amnesty. The document, designed to
prevent the emergence of a Thaksin-like strongman leader, may portend Thailand’s
return to a period of weak, unstable coalition governments.

---

CRS-8
Concern About Eroding Democracy
Thaksin’s Rule. During Thaksin’s rule, detractors consistently voiced
concern that his strongman style threatened Thailand’s democratic institutions.
Charges of cronyism and creeping authoritarianism grew louder as his political power
strengthened. Previously independent watchdog agencies reportedly weakened under
his watch,7 and some commentators alleged that Thaksin undermined anti-corruption
agencies by installing political loyalists to protect the business interests of his family
and members of his cabinet — sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin had a record
of appointing relatives and friends to prominent posts.8 Thaksin insisted that political
strength enhances development, citing Singapore’s economic success and lack of
political opposition as a model for Thailand to follow.9
Outside groups warned that press freedom has been squeezed in recent years,
documenting multiple cases in which critical journalists and news editors were
dismissed, and pointing to a libel suit against an outspoken editor filed by a
telecommunications corporation that Thaksin founded.10 Shin Corporation,
Thaksin’s family company, bought the only independent television station; the others
are owned by the government and armed forces.11 Human Rights Watch claims that
Thaksin stifled criticism from the media of his Administration’s controversial
policies, such as the deaths of over 2,000 individuals in the government-sponsored
“war on drugs.”12
Coup and Aftermath. By militarily ousting a democratically elected leader,
the coup itself raised obvious concerns about the democratic process in Thailand.
Much of the Thai press and some long-time Thai watchers embraced the notion that
the coup was necessary for Thailand to move forward; that is, that the military coup
represented less of a threat to Thai democracy than Thaksin’s perceived systematic
dismantling of the democratic system. In addition, much of the state’s apparatus,
including the key institutions of the parliament, the judicial branch, and watchdog
agencies, reportedly has been undermined in the past several years. Uncertainty
about the king’s succession compound the concern about Thailand’s ability to
preserve democratic structures and stability in the upcoming years. The 2006 State
Department Report outlines how the repeal of the 1997 constitution erodes legal
7 “Thaksin’s Way - Thailand’s Election,” The Economist. February 5, 2005.
8 “Thailand Risk: Alert — Corruption May Still Go Unchecked,” Economist Intelligence
Unit, July 19, 2004.
9 “One Party Rule: Opposition Does Not Need to Be Strong, Says PM,” The Nation
(Bangkok), August 10, 2004.
10 “Rights Group Says Libel Suit Deepens Assault on Thailand’s Media,” Agence France
Press, August 31, 2004.
11 “Thai Vote: Democratic Backslide?” Christian Science Monitor. February 4, 2005.
12 “Thailand: Libel Suit Deepens Assault on the Press,” Human Rights Watch. September
1, 2004.

---

CRS-9
protection of civil liberties and due process.13 Particularly strong criticism centers
on the military government’s restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
and freedom of the press, including internet sites critical of the coup.
New Government Approach? Although the transition back to democratic
rule has been relatively smooth to date, there are concerns among some democracy
activists about Samak’s record. Samak was a prominent figure in the 1992
government that cracked down on student protestors, and has been known to have a
rocky relationship with the media in Thailand. In addition, some fear he will re-
adopt Thaksin policies like the “war on drugs” that many critics say sanctioned extra-
judicial killings of suspected drug dealers.
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations
A Long-Standing Southeast Asian Ally
The military coup and subsequent suspension of military aid by the United
States threatened to derail the strong bilateral defense relationship. Following the
reinstatement of aid, Thai and U.S. military officials emphasized their commitment
to a smooth resumption of close military ties. Several of the programs listed below
were suspended under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
(P.L. 109-102). (See “U.S. Response” section.) In May 2007, the annual “Cobra
Gold” multinational military exercises went forward despite the suspension of several
other military cooperation programs.
The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), together with the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique, forms the basis of the
long-standing U.S.-Thai security relationship. Although SEATO was dissolved in
1977, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact, which calls for signatories to “act to meet the
common danger” in the event of an attack in the treaty area, remains in force.
Thailand is considered to be one of the major U.S. security allies in East Asia, along
with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines.
The U.S. security relationship with Thailand has a firm historical foundation
based on joint efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Persian
Gulf War. Thailand sent more than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations
Command during the Korean War, where the Thai force suffered over 1,250
casualties.14 A decade later, the United States staged bombing raids and rescue
missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand. During the Vietnam War, up
to 50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance poured into the
13 For full report, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78792.htm].
14 See [http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/allied.shtml] (official public access
website for Department of Defense Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean
War).

---

CRS-10
country to help Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.15 Thailand
also sent troops to South Vietnam and Laos to aid the U.S. effort. The close security
ties continued throughout the Cold War, with Thailand serving as solid anti-
Communist ally in the region. More recently, Thai ports and airfields played a
crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies to the theater
in both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.
In October 2003, President Bush designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO
ally,” a distinction which allows more access to U.S. foreign aid and military
assistance, including credit guarantees for major weapons purchases.16 An agreement
concluded with the United States in July 2001 allows Thailand to purchase advanced
medium-range air-to-air missiles for its F-16 fighters, a first for a Southeast Asian
state.17 Thaksin authorized the reopening of the Vietnam-era U.S. airbase in Utapao
and a naval base in Sattahip, from which the U.S. military can logistically support
forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East.
Thailand served as the logistics hub for much of the U.S. and international relief
effort after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for
the entire region were directed out of Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base.
Thailand immediately granted full U.S. access to the bases following the disaster.
Support for U.S. Operations. Thailand strengthened its partnership with the
United States by contributing troops to two American military operations and the
broader war on terrorism after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Thailand sent 130
soldiers, largely engineers, to Afghanistan to participate in the reconstruction phase
of Operation Enduring Freedom. Thai forces were responsible for the construction
of a runway at Bagram Airbase, medical services, and some special forces
operations.18 Although Thailand remained officially neutral during the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq, it contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by dispatching over
450 troops, including medics and engineers, to the southern city of Karbala. The
deployment proved unpopular with the Thai public, particularly after the deaths of
two soldiers in December 2003. In spring 2004, Thaksin threatened to withdraw the
troops early if the security situation continued to disintegrate and resisted U.S. calls
to postpone the withdrawal until after the January 2005 Iraqi elections. The
withdrawal was completed in September 2004.
Thailand reportedly provided a “black site” where U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency officials were allowed to secretly hold suspected terrorists. According to
15 The Eagle and the Elephant: Thai-American Relations Since 1833 (Bangkok: U.S. Agency
for International Development, 1997).
16 Under section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can designate a
non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization state as a major ally for the purposes of the Foreign
Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
17 Limaye, Satu P. “Minding the Gaps: The Bush Administration and U.S.-Southeast Asia,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 1 (April 2004).
18 “Thai Soldiers Help Rebuild Afghanistan,” The Nation (Thailand), July 4, 2003.

---

CRS-11
press reports, two major Al Qaeda figures captured in Pakistan were flown to
Thailand for interrogation by U.S. officials.19
Asia Pacific Military Transformation. The U.S. Department of Defense
initiative to transform and realign the U.S. military around the globe provides
potential opportunities for increased security cooperation with Thailand. Pentagon
planners are breaking with the quantitative assurance of keeping 100,000 troops on
the ground in East Asia in favor of a more mobile, capability-based force. In the past
few years, U.S. military planners have emphasized a “places, not bases” concept in
Southeast Asia in which U.S. troops can temporarily use facilities for operations and
training, without maintaining a lengthy and costly permanent presence. In a State
Department press release, a senior Defense Department official pointed to
cooperation with Thailand as an example of the military’s new approach, citing the
annual Cobra Gold exercises.20 Facilities used by the U.S. military in Thailand fall
under the Pentagon’s “cooperative security location” (CSL) concept, in which host
countries provide access in exchange for upgrades and other aid.21
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Security Assistance. The United States has provided funds for the purchase
of weapons and equipment to the Thai military through the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program. As a major non-NATO ally, Thailand also qualifies for
the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows for the transfer of used
U.S. naval ships and aircraft. The United States faces stiff competitors in the market
for foreign military sales in Thailand, particularly because other countries are more
willing to engage in barter trade for agricultural products.
Military Exercises. Training opportunities for U.S. forces in Thailand are
considered invaluable by the U.S. military. Thailand and the United States have
conducted over 40 joint military exercises a year, including Cobra Gold, America’s
largest combined military exercise in Asia. In the May 2007 exercises, about 3,000
Thai troops and 2,000 U.S. forces conducted humanitarian, civic action, and
peacekeeping missions. Nearly twenty other countries from Europe and Asia either
participated or acted as observers for the 2007 exercises.
Training. Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those
in top leadership positions throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have
received U.S. training under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program. Designed to enhance the professionalism of foreign militaries as
well as improve defense cooperation with the United States, the program is regarded
by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to achieve U.S. national
security goals.
19 “CIA Operates Secret Prisons Outside U.S.,” Wall Street Journal Asia. November 2, 2005.
20 “U.S. to Transform Military in Parallel with Allies — Capabilities Will Be Emphasized
Instead of Numbers of Troops,” State Department Press Releases and Documents. August
16, 2004.
21 Kaplan, Robert D., “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly. June 2005.

---

CRS-12
Intelligence. Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States
reportedly increased markedly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, culminating in
the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (known as the CTIC)
in 2001. The CTIC, which combines personnel from Thailand’s intelligence agency
and specialized branches of the military and armed forces, provides a forum for CIA
personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities and
information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials.22 Close
cooperation in tracking Al Qaeda operatives that passed through Thailand reportedly
intensified into active pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes.23 The
most public result of enhanced coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah
Islamiyah leader Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, outside of Bangkok in
August 2003. Other intelligence cooperation focuses on counter-narcotics or
specialized military intelligence.
Law Enforcement. In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) Bangkok was established to provide legal training for officials to combat
transnational crime.24 The center is open to government officials from any Southeast
Asian country, with the exception of Burma (Myanmar). ILEA Bangkok aims to
enhance law enforcement capabilities in each country, as well as to encourage cross-
border cooperation. Instruction for the courses is provided largely by the Royal Thai
Police, the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and various U.S. agencies,
including the Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Internal Revenue Service.25
Counter-Narcotics. Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand and the
United States has been extensive and pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok.
Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law enforcement agencies, in
conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty, has led to
many arrests of international drug traffickers. Specialized programs include the
establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. Special Forces train Thai units in
narcotics interdiction tactics.26
Human Rights Concerns
Some members of Congress and other U.S. officials have criticized Thailand’s
record on human rights. Thailand has neither signed the United Nations Convention
Against Torture nor joined the International Criminal Court. According to the 2006
22 Crispin, Shawn, and Leslie Lopez, “U.S. and Thai Agents Collaborate in Secret — Cold-
War-Style Alliance Strikes Jemaah Islamiyah Where It Least Expects It.” Asian Wall Street
Journal, October 1, 2003.
23 Ibid.
24 ILEA-Bangkok is one of four ILEAs in the world. The others are located in Hungary,
Botswana, and Roswell, New Mexico.
25 Course information from [http://www.ileabangkok.com].
26 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.

---

CRS-13
U.S. State Department Human Rights Report and to other NGOs’ accounts, the
excessive use of force by government security forces in the southern border provinces
continued in 2006, including the reported “disappearances” of Muslim citizens. The
failure to convict police officers of the suspected abduction and murder of prominent
Muslim activist and lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit has drawn particular fire. The State
Department reports that the new government’s Ministry of Justice opened
investigations of the approximately 1,300 extrajudicial killings during Thaksin’s
2003 “War on Drugs,” while Human Rights Watch puts the number at 2,500 and is
more harsh in its criticism of the failure to hold any officials accountable for the
deaths. The emergency decree on administrative rule announced in summer 2005
alarmed international rights groups: the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
among others, has voiced concern that the executive order and other developments
were undermining Thailand’s democratic process and human rights record.27
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations
As a major recipient of foreign direct investment, and with merchandise exports
making up over half of its GDP, Thailand’s economy depends heavily on its trading
partners. The political uncertainty following the coup slowed GDP growth to 4.8%
in 2007. Economic relations with the United States are central to Thailand’s
outward-looking economic strategy. USTR reports that in 2006 U.S. goods exports
to Thailand totaled $8.2 billion, and corresponding U.S. imports from Thailand
amounted to $22.5 billion. Thailand is currently the 24th largest export market for
U.S. goods. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the United States
invested $8.6 billion in Thailand in 2005 and over 95,000 Thai nationals are on the
payrolls of U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates.
After taking office, the military government came under criticism from the
foreign business community for imposing currency controls (later partially reversed)
and introducing a bill that would restrict foreign ownership of Thai companies. The
amendment to the law affecting foreign business ownership, stemming from the
negative reaction to the sale of Thaksin’s family telecommunications company to a
Singaporean state-owned enterprise, will reportedly exclude several sectors.
International drug companies have reacted negatively to a government decision to
issue compulsory licenses to develop generic versions of patented HIV/AIDS drugs.
The PPP has promised to remove all capital controls that were imposed by the
interim government in order to encourage international investment.

A Difficult Road for U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations
Bilateral FTA negotiations were suspended by Thailand when the political crisis
erupted in April 2006. Following the coup, U.S. officials said that the FTA could not
go forward without a return to democratic rule. Even before the suspension of talks,
many analysts said that the prospects for an FTA were severely diminished.
Although studies indicate that a U.S.-Thailand FTA would increase trade and
27 See the Office of United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights website at
[http://www.ohchr.org/english/].

---

CRS-14
investment for both countries and yield net benefit for Thailand, negotiations must
address a list of challenging issues to reach a successful conclusion. The agreement
sought by the United States is the most comprehensive of the multiple FTAs
Thailand has attempted; the agenda includes issues such as intellectual property
rights, investment, environment, labor rights, textiles, telecommunications,
agriculture, electronic commerce, and government procurement.28
In the six rounds of talks held, market access for sugar, rice, and trucks are
among the thorniest of the differences between the two sides. Further, some sources
have speculated that Thaksin launched negotiations without consulting adequately
with the bureaucracies in charge of the controversial areas. The sixth round of
negotiations in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in January 2006 were marked by slow
progress, disruptions by thousands of protestors, and the resignation of the chief Thai
negotiator following the meetings. Even before the suspension of talks, many
analysts said that the prospects for an FTA were severely diminished.
An Aggressive FTA Strategy
Thailand has aggressively pursued FTAs with countries other than the United
States in its campaign to expand trading opportunities. Agreements have been signed
with Bahrain, China, Peru, Australia, Japan, and India. Further deals are possible
with New Zealand, South Korea, Chile, and the European Union (EU). Thailand has
championed ASEAN regionalism, seeing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA,
among ASEAN countries only) as a vehicle for investment-driven integration which
will benefit Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.29 Many observers see
Thailand’s pursuit of FTAs as an indication of its shift away from a multilateral
approach, such as working through the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
toward a bilateral or regional approach.
Thailand in Asia
Although the coup’s impact did not include any widespread violence or
precipitous economic losses, there are concerns about longer-term repercussions for
Southeast Asia. Thailand is important to the region because of its large economy
and, until the coup, its relatively longstanding democratic rule. Regional observers
fear that the loss of Thailand as a stabilizing presence could hurt democratic efforts
in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Southeast Asia is considered
by many Asian experts to be a key arena of soft power competition between the
United States and China: the loss of a democratic government, as well as any
resulting friction with the United States, could be considered an opening for closer
Sino-Thai relations.
28 “Ives to Leave USTR to Take Position in Medical Trade Association,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 16, 2004.
29 Chirathivat, Suthiphand, and Sothitorn Mallikamas, “Thailand’s FTA Strategy: Current
Developments and Future Challenges,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 21, no. 1 (April
2004).

---

CRS-15
The clout of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be
affected as well. Thailand was a founding member of ASEAN, and, previous to his
political troubles, Thaksin was considered to be poised to provide crucial leadership
for the organization. Thailand has been an aggressive advocate of increased
economic integration in the region: Singapore and other developed economies may
fear that any domestic weakening in Thailand could set back those efforts as well.
Growing Ties with China
Sino-Thailand ties, historically far closer than Beijing’s relations with most
other Southeast Asian states, have continued to strengthen. Bilateral trade and
positive relations have boomed over the past decade, particularly under Thaksin’s
business-oriented, engagement approach toward the rest of Asia that de-emphasized
human rights and democracy. Even while re-asserting its alliance with the United
States, Thailand has continued to court China, including signing agreements on
technology, environmental protection, and strategic cooperation.
Military-to-military ties increased through both exchanges and arms sales: China
exports major weapons and military equipment to Thailand, a practice that originated
in the 1980s when both countries supported Cambodian resistance groups, including
the Khmer Rouge, against the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh.
Many analysts saw the suspension of several U.S. military programs following the
coup as an opportunity for China to expand its influence in the Thai defense
establishment. China participated as an observer for the first time in the May 2008
Cobra Gold exercises, and in July Thailand and China staged a joint anti-terrorism
exercise.
Thailand’s strong relationship with China is based on a history far less
antagonistic than Beijing’s past with many other ASEAN countries. After the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, Bangkok pursued a strategic alignment with Beijing in
order to contain Vietnamese influence in neighboring Cambodia. Bangkok restored
diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, far before other Southeast Asian nations.
Thailand also has no territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, unlike
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The sizeable overseas Chinese population
in Thailand assimilated relatively easily and became a strong presence in the business
world, and eventually in the political arena as well. Thai companies were among the
first to explore investment opportunities after the Chinese economy opened up in the
late 1970s, pursuing ventures with China’s state-run enterprises. As other regional
powers tentatively began to explore commercial relationships with China, investment
from Sino-Thai companies flourished in the 1990s, fueling a rebirth of interest in
Chinese language and culture in Thailand.30
Given the simultaneous emphasis on building close relationships with the
United States and China, Thailand’s foreign policy could be construed as a classic
hedging strategy designed to avoid dominance by any one power. Some analysts
suggest that Bangkok’s embrace of China indicates a slow move away from the Cold
30 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Sino Chic: Suddenly, It’s Cool to Be Chinese,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, January 11, 1996.

---

CRS-16
War reliance on the United States, despite enhanced cooperation in the war on
terrorism, and could be an indicator of how Southeast Asia will deal with China’s
increasing influence.31
Divergence with United States on Burma (Myanmar) Policy
Bangkok’s approach toward Burma has long been seen as conflicting with U.S.
policy. While the United States has pursued strict economic and diplomatic
sanctions against the regime, Thailand has led ASEAN’s “constructive engagement”
initiative, which favors integration and incentives to coax Burma into reform.32 For
Thailand, this policy minimizes the danger of a large-scale military struggle and
expands Thai business opportunities in Burma. Thailand has been criticized for
supporting the junta through substantial trade, particularly in natural gas. As
international groups struggled for access to Burma to provide humanitarian relief
following the cyclone, Burma granted Thai officials and aid workers entry.
Thailand’s relationship with Burma grew closer under Thaksin’s administration.
During the 1990s, Thailand voiced harsh criticism of the military junta ruling Burma,
particularly its crackdown on the National League for Democracy, the opposition
party led by democratic activist Aung San Su Kyi. Thailand also has chafed at the
huge inflow of illegal drugs from Burma. But the Thaksin government placed special
emphasis on maintaining normal relations with Burma, even as European countries
tightened sanctions and other Southeast Asian countries distanced themselves from
Rangoon.
Some congressional leaders also have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of
Burmese refugees, migrant workers, and political dissents living in Thailand. Backed
by human rights groups’ reports, some U.S. lawmakers have leveled charges of
arrests and intimidation of Burmese political activists, as well as the repatriation of
Burmese who seek political asylum.33 In the past, Congress has passed legislation
that provides money to refugees who fled Burma, particularly those in Thailand.34
Refugee Situation
Thailand has long been a magnet for economic and political refugees,
particularly from the neighboring countries of Laos, Cambodia, and, most
prominently, Burma. Displaced populations of ethnic minorities from Southeast Asia
have sought refuge across Thailand’s long borders, often attracted by relatively loose
immigration controls and often lenient treatment by Thai authorities. A strong
network of international humanitarian organizations exists in Thailand to provide
assistance to these populations. However, successive Thai governments have
31 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Catching the Dragon’s Tail: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st
Century,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 25, no. 1 (April 2003).
32 See CRS Report RL33479, Burma-U.S. Relations, by Larry A. Niksch.
33 See Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy Toward Burmese Refugees and Migrants,
Human Rights Watch Report, released February 2004.
34 H.R. 4818, Foreign Operations Appropriations, Section II, Bilateral Assistance.

---

CRS-17
expressed frustration with this continuing presence and periodically have clamped
down on the incoming asylum seekers. Often this response relates to Bangkok’s
wish to maintain strong political relationships with other regional governments.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that
over three decades around three million asylum seekers have sought refuge in
Thailand. Burmese refugees in Thailand come from a variety of ethnic groups that
have fled attacks on their villages by the Burmese army and warlords. As of
November 2006, 140,000 refugees from Burma live in the camps recognized by the
Thai government along the Thai-Burma border and 1,000 asylum seekers are thought
to be in urban areas. Thailand has been generally cooperative in helping refugees,
but does not want to become an indefinite host, nor does it want to absorb those
Burmese who do not qualify as refugees. Moreover, the camps were intended for
temporary use and are not considered suitable for permanent inhabitation. The Thai
government views Burma as presenting the most immediate source of refugee
problems. Another 200,000 refugees and asylum seekers representing groups (many
of them Hmong refugees from Laos) live elsewhere in the country. In addition,
Thailand’s reputation for relative tolerance for refugees, as well as crackdowns in
other recipient countries, has attracted an increasing number of North Korean
asylum-seekers.
ASEAN Relations
Thailand’s “local” foreign policy with fellow Southeast Asian nations who make
up ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam,
Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia) consists of a web of complicated relations.
As one of the largest and most economically developed of the ASEAN countries
(including having the largest volume of trade), Thailand has much to gain for
promoting ASEAN’s significance in global affairs. With its favorable geographic
location and broad-based economy, Thailand has traditionally been considered
among the most likely countries to play a major leadership role in Southeast Asia and
has been an aggressive advocate of increased economic integration in the region.
Bangkok has developed strong relations with its Indochina neighbors through
infrastructure assistance and other aid. In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia provide
raw materials, inexpensive manufacturing, and expanding markets for Thailand.
Particularly under Thaksin, Thailand pursued enhanced relations with Singapore
based on a common interest in liberalizing trade and with the Philippines centered
on a mutual interest in combating terrorism. Former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs
Surin Pitsuwan currently serves as ASEAN Secretary General.
Despite cooperative elements, Bangkok’s relations with its neighbors are often
characterized by tension and diplomatic spats. Intermittent tension with Cambodia
re-ignited recently over competing territorial claims of Preah Vihear, a temple
situated along the Thai-Cambodian border. Relations with Singapore were disturbed
by the sale of Thaksin’s family firm Shin Corporation to Singapore’s Temasek
Holdings in 2006: the tax-free sale angered many Thais and played a role in
Thaksin’s downfall. Relations with Malaysia have been complicated by an
insurgency since 2004 in Thailand’s majority-Muslim southern provinces, which
border Malaysia. Many Thai Muslims are ethnically Malay and speak Yawi, a Malay
dialect, and at times the Malaysian public has grown angry at the perceived violence

---

CRS-18
against Muslims in Thailand. Although successive Thai administrations have
pursued cooperative agreements to help curb the violence, relations have remained
uncertain as the violence continues.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2005-2009
(thousands of dollars)
FY2008
FY2009
Account
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 estimate
request
CSH
0
0
1,400
992
1,000
DA
0
0
0
0
4,500
ESF
992
990
990
0
0
FMFa
1,488
1,485
0
149
800
IMETa
2,526
2,369
0
1,142
1,400
INCLE
1,608
990
900
1,686
1,400
NADR
1,782
3,989
2,100
2,483
2,000
Peace Corps
2,143
2,212
2,144
2,278
—
Totals
10,539
12,035
7,534
8,730
11,100
Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID.
Notes: CSH = Child Survival Health; DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support
Funds; FMF = Foreign Military Sales Financing; IMET = International Military Education and
Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining, & Related.
a. These programs were suspended on September 28, 2006, under Section 508 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) and resumed on February 6, 2008.

---

CRS-19
Figure 1. Map of Thailand
CHINA
VIETNAM
MYANMAR
LAOS
Phitsanulok
Nakhon
Sawan
THAILAND
Ubon
Ratchathani
Nakhon
Ratchasima
KAMPUCHEA
Andaman Sea
Gulf of Thailand
Phuket
Hat
Pattani
Yai
Narathiwat
Yala
Strait of
South China
Malacca
MALAYSIA
INDONESIA
Sea
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 3/23/04)

---