Order Code RL33627
NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of
the Transatlantic Alliance
Updated July 18, 2008
Paul Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Vincent Morelli
Analyst in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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NATO in Afghanistan:
A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance
Summary
The mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan
is a test of the alliance’s political will and military capabilities. The allies intended
to create a “new” NATO, able to go beyond the European theater and combat new
threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Afghanistan is NATO’s first “out-of-area” mission beyond Europe. The purpose of
the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mission is a
difficult one because it must take place while combat operations against Taliban
insurgents continue. Recent assessments of the current situation in Afghanistan point
to a rise in the overall level of violence due to increased Taliban military activity and
an increase in terrorist-related activities including, suicide bombings.
U.N. Security Council resolutions govern NATO’s responsibilities. The NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces formidable obstacles:
shoring up a weak government in Kabul; using military capabilities in a distant
country with rugged terrain; and rebuilding a country devastated by war and troubled
by a resilient narcotics trade. NATO’s mission statement lays out the essential
elements of the task of stabilizing and rebuilding the country: train the Afghan army,
police, and judiciary; support the government in counter-narcotics efforts; develop
a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban.
ISAF has proceeded in four stages to extend its area of responsibility over the
whole of Afghanistan. ISAF’s principal mechanism to rebuild Afghanistan is the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). PRTs, composed of military and civilian
officials, are charged with extending the reach of the Afghan government by
improving governance and rebuilding the economy. There are significant differences
in how individual NATO governments run their PRTs.
Although the allies agree on ISAF’s mission, they differ on how to accomplish
it. Increasing turmoil in Pakistan has complicated the effort to prevent the Taliban
from infiltrating Afghanistan. Some allies do not want their forces to engage in
combat operations. None, except the United States, wants to engage directly in
destruction of poppy fields in countering the drug trade.
The 110th Congress has supported most Administration policies in Afghanistan,
but wishes to see a more coherent plan for integration, stabilization, and
reconstruction operations. In June 2008, Congress appropriated $31 billion for the
conflict in Afghanistan.
Most observers predict that ISAF’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require
five years or more. An exit strategy has multiple components: suppressing the
Taliban; rebuilding the economy; and cajoling Afghan leaders to improve
governance. U.S. leadership in Afghanistan may well affect NATO’s cohesiveness,
credibility and its future. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Stages One and Two: Evolution of NATO in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Purpose of the Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
National Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Counter-Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Stages Three and Four: Establishing Mission and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Mission Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Difficulties in Raising Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Disagreements over Treatment of Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Command Structure: Coordinating ISAF and OEF Operations . . . . . . . . . . 15
Allied Viewpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Germany: Rebuild but Avoid Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Netherlands: An Increasingly Decisive Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The United States, Britain, and Canada: A Broad Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
France: Combat and Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

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NATO in Afghanistan:
A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance
Introduction
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is seen as a test of the allies’ military
capabilities and their political will to undertake a complex mission. Since September
11, 2001, the allies have sought to create a “new” NATO, able to go beyond the
European theater and combat new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NATO is seeking to be “global” in its
geographic reach and in the development of non-member partner states that assist in
achieving an agreed mission. This change in overall mission reflects a NATO
consensus that the principal dangers to allied security lie distant from the treaty area
and require new political tools and military capabilities to combat them.
Two military operations in Afghanistan seek to stabilize the country. Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) is a combat operation led by the United States against the
Taliban and al Qaeda remnants, primarily in the eastern and southern parts of the
country along the Pakistan border. OEF is not a NATO operation, although many
coalition partners are NATO members. Approximately 20,000 troops are in OEF,
including approximately 18,000 U.S. forces.1 The second operation is the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), established by the international
community in 2002 to stabilize the country. NATO assumed control of ISAF the
following year. By July 2008, ISAF had an estimated 52,700 troops from 40
countries, with NATO members providing the core of the force. The United States
has approximately 14,800 troops in ISAF2.
NATO’s effort in Afghanistan is the alliance’s first “out-of-area” mission
beyond Europe. The purpose of the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction
of Afghanistan. Although NATO has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction
missions before, for example in Kosovo, the scope of the undertaking in Afghanistan
is considerably more difficult. Taliban and al Qaeda remnants are resisting the
operation, Afghanistan has never had a well-functioning central government, and the
distance from Europe and the country’s terrain present daunting obstacles.
Reconstruction must therefore take place while combat operations, albeit often low-
level, continue. And although the allies agree upon a general political objective,
some have differing interpretations how to achieve it.
1 See CRS Report RS22633, U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, by JoAnne Bryan and Michael
Waterhouse.
2 Note: The number of “boots-on-the-ground” are approximations due to regular unit
rotations and the different ways in which the U.S. Joint Staff and ISAF account for
personnel.

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CRS-2
The mission in Afghanistan is likely to be important for NATO’s future, and for
U.S. leadership of the alliance. The European allies insisted that a U.N. resolution
govern NATO’s mission to give legitimacy to the insertion of allied troops in
Afghanistan. This important political requirement was achieved in August 2003.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1776 adopted in September 2007 extended the
U.N. mandate until September 2008. Over the past several years, NATO
governments have also repeatedly pledged to develop capabilities making their forces
more expeditionary and “deployable.” The mission in Afghanistan provides a hard
test of these capabilities. Several key NATO members, above all the United States,
have insisted that the allies must generate the political will to counter the greatest
threats to their security. Again, Afghanistan provides a test of will against the
concrete danger of international terrorism.
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan also tests U.S. leadership of the alliance. Some
allies question whether the United States will distance itself from inhumane practices
reportedly used in U.S. military-run prisons; and whether the U.S. commitment to the
interests of the allies preserves the mutual sense of obligation that once more clearly
characterized the alliance. The allies also believe that the United States, as a global
power, must provide leadership and resources to counter the destabilizing influences
upon Afghanistan of two neighboring states, Iran and Pakistan.
A highly respected German Marshall Fund poll has found a sharp decline in
European public opinion towards U.S. leadership since 2002. In key European
countries, the desirability of U.S. leadership in the world fell from 64% in 2002 to
36% in June 2007; the approval rating of President Bush in these same countries fell
from 38% in 2002 to 17% in 2007. Thus far in 2008, these figures have continued to
hold firm. U.S. policy in Iraq is the principal cause of this decline.3 This decline is
complicating the effort of allied governments to sustain support for the ISAF
mission. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave credence to the political
ramifications of the Iraq war when he said in February 2008, “I worry that for many
Europeans the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are confused.... Many of them...have
a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan.”4
Afghanistan continues to present a growing challenge to NATO. Over the past
two years, Taliban attacks have increased in scope and number, and Taliban fighters
are adopting some of the tactics, such as roadside bombs, used by insurgents in Iraq.
In fact, according to a study by the Afghanistan Study Group, the year 2007 was the
deadliest for American and international troops in Afghanistan since the 2001
invasion of Afghanistan.5 In addition to increased insurgent activity, terrorist violence
has increased since the beginning of 2008. In February, a terrorist bomb killed over
70 civilians and police officers near Kandahar. In April an assassination attempt was
carried out against President Karzai and in June a Taliban-led attack on a prison in
3 Transatlantic Trends, German Marshall Fund, September 2007, p. 5-7.
4 “Gates asks Europeans to face Afghan threat,” International Herald Tribune, Be. 9-10,
2008, p. 3.
5 “Revitalizing our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies”, Report of the Afghanistan Study
Group, Center for the Study of the Presidency, January 30, 2008, p.17.

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Kandahar resulted in the release of several hundred Taliban inmates. On July 13, a
Taliban attack on a joint U.S.-Afghan outpost along the eastern border with Pakistan
resulted in the death of 9 U.S. troops. This attack was the deadliest against U.S.
forces in Afghanistan since 2005.
The Karzai government in Afghanistan is coming under international criticism,
and its public support has diminished, due to corruption and an inability to improve
living conditions. Some warlords continue to exert influence, and the narcotics
industry remains an entrenched threat to the country’s political health.6 The allies are
not in full agreement on how to counter these problems, but allied officials say that
they need a strong and reliable Afghan government to provide reasonable services
and competence to the population if NATO is to succeed.
Turmoil in neighboring Pakistan has complicated ISAF’s mission. The
assassination of presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, possibly
by Islamic extremists, led to increasing internal restiveness against President Pervez
Musharraf, widely criticized by NATO governments as unable or unwilling to stem
Taliban movement across the Pakistan border into Afghanistan. The new Pakistani
government, in an effort to bring internal stability to Pakistan, had struck a deal with
Islamic militants in western Pakistan, and sharply reduced military operations against
the Taliban, a step criticized by many as opening the door to greater Taliban freedom
to move across the border into Afghanistan. Since then, the new government has
dispatched several paramilitary units to the border region to patrol for insurgents
crossing into Afghanistan. However, these units are restricted from carrying out
military operations against the insurgents. NATO military officials believe that the
Pakistani army remains trained to fight a conventional conflict against India, and not
a war against insurgents.7
In another development, intelligence sources suggest that there has been an
increase in the number of pro-al Qaeda foreign militants arriving in Pakistan from
Iraq and other places in the Middle East. These sources believe these new arrivals
are destined to join Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.
The 110th Congress has largely supported Administration policy in Afghanistan,
but a range of congressional committees in the first session called on the
Administration to develop a more coherent plan to coordinate ISAF’s stabilization
and reconstruction efforts. As a first step, the Bush Administration led an effort
before NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 to develop a “strategic vision” paper
for Afghanistan that would lay out a rationale for the mission and could be used to
garner more public support for ISAF. The paper made four principal points: the
allies promised a “long-term commitment” to Afghanistan; expressed support to
improve the country’s governance; pledged a “comprehensive approach” to bring
6 For an overview and analysis of key issues in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
7 Interviews with NATO officials, February-May 2008.

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civil and military efforts to effect stabilization; and promised increased engagement
with Afghanistan’s neighbors, “especially Pakistan.”8
The paper represented some strides in bringing together allied views, but it also
masked some important differences. It committed the allies to an indefinite period
of time to stabilize Afghanistan, something that several allies had previously resisted.
The paper, however, did not commit governments to pledge more forces; rather, the
phrase “comprehensive approach” is seen by some observers as a euphemism for
equating the importance of reconstruction and combat. Some governments believe
that the military commitment remains paramount if security in the country is to
improve so that reconstruction may proceed throughout Afghanistan. The paper also
did not present a plan for engaging Pakistan or Iran; instead, the allies will continue
to do so bilaterally, an approach that has not thus far yielded success in stemming the
flow of arms or fighters into Afghanistan.9
This report follows the path of NATO’s evolution in Afghanistan. The first
section covers the initial two stages of ISAF’s mission, and analyzes key issues in the
mission: use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to stabilize and rebuild the country;
overcoming caveats placed by individual allies on the use of their forces; and
managing the counter-narcotics effort. The next section of the report examines stages
three and four of the ISAF mission which cover roughly the period December 2005
to the present. In this section, the debate to develop a refined mission statement and
a new organizational structure is analyzed by looking at issues that are both political
and military, such as securing more troops, the treatment of prisoners, and
organization of command. By late 2006 as ISAF extended its responsibilities to
cover all of Afghanistan, the allies began to realize that ISAF would require a greater
combat capability than originally believed, and the mission began to change. This
adjustment in mission is discussed through the perspective of several key allies. The
final section of the report assesses ISAF’s progress to date.
Stages One and Two: Evolution of NATO in
Afghanistan
Purpose of the Mission
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001. Led by the United
States, the ISAF mission was initially limited to Kabul. The United Nations, at the
request of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, then asked for NATO’s participation.
NATO took over command of ISAF in Afghanistan in August 2003. The Security
Council passed the currently governing resolution, Res. 1776, on September 17,
2007, to run for one year. Like its predecessors, it calls upon NATO to disarm
militias, reform the justice system, train a national police force and army, provide
security for elections, and combat the narcotics industry. The resolution does not
8 “ISAF’s Strategic Vision,” NATO summit, Bucharest, April 3, 2008, p. 1.
9 Interviews with officials from European governments and U.S. specialists, April 2008.

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provide details of how NATO should accomplish these tasks; rather, the allies among
themselves, in consultation with the Afghan government, have refined the
resolution’s provisions into active policy. The International Security Assistance
Force includes troops from all 26 member states of the NATO alliance as well as
several non-NATO nations, such as Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and Jordan.
Over time, NATO commanders have laid out four stages designed to bring all
of Afghanistan under NATO’s operational responsibility. In Stage One in 2003-2004,
NATO moved into the northern part of the country; French and German forces
predominate in these areas. Stage Two began in May 2005, when NATO moved into
western Afghanistan; Italian and Spanish forces are the core of the NATO force
there. These sections of the country are relatively stable. Stage Three began in July
2006 when ISAF moved into the volatile southern region of Afghanistan, where U.S.,
British, Canadian, and Dutch forces predominate. Stage Four began in October 2006,
when ISAF extended its geographic area of responsibility to include the entire
country.
There are approximately 30,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan not under ISAF
command. These forces will simultaneously continue to engage in a wide array of
counter-insurgency (COIN) activities as well as in training and mentoring Afghan
National Security forces.
Issues
From the beginning of NATO’s command of ISAF, political leaders and local
commanders have had to deal with several significant issues which have influenced
the implementation of the ISAF mission.
National Caveats
At the outset, NATO leaders faced considerable difficulty persuading some
member states to contribute forces to ISAF. An additional problem has been how
some of those forces provided would actually operate once deployed. Some allies
have committed forces to the NATO operation, then imposed restrictions —
“national caveats” — on tasks those forces could undertake. These restrictions, for
example, may prohibit forces from engaging in combat operations or from patrolling
at night due to a lack of night-vision equipment.10 In another example, some
governments do not permit their forces to be transferred to other parts of
Afghanistan. It is reported that almost half the forces in ISAF have some form of
caveats. Caveats pose difficult problems for force commanders, who seek maximum
flexibility in utilizing troops under their command. NATO commanders have
willingly accepted troops from some 40 governments but have had to shape the
mission to fit the capabilities of and caveats on those troops.

NATO commanders have long sought to minimize the number of caveats on
forces dedicated to ISAF, an effort that has met with mixed success. In September
2006, former NATO SACEUR General James Jones expressed frustration at the
10 Interviews of NATO officials, February 2006.

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limitations that some allies place on their troops. “It’s not enough,” he said, “to
simply provide forces if those forces have restrictions on them that limit them from
being effective.”11
At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, allied political leaders
sought to reduce the caveats placed on forces in Afghanistan. The United States,
Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands which have forces in the highly unsettled areas
of southern and eastern Afghanistan, continue to appeal to other governments to
release combat forces to assist them in moments of danger. Some progress has been
made over time in persuading NATO members to adopt more flexible rules of
engagement. The French government reduced its caveats and agreed to allow its
forces in Kabul and elsewhere come to the assistance of other NATO forces in an
emergency. Germany has allowed its forces to respond in emergency situations. The
Italian and Spanish governments said that their force commanders in the field could
make the decision to send forces to assist in an urgent situation. It remains unclear
whether and when these commanders would have to request permission from their
capitals to do so, a complicating factor that could delay a decision. Turkey, in
contrast, has not changed its proscription against its forces’ use in combat.
At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO countries again pledged to
continue to work to remove the limitations placed on their troops. Some allies have
singled out Germany for special criticism, given that Germany has a large contingent
of 3,300, most of which are deployed troops in a relatively quiet area of northern
Afghanistan. German troops reportedly patrol only in armored personnel carriers,
and do not leave their bases at night.12 This has led some to suggest that the
implementation of excess force protection measures by the Germans has made their
work, even in a safe area, far less effective. Former NATO SACEUR General James
Jones complained about German restrictions after he had specifically requested that
Germany send some of its force in northern Afghanistan into the south to combat
Taliban activity, a request the German government refused.
The concern over the impact of national caveats has spread even beyond NATO
itself. On July 9, 2008 the European Parliament debated and voted on a report on
Afghanistan presented by its Committee on Foreign Affairs. One of the provisions
in the report emphasized “that a major strengthening of political will and
commitment is necessary, and that this should be followed up not only by a
willingness to provide additional combat troops in the most difficult areas,
unrestricted by national caveats...”13
11 “NATO Commander Asks Member Nations to Drop Troop Limits,” Mideast Stars and
Stripes, October 25, 2006.
12 Interviews at the NATO Defense College, Rome, December 2006, and Washington, DC,
April-May 2007; “Germans wavering on Afghan mission,” International Herald Tribune,
August 20, 2007, p. 3.
13 See Report, “Stabilization of Afghanistan: Challenges for the EU and International
Community, Report (2007/2208(INI) of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, European
Parliament, June 2008.

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Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are civilian-military units of varying
sizes designed to extend the authority of the central government into the countryside,
provide security, and undertake projects (such as infrastructure development and the
delivery of basic services) to boost the Afghan economy. NATO currently
administers 26 PRTs. NATO officials describe the PRTs as the “leading edge” of the
allies’ effort to stabilize Afghanistan. Some allied governments believe that poor
governance, rather than an insurgency, is the principal problem impeding
stabilization of the country. NATO’s assistance to the Afghan government in
controlling the narcotics trade, disarming militias, reducing corruption, and building
an economic infrastructure is the essence of the effort to bring stability to the
country.14
Despite the general support for PRTs, there have been criticisms of the overall
PRT initiative. Some observers believe the PRTs operate without an overarching
concept of operations, do not provide a common range of services, do not have a
unified chain of command and often do not coordinate with each other or exchange
information on best practices.15
There is no established model for PRTs, and they receive mixed reviews. By
most accounts, those serving in PRTs make an effort to move about surrounding
territory, engage the local governments and citizens, and demonstrate that the
international presence is bringing tangible results. However, there are reportedly
considerable differences between U.S. and ISAF PRTs.
U.S. PRTs are composed of military personnel, civil affairs officers,
representatives of the U.S. and other government agencies focused on reconstruction,
and Afghan government personnel. In the U.S. view, PRTs should be initially
established in remote areas where most non-governmental organizations will not go.
The PRTs should undertake reconstruction projects such as road building to enhance
economic development, irrigation networks to assist in agricultural development and
diversification, and political tasks, ranging from gaining the confidence of local
officials to “workshops” to educate officials and tribal leaders in governance and
long-term reconstruction plans.16 The United States government controls the funds
for its PRTs, in part to ensure that the money does not disappear through the hands
of corrupt officials in the provinces or in Kabul, and that it goes directly to
designated projects. U.S. PRTs also have inherent force protection capabilities which
allow them to respond to any situation in which their personnel are endangered.
14 Statement of Nancy Powell (Dept. of State), House Armed Services Committee hearing,
June 22, 2005; interviews with European officials, November 2005- July 2006.
15 Report of the Afghanistan Study Group, op. cit. p. 22
16 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams ...,” op. cit., Dept of Defense, p. 9-20; interviews with
U.S. officials serving in PRTs, 2005-2007.

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There are criticisms of U.S. PRTs. Some observers believe that there is a lack
of qualified civilian personnel to accomplish key tasks. For instance, there is a critical
shortage of U.S. agricultural specialists on the ground in Afghanistan.17 U.S. PRTs
are often seen as too heavily weighted with military personnel who lack the expertise
to assist in developing important elements of the economy.18 Some critics allege, that
the ratio of troops to State Department and USAID officials serving in PRTs is
100:1. Another problem that has risen for the PRTs in some areas is that civilian
relief organizations do not want to be too closely associated with the military forces
assigned to the PRTs because they feel their own security is endangered as well as
their perceived neutrality.
Although U.S. and ISAF share the same mission, their resources and activities
often differ. ISAF PRTs generally have fewer personnel as well as a different mix
of military forces and civilian experts. Some U.S. officials believe that most
European-led PRTs are too hesitant in their engagement of the Afghan population.
Some European-led PRTs are minimally funded, or provide little supervision of how
their funds are managed and dispensed.19 The Dutch give their funding for PRT
reconstruction activities directly to the Afghan central government, mainly through
U.N. and World Bank channels. The Dutch argue that the Karzai government itself
must undertake responsibility for planning and implementation of projects to rebuild
the country. By contrast, the French have declined to lead a PRT and have questioned
NATO’s role in the PRTs. Individual European government perspectives on PRTs
will be more fully discussed in another section that will illustrate the range of allied
thinking on the principal issues confronting ISAF.
In hearings before the 110th Congress, witnesses have urged steps to strengthen
the PRTs. Some witnesses argued that the Administration should increase funding
for the State Department, AID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, three parts
of the government able to provide needed expertise in the PRTs. Witnesses also
repeatedly called for a model for ISAF PRTs that might provide guideposts to “best
practices” to ensure a higher quality of assistance to the Afghan population.20
Counter-Narcotics
The allies are struggling to combat Afghanistan’s poppy crop. As of 2007.
Afghanistan supplies up to 90% of the world’s opium. According to some, the poppy
crop is a major factor in the economic life and stability of the country, and by one
17 Discussion with U.S. official, February 2008.
18 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - An Interagency Assessment,” Dept.
of Defense, Washington, DC, April 26, 2006; Interviews of U.S. officials, 2006-2008.
19 Interviews of U.S. officials, 2005-2007.
20 For example, see House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
hearing on PRTs, 1st session, 110th Congress, December 5, 2007.

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estimate accounts for 40% of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).21 Opium
poppy farmers are heavily concentrated in the southern part of the country.
The repercussions of Afghanistan’s poppy crop for the future of the country and
for ISAF operations are extensive and complex. The Afghan government lacks the
law enforcement apparatus, including a well-functioning judicial system, to combat
the narcotics trade successfully. Narcotics traffickers can exploit the country’s
primitive transportation network, as an extensive road system is not needed to move
opium to market; a small load of opium can yield a high financial return.
The opium trade has a corrosive effect on Afghan society. Former CIA Director
John Negroponte told Congress in January 2007 that “the drug trade contributes to
endemic corruption at all levels of government and undercuts public confidence. A
dangerous nexus exists between drugs and insurgents and warlords who derive funds
from cultivation and trafficking.” At the same time, farmers in parts of the country
view the poppy as their only source of income. Eradication of the industry without
a substitute source of income would throw these farmers into destitution, and they
violently resist any effort to destroy their crops.
The NATO/ISAF mission was not authorized to play a direct role in the counter-
narcotics effort. Nevertheless, NATO commanders have been told to provide
assistance to the local counter-narcotics authorities. Britain leads the international
effort to coordinate the counter-narcotics assistance. The allies provide training,
intelligence, and logistics to Afghan army units and police who destroy poppy fields
and opium labs.22 One former regional commander believes that the Afghan
government’s destruction of poppy fields is too random to be effective, and that the
government does not take decisive action to end warlord involvement in the narcotics
trade. There are also reports that the government primarily destroys the crops of the
poorest farmers, and leaves those of more influential families whose support is
needed by the government.23 The Bush Administration has urged the Karzai
government to consider spraying herbicide on the poppy fields; the Afghan
government is considering this proposal, and studying the possible effects of
herbicide on public health and the environment. No other ally reportedly supports
aerial spraying.24
21 See CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher
Blanchard; Pankaj Mishra, “The Real Afghanistan,” New York Review of Books, March 10,
2005, p. 44-48; House Armed Services Committee, hearing on “Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” June 28, 2006; “Afghan opium trade hits new peak,” Washington Post,
August 28, 2007, p. A7.
22 Testimony of Director Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment,” Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007; House International Relations Committee,
hearing on “U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan,” March 17, 2005; Mishra, op. cit,
p. 46.
23 Interview, June 20, 2007; and “Opium guerre, le ‘narco-état afghan,” Le Monde
(December 13, 2007), p. 5.
24 Interviews with officials from allied countries, June-December 2007.

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Some western officials in Afghanistan note that the country has very few well-
educated individuals able to serve in the judiciary and in other professions. In the
view of most observers, the entire judicial system is greatly deficient. The police
remain corrupt and distrusted by the population. They lack extensive training and
experience, as well as transport. The court system remains in its infancy, with few
capable jurists and attorneys.25 The Italian government leads the effort to build a
professional judicial system. In July 2007, Italy held a conference in Rome to develop
a strategy to build such a system. Governments in attendance pledged $360 million
to the effort over a period of several years; they linked the pledges to specific
programs. Among the principles and steps that the programs will seek to establish
are: a code of conduct, transparency, and accountability for officials in the judicial
system; and equipment, salary support, qualification requirements, and an educational
system for those interested in the legal profession. A follow-up meeting was held in
Kabul in October 2007 to begin implementation of these programs.26
Another component of the counter-narcotics effort is to persuade farmers to
switch to alternative crops. Such crops cannot compete with poppies; income from
a hectare of poppies can reach $4,600 a year, while wheat, one of the suggested
substitute crops, can bring only $390. Orchards might bring more money, but they
require years to develop. A more extensive market infrastructure is necessary as
well. U.S. officials believe that an extensive road-building effort is imperative to
modernize the country’s economy.
Stages Three and Four: Establishing Mission and
Structure
ISAF’s task in Stage Three was to bring stability to the southern part of the
country, where the writ of the Karzai government has been limited. In Stage Four,
ISAF consolidated its responsibilities to cover all of Afghanistan. Initially, in late
2005, the allies believed that Stages Three and Four would emulate Stages One and
Two by seeing a replacement of OEF forces by NATO forces in a stabilizing
environment. The allies nonetheless knew that there would be several significant
new challenges in both Stages. The Taliban originated in the south, in Kandahar
province, and they retain their most active network there. Poppy farming is
widespread in the south, particularly in Helmand province, where British troops
operate, and in Uruzgan province, where Dutch troops predominate.
Stage Three came into force on July 31, 2006, after having been postponed
several times due to insurgent violence and an effort to secure pledges of additional
troops from allied governments. Elements of ISAF had been present in the region for
several months, preparing for their mission. Stage Four began on October 5, 2006.
25 Interviews with European Union officials, 2006-2007; presentation of former Afghan
Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, Brookings Institution, April 30, 2007; and “McCaffrey Sees
2007 as a Crucial Year,” Washington Post, April 10, 2007, p. A15.
26 “Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan,” Rome, July 2-3, 2007;
interviews of Italian officials, August 2007. The United States pledged $15 million for the
program, and Italy pledged approximately $13.5 million.

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In Stage Four, the United States transferred 10,000 to 12,000 of its own troops to
ISAF, who now serve under NATO commander U.S. General David McKiernan.
ISAF now has approximately 52,000 troops.
The allies have confronted four issues in attempting to develop a coherent force
for Stages Three and Four: writing a mission statement; raising troops to accomplish
that mission; agreeing upon treatment of prisoners; and creating a command
structure. They continue to address the latter three of these issues.
Mission Statement
From fall 2005 through early 2006, the Bush Administration wished to merge
the functions and command of ISAF and OEF. Then-Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld asked the allies to assume counter-insurgency and anti-terror
responsibilities in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. Some allies balked,
contending that such combat operations were OEF’s task, that the U.N. resolution
governing ISAF called for a stabilization operation only, and that, in some cases, the
allies did not have forces available for the counter-insurgency and counter-terror
tasks.27
In December 2005, the allies announced a mission statement for ISAF’s Stages
Three and Four in the form of a communiqué. They pledged to work to extend the
authority of the Afghan government, primarily through development of PRTs. They
also committed themselves to training the Afghan army and police, an effort in state-
building meant to provide a Kabul government with reliable security forces, a
formidable task because such forces were barely in existence. They further
committed themselves to “supporting Afghan government counter-narcotics
efforts.”28 They also agreed upon guidelines for dealing with prisoners.
The mission statement reflected European and Canadian views that Stages Three
and Four operations should concentrate on reconstruction and stabilization, with
initial concern over military threat at a minimum. The Taliban were relatively quiet
when the allies wrote their communiqué, perhaps due to the winter weather in
Afghanistan or perhaps because the Taliban were organizing and seeking to gather
their strength. In April 2006, then British Defense Secretary said that he hoped that
his country’s forces could deploy “without firing a shot.”29 Peter Struck, Defense
Minister under the previous German government, said in September 2005 that
“NATO is not equipped for counter-terrorism operations. That is not what it is
supposed to do.”30 The Dutch parliament held a contentious debate in February 2006
over whether to send forces to ISAF. Some government and opposition members of
27 “Europeans Balking at New Afghan Role,” New York Times, September 14, 2005, p. 1;
interviews of European officials, September 2005 - February 2006.
28 “Final Communiqué,” North Atlantic Council, NATO, Brussels, December 8, 2005.
29 “UK Warned of More Afghanistan Deaths,” Financial Times, July 3, 2006, p. 3.
30 “Europeans Balking at New Afghan Role,” op. cit. Struck’s view seems to be contradicted
by the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, the alliance’s guiding political document, which
clearly states that counter-terrorism is one of NATO’s new post-Cold War tasks.

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Parliament opposed sending Dutch forces for a combat operation; their view was
clear that Dutch forces were primarily to support a stabilization mission.31
By spring 2006, events on the ground in Afghanistan imposed new exigencies
on ISAF’s mission. An attack on the Norwegian-Finnish PRT in normally tranquil
Meymaneh, in western Afghanistan, in February 2006 had given an indication of an
emerging problem: the need for a rapid military response capability for rescue
operations. When the PRT was attacked, no NATO combat forces were in the region
to protect the ISAF personnel. Other NATO forces that were nearby had caveats
prohibiting their use in combat operations. Eventually a British plane and forces
were found to end the attack on the PRT. Before and after the attack on the PRT,
then NATO SACEUR General James Jones called upon the NATO governments to
pledge forces to ISAF that would be capable of combat operations. He waged a
constant campaign to cajole allied governments not to place caveats on their forces
that ruled out combat operations.32
NATO governments ultimately agreed to adjust how ISAF would fulfill Stage
Three. They wrote more “robust” rules of engagement, which have not been made
fully public. By May 2006, British General David Richards, then the ISAF
commander, was describing Stage Three as a “combat operation.” He added that
caveats affecting Stage Three and Four forces had been “reduced.” He dismissed the
tendency of some NATO governments to draw a line between OEF’s counter-terror
operations and the supposedly low-level counter-insurgency responsibilities that had
crept into Stage Three responsibilities. He told visiting members of a NATO
parliamentary delegation that counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations in
Afghanistan were not always distinguishable.33 When OEF turned southern
Afghanistan over to ISAF on July 31, 2006, some OEF forces remained in the region
to continue combat operations targeted against terrorist elements.
Difficulties in Raising Troops
The debate over the mission continues to affect the effort to raise forces for the
ISAF mission. The highest priority for any ISAF commander is to have the forces
necessary along with the greatest amount of flexibility possible to provide a safe and
secure environment in which the government of Afghanistan can extend its authority.
Since 2005, NATO officials have experienced difficulty persuading member
governments to supply forces. According to NATO officials, the attack on the
Norwegian-Finnish PRT awakened some governments to the continuing threat posed
by instability and the insurgency.34 Rapid-response forces eventually became
31 “Peacekeeping in Afghanistan Is Modern Crisis Management,” in European Affairs,
spring/summer 2006, p. 3-4.
32 Comments by Gen. Jones at NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings in Copenhagen,
November 2005.
33 “Visit to Afghanistan,” report by the Defence Committee of the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, May 23, 2006, p. 2.
34 Interviews with NATO officials, February 2006.

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available. Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands were the first to pledge forces for
Stage Three.
U.S. Defense Secretary Gates has been critical of the allies for not providing
more troops, although he has softened his tone. He told the House Armed Services
Committee in December 2007 that another 7,500 troops were needed, in addition to
the 41,700 then in ISAF. Of this addition, approximately 3,500 should be trainers for
the Afghan army. He also called for at least 16 more helicopters.35 A week later,
however, after a NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting, he acknowledged that domestic
political problems were preventing some allies from increasing their force levels in
Afghanistan. Allied government officials stated privately that their populations were
reluctant to follow the Bush Administration, largely due to the U.S. invasion of Iraq
and subsequent criticism of the United States in Europe and the Middle East.36 The
German Marshall Fund poll noted earlier found that while 64% of those polled
support the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, only 30% support combat operations
against the Taliban.37
Britain initially promised to send 3,600 troops to Helmand province by the
beginning of Stage Three operations in July 2006, and has steadily increased its
contribution to 7,800 troops. Canada was one of the first allies to recognize the need
for combat forces. By a close vote in the Canadian parliament in May 2006, the
government designated 2,300 troops for Afghanistan until February 2009, most of
which have been sent to Kandahar province. In early 2008, Germany agreed to send
200 troops to replace a Norwegian contingent in the north. In February 2008, the U.S.
deployed the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to southern Afghanistan.
The debate in the Dutch parliament over assigning troops to ISAF was also
contentious. The Dutch population initially opposed sending forces into a combat
operation. Ultimately, the Netherlands designated 1,400 to 1,700 troops for duty in
ISAF’s Stage Three and Stage Four operations. In December 2007, the Dutch
parliament agreed to keep troops in Afghanistan, but to begin a withdrawal in August
2010 until all Dutch forces were withdrawn by December 1, 2010. The parliament
expressed dismay that more allies have not been forthcoming in providing forces for
southern Afghanistan.
Despite these pledges, the upturn in violence during 2007 led U.S. and NATO
commanders in Afghanistan to conclude that they needed about three more brigades
(10,000 troops) to be able to stabilize the still restive southern sector.
A key objective of several allies at NATO’s Bucharest summit with combat
contingents in Afghanistan was to persuade other governments to send more forces.
The Canadian government had threatened to withdraw its forces in 2009 if a
commitment of at least 1,000 new combat troops was not made. President Bush
35 Testimony of Sec. Gates, House Armed Services Committee, hearing, 1st Session, 110th
Congress, December 11, 2007.
36 Interviews, June-December, 2007.
37 Transatlantic Trends, op. cit., p. 17-18.

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pledged to further increase U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2009 regardless of the
change in the U.S. Administration at that time. In an effort to help several Allies
boost domestic political support for increased resources, the U.S. helped develop a
Strategic Plan intended to show how NATO’s long-term security was linked to
stability in Afghanistan. The plan was unveiled at the Bucharest summit in April
2008
At the Bucharest summit, France agreed to send 720 combat troops. Germany
has since agreed to deploy an additional 1,000 troops to the northern sector pending
approval by the German Parliament in October when the current German mandate
expires. Poland, the Czech Republic and several other allies pledged smaller
contingents, allaying Canadian concerns to some degree. However, allies with forces
in harm’s way continue to criticize other allies that will not send combat forces or
commit them to areas where the Taliban are active. In the aftermath of Bucharest,
Italy announced in May that it would lift its caveats and was willing to deploy some
of its forces to the combat-intense south. In June, the UK announced it would add
200 troops to its total force. Also, in early July, the U.S. extended the tour of the 24th
MEU.
Disagreements over Treatment of Prisoners
There was a contentious debate among the allies over the December 2005 final
communiqué guiding NATO operations in Afghanistan. Most of the allies were
critical of U.S. abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq; they extended this
criticism to the U.S. detention policy at Guantanamo Bay, where some prisoners
captured in Afghanistan have been sent since 2001. These allies contended that the
Bush Administration was ignoring the Geneva Convention governing treatment of
prisoners taken in combat, and that the issue was a significant one among their
publics and in their domestic political debates.38
These allies insisted that the communiqué explicitly address the issue of
treatment of prisoners. The final document contains the statement: “In addition to
NATO’s agreed detention policy for ISAF, which is and remains consistent with
international law, we welcome initiatives by Allies to assist the Afghan authorities
in the implementation of international standards for the detention of prisoners.”39
The allies also agreed that prisoners taken by ISAF should be turned over to the
Afghan government. Some allied governments reportedly told the Afghan
government that they did not wish such prisoners to then be transferred to the United
States government. The Afghan government reportedly insisted upon its sovereign
right to determine the disposition of prisoners in its custody. A new problem has
38 Interviews with officials from NATO governments, December 2005-February 2006; “En
Afghanistan, l’OTAN évolue de la pacification vers le contre-terrorisme,” Le Monde,
November 20-21, 2005, p. 4.
39 “Final Communiqué,” North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, December 8, 2005.

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arisen over allegations that Afghan officials have tortured detainees turned over to
them by ISAF forces.40
Command Structure: Coordinating ISAF and OEF Operations
NATO’s discussion over the command structure for Stages Three and Four in
Afghanistan has reflected the U.S. desire to see the allies more fully embrace combat
tasks. Reluctance on the part of some European governments to clash with the
Taliban and warlords was evident during these discussions.
From at least 2004, the Bush Administration had begun to urge the allies to
assume more responsibilities in the fight against insurgents and terrorists in
Afghanistan. By late 2005 the Administration was urging that ISAF and OEF be
merged under one command. Many allies at first resisted the call to merge the two
commands, largely because of the different nature of the two operations and differing
national agendas.
Britain, Germany, and France were the principal allies opposing the U.S. idea
to merge the commands. They did so for differing reasons. Britain and Germany
wished to preserve ISAF as a stabilization, and not combat, mission. Britain, leading
the ISAF anti-narcotics effort, wished to ensure that the initiative remained in the
political sphere; along with other allies, the British believed that using force against
Afghan farmers to eradicate the poppy crop might result in a broadened insurgency.
Germany opposed a merger of the commands because German forces in ISAF were
trained only for stabilization, and not for counter-insurgency operations.
The French view was somewhat different. The French government was close
to the Administration view that some combat operations against the Taliban and
other elements would be necessary. At the same time, France was concerned that the
Administration, after having a U.S. commander in place to guide all military activity
in Afghanistan, might use NATO as a “toolbox” to accomplish Washington’s broader
objectives. Specifically, Paris was concerned that the Administration would designate
more U.S. units from Afghanistan to be sent to Iraq, and leave the allies to stabilize
Afghanistan. Administration officials insisted publicly and privately that they had
no intention of sharply reducing forces in Afghanistan.41 In fact, the Bush
Administration has increased the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The
government of President Nicolas Sarkozy, as noted earlier, has decided to increase
its combat contingent in Afghanistan.
In attempting to resolve the issue of command structure, the allies sought to
address practical problems for the two operations. ISAF and OEF operate in
contiguous areas, but there is no clear dividing line between regions where the
Taliban and al Qaeda are active, and the relatively stable regions of the country. A
weakness of ISAF had been deficient capability for rapid response rescue, should
soldiers and civilian personnel find themselves under fire.
40 Interviews with officials from NATO governments, 2005-2007.
41 Interviews with officials from allied governments, December 2005-October 2007.

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The allies agreed upon a “synergy,” rather than a merger, of the two commands
to solve this problem. The ISAF commander now has three deputies. One deputy
leads the stabilization operations. A second deputy commands air operations. The
third deputy directs security operations. This deputy has a formal “coordination
relationship with the OEF and ISAF commanders. For example, if troops in one
operation need air cover or an emergency response, then those resources could come
from either OEF or ISAF, depending on which was nearest to the action and had
available resources. This arrangement was in fact already in place with some allied
governments before Stage Three began. French air combat forces operating out of
Tajikistan, for example, have been providing this function to troops in the field in
both ISAF and OEF since 2005, and other allies’ air components are now prepared
to do the same. In addition, French and Dutch officials say that their air force
components serve both commands by gathering and sharing military intelligence.42
Allied Viewpoints
Once the allies agreed on ISAF’s mission for Stages Three and Four, they began
to differ on how to accomplish it. The previous section analyzed allied views in
establishing and implementing the mission and structure of Stages Three and Four.
This section discusses the developing views of allies as Stage Three and then Stage
Four moved forward. Allied views began to change between the time of the
December 2005 NATO communiqué describing ISAF’s mission and July 2006,
largely due to the surge in Taliban activity. For purposes of analysis, the range of
views begins with governments most hesitant about the use of combat forces in
Afghanistan and proceeds through a list of governments that believe that a more
forceful military hand will be necessary to stabilize and rebuild the country.
Germany: Rebuild but Avoid Combat
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government had initially expressed a
more decisive commitment to securing stability in Afghanistan than its predecessor.
Under the preceding Schroeder government, Berlin was adamant that German forces
would not engage in combat operations; according to NATO officials, the German
caveat against combat has limited the alliance in integrating German forces with
those of other allied governments. Berlin has advocated a shift in its and NATO’s
Afghanistan strategy toward civilian reconstruction and development projects, army
and police training activities, and enhanced political engagement with Afghanistan’s
neighbors.
Germany now has approximately 3,500 forces in ISAF trained for stability
operations but not for combat in the northern part of the country. In September 2006,
the German parliament (Bundestag) extended the commitment for German troops,
but only gave permission to send them to relatively secure northern Afghanistan
where they lead two PRTs, one in Kunduz and one in Feyzabad. At NATO’s Riga
summit, however, Germany agreed to send troops to assist allied forces in an
emergency. In spring 2007, the German government assigned six Tornado aircraft to
42 Interviews of officials in allied governments, November 2005-July 2006.

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Afghanistan for use in surveillance operations. In October 2007 the Bundestag
renewed the commitment for another year to keep German forces and Tornado
aircraft in Afghanistan. Chancellor Merkel rejected an appeal by the NATO
Secretary General to send some of Germany’s forces to the south for stabilization
operations.
As noted above, in June 2008, Berlin announced that it would seek approval to
increase troop levels in Afghanistan by up to 1,000 when the Bundestag votes on
extending the Afghanistan mandate in October. The additional troops are expected
to boost Germany’s efforts in northern Afghanistan, with a stated aim of tripling the
amount of training Germany gives to Afghan troops.43
Public support in Germany for the Afghan mission has steadily declined. In
2002, 51% of those polled supported German involvement in Afghanistan’s
stabilization; as of October 2007, that figure had declined to 34%. In June 2008,
support among the population has declined to around 16%. Low public support for
the mission and some political opposition from within her coalition have dampened
expectations. Some observers fault Merkel for failing to lay out the importance of the
Afghan mission to the German people.44

Some officials from other allied governments and the EU have criticized the
existing restrictions on German forces and the capabilities of those forces. These
officials say that German troops and civilians rarely venture beyond the perimeter of
their PRTs due to concern that they might arouse Afghan public criticism or come
into contact with armed elements. German troops reportedly do not go on extended
patrols and do not respond to local security incidents. Critics of the German approach
say that it is important to engage local officials and demonstrate that NATO has an
active approach to rebuilding the country and persuading the Afghan population that
the alliance is serving a constructive role.45
Some U.S. and European officials are also critical of the manner in which
Germany managed its task of training the Afghan police force (ANP). The task was
a daunting one, given the low pay provided by the Afghan government and the
modest numbers of police used to cover a broad territory. In this view, the Afghan
police remain “corrupt and hollow” as a force. At the same time, former SACEUR
General Jones said that while training of the Afghan army is “one of the bright
stories, one of the not-so-good stories ... is the inadequacy to bring similar progress
to police reform, which is the responsibility of Germany.” Part of the problem may
have been the lack of authority of the German government to order police to
Afghanistan; unlike its military forces, German police must volunteer for such an
assignment.46
43 “Germany Plans to Raise Troops Level in Afghanistan,” Spiegelonline, June 24, 2008.
44 Judy Dempsey, “Merkel aloof as public wavers on Afghanistan,” International Herald
Tribune, October 19, 2007, p. 2.
45 Interviews with European and U.S. officials and observers, June-July 2006.
46 Cited in “If Called to Lebanon, NATO ‘Could Go In,’” International Herald Tribune, July
(continued...)

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In May 2007, the EU accepted a request by NATO to take the lead in training
Afghanistan’s police. That mission began in June 2007 with the addition of some
120 EU police trainers who joined the 41 German trainers that remained in the
program. In a February 2008 report by ISAF to the U.N., NATO noted that the
Afghan police “still fall behind the desired level of capability.”47 In March 2008,
officials at the EU suggested that the EUPOL training team could be doubled.
The police could play a key role in Afghanistan’s stabilization because they,
along with the Afghan army, have primary responsibility for destroying poppy fields
and opium labs.48 The EU effort has faltered thus far, for several reasons. Turkey is
reportedly blocking any provision by NATO of intelligence to the EU and the Afghan
police because (Greek) Cyprus and Malta, both in the EU, are not NATO members.
Turkey is also blocking any agreement for NATO to provide protection to police who
come under attack by the Taliban. Turkey’s actions are a side effect of its dispute
with the EU over a range of issues. In September 2007, the German general heading
the EU police training mission reportedly quit in frustration over these complications,
and due to the corruption encountered in dealing with the Karzai government.49
The Netherlands: An Increasingly Decisive Position
Dutch forces are concentrated in the south, in Uruzgan province, one of
Afghanistan’s most unstable regions and an area that has seen considerable Taliban
activity since spring 2006. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal and U.S. treatment of
prisoners at Guantanamo were important issues in the Dutch debate over
Afghanistan. Dutch officials say that “the rules of the road in fighting terrorism” are
not clearly agreed upon in the alliance. For this reason, Dutch officials were initially
reluctant to have their forces closely associated with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The
Netherlands was the principal proponent of the section of the December 2005 NATO
communiqué detailing allied treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan.50
Initial Dutch efforts in ISAF were tentative and indecisive. However, Dutch
troops have grown increasingly engaged in providing security, in tandem with an
active and well-funded reconstruction effort.
Dutch officials offer a strategic approach to Afghanistan’s problems. They
believe that the alliance must make a more concerted effort to engage regional
countries — above all, Pakistan, India, and Iran — to bring stability to the country,
46 (...continued)
28, 2006, p. 3; interviews, fall 2006.
47 “Quarterly Report to the U.N. on ISAF Operations,” NATO, Brussels, February 1, 2008,
p. 3.
48 “Foreign Troops in North Afghanistan Say ‘Drug Wars’ the Biggest Threat,” Agence
France Presse, August 30, 2005; “Shake-up of Afghan Police ‘Brought Back Corruption,’”
Financial Times, June 13, 2006, p. 2.
49 “German giving up on Afghan position,” International Herald Tribune, September 12,
2007, p. 1; interviews with officials from allied governments, June-September, 2007.
50 Discussions with Dutch officials, September 2005-May 2006.

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a view given increasing attention in some allied capitals after the assassination of
Benazir Bhutto. These officials are concerned that NATO’s military operations are
alienating the Afghan population. They advocate creation of a general fund to rapidly
compensate local victims of mistaken attacks by NATO forces. In addition, they
advocate a common approach in NATO and the EU to the problems presented by the
drug trade. In the Dutch view — echoed by Italy — NATO must emphasize
reconstruction more than combat operations.51
Others counter this argument by saying that “there can be no reconstruction
without security.” The Taliban must be cleared out before reconstruction can
proceed. The issue may be more complicated, however. U.S. General Karl
Eikenberry, now the Deputy of the NATO Military Committee and former
Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, believes that
many Taliban are not individuals who have hidden themselves in Pakistan or
elsewhere outside Afghanistan, but are above all “the unemployed,” those currently
without a stake in Afghan society. In his view, to weaken the Taliban, NATO should
build roads and other economic infrastructure to help create an economy to give
Afghans promise of a future.52 In a sense, his view is close to that of Dutch officials.
The Dutch government was the most publicly critical of U.S. handling of
prisoners taken in the conflict against terrorism. Dutch government spokesmen and
opposition leaders criticized U.S. handling of prisoners who had been sent to
Guantanamo and called for treatment of detainees to meet the strictures of
“international law.” In a memorandum of understanding with the Afghan
government, the Netherlands secured a pledge that prisoners turned over to Kabul
would not receive the death penalty for any crimes committed. The Dutch expressed
their desire to the Afghan government that such prisoners not be turned over to the
United States.53
In the Dutch view, ISAF’s purpose is “to provide a secure and stable
environment for reconstruction.” The government’s policy has been that measures
of “defense, diplomacy, and development” are key to ISAF’s success. When
necessary, Dutch troops will use force to subdue the Taliban to build stability so that
reconstruction projects may take hold. A growing number of combat engagements,
occasionally along with U.S. troops, has occurred since late summer 2006, and Dutch
forces have suffered casualties.54 The Netherlands endorsed the “synergy” of ISAF
and OEF commands and has made available four F-16s for missions in both ISAF
51 Remarks by Bert Koenders, Minister for Development and Cooperation, The Netherlands,
at CSIS, Washington, DC, April 16, 2007. Koenders is the highly regarded former President
of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and is well-versed in NATO issues. For a view
advocating EU coordination of reconstruction/civilian programs in Afghanistan, see Julianne
Smith, “How the EU Can Act Now to Assist Global Leadership,” CSIS report, March 26,
2007.
52 Remarks of Gen. Eikenberry at Brookings conference on Europe, April 30, 2007.
53 “Peacekeeping in Afghanistan Is Modern Crisis Management ...,” op. cit., p. 3-4.
54 Bernard Bot, “Saving Democracy in a World of Change,” speech at Georgetown
University, Washington, DC, October 24, 2006; interviews, 2007.

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and OEF. The aircraft may be used for missions from intelligence gathering to close
air support. The Netherlands now has 1,700 troops in Afghanistan in restive Uruzgan
province. Another 250 Dutch troops serve in Kabul and in northern Afghanistan.
The Dutch government will reportedly begin a drawdown of part of these forces due
to a need to provide rest and retraining.
As stated previously, the Dutch give their funding for PRT reconstruction
activities directly to the Afghan central government, mainly through U.N. and World
Bank channels. Dutch officials note the contrast with the U.S. approach, which is to
bring in a “turnkey” operation in which U.S. officials are trained to undertake
reconstruction projects, using U.S. manpower and equipment. The Dutch argue that
the Karzai government itself must undertake responsibility for planning and
implementation of projects to rebuild the country. Only in this way, the Dutch
believe, can the Afghans learn good governance and management of their own
affairs. The Dutch are directly involved in some projects, providing clean water to
villages and almond trees and seeds to farmers for alternative crops, for example.
Some U.S. officials believe that the Dutch practice of providing assistance funds
directly to the Afghan government has led to the money being spent on other
governmental purposes or landing in the pockets of corrupt Afghan officials.55
The United States, Britain, and Canada: A Broad Mandate
The governments of the United States, Britain, and Canada share similar views
on how ISAF should fulfil its mission. They have sent combat forces to Afghanistan,
maintain PRTs in the most unstable parts of the country, and have engaged the
Taliban resurgence aggressively. Many of the British and Canadian forces for Stage
Three began to arrive in Afghanistan in spring 2006, and worked under OEF
command fighting the Taliban. On July 31, 2006, most of these forces were
“rebadged” as NATO forces serving ISAF’s Stage Three mission.
The United States has approximately 18,000 troops in OEF. The U.S.-led OEF
controlled southern Afghanistan until ISAF’s succession there at the end of July
2006. The United States now has approximately 14,800 troops in ISAF. There is a
debate in the Pentagon over whether a possible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq
could open the door to more U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Pentagon has reportedly
discussed a plan with President Bush to increase U.S. forces in Afghanistan by 7,000
in 2009, necessitated at least in part by some allies’ refusal to agree to a greater
sharing of the burden.56
U.S. officials believe that ISAF must undertake tasks “from the lowest level of
peacekeeping to combat operations against the Taliban and warlords.” OEF’s task
should be counter-terrorism against al Qaeda. These officials concede that the line
between the two operations is blurred, given that OEF has been fighting both an
55 Discussions with Dutch and U.S. officials, February-July 2006.
56 Discussions with officials from the Dept. of Defense, October-December 2007; “An
Afghan mission short of troops,” International Herald Tribune, May 3-4, 2008, p. 3.

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insurgency led by the Taliban and searching for al Qaeda.57 Some allied governments
believe that the U.S. combat effort is overly aggressive and, in some instances, has
been counterproductive. President Karzai has said that U.S. air strikes have
sometimes been poorly targeted and have carelessly killed civilians, which he
believes may be alienating the population in some areas of the country. In July 2007,
NATO announced a new policy. ISAF will postpone a combat response, where
possible, when civilians are present near the Taliban; in addition, ISAF aircraft will
use smaller bombs to limit damage to an area.58
The British view largely mirrors the U.S. view of NATO’s role in Afghanistan.
Britain has ISAF and OEF contingents, and its combat aircraft support both missions.
Most of Britain’s ISAF troops, numbering approximately 8,500 in the entire country
with approximately 4,200 in the south, are combat units. British forces in the south
are largely in Helmand province, the principal poppy-growing region in the country.
British forces have an “inkblot” strategy, in which they clear an area of Taliban, then
undertake reconstruction projects, such as road building, moving out from a village
into the countryside.59 The new British government under Gordon Brown has
reaffirmed the U.K.’s commitment to ISAF. Britain had reportedly hoped to increase
its force contingent at the Bucharest summit, but increased violence in Iraq has kept
combat elements tied down there.
From a cautious position on ISAF’s mission in early 2006, noted earlier, the
British government has adopted a more aggressive stance, as a result of the increase
in Taliban activity in southern Afghanistan. Britain has a clearly vested interest in
ISAF’s stabilization mission, not only out of concern that terrorist activity has
emanated from south Asia but because most of the heroin found in the United
Kingdom comes from Afghanistan. U.S. officials believe that Britain’s PRT in
Helmand province is well-funded and concentrates on local governance and
economic development.60
At the same time, a debate over the proper balance between combat missions
and reconstruction continues in Britain. Prime Minister Brown’s government now
reportedly believes that more emphasis must be given to an effort to reconcile
elements of the insurgency with the Karzai government. The British government
reportedly believes that there are “hard-core” Taliban elements incapable of
accepting the Karzai government, but that there are other levels of Taliban supports
not affiliated with Islamic extremism that can be persuaded to lay down their arms.
A key component of such an approach would be a successful reconstruction effort
that would provide jobs and broadened economic growth.61
57 Discussions with U.S. officials, 2006-2007.
58 “NATO plans to reduce Afghan casualties,” Financial Times, July 30, 2007, p. 1.
59 “For British in an Afghan province, initial gains against the Taliban,”New York Times,
August 5, 2007, p. 1.
60 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams ...,” op. cit., Dept. of Defense, p. 22; “Opium War an
Absolute Disaster,” Financial Times, July 5, 2006, p. 3.
61 “Fields of little glory,” Financial Times, November 19, 2007, p. 10.

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The United States and Britain disagree about Britain’s plan to arm tribal militias
to combat the Taliban, a step proposed by London to aid ISAF’s overstretched forces.
U.S. General Dan McNeill, former ISAF commander, expressed concern that the plan
could fan inter-tribal conflict.62 The plan would appear to conflict with NATO’s
effort to disarm regional militias.
Canada also has primarily combat forces in Afghanistan, in both OEF and ISAF.
There is a vigorous debate in Canada over the country’s involvement in Afghanistan.
In 2006, by a narrow vote of 149-145, the Canadian parliament approved Ottawa’s
plan to commit 2300 troops to ISAF until February 2009. Public support for the
mission has fallen, however. In 2002, 66% of those polled supported sending
Canadian forces to Afghanistan, but only 44% supported the two-year extension until
2009. By April 2007, support for keeping Canadian forces in Afghanistan had
dropped to 52%. While Canadians appear to support their country’s long involvement
in U.N. peace operations, the need for combat operations in Afghanistan has eroded
support for the ISAF mission. When the alliance produced more combat forces for
southern and eastern Afghanistan at the Bucharest summit, Ottawa withdrew its
threat to remove its troops in 2009. On March 13, 2008, the Canadian parliament
extended the commitment to keep troops in Afghanistan until 2011.63
Canadian forces joined U.S. and British forces in summer and fall 2006 OEF
combat operations against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Some of these
operations, led by Canadian teams, were joined by Afghan army (ANA) elements in
Kandahar province. The Canadians eventually wish to turn over such operations to
the ANA. Some of the Canadian forces assigned to OEF were transferred to ISAF’s
Stage Three operations on July 31, 2006, and Kandahar province is their principal
region of responsibility. Canada leads a PRT in the province.
France: Combat and Stabilization
The French government believes that ISAF must be a combat force that
buttresses the efforts of the Afghan government to build legitimacy and governance.
Unlike German forces, for example, many French forces are trained both for combat
and stabilization. As of May 2008 France has 1,670 troops in ISAF; most are in a
stabilization mission in Kabul and in army training missions elsewhere in the
country. French officials express concern that ISAF will fail “if not accompanied by
increased capacity by the Afghan police and judicial system.”64
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has reaffirmed Paris’s commitment to ISAF.
In 2008 France moved 6 Mirage fighter bombers from a French base in Tajikistan to
the NATO base in Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan. These jets are used in
62 “Top U.S. general warns on Afghan self-defence plan,” Financial Times, January 3, 2008,
p. 4.
63 “Canadian and Dutch Publics Feeling Stretched ...,” op. cit.; “Troop Pullout Bill Defeated
in Canada,” Washington Post, April 25, 2007, p. A12.
64 Interview with Defense Minister Morin in “Hervé Morin: ‘La situation se dégrade en
Afghanistan,” Le Monde, December 21, 2007, p. 5.

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intelligence and close air support missions; their relocation to Kandahar will allow
them to spend more time in the air on mission rather than on the long return to
Tajikistan for resupply.65 France also supplies C135 tankers to refuel French and
other allied aircraft. France has built 4 operational “OMLTs”, a term used to describe
a joint allied and Afghan combat force, and participates in another with Dutch forces.
These forces are in the east and south where combat is at the highest levels. U.S. and
French forces are jointly training Afghan special forces teams.
As noted above, President Sarkozy pledged approximately 720 combat troops
for Afghanistan at the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008. Two hundred are
special forces, and some of these may join U.S. forces in OEF; the rest are in mobile
combat units. These troops will be under U.S. command in eastern Afghanistan
where, according to NATO, Taliban operations “continue at a high level.”66
The opposition Socialist Party in France has strongly criticized Sarkozy’s
decision to increase French force levels in Afghanistan. The Socialist leader in the
National Assembly characterized the decision as asking “France to support in
Afghanistan the American war burden in Iraq” as part of the French president’s
“Atlantic obsession;” in this view, European forces in Afghanistan free the United
States to send or keep forces in Iraq, a war that is highly unpopular among the French
public. Prime Minister François Fillon responded that in fact the troops will be sent
to Afghanistan as part of a NATO “common strategy.” President Sarkozy has
described ISAF’s mission as one to counter global terrorism.67
The French government, mindful of civilian casualties and Afghan criticism of
ISAF, is emphasizing more restrictive rules of engagement for its forces. Its troops
have been instructed to use force “proportional” to a threat, to avoid bombing civilian
infrastructure, and to have “visual recognition” of a target before releasing bombs.68
As noted above, France may send additional combat forces to southern Afghanistan
in early 2008.
The Afghan mission has marked important changes in French NATO policy.
France supported the invocation of Article V, NATO’s mutual security clause, after
the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States. Those attacks were decisive
in the French government’s change of position on NATO’s “out-of-area”
responsibilities. For many years, Paris had argued that NATO was a European
security organization, and must only operate in and near Europe. After September
11, the French government embraced the emerging view that NATO must be a global
65 “La France redéploie ses avions de combat dans le Sud afghan,” Le Monde, August 31,
2007, p. 4.
66 NATO quarterly report to the U.N., op. cit.; “Mille soldats français en renfort dans l’Est
afghan,” Le Monde, April 2, 2008, p. 4.
67 “L’Opposition français craint un ‘enlisement’ en Afghanistan,” Le Monde, April 3, 2008,
p. 6; and “A Kaboul, M. Sarkozy évoque un effort militaire français,” Le Monde, December
25, 2007, p. 4.
68 “À Kandahar, dans la base sous haute sécurité, d’où opèrent les Mirages français en
Afghanistan,” Le Monde, November 25-26, 2007, p. 5.

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security organization able to combat terrorism and WMD proliferation around the
planet. French officials say that ISAF is NATO’s most important mission.69
Since the late 1990s, NATO has urged member governments to construct more
“deployable,” expeditionary forces, and gave the notion a concrete base in the Prague
Capabilities Commitment (PCC) in 2002, when allies pledged to develop capabilities
such as strategic lift, aerial refueling, and more special forces.70 Among the European
allies, France has made considerable progress along this path. As noted above,
French aerial tankers refuel not only French aircraft in the Afghan theater, but U.S.,
Dutch, and Belgian aircraft as well. These capabilities contribute to the improving
integration of NATO forces in the Afghan theater, according to U.S. officials, and to
the ability of ISAF and OEF to share capabilities and command.71 U.S. officials give
French forces high marks for their ability and their willingness to fight.
The French government has clearly defined its interests in Afghanistan. French
officials argue that the allies must commit to a long effort to assist the Afghan
government in eradicating the opium industry, in part because heroin finds its way
into western societies, in part because it fuels terrorist groups. Ultimately, French
officials believe that the Afghan government itself must learn to govern the country,
and that NATO and partner states cannot do this for Kabul. To this end, the French
have a contingent in place that assists in training the Afghan army. France does not
believe that PRTs can play a meaningful role in Afghanistan, and believes that the
Karzai government must itself exercise the initiative and build good governance to
gain the confidence of its people. France does not accept the view, held by some
U.S. officials but nowhere present in NATO’s ISAF mission statement, that part of
NATO’s brief is to build democracy in Afghanistan. In the French view, Afghanistan
is a highly diverse ethnic state with no tradition of democracy; at best, for the
foreseeable future, a more representative and tolerant society can be built.72
France also contends that the EU and other civilian institutions, such as the U.N.
and the World Bank, are more suited to undertake development projects than NATO.
In Paris’ view, NATO should concentrate on collective defense.
Congressional Action
A bipartisan consensus continues to support the Afghan mission in the 110th
Congress. The Afghan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327), as amended,
69 Interviews with French and U.S. officials; Remarks by Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-
Marie at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly plenary, Paris, May 30, 2006.
70 CRS Report RS21659, NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment, by Carl W. Ek.
71 Interviews with U.S. and French officials, 2005-2007; “France Quietly Offers More
Military Help,” Army Times, August 29, 2005; “Français et Américains louent une
coopération exemplaire en Afghanistan,” Le Monde, October 24-25, 2004, p. 3.
72 Interviews with French officials, August 2005-July 2006; Alliot-Marie, op. cit.
Afghanistan supplies an estimated 90% of the heroin that finds its way to France; “Hervé
Morin: ‘La situation...,” op. cit.

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authorized U.S. aid for reconstruction, military operations, counter-narcotics efforts,
election reform, and human rights assistance. A succession of appropriations bills
has met or exceeded authorization targets.73 Since the 9/11 attack, Congress has
appropriated over $176 billion for Afghanistan. In hearings during the first session
of the 110th Congress, Administration officials told Members that the United States
spends approximately $2 billion a month in Afghanistan on troops and
reconstruction. During the first session of the 110th Congress, congressional
committees increasingly pressed Secretary Gates and other officials to provide
Congress with a more detailed accounting of ISAF’s operations, and urged the
Administration to persuade the allies to provide a greater proportion of ISAF’s
forces.
On June 19, 2008, the House passed the supplemental appropriations bill and
on June 26, the Senate passed its version. On June 30 the President signed the
FY2008-FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations bill into law (P.L. 110-282). The law
will provide $31 billion for the conflict in Afghanistan. The bill also provides $1.3
billion for economic reconstruction in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF),
primarily to strengthen regional governance, health care and education, development
of the rural economy, and civilian infrastructure.74 An additional $35 million was
provided to support the counter-narcotics programs in Afghanistan.
On July 15, 2008, Senator Biden and Senator Lugar, the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced S. 3263, a bill that
would significantly increase non-military aid to Pakistan. The assistance would,
among other things, be used to improve Pakistani counter-terrorism capabilities and
ensure more effective efforts are made against Taliban and al Qaeda forces using
Pakistan as a springboard for launching military and terrorist attacks into
Afghanistan.
Several hearings have been held during the 110th Congress that have addressed
a range of Afghanistan-related issues, including troop levels, command and control
arrangements, counter-narcotics efforts, PRTs, and others. In addition, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) established three new
reporting requirement: a twice yearly report from the President on progress toward
security and stability in Afghanistan; an annual report from the Secretary of Defense
on a long-term, detailed plan for sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces; and
a one-time requirement for a report from the Secretary of Defense on enhancing
security and stability along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.75
73 See CRS Report RL34276, FY2008 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation of
International Affairs, by Susan Epstein, Rhoda Margesson, and Curt Tarnoff.
74 For a detailed description, see CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations for Global War on Terror, Military Operations, International Affairs, and
Other Purposes, by Steve Daggett et al., continually updated.
75 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.

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CRS-26
Assessment
For some, Afghanistan’s political transition was completed with the convening
of a parliament in December 2005. However, after seven years, the international
community has made only incremental progress towards its goals of peace, security,
and development. According to a March 2008 report issued by the Atlantic Council
of the United States, the situation on the ground has gradually settled into a strategic
stalemate. NATO and Afghan forces cannot eliminate the Taliban threat by military
means as long as they have sanctuary in Pakistan, and the civil development efforts
are not bringing sufficient results.76
Despite slow internal progress and the increase in insurgent and terrorist activity
beginning in 2007, the NATO allies have maintained a basic unity of purpose in
Afghanistan. All 26 member states contribute troops to the ISAF effort to bring order
to Afghanistan. Their desire to stabilize the country and to prevent the return of a
terrorist state has led to an ongoing general consensus that if Afghanistan cannot be
stabilized and made more secure, the future credibility and relevance of NATO will
come under question. Press reports state that the allies produced a classified
document at the Bucharest summit that lays out a five-year plan for ISAF to stabilize
the country and turn most combat operations over to the Afghan National Army.77
The allies believe that there is a tangible benefit to ISAF. If ultimately successful,
ISAF can help to build a state that is relatively stable, no longer a source of
international terrorism, and one that attempts to diminish a narcotics trade that is a
threat to European societies.
Nevertheless, NATO faces complex issues in its own ranks and on the ground
in Afghanistan that are likely to concern ISAF over the next several years. Although
the allies agree on their overall mission to stabilize the country, they often differ on
the means to reach that objective and on the amount of resources to be made
available. As a result, NATO leaders continue to have difficulty in persuading allies
to contribute forces to ISAF. For some allies, it is clear that fighting the Taliban,
warlords, and the narcotics trade can prevent the return of al Qaeda or radical Islamic
groups inimical to western interests. For others, the sooner the Afghan government
and the civil sector can win the hearts and minds of the general population through
economic development and the efficient provision of services, the faster stability will
take hold.
The allies have reached a consensus that reconstruction is the key to building a
viable, functioning Afghan state. Officials in allied governments repeatedly point
to the need for more road building to extend the reach of Kabul and to provide the
infrastructure to diversify and strengthen the economy of a country lacking the
capacity to develop enduring market practices. General Eikenberry, when asked by
a congressional committee what he needed to build a stable society, responded,
“Would I prefer to have another infantry battalion on the ground of 600 U.S. soldiers
76 “Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action,” Issue Brief, The Atlantic
Council of the United States, March 2008.
77 “Mille soldats français...,” op. cit.

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or would I prefer to have $50 million for roads, I’d say ... $50 million for roads.”78
His view has been echoed by calls from the NATO Secretary General for allies and
international institutions to provide more funds for reconstruction.
Some observers have indicated that while some governments have pledged
money in the past many have not yet contributed to the reconstruction effort. At an
international conference to support Afghanistan convened in Paris in June, 2008,
delegates pledged $20 billion to support the Afghanistan National Development
Strategy. Key allied governments say that they are committed to staying for a period
of years to stabilize the country. Some EU officials believe that five years or more
will be necessary to build a market economy and proficient governance.79
An additional problem for many of the allies is the growing lack of public
support for continued involvement in Afghanistan. Many of the allies have a difficult
enough problem trying to address the issues of troop commitments and national
caveats for their troops already in Afghanistan. Now, however, many are facing a
growing restlessness among the public for bringing the seven year war to an end or
at least withdrawing troops from the theater.
Afghanistan’s long history without a central government able to extend its reach
over the country’s difficult geographic and political terrain is presenting the allies
with problems rivaling the threat of the Taliban. Political differences within the
alliance over how to manage Afghanistan’s future are apparent in ISAF’s operations.
The allies’ description of PRTs as the “leading edge” of their stabilization effort
masks a divergent reality. Some PRTs are clearly effective, building needed
infrastructure and by most accounts gaining the confidence of local populations.
Others, in the view of some U.S. and European officials, are no more than
showcases, aimed more at demonstrating an ally’s desire to participate in an
important NATO mission than at producing concrete results for the stabilization plan.
In the view of these same officials, NATO may be expecting too much from some of
its new member governments, which, only recently coming out of communism, lack
the experience and the funds to mount an effective reconstruction effort in a distant,
impoverished country.80
The declining fortunes of the Karzai government also present a difficult
obstacle. NATO is attempting both to respect the policies of a nascent representative
government and to urge it forward to better governance. The Karzai government’s
own problems are apparent: discontented warlords, a vigorous drug trade, the
Taliban, and a rudimentary economy and infrastructure. In the view of General
Eikenberry, “The enemy we face is not particularly strong, but the institutions of the
Afghan state remain relatively weak.”81 There is a widespread view that President
78 House Armed Services Committee, June 28, 2006, op. cit.
79 “EU/Afghanistan: Europeans must Prepare for Losses ...,” Atlantic News, July 20, 2006,
p. 2.
80 Interviews with U.S. and European officials, 2006-2007.
81 House Armed Services Committee, hearing on “Security and Stability in Afghanistan,”
(continued...)

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Karzai is losing the confidence of the Afghan people; he blames the slow pace of
reconstruction and insufficient financial support from the international community.
General Ed Butler, the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, said in
May 2006: “This year we need to be seen to be making a difference. It is a real
danger that if people do not feel safer, we may lose their consent.” In his view, poor
governance and not the Taliban insurgency is the country’s central problem, a view
widely reflected by other officials from NATO governments.82 NATO, in this view,
must prepare to deal with successive governments of unknown composition and
policies should the Karzai government fail to endure.
NATO’s effort to assist the Karzai government in weakening the narcotics trade
demonstrates the central dilemma of ISAF’s mission. The allies must fight an
insurgency tied to the opium industry with forceful means while at the same time
attempt to win the confidence of the Afghan people through reconstruction of the
country. In this view, “breaking down suspected insurgents’ doors in the morning
[makes] it difficult to build bridges in the afternoon.”83 While NATO officials state
publicly that allied forces are not burning poppy fields and are depending instead on
the Afghan army and police to do the job, farmers are well aware that it is ISAF that
supplies the intelligence, training, and logistics enabling government security forces
to attack the industry, the lifeline of many poor Afghans.84
NATO’s training of Afghan officials has made measured progress in some areas,
and very little in others. Although the Karzai government has complained that
NATO is not building a sufficiently large army, most allies believe that substantial
progress has been made in developing a professional and reliable force. Since the
beginning of Stage Three, British, French, and Canadian troops have reportedly given
more and more responsibility to the ANA in joint operations.85 As of February 2008,
the ANA has 38,500 troops of which 21,000 are classed by NATO as capable of
counter-insurgency operations with allied support.86
NATO and the broader international community are now making a more
substantial effort to reform the judicial system and build an effective police force.
Italy has successfully urged donor nations to provide more funding to build a judicial
system and to begin implementation of specific programs using the funds. The EU
has assumed responsibility for training the police, and put professional trainers on the
ground in June 2007, an effort yet to bear significant fruit.
81 (...continued)
June 28, 2006.
82 “UK Troops ‘Must Beat Back the Taliban this Year,’” Financial Times, May 23, 2006,
p. 7; interviews with U.S. and European officials, 2006-2007.
83 “Mission Impossible? Why Stabilising Afghanistan Will Be a Stiff Test for NATO,”
Financial Times, July 31, 2006, p. 9. The quotation is a paraphrase by the Financial Times
of a French official who was reflecting on a similar dilemma for French forces in Algeria
in the 1950s.
84 Interviews with U.S. and British officials, 2005-2007.
85 “Army Woefully Unready, Afghans Say,” Globe and Mail, November 16, 2006, p. A13.
86 “Quarterly report to the U.N....,” op. cit.

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The quality and practices of NATO’s own forces have also come into question
by some U.S. and European officials. It has already been noted that some of NATO’s
newer member states attempt to manage PRTs with troops not yet trained for a
stabilization mission in a dangerous environment. U.S. PRTs lack appropriate
civilian specialists.
Some NATO forces also do not have the appropriate equipment for their tasks.
They may lack night-vision equipment, or the technology necessary to detect roadside
bombs. Some NATO governments send forces inappropriate for the task, forces that
are heavy on support functions but light on combat capability. These governments
tend to be reluctant to send their forces into the field to confront the Taliban and to
control warlords and their militias. The result, in this view, has been that British,
Canadian, Dutch, Danish, French and U.S. forces bear a disproportionate share of the
most dangerous tasks.87
The United States has made an evident effort through its PRTs to engage local
Afghan leaders and the general population to convince them of the worth of ISAF’s
mission. While some progress has clearly been made, several U.S. officials have
noted that Afghanistan is a society where personal contact and developed
relationships are critical in building trust and in persuading Afghans to pursue better
governance. The short rotations of some allied forces impede this effort. Some
allied governments, however, are now sending troops into Afghanistan for two-year
rotations, which provide a better opportunity to gain the confidence of the population.
Cohesiveness of command is another lingering issue. While the allies reached
agreement on a command structure linking ISAF and OEF, some observers believe
that national commands will preserve the authority to make final decisions about use
of their forces. The Dutch parliamentary debate clearly signaled this inclination.
ISAF may be having a residual, positive effect on the militaries of some NATO
members, particularly new member states. U.S. military personnel say that true
reform of new members’ militaries can best take place in the field, under difficult
conditions, and through operations with more experienced NATO militaries. By
several accounts, this experience is being gained in Afghanistan.88
Prospects
The Afghanistan mission is an important test of NATO’s out-of-area capability.
In a view of growing prevalence, Afghanistan exemplifies conditions in which
“extreme belief systems, ... unstable and intolerant societies, strategic crime and the
globalization of commodities and communications combine to create a multi-
dimensional threat transcending geography, function, and capability.”89
87 Ibid.
88 Interviews with military officers from NATO governments, 2006-2007.
89 Julian Lindley-French, “Big World, Big Future, Big NATO,” NATO Review, Winter 2005,
p. 5.

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As previously suggested, the NATO allies have maintained a basic unity of
purpose in Afghanistan. Their desire to stabilize the country and to prevent the return
of a terrorist state has led to an ongoing general consensus that ISAF can help to
build a state that is relatively stable and no longer a source of international terrorism.
On the other hand, the growing level of violence carried out by what some
perceive to be a resurgent Taliban, reinforced by the a growing number of al Qaeda
and other foreign fighters, and the perception that the Afghan government has not
made tangible progress in extending its authority, could lead to some wavering
among the allies with respect to a long term commitment to remain in Afghanistan.
Most observers predict that ISAF’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require five
more years, or longer. This prospect has exacerbated an existing problem that several
allied governments already face with respect to declining support among their general
populations. As the years wear on and the situation on the ground shows little
progress and more violence, some policy-makers believe that the five-plus years
time-frame could ultimately lead to new public pressure on NATO member
parliaments to consider downgrading support, or at least reducing the military
commitments to the Afghan mission. As was pointed out by The Atlantic Council
in its March 2008 Issue Brief, “the stalemate in Afghanistan poses a great dilemma
for NATO: how can the 26 NATO governments convince their public to support a
long-term effort in Afghanistan without clear indications of real progress either in the
security or reconstruction sectors. Those allies with substantial forces fighting in
Afghanistan are already fatigued by the political battles at home, as adverse domestic
opinion challenges the governments..”.90
Some observers believe a good portion of public opinion within some allied
nations is directly attributable to an overall negative opinion of the foreign policy of
the current U.S. Administration, especially Iraq policy. These observers suggest that
a new U.S. Administration could have a more positive effect on the international
stage and could serve to help reverse some of the prevailing skepticism. However,
the current U.S. Presidential campaign could serve to complicate this matter. Both
candidates for the White House have begun to speak of a more determined
commitment to improving the situation in Afghanistan. For some observers, this
renewed emphasis on Afghanistan could result in increased pressure on the NATO
allies to get serious about sending more troops to Afghanistan and lifting their
restrictive national caveats. This in turn could lead to more combat operations, more
violence and more casualties, a prospect many NATO allies would be reluctant to
have to explain to their public.
NATO’s exit strategy for Afghanistan requires supporting the development of
the economic foundations of the country and providing the security for a fledgling
government to find a stable political footing that excludes violence, reduces
corruption, and creates a climate conducive to representative institutions. External
factors will affect realization of this exit strategy. Stabilization of Afghanistan is
closely linked to developments in and the intentions of neighboring Iran and
90 “Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and a Plan for Urgent Action”, op. cit., p.7

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Pakistan, a situation that many in the alliance believe demands a continuing U.S.
presence.91 For these reasons,
U.S. leadership of the alliance appears to be at a key moment. The allies believe
that the success of the mission will also be a test of the United States’ ability and
commitment to lead NATO, even if they do not always agree with every element of
U.S. policy in the country. The United States and its NATO allies have greater unity
of purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of NATO’s effort to stabilize
Afghanistan and U.S. leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the
alliance and Washington’s ability to shape NATO’s future.
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan

91 Olivier Roy, “Afghanistan: La Difficile Reconstruction d’un État,” Cahiers de Chailliot,
December 2004.

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