Order Code RS21513
Updated July 8, 2008
Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Kuwait, which has been pivotal to nearly two decades of U.S. involvement in Iraq,
has advanced its democratic development since the fall of Saddam Hussein. However,
it remains mired in internal wrangling over economic issues and the political dominance
of the ruling family, and it is showing signs of Sunni-Shiite tensions previously absent.
This report, prepared with the assistance of Kim Klarman, will be updated.
Governmental Changes and Political Reform1
Kuwait’s optimism after the 2003 fall of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, was
interrupted by a succession crisis upon the January 15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir
Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. His relative, Crown Prince Shaykh Sa’d Abdullah Al Sabah,
was declared successor, but his serious illness led Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-
Ahmad al-Jabir Al-Sabah (about 77, the younger brother of the late Amir) and his branch
of the Sabah family to successfully succeed to rulership. After extensive discussions with
the elected National Assembly, which had never before had a role in succession, the
Assembly formally named Shaykh Sabah as the new Amir on January 29, 2006. The
peaceful handling and Assembly involvement in the succession crisis, was widely hailed.
Amir Sabah subsequently sidestepped a tacit agreement to alternate succession
between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family by appointing members of his Jabir
branch as his Crown Prince/heir apparent (his half-brother, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad
Al Sabah, age 67) and Prime Minister (his nephew, Shaykh Nasser Muhammad al-Ahmad
Al Sabah, age 65). The highest ranking “Salem†in the cabinet is Dr. Mohammad Al
Sabah, who kept his Foreign Minister post and simultaneously was made a deputy prime
minister. In moves that have broadened representation in government, a second Shiite
1 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices
for 2007 (released March 11, 2008); the report Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The
U.S. Record 2006, by its Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (April 5, 2007); the
International Religious Freedom Report (September 14, 2007); and the Trafficking in Persons
Report for 2007 (June 12, 2007).
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Muslim was named, giving the cabinet two Shiite ministers for the first time since 1992;
a third (Minister of Public Works Musa al-Sarraf) was added in March 2007. That
reshuffle also added a second woman to the cabinet, Nuriya as-Sabih, as Minister of
Education and of Higher Education, joining Massouma Mubarak, a Shiite who was
Minister of Health (she was first appointed Minister of Planning in June 2005). Ms.
Mubarak resigned in September 2007 after some members of parliament blamed her for
mismanagement. In January 2008, MPs levied a similar charge against Ms. al-Sabih, but
she survived a no-confidence vote.
Amir Sabah supports political reform, but not at the expense of Sabah control, and
Assembly-government differences have widened since the Amir’s death, creating a sense
of political and economic stagnation in Kuwait. It has the longest serving all-elected
National Assembly of the Gulf monarchies; 50 seats are elected, plus up to 15 ministers
serving in it ex-officio. The body was established by Kuwait’s November 1962
constitution, but the Amir, on several occasions, has used his power to dissolve the
Assembly (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003, 2006) when the Assembly aggressively
challenged the government. The Assembly can vote no confidence in ministers and can
veto government decrees made when the Assembly is not in session. Political parties are
still not permitted, but factions can compete as “currents,†or “trends.†Kuwaitis have a
parallel tradition of informal political consultations in nightly “diwaniyyas†– social
gatherings held by elites.
In May 2006, the Amir suspended the Assembly and called new elections for June
29, 2006, after 29 opposition members — an alliance of liberals and Islamists —
demanded to question the Prime Minister over the government’s refusal to endorse a
proposal to reduce the number of electoral districts to 5, from the current 25. The
opposition wanted to increase the size of each district so that it would be more difficult
to influence the outcome through alleged “vote buying†or tribal politics. In the 2006
election, the opposition, which attracted youth support under the “Orange†banner, won
34 out of the 50 seats. The election was the first in which women could vote or run, but
none of the 27 female candidates (out of 249) won a seat. The schisms between the
opposition and the government became unreconcilable in March 2008 when the Assembly
insisted on a second pay raise for state employees, beyond one granted by the cabinet in
February 2008, as a response to spiraling inflation. The government refused and, on
March 17, 2008, the cabinet resigned. The Amir dissolved the Assembly and set new
elections for May 17.
The May 17, 2008 elections were the first held since the reduction of electoral
districts from 25 to 5 was passed into law. Election results indicate that there will be
ongoing conflict between the legislative and executive branches because Islamists and
conservative tribal leaders won a total of 24 seats in the new parliament – an increase of
four seats. Their allies in opposition to the government – the so-called “liberals†– won
seven seats. Shiites increased their representation by one to a total of five seats. Pro-
government and other independent tribalists will hold the remaining fourteen seats. As in
the 2006 election, none of the 27 women candidates won a seat. Turnout was 68.9%.
Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah announced the formation of a new cabinet only days
after the elections. The new cabinet caused an uproar amongst Islamists who voiced
opposition to the appointment of two women and a member of the Shiite minority. The
two female cabinet members are Nuriya al-Sebih, who was reappointed as the education
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minister, and Mudhi al-Humoud, a liberal academic, who was appointed as state minister
for housing and administrative development. Shiite Fadi Safar, appointed as the minister
of public works and municipalities, was detained briefly in March 2008 and questioned
over his connection to the local branch of Hezbollah, but formal charges were never
brought against him. In June 2008, the newly-formed parliament and cabinet quickly
passed a salary increase for public sector employees and approved additional citizens’
benefits to help payoff rising personal debts associated with the mounting inflation rate
(currently estimated at 10.14%.)
Kuwait’s population is only about 3.3 million, of which 1.02 million are citizens.
Over the past decade, the government expanded the all-male electorate gradually by
extending the franchise to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at
least twenty (as opposed to thirty) years, but these modifications raised the electorate to
only about 130,000, or about 15% of the citizenry. The long deadlock on female suffrage
began to break in May 2004, after the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to
give women the right to vote and run. (A government attempt in May 1999 to institute
female suffrage by decree was vetoed by the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime
Minister Shaykh Sabah pressed the Assembly to adopt the government bill, which it did
on May 16, 2005 (35-23) and which was effective as of the 2006 National Assembly
elections. Islamist deputies added a requirement for gender-segregated polling entrances.
The State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2007
highlighted the licensing of six new daily newspapers during the year but reported that
security forces continue to abuse detainees, particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, and
that stateless residents (“bidoonsâ€) continue to face discrimination. The report also notes
that violence against women remains a “serious and overlooked problem.†Kuwait is now
designated by the State Department’s “Trafficking in Persons†report (for 2007) as a “Tier
Three†(worst level) country — a downgrade from the 2006 report (Tier Two Watch List)
— because Kuwait is not “making significant efforts†to comply with minimum standards
for the elimination of trafficking. Official press censorship ended in 1992, and a vibrant
press often criticizes the government. The government allows one trade union per
occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the Kuwait Trade Union Federation
(KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic workers, are allowed to join
unions. On religious freedom, the State Department report for 2007 reported “no changeâ€
in Kuwait’s performance during the reporting period. Sunni-Shiite tensions have been
previously absent in Kuwait, but Shiite Muslims (about 30% of Kuwait’s population)
have reported official discrimination, including limited access to religious education.
Possibly as a spillover of sectarian tensions in post-Saddam Iraq, sectarian recriminations
flared in February 2008 after several Shiite politicians attended a public ceremony
commemorating the killing earlier that month of Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist leader Imad
Mughniyah. Kuwait has seven officially recognized Christian churches.
The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait uses various programming tools, including dialogue
and public diplomacy and funds from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), to
encourage democracy. MEPI funds have been used to enhance the capabilities of the
media, to promote women’s rights, to support democracy initiatives, and to provide a
broad spectrum of educational opportunities. Several Kuwaiti organizations, such as the
Kuwait Women’s Cultural and Social Society, actively promote democratization.
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U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Cooperation on Iraq
A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an
embassy upon Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait, the first Gulf state
to establish relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was not particularly close to the
United States until the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). In 1987-88, the United States established
a U.S. naval escort and tanker reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti and international
shipping from Iranian naval attacks (Operation Earnest Will). Kuwait’s leaders were
subsequently shaken by the 1990 Iraqi invasion, and they drew even closer to the United
States after U.S. forces liberated Kuwait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Kuwait signed a
ten-year defense pact with the United States on September 19, 1991 (the text is classified),
which reportedly provides for mutual discussions in the event of a crisis; for joint military
exercises, U.S. training of Kuwaiti forces, U.S. arms sales, pre-positioning of U.S.
military equipment (armor for a U.S. brigade), and U.S. access to Kuwaiti facilities, such
as Ali al-Salem Air Base. A related Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides that
U.S. forces in Kuwait be subject to U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law.2 In September 2001, the
pact was renewed for another ten years.
Kuwait contributed materially to the 1991 war and subsequent containment efforts
— it paid $16.059 billion to offset the costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, funded two
thirds of the $51 million per year U.N. budget for the 1991-2003 Iraq-Kuwait Observer
Mission (UNIKOM) that monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border; and contributed about $350
million per year for U.S. military costs of Kuwait-based Iraq containment operations,
including the 1992-2003 U.S.-led enforcement of a “no fly zone†over southern Iraq
(Operation Southern Watch, involving 1,000 Kuwait-based U.S. Air Force personnel.
Kuwait hosted an additional 5,000 U.S. forces during Operation Enduring Freedom that
ousted the Taliban from Afghanistan.
U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes
(dollars in thousands)
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
Economic Support Funds (ESF)
International Military Training and
-
19
14
15
Education (IMET) - to train Kuwaiti
(request)
officers in civil-military tradition. Enables
Kuwait to get discount for all Kuwait-
funded trainees in U.S.
Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-
628
1,025
-
Mining and Related (NADR). Anti-
(193 for
Terrorism component is ATA
ATA)
Kuwait supported the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow
Saddam Hussein (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); it closed off its entire northern half to
secure the U.S.-led invasion force, and allowed U.S. use of two air bases, its international
2 Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute. P.27.
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airport and sea ports, and provided $266 million in burdensharing support to the combat,
including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as food and fuel. Since then,
according to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait contributed $213 million
in burdensharing support to OIF in FY2005, and contributed $210 million in both FY2006
and FY2007.
Kuwait hosts more than 50,000 U.S. military personnel rotating in or out of Iraq. The
key U.S. staging facility in Kuwait is Camp Arifjan and a desert firing range facility,
Camp Buehring (Udairi Range). U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for
U.S. forces in Kuwait during the 1990s, in December 2005. Kuwait’s facilities would be
pivotal in any U.S. withdrawal, and might also host a post-withdrawal U.S. force that
could assist the Iraqi government on short notice. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
officials said in February 2008 they are establishing in Kuwait a permanent platform for
“full spectrum operations†in 27 countries in the region. Among the objectives is to help
Kuwait establish a navy. In appreciation of Kuwait’s support to OIF, on April 1, 2004, the
Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),†a
designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). Kuwait gave $500 million worth
of oil to U. S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.
U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait defense relationship has improved the quality
of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the air force. Its military has now nearly regained its
pre-Iraq invasion strength of 17,000. Kuwait, receives no U.S. defense aid, and is not
eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles and. Major post-1991 Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) include (1) 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in 1993 (deliveries
completed in 1998); (2) 5 Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210
Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million, in 1992 sale (delivered by 1998). Some of
them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003
war; (3) 1992 sale of 40 FA-18 combat aircraft (purchase of an additional 10 are under
consideration); and (4) September 2002 sale of 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped
with the Longbow fire-control system, valued at about $940 million. According to the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), another $730 million in purchases were
agreed during 2005-2007, including a $20 million deal for 436 TOW anti-tank missiles.
The first major sale to Kuwait under the “Gulf Security Dialogue†package for the Gulf
states, designed to contain Iran, was 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60 PAC-2 missiles
and upgrades, valued at about $1.3 billion, notified to Congress on December 4, 2007.
Kuwait is trying to build political ties to newly ascendant Iraqi factions in order to
ensure there is no repeat of the 1990 invasion or the Shiite violence that rocked Kuwait
in the 1980s. The December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait
and an attempted assassination of the Amir in May 1985 were attributed to the Iraqi
Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party, the Shiite party of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
Seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for these attacks and Da’wa activists hijacked
a Kuwait Airlines plane in 1987. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait has built a
water line into Iraq, and it runs a humanitarian operation center (HOC) that has funneled
over $550 million in assistance to Iraqis since Saddam fell, in line with its pledges.
Kuwait has pledged to send an ambassador, but it has not established a full embassy to
date. On April 22, 2008, Kuwait hosted the third Iraq security conference which included
the United States, Iran, and other neighboring countries. However, Kuwait still insists on
full U.N.-supervised reparations by Iraq for damages caused from the 1990 invasion;
about $41 billion of such payments have been awarded to date, and of that about $11
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billion has been paid from an escrow account funded by 5% of Iraq’s oil revenues . That
percentage was set by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003), a reduction
from 25%. In 2004, Kuwait reportedly pledged to forgive a substantial portion of the $25
billion Saddam era debt, but it has not written off the debt to date. Of the 605 Kuwaitis
missing and presumed dead from the 1991 war; the bodies of over 227 have been found
(confirmed by DNA tests) in post-Saddam searches. A Kuwait company, First Kuwaiti
General Trading and Contracting, was lead contractor on the new U.S. embassy in Iraq.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
After Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Kuwait’s fear of Saddam Hussein colored its
foreign relations. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait was more critical than were the
other Gulf states of the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he publicly opposed
war to liberate Kuwait. Kuwait expelled about 450,000 Palestinian workers after
liberation. Since Arafat’s death, Kuwait has rebuilt its relations with the mainstream
Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership. In March 2006, Kuwait pledged $7.5 million per
month in aid to the then Hamas-led government, and it later supported a Saudi-brokered
Fatah-Hamas unity government in March 2007, which later fractured. Kuwait participated
in multilateral peace talks with Israel during 1992-1997, although it did not host any
sessions. In 1994, Kuwait was key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease
enforcement of the secondary (trade with firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade
with firms that do business with blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel.
Cooperation in Global War on Terrorism. The State Department report on
global terrorism for 2007 (released April 2008) credited Kuwait for measures to protect
U.S. forces in Kuwait from terrorist attacks but noted that Kuwait has “difficulty
prosecuting terrorists and terrorism financiers and facilitators.†The report also said that
Kuwait has continued to prosecute 36 members of the “Lions of the Peninsula†extremist
group. Kuwait is criticized for not enacting stronger antiterrorism and money laundering
legislation in 2007. On June 13, 2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets of a
Kuwaiti charity with alleged links to Al Qaeda – the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society
– under Executive Order 13224.
Economic Policy
Although Kuwait has a relatively open economy, U.S. officials have attempted to
persuade Kuwait to open to foreign investment in the energy sector and to expand the
private sector. Kuwait’s state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government
income and 90% of export earnings. The United States imports about 260,000 barrels per
day in crude oil from Kuwait (about 3% of U.S. oil imports). Kuwait’s proven crude oil
reserves are about 95 billion barrels, enough for about 140 years at current production
levels (about 2.5 million barrels per day). The Kuwaiti government wants to open its
northern oil fields to foreign investment (“Project Kuwaitâ€) to generate about 500,000
barrels per day of extra production, but the National Assembly has blocked the $8.5
billion project for over a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty. There
are ongoing discussions about reviving the project. In 1994, Kuwait became a founding
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States
and Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed
as a prelude to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks.