Order Code RL34565
Building an Interagency Cadre of National
Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent
Experience, and Issues for Congress
July 8, 2008
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security
Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience, and
Issues for Congress
Summary
There is a growing consensus among many national security practitioners and
scholars, across the political spectrum, broadly in favor of reforming the interagency
system to encourage a more effective application of all elements of national power.
The reform debates have included proposals to establish and foster an interagency
cadre of national security specialists from all relevant departments and agencies.
According to proponents, cadre members, through a long-term career development
program that might include education, training, and exchange tours in other agencies,
would gain a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other
agencies. They would become better prepared to plan national security missions
together in Washington, D.C., and to execute them in the field, and eventually, better
able to oversee their own agencies’ efforts from leadership positions. As a rule, such
proposals have not been aimed solely at creating individual specialists. Rather, just
as the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in the Department of Defense (DOD) sought to
foster greater “jointness” among the Services, “interagency cadre” proposals have
also aimed to adjust the organizational cultures of all agencies with national security
responsibilities, in order to make interagency collaboration and integration second
nature.
Such recommendations are not new, but they were given a new sense of urgency
by recent operational experiences at home and abroad — from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan to the responses to Hurricane Katrina — which suggested insufficiencies
in the abilities of the U.S. government to integrate the various components of its
efforts. Reflecting the growing interest, in 2008 on Capitol Hill, several committees,
including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services
Committee, have held hearings and sponsored other projects addressing interagency
reform, including proposals for fostering closer integration among agencies.
Meanwhile, in 2007, the Bush Administration quietly launched an initiative, the
National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program, aimed at fostering an
interagency cadre of national security practitioners. The still-inchoate NSPD
program includes a national strategy, an organizational structure, and a pilot
educational program, but to date, it has apparently enjoyed very little visibility on the
Hill. Lessons learned from the early NSPD efforts could prove valuable for those
Members considering the establishment of a permanent legislative requirement for
an interagency cadre program.
This report highlights key past proposals for the establishment of an interagency
cadre, including their rationales; describes and assesses the emergence and operations
to date of the Administration’s NSPD program; and raises a series of issues that
might help inform congressional debates about a possible permanent interagency
cadre requirement. The report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Past Reform Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Recent Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Homeland Security: Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
National Security: Iraq and Afghanistan, Goldwater-Nichols,
and the Quadrennial Defense Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The National Security Professional Development Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Scope of the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Organization and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Executive Steering Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
NSPD Integration Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
National Security Education and Training Consortium . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Education Pillar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Pre-existing DOD Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
NDU Pilot Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
NSPD Education: Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Training Pillar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Experience Pillar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Possible Roles for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Program Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Nature of “Integration” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Program Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Integration Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Personnel System Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Building an Interagency Cadre of National
Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent
Experience, and Issues for Congress
Introduction
There is a growing consensus among many national security practitioners and
scholars, across the political spectrum, broadly in favor of reforming the interagency
system to encourage a more effective application of all elements of national power.1
The reform debates have included proposals to establish and foster an interagency
cadre of national security specialists from all relevant departments and agencies.
According to proponents, cadre members, through a long-term career development
program that might include education, training, and exchange tours in other agencies,
would gain a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other
agencies. They would become better prepared to plan national security missions
together in Washington, D.C., and execute them in the field, and eventually, better
able to oversee their own agencies’ efforts from leadership positions. As a rule, such
proposals have not been aimed solely at creating individual specialists. Rather, just
as the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in the Department of Defense (DOD) sought to
foster greater “jointness” among the Services,2 “interagency cadre” proposals have
also aimed to adjust the organizational cultures of all agencies with national security
responsibilities, in order to make interagency collaboration and integration second
nature.
Such recommendations are not new, but they were given a new sense of urgency
by recent operational experiences at home and abroad — from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan to the responses to Hurricane Katrina — which suggested insufficiencies
in the abilities of the U.S. government to integrate the various components of its
efforts. Reflecting the growing interest, in 2008 on Capitol Hill, several committees,
including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services
Committee, have held hearings and sponsored other projects addressing interagency
reform, including proposals for fostering closer integration among agencies.3 The
1 For an overview of the current national security reform debates, see CRS Report RL34455,
Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform
Debates
, by Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat Towell.
2 A major focus of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986
, October 1, 1986, P.L. 99-433, and additional subsequent amendments to Title 10, U.S.
Code, has been improving the abilities of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines to
cooperate closely across Service boundaries.
3 On March 5, 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) held a hearing,
(continued...)

CRS-2
debates are likely to receive an additional jumpstart from the Project on National
Security Reform (PNSR), which intends to put forward a comprehensive set of
proposals for interagency reform, including a new draft National Security Act, later
this year; reportedly, those recommendations are likely to include the establishment
of an interagency cadre.4
Meanwhile, in 2007, the Bush Administration quietly launched an initiative, the
National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program, aimed at fostering an
interagency cadre of national security practitioners. The still-inchoate NSPD
program includes a national strategy, an organizational structure, and a pilot
educational program, but to date, it has apparently enjoyed very little visibility on the
Hill. Lessons learned from the early NSPD efforts could prove valuable for those
Members considering the establishment of a permanent legislative requirement for
an interagency cadre program.
This report highlights key past proposals for the establishment of an interagency
cadre, including their rationales; describes and assesses the emergence and operations
to date of the Administration’s NSPD program; and raises a series of issues that
might help inform congressional debates about a possible permanent interagency
cadre requirement. The report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
Calls for the development of some form of interagency cadre career
development program to help improve interagency integration date back at least to
3 (...continued)
“Strengthening National Security through Smart Power — a Military Perspective,” to
explore implications of the report by the Commission on Smart Power, Richard L. Armitage
and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., co-chairs, “A Smarter, More Secure America,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, November 2007. On April 24, 2008, the SFRC held a follow-on
hearing, “Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform.”
On April 15, 2008, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), held a hearing,
“Building Partnership Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process.” In March
2008, the HASC Panel on Roles and Missions released its final report, “Initial Perspectives,”
dated January 2008, which included interagency coordination as one of three primary lines
of inquiry. On April 17, 2008, following a series of hearings, the HASC Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations released a report, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility:
Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
4 PNSR may be the most comprehensive current interagency reform initiative, based on the
scope of its aims and the broad membership of its Guiding Coalition and its contributors.
PNSR is based at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and partially funded by the
Department of Defense, pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008
, P.L. 110-181, Section 1049(a), which authorized the Secretary of Defense to contract
with an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization for up to $3 million to conduct a
study of the national security interagency system. PNSR Executive Director James Locher
III, serving as a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer in the 1980s, directed the
development of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. See [http://www.pnsr.org].

CRS-3
the immediate aftermath of World War II. They were given fresh impetus by recent
operational experiences at home and abroad.
Past Reform Proposals
The largest major contingency of the 20th century, World War II, prompted some
calls to use professional development tools to improve the nation’s ability to apply
all of its critical instruments of power more effectively. In the war’s immediate
aftermath, the War Department commissioned a study of military officer education,
and tasked Army Lieutenant General Leonard Gerow to lead it. In February 1947,
the study team issued its findings, including a recommendation for the establishment
of a National Security University. The University would bring together and educate
practitioners not just from DOD but from all the key security-related agencies — a
central tenet of later, more multi-faceted interagency cadre proposals. The University
would include the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF, which had already
been established), as well as four new schools — a National War College, a joint
administrative college, a joint intelligence college, and a Department of State
college.5 As it turned out, only the National War College (NWC) was established,
and in 1976, ICAF and the NWC were brought together under the new National
Defense University, designed to pool the intellectual resources of the defense
community.
Fifty years later, in the aftermath of the Cold War and during a time of
expanding U.S. government involvement in nation-building missions, the National
Defense Panel (NDP) recommended the establishment of an interagency cadre based
on long-term, multi-faceted career development.6 The NDP itself, a “nonpartisan,
independent panel,” was established by the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1997 to assess and report on the execution by the
Department of Defense of the 1997 quadrennial defense review process.7 The NDP
recommended creating:
5 See John W Yaeger, “Developing National Security Professionals,” Joint Forces
Quarterly
, Issue 49, 2nd quarter 2008, p.155. Yeager cites Leonard T. Gerow, “Report of
War Department Military Education Board on Education System for Officers of the Army,”
February 1946, 10, Special Collections, National Defense University Library, Washington
DC.
6 Earlier that year, in May 1997, the Clinton Administration had issued Presidential Decision
Directive 56 (PDD 56), which also aimed at fostering greater interagency coordination, but
with a more immediate operational purpose and a narrower focus. PDD 56 required the
National Security Council, working with “appropriate U.S. Government educational
institutions,” to “develop and conduct an interagency training program,” with the goal of
training mid-level managers in political-military planning for complex contingency
operations. Thus, the goal was training current practitioners to do their jobs better, rather
than fostering a new professional cadre through long-term career development that might
include training as one component. See White House White Paper on Presidential Decision
Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” May 1997, available at
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm].
7 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-201, September 23,
1996. Section 924 provides the mandate for the NDP. Section 923 provides the mandate
for the quadrennial defense review process that the NDP was to assess.

CRS-4
... an interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian and military officers,
whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national security structures.
Such a cadre would be similar in spirit to the “joint” experience envisioned by
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Attention should be given to their education,
development, and career development. A certain number of “interagency” slots
should be identified within the national security community, including domestic
agencies that have foreign affairs responsibilities (e.g. Justice, Commerce,
Energy) and staffed by the interagency cadre.
The panel further recommended that to support the new cadre, a national
security curriculum should be established, “... combining course work at the National
Defense University and National Foreign Affairs Training Center, with a mix of
civilian, military, and foreign students to receive training and education in strategic
affairs.”8
In February 2001, as part of a larger package of proposed national security
reforms, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (the
“Hart-Rudman Commission”) proposed the creation of an interagency cadre called
the National Security Service Corps (NSSC) and spelled out its recommendations in
detail. The goal would be developing leaders “skilled at producing integrative
solutions to U.S. national security policy problems.” The program would include
full-spectrum career development, including rotational assignments and professional
education, and these experiences would be required in order “to hold certain
positions or to be promoted to certain levels.” The scope of “national security”
would be broadly defined — participating departments would include “Defense,
State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy, and the new National Homeland
Security Agency.” The proposals focused only on civil servants — the military, the
intelligence community, and the Foreign Service would be excluded.
To help integrate the efforts by multiple agencies, the Commission
recommended the creation of an “interagency advisory group.” The group would
ensure that promotion rates for the NSSC were at least comparable to those
elsewhere in the Civil Service, and help establish guidelines for rotational
assignments and for meeting professional education requirements. Departments
would retain control over their own personnel and would continue to make
promotion decisions. The Commission believed that specific legislative authority for
such an initiative was not necessary.9
More recently, the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) made a very similar recommendation, noting their
debt to the Hart-Rudman Commission. They proposed and described the creation of
a “national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to
seek out interagency experience, education, and training.” To the Hart-Rudman
proposals, the CSIS team added that to make the program workable for civilian
8 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,
U.S. Department of Defense, December 1997.
9 The United States Commission on National Security/ 21st Century (“Hart-Rudman
Commission”), Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report,
February 15, 2001, pp. xvi, 101, 102.

CRS-5
agencies, “Congress should approve a 10% float” — additional personnel — to allow
participation in training, education, and exchange programs.10
Recent Lessons Learned
In recent years, the interagency reform debates received a powerful jumpstart
from the convergence of “lessons learned” thinking in the homeland security and
traditional national security communities, developed to assess operational
experiences, respectively, in response to Hurricane Katrina, and in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Members of both communities concluded that creating some form of
interagency cadre of specialists would help improve coordination in the future. This
convergence of thinking gave additional weight to the recommendations, but also
introduced a fundamental tension concerning the relative importance of national and
homeland security considerations in shaping future interagency coordination
initiatives.
Homeland Security: Hurricane Katrina. In February 2006, the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Frances Fragos
Townsend, submitted to the President the report Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned
, which described the state of national preparedness before
Katrina’s landfall and assessed the responses in the immediate aftermath. The report
highlighted numerous challenges responding organizations faced in trying to
coordinate their efforts — for example, communicating with one another effectively
given some communications systems that were mutually incompatible and others that
were rendered inoperable by natural events. The report made 125 recommendations
for change.11 Among those recommendations, the report called for the creation of a
“comprehensive program for the professional development and education of the
Nation’s homeland security personnel,” with the goal of fostering a “... ‘joint’ Federal
Interagency, State, local and civilian team.” The scope of the proposed program
would thus be broad, including federal, state, and local officials as well as emergency
management persons within the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and
faith-based and community groups.
Like the Hart-Rudman Commission report, the Katrina Lessons Learned report
spelled out a de-centralized division of labor between individual agencies and the
interagency systemic level. The Office of Personnel Management would establish
the professional development program, and individual agencies would implement it.
10 Clark A. Murdock and Michele Flournoy, Lead Investigators, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols:
U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report
, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, July 2005, p. 40. The “10%” figure, frequently cited in
discussions of the possible creation of a civilian “float,” was borrowed from the rough
percentage used by the military Services. In practice, civilian agencies might require a
larger or smaller percentage float, depending on the formats of the education and training
programs they adopt, and on how they define backfill requirements.
11 Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, February
2006, pp.119-120, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned.pdf].

CRS-6
Each participating agency would determine which of its offices plays homeland
security roles, and what preparation would be required to support the execution of
those responsibilities. Each agency would establish its own professional
development program, including “career assignments, education, exercises, and
training.” The Department of Homeland Security, in turn, would set up an
interagency working group to establish shared goals and standards for measuring
individual agency progress.
The Katrina Lessons Learned report also called for making both exchange tours
in other agencies, and professional education, prerequisites for “senior managerial
positions.” It argued that legislation should be considered to support this provision.
National Security: Iraq and Afghanistan, Goldwater-Nichols, and the
Quadrennial Defense Review. Meanwhile, operational experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan led many participants and observers to conclude that interagency
coordination in the execution of national security activities left much to be desired.
Many, particularly senior military officers, suggested that the military’s experiences
integrating the Services under the umbrella of “jointness” might be germane. In
2004, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Peter
Pace, in a series of public speeches and addresses to DOD war college audiences,
suggested that the nation might need a “Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency.” He
emphasized the value that “cross-pollination,” trust, and understanding among
agencies could have — and the fact that within DOD, the Services “had to be forced”
into jointness by legislation.12
“Goldwater-Nichols” is a touchstone for the uniformed military — both a
watershed event for today’s senior leaders, and a fundamental way of doing business
for junior officers — so it is no surprise that it provides a basis of comparison for
many, in thinking about possible interagency reform. In common parlance,
“Goldwater-Nichols” refers to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986
itself (P.L. 99-433, October 1, 1986), and to the ongoing
process of implementing and adapting the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, including
follow-on amendments to Title 10, U.S. Code, and updated practices and policies
within DOD.
The 1986 Act ushered in fundamental defense reorganization, aimed at reducing
inter-Service rivalries and fostering greater “jointness” among the Services. The Act
began by defining what the new concept “joint” meant, thereby bounding the
substantive scope of the Act. The Act stated, “the term ‘joint matters’ means matters
relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters
relating to — (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency
12 General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Extemporaneous
Remarks as delivered to the Marine Corps Association/ Naval Institute’s Forum 2004,”
September 7, 2004, available at [http://www.jcs.mil/vice_chairman/speeches/MCANaval
InstituteFORUM2004.html].

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planning; and (3) command and control of combat operations under unified
command.”13
To achieve greater “jointness,” the Goldwater-Nichols Act and related later
amendments to Title 10, U.S. Code, created and elaborated a professional
development system for “joint specialty officers,” including requirements for both
education and joint duty assignments.14 The John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
made an important revision, amending Title
10, U.S. Code, to establish a four-tiered system of joint qualification that emphasized
career-long development and introduced more flexible options for meeting the
requirements.15 As the amended Title 10 now states: “The purpose of establishing
such qualification levels is to ensure a systematic, progressive, career-long
13 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1,
1986, P.L. 99-443, §401, amended Title 10, U.S. Code, creating the new §668. The
subsequent legislative history of the section suggests the premise that key concepts may
evolve over time, in response to the changing global context; and also that crafting clear
concepts can be a challenge. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2007
, October 17, 2006, P.L. 109-364, §519(a), which amended Title 10,
U.S. Code §668(a), revised and expanded the definition of ‘joint matters’ to mean: “...
matters related to the achievement of unified action by multiple military forces in operations
conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information
environment, including matters relating to (A) national military strategy; (B) strategic
planning and contingency planning; (C) command and control of operations under unified
command; D) national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United
States; and (E) combined operations with military forces of allied nations. The 2007 NDAA
added that in this context, the term ‘multiple military forces’ refers: “... to forces that
involve participants from the armed forces and one or more of the following: (A) Other
departments and agencies of the United States, (B) The military forces or agencies of other
countries, (C) Non-governmental persons or entities.” The new definition increased the list
of applicable domains to include space and cyberspace, and the range of activities to include
those undertaken with other U.S. government agencies and international partners. The
wording of the 2007 NDAA indicated that unified actions by U.S. Services qualify as ‘joint’
only if they are joined by other U.S. agencies, other countries’ militaries, or NGOs — some
observers suggest that this caveat may have been unintentional.
14 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1,
1986, P.L. 99-443, §401(a), amended Title 10, U.S. Code, by inserting Chapter 38 “Joint
Officer Management,” including §661 through §668, which introduced the requirement for
both education and experience to earn the joint specialty officer designation. The Ronald
W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
, October 28, 2004, P.L.
108-375, §532(a) elaborated on education requirements by amending Title 10, U.S. Code,
adding a new Chapter 107, “Professional Military Education,” §2151-2157. In addition to
adding new language, the changes included striking some subsections of the previous Title
10 §663 and transferring others to the new Chapter 107.
15 The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, October 17,
2006, P.L. 109-364, §516, amending Title 10, U.S. Code §661. The amendment replaced
the term “joint specialty officers” with “officers who are joint qualified.” In July 2007,
DOD unveiled its revised and renamed Joint Qualification System, reflecting the FY2007
NDAA changes. See joint briefing by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff, “Joint Officer Management: Joint Qualification System (JQS) 101,” July 2007,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/briefings/JQS-101-20070707.ppt].

CRS-8
development of officers in joint matters and to ensure that officers serving as general
and flag officers have the requisite experience and education to be highly proficient
in joint matters.”16
To make the new system work, the Goldwater-Nichols Act and follow-on
legislation established links between “jointness” and career progression. In the first
place, the legislation took steps to ensure that pursuing “jointness” would have no
negative repercussions on individual career advancement, by supporting parity in
promotion decisions concerning “joint” officers and their peers.17
In addition, in order to create a strong incentive for individual participation, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act established joint service as a requirement for promotion to
the rank of general or flag officer.18 The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002
strengthened the requirements for promotion to general or flag
officer, to include serving a “full tour” of duty in a joint duty assignment, as well as
achieving the “joint specialty” designation.19
In 2005, the Department of Defense carried out the congressionally mandated
quadrennial defense review (QDR) process, which drew on reflections concerning
Goldwater-Nichols and on lessons learned from recent operational experiences.20
16 Title 10, U.S. Code, §661(b)(1)(A), as amended by the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
, October 17, 2006, P.L. 109-364, §516(b).
17 Title 10, U.S. Code, §662, added by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986
, October 1, 1986, P.L. 99-443, §401(a), tasked the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are
such that officers serving on the Joint Staff, and officers who have the joint specialty are
“promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same
grade and competitive category who are serving on or have served on the headquarters staff
of their armed force”; and that officers serving in joint duty assignments are promoted “at
a rate not less than for all officers of the same armed force in the same grade and
competitive category.” This measure may be seen as protection and support for those
officers undertaking joint service, and also as insurance that Services would select well-
qualified officers to serve in joint assignments. The John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, October
17, 2006, P.L. 109-364, §517, amended
Title 10, U.S. Code, §662 to remove the provision concerning promotion of officers with the
“joint specialty” and leaving only those provisions concerning promotion rates for those
officers serving on the Joint Staff and in joint duty assignments.
18 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1,
1986, P.L. 99-443, §404, amended Title 10, U.S. Code, §619 by adding subsection (e),
which began: “(1) An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier
general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment.”
Section 619(e)(2) described conditions under which the Secretary of Defense might waive
that requirement. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, November
30, 1993, P.L. 103-160, §931(a) amended Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 36, by relocating
these provisions from §619 to a new §619a.
19 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, December 28, 2001, P.L.
107-107, §525(a), which amended Title 10 U.S. Code, §619a(a).
20 The permanent QDR requirement is found in Title 10, U.S. Code, §118, added by the
(continued...)

CRS-9
The QDR Report was issued in February 2006, the same month that the Katrina
Lessons Learned
report was released. The QDR Report called specifically for an
interagency cadre: “... the Department supports the creation of a National Security
Officer (NSO) corps — an interagency cadre of senior military and civilian
professionals able to effectively integrate and orchestrate the contributions of
individual government agencies on behalf of larger national security interests.” In
putting forward this proposal, the QDR Report also specifically invoked the joint
duty assignment provisions of Goldwater-Nichols, noting, “Much as the
Goldwater-Nichols requirement that senior officers complete a joint duty assignment
has contributed to integrating the different cultures of the Military Departments into
a more effective joint force, the QDR recommends creating incentives for senior
Department and non-Department personnel to develop skills suited to the integrated
interagency environment.”21
The National Security Professional
Development Program
In May 2007, as a direct outgrowth of the convergence of national and homeland
security “lessons learned,” the Bush Administration launched an interagency cadre
initiative, the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program.22
Despite apparently broad and long-standing support for the establishment of such a
program, NSPD was launched quietly, without much fanfare, and senior officials
have seldom spoken about it publicly.23 The NSPD efforts to date may be instructive
for those considering future interagency cadre options.
20 (...continued)
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, October 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65,
§901.
21 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 79,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf].
22 For an overview of the program and supporting documentation, see the NSPD web portal
at [http://www.nspd.gov]. The acronym is potentially confusing, because during both terms
of this Bush Administration, “NSPD” also stands for National Security Presidential
Directive.
23 One exception was a reference by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in January 2008,
who, naming the NSPD program as one of a number of recent interagency reforms,
mentioned one of its components and described it somewhat incorrectly. He said: “A new
executive order on national security professional development encourages Foreign Service
officers and civil servants from State as well as the military and other departments to serve
tours in other agencies in a way that enhances their career and promotion prospects.” NSPD
does not include military officers or Foreign Service Officers, see below. See Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
January 26, 2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?
speechid=1211].

CRS-10
Mandate
The NSPD program has no legislative mandate. It is based exclusively on
executive branch guidance, including an executive order issued in May 2007, and the
National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals (“National
Strategy”)
, released in July 2007.24 Without some basis in law, the program’s future
under the next Administration will depend on the discretion of the new leadership.
According to the executive order, the broad purpose of the NSPD program is “to
enhance the national security of the United States, including preventing, protecting
against, responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters.” The
program aims to achieve such enhancement by providing opportunities in three areas,
or “pillars” — education, training, and professional experience — and by linking
progress through the program with career opportunities.25
Scope of the Program
Early efforts of the NSPD program included defining the terms “national
security” and “national security professional,” and determining to which persons and
positions those definitions ought to apply. Reportedly, these fundamental debates
about the basic scope of the program have not yet been fully resolved.
The program pointedly defines “national security” to include both “traditional
national security and homeland security missions.”26 The National Strategy
attempted to refine that definition, somewhat circularly, by stating that “national
security missions” are those necessary for the implementation of a series of national
strategies: “... among others, the National Defense Strategy, the National Drug
Control Strategy
, the National Intelligence Strategy, the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism
, the National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction
, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
, the National
Security Strategy
, the National Response Plan, the National Cyber Security Strategy,
and the War on Terrorism National Implementation Plan.”27
Without a crisp definition of “national security” itself, the NSPD program has
struggled to clearly define the term “national security professional” (NSP). The
NSPD web portal includes this version: “National security professionals are those
personnel in positions responsible for developing strategies, creating plans to
implement, and executing common missions in direct support of U.S. national
24 Executive Order 13434, May 17, 2007, “National Security Professional Development,”
available at [http://www.nspd.gov/NSPD_Resources/Documents/order]; and National
Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals
, July 2007, available at
[http://www.nspd.gov/NSPD_Resources/Documents/National_Strategy_for_Professional
_Development].
25 Executive Order, para.1.
26 See the NSPD web portal, [http://www.nspd.gov], and the National Strategy, p. 1.
27 National Strategy, p. 2.

CRS-11
security objectives.”28 An NSPD “Action List” approved as guidance in March 2008
and posted on the NSPD web portal includes the same definition with one key
difference: it begins, “Federal national security professionals are those personnel....”
As written, this definition leaves open the possibility that there might exist
non-federal NSPs, for whom the definition might be different.29 For its part, the
National Strategy suggests that NSPs are exclusively federal government employees.
For example, it notes: “A national security professional development framework
must utilize existing and new opportunities to develop Federal Government
professionals with the breadth and depth of knowledge, skills, abilities, and
experiences necessary for them to carry out their national security responsibilities
effectively.”30
The “Action List” names some “additional clarifying criteria for defining
national security positions.” In addition to having a role in executing aspects of
various national strategies, NSPs, according to the “Action List,” have “significant
interaction with other departments, agencies, or government entities”; and “may be
called upon in U.S. Government operations or crises.”31
In practice, NSPD officials estimate that NSPs will include approximately
20,000 federal government employees, of which about 1,500 will be Senior
Executive Service (SES) positions and the rest GS-13s through GS-15s (and their
rank equivalents).32 To some officials familiar with the program, these numbers
seem low, and they have wondered which positions at the Department of Defense,
for example, would not logically fall under the rubric of national security. Others
suggest that the relatively low numbers may have a practical explanation — the
NSPD program tasks individual departments and agencies to produce lists of their
respective NSP positions, but provides no additional resources to support NSP
education, training, or other programs, so agencies may have an incentive to lowball
the total numbers reported.
From the outset, the NSPD program has specifically excluded three major
categories of federal professionals: “Department of Defense military personnel,” the
Foreign Service, and the intelligence community.33 According to NSPD officials,
28 NSPD web portal, [http://www.nspd.gov], accessed June 24, 2008.
29 Emphasis added. “Action List for Short-Term Implementation,” revised as of 3/14/2008,
available at [http://www.nspd.gov/rawmedia_repository/433b656bbafc27bd7a1b91c1bf
3 0 b 0 5 e ? / A c t i o n % 2 0 L i s t % 2 0 f o r % 2 0 S h o r t - T e r m % 2 0 I m p l e m e n t a t i o n -
3a11aa38b2bdaccdacfe3b3511932494.pdf]. It is possible that the Action List drafters
misplaced an adjective and intended to indicate, “National security professionals are those
federal personnel....” It is also possible that the ambiguity was intentional.
30 National Strategy, p. 3.
31 “Action List” p.1.
32 NSPD web portal.
33 Executive Order, para.5. Using the descriptor “DoD” before “military personnel”
suggests that the non-DOD military service, the U.S. Coast Guard, could be included. The
March 2008 “Action List,” p. 2, added that participation by political appointees is not
(continued...)

CRS-12
these exclusions were based in part on the fact that each of these communities
maintains its own career development program, which in some fashion incorporate
elements of interagency coordination. Some officials from those communities
reportedly feared that full participation in the NSPD program might impinge on time
and resources available to meet their existing career development requirements. In
theory, with agreement from the ESC, any of those communities could seek to make
the NSP designation available to its members. In practice, although the practical
implications for their career paths have not yet been clarified, some members of these
communities have already taken part in some NSPD programs, including a pilot
educational program (see below).
Organization and Structure
In general, governance of the NSPD program is characterized by weak central
administration and largely decentralized execution. Specific leadership roles, and the
relationships among key NSPD bodies, have shifted since the program’s inception.
Executive Steering Committee. The May 2007 executive order created an
Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to provide senior-level oversight of the NSPD
program. The executive order specified that the ESC would be chaired by the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The ESC’s relatively
extensive membership, reaching beyond the bounds of those agencies traditionally
concerned with national security, includes the Principals or their designees from the
Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Agriculture, Labor, Health and
Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy,
Education, and Homeland Security; and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In practice,
according to participants, agency designees tend to be senior human resources
professionals.34
The executive order provides that the ESC reports jointly to the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs. That dual reporting chain — and the dual
emphasis in general — may be considered both an innovative strength of the NSPD
program, and also, according to some officials, the source of ongoing tensions about
the program’s focus.
As established by the executive order, the ESC’s broad mandate — to “facilitate
the implementation of the National Strategy” — is relatively weak, and individual
agencies are the primary engines of the effort. Agencies craft career development
initiatives, and it is the function of the ESC to “coordinate, to the maximum extent
practicable, national security professional development programs and guidance
issued by the heads of agencies in order to ensure an integrated approach to such
33 (...continued)
envisaged.
34 For example, the representative for the Office of the Secretary of Defense comes from
OSD (Personnel and Readiness). The Joint Staff, which has a separate seat at the table, is
represented by the J7, which is responsible for joint force development.

CRS-13
programs.”35 The National Strategy elaborates on this theme, arguing that core
competencies and requirements differ among agencies, and it states that therefore, the
Strategy “does not call for a single human resource or career development standard,”
but rather “promotes an integration of national security professional development
resources and opportunities.”36
In late 2007, leadership of the ESC shifted — rather abruptly, some observers
note — from OPM to OMB, under the personal direction of Deputy Director for
Management Clay Johnson. The shift took place after OPM, in accordance with
Section 3 of the executive order, met a major milestone by submitting a plan for the
implementation of the National Strategy. An updated implementation plan is
expected by October 1, 2008.
NSPD Integration Office. The NSPD Integration Office (NSPD IO) is a
small body formed earlier this year that coordinates NSPD-related activities among
agencies, on behalf of the ESC. The NSPD IO is led by retired Army Major General
William Navas, Jr., a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, supported by an SES Deputy detailed from the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and a handful of staff provided by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness. The office has a limited operating budget provided by
DOD.
The day-to-day focus of the NSPD IO is coordination rather than execution.
With its skeleton staff and limited resources, the office in its current form would not
appear to have the capacity for more robust missions. As the NSPD portal describes,
the office conveys ESC guidance to the appropriate agencies, monitors
implementation, provides coordination among agencies, and reports back to the ESC.
National Security Education and Training Consortium. The NSPD
effort is also expected to include a National Security Education and Training
Consortium (NSETC), led by a Board of Directors that, like the NSPD IO, reports
directly to the ESC. The Consortium itself is to include education and training
institutions, public and private, that host NSPD programs.
The Board was established in late spring 2008. It includes representatives from
the departments and agencies named as ESC participants in the executive order (see
above), and is supported in part by the Education and Training Center at the United
35 Executive Order, Section 3(c).
36 National Strategy, p.3. The strategy adds: “It is the responsibility of each Federal
department and agency with a role in national security to reform and enhance its
professional development programs in conformity with Executive Order 13434 and this
Strategy,” p. 4.

CRS-14
States Institute of Peace (USIP).37 The Board has been tasked to nominate
Consortium members and establish criteria for its NSPD programs.
Education Pillar
Progress to date in the NSPD education pillar has relied in part on pre-existing
initiatives and programs at DOD educational institutions.
Mandate. The NSPD National Strategy stated that the federal government
would “establish a broad interagency education system.” To that end, rather than
create new programs from scratch, the ESC was tasked first to identify existing
programs inside and outside government, to synchronize and provide curricula as
needed, to enable virtual connectivity, and to consider a wide array of possible
formats including short-term programs and distance learning.38
Pre-existing DOD Initiatives. Well before the launch of the NSPD program,
DOD, based on lessons learned from recent operational experiences, had begun
exploring ways to expand interagency education and training. The 2006 QDR
Report
, borrowing terminology from the 1947 Gerow study (see above), called for
the transformation of the National Defense University (NDU), located at Ft. McNair
in Washington, D.C., into a “true National Security University.” As the QDR Report
described it: “... this new institution will be tailored to support the educational needs
of the broader U.S. national security profession. Participation from interagency
partners will be increased and the curriculum will be reshaped in ways that are
consistent with a unified U.S. government approach to national security missions,
and greater interagency participation will be encouraged.”39
In response to these plans, Representative Ike Skelton, then-Ranking Member
of the House Armed Services Committee, and long a strong proponent of
professional military education, wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, urging him not to take a step that might impinge on joint professional
37 USIP has also provided substantial and similar support to the interagency Consortium for
Complex Operations (CCO), including a survey of relevant existing training and education
programs (“Sharing the Space: A Study on Education and Training for Complex
Operations”). The CCO, formally launched on April 28, 2008, and supported by a small,
dedicated staff from DOD, is a virtual community of practice, geared toward current
educators, and civilian and military practitioners, in the field of complex operations. The
CCO defines complex operations as “counterinsurgency; stability, security, transition and
reconstruction operations; and irregular warfare.” See the CCO web portal at
[https://www.ccoportal.org/]. The CCO and NSPD statements of purpose sound similar in
some respects, but the programs differ in their fundamental focus: the CCO focuses on
improving current and future practice in a specific functional area, while the NSPD —
which might usefully draw on the CCO’s efforts — is a much broader, longer-term career
development program aimed, like the Goldwater-Nichols process, at changing the ways
organizations as well as personnel work together.
38 National Strategy, pp. 4-5.
39 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 79,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf].

CRS-15
military education (JPME).40 General Pace, by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, agreed, and he reportedly gave guidance to make sure that new
interagency-focused initiatives would not interfere with the execution of the
military’s own existing educational requirements.41
Therefore, instead of transforming itself into a “National Security University,”
including new bricks-and-mortar facilities, NDU began exploring options for creating
virtual communities with counterpart institutions, including the Foreign Service
Institute, and the National Intelligence University. This approach also reportedly
eased concerns of some civilian agencies that developing interagency educational
programs within DOD facilities might give the program too much of a defense focus.
NDU Pilot Program. After the NSDP executive Order was signed in May
2007, the ground-up NDU-led efforts were subsumed under the NSPD umbrella.
While NDU’s early efforts to expand interagency education had been guided
primarily by educators, under the NSPD umbrella, human resources professionals,
responsible in general for establishing competencies to guide educational
requirements, assumed the lead role.42 The first major initiative was the NSPD
education pilot program, hosted by NDU during the 2007-2008 academic year.
NDU hosted the pilot program at three of its schoolhouses — the National War
College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at Ft.
McNair, and the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia. According
to its mission statement, the goal of the pilot program was to produce professionals
able to “analyze, at the strategic and operational level, the capabilities, organizational
cultures, procedures, and roles of U.S. departments and agencies in the planning and
conduct of complex operations in peace, crisis, war and post-conflict overseas and
in homeland contingencies.”43
40 See Ike Skelton, “Letter to the Honorable Donald L. Rumsfeld,” dated April 4, 2006,
Special Collections, National Defense University Library, Washington DC; cited in John
W Yaeger, “Developing National Security Professionals,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 49,
2nd quarter 2008, p. 117.
41 Interviews with DOD officials. For example, interagency education efforts could
conceivably impinge on JPME, for example, by taking classroom seats from the military and
giving them instead to civilians, or by changing the core curriculum, allowing less time for
JPME-focused course work.
42 The NSPD program established a working set of competencies — “National Security
Professionals Shared Competencies for Interagency Operations” — which are posted on the
NSPD web portal and quite general. The list includes strategic thinking; critical and
creative thinking; leading and working with interagency teams; collaborating; planning,
managing and conducting interagency operations; maintaining global and cultural acuity;
mediating and negotiating; and communicating. Some observers have suggested that the
competencies — basic desired objectives of the overall program — require further
refinement.
43 Joint Staff Briefing (to the Military Education Coordination Council) “National Security
Professional Development”, National Defense University, National Security Education
Consortium, Pilot Program Update, April 17, 2008. The mission statement is annotated to
(continued...)

CRS-16
A total of 38 students took part — 15 at the NWC, 15 at ICAF, and 8 at the
JFSC. Of those, 11 were military officers, including members of the U.S. Coast
Guard. Participating civilian agencies included the CIA, and the Departments of
Homeland Security, Justice, and Energy, as well as the Congressional Research
Service.44 At each institution, NSPD students completed all of the regular core
curriculum courses, and then selected their elective courses from special lists.45 At
the NWC and ICAF, 12 electives were available, including — illustratively —
“Intelligence and National Security,” “Homeland Security,” “Stabilization and
Reconstruction,” and “Interagency Negotiation.” At the JFSC, available electives
included “Case Studies in Interagency and International Operations”; “Homeland
Security, Transformation and the War against Terrorism”; “Joint Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance”; and “Just War to Jihad: Ethics in an Age of
Uncertainty.”
The pilot program participants, who graduated on June 12, 2008, are to receive
a designation in their personnel records that they completed the NSPD education
pillar. According to NSPD officials, eligible participants will still be required to
complete the training and professional experience pillars, in order to be designated
National Security Professionals. The regulations for those pillars have not yet been
produced.
“Lessons learned” efforts, including a series of focus groups conducted by NDU,
and informal feedback volunteered by students, suggested a few concerns with the
pilot program’s execution.46 Some observers reportedly commented that it was not
obvious how the NSPD educational objectives differed from those of the normal
NDU programs. This observation might be considered a vote of confidence in the
adaptability of NDU programs in general, which have been revised and updated in
recent years to reflect greater concern with interagency issues. At the NWC, for
example, after the 2004-2005 academic year, the core curriculum was revised to
include a full core course on Non-Military Elements of Strategy.47 Some pilot
program participants advocated greater flexibility in selecting their elective courses,
suggesting that the concept of what is relevant to national security professionals
might usefully be expanded. Others reportedly suggested that the NSPD program
should be more robust and intensive — for example, it might include additional
seminars or discussions, outside the usual coursework, exclusively for NSPD
participants, to delve more deeply into key interagency issues and case studies.48
43 (...continued)
clarify that analysis at the operational level pertains only to the JFSC program.
44 Joint Staff Briefing, April 17, 2008; and interviews with NSPD officials.
45 According to officials, the elective courses were selected by NSPD officials from among
existing NDU course offerings for their relevance to NSPD concerns.
46 Joint Staff Briefing, April 17, 2008, and interviews with NSPD officials.
47 A description of the NWC core curriculum is available on the NWC website, at
[http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/index.htm].
48 Joint Staff Briefing, April 17, 2008, and interviews with NSPD officials.

CRS-17
NSPD Education: Next Steps. The NSPD leadership is reportedly
considering several basic aspects of the education pillar “way forward.” One
question is whether the NDU pilot project will continue during academic year
2008-2009, which begins in early August 2008, and if so, whether it might be
expanded to include more participants. Some NDU officials suggest there is no
reason not to make the NSPD education track available to all U.S. students in
Masters degree-granting programs at NDU.49
A second question is whether to expand NSPD educational opportunities to
other institutions. Other institutions might include those that directly support other
U.S. government agencies, such as the Foreign Service Institute, but could also
include focused programs at public or private universities. Some observers report
disagreements within the community of government institution educators about what
constitutes “education” versus “training,” and which institutions provide each of
them.50 Some from the DOD community note, for example, that the State
Department’s Foreign Service Institute is based at the George P. Shultz National
Foreign Affairs Training Center (emphasis added) and suggest that its programs more
closely resemble skills-training than knowledge-fostering.51
An additional question is whether to expand NSPD educational opportunities
to other formats. Such formats might include distance learning, or programs that
convene periodically, such as DOD’s Executive Leadership Development Program
(ELDP).52 To illustrate, ELDP, established in 1985, provides DOD civilians (GS-12
to GS-14) with deep exposure to DOD joint roles and missions. Over the course of
10 months, students — who remain in their current jobs — convene first for two
weeks of classroom education, and then monthly for one-week field visits to various
DOD commands around the world.
49 Interviews with NSPD officials.
50 Some practitioners suggest the shorthand, “training teaches you what to do, while
education teaches you how to think.” The NSPD National Strategy defines the two terms
this way: “Education: Opportunities to enhance a person’s capacity for critical and
innovative thinking, and level of understanding of authorities, risks, responsibilities, and
tools to perform a current or future national security mission successfully. Training:
Opportunities to enhance, exercise, or refine a person’s ability to apply knowledge, skills,
and abilities in performing national security missions.” See National Strategy for the
Development of Security Professionals
, July 2007, p. 3, available at
[http://www.nspd.gov/NSPD_Resources/Documents/National_Strategy_for_Professional
_Development].
51 Interviews with DOD officials.
52 For more information, see the DOD Civilian Personnel Management Service website at
[http://www.cpms.osd.mil/jldd/eldp_index.aspx].

CRS-18
Training Pillar
For the second NSPD pillar, the National Strategy calls for “... ample training
opportunities to refine skills through instruction, drills, and exercises.”53 According
to the Strategy, the first step — as in the education pillar — is identifying existing
training programs, facilities and institutions applicable to the NSPD program. The
survey should consider federal programs first, but also state, local, territorial, tribal,
academic, non-governmental, and private sector programs. The newly constituted
National Security Education and Training Consortium (NSETC, see above) Board
of Directors has the responsibility to recommend training as well as educational
courses for inclusion in the NSPD program. The National Strategy also tasks the
ESC to promote existing federal government training consortia concerned with
aspects of national security, “in order to promote a sharing of best practices.”54
As a whole, the NSPD program acknowledges great variation among the roles
and responsibilities of NSPs. The National Strategy, for example, recognizes “... the
reality that the core competencies needed for each mission area and institution will
vary, and therefore professional experience, education, and training programs must
be customized in each mission area and institution.”55 What the NSPD program’s
strategic documents do not directly address is that the variation in requirements might
be substantially greater for training than for education. Education in strategic
planning, problem-solving, and leadership, for example, might be appropriate for all
NSPs. Training requirements, however, are typically much more specific, focused
on mastering tasks to be executed during contingencies, including any specific
requirements for coordination with colleagues in other agencies, and thus might vary
significantly among NSPs.56
The most concrete effort so far under the NSPD training pillar is the
establishment, required by the March 2008 “Action List,” of a federal training
orientation course for holders of all designated NSP positions. According to NSPD
53 National Strategy, p. 6.
54 National Strategy, p. 7. One example would be the Consortium for Complex Operations
(CCO, see above). See the CCO web portal at https://www.ccoportal.org.
55 National Strategy, p. 3.
56 The descriptions of training in the National Strategy reflect the difficulty of expressing
succinctly the full range of all forms of interagency training required by all NSPs. For
example, the Strategy states, p. 8: “A successful training program must ensure that Federal,
State, local, and tribal government leaders are cognizant of their preparedness roles and
responsibilities, trained in carrying out their assigned functions, and prepared to be
immediately effective in interagency, inter-governmental, and international emergency
operations.” To some observers, that emphasis on other levels of government,
“preparedness,” and “emergency operations” sounds like an only slightly modified
description of homeland security training concerns, that excludes such interagency national
security activities as steady-state diplomacy and security cooperation.

CRS-19
officials, the purpose of the course is not to create instant experts, but rather to
introduce participants to the full spectrum of NSPD agencies and concerns.57
To date, the effort is bifurcated between the “traditional national” and homeland
security foci of the NSPD program. On February 4, 2008, the Emergency
Management Institute of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), part
of the Department of Homeland Security, unveiled an online, three-hour orientation
course entitled, “National Response Framework: An Introduction.” The course
outline states that material covered includes the Framework’s purpose, response
doctrine, the roles and responsibilities of participating entities, and multi-agency
coordination. The course is intended for “... government executives, private-sector
and non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders, and emergency management
practitioners.”58 The NSPD federal training orientation will, at least initially, have
two parts — the FEMA course to cover homeland security, and a national
security-focused course, currently under development. Some officials note that this
dual-track approach to orientation misses a key opportunity to underscore and
elaborate on a fundamental premise of the NSPD program — that, as the National
Strategy
states: “The Nation cannot view the missions of national security and
homeland security as separate and distinct.”59
Experience Pillar
The May 2007 executive order established the “professional experience” pillar
of the NSPD program. The National Strategy spelled out tasks to be undertaken to
support that pillar, including designating certain activities as “interagency duty
assignments,” developing a “formal mechanism” for rotational and temporary detail
assignments, and linking career advancement to participation in such assignments.60
The Strategy explicitly assigned these responsibilities to the “relevant
departments and agencies.” The role of the ESC would be simply to “coordinate the
completion” of the tasks.61 This highly de-centralized division of labor was
reinforced by the March 2008 “Action List,” which tasked individual agencies to
develop the “criteria for acceptable mission-related experiences that are appropriate
for their NSP positions”; to identify positions available for rotational opportunities;
and, “to the extent permitted by law,” to draft regulations “designed to create rules
stipulating that candidates for SES positions (or other equivalent senior-level federal
executive positions) for identified national security positions across the Federal
57 Interviews with NSPD officials.
58 See [http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is800b.asp]. The course slide show begins
at [http://emilms.fema.gov/IS800B/index.htm].
59 National Strategy, p. 1.
60 National Strategy, p. 9.
61 National Strategy, p. 8.

CRS-20
government must have documented rotational or interagency national security
professional experience.”62
This approach stands in some contrast to that of DOD’s joint officer
management program, which enjoys stronger oversight from the systemic — DOD
— level. The Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, is tasked to establish different levels of joint qualification, including
education and joint experience criteria,63 to determine the number of officers who are
joint qualified,64 and to establish career guidelines for officers to achieve joint
qualification and for officers who have been so designated, including guidelines for
selection, education, training and types of duty assignments.65 Further, the
requirement of joint duty service and joint qualification as prerequisites for
promotion to general or flag officer are stipulated by law, not left to the discretion of
Service rules or regulations.66
Issues for Congress
Members of Congress weighing the merits of various proposals for national
security reform for the interagency, including possible options for an interagency
cadre professional development program, may wish to consider the following points.
Possible Roles for Congress
Congress could help direct or shape a future interagency cadre career
development program either through legislation, oversight, or both.
Legislation. The current NSPD program, which has no legislative mandate,
would continue under a new administration only at the discretion of that new
leadership team. Many current officials and observers contend that legislation would
be necessary to ensure the success of any interagency career development program,
particularly because by definition, career development requires a long-term,
administration-spanning perspective. Without the assurance that a program would
continue into the future, individuals might be less likely to risk the investment of
their time, and agencies might be less likely to risk the investment of their
resources.67 Numerous senior military officers and defense observers, including
General Pace, have asserted that the Goldwater-Nichols reforms would not have been
possible without legislation.
62 “Action List,” pp. 4-5.
63 Title 10, U.S. Code, §661(b)(1)(A).
64 Title 10, U.S. Code, §661(b)(1)(B).
65 Title 10, U.S. Code §661(e).
66 Title 10 U.S. Code, §619a(a), and see above.
67 Interviews with officials, and see for example Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Developing
Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
February 2008.

CRS-21
Some observers and practitioners suggest that the most important factor in
ensuring full agency participation and commitment to interagency career
development is presidential support — including regularly emphasizing the program
as a priority, and providing ongoing oversight from the White House. In theory,
legislation and presidential emphasis are not mutually exclusive. Little empirical
evidence is available concerning their relative importance, because the single
empirical test case to date, the NSPD program, is not supported by legislation.
Oversight. Whether or not legislation is enacted, Congress has the option of
exercising oversight over any future executive branch interagency career
development program for national security professionals. Some observers have
wondered how Congress might best exercise such oversight, given that such a
program would be likely to involve multiple agencies, including some without
traditional national security responsibilities such as the Departments of Justice and
Commerce.
One option would be oversight of program implementation in individual
agencies by their respective committees of jurisdiction. This approach might help
ensure such agencies’ individual compliance, but it would not provide an assessment
of the program’s overall impact or the consistency of its application.
Another option might be oversight by the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the House Committee on Government
Oversight and Reform. These committees have oversight responsibility for executive
branch organization and the federal civil service, although they neither authorize nor
appropriate.
In the broader debates concerning national security reform for the interagency,
some participants have suggested yet another option — the creation of House and
Senate Select Committees on National Security, which would have oversight
responsibility for holistic issues and initiatives that cross agency boundaries.68 Such
bodies might be well-placed to provide oversight of an interagency cadre program,
although such a restructuring might be difficult to achieve.
Program Policy Issues
The experiences of the NSPD program to date, and some aspects of the
Goldwater-Nichols process, suggest a series of policy questions that could help shape
any future interagency cadre program.
Scope. According to officials involved with the NSPD program, it has been
difficult to achieve consensus on the program’s scope. While many options, with
various pros and cons, are theoretically possible, any new or adapted interagency
cadre program would benefit from clearly established parameters.
68 See CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security:
Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates
, by Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat
Towell.

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One issue is the substantive focus — and in particular, the balance between
homeland and traditional national security concerns. There is a broad consensus in
the Washington policy community that the two categories are related. As many
observers have noted, it is difficult to draw a clear line between them, because
providing security for the homeland may require addressing challenges that arise
abroad. But there is also recognition in practitioner communities that not all aspects
of “national security” broadly defined are related to all others. Too broad a reach —
or too broad a reach with too-uniform implementation policies and procedures —
could produce in some cases unneeded professional development activities, with
attendant waste in time and resources.
A second issue is the “horizontal” scope of agency participation. At the federal
level, the NSPD executive order mandates very broad participation by federal
entities, including many without traditional national security concerns — such as the
Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing
and Urban Development, Transportation, and Education.69 Officials involved with
the NSPD program note that though such agencies’ extent of involvement is much
less than that of DOD or the State Department, for example, ensuring their full
participation is actually more of a challenge, because as a rule, national security is a
relatively small part of their focus. The benefits of casting a wide net at the federal
level include incorporating those entities with singular, needed expertise. The
potential drawbacks include possible disproportionate administrative burdens on
non-traditional national security agencies, and providing comprehensive
congressional oversight of all participating agencies.
A related issue is the “vertical” scope of agency participation, that is, the layers
of government — federal, state, local, territorial, and/or tribal — to which the
program applies. Most indications suggest that the NSPD leadership has chosen to
focus the program at the federal level, although both program documents and
participant accounts make clear that the NSPs’ ability to work smoothly with
counterparts from other layers of government is a key program goal. The Katrina
Lessons Learned
report envisaged a professional development program that would
include federal, state, and local officials and other civilian first responders,70 and that
multi-layer approach to building a cadre reportedly continues to find favor within the
homeland security community.71
69 Executive Order 13434, May 17, 2007, National Security Professional Development,
Section 3(b), and see above.
70 Katrina Lessons Learned, pp. 119-120.
71 Interviews with NSPD officials. One additional aspect, germane to both the homeland and
traditional national security communities, is the role of contractors. Observers generally
support integrating contractors into preparations for contingencies at home and abroad —
both training programs and exercises — given that integrated efforts by government
employees and contractors are required during actual contingencies. “Interagency cadre”
programs differ in their focus on long-term professional development, and they require, by
definition, that the program authorities are empowered to make career decisions concerning
participants. While any such program may set “ability to integrate efforts with those by
contractors” as a program goal, and might include contractors in various program activities,
(continued...)

CRS-23
Nature of “Integration”. It is common for interagency reform proponents
to call for closer integration among departments and agencies, but integration can
mean a range of different things in practice. At one end of the spectrum, members
of different agencies view themselves primarily or exclusively as representatives of
their home agencies, but are familiar with the work of other agencies and able to
work with counterparts in them — this may facilitate an integrated application of
their respective capabilities. At the other end of the spectrum, members of different
agencies view themselves primarily as part of a common, completely integrated
enterprise at the systemic level, though they are still able to reach back into their
home agencies for resources and support. Neither end of the spectrum necessarily
corresponds to greater effectiveness, but the nature of the integration desired may
shape program requirements in terms of education, training, and rotational
opportunities.
For the sake of comparison, some observers have suggested that due to
Goldwater-Nichols, designed to foster a shared joint culture among the Services, all
officers are now purple,72 but that may be true only up to a point. In general, while
joint qualification has, by most accounts, provided valuable familiarity with other
Services, it does not appear to have replaced the primary cultural association with an
officer’s own Service. Arguably, a servicemember, if asked, is still far more likely
to identify himself or herself as a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine, than as a
generic member of the armed forces.
Responses to recent efforts by the Department of State, under the rubric of
Secretary Rice’s transformational diplomacy initiative, to collaborate more closely
with the U.S. military, suggest additional possible constraints on complete
integration. In a June 2008 OpEd piece in the Washington Post, a serving Foreign
Service Officer voiced concern about possible unintended consequences of State
Department efforts to integrate more seamlessly with the military, including
sidelining the Department’s focus on traditional diplomacy. He argued, “Developing
a Foreign Service wise in the ways of nation-building should not come at the expense
of its core capabilities — above all, its unrivaled language, area and cultural
expertise.”73
Program Objectives. Although it may sound obvious, a new or updated
interagency cadre program would benefit from a clearly articulated statement of
purpose, including how it differs from or complements related efforts. In particular,
a statement of purpose might suggest the relative emphasis on long-term career
development, versus shorter-term preparation for participation in interagency national
security activities. It might describe the relative concern with cultivating field
practitioners for current missions versus fostering and mentoring future senior leaders
71 (...continued)
the government career-development program could not, at its own initiative, formally
include contractors as participants.
72 “Purple” is a shorthand for “joint” — a color that might result from mixing together all
the colors used by all the Services, or at the very least, a color not directly associated with
any single Service.
73 James P. DeHart, “Suited for the New Diplomacy?” Washington Post, June 15, 2008.

CRS-24
with an “interagency” perspective. It might address the relative weight of changing
institutional cultures versus changing individual practices. All of these objectives are
mutually compatible, but how their relative importance is defined might have an
impact on the structure of a career development program and on how it leverages or
supports other programs aimed at interagency integration.
To illustrate, the Goldwater-Nichols process explicitly focuses on long-term
career development of joint-qualified officers. As part of the qualification process,
such officers generally serve tours as joint practitioners, so in practice the program
does support current operations. But the long-term objective is fostering
joint-qualified senior leaders, who will bring a deeply “joint” perspective to their
leadership activities in their home Services. The more fundamental objective of
Goldwater-Nichols has been to transform Service cultures, augmenting them —
though not replacing them — with joint perspectives.
The current NSPD program also focuses primarily on long-term career
development, designed to produce “interagency-qualified” professionals, able to
work smoothly at the systemic level, who will bring those perspectives back to senior
leadership roles in their home agencies. NSPD shares some substantive concerns —
in particular, the focus on integration — with current initiatives designed to increase
and better integrate civilian capacities for various complex contingencies. The
overlap is most evident in the realm of training initiatives designed to prepare current
practitioners for potential near-term execution roles.74
The division of labor is arguably clearer between NSPD and initiatives focused
on actual planning and execution, such as the work of the Office for the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (“S/CRS”),75 established at the Department of
State in 2004, and the Interagency Management System (IMS) created in March
2007.76 The conceptual difference is like the distinction, in DOD, between
74 For example, both the NSPD program and the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO,
see above, and web portal at [https://www.ccoportal.org] are mandated to identify and help
develop interagency training programs.
75 “CRS” is an acronym, and “S” denotes that the office reports to the Secretary of State.
S/CRS was established in 2004 and codified the following year by National Security
Presidential Directive 44, December 7, 2005, “Management of Interagency Efforts
C o n c e r n i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d S t a b i l i z a t i o n , ” a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf], which assigned the Secretary of State
the responsibility to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts,
involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for,
and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” The scope of those activities is
defined this way: “The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions,
failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly
those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions.” Per the
Directive, S/CRS supports the Secretary of State in carrying out these responsibilities. For
background and analysis, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities
, by Nina Serafino and
Martin Weiss.
76 The Interagency Management System, established in March 2007, is designed to manage
(continued...)

CRS-25
developing and employing the force. Services are responsible for building
(organizing, manning, training, and equipping) a joint force, with oversight from the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while Combatant
Commands put those forces to use. Similarly, the NSPD program is tasked with the
long-term development of “interagency-qualified” personnel, some of whom may be
employed by IMS, S/CRS, or other organizations, during contingencies.
Integration Function. A new or adapted interagency cadre program might
also address how strong the systemic-level integration function ought to be, to
support the program’s success. The current NSPD program is quite de-centralized.
The systemic-level structure — the ESC and its supporting Integration Office —
control no resources and serve primarily, by mandate, to coordinate agency programs,
practices, and promotion policies.
In the Goldwater-Nichols process, Services are still the engines for execution,
but the systemic-level integration function is much more powerful than it is in NSPD.
The Secretary of Defense, responsible for oversight with advice from the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), establishes the levels of joint qualification,
determines the number of joint qualified officers, and establishes joint qualification
career guidelines.77 The Secretary also controls the submission of the overall DOD
budget request.
While a reasonably robust integration function would seem to have some
advantages in terms of forcing the system to work, some observers offer a caveat:
detailed legislative prescriptions concerning program structure and organization can
limit flexibility — in particular, the opportunity, in the early days, to experiment to
find the most effective organizational arrangements. One alternative way for
Congress to help ensure that the system functions, without being overly prescriptive,
is through robust and regular reporting requirements.
Resources. Congress may wish to consider what resources would be required
to support any new or updated interagency cadre program. The current NSPD
76 (...continued)
implementation of interagency reconstruction and stabilization efforts — to “employ the
interagency force” — in response to crises. The System includes three interagency
components — a Washington-based Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group at the
Assistant Secretary-level, supported by a Secretariat provided by S/CRS; an Integration
Planning Cell to deploy to the relevant Combatant Command or other military headquarters;
and an Advanced Civilian Team to deploy in support of the Chief of Mission (or to help
establish a U.S. diplomatic presence). In theory, such a system might employ “interagency-
qualified” professionals as senior leaders and field practitioners. See Ambassador John
Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Prepared Statement for the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, House Armed Services Committee, October
30, 2007, available at [http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/94379.htm]. The IMS
organizational structure draws in part on the “Executive Committee” (ExCom) structure
described by the 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 56. See White House white paper on
Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” May
1997, available at [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm].
77 Title 10, U.S. Code, §661.

CRS-26
program has been supported, to date, “out of hide” — that is, through agency
re-prioritization, without any additional funding. Additional resources could
conceivably be required to support new or expanded education and training
programs, including faculty and staff, facilities, curriculum-development, and/or
tuition at non-government institutions. Resources could also be required to support
a centralized “integration function” secretariat that coordinates and integrates
program efforts. The single greatest cost could be the funding required to create a
personnel “float” in civilian agencies, to backfill positions while personnel
participate in education programs, training, or rotational tours in other agencies.
Many observers have suggested that without such a float, the ability of civilian
agencies to participate in an interagency cadre program would be quite limited.78
Personnel System Incentives. Observers have suggested that in order to
ensure full participation, an interagency cadre system would need to provide
incentives for individuals to participate. Those might include enhanced promotion
potential; improved prospects for choice assignments; and a reasonable degree of
confidence that the program rules, the basis for career decision-making, will not
change too dramatically over time.
One of the key elements of the Goldwater-Nichols process is the linkage
between jointness and promotion to flag rank.79 In a public address in 2004, General
Pace suggested that the officer corps got the message: “Congress said, if you want to
get promoted, you’ve got to be joint. I was a Lieutenant Colonel in 1986. I said, ‘I
want to get promoted! What is joint, and how do I get some?’”80 The NDAA for
FY2007, which fundamentally revised the program and changed the nomenclature
from “joint specialty” to “joint qualification,” also took care to protect those officers
who had achieved a joint designation under the old system — those who already had
the joint specialty, or had been selected for it, would simply be considered joint
qualified.81
Under the Goldwater-Nichols process in DOD, Services maintain jurisdiction
for individual promotion decisions. But legislation ensures jointness prerequisites
for promotion to flag officer, and the Secretary of Defense, with advice from CJCS,
plays an oversight role, strengthened by reporting requirements to Congress, helping
ensure that overall promotion rates support jointness. In the NSPD program,
Departments and agencies retain full jurisdiction over individual promotion
decisions, with neither legislation nor a systemic-level mechanism to help ensure that
78 See for example Commission on Smart Power, Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye,
Co-Chairs, “A Smarter, More Secure America,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2007, p.66.
79 Title 10 U.S. Code, §619a(a), and see above.
80 General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Extemporaneous
Remarks as delivered to the Marine Corps Association/ Naval Institute’s Forum 2004,”
September 7, 2004, available at [http://www.jcs.mil/vice_chairman/speeches/MCANaval
InstituteFORUM2004.html].
81 The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, October 17,
2006, P.L. 109-364, §516(g).

CRS-27
“interagency qualification” is given due consideration in the agencies’ promotion
decision-making processes.
Recruiting. Some observers argue that a comprehensive program to build an
interagency cadre might also consider fostering recruitment policies that support the
program’s goals.82 One possible approach would be further developing programs at
the college-level, including support for national security studies and opportunities for
internships in national security fields. Another possible recruitment approach would
be allowing greater flexibility for mid-career recruitment of specialists from outside
the government, and for transfers in and out of government jobs including incentives
for valuable experience gained. The National Strategy tasks departments and
agencies to “reform employment practices to encourage the hiring of personnel with
a variety of experiences from within and outside the Federal Government,” but that
intent is not reflected in the March 2008 “Action List,” and little action seems to have
been taken on that front.83
82 See for example Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st
Century,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2008.
83 National Strategy, p. 9.