Order Code RL34160
The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility:
Issues for Congress
Updated June 30, 2008
Dana A. Shea
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Jim Monke
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Frank Gottron
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility:
Issues for Congress
Summary
The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially
susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts
of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be
transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific
and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and
development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact
of a successful terrorist attack.
To safeguard the United States against animal disease, Congress has
appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to engage in
research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), off the coast of New
York, on animal diseases not native to the United States. When creating the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the PIADC
facility from USDA to DHS. Both USDA and DHS, in cooperation with USDA,
conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but PIADC has been identified
as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture
and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art
agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic
capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.
To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds
to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).
This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens
currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six
candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans
to select the site in 2008 and open NBAF in 2014. The final construction cost will
depend on the site location and may exceed the $451 million projected total cost.
Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel
and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may reach an
additional $100 million. The DHS has not yet determined what actions to take with
the PIADC when construction of the NBAF is completed.
The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues.
Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and
other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised
about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization
and investment in agricultural biodefense, may be reassessed once more high-
containment laboratory space becomes available.
By law, research on live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is not permitted
on the U.S. mainland. However, in anticipation of DHS building NBAF on the
mainland and conducting FMD research, the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) instructs
USDA to issue a permit to DHS for possession of FMD, subject to select agent rules.
H.R. 1717 also addresses coordination of research between departments.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NBAF Research Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
NBAF Funding and Site Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Facility Site Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Expressions of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Prospective Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Finalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Level of Protection Against Pathogen Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Permission to Work with Foot and Mouth Disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Need for and Scope of NBAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Coordination of Research Activities with Other Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Timeliness of Construction Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Future Use of PIADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Selling Plum Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
List of Tables
Table 1. Initially Projected NBAF Construction Funding Requirements
(2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. NBAF Construction Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 3. Changing NBAF Funding Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 4. Consortia Selected by DHS after Expression of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 5. Finalists for NBAF Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 6. Estimated Use of NBAF Space by Gross Square Footage . . . . . . . . . . 15

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The National Bio- and Agro-Defense
Facility: Issues for Congress
Introduction
The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is a key component
of economic productivity and growth. A terrorist attack on this infrastructure could
damage the public trust in agricultural safety and quality and the nation’s ability to
provide food and other agricultural products.1 Additionally, many animal diseases
can infect humans.2 These types of diseases are termed zoonotic. Scientific and
medical understanding of such zoonotic diseases in their animal hosts may protect
the animals themselves and could also lead to the discovery and development of new
medical countermeasures for humans.
To safeguard the United States against the impacts of naturally occurring and
intentional animal disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
engages in animal disease research, including research into highly contagious animal
pathogens and animal diseases not native to the United States.3 Such research
activities have historically been performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center
(PIADC), located on an island near Long Island, NY.
When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress
transferred the operation of the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS, though USDA
still maintains an active research program at PIADC. The DHS, in cooperation with
USDA, has established its own research and development program at PIADC. As the
federal government undertakes new efforts in human biodefense and defense against
agroterrorism, DHS has identified the PIADC facility as “reaching the end of its life
cycle” and lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility performing
this research.4
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) tasks the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop “a plan to provide safe, secure, and
state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop
1 For more background on the potential of terrorism against agriculture and food, see CRS
Report RL32521, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness, by Jim Monke.
2 Examples include influenza, plague, West Nile Virus, and Rift Valley Fever.
3 These diseases are sometimes referred to as foreign animal diseases (FAD).
4 Department of Homeland Security, FY2006 Science and Technology Directorate
congressional budget justification, p. 44.

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diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.”5 The Secretary of
Homeland Security is to coordinate an acceleration and expansion of the
development of current and new countermeasures against the intentional introduction
or natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases, including
countermeasure research and development of new methods for detection,
prevention technologies, agent characterization, and dose response relationships
for high-consequence agents in the food and the water supply.6
The Department of Homeland Security has announced that, to meet the
obligations of HSPD-9, it will establish a new facility, the National Bio- and
Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).7 This facility would have high-containment
laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC as
well as other pathogens of interest. The plans announced by DHS to establish the
NBAF have raised congressional and public concerns regarding its safety and
security and policy questions about coordination between DHS and USDA regarding
the research to be conducted at NBAF.
The DHS has narrowed the number of possible sites for the NBAF to six. The
sites are located in Athens, GA; Manhattan, KS; Madison County, MS; Granville
County, NC; San Antonio, TX; and Plum Island, NY.8 Each site is currently
preparing an Environmental Impact Statement for the location.
This report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF,
presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy
issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of
viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC, and community safety
concerns.
NBAF Research Goals
The DHS intends the new NBAF to be more than just a replacement facility for
PIADC; DHS intends it to exceed both the capacity and capabilities of the existing
Plum Island laboratories. The highest level of biocontainment available at PIADC
is Biosafety Level 3 Agricultural (BSL-3Ag).9 Because DHS plans to perform
5 Executive Office of the President, The White House, “Subject: Defense of United States
Agriculture and Food,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9, January 30,
2004.
6 Ibid.
7 72 Fed. Reg. 41764-41765 (July 31, 2007).
8 72 Fed. Reg. 41764-41765 (July 31, 2007).
9 Biosafety levels for pathogens and the recommended protective measures at each biosafety
level are developed by the Department of Health and Human Services. Department of
Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National
Institutes of Health, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th Edition,
(continued...)

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experiments with some pathogens that require a higher level of protection,
approximately 10% of the NBAF’s net square footage would be BSL-4 laboratories.10
The DHS foresees multiple uses and goals for the new facility:

! serving as a unique BSL-3 and BSL-4 livestock laboratory capable
of developing countermeasures for foreign animal diseases;

! providing advanced test and evaluation capability for threat
detection, vulnerability assessment, and countermeasure assessment
for animal and zoonotic diseases; and

! supporting countermeasure licensure.11
The research agenda for NBAF is to be at least partially based on current risk
assessments and subject to change as the risk assessments change. The DHS predicts
that the facility will focus on foot and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever,
African swine fever, Rift Valley fever, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia, and Japanese encephalitis.12 The DHS plans to perform research
at NBAF to study how these pathogens enter the animal, what types of cell the
disease affects, what effects the disease has on cells and animals, and how newly
developed countermeasures help the animal develop protection against the disease.
NBAF Funding and Site Selection
Funding
In the DHS Science and Technology FY2006 congressional budget justification,
DHS provided a NBAF project schedule that included a summary of major
milestones, a projected time line for meeting the milestones, and projected funding
9 (...continued)
February 2007, available online at [http://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/
bmbl5toc.htm]. The BSL-3Ag containment level was established by the USDA for research
with certain pathogens in large animal species. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Agricultural Research Service, ARS Facilities Design Standards, 242.1-M ARS, July 24,
2002, available online at [http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/PDF/242-01M.pdf].
10 For example, research on Nipah virus must be performed in a BSL-4 laboratory. Since
the United States has limited space to perform large animal research under BSL-4
containment, U.S. scientists have gone outside the country, for example to Canada, to
conduct such experiments. Testimony by James Roth, Director, Center for Food Security
and Public Health, Iowa State University, before the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, on July 20, 2005, available online at [http://agriculture.senate.gov/
Hearings/hearings.cfm?hearingid=1572&witnessId=4472].
11 71 Fed. Reg. 3107-3109 (January 19, 2006).
12 Department of Homeland Security, Facility Research & Staffing for the National Bio and
Agro-Defense Facility, June 12, 2007. Available online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/
gc_1181073261627.shtm].

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requirements by fiscal year to launch operation of a new facility in 2010. See Table
1.
Table 1. Initially Projected NBAF Construction Funding
Requirements (2005)
($ in millions)
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
Total
3
23
73
129
129
94
451
Source: DHS Science and Technology Directorate, FY2006 congressional budget justification.
Actual NBAF funding has not followed this schedule. See Table 2. The DHS
has requested, and received, appropriations at a lower level than initially projected
in 2005. The DHS Science and Technology FY2006 congressional budget
justification stated that NBAF funding began in FY2005 when “$3 M was received
for a planning and feasibility study from base funding of Biological
Countermeasures.”13 However, DHS has subsequently clarified that the FY2005
funding was used elsewhere in DHS and that FY2006 and FY2007 appropriations
funded these studies.14 In FY2006, Congress appropriated $23 million to select a site
and conduct other pre-construction activities.15 In FY2007, an additional $23 million
was appropriated for site selection and other pre-construction activities.16 The
FY2007 DHS Appropriation Act also included a $125 million rescission of
unobligated prior year appropriations from Science and Technology Directorate
accounts. As part of its implementation of this law, DHS removed $11 million from
the FY2006 NBAF appropriation.17 In FY2008, Congress appropriated $11 million
to continue environmental studies necessary to select a site for the NBAF.18 For
FY2009, the President’s budget requests $35.6 million to continue progress on the
NBAF construction.
13 Department of Homeland Security, FY2006 Science and Technology Directorate
congressional budget justification, p. 45.
14 Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, September 10, 2007.
15 H.Rept. 109-241 to accompany H.R. 2360 (P.L. 109-90), p. 78.
16 H.Rept. 109-699 to accompany H.R. 5441 (P.L. 109-295), p. 168.
17 Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, September 10, 2007.
18 P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008.

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Table 2. NBAF Construction Funding
($ in millions)
Action
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
DHS Allocation
3
DHS Reallocation
(3)
P.L. 109-90
23
P.L. 109-295
(11)
23
P.L. 110-161
11
FY2009 Budget Request
36
Total Appropriations
0
12
23
11
Annual Costs Projected in
2005 (from Table 1)
3
23
73
129
129
Source: Funding rounded to nearest million. CRS calculations based on DHS congressional budget
justification, H.Rept. 109-241, H.Rept. 109-699, and DHS personal communication.
The DHS has changed the expected completion date for the NBAF facility from
2010 to 2014.19 An updated full cost schedule is not publicly available. In the
February 2005 projection, DHS anticipated requesting funding throughout the
construction process, including 2010, the year DHS expected to open the facility.
This raises questions about whether the total cost of the NBAF facility will increase
due to the extension of the construction schedule. Subsequent DHS budget requests
have not updated the projected overall funding requirements. It remains unclear how
this delay will affect the future annual appropriations requests and the total cost of
the project.20
The DHS Science and Technology Five-Year Research Plan projects the NBAF
costs to be $436.5 million for FY2007-FY2011. Including the $12 million in
FY2006 brings the cumulative total for FY2005-FY2011 to $448.5 million. See
Table 3. The DHS states that the overall construction cost will depend on the site
selected and that site-specific infrastructure costs may increase the total cost above
19 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Five-Year
Research and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May 2007.
20 The DHS was directed to “submit a project schedule, including expected completion dates
and funding requirements for all phases of the project, to the Committees on
Appropriations.” See H.Rept. 109-699 to accompany P.L. 109-295, p. 168.

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$451 million.21 Additional delays to the construction schedule may further change
the final cost of the facility due to changing material and labor costs.22
Table 3. Changing NBAF Funding Projections
($ in millions)
Year of
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
Total
Projection
2005
3.0
23.0 73.0
129.0
129.0
94.0
0
451.0
2007
0a
12.0a
23.0
11.0
45.6
184.9
172.0
448.5b
Source: CRS calculations and DHS FY2006 congressional budget justification; Department of
Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Five-Year Research and Development Plan,
Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May 2007; and DHS, personal communication September 10, 2007.
a. These numbers were not included in the DHS projection, but are taken from actual funding, see
Table 2.
b. The DHS did not include costs beyond FY2011 in this five year projection, although they predict
construction to continue until 2014.
The two DHS project schedules differ in the pace of anticipated funding
requests. The initial NBAF project schedule planned to receive the bulk of its
appropriated construction funding in the years immediately before facility
completion. In contrast, the funding schedule provided in the Five-Year Research
and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2011 plans to receive the bulk of the
NBAF construction funding up to four years prior to facility completion. The DHS
may be attempting to account for NBAF’s full funding requirements within the 2007
five-year plan.23
Not included in the projected construction costs are equipment and relocation
expenses involved in transferring the research projects of PIADC to the NBAF.24
These costs are variable, as they depend on the final location of the NBAF, the
21 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Five-Year
Research and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May 2007 and Department of
Homeland Security, personal communication, September 10, 2007.
22 Material and labor costs may be higher or lower at the time of construction than at the
time of the initial projection. An increase in total cost due to increased material expense
occurred during construction of another DHS high containment biological laboratory, the
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. See CRS Report RL32891, The
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress, by Dana
A. Shea.
23 The DHS states that no additional funds beyond those reported in the five year plan are
expected to be requested, barring site-specific infrastructure costs. DHS, personal
communication, September 10, 2007, and DHS, personal communication, October 4, 2007.
24 Similar move-in costs will be incurred following the completion of the NBACC facility.
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Research,
Development, Acquisitions, and Operations, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Justification.

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number of research projects to be transferred, and the particular equipment needs
identified. They have been reportedly estimated by DHS as up to $100 million.25
Facility Site Selection
The DHS has stated that the establishment of the NBAF would be a multi-stage
process. This process involves:
! obtaining expressions of interest to be the site of the NBAF;
! selecting prospective sites from these expressions of interest and
requesting further information;
! assessing the information provided and visiting these prospective
sites;
! narrowing the number of prospective sites to a list of final sites;
! preparing environmental impact studies of the final sites;
! choosing a site for the NBAF; and
! constructing the facility.
The stages of the DHS process will be addressed below. The DHS is now at the
stage of requiring environmental impact studies of the final potential sites. The final
potential sites are listed below in Table 5. The DHS has stated it plans to choose the
final site by October 2008.26
Expressions of Interest. In January 2006, DHS issued a Request for
Expressions of Interest from consortia interested in hosting NBAF. Consortia
responding to the DHS request included academia, industry, and non-profit institutes.
In its request, DHS described four criteria that the agency would use when
considering the expressions of interest:
! research capabilities,
! workforce,
! acquisition/construction/operating expertise, and
! community acceptance.27
Prospective Sites. In August 2006, DHS selected, from the 29 expressions
of interest, 18 sites to submit more information with respect to the four criteria. One
site was later removed from consideration by its sponsoring consortium. Although
17 sites were under consideration, only 12 consortia were involved, as some
25 As cited in Letter from Marc L. Kesselman, U.S. Department of Agriculture, to
Representatives John D. Dingell and Bart Stupak, December 18, 2007.
26 Testimony by John Vitko, Jr., Head, Chemical and Biological Division, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee
on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology, on May 23, 2007.
27 71 Fed. Reg. 3107-3109 (January 19, 2006).

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consortia submitted multiple possible sites that were selected by DHS.28 See Table
4. An intergovernmental review group, which included DHS, USDA, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Defense, assessed
the additional information. The DHS then visited each site to validate the
information provided and to observe the sites.
Table 4. Consortia Selected by DHS after Expression of Interest
Consortium
Site Location
University of California/Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
CA
Georgia Consortium for Health and Agro-Security (2 sites)
GA
Heartland BioAgro Consortium (2 sites)
KS
Kentucky and Tennessee NBAF Consortium
KY
Mid-Atlantic Bio-Ag Defense Consortium
MD
Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium (3 sites)a
MS
University of Missouri at Columbia NBAF Consortium
MO
North Carolina Consortium for the NBAF
NC
Oklahoma State University Consortium
OK
Texas A&M University and the NBAF Consortium
TX
Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium (3 sites)
TX
Wisconsin Consortium
WI
Source: DHS, online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1170798884583.shtm].
a. One site was withdrawn from consideration in April 2007.
Finalists. Following the site visits, DHS selected five sites in July 2007 to
complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Also, DHS included Plum
Island as a candidate site. See Table 5. The DHS has requested public input into the
selection process through the EIS process and public hearings.29 Following
completion of the EISs, DHS expects to choose a site by October 2008.
28 See online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1170798884583.shtm].
29 Additional information on the potential sites and dates for public meetings about the EIS
are available at 72 Fed. Reg. 41764-41765 (July 31, 2007).

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Table 5. Finalists for NBAF Site
Consortium
Location
University of Georgia
Georgia Consortium for Health and Agro-Security
Athens, GA
Kansas State University
Heartland BioAgro Consortium
Manhattan, KS
Flora Industrial Park
Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium
Madison County, MS
Umstead Research Farm
North Carolina Consortium for the NBAF
Granville County, NC
Texas Research Park
Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium
San Antonio, TX
Department of Homeland Securitya
Plum Island, NY
Source: DHS, online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1184180641312.shtm] and 72 Fed. Reg.
41764-41765 (July 31, 2007).
a. According to DHS, although not included in the competitive selection process described above, the
DHS-owned PIADC will also be considered as a potential NBAF site.
Policy Issues
Policy issues relating to NBAF include limits on possession of certain
pathogens, the need for and scope of NBAF, coordination among agencies, the
NBAF construction schedule, disposition of PIADC or Plum Island, and community
concerns. The 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) addresses the possession of live FMD
virus by DHS on the U.S. mainland. Before passing the farm bill provision,
Congress also considered H.R. 1717 as reported by the House Homeland Security
Committee. The Administration, through USDA, proposed legislative language to
authorize the establishment of NBAF and, through DHS, to provide authority for the
sale of Plum Island.
Level of Protection Against Pathogen Release
A release of pathogens is a potential risk of high-biocontainment laboratories,
but the likelihood that a pathogen would be accidentally released from the laboratory
into the surrounding area is generally considered to be low. To protect against such
accidental release, the Department of Health and Human Services and the USDA
have developed guidelines for the construction, maintenance, and operation of high-
biocontainment laboratories. These guidelines take into account the properties of the
pathogen and the types of experiments being performed. The established
biocontainment levels have increasing levels of rigor, and these biocontainment
protocols are adhered to as a matter of best practice in government, academic, and
industrial laboratories.30
30 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Institutes of Health, Department
(continued...)

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In addition to the safety precautions established by these biocontainment
guidelines, some pathogens have been deemed to require additional layers of
protection.31 One pathogen so considered is foot and mouth disease (FMD). As it
is considered highly contagious and to have the potential to seriously harm the
national economy if domestic livestock or other animals are infected, importation of
FMD virus is prohibited, and research on live FMD virus currently is limited to
locations outside of the mainland of the United States. The conduct of FMD virus
research on an island was perceived as providing a geographic barrier to infection of
domestic livestock in the case of an accidental release. Only if the Secretary of
Agriculture provides an explicit permit under 21 U.S.C. 113a may research on live
FMD virus be performed on the mainland of the United States.32 Currently, the
USDA performs FMD research only at PIADC.
Security concerns regarding the potential for terrorist use of pathogens also has
led to the application of registration of researchers and facilities that work with or
possess certain “select agents.” The PIADC must conform to the regulations of the
Agricultural Select Agent Program promulgated by USDA, and the NBAF would as
well.33 Under these regulations, biological agents, such as pathogens and toxins, that
pose a severe threat to public, animal, or plant health have been identified and listed
as “select agents.” The FMD virus is a select agent. Entities that possess, use, or
transfer these select agents are required to develop security plans for protecting the
select agents, register with the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), and become certified as eligible to possess select agents. Researchers
handling select agents must pass a security review by the Department of Justice.
Even with these guidelines and regulations in place, some activists have been
concerned that these protections may be insufficient. Operation of PIADC has
engendered some controversy among nongovernmental organizations and others,
who have expressed concerns about the potential for pathogen release, illicit research,
and unintended consequences.34 Local opposition also increased following
30 (...continued)
of Health and Human Services, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories,
5th Edition, February 2007, online at [http://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/
BMBL_5th_Edition.pdf].
31 An example is smallpox virus, which is only allowed to be possessed by one U.S.
laboratory, the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, GA.
32 Because of concerns about the economic damage that might arise from the release of the
pathogen that causes foot and mouth disease into domestic animal stocks, Congress enacted
prohibitions in 1948 against performing research within the mainland of the United States.
21 U.S.C. 113a prohibits the Secretary of Agriculture from introducing live foot and mouth
disease virus to the mainland of the United States unless the Secretary determines it is
necessary and in the public interest.
33 The agricultural select agent regulations are codified at 9 C.F.R. 121 and 7 C.F.R. 331.
A comparable program exists for select agents that might infect humans. It is overseen by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on behalf of the Department of Health and
Human Services. These select agent regulations are codified at 42 C.F.R. 73.
34 John Rather, “ Heaping More Dirt On Plum I.,” New York Times, February 15, 2004, and
(continued...)

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suggestions of upgrading the biocontainment facilities from BSL-3Ag to BSL-4 to
allow work on more dangerous pathogens. Those suggestions were not acted upon.35
Questions regarding worker safety and the potential for human infections by
pathogens that affect both humans and animals have also been raised.36 The DHS,
through informational sessions in the EIS process, has attempted to allay these
concerns and has stated that community acceptance, or at least minimal community
resistance, is one of the NBAF site criteria. However, continued community outreach
may be a key factor in determining whether NBAF will suffer delays that have
threatened construction of other high-containment laboratories.37
The focus of some community concerns has been the potential for an FMD
outbreak to occur following an accidental or deliberate release of FMD virus from
the proposed NBAF. The likelihood of such a release is difficult to quantify.
Accidental releases of FMD virus from research laboratories have occurred in the
United Kingdom.38 Historically, FMD virus was accidentally released from PIADC
in 1978, though no infected animals reached the mainland and the foot and mouth
disease outbreak was contained to Plum Island.39 More recently, in 2004, FMD virus
was discovered outside of research laboratories but still within PIADC.40 Should the
NBAF be sited on the mainland, such an outbreak might be more difficult to contain.
Some argue that FMD virus research should not be performed on the mainland but
34 (...continued)
Beth Daley, “Danger Island,” Boston Globe, September 11, 2001.
35 John Rather, “East End Germ Lab Getting an Upgrade,” New York Times, November 25,
2001.
36 Occupational exposure to dangerous, federally regulated pathogens in a laboratory at
Boston University and Texas A&M University are cited as examples of such events. (M.
Anita Barry, Report of Pneumonic Tularemia in Three Boston University Researchers,
November 2004 — March 2005, Boston Public Health Commission, March 28, 2005 and
Emily Ramshaw, “CDC Suspends A&M Research on Infectious Diseases; CDC Suspends
Bioagent Work after Exposures Not Reported Promptly,” The Dallas Morning News, July
2, 2007.)
37 Barbara Goodson, “Judge Hits BU Biolab; Ruling Calls for Safety Review, May Stall
Plan,” The Boston Herald, August 4, 2006.
38 The July/August 2007 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom has been associated with a
likely breach of biosecurity in a waste water drainage system at the nearby Pirbright
research facility. The investigation also identified inadequate controls on the movement of
people and vehicles from the site. (Health and Safety Executive, Final Report on Potential
Breaches of Biosecurity at the Pirbright Site 2007, September 7, 2007, available online at
[http://www.hse.gov.uk/news/archive/07aug/finalreport.pdf]. See also Martin Enserink,
John Travis, and Jocelyn Kaiser, “Labs Suspected in Foot-and-Mouth Crisis,” ScienceNOW
Daily News, August 6, 2007.)
39 Nicholas Wade, “Cattle Virus Escapes from a P4 Lab,” Science, Vol. 202, October 20,
1978, p. 290, and Nicholas Wade, “Accident and Hostile Citizens Beset Animal Disease
Laboratory,” Science, Vol. 202, November 17, 1978, pp. 723-724.
40 Bill Bleyer, “Clinton, Bishop Complain of ‘Breach’: Plum I. Lab Tightens Biosafety,”
Newsday, August 17, 2004, and John Rather, “Plum Island Reports Disease Outbreak,” New
York Times, August 22, 2004.

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CRS-12
instead remain offshore and retain a geographic barrier to help contain an outbreak.41
Biocontainment technologies have advanced since the PIADC FMD virus release,
and DHS argues that modern biocontainment technology is sufficient to prevent an
accidental release.42
The consequences of an environmental pathogen release would depend on the
location of the laboratory. A release of an animal pathogen into an area without a
natural host may have relatively low consequences. Alternatively, the release of a
highly contagious pathogen into an area densely populated with potential hosts could
have relatively high consequences. An accidental or deliberate release of FMD virus
could lead to an FMD outbreak in domestic animals. The consequences of an FMD
outbreak within the United States could be high.43
Permission to Work with Foot and Mouth Disease. When PIADC was
transferred to DHS, the Secretary of Agriculture retained the authority to prevent
FMD research from being performed on the mainland of the United States. If the
NBAF is located on the mainland of the United States and is to perform high-value
foreign animal disease research, researchers at the facility will likely need to receive
such permission from the Secretary of Agriculture to perform FMD research.44
41 Emily Ramshaw, “Texas May Be Home to New Foot-and-mouth Disease Research Lab,”
Dallas Morning News, November 11, 2007.
42 See, for example, oral testimony of John Vitko, Head, Chemical and Biological Division,
Science and Technology Directorate, DHS, before the House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology,
on May 23, 2007.
43 Estimates of the economic impact of an FMD outbreak vary. A 2002 Purdue University
and USDA study found that an FMD outbreak in the U.S. similar to the 2001 outbreak in
the United Kingdom could reduce farm income by $14 billion. Price Waterhouse Coopers
determined loss ratios for the 2001 U.K. outbreak. When applied to the U.S. livestock
industry, the potential impact is estimated at $10 billion to $33 billion. A University of
California study in 1999 estimated the potential impacts of an FMD outbreak in California
at between $8.5 and $13.5 billion. (Beth Lautner and Steve R. Meyer, “U.S. Agriculture in
Context: Sector’s Importance to the American Economy and Its Role in Global Trade,” in
Terrence K. Kelly, Peter Chalk, James Bonomo, John Parachini, Brian A. Jackson, and Gary
Cecchine, The Office of Science and Technology Policy Blue Ribbon Panel on the Threat
of Biological Terrorism Directed Against Livestock, CF-193-OSTP, 2004, pp. 111, 113-114,
available online at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/CF193.pdf]). A 2002
National Defense University study estimated that a limited outbreak of FMD on just 10
farms could have a $2 billion financial impact. (Henry S. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism:
A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat, McNair Paper 65, National Defense University,
March 2002, available online at [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair65/McN_65.pdf]).
44 The Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture, has
testified, “It is our expectation that the Secretary of Agriculture will authorize FMD work
to be done on the mainland in NBAF, and that would be for all agencies. The USDA
programs now at Plum Island will be a component of the NBAF facility. So yes, the
Secretary of Agriculture intends to do that.” See Testimony by Edward Knipling,
Administrator, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture, before the House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
(continued...)

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CRS-13
While some experts might construe this permission as a formality, since, under
HSPD-9, DHS and USDA are to coordinate their activities in food and animal
disease research, others might see it as a potential barrier to effective and efficient
use of the NBAF. Thus they sought to provide the Secretary of DHS with
independent authority to perform FMD research.
2008 Farm Bill (P.L. 110-246; H.R. 2419 / H.R. 6124). On June 18, 2008,
the 2008 farm bill was enacted45 with a provision (section 7524) that requires USDA
to issue a permit to DHS for live FMD virus research at one successor facility to the
PIADC. The provision states that, once issued, the permit can only be suspended,
revoked, or otherwise impaired if the Secretary of Agriculture determines that the
FMD research is not being carried out in compliance with the select agent
regulations. This provision preserves the restrictions on FMD research that have
existed in 21 U.S.C. 113a — including USDA’s authority to control possession —
but provides one exception to allow DHS to possess and work with the virus.
USDA’s Proposal. The USDA’s proposal for the farm bill in early 2007
included a provision to revise 21 U.S.C. 113a.46 The USDA provision would have
allowed USDA to conduct research on foot and mouth disease on the U.S. mainland.
It would have prohibited anyone else from importing, transporting, or maintaining
viruses that would be on a USDA-prescribed list, unless the Secretary of Agriculture
issued a permit. However, the USDA provision also stated that it would not apply
to select agents, which thus created an apparent contradiction.
The House-passed version of the farm bill in July 2007 contained the USDA
proposal (section 7108 of House-passed H.R. 2419), but without the enacting clause
that mentioned 21 U.S.C. 113a.
H.R. 1717. As amended by the House Homeland Security Committee, H.R.
1717 would instruct USDA to issue a permit to DHS for FMD research at the NBAF.
Other existing requirements under the agricultural select agent regulations would
continue to apply, and DHS would have to meet them for the permit to remain valid.
Although this provision would compel USDA to issue a permit allowing DHS to
possess the virus, it would continue to vest authority for determining who may
possess the virus with USDA. This is the basic provision that was adopted by the
44 (...continued)
Science and Technology, on May 23, 2007.
45 The conference agreement on the 2008 farm bill was originally approved by the House
and the Senate as H.R. 2419 and vetoed by the President in May 2008. Both chambers
overrode the veto, making the bill law (P.L. 110-234). However, the trade title was
inadvertently excluded from the enrolled bill. To remedy the situation, both chambers
repassed the farm bill conference agreement (including the trade title) as H.R. 6124. The
President vetoed the measure in June 2008 and both chambers again overrode the veto,
which made H.R. 6124 law as P.L. 110-246, and superseded P.L. 110-234.
46 See USDA’s farm bill proposal, section 7303, online at [http://www.usda.gov/documents/
fbresearch0507_1.pdf].

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CRS-14
farm bill. H.R. 1717, as introduced, would have given DHS independent authority
to possess FMD virus, notwithstanding 21 U.S.C. 113a.47
Analysis. The 2008 farm bill, as enacted (and the reported version of H.R.
1717), makes DHS eligible to possess and conduct research with FMD and other high
consequence animal viruses through a USDA permit under 21 U.S.C. 113a. This
eligibility is still subject to USDA’s authority to revoke the mandated permit, as well
as its authority under the agricultural select agent regulations.
The Administration’s proposed language could have led to possibly
contradictory interpretations. It would have established a prohibition against entities
other than the Secretary of Agriculture possessing FMD virus without the permission
of the Secretary of Agriculture, but then exempted FMD virus from these
prohibitions. The net effect may have been removal of any permitting restrictions for
FMD virus, thus allowing research to be performed by those compliant with the
agricultural select agent regulations. The contradiction could have been resolved if
USDA chose to no longer regulate FMD virus as a select agent — a decision within
its authority — however, this action could have been viewed as weakening other
important security controls on FMD virus.
Need for and Scope of NBAF
Other agencies and organizations in addition to DHS have identified needs that
could be met by the NBAF. At least as early as 1999, USDA recognized a need for
a BSL-4 facility capable of handling large animals. In response to a mandate by
Congress,48 USDA commissioned a strategic planning task force that recommended
that the “Agricultural Research Service must consider upgrading current Level 2 and
Level 3 bio-containment units for animals and constructing a Level 4 unit.”49 In
2005, the National Research Council (NRC) echoed the need for a BSL-4 facility
capable of handling large animals. The NRC also concluded that PIADC was at the
end of its life cycle and that it should be “replaced urgently.”50
While USDA and DHS have repeatedly stated their need for a new BSL-4
facility, it is less clear how large this facility should be. In response to questions for
the hearing record, DHS asserted that
Site criteria and requirements for NBAF were developed by an interagency
technical working group, including DHS, USDA, and HHS to evaluate sites that
would best support research in high-consequence animal and zoonotic diseases
47 See footnote 32.
48 P.L. 104-127, Subtitle D, section 884.
49 USDA, “Report on the Strategic Planning Task Force on USDA Research Facilities:
Report and Recommendations,” August 1999, p. 24.
50 National Research Council, Critical Needs for Research in Veterinary Science, (National
Academies Press: Washington, DC) 2005.

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CRS-15
in support of Homeland Security Presidential Directives, HSPD-9 and
HSPD-10.51
The DHS has not publically released supporting documentation relating to the
working group’s deliberations.
The DHS projects the size of the NBAF to be approximately 504,000 gross
square feet.52 Approximately 55,000 gross square feet of the facility would be BSL-4
laboratory space. See Table 6. This facility would be more than twice as large as
the existing PIADC facility.53 This sizeable increase in laboratory capacity may meet
the requirements put forth by HSPD-9, as well as establishing the expanded, modern
facilities to replace PIADC and perform necessary research activities. Full use of this
expanded laboratory space may pose a challenge to federal research planners as other
federal agencies have also expanded their research laboratory capacity, including
BSL-3Ag space, providing alternative venues for performing such research.54
Table 6. Estimated Use of NBAF Space by Gross Square
Footage
Space
Gross Square Footage
Office/Administrative
35,000
BSL-2
30,000
BSL-3
372,000
BSL-4
55,000
Vaccine Production
12,000
Total
504,000
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Research,
Development, Acquisitions, and Operations, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Justification.
Note: BSL-2 space includes laboratory and support areas. BSL-3 space includes laboratory,
agriculture threat containment, and training and support areas.
51 House Committee on Science, An Overview of the Federal R&D Budget for Fiscal Year
2007, Committee Serial No. 109-35, February 15, 2006.
52 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Research,
Development, Acquisitions, and Operations, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Justification.
The NBAF was initially estimated at 500,000 square feet with ten percent being BSL-4
laboratory space. 71 Fed. Reg. 3107-3109 (January 19, 2006). Other scoping documents
place the size of the NBAF at 520,000 square feet. See online at
[http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nbaf-scopingmeetingmaterials.pdf].
53 PIADC has a combined office/laboratory space of 226,560 square feet, excluding other
buildings. USDA, “Report on the Strategic Planning Task Force on USDA Research
Facilities: Report and Recommendations,” August 1999.
54 For example, USDA has invested in expanded BSL-3Ag laboratories at both the National
Wildlife Research Center in Fort Collins, Colorado, and the National Centers for
Epidemiology and Animal Health in Ames, Iowa.

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CRS-16
The ability of DHS to effectively use the newly constructed BSL-4 and
BSL-3Ag laboratories may depend on efficient interagency cooperation in order to
identify other agency research activities that could benefit from being performed at
NBAF. The DHS and USDA investment into research areas done currently at
PIADC may also need to increase to fill the expanded capacity. Analytic study
assessing the current and future needs for BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 research may aid
DHS and USDA in effectively using the NBAF.
Coordination of Research Activities with Other Agencies
Since the NBAF would replace PIADC, research at NBAF is expected to be
collaborative between USDA and DHS. At PIADC, DHS and USDA cooperatively
set research priorities, based on risk assessment and other information. Generally,
USDA performs basic research activities while DHS develops the results of that
research and attempts to translate them into practical applications.55 However, since
NBAF also represents an expansion in capacity and capabilities over PIADC, this
relationship may change. Establishment of the new facility provides an opportunity
to evaluate previous agreements and make adjustments. Assignment of lab space to
the Department of Health and Human Services or other agencies may require
reevaluation and updates to these procedures.56
The USDA and DHS have testified that their current agreements have served
them well at PIADC, with respect to both daily operation and transfer of technical
information regarding research results and priorities.57 Such interagency coordination
may be essential in case of a crisis or in dealing with an outbreak of animal disease.
The extent to which all agencies engaged in the NBAF agree on how to coordinate
roles and responsibilities may prove to be a key factor in maintaining clear lines of
authority and information and may be crucial to effective oversight of the facility.
The 110th Congress is considering these issues. Under H.R. 1717 (ordered to
be reported by the House Homeland Security Committee on August 1, 2007), the
NBAF would be run by a director appointed by DHS in consultation with USDA.
The director’s role would be limited to operating and maintaining the facility,
including ensuring security and emergency response plans. This role is less broad
than in a previous version of the bill, which would have also given the DHS-
appointed director authority over all research programming at the facility, including
USDA research. In the committee-amended bill, in addition to the director, separate
55 For further discussion of how USDA and DHS cooperate at PIADC, see Government
Accountability Office, Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS and USDA Are
Successfully Coordinating Current Work, but Long-Term Plans Are Being Assessed, GAO-
06-132, December 2005.
56 Because of the NBAF focus on foreign animal disease, agencies beyond USDA and DHS
may have limited roles. Department of Homeland Security, personal communication,
September 17, 2007.
57 House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, “Reducing Threats to Our Nation’s
Agriculture: Authorizing a National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility,” Hearing Transcript,
May 23, 2007.

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CRS-17
directors of research would be appointed from DHS and USDA to oversee the
research programs of each department. The USDA and DHS would develop a “joint
strategy” defining the roles of USDA and DHS at the NBAF.58 Although the 2008
farm bill basically adopted the H.R. 1717 provisions for possession of FMD virus,
the farm bill did not address coordination and research leadership issues.
Timeliness of Construction Activities
When complete, NBAF would eventually house all the research activities
underway at PIADC. The DHS considers PIADC to be approaching the end of its
design lifetime. Finishing construction of the NBAF and achieving operational status
before down-sizing or decommissioning PIADC is dependent on timely construction
activity. Because of the unique research currently performed at PIADC, the smooth
transition of this capacity may be an issue of congressional concern. Beyond the
transition of research projects, programs, and supplies, transfer of personnel and
retention of an experienced workforce may also pose a challenge to DHS and USDA.
The original schedule for the NBAF, as presented to Congress, proposed
finishing construction and commissioning the NBAF in FY2010. Since then, the
proposed schedule has been extended twice, first having operations begin in
FY2013,59 and most recently having operations begin in FY2013 to FY2014.60
The extension of the NBAF construction schedule increases the time that
PIADC will be in operation. The PIADC has historically had security, coordination,
and other issues.61 The DHS has developed and implemented a multi-year Corrective
Action Plan to address these issues and maintain the operation of PIADC.62 Since
PIADC has been identified as approaching the end of its design lifetime, extended
58 In 2004, the USDA and DHS developed “A Joint DHS and USDA Strategy for Foreign
Animal Disease Research and Diagnostic Programs” to coordinate their activities with
respect to activities at PIADC. While this strategy has not been made public by DHS or
USDA, it has been discussed in congressional testimony. See Testimony by Edward
Knipling, Administrator, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture, before
the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, on May 23, 2007. The DHS has not updated
this strategy. Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, September 17,
2007.
59 See online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NBAF_Timeline.pdf].
60 See online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1170798884583.shtm].
61 See General Accounting Office, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve
Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center, GAO-03-847, September 2003; and
Government Accountability Office, Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS and USDA
Are Successfully Coordinating Current Work, but Long-Term Plans Are Being Assessed,
GAO-06-132, December 2005.
62 According to DHS, the total cost of the Corrective Action Plan is approximately $56
million. The Corrective Action Plan was reported to Congress by DHS in FY2005.
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Additional Physical,
System, and Management Controls Can Enhance Security at Plum Island (Redacted),
OIG-07-43, May 2007.

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CRS-18
operation and maintenance of these facilities may not be as cost effective or as
efficient for the research endeavor as completing and transitioning research to the
NBAF. The DHS spent approximately $24 million in FY2007 and $17 million in
FY2008 to upgrade the facilities at PIADC, and requested approximately $17 million
more for FY2008. The DHS did not request additional appropriation for upgrades
in FY200963 and does not plan to in future years.64 The upgrades include designing
a new animal wing and continuing activities described in the Corrective Action Plan.
The DHS expects completion of these upgrades in FY2010.65 Further NBAF
construction delays may require additional funds be used to support PIADC’s
corrective maintenance.
Future Use of PIADC
The DHS has yet to determine what actions to take with the PIADC when
construction of the NBAF is completed. The DHS has stated that one of the main
goals of the NBAF is to expand upon the existing PIADC research. According to
DHS, once NBAF is operational, PIADC research activities will transfer to it.66
The fate of the PIADC, once current research activities are transferred from it,
remains unclear. The DHS has identified that “proper decontamination and
decommissioning (D&D) of the facility after the transition will be critical to meet
regulatory compliance and eventual disposal of the site.”67 The DHS has not stated
when or how this process might occur. In discussing the development and
construction of the NBAF, DHS has stated, with regards to PIADC, that “no decision
has been made as to the future of Plum Island.”68
The DHS is currently investing money to improve and upgrade the laboratory
facilities. Continued use of PIADC either by DHS in some other capacity or under
the control of some other entity remains an option. Alternatively, following
decommissioning, the laboratories might be removed and the site used for a different
purpose. Although many local officials have opposed expanding the number or type
of pathogens researched at PIADC, some have expressed support for the continued
operation and existence of the facility, because of its economic value to the
surrounding area.69
63 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Fiscal Year 2009
Congressional Justification.
64 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Five-Year
Research and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May 2007.
65 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Five-Year
Research and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May 2007.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Bill Bleyer, “Homeland Security Seeks Input on Plum Island Disease Lab,” Newsday,
August 21, 2007.
69 Ibid.

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CRS-19
Selling Plum Island. One option raised by DHS has been to sell Plum Island
and use the profit from such a sale to offset the construction costs of the NBAF, the
decontamination and remediation costs for the island, and the demolition costs for
the PIADC. Under this proposal, DHS would sell Plum Island in FY2009 or
FY2010, arrange with the purchaser to allow operations to continue until the NBAF
construction was finished, and transfer Plum Island to the purchaser only after clean
up of the island had been completed.70
Most sales of surplus property are handled by the General Services
Administration and any funds received redirected into the Treasury.71 The DHS has
proposed to add statutory language to the FY2009 DHS appropriations act providing
express authority to liquidate the Plum Island assets and retain the proceeds of the
sale. The proposed language indicates that these funds could be used to offset costs
associated with construction of the NBAF; however, the proposed language would
also allow the DHS Secretary to use the net proceeds of the Plum Island sale for
“other real property capital asset needs.”72 Under this proposed language, the net
proceeds from the sale of Plum Island would be retained by DHS until fully spent
rather than reverting to the Treasury at a future date.
The amount of money that might result from liquidation of the Plum Island
assets is uncertain. Fluctuations in remediation costs for environmental clean-up of
the island and property values, for example, contribute sizeable uncertainty to any
estimate of a future sale’s proceeds. The sale might provide net funds insufficient
for the construction of the NBAF or might provide substantial surplus funds even
after the NBAF construction is complete.
Policymakers, in considering DHS’s proposed language, may weigh the value
of having offsetting revenue for current and future construction performed by DHS
against the potential for lessened congressional oversight of DHS capital construction
projects. By providing such authority, Congress may be lowering DHS’s burden for
justifying construction projects, as new appropriations might not need to be requested
for each project. In contrast, having a secure, readily available source of funds might
allow DHS great flexibility and efficiency in planning and executing future
construction projects.
70 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Research,
Development, Acquisitions, and Operations, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Justification.
71 For a brief overview, see CRS Report RS20630, Surplus Federal Property, by Stephanie
Smith.
72 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Research,
Development, Acquisitions, and Operations, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Justification.

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