Order Code RS22887
Updated June 26, 2008
International Convention Against Doping in
Sport: Issues for Congress
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The International Convention Against Doping in Sport seeks to harmonize anti-
doping commitments for non-professional sports at the international level. This
Convention, adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) in 2005, entered into force on February 1, 2007. On February
6, 2008, George W. Bush transmitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent
for ratification (Treaty Doc 110-14). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved
the treaty by voice vote on June 24, 2008. Issues that could arise as the Senate considers
the treaty include its relationship to anti-doping regulations in professional sports,
potential consequences that non-ratification could pose to the United States, and the
legitimacy and effectiveness of current international anti-doping activities. U.S.
ratification would not require changes to current federal laws.
Background
Doping involves the use of substances or methods that artificially enhance athletic
performance.1 Although doping is not a new phenomenon, policy makers remain
concerned about the health effects and ethical implications associated with the continued
use of performance-enhancing substances in competitive sports. Anti-doping rules have
been in place for various sports and in various countries since at least the 1920s, but many
claim that the enforcement of anti-doping rules is fundamentally limited by a lack of
uniform standards across sports and across countries.2 In response to such criticism,
UNESCO adopted in 2005 the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, which
1 Examples of doping substances include certain types of steroids, hormones, and stimulants;
examples of doping methods include blood doping, gene doping, and tampering with tests.
2 See CASA National Commission on Sports and Substance Abuse, Winning at Any Cost: Doping
in Olympic Sports, 2000, at [http://www.casacolumbia.org/absolutenm/articlefiles/379-winning_
at_any_cost.pdf].

---

CRS-2
seeks to harmonize anti-doping commitments for non-professional sports at the
international level.3 Eighty-five states are now parties to the Convention.4
Treaty Evolution. The field of international anti-doping policy has undergone
several rapid transformations in the past decade. The International Olympic Committee
(IOC), the umbrella organization for all participants in the Olympic Movement and whose
authority includes sport doping regulation, leads the international campaign against sport
doping.5 In 1999, the IOC created the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as the first
independent entity to monitor and enforce international anti-doping activities for non-
professional sports. One of WADA’s first achievements was to develop an international
framework for harmonizing anti-doping policies, rules, and regulations among
international amateur sport organizations and public authorities, called the Olympic
Movement Anti-Doping Code. In 2003, it was modified and renamed the World Anti-
Doping Code (the Code). As a non-governmental foundation, however, WADA cannot
legally bind governments to its policies, including the Code.
Also in 2003, 192 countries, including the United States, signed the Copenhagen
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport.6 The Copenhagen Declaration is a political
statement of intent to identify the Code as the “foundation in the world wide fight against
doping in sport,” ensure that national anti-doping policies conform with the Code, and
acknowledge the role of WADA in coordinating and standardizing international anti-
doping efforts according to the Code. UNESCO’s 2005 International Convention Against
Doping in Sport further institutionalizes anti-doping norms among national governments.
Treaty Commitments. States Parties to the Convention are required to harmonize
national laws, regulations, policies, and administrative practices with the “principles” of
the Code.7 This includes restricting availability of prohibited substances,8 applying
WADA’s standards for granting therapeutic use exemptions, funding domestic anti-
doping test programs, supporting the sanctioning of doping violators, promoting anti-
doping research and education, and facilitating international anti-doping cooperation by
supporting and funding WADA.9 Every two years, States Parties are also required to
provide the Conference of Parties with status reports on their compliance with the
3 See the text at [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001425/142594m.pdf#page=2].
4 See the States Parties at [http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language=E&
order=alpha].
5 The Olympic Movement includes the International Olympic Committee (IOC); the Organising
Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs); the National Olympic Committees (NOCs);
International Federations (IFs), which internationally govern each sport in the Olympics; National
Governing Bodies (NGBs), which are the domestic counterparts to IFs; and member athletes.
6 See the full document at [http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/copenhagen_en.pdf].
7 For an article-by-article analysis of potential U.S. obligations under the Convention, see Treaty
Doc. 110-14, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting International
Convention Against Doping In Sport, February 6, 2008.
8 The 2008 list is at [http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ 2008_List_En.pdf].
9 Notably, some argue that international treaty commitments can undermine U.S. sovereignty by
favoring international law over U.S. constitutional law and self-government.

---

CRS-3
Convention. States Parties are the sole voting members of the Convention’s Conference
of Parties. WADA is an advisory organization to the Conference of Parties.
U.S. ratification would not require changes to domestic laws nor additional funding
contribution levels to WADA and domestic anti-doping programs.10 Further, the
Convention does not apply to professional sport associations and institutions.
U.S. Policy
The Administration states that ratification of this treaty is a priority.11 On February
6, 2008, the President transmitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification.12 The President did not recommend any reservations, understandings, or
declarations to accompany the treaty.13 On May 22, 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee held a hearing on the treaty. During the hearing, Senators explained that they
are expediting consideration of this treaty in order to avoid IOC sanctions against non-
ratifying countries, including bans against hosting future Olympic Games. On June 24,
2008, the committee approved the treaty by voice vote. Full Senate approval for
ratification would still require Senate leaders to call up the treaty for a floor vote and a
two-thirds majority approval among the Senators present.
National Anti-doping Testing. Since its creation in October 2000, the U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA) has implemented and enforced the Code for Olympic sports
in the United States.14 In 2006, USADA reported spending $5.9 million on anti-doping
test expenses, primarily for Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan American Sports.15
Professional sport associations and leagues, including Major League Baseball and the
National Football League, do not fall under the jurisdiction of federal regulation and
adhere to their own anti-doping policies, testing requirements, and penalties.16
10 Article 17 of the Convention, however, establishes a “voluntary fund.”
11 Testimony of Scott M. Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
International Convention Against Doping in Sport, May 22, 2008.
12 Under the U.S. Constitution, the President is responsible for making treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate. See more information on the treaty process at [http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm].
13 The Senate has the option of making its approval of a treaty conditional by including in the
resolution amendments to the text of the treaty, reservations, understandings, interpretations,
declarations, or other statements. The President and the other countries involved would then
have to decide whether to accept the conditions and changes in the legislation, renegotiate the
provisions, or abandon the treaty.
14 Congress first recognized USADA as the “official anti-doping agency for Olympic, Pan
American, and Paralympic sport” in the United States in the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-67, Section 644). In the 110th Congress, the same recognition
was included in P.L. 110-161, Section 733.
15 USADA, 2006 Annual Report, at [http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/annual_report
_2006.pdf].
16 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32894, Anti-Doping Policies: The Olympics and
Selected Professional Sports, by L. Elaine Halchin.

---

CRS-4
Substance Control. The U.S. Office on National Drug Control Policy, the lead
policy office for national drug control programs, identifies the elimination of doping in
sport as a goal in its 2008 National Drug Control Strategy document.17 To this end,
several national laws proscribe many substances identified by the Code. The Controlled
Substances Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), prohibits the production, movement,
import, distribution, and sale of many of the substances identified in the Code’s “List of
Prohibited Substances and Methods.” Substances on the Code’s list that are not subject
to the Controlled Substances Act are subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), which restricts their use to legitimate medical
activities. In addition, the U.S. government commits law enforcement resources to
investigate doping cases. In one example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), in conjunction with other law enforcement entities, participated in a two-year
international steroid trafficking investigation ending in 2007, called Operation Raw Deal,
which resulted in 124 arrests and the seizure of 11.4 million steroid dosage units, $6.5
million, 25 vehicles, three boats, and 71 weapons.18
Commitments to Anti-doping Research and Education. USADA and U.S.
agencies support anti-doping research and education. USADA budgets approximately $2
million per year in support of research related to the deterrence of the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in sports, and in 2006, spent approximately $1.3 million
in education. Combined, anti-doping research and education programs accounted for
approximately 27% of USADA’s expenses in that year. Other anti-doping research is
funded through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, DEA, and U.S.
Department of Education.
Multilateral Commitments. The Administration demonstrates its support for
international efforts to combat doping in sport through its participation in several
multilateral anti-doping venues. As a signatory to the 2003 Copenhagen Declaration on
Anti-Doping in Sport, the U.S. government formally recognized the role and importance
of WADA in harmonizing international anti-doping standards. The U.S. government is
also a member of WADA’s Foundation Board and Executive Committee, and Congress
regularly appropriates funding to support WADA. In FY2008, Congress appropriated
$1.7 million to WADA.19 The United States also participates in anti-doping activities
through the Council of Europe, the Caribbean Community, and the Americas Sports
Council, the latter an informal governmental organization designed to combat doping in
sport in North, South, and Central America.
Issues for Consideration
Participation in the Olympics. Lack of ratification may result in a ban from
hosting and participating in some international competitions, including future Olympic
Games. The IOC requires that governments become a party to the International
Convention Against Doping in Sport by January 1, 2009 — and failure to do so may result
17 See [http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs08/2008ndcs.pdf].
18 See the DEA press release at [http://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr092407.html].
19 Title II of Division D, Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2008,
Division D, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, 121 STAT 1984).

---

CRS-5
in those countries being barred from participation in the 2010 Winter Olympics in
Vancouver, Canada, and the 2012 Olympics in London.20 Some also speculate that failure
to ratify the treaty could affect a city’s bid for hosting the 2016 Olympics. Chicago is the
U.S. Olympic Committee’s candidate for the 2016 Games. The IOC plans to announce
its selection for the 2016 Olympics in October 2009.
Consequences for Professional Sports. The International Convention
Against Doping in Sport does not apply to professional sports. Some athletes of U.S.
professional teams, however, may already follow the Code — whose guidelines the
Convention embraces — when they participate in international tournaments under the
jurisdiction of organizations that already implement the Code. This has already been the
case, for example, when National Basketball Association or National Hockey League
players participate in the Olympic Games or World Championships. Article 20 of the
Convention, however, requires that States Parties encourage professional sports
associations and institutions to develop anti-doping principles consistent with the Code.
Symbolic Importance of the Convention. Many observers claim that
ratification of the Convention is important for symbolic purposes. Upon the President’s
transmittal of the Convention to the Senate for consideration, the White House Press
Secretary released a statement justifying its ratification, stating that it would “solidify our
Nation’s place as a leader in the worldwide effort to rid athletics of cheating through
chemistry.”21 Many, including Members of Congress, argue that international
commitments to anti-doping can help set a positive example for elite and aspiring athletes
and help discourage their use of performance-enhancing substances.22 Further, some
argue that government support for anti-doping measures is important because it reflects
a prevailing “sense of public interest in the exclusion of performance enhancing drugs
from the sporting arena.”23
Effectiveness of Anti-doping Tests. Many observers argue that the value of
international anti-doping efforts, including the International Convention Against Doping
in Sport, are limited by a lack of effective anti-doping tests that can positively identify
prohibited substances. Historically, the search for better methods to detect doping
substances has lagged behind the discovery and use of new, undetectable substances.24
For example, though the use of anabolic steroids was already reportedly “widespread” by
the early 1970s, a reliable test method for detecting them was not found until 1974, and
20 “IOC, WADA Rage against Lack of Support,” The Bangkok Post, November 17, 2007.
21 White House, Statement of the Press Secretary, February 7, 2008, at [http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2008/20080207-4.html].
22 Such comments were voiced by several Members of Congress during a February 27, 2008,
hearing on Drugs in Sports, held by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection.
23 Eoin Carolan, “The New WADA Code and the Search for A Policy Justification for Anti-
Doping Rules,” Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law, Vol. 16, 2006, p. 39.
24 See “The Secret Steroid,” The Economist, October 23, 2003; Jessica K. Foschi, “A Constant
Battle: The Evolving Challenges in the International Fight against Doping in Sport,” Duke
Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 16, 2006, pp. 457-486.

---

CRS-6
they were only added to the IOC’s list of prohibited substances in 1976.25 More recently,
anti-doping efforts suffered setbacks related to the use of designer, or synthetic, steroids
that have proven difficult to detect. New concern currently surrounds the possibility of
“gene doping,” whereby genetic therapies may be used to enhance athletic performance.26
Athletes’ Rights Protection. The International Convention Against Doping in
Sport requires States Parties to adhere to the principles of the Code. Some observers,
however, question whether the Code sufficiently protects athletes who may be
accidentally implicated in a doping violation.27 These critics argue that the Code imposes
excessively stringent punishments, including potentially career-ending suspensions, that
offer little distinction between intentional doping and the detection of trace levels of
prohibited substances originating from the consumption of contaminated or mislabeled
nutritional supplements.28 Further, some question the legitimacy of WADA as an
authority in international anti-doping policy, accusing WADA of not being sufficiently
transparent in its decision making and resistant to outside scrutiny.29 Critics have also
questioned WADA procedures for handling drug testing samples and avoiding
contamination, as well as for dealing with false positives and other potential testing
mistakes.
Cost of Enforcing Anti-doping Regulations. The International Convention
Against Doping in Sport commits States Parties to funding WADA and domestic anti-
doping tests. Although ratification of the Convention does not impose new costs upon
the U.S. government, it would commit the United States to continuing such funding in the
future. Some critics argue that the cost of anti-doping activities, especially legal costs of
adjudicating doping cases, outweighs the benefits of deterring the use of performance-
enhancing substances in sport.30 USADA’s legal expenses, for example, represented more
than 15% ($1.8 million) of its total expenses in 2006. Already in 2008, USADA has
sought more than $1 million in external financial support from WADA for its legal case
against U.S. cyclist Floyd Landis, who was stripped of the 2006 Tour de France title for
a doping violation.31
25 WADA, “A Brief History of Doping,” at [http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=312].
26 See Sam Mellinger, “Gene Doping Is Next Frontier of Performance Enhancers in Sports,” The
Kansas City Star, May 11, 2008.
27 Article 2.1.1 of the Code holds the athlete liable for any prohibited substance detected.
28 See Edward H. Jurith and Mark W. Beddoes, “The United States’ and International Response
to the Problem of Doping in Sports,” Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and Entertainment
Law Journal, vol. 12, 2001-2002, pp. 461-488. Notably, WADA urges athletes not to use dietary
supplements because of irregular international labeling standards. See WADA, Athlete Guide,
2006, at [http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/Athlete_Guide_2006_EN_FR_SP.pdf].
29 Michael A. Hiltzik, “Athletes’ Unbeatable Foe,” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2006;
Hiltzik, “Athletes See Doping Case Appeals as Futile Exercise,” Los Angeles Times, December
11, 2006; “Upshaw Tells Newspaper He Doubts WADA’s Credibility,” ESPN, January 21, 2007.
30 See “(EU) EP/Sport: Mavrommatis Report on Sport Adopted,” Agence Europe, May 9, 2008.
31 “Landis Doping Case Cost World Anti-Doping Agency $1.3 Million,” AP, May 12, 2008.

---