Order Code RL34541
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Russia:
Statutory Procedures for Congressional
Consideration
June 20, 2008
Richard S. Beth
Specialist on the Congress and Legislative Process
Government and Finance Division

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Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Russia: Statutory
Procedures for Congressional Consideration
Summary
On May 13, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a proposed agreement
for nuclear cooperation with the Russian Federation. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA)
prescribes that the text of such an agreement be submitted to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for at least 30
days of consultation. Also, the agreement itself is to be submitted to Congress for 60
days, during which the committees consider it and report recommendations. The
agreement goes into effect unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted by the
end of the 60-day period. This report will be updated to reflect congressional action.
The President’s letter of transmittal states that the May 13 action meets all
requirements for both submissions, and stipulates that the 60-day period start
immediately upon conclusion of the 30-day period. Both periods are measured in
“days of continuous session,” which the AEA defines to include all days except
recesses of either house of more than three days, with “continuity” broken only by
the sine die adjournment of a Congress. By this definition, the 60-day period may
begin on June 24. If both houses take recesses as scheduled, the projected sine die
adjournment on September 26 may be only the 78th day of continuous session. In this
case, the statutory period for disapproval would have to start over again when
Congress reconvenes in January, 2009. On the other hand, if both houses hold pro
forma sessions during scheduled recesses, as they did in some recent instances, the
disapproval period could end, and the agreement take effect, as early as August 11.
The AEA prescribes the text for a disapproval resolution and directs House
committee leaders and Senate floor leaders (or designees) to introduce it when the
60-day period starts (in addition, a House Member introduced such a resolution at the
start of the 30-day period). The AEA also requires the President to state his approval
of the agreement before the 60-day period begins, but he did so in his initial
transmission letter, perhaps rendering moot the consultive purpose of the 30-day
period. Yet both committees of referral met with State Department officials on the
agreement during the 30-day period, which may constitute the consultations the AEA
directs during that period, but might also be taken as the hearings mandated during
the 60-day period.
The AEA prescribes an expedited procedure for Senate floor consideration of
a disapproval resolution, including a non-debatable motion to take up the measure,
a 10-hour limit on consideration, and a prohibition on amendments. For House
consideration, the AEA invites the Committee on Rules to prescribe similar terms.
Congress could also disapprove the agreement, or approve it with conditions, by
enacting an alternative measure under its general rules. The President, however,
might likely veto any disapproval or conditional approval, in which case the
agreement would go into effect unless Congress overrides the veto before the end of
the disapproval period. Inasmuch as the President may take 10 days for his action,
the timely enactment of a disapproval resolution may be feasible only if Congress
initially passes it with more than 10 days remaining in the disapproval period.

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Contents
Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nuclear Cooperation with Russia and the Atomic Energy Act . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Summary of Procedural Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Legislative Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Period for Congressional Disapproval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Definition of “Continuous Session” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Days of Continuous Session in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Potential Effect of Altered Recess Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Change in August Recess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
“Lame Duck” Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Pro Forma Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Possible Need to Renew Action in the 111th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Statutory Procedure for Disapproval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Submission of the Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Requirements for Submission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Submission of Agreement with Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Resolutions of Disapproval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Requirements for Disapproval Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Resolutions to Disapprove Agreement with Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Committee Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Consultations With Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Committee Action on Agreement with Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Discharge of Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Timing of Discharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Possible Discharge of Agreement with Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Chamber Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Final Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Presidential Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Alternative Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

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Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with
Russia: Statutory Procedures for
Congressional Consideration
Introduction and Overview
Nuclear Cooperation with Russia and the Atomic Energy Act
On May 13, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a proposed agreement
for civil nuclear cooperation with the Russian Federation.1 In accordance with the
non-proliferation provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended (AEA or “the
act”),2 agreements for nuclear cooperation may go into effect only following an
opportunity for congressional consideration defined by section 123. of the act (42
U.S.C. 2153),3 on account of which these agreements are sometimes known as “123
agreements.” The effect of these provisions is that an agreement with terms like that
of the proposed agreement with Russia will go into effect at the end of 90 “days of
continuous session” of Congress after it is initially submitted to Congress, unless,
during that time, a joint resolution disapproving the agreement is enacted through
procedures defined in section 130. of the act (42 U.S.C. 2159).
1 For information on policy issues associated with the proposed agreement with Russia, see
CRS Report RS22892, U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for
Congress, by Mary Beth Nikitin.
2 Legislation governing atomic energy was originally enacted by the Atomic Energy Act of
1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 755). The 1946 act was comprehensively
amended by Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Public Law 703, 83rd Cong., 68 Stat. 919), which
added the initial version of the non-proliferation provisions, now codified chiefly at 42
U.S.C. 2151-2160d (Subchapter X, “International Activities,” of Chapter 23, “Development
and Control of Atomic Energy,” of Title 42, “Public Health and Welfare”). These
provisions included pertinently sec. 123. (68 Stat. 940, 42 U.S.C. 2153), which defines
requirements for nuclear cooperation agreements and for their approval. Sec. 308 of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 at 139) added the initial
version of section 130. (42 U.S.C. 2159), which establishes expedited procedures for
legislation to approve or disapprove nuclear cooperation agreements. Section 301(b)(2)(B)
of P.L. 99-64 (99 Stat. 120 at 161) added subsection 130.i. (42 U.S.C. 2159(I)), which
establishes the expedited procedure now applicable to the proposed agreement with the
Russian Federation.
3 This report follows the form of the enacting statutes in using periods in the designation of
sections and subsections (for example, sections 123.d. and 130.i.). The codified versions
of these provisions are designated with the more usual parentheses (for example, 42 U.S.C.
2153(d) and 2159(i)).

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CRS-2
This report first sketches the procedures prescribed by the AEA for
congressional action in relation to agreements of this kind, then summarizes
legislative proceedings occurring in relation to the proposed agreement with Russia,
beginning with its recent submission. Thereafter, the report addresses several
questions of the implementation and intent of these statutory requirements that are
raised by their application to the proposed agreement with the Russian Federation.
Special attention is given to the definition of “days of continuous session” and
possible implications of this definition depending on whether or not the requisite
period ends before the end of the 110th Congress.
Other questions addressed in this report about the effects of congressional action
on the proposed agreement include
! What does the President submit, when, to whom, and with what
effect?
! How and when are resolutions of disapproval introduced?
! How might the requirement for automatic discharge of the
disapproval resolution come to bear?
! How might congressional action on the disapproval resolution come
about?
! What proceedings would have to occur for the nuclear cooperation
agreement with Russia to be disapproved?
! What possibilities of disapproval (or approval) of the agreement
exist other than pursuant to the statutory procedures?
Summary of Procedural Requirements
Section 123.a. of the AEA establishes nine requirements that a proposed
agreement for nuclear cooperation must either meet or receive presidential exemption
from meeting. The remainder of section 123. prescribes different regulations for
congressional action depending on whether or not the agreement requires this
exemption and on other features of its terms. As explained below, the procedural
regulations applicable specifically to the proposed agreement with Russia depend
principally on three features of the agreement: (1) it requires no exemption for
failure to meet any of the nine requirements; (2) it includes provisions relating to
“large reactors;” and (3) it covers only civil uses of atomic energy.
Section 123.a. provides that if a proposed agreement requires no exemption, it
may go into effect at a prescribed point unless Congress has previously acted to
disapprove it.
Section 123.b. specifies that unless an agreement involves military-related uses
of nuclear energy, the President is to submit its text to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for a period of “not
less than 30 days of continuous session” for consultation.4 This submission is to be
4 The requirements of section 123.b. (42 U.S.C. 2153(b)) apply to agreements not “arranged
pursuant to subsection 91(c), 144(b), 144(c), or 144(d)” of the Atomic Energy Act (42
(continued...)

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CRS-3
accompanied (for agreements like that with Russia) by an unclassified Nuclear
Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) prepared by the Department of State.5
Section 123.d. directs that if the agreement involves large reactors,6 the
President is to submit it, along with additional supporting documents, to Congress
for a period of 60 “days of continuous session.” The supporting documents include
(1) any classified annexes to the NPAS; and (2) a statement of the President’s
approval of the agreement and determination that it “will promote, and will not
constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.” The measure
is to be referred to the same two committees as specified under section 123.b., and
these committees are to hold hearings on the proposal and report recommendations
to their respective chambers. The agreement goes into effect unless, by the end of
this 60-day period, a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted into law pursuant to
procedures prescribed by section 130.i.
Section 130.i. specifies the text for this joint resolution of disapproval and
provides that it be automatically introduced in each chamber, at the beginning of the
60-day period, in the House by the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in the Senate by the two party floor leaders, or,
in either case, by their designees. If a committee of referral does not report the
measure within 45 days,7 it is automatically discharged from further consideration.
For the Senate, section 130.i. provides that the disapproval resolution may be called
up on a non-debatable motion, time for consideration is limited to 10 hours, and
amendments are prohibited. For the House, the statute invites the Committee on
Rules to report a special rule incorporating comparable restrictions.
Legislative Action
President Bush transmitted the proposed agreement for civil nuclear cooperation
with the Russian Federation to Congress on May 13, 2008.8 The President’s letter
4 (...continued)
U.S.C. 2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c), or 2164(d)), which cover military uses of atomic energy.
5 The NPAS is described in section 123.a. (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)).
6 The requirements of section 123.d. (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) apply to agreements “entailing
implementation of [42 U.S.C.] 2073, 2074(a), 2133, or 2134 ... in relation to a reactor that
may be capable of producing more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear material
for use in connection therewith.” In practice, this category includes most reactors other than
some that serve purposes of research alone.
7 Section 130.i. does not specify that the 45 days allowed for committee action are days of
continuous session; accordingly, they would presumably be treated instead as legislative
days. The significance of this difference is addressed below in the section on “Discharge
of Committee.”
8 U.S. Congress, House, Proposed Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, message from the
President of the United States transmitting a proposed agreement between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for
(continued...)

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CRS-4
of transmittal states that the agreement is accompanied by his “approval and
determination,”9 as well as by the requisite unclassified NPAS.10 The transmittal
letter also states that the classified annex would be submitted separately (and it
appears, in fact, that the committees of jurisdiction had already received this annex
on May 12).
The inclusion of the unclassified NPAS meets the requirements of the AEA to
begin the 30-day period, and the inclusion of the President’s “approval and
determination,” together with the separate submission of the classified annex to the
NPAS, meet the requirements for the 60-day period to start. The President’s
transmittal letter, accordingly, states that this submission “shall constitute a submittal
for purposes of both sections 123.b. and 123.d. of the Atomic Energy Act.” The
letter of transmittal, nevertheless, also expresses an understanding that the two
periods will not both commence immediately, but instead will occur consecutively.
It goes on to declare that the 60-day period shall commence “upon completion of the
30-day period.” These stipulations, which appear to conform to recent past practice
on agreements for nuclear cooperation, seem intended to enable the two periods to
be treated, for practical purposes, as a single uninterrupted period of 90 days of
continuous session.
In accordance with section 123. of the AEA, the President’s message and the
accompanying papers were referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.11 On May 14, 2008, a joint resolution
of disapproval with the text required by section 130.i. was introduced in the House
by a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.12 On June 12, the House
Committee held a hearing on “Russia, Iran, and Nuclear Weapons: Implications of
the Proposed U.S.-Russia Agreement,” at which John C. Rood, Acting Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, appeared as a witness.
On June 17, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations received a closed briefing
from William J. Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, on “Russia,
Iran and U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cooperation,” but by that date no resolution of
disapproval had been introduced in that chamber.
8 (...continued)
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2153(b),
(d), H.Doc. 110-112, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2008).
9 Ibid., p. 3.
10 Ibid., pp. 26-51.
11 “Proposed Agreement With Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy — Message from the President of the United States (H.Doc. No.
110-112,” message inserted in House proceedings, Congressional Record [daily ed.], vol.
154, May 13, 2008, pg. H3701; “Text of a Proposed Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for
Cooperation in the field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy — PM 48,” message inserted
in Senate proceedings, ibid., pp. S4103-S4104.
12 H.J.Res. 85 (Markey).

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CRS-5
Period for Congressional Disapproval
Definition of “Continuous Session”
Section 123. of the AEA specifies that the two time periods involved in the
proceedings prescribed for the nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia are to be
measured in days of continuous session, as defined by section 130.g. of the AEA.
Section 130.g.(2) stipulates that
[F]or purposes of this section insofar as it applies to section 123 ... continuity of
session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die; and ... the days
on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than
three days are excluded in the computation of any period of time in which
Congress is in continuous session.13
Under this provision, (1) any period of continuous session ends with the final
adjournment of the last session of a Congress; and (2) days on which either house has
recessed its session are not counted toward the required time periods.14
The definition established by section 130.g.(2) is evidently meant to correspond
to the constitutional requirement that neither house may adjourn for more than three
days without the consent of the other. Congress may adjourn for more than three
days either by ending its annual session (an adjournment sine die) or by taking a
recess within its annual session. In either case, the two houses typically grant each
other the required consent by adopting a concurrent resolution.15 Under the statutory
definition, accordingly, the continuity of session is broken just when Congress
adjourns its last session pursuant to a concurrent resolution for a sine die
adjournment, and the count of “days of continuous session” pauses on exactly those
days on which both houses, or either one of them, is not in session pursuant to a
concurrent resolution for a recess of more than three days.16
This arrangement is apparently intended to prevent a situation in which an
agreement would go into effect only because Congress was not in session, or did not
remain in session long enough to act on a disapproval resolution. At the same time,
however, days on which either house, or both, is out of session for three consecutive
days or fewer are not excluded from the count. If both houses adjourn from Friday
to Tuesday, for example, not only the days of session in the preceding and following
week, but also the intervening three days of the extended weekend, will count as days
of continuous session.
13 Section 130.g.(2) (42 U.S.C. 2159(g)(2)).
14 “Recesses of the session,” in the sense used here, includes such periods as the “non-
legislative periods,” or “state [or “district”] work periods” scheduled, in 2008 as in most
recent years, around Memorial Day and Independence Day, as well as during August.
15 A concurrent resolution is used because this form of measure requires the agreement of
both houses, but is not presented to the President for approval.
16 Several other expedited procedure statutes also make use of this means of counting days.

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CRS-6
Under the definition of section 130.g.(2), accordingly, until the final sine die
adjournment of the 110th Congress, every calendar day will be counted as a day of
continuous session except those on which at least one house is out of session
pursuant to a concurrent resolution providing for a recess of more than three days.
Under the Constitution, however, the term of the 110th Congress expires on January
3, 2009, and at some point before then, accordingly, the 110th Congress will
presumably adjourn its last session sine die. As Under Secretary Rood affirmed in
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 12, this sine die
adjournment will put an end to the existing period of continuous session.17 If
Congress adjourns sine die without acting on the proposed agreement, and before 90
days of continuous session are completed, the agreement will not take effect until a
new period of continuous session, beginning ab initio when the 111th Congress
convenes, has reached the requisite length.18
In colloquy with members of the Committee, Under Secretary Rood also gave
it as his understanding that the 90-day period was measured separately in each house
and, for each house, included all the days on which that house was in session. On
this understanding, for example, if the House were out of session on Thursday while
the Senate met, and the Senate were out of session on Friday while the House met,
one day would be counted for each chamber.19 This interpretation appears to
overlook that days of continuous session of Congress may occur when either or both
houses are out of session (as long as they are out of session for no more than three
consecutive days). In addition, section 131.g. is not couched in terms of separate
counts in each house, but explicitly refers to the continuous session of Congress as
a whole. The language quoted at the outset of this section implies that a single count
covers both houses, and states explicitly that when either house takes a recess (of
more than three days), the count of days pauses until both houses are back in session.
The estimates in the following sections follow this last interpretation of the quoted
provision.
Days of Continuous Session in the 110th Congress
After President Bush submitted the nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia
on May 13, 2008, Congress remained in continuous session, as defined by the AEA,
until May 22. It then entered a recess for Memorial Day,20 from which it returned on
June 3. The period from May 13 through May 22 amounted to nine days of
continuous session, and the period from June 3 through June 17, when the House
17 CQ Transcriptwire, “House Committee on Foreign Affairs Holds a Hearing on Russia,
Iran, and Nuclear Weapons,” June 13, 2008, available at [http://transcriptswire.cq.com/do/
transcriptView?id=259144].
18 The question of how long the period of continuous session in the new Congress would
have to be is addressed below in the section on “Possible Need to Renew Action in the 111th
Congress.”
19 CQ Transcriptwire, “House Committee on Foreign Affairs Holds a Hearing on Russia,
Iran, and Nuclear Weapons,” June 13, 2008.
20 This recess occurred pursuant to H.Con.Res. 355, 110th Congress, adopted May 22, 2008.

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CRS-7
Committee on Foreign Affairs held its hearing, included another 15 days.21 It
accordingly appears that June 17 constituted the 24th day of continuous session since
submission of the agreement.
Any future projection of days of continuous session is dependent on
assumptions about the schedule the two houses will follow. The simplest assumption
is that each house will take recesses, and will adjourn sine die, as projected in the
schedules announced by its majority party leadership.22 These schedules project the
following recesses for the part of 2008 following submission of the proposed
agreement:
! From Saturday, May 24, through Sunday, June 1, for Memorial Day;
! From Saturday, June 28, through Sunday, July 6, for Independence
Day;
! From Saturday, August 2, through Sunday, September 8, for the
summer recess of the House; and
! From Saturday, August 9, through Sunday, September 8, for the
summer recess of the Senate.
The House schedule projects adjournment sine die on September 26, 2008; the
Senate schedule includes no projection for this event.
Under this schedule, days of continuous session will continue to accrue from
June 17 until the 30th day is reached on Monday, June 23. Pursuant to the
declarations in President’s letter of transmittal, June 23 would count as the last day
of the 30-day period for consultation, and the following day, June 24 (the 31st day of
continuous session after May 13), would become the first day of the 60-day period
for congressional action (and the day on which the automatic introduction of
disapproval resolutions would occur).
Thereafter, if each house of Congress takes recesses as listed above, so that the
count of days of continuous session pauses during each recess, then it appears that
September 26, 2008, will be the 78th day of continuous session. If Congress adjourns
sine die on this date, as the House schedule projects, continuity of session will be
broken before the 90th day is reached, and a new period of continuous session will
have to begin when the 111th Congress convenes. Under these conditions, the nuclear
cooperation agreement with Russia could not take effect under the AEA until this
21 This calculation, like all the calculations and projections presented in this report,
presumes that the first day of the 30-day period is the day following the submission of the
text to the committees, and that the first day of the 60-day period is the day immediately
following the 30th day of the 30-day period. These ways of counting conform to the usual
congressional practice for day counts.
22 The schedules used in making these calculations were those posted on the respective
chamber websites at [http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/two_column_table/
2008_Schedule.htm] and [http://www.majorityleader.gov/docUploads/2008-
CALENDAR.pdf ].

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CRS-8
new period of continuous session was complete.23 If, on the other hand, Congress
were not to adjourn sine die on September 26, but were to remain in session without
taking any further recess, the 90th day of continuous session could be reached on
October 8, and the agreement with Russia could accordingly take effect on that date.
Potential Effect of Altered Recess Schedules
The projections in the previous section could potentially be altered by departures
from the schedule of recesses assumed there. Possibilities with some practical
likelihood of occurring may include the following: (1) a later beginning for the
August recess; (2) the reconvening of Congress for a “lame duck” session after the
November elections; and (3) the use of periodic pro forma sessions rather than
recesses of more than three days during scheduled state and district work periods.
The following sections consider the possible effects of each of these possibilities.
Change in August Recess. The estimate presented in the previous section
presumes that the House will be in recess during the first week of August, as
projected in the schedule given on the website of the House Majority Leader.
Schedules displayed on some other House websites, however, presume that the
House will begin its August recess not on Saturday, August 2, but on the following
Saturday, August 9.24 As previously noted, the Senate is expected, in any case, to be
in session during the week in question. As a result, if the House is also in session,
the week will become one of continuous session rather than of recess. The additional
seven days of continuous session could make the scheduled sine die adjournment day
of September 26 the 85th day of continuous session, rather than the 78th day as
estimated above. Under these circumstances, additional small changes in the
congressional schedule might enable the 90-day period to be completed before the
end of the 110th Congress.
“Lame Duck” Session. Rather than adjourning sine die on September 36,
Congress might recess its session on or after that date and return for a “lame duck”
session after election day (November 4). In this case, the occurrence of the 90th day
of continuous session would depend on the dates of recess and reconvening. For
example, Congress might recess on September 26 and reconvene on November 12
(the day after Veterans’ Day). Under these conditions, if September 26 had been the
78th day of continuous session, the 90th day could occur on the 12th calendar day
following the reconvening, which, in the case supposed, could be November 23 (the
Sunday preceding Thanksgiving). If both houses were to remain in session during
the first week of August, so that September 26 was the 85th day of continuous
session, the 90th day could be reached a week earlier, on Sunday, November 17.
23 The required length of this new period of continuous session, and other considerations
relevant to the extension into a new Congress of action on the proposed agreement with
Russia, are pursued below in the section on “Possible Need to Renew Action in the 111th
Congress.”
24 See, for example: [http://www.house.gov/house/House_Calendar.shtml] and
[http://majoritywhip.house.gov/house_calendar/2008/go.pdf], both visited on June 13, 2008.

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CRS-9
Similar considerations could apply if the 110th Congress were to adjourn sine
die before the 90th day of continuous session was reached, but were called back by
the President, pursuant to his constitutional authority,25 before its expiration on
January 3, 2009. Another possibility is provided by the authorization, included in
most recent concurrent resolutions providing for sine die adjournments, for the
bicameral leadership to call Congress back into session before the next session is
slated to convene “if the public interest shall require it.”26 The leadership’s exercise
of this authority would presumably vitiate the sine die character of the previous
adjournment, and if so, the previous count of days of continuous session would
presumably resume from the point at which it had left off. By this means as well, the
existing period of continuous session might reach 90 days before the end of the 110th
Congress.
Pro Forma Sessions. The occurrence of pro forma sessions might also
affect whether or not the continuous session of the 110th Congress may reach its 90th
day before its adjournment sine die. Pro forma sessions are those held merely “for
the sake of form,” or as a formality. Typically, no legislative business is conducted;
on some occasions, the chamber provides in advance (usually by unanimous consent)
that no business may occur. These sessions count as days of session for purposes of
determining whether an adjournment of more than three days is occurring.27
The resolution authorizing the non-legislative period for George Washington’s
Birthday in 2008, for example, did not provide for a recess in the constitutional
sense.28 Although the resolution covered essentially the period defined by the
announced schedules, it did not provide for a recess of more than three days, but
instead directed pro forma sessions of the House at least every fourth day, and
authorized the Senate to arrange a similar schedule. Inasmuch as the Senate
proceeded to exercise this authority, no “adjournment of more than three days,” as
contemplated by section 130.g.(2) and the Constitution, occurred in either house
during this period.29 Instead, every day of the non-legislative period counted as a day
of continuous session.
25 Article II, section 3.
26 For a recent example of an adjournment resolution providing this authority, see
H.Con.Res. 531, 108th Cong., adopted December 9, 2004.
27 It is, in fact, exactly this “formality” for the “sake” of which pro forma sessions are held.
If a chamber holds a pro forma session at least every fourth day, it can avoid the need to
obtain the permission of the other for the intervening days on which no sessions are held.
28 H.Con.Res. 293, 110th Cong., agreed to February 14, 2008.
29 The resolutions providing for these “recesses,” accordingly, were technically not
necessary to meet constitutional requirements. Media reports indicate that Senate leadership
decided to hold regular pro forma sessions in that chamber during scheduled recess periods
in an attempt to prevent the President from making certain “recess appointments.” See Paul
Singer, “Masters of a Pro Forma Senate,” Roll Call, January 7, 2008. These reports do not
ascribe any motivation for the House to meet in pro forma session during these periods.

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At the July 12 hearing, Under Secretary Rood noted that days with pro forma
sessions count as days of continuous session.30 He did not note that this will be true
only if the other house is not in recess. Nor, conversely, did he explicitly note that
if both houses hold pro forma sessions at least every fourth day during a non-
legislative period, no “adjournment of more than three days” occurs; as a result, not
only the days of pro forma session themselves, but also the remaining days of the
non-legislative period, will count not as days of recess, but as days of continuous
session. If, accordingly, both houses were to hold periodic pro forma sessions during
every non-legislative period in the remainder of the current session, every remaining
calendar day before sine die adjournment would be a day of continuous session as
defined by the AEA. Under these conditions, the “clock” defined by section 130.g.
would run far more quickly, and the 90th day of continuous session could occur as
early as August 11, 2008, instead of in early October.
Under these conditions, moreover, the 90th day of continuous session might fall
within a non-legislative period. If one or both houses had provided that no legislative
business occur in the pro forma sessions during this period, Congress could become
unable to act on a joint resolution of disapproval during the period, and in the
absence of that disapproval, the agreement with Russia would presumably take effect
on the date specified. On the other hand, concurrent resolutions providing for
recesses of the session, like resolutions for a sine die adjournment, often provide
contingent authority for the bicameral leadership to call Congress back into session
before the expiration of the recess. This authority might be used to give Congress an
opportunity to consider a disapproval resolution rather than allow the agreement to
enter into force by default.
The use of pro forma sessions might affect the occurrence of days of continuous
session in another way as well. The announced schedule for the House includes at
least one period not identified as a recess period, but in which “no votes” are
scheduled for both a Friday and the following Monday (July 18-21).31 If no session
of the House occurs on any of these days, the period would constitute a break of more
than three legislative days. It would be a recess of the House in the constitutional
sense, for which a concurrent resolution would be required. In that case, these four
days would not count as days of continuous session, and as a result, the projected sine
die adjournment date of September 26 would presumably become the 74th rather than
the 78th day of continuous session (or, under the alternate assumption discussed in the
previous section, the 81st rather than the 85th).
It is possible that no pro forma sessions will be used in these ways to affect the
length of continuous session of the current session of Congress. Unlike that for
George Washington’s Birthday, the resolution providing for the 2008 Memorial Day
non-legislative period authorized only the Senate to schedule pro forma sessions, and
30 CQ Transcriptwire, “House Committee on Foreign Affairs Holds a Hearing on Russia,
Iran, and Nuclear Weapons,” June 13, 2008.
31 “In figuring the length of an adjournment, Sundays are not counted, but “either the day
of adjourning or the day of meeting ... must be taken into the count.” W[illia]m Holmes
Brown and Charles W. Johnson, House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and
Procedures of the House (Washington: GPO, 2003), chapter 1, sec. 10.

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provided for a recess of the House in the constitutional sense. Pursuant to section
130.g.(2) of the AEA, inasmuch as one house was in recess during this period, the
days of this recess are excluded from the count of days of continuous session. If the
two houses follow this practice for their remaining scheduled recesses, the date
scheduled for sine die adjournment of the House will arrive, as already discussed,
before the 90th day of continuous session after submission of the agreement has been
reached.
Similarly, the schedules used to arrive at the initial estimates set forth above did
not project a recess for any long weekend during the remainder of the 110th Congress.
The estimates given were based, accordingly, on a presumption that on any such long
weekend, at least one pro forma session would be held, in order to avoid the
occurrence of a recess long enough to require a concurrent resolution. If, however,
either house were to decide to obtain a concurrent resolution to cover a period of this
kind, rather than holding pro forma sessions, the days of continuous session
accomplished by September 26 could be diminished by the length of that recess.
Possible Need to Renew Action in the 111th Congress
If the 110th Congress adjourns sine die before the 90th day of continuous session
after May 13, 2008, the period during which Congress could act to disapprove the
agreement will not yet have elapsed, and the agreement with Russia will be unable
to take effect under the AEA at that point. Instead, a new period of continuous
session will begin with the convening of the 111th Congress in January 2009. Until
this new period of continuous session reaches the requisite length, the entering into
effect of the agreement will be postponed, and the opportunity for Congress to
disapprove it pursuant to the AEA will remain available.
It is not clear from the statute, nor do any previous proceedings appear to
establish, whether or not failure of the 110th Congress to complete the periods
required under section 123. would necessitate starting from the beginning, in the
111th Congress, of the entire approval process or of only such parts of it as the 110th
Congress did not complete.
At the June 12 hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Under
Secretary Rood took the position that, if the full period of 90 days of continuous
session is not completed within the 110th Congress, the entire period must begin de
novo in the 111th Congress.32 In favor of this view, it could be argued that the newly
constituted committees in the 111th Congress might not wish to be compelled to rely
on the consultations and deliberations engaged in by their predecessors. In addition,
of course, any resolution of disapproval submitted in the 110th Congress will die with
a sine die adjournment, so that any such resolution could be considered in the 111th
Congress only if it was introduced anew in that Congress. Finally, this interpretation
might be held to imply, under these circumstances, the President would also have to
retransmit the agreement itself to Congress, in the way provided in the AEA, in the
32 CQ Transcriptwire, “House Committee on Foreign Affairs Holds a Hearing on Russia,
Iran, and Nuclear Weapons,” June 13, 2008.

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CRS-12
new session. Absent this resubmittal, it could be argued, no date could be fixed at
which the disapproval resolution would be automatically introduced.
A contrary argument might hold that, inasmuch as the AEA makes provision
for the process it prescribes to continue after a break in the continuity of session, it
intends that the submission of an agreement will trigger a single process of
congressional action that may carry over into a subsequent Congress. On this view,
the new period of continuous session required by the act would begin automatically
with the convening of the 111th Congress. Rigorously applied, this view could hold
that the 111th Congress would not have to repeat statutory requirements that had
already been accomplished in the 110th Congress.
On this interpretation, for example, inasmuch as the President has already
submitted the text of the agreement to the committees, made the required approval
and determination, submitted the agreement itself to Congress, and submitted the
NPAS and its classified annexes, he would not have to carry out these requirements
anew in the 111th Congress. It could be argued, as well, that if at least 30 days of
continuous session in the 110th Congress elapse between the May 13 submission of
the text and the sine die adjournment, the 30-day consultation period required by
section 123.b. will not have to repeated in the 111th Congress. If all these conditions
are fulfilled in the 110th Congress, on this view, the first day of the 111th Congress
could be construed as the beginning of the 60-day period prescribed by section 123.d.
for congressional action on the agreement and, accordingly, as the day on which new
joint resolutions of disapproval should automatically be introduced. Further, by this
interpretation, if no joint resolution of disapproval were to be enacted by the end of
the 60th day of continuous session of the 111th Congress, the agreement would
automatically go into effect.
Statutory Procedure for Disapproval
Submission of the Agreement
Requirements for Submission. Several features of the language of section
123. indicate differences in purpose and intent between the 30-day period for
consultation under section 123.b. and the 60-day period for congressional action
under section 123.d. Under section 123.b., the President submits the text of the
agreement to the committees having jurisdiction for consultation; under section
123.d. he submits the agreement itself to Congress for its action.
Section 123.b. then directs that the President consult with the committees
receiving the submission for a period of “not less than 30 days of continuous session
... concerning the consistency of the terms of the proposed agreement with all the
requirements of” the non-proliferation provisions of the AEA. He is also to approve
the proposed agreement and make “a determination in writing that ... [it] will
promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and
security.” Under section 123.d., the 60-day period for congressional action begins
when the President submits the agreement itself to the Congress, along with his

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“approval and determination,” and then only when the NPAS, including any
classified annexes, has also been submitted to Congress.
The reference of section 123.d. to the “approval and determination of the
President,” appears to address the same act of approval “determination in writing”
required by section 123.b. Further, although section 123.b. does not explicitly
require that the President must approve the agreement and make the required
determination following the consultation with the committees, it can be read as
implying that the consultation should precede this action. This reading of the statute
appears to imply that the 60-day period required by section 123.d. will not run
concurrently with the 30-day period prescribed by section 123.b., but will instead
follow that 30-day period. On the other hand, the AEA does not appear to require
that the submission to Congress of the agreement itself must immediately follow the
30-day period for consultation.
Submission of Agreement with Russia. Two features of the President’s
submission on May 13 do not appear to comport clearly with the statutory scheme.
First, the President’s letter of transmittal made explicit reference only to submitting
the agreement to Congress for approval; it did not explicitly submit the text of the
agreement to the committees of jurisdiction as well. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the
submission did result in referral of the agreement to the committees, the President
and Congress are apparently agreed in treating the submission of the agreement to
Congress as also constituting submission of the text to the committees. It is this
understanding, in effect, that enables the President by a single submission to fulfill
the requirements of both sections 123.b. and 123.d.
Second, inasmuch as all requirements for both the periods required by the statute
were met by the time of the submission on May 13, it might be questioned why the
30-day and the 60-day period should not both be considered as beginning at once.
The chief reason against doing so appears to be the apparent presumption of the
statute that the President’s “agreement and determination,” the submission of which
is required for the beginning of the 60-day period for congressional action, is to
follow and, in some sense, result from the consultation with committees that is
supposed to occur during the period of at least 30 days.
Under this rationale, however, the President’s declaration of his “approval and
determination” at the outset of the 30-day period could be viewed as rendering moot
the consultive purpose of that period. The President’s letter of transmittal,
nevertheless, also declares the readiness of the Administration to “begin immediately
the consultations ... provided in section 123.b.”
Resolutions of Disapproval
Requirements for Disapproval Resolution. Section 130.i. of the AEA
regulates the form of the joint resolution to disapprove a proposed agreement for
nuclear cooperation and proceedings thereon. Pursuant to section 130.i.(2), joint
resolutions of disapproval are to be introduced automatically in each house “on the
day on which a proposed agreement for cooperation is submitted” to Congress under
section 123.d. The date specified would be the first day of the period of 60 days of
continuous session for congressional consideration mandated by section 123.d. In

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order for the disapproval resolution to be eligible for expedited consideration under
section 130.i., section 130.i.(1) prescribes that its text must simply state: “That the
Congress does not favor the proposed agreement for cooperation transmitted to the
Congress by the President on [the appropriate date].”
The automatically introduced measure is to be sponsored in the House by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in
the Senate by the two party floor leaders, or (in each case) their designees.33 The
AEA, however, also appears to contemplate that other Members may also introduce
similar resolutions. Pursuant to section 130.i.(3), a disapproval resolution is to be
referred, in the Senate, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and in the House to
“the appropriate committee or committees,” which presumably would be, or at least
include, the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Resolutions to Disapprove Agreement with Russia. Some elements
of congressional proceedings in relation to the proposed agreement with Russia do
not clearly reflect the distinctions between the period for consultation with
committees and the period for action by Congress that the AEA appears to intend.
For this agreement, as noted earlier, the first day of the 60-day period provided by
section 123.d. must presumably occur on the 31st day of the full 90-day period
contemplated in the President’s submission letter. Inasmuch as the House maintained
its scheduled Memorial Day recess, it appears that this point will be reached on or
about June 24, 2008. A joint resolution to disapprove the proposed agreement
(H.J.Res. 85), however, had already been introduced on May 14, the day after the
President had submitted the agreement to Congress. This resolution has the text
specified by section 130.i.(2), and was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
It was introduced, however, at the beginning not of the 60-day period, but of the 30-
day period, immediately after the President’s initial transmission of the proposed
agreement. Accordingly, it is not clear whether or not this measure is being regarded
as meeting the requirements of section 130.i.(2) for the automatically introduced
resolution.
In any case, however, the provisions of the statute do not seem to preclude any
resolution having the required text from consideration pursuant to the expedited
procedure of section 130.i. If H.J.Res. 85 were to be enacted before the end of the
60-day period, it would presumably suffice to prevent the agreement from going into
effect, as contemplated by the statute.
Committee Action
Consultations With Committees. Section 123.b. of the AEA directs that
after the President submits the text of the agreement to the pertinent committees, he
is to consult with them thereon during the stated period of “at least 30 days of
continuous session.” This provision does not specify the form to be taken by these
consultations. During the 60 days of continuous session after the agreement itself is
submitted to Congress, on the other hand, section 123.d. specifies that the
33 The joint resolution is to be introduced “by request,” signifying that the introducing
Members do not necessarily advocate the measure.

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committees of referral are to “hold hearings on the proposed agreement ... and submit
a report to their respective bodies recommending whether it should be approved or
disapproved.”34 Presumably, if the committee decides to recommend disapproval,
the report in question could be that which accompanies the resolution of disapproval
itself. If the committee favors approval, the report might simply be explanatory,
rather than accompanying any legislation.35
Committee Action on Agreement with Russia. The relation between
these statutory requirements and initial congressional action on the proposed
agreement with Russia also reflects possible ambiguities. This congressional action
began with the hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 12 and
the closed briefing with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 17. It
is not clear whether either committee conceived its session as meeting the
requirement of section 123.d. for hearings on the agreement. If they did, it is not
clear whether hearings held after the agreement has been submitted and referred, but
before the 60-day period during which section 123.d. calls for them, could
appropriately be regarded as also satisfying that requirement. On the other hand,
inasmuch as officials of the Department of State appeared at both sessions, they
could no doubt be understood as means of implementing the consultations for which
section 123.b. calls. There seems no reason to suppose that consultations pursuant
to section123.b. might not take such a form.
Discharge of Committee
Timing of Discharge. Under section 130.i.(4) of the AEA, each committee
of referral is automatically to be discharged from the further consideration of all
disapproval resolutions referred to it at the end of 45 days from the date of
submission of the agreement. This provision appears intended to guarantee that a
disapproval resolution will become eligible for timely floor consideration in each
chamber even if the committee takes no action. The statute, however, does not
define this time period in terms of days of continuous session. Instead, it is the
practice of Congress to construe references in its procedures to “days,” if not
otherwise specified, as legislative days. For each house, a legislative day ends each
time the chamber adjourns, and another begins each time it convenes after an
adjournment. Accordingly, “legislative days” in each chamber normally correspond
to its days of session.36 For this reason, although days of continuous session are
34 Section 123.d. (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)).
35 The committee might also wish to advocate approval with conditions. In this case, the
report might accompany a measure providing for that action, as described in the section on
“Alternative Action,” below.
36 Exceptions today are not common, but in recent decades were more frequent in the Senate
than in the House. Exceptions occur when a chamber does not adjourn, but takes a recess,
overnight or longer, or, conversely, when it adjourns briefly and reconvenes in the course
of a single calendar day. See “Day” in U.S. Congress, Senate, Riddick’s Senate Procedure:
Precedents and Practices, S.Doc. 101-28, 101st Cong., 2nd sess. by Floyd M. Riddick and
Alan S. Frumin, rev. and ed. by Alan S. Frumin (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp. 712-715;
U.S. Congress, House, Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United
(continued...)

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measured in a way that maintains a single count for Congress as a whole, the number
of legislative days in the two houses may differ.
As a result, if either chamber convenes Monday through Friday except during
recess periods, five legislative days would probably occur per week there, although
seven “days of continuous session” would elapse. If both houses held pro forma
sessions during a recess period, days of continuous session would elapse even more
quickly compared to legislative days in each chamber. (For example, if each house
convenes two pro forma sessions during a “recess” period running from one Saturday
through the second following Sunday, the recess would consume nine days of
continuous session, and only two legislative days in each chamber.) Under these
conditions, the 45th (legislative) day after referral of a disapproval resolution might
not occur, in either or both chambers, until 60 days of continuous session from the
submission of the agreement had already elapsed. In this case, the discharge of the
committee(s) might not occur until after the agreement had already gone into effect
and could no longer be disapproved under the statute.37 It is not clear whether the
possibility of such a result was intended by the statute or arises from an inadvertent
oversight in drafting.
Possible Discharge of Agreement with Russia. In the present instance,
if either house meets five days a week, except during recesses, during the period after
the resolutions of disapproval are to be introduced on June 24, the required 45
legislative days in that house will not have elapsed by the time of the scheduled sine
die adjournment on September 26. Under these conditions, that house will never
reach the point at which discharge would occur by the time the 110th Congress ends.
Alternatively, if Congress continues meeting after September 26 on the same
schedule, and without recesses, committees could be discharged pursuant to the
statute on or about October 10, 2008. As estimated above, however,38 the 90th day
of continuous session will already have been reached on October 8, so that the
discharge will come too late to prevent the agreement from going into effect.
Similarly, if both houses hold two pro forma sessions per week during the scheduled
Independence Day and August recesses, the additional legislative days represented
by these pro forma sessions of discharge could advance the point of discharge in each
house to about September 24. As also explained earlier, however, the pro forma
sessions would also give rise to the days of the “recess” period being counted as days
of continuous session. Under these conditions, as a result, the 90th day of continuous
session would already have been reached on about August 11. In either case, if the
committee in each chamber did not choose to report a joint resolution of disapproval
36 (...continued)
States, by Asher C. Hinds (Washington: GPO, 1907), vol. IV, sec. 3192; and U.S. Congress,
House, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, by
Clarence Cannon (Washington: GPO, 1935), vol. VI, sec. 723.
37 On the other hand, if one house held pro forma sessions during a period when the other
was in recess, additional legislative days would occur while the count of days of continuous
session would remain static. This circumstance would tend to allow the committee to be
discharged earlier in the 60-day period when action to disapprove must occur.
38 See “Days of Continuous Session in the 110th Congress,” above.

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for the agreement with Russia, the provision of section 130.i. for automatic discharge
would not afford the 110th Congress an opportunity to act on the resolution.39
Chamber Action
Section 130.i. of the AEA provides that, once the committee in either chamber
reports or is discharged from a joint resolution to disapprove a nuclear cooperation
agreement, the measure is to be placed on the chamber’s calendar of business.40 The
provision then directs that the disapproval resolution be considered under expedited
(or “fast track”) procedures, the purpose of which is to ensure that Congress will have
an opportunity to consider and vote on the measure before the arrival of the time at
which the agreement would otherwise automatically take effect. Section 130.i.,
however, does not itself specify procedures for floor consideration of a resolution of
disapproval. Instead, for the Senate, it applies an expedited procedure contained in
another statute, and for the House, it presumes that the procedures used will be
established by a special rule.
For the Senate, section 130.i.(5) of the AEA provides that floor consideration
shall occur pursuant to section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (ISAAECA).41 This provision of law established
an expedited procedure, for the Senate only, that has been made applicable to
additional classes of measure by several subsequent laws. Pursuant to this expedited
procedure, the joint resolution of disapproval is privileged, meaning that the Senate
may take it up by approving a non-debatable motion to proceed to consider.
ISAAECA also limits debate on the resolution itself to 10 hours (equally divided and
controlled by the two floor leaders or their designees), and precludes any amendment
(or motion to recommit). A non-debatable motion to limit debate further is allowed,
various other potentially dilatory actions are prohibited, and limits are placed on the
debate of questions arising during consideration. Provisions similar to these are
standard components of statutory expedited procedures.
Section 130.i.(5) establishes no regulations for House floor consideration of the
resolution of disapproval, nor does it even make the measure privileged for
consideration (which, in the House, means that the measure could be called up with
priority over the regular order of business). Instead, section 130.i.(5) authorizes the
Committee on Rules to report a special rule providing for consideration of the
39 It is also possible, as suggested in footnote 21, that the Senate might hold two pro forma
sessions per week while the House actually took its scheduled recesses for Independence
Day and during August. In this case legislative days would accrue in the Senate during a
period in which no days of continuous session were occurring. Under these conditions,
discharge might occur in the Senate on about September 24, even though the period for
disapproval might still potentially extend until October 8. Such an arrangement,
nevertheless, could provide no corresponding help for the House.
40 In the Senate, the resolution would be placed on the Calendar of General Orders, which
carries most measures eligible for floor consideration. In the House, the measure would
most likely be placed on the Union Calendar, which is for measures that may affect revenues
or expenditures.
41 P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 at 766.

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measure under terms that “may be similar, if applicable” to those of ISAAECA. Any
special rule for consideration of a disapproval resolution would surely place limits
on debate, and would most likely prohibit amendments as well, inasmuch as any
change in the text of the resolution would render it inconsistent with the requirements
of section 130.i.(1), and therefore, presumably, ineligible for further consideration
under the expedited procedure of section 130.i.
This provision of the AEA grants the Committee on Rules no power that it
would not otherwise have. Nevertheless, unless the Committee on Rules reports a
special rule for considering a disapproval resolution, or unless privilege for
consideration is conferred on the measure by some other means (e.g., suspension of
the rules or unanimous consent), section 130. would afford no means by which House
floor consideration of the measure could be ensured.
Final Congressional Action
Section 130.i.(6) of the AEA makes provision to preclude the necessity to
resolve differences between disapproval resolutions passed by the two chambers. If
one chamber adopts its resolution and transmits it to the other, then the receiving
chamber considers its own companion measure, but takes the final vote on the
measure received from the first house (which, under the statute, must be
substantively similar). This automatic “hookup” is evidently intended to ensure that
final action in both houses will occur on the same measure in the same form, so that
it can be cleared for presentation to the President without the necessity for a
conference committee or other process of resolving differences between versions of
the measure adopted by the two chambers.42
Presidential Action
Pursuant to section 123.d. of the AEA, the proposed nuclear cooperation
agreement with the Russian Federation will take effect at the end of the total period
of 90 days of continuous session unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted
before that time. It is not sufficient for Congress to complete action on the
disapproval resolution within the required time; the measure must actually become
law before the end of the prescribed period. Enactment into law of the resolution
requires either that (1) the President signs it or allows it to pass into law without his
signature; or (2) the Congress overrides his veto. For Congress to prevent the
agreement from taking effect, one of these actions would have to take place before
the end of the 90-day period.
Under the Constitution, the President has 10 days (Sundays excepted) to act on
a measure after it is presented to him. As a result, if the resolution were to be
presented when fewer than 10 calendar days (excluding Sundays) remained in the
total period of 90 days of continuous session, it appears that the President could
render the measure moot by failing to act until the 90-day period expired and the
agreement went into effect. Similarly, if the President were to return the resolution
with a veto, the agreement would take effect unless Congress were to complete action
42 Similar provisions, again, appear in several other statutory expedited procedures.

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to override the veto before the 90th day of continuous session after the initial
submission of its text to the committees.
In practice, the President is likely to veto a resolution disapproving an
agreement of which, under the statute, he has already certified his approval. For
Congress to make effective use of its opportunity under the AEA to disapprove the
agreement, accordingly, it would presumably have to present the resolution of
disapproval to the President at a point when a minimum of 11 days of continuous
session remain in the 90-day period before the agreement automatically becomes
effective. (The minimum is 11 if Congress remains in session, such that every
calendar day is a day of continuous session, inasmuch as any period of 10 calendar
days will contain at least one Sunday that will count as a day of continuous session
but not as a day of the period for presidential action.) A still longer period would
afford Congress a more practicable opportunity to act to override the veto.
Specific implications of this circumstances for the agreement with Russia can
be illustrated only through assumptions about the sine die adjournment of the 110th
Congress. Assume, for example, that Congress maintains the announced schedule
described above, in the section on “Days of Continuous Session in the 110th
Congress,” through September 26, 2008, but instead of adjourning sine die on that
date, recesses its session until November 12. As shown earlier, September 26 would
then presumably be the 78th day of continuous session, and November 12 would be
the 79th. Under these circumstances, if Congress completes action on the resolution
of disapproval and presents it to the President on September 26, just before recessing,
the 10-day period allowed for presidential action would extend until October 8, and
when Congress returned on November 12, it would have until the 90th day of
continuous session (presumably Sunday, November 23) to prevent the agreement
entering into effect by overriding the veto.
If, on the other hand, Congress does not complete action on the resolution of
disapproval until it reconvenes on November 12, the 10 days allowed for presidential
action would last until Monday, November 24. Assuming Congress remains in
session, however, its 90th day of continuous session after submission of the agreement
would still be November 23. Under these circumstances, it appears that the President
could ensure that the agreement would go into effect by delaying his veto of the
measure until November 24.
Finally, if Congress were to adjourn sine die shortly after adopting the
disapproval resolution, the President could pocket veto it. If this sine die
adjournment occurred after the 90th day of continuous session, the agreement would
go into effect. On the other hand, if the adjournment occurred on or before the 90th
day of continuous session, the agreement presumably could not go into effect until
the appropriate period of continuous session had elapsed beginning with the
convening of the 111th Congress, and then only if no congressional disapproval was
accomplished during that period.43
43 This period might encompass either 90 or 60 days, depending on interpretation, as
explained above under “Possibility of Renewing Action in the 111th Congress.”

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CRS-20
Alternative Action
Although the AEA provides the expedited procedures described above for
congressional action on a joint resolution of disapproval, it does not require Congress
to use these procedures to act on the matter. If, during the period for action provided
by the statute, Congress were to adopt a disapproval resolution meeting the
requirements of section 130.i. under any of its regular procedures, enactment of the
resolution would have the same effect of disapproving the agreement as would that
of a similar measure under the expedited procedures of the statute.
Under its general legislative power, Congress could also determine the status of
the agreement by acting on a measure other than the one prescribed by the statute.
Such action occurred in the 99th Congress (1985-1986), when Congress enacted a
measure (P.L. 99-183) providing that a nuclear cooperation agreement with China
would become effective only when certain further conditions were met. Just as with
the disapproval resolution specified by the statute, however, any such measure would
have to be enacted before the end of period required by the AEA, because otherwise
the agreement as submitted would automatically go into effect. On the other hand,
inasmuch as any such alternative measure would not meet the requirements of section
130.i. for a joint resolution of disapproval, the measure would not be eligible for
consideration under the expedited procedures of section 130.i. Instead, each house
would have to consider it under its regular legislative procedures (unless it chose, in
accordance with its own general procedures, to apply the expedited procedure to the
alternative measure).
Any measure granting approval with conditions to the proposed agreement with
Russia would presumably have to contain language specifying that its provisions
apply “notwithstanding section 123. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.”
Section (a)(2) of P.L. 99-183, granting conditional approval to the agreement with
China, contained a provision of this kind. In the absence of such a provision, the
provision of section 123. for automatic unconditional approval at the end of the 90
days would presumably continue to apply, so that in spite of the conditional approval,
and unless the joint resolution of disapproval specified by section 130.i. were enacted
into law, the agreement might take effect without conditions at the end of the period.
The President might also be able to vitiate an attempt by Congress to place
conditions on its approval of the agreement with Russia by vetoing the measure.
Unless Congress could override the veto (or secure enactment into law of a joint
resolution of disapproval), the agreement would then instead go into effect without
conditions at the end of the period prescribed in accordance with section 123.

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