Order Code RL34528
U.S.-South Korea Beef Dispute:
Negotiations and Status
Updated June 20, 2008
Remy Jurenas
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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U.S.-South Korea Beef Dispute:
Negotiations and Status
Summary
On April 18, 2008, U.S. and South Korean negotiators reached agreement on the
sanitary rules that Korea would apply to all beef imports from the United States.
This would allow for imports of all cuts of U.S. boneless and bone-in beef and other
beef products from cattle, irrespective of age, as long as specified risk materials
known to transmit mad cow disease are removed and other conditions are met. These
rules significantly expand upon a January 2006 U.S.-South Korean protocol, which
only permitted imports of U.S. boneless beef from cattle less than 30 months old.
The revised rules were expected to take effect in mid-May when Korea published
implementing regulations. However, continued strong Korean public opposition to
the agreement led to the government’s decision to request that the United States put
on hold exports of beef from cattle older than 30 months, and to indefinitely postpone
publication of the rules until there is a U.S. response. On June 19, negotiators
reportedly reached an accomodation, with details expected to be released shortly.
If the April 2008 agreement takes effect, U.S. beef exporters would be ready to
recapture a key overseas market. In 2003, South Korea was the third-largest market
for U.S. beef exports, prior to the ban imposed after the first U.S. cow infected with
mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), was discovered.
Several Members of Congress have stated that congressional consideration of,
and support for, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), depends
upon South Korea fully opening its market to U.S. beef. Though not technically on
the agenda of the FTA talks, parallel bilateral negotiations in 2006-2007 did not
resolve differences on the sanitary terms for resuming sales of all U.S. beef products.
The U.S. beef industry and U.S. policymakers welcomed the deal. However, in
Korea, TV coverage of the issue and Internet-spread rumors that questioned the
safety of U.S. beef resulted in escalating protests. With opposition political parties
also advocating that the beef agreement be renegotiated or scrapped, the Korean
government sought and received assurances from the United States (confirmed in an
exchange of letters on May 19) that South Korea has the right under existing
international agreements to take steps to protect its citizens from health and safety
risks. The government hoped this letter exchange would quell public concerns by
showing it could suspend U.S. beef imports if another infected BSE cow is
discovered in the United States. However, protests have intensified and undermined
the standing of the Korean President and his political party, which holds a slim
majority in Korea’s parliament.
U.S. trade officials maintain that the beef agreement will not be renegotiated.
Their position is that U.S. beef is safe and is consumed by millions of Americans.
They maintain that the U.S. measures in place to prevent the introduction of BSE in
U.S. cattle herds meet international scientific standards. With Korea requesting to
modify the agreement’s terms without formally renegotiating it, both governments
have little choice but to again explore options to reach some accommodation. This
report will be updated to reflect developments.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Beef Exports to South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
U.S. and South Korean Negotiating Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
April 2008 Beef Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Feed Ban Rule Broadens Scope of Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Steps to Be Taken If Problems Are Found During Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Steps That Apply If Another U.S. BSE Case Occurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Other Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Korean Reaction to Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Initial Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Government Efforts to Respond to Public Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bilateral Letter Exchange to Clarify Agreement Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
More Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
U.S. Reaction to Agreement and to Korean Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Latest Bilateral Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. International Standards to Prevent Spread of BSE in Beef Trade . 15
List of Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Beef Exports to South Korea, by Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. South Korean Beef Imports, by Leading Suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

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U.S.-South Korea Beef Dispute:
Negotiations and Status
Many U.S. policy makers view the resumption of all U.S. beef exports to South
Korea — the third-largest market in 2003 — as essential, but not necessarily
sufficient, before the U.S. Congress would consider implementing legislation for the
Korean-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).1 To facilitate this, the U.S. and
Korean governments reached an agreement in mid-April 2008 on the rules that Korea
would apply to U.S. beef imports that ensure shipments meet human health
standards. South Korea’s rationale for concluding this deal was to improve the
prospects for the Bush Administration deciding to soon send the KORUS FTA to
Congress, because of the limited time remaining in this year’s congressional
calendar. The White House had for some time signaled that Korea had to reopen its
market to U.S. beef sales in order to secure the votes of Members of Congress who
represent cattle production and beef processing states and whose support for the
KORUS FTA is viewed as critical. However, in light of Korean public concerns
about the safety of U.S. beef and growing opposition to the agreement, both
governments have since engaged in intense discussions to find ways to address these
concerns and resume U.S. beef sales to Korea. A formal bilateral announcement is
expected shortly on the results of the latest round of talks that ended on June 19.
Background
South Korea’s concern about the potential human health impacts of U.S. beef
dates back to December 2003, when its government banned imports of U.S. beef after
a Canadian-born cow in Washington state tested positive for bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow disease.2 The loss of the third-largest export
market together with other major foreign markets for U.S. beef contributed to a sharp
fall in U.S. cattle prices in 2004. Subsequent talks over the sanitary rules that would
apply to U.S. beef sales took two years to complete. In January 2006, South Korea
agreed to a protocol that allowed imports of U.S. boneless beef only from cattle less
than 30 months old. U.S. negotiators had signaled that some opening on the beef
issue was necessary before negotiations with South Korea on a comprehensive FTA
1 For more information, see CRS Report RL34330, The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free
Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications, by William H. Cooper, Mark
E. Manyin, Vivian C. Jones, Stephen Cooney, Remy Jurenas, and Alison Siskin.
2 There have been only two other discoveries of BSE in cattle in the United States — in June
2005, in a U.S.-born cow on a Texas farm, and in March 2006, in another U.S-born cow in
Alabama. For more information on U.S. safeguards to protect cattle herds from BSE,
third-party assessments made of U.S. import safeguards against the introduction of BSE,
debate and developments on the livestock “feed ban” issue, U.S. surveillance and testing
programs for BSE in cattle, and BSE prevention in cattle slaughter and beef processing, see
CRS Report RL32199, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or ‘Mad Cow Disease’):
Current and Proposed Safeguards, by Sarah A. Lister and Geoffrey S. Becker.

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CRS-2
could begin. However, in late 2006 South Korean inspectors rejected the first three
shipments of U.S. beef, after discovering small bone fragments in a few boxes of
packaged frozen boneless beef. Though not on the agenda of its FTA negotiators,
U.S. efforts to resolve all issues of beef access to the Korean market subsequently
became contentious as those talks continued. For example, the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) decided not to participate for several weeks in the FTA’s
sanitary and phytosanitary working group. Also, separate bilateral discussions on this
sensitive issue moved from the technical level to high-level meetings as both sides
raced to conclude the KORUS FTA by the end of the March 2007 deadline set by the
then-in-effect trade promotion authority.
Although the beef issue was not resolved in the FTA talks, South Korea’s then-
President Roh, on April 1, 2007, stated he had personally promised President Bush
that his government would “uphold the [yet to-be-released] recommendations” of the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) on the BSE risk status of the United
States and “open the Korean [beef] market at a reasonable level.” The OIE is the
international scientific body recognized by the World Trade Organization as the
international reference for matters of animal disease and health. On May 22, 2007,
the OIE formally found that the United States is a “controlled risk” country for the
spread of mad cow disease. For a description of OIE’s role on this issue, see
Appendix A, “International Standards to Prevent Spread of BSE in Beef Trade.”
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) top official on this matter
commented that this “risk classification recognizes that OIE-recommended, science-
based measures are in place to effectively manage any possible risk of BSE in the
[U.S.] cattle population” and “provides strong support that U.S. regulatory controls
are effective and that U.S cattle and products from cattle of all ages can be safely
traded in accordance with international guidelines, due to our interlocking
safeguards.”3
USDA immediately requested that South Korea amend its import requirements
for U.S. beef within a specified time frame to reflect this risk determination and to
reopen its market to all U.S. cattle and beef products. In response, South Korea’s
animal health regulatory agency began an eight-step process to assess the BSE risks
of the U.S. beef sector in light of the OIE finding, with the intent to negotiate a
revised bilateral agreement that would lay out import rules applicable to U.S. beef.
Initial expectations were that this process would be completed by late September
2007. However, the process was delayed by the third discovery since shipments
resumed in April 2007 of banned backbones in some boxes of U.S. packaged beef.
On October 5, 2007, South Korean authorities announced they would not conduct any
more inspections of U.S. beef until both sides conclude formal negotiations to revise
the 2006 protocol. To move toward that goal, bilateral technical-level talks held
October 11-12, 2007, failed to bring both sides closer to an agreement. South Korean
officials sought rules that were reportedly more strict than OIE guidelines, intended
to reportedly correct four shortcomings in the U.S. measures taken to limit BSE risks.
The U.S. stance was that current rules already met OIE standards.4
3 USDA, Animal and Plant Inspection Service, “Statement by Dr. Ron DeHaven Regarding
OIE Risk Recommendation,” March 9, 2007.
4 Inside U.S. Trade, “U.S., Korea Beef Market Access Talks Fail Over Level of Access,”
(continued...)

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CRS-3
Because of the political controversy anticipated with the prospect of further
opening the Korean market to U.S. beef, President Roh’s government decided to
defer negotiations until after the December 2007 presidential election. Then, newly
inaugurated President Lee Myung-bak decided to wait until after the April 9, 2008,
parliamentary elections. Both decisions effectively delayed talks with the United
States on revising the beef import rules. These talks finally began on April 11.
U.S. Beef Exports to South Korea
Since the late 1990s, South Korea has became a growing market for major beef
exporters, particularly the United States. By 2003, beef imports accounted for nearly
75% of South Korean beef consumption. U.S. shipments alone supplied half of all
of the beef consumed by Koreans.
In 2003, U.S. beef exports to South Korea totaled $815 million, or 246,595
metric tons (MT), and accounted for 21% of the $3.9 billion in U.S. beef products
shipped worldwide. Boneless beef products accounted for $449 million (55% of the
total), while bone-in (rib) beef totaled $292 million (36%). Sales of beef offals
(tongue, liver, heart, among other edible cattle parts) reached $65 million (8%).
Minimal U.S. beef offal exports occurred in 2004, 2005, and 2006, due to South
Korea’s ban on imports after the first U.S. BSE-infected cow was discovered (Figure
1). Though some U.S. boneless beef sales occurred in the last few months of 2006
after South Korea agreed to implement the January 2006 agreement, Korean
inspectors rejected these shipments after discovering small bone fragments in a few
boxes. During the 2004-2006 period, beef shipments to South Korea from Australia
and New Zealand increased substantially to cover demand that had previously been
met by U.S. beef exporters (Figure 2). In 2007, both countries accounted for 92%
of South Korea’s beef imports, compared to 29% in 2003.
U.S. boneless beef exports to South Korea resumed in late April 2007 soon after
negotiators concluded the KORUS FTA. Through early October 2007, Korea’s
quarantine regulatory agency inspected and cleared for retail sale most U.S. boneless
beef shipments, applying its interpretation of the January 2006 agreement. Even with
partial-year exports, South Korea ranked as the fourth-largest market for U.S. beef
in 2007, with sales of $119 million, or 25,165 MT (Figure 1).
U.S. and South Korean Negotiating Objectives
The longstanding U.S. negotiating position has been to press for full access in
one step for all U.S. beef into South Korea’s market. This meant expanding the
scope of the 2006 agreement to include exports of bone-in beef and coverage of all
U.S. beef from cattle, regardless of age, as long as BSE-risk materials are removed
during processing.
4 (...continued)
October 19, 2007, p. 6.

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CRS-4
Figure 1. U.S. Beef Exports to South Korea, by Type
1000
815
800
648
600
390
400
200
119
0.2
1.2
0.6
0.6
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Jan-Apr
Beef & Veal, Prepared/Preserved
Beef Variety Meats (Offals)
Bone-In Beef & Beef Carcasses
Boneless Beef
Source: Derived by CRS from Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics
Figure 2. South Korean Beef Imports, by Leading Suppliers
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Other Countries
New Zealand
Australia
United States
Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service

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CRS-5
South Korea argued for a “two-phased” approach to a full opening. The first
step would allow imports of both boneless and bone-in beef cuts from U.S. cattle less
than 30 months old, as long as those cattle parts identified by the OIE as agents that
can transmit BSE to cattle and in turn to humans are removed. Korea’s trade minister
argued this first step would give the United States about 80% of its market share
before the ban on U.S. beef took effect in late 2003. The second step would permit
imports of beef from older cattle, as long as risk materials are removed according to
OIE’s standards.5 In preparing to take office, South Korea’s then President-elect Lee
Myung-bak signaled an interest in moving quickly to resolve the beef issue. His
transition team reportedly instructed the Ministry of Agriculture to advocate
strengthening import rules, such as placing Korean inspectors at U.S. meat
processing plants to conduct “on-the-spot” inspections.6
April 2008 Beef Agreement
The second agreement, reached just hours before President Lee met President
Bush at Camp David on April 18, 2008, spells out South Korea’s health requirements
that would apply to imports of U.S. beef and beef products. Korea would allow entry
to all cuts of U.S. beef (bone-in or ribs, and boneless) and other beef products from
the edible parts of cattle, irrespective of age, that meet all other specified conditions.
The new rules significantly expand upon the products covered by the first (January
2006) protocol, which only permitted imports of boneless beef from cattle under 30
months old. The agreement would require the removal of specified risk materials
(SRMs) during meat processing, and prohibit the entry of (1) all mechanically
recovered and mechanically separated meat and (2) advanced meat recovery (AMR)
product from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and over at
the time of slaughter. These prohibitions reflect scientific conclusions that these
materials can harbor the BSE agent in cattle and in turn infect humans if product
from such cattle are consumed.7 Other provisions detail which other beef products
may or may not enter South Korea.8
5 Inside U.S. Trade, “Korean Minister Sees Open Beef Market In Two Steps, Delay In FTA
Approval,” November 16, 2007, p. 5.
6 Korea Times Online, “Election Politics Cloud KORUS FTA Ratification,” January 7,
2008.
7 Specified SRMs are “tonsils and distal ileum from cattle of all ages; and [the] brain, eyes,
spinal cord, skull, dorsal root ganglia and vertebral column (excluding vertebrae of the tail,
transverse processes and spinous processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae,
median crest and wings of the sacrum) from cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of
slaughter.” For more information, see “BSE Prevention in Slaughter and Processing: the
‘Fourth Firewall’” in CRS Report RL32199, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or
“Mad Cow Disease”): Current and Proposed Safeguards, by Sarah A. Lister and Geoffrey
S. Becker.
8 AMR product that is free of SRMs and central nervous system tissues is allowed. Ground
meat, processed products and beef extracts may contain AMR but must be free of SRMs and
all mechanically recovered or separated meat.

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CRS-6
U.S. Feed Ban Rule Broadens Scope of Agreement
One important provision would automatically broaden the age range of cattle
covered by the agreement when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
publishes its final animal feed ban rule. Its inclusion addresses some of South
Korea’s concerns about what U.S. government regulations prohibit to be added to
animal feed. With the publication of this FDA rule on April 23, 2008, the bilateral
agreement upon taking effect would apply to imports of U.S. beef and beef products
from all cattle, even those older than 30 months. Prior to this development, the
agreement would have applied only to beef and beef products from cattle less than
30 months old at the time of slaughter.
The published FDA rule bars the use in animal feed and pet food of specified
risk materials from cattle that have “the highest risk for carrying the agent thought
to cause BSE.” FDA states that these measures will strengthen existing safeguards
that have been adopted against BSE.9 The rule reportedly falls short of South Korean
negotiators’ initial demands for (1) a broader ban on the materials that are allowed
to be used in animal feed, (2) a requirement that ranchers report cattle with BSE
symptoms to the USDA, and (3) U.S. implementation of a mandatory national animal
identification system.10
Steps to Be Taken If Problems Are Found During Inspection
The April agreement prescribes steps that South Korea’s quarantine inspection
agency can take if banned cattle parts or other problems are found in a shipment from
a U.S. meat firm and specifies what its counterpart U.S. agency must do to address
the matter. One provision specifies that Korea will continue to inspect other imports
of U.S. beef and related products, rather than as allowed by the first agreement to
suspend their entry and revoke the right of that firm to sell beef to Korea if the
problem is not resolved. For example, if Korean inspectors detect a “food-safety
hazard” — defined as “any biological, chemical, or physical property that may cause
food to be unsafe for human consumption” — in a “lot” from a U.S. firm, the Korean
government “may reject the lot.” Korea must then notify and consult with the U.S.
government on the matter and may request corrective action if appropriate. If an
SRM is found, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) will investigate
to determine what caused the problem. In the meantime, Korea will inspect more
closely other shipments from that U.S. firm (i.e., by increasing the inspection rate on
lots of the same product) until five lots pass inspection without the discovery of any
9 Prohibited materials include the brains and spinal cords from cattle 30 months of age and
older, the entire carcasses of BSE-infected cattle, the entire carcass of cattle that has not
been inspected and passed for human consumption that is 30 months of age or older from
which brains and spinal cords were not removed, tallow derived from BSE-infected cattle
and from other prohibited cattle materials, and mechanically separated beef derived from
the same prohibited materials. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and
Drug Administration, “Substances Prohibited from Use in Animal Food or Feed,” published
in the Federal Register, April 25, 2008, p. 22720.
10 Inside US Trade, “Feed Ban Opens Beef Market Despite Failing to Meet Korean
Demands,” April 25, 2008, p. 4.

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CRS-7
food-safety hazard. Only then can Korea return to its standard inspection procedures
and rates on imports from that firm.
However, if the Korean government discovers two incidents of food-safety
hazards involving separate lots from that same U.S. firm, Korea may suspend entries
from that firm until corrective action occurs. One exception is that beef product from
that firm certified for export to Korea prior to the date of suspension is eligible to be
inspected. That U.S. meat firm is suspended from exporting to Korea until the U.S.
government informs the Korean government of what corrective action has been taken
and the date the firm’s suspension is lifted. Unlike the first (2006) agreement, these
various steps provide a map for addressing problems that could arise in future beef
shipments.
Steps That Apply If Another U.S. BSE Case Occurs
If another case of BSE occurs in the United States, the agreement narrows the
scope of how both countries would respond to such a discovery. The first step
requires the U.S. government to immediately conduct a thorough epidemiological
investigation (i.e., look at all of the factors that contributed to the presence of BSE
in this case) and inform the Korean government of the results. The second step
requires the U.S. government to consult with the Korean government about these
findings. The Korean government can only suspend imports of U.S. beef and
products if the additional case or cases results in the OIE recognizing an adverse
change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status (i.e., changing it from “controlled
risk” to “undetermined risk”).11 However, in an effort to address Korean public
concerns that these provisions were not strong enough, both governments on May 19
exchanged letters affirming that each country could take steps to protect its citizens
from health and safety risks under specified multilateral agreements (see “Bilateral
Letter Exchange to Clarify Agreement Terms,” below). Previously, under the
January 2006 agreement, South Korea reserved the right to unilaterally suspend
imports of U.S. boneless beef when (1) there was objective recognition that the U.S.
BSE risk status has significantly worsened “due to the malfunctioning of [five
specified] U.S. BSE control measures,” and (2) the presence of “additional BSE risk
has been confirmed through the development of new science.”
Other Rules
The agreement also includes provisions spelling out the requirements that U.S.
beef exporters and the U.S. government must meet to sell beef and beef products to
South Korea. Among other things, these provisions:
! allow all U.S. meat establishments operating under USDA
inspection to sell beef and beef products to South Korea,12 except in
11 For an explanation, see Appendix A, “International Standards to Prevent Spread of BSE
in Beef Trade.”
12 However, during the first 90 days after the agreement takes effect, South Korea reserves
the right to audit and/or reject U.S. decisions on the listing of new plants eligible to export
(continued...)

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CRS-8
the case (as described above in “Steps to Be Taken If Problems Are
Found During Inspection”) when Korea suspends a firm following
the discovery of two food safety hazard incidents. Currently, seven
U.S. processing plants are not eligible under the first agreement’s
terms as interpreted by South Korea to export boneless beef to that
market.13
! expand the origin of foreign cattle from which beef and products can
be exported to Korea to include cattle imported from Canada and
raised in the United States for at least 100 days before slaughter.
Previously, only boneless beef from cattle imported from Mexico
and present in the United States for a minimum 100 days was
eligible for export.
! detail the steps that USDA’s FSIS would take to handle cases of a
U.S. meat establishment’s “serious non-compliance” — the
discovery of a food-safety hazard — during an audit or in a shipped
product (e.g., immediately control the non-compliant product; stop
the production process if the problem continues until the
determination is made that corrective and preventative measures
have been taken; and allow production to resume if the
determination is made that corrective steps are adequate).
Previously, the U.S. government was required to immediately
suspend the inspection of beef destined for Korea when serious non-
compliance with the agreement’s health requirements was
discovered.
! require during the first 180 days after the agreement takes effect that
U.S. exporters will indicate on boxes of T-bone and Porterhouse
steaks that such cuts come from cattle under 30 months of age.
! allow Korean government inspectors to conduct on-site audits of a
representative sample of U.S. facilities that export beef and products
to Korea, with any resulting discovery of serious non-compliance
with health requirements to require the U.S. government to take
appropriate measures. Previously, the Korean government could ask
the U.S. government to stop the U.S. meat establishment from
exporting beef to Korea.
! require the United States to implement measures that meet or exceed
OIE guidelines for controlled-risk status to detect and prevent the
introduction and spread of BSE.
12 (...continued)
beef to Korea or on re-listing those plants that had lost their eligibility to export because of
problems with previous shipments.
13 USDA, FSIS, “Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea,” KS-74, June 13, 2008,
at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Republic_of_Korea_Requirements/
index.asp].

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CRS-9
Korean Reaction to Agreement
Initial Reaction
In South Korea, announcement of the beef import agreement with the United
States was met with street protests sparked by TV coverage and Internet-spread
rumors claiming that U.S. beef is not safe, calls by opposition political parties for the
government to nullify or renegotiate the terms of the agreement, and calls by farmers
for the National Assembly (Korea’s parliament) to reject the KORUS FTA upon its
consideration during a special session later in May 2008. Opponents argued that the
South Korean government moved too quickly to strike a deal, and did not secure
enough safeguards against the dangers of mad cow disease. The intensity of the early
May protests prompted Korean government officials to go on the defensive to
reassure the public that U.S. beef is safe. Lengthy nationally televised press
conferences were held and government officials appeared before a parliamentary
committee examining the agreement’s details.
Government Efforts to Respond to Public Concerns
In light of mounting public concerns, President Lee on May 7 stated that his
government will immediately stop imports of U.S. beef if public health is threatened,
and then work out countermeasures. Korea’s Agriculture Minister further stated that
quarantine inspections of U.S. beef imports would be suspended if another case of
mad cow disease is detected in the United States, even if that step risks trade friction.
On May 8, Prime Minister Han Seung-soo went further by stating that the Korean
government “will put the people’s health and safety before all else,” and if a case of
mad cow disease occurs in the United States that is believed to endanger public
health, will act to ban imports of U.S. beef, conduct a survey of all U.S. beef imports,
immediately send an investigative team to the United States, and negotiate to revise
the signed beef agreement.14 These statements raised concerns among U.S. trade
officials that the agreement could be unraveling. They signaled to their Korean
counterparts that there will be no renegotiation but decided to work together to find
some accommodations. On May 12, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Susan
Schwab acknowledged that “the United States accepts and supports the Prime
Minister’s statement and would not ask for anything different” and that the United
States recognizes Korea’s right to take measures to protect public health that are
consistent with international agreements’ position on protecting public health. She
also reiterated that the bilateral beef agreement “should address any concerns of
Korean consumers by building several layers of procedures and safety measures to
ensure that imported U.S. beef is safe.”15
14 Yonhap English News, “PM pledges beef deal revision if BSE outbreak is confirmed,”
May 8, 2008; Seoul Yonhap, “Statement to the People Regarding Imports of US Beef,” May
8, 2008.
15 USTR, “Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab on Recent
Developments in Korea,” May 12, 2008.

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CRS-10
Bilateral Letter Exchange to Clarify Agreement Terms
As the initial May 15 target for publishing the rules to implement the agreement
passed, Korean trade officials, trying to find a way to defuse public criticism but still
adhere to President Lee’s then-position not to reopen the April agreement, continued
talks with their U.S. counterparts. Several days of intense behind-the-scenes talks
culminated in an exchange of letters to clarify the agreement.
On May 19, 2008, Korea’s trade minister and the U.S. Trade Representative
signed letters that affirm Korea’s right as a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to protect its citizens from health and safety risks under Article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. While this letter exchange does
not specifically state that South Korea can prohibit U.S. beef should another case of
mad cow disease occur in the United States, the U.S. recognition that Korea can
exercise broad recourse permitted under multilateral agreements to protect its
citizens’ health appears to give the Korean government some cover to take this step
if determined to be warranted.
The letter exchange also addressed Korea’s concern that the SRMs specified in
the April agreement did not include two SRMs from cattle over 30 months old that
are listed in U.S. regulations as required to be removed from all beef and beef
products, whether destined for U.S. consumption or export. The United States agreed
to recognize Korea’s right to reject any beef shipment that contains these additional
SRMs, and to block all future shipments from a U.S. processor that violates the
expanded list of SRMs twice.
More Recent Developments
In acknowledging the continuing strong, vocal opposition to the beef agreement,
President Lee in a nationwide address on May 22 apologized for his government’s
lack of efforts to sound out public opinion on resuming U.S. beef imports and
accepted criticism for his negligence “in carefully reading the public’s mind” on this
issue. He pointed to the recent bilateral document exchange that guarantees Korea’s
right to “take sovereign measures to halt beef imports immediately if any situation
endangering public health occurs,” noting that it guarantees that the safety of U.S.
beef to be imported will meet international standards and that the quality of such beef
will be the same as that consumed by Americans. Lee further called on the political
opposition that holds the majority in the National Assembly to set aside its
partisanship and approve the KORUS FTA in the remaining few days of its special
session, in order to secure a competitive edge in the U.S. market and bolster Korea’s
economy.16
On May 26, Korea’s Agriculture Ministry announced another delay in issuing
updated rules to apply to U.S. beef imports until it reviews the report of inspectors
who had just toured U.S. beef processing plants and the government holds meetings
16 Yonhap News Agency, “Full text of Lee’s statement on beef dispute, KORUS FTA,” May
22, 2008.

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CRS-11
with cattle producers to discuss support measures that could be adopted to assist them
adjust to cheaper beef imported from the United States.17 On May 29, Korea’s
Agriculture Ministry announced it would publish on June 3 these rules to apply to
imports of U.S. beef and products.
Public protests on the beef issue turned violent during the weekend of May 31 -
June 1. On June 2, the Agriculture Ministry announced it would indefinitely
postpone the official publication of the rules. This means that quarantine inspections
of U.S. beef cannot resume. This step was reportedly taken at the request of the
President’s ruling political party, which some speculate was prompted by its desire
to restore civil order and end the violence.18
While the Korean government’s position for several weeks had been that it
would not seek to reopen the agreement for renegotiation, its stance appeared to
change on June 3. To address public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef, the
Agriculture Minister said that his government had requested the United States to put
on hold exports to South Korea of beef from cattle older than 30 months. He also
stated that the publication of the new import rules will be postponed until the United
States responds to this request, and added that quarantine inspection of U.S. beef at
various stages of entry will also stop. On the same day, President Lee in a cabinet
meeting acknowledged the significant drop in his approval rating because of the
controversy over the agreement, and stated that “It is only natural that we do not
import beef from cattle older than 30 months as long as the public is worried about
it, and the majority is opposed to it.”
The beef issue has served as the catalyst for the expression of public discontent
with President Lee’s other policies. Protests continued to spread across Korea, as
reflected in a June 10 march of a reported 80,000 demonstrators in Seoul opposed to
resuming U.S. beef imports and calling for Lee’s resignation. Also on June 10, the
President’s cabinet offered to resign, reportedly taking blame for the political turmoil
triggered by the beef agreement.
U.S. Reaction to Agreement
and to Korean Concerns
The U.S. beef sector and U.S. policy makers welcomed news of the agreement
when announced in mid-April 2008. The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association
noted that South Korea “potentially represents a $1 billion market and could grow to
be the United States’ top beef customer.” The American Meat Institute commended
U.S. negotiators for their efforts to communicate “the interlocking safeguards in
place in the United States that make the U.S. beef supply among the safest in the
world.” The National Meat Institute emphasized that the agreement’s most important
17 Yonhap News Agency, “Gov’t to consult farmers ahead of U.S. beef pact
implementation,” May 27, 2008.
18 Inside U.S. Trade Online, “Korea Again Delays Opening to U.S. Beef Amid Protests,”
June 2, 2008.

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CRS-12
aspect is “the reduced risk of failure,” leaving “few opportunities for the types of
technical non-compliance” that caused problems when Korea last allowed U.S. beef
to enter.
President Bush thanked South Korea’s President Lee for the decision to reopen
that country’s market to U.S. beef “consistent with international standards.” Some
Members of Congress welcomed the announcement, indicated they will monitor the
agreement’s implementation to see commercially meaningful quantities of U.S. beef
appear on Korean store shelves, and stated that this step will improve the atmosphere
for congressional consideration of the KORUS FTA.19
As the Korean government struggled to respond to public protests against the
agreement and opposition political parties’ calls for its renegotiation, U.S.
government officials initially maintained there will be no renegotiating.20 Repeated
U.S. statements have emphasized that U.S. beef is safe and is consumed by millions
of Americans, and that internationally recognized measures are in place to prevent
the introduction of BSE into U.S. cattle herds. At the same time, U.S. officials began
consultations with their Korean counterparts on approaches that could help defuse
the sensitivity of this issue among the Korean public. The May 19 letter exchange
was the first outcome of this process.
Responding to Korea’s request to exclude beef from cattle aged more than 30
months, U.S. government spokesmen expressed disappointment with the continued
delay in implementing the agreement, signaled that work will continue with the U.S.
beef industry and Korean officials to address U.S. concerns about the delay, and
acknowledged respect for Korea’s need to work within its system to address the
issues that have arisen. In a recognition of this importance of this matter, President
Bush in a June 7 phone call with President Lee reportedly promised to address the
Korean leader’s request to work out effective ways to limit U.S. beef exports to cattle
aged 30 months or less.21 In a separate initiative, five U.S. beef processing firms said
they would voluntarily add labels to indicate whether shipped beef is from cattle
more or less than 30 months of age, leaving the choice on what to buy up to Korean
consumers.22
19 For example, see press releases and statements issued on April 18, 2008 by Senator Max
Baucus, “Baucus Welcomes Deal On U.S. Beef, Says Korea Must Follow Through”;
Senator Saxby Chambliss, “Sen. Chambliss Statement On South Korea Lifting Ban On U.S.
Beef”; Senator Charles Grassley, “Memorandum: South Korea on U.S. Beef”;
Representative Roy Blunt, “Blunt Hails South Korean Decision to Reopen Beef Market,
Urges Action on Sidelined Trade Pacts”; Representative Bob Goodlatte, “Agreement Should
Bolster Momentum for Future Free-Trade Agreement”.
20 Inside U.S. Trade, “Korea FTA Backers Float Auto Proposals To Clear Way For Vote,”
May 9, 2008; Dow Jones International News, “US Rejects Calls For Renegotiating S Korea
Beef Export Deal,” May 16, 2008.
21 AgWeb.com, “Bush, South Korean Leader Talk Saturday Re: Beef Trade Issues,” June
9, 2008; AgriPulse, “South Korean concerns continue to delay U.S. beef imports,” June 11,
2008.
22 Press release issued by Tyson Foods, Inc., JBS Swift & Co., Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.,
(continued...)

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CRS-13
Latest Bilateral Discussions
To find a “mutually agreeable path forward” on Korea’s request, USTR’s
Schwab and South Korea’s trade minister engaged in week-long intense negotiations
that ended on June 19. According to USTR, both sides were close to reaching an
agreement on the issue of the age of cattle slaughtered for U.S. beef to be exported
to South Korea and were in the process of consulting with their governments and
stakeholders. Press accounts report that negotiators had agreed in principle that U.S.
beef from cattle older than 30 months would not be shipped to Korea, with details on
how this would be handled to be announced late on June 20.23 Evidence of this is
reflected in a U.S. meat industry statement acknowledging the Korean Import Beef
Association’s position that, as a transitional measure, its members will only import
U.S. beef from cattle less than 30 months old, and its request that U.S. beef exporters
ask the U.S. government to verify that U.S. beef exported to Korea meets the
importers’ request. The statement includes a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture
and to the USTR stating that the “U.S. beef industry is prepared to limit exports to
Korea to only products from cattle less than thirty months of age under a program
verified by USDA as a transitional measure to full market opening consistent with
OIE guidelines.” To facilitate this, the letter requests that USDA establish this
program as soon as Korea publishes rules to put the April 2008 agreement into
effect.24
Outlook
The April 2008 beef agreement is the latest step in the U.S. government’s 4½-
year effort to regain access to South Korea’s lucrative beef market for the U.S. cattle
and beef processing sectors. Once the revised rules are published, attention will turn
to how Korea’s quarantine inspection agency implements them and the pace at which
U.S. beef cuts begin to reach consumers.25 The U.S. Meat Export Federation
22 (...continued)
National Beef Packing Co. and Smithfield Beef Group, Inc., “U.S. Beef Processors to Offer
Temporary Beef Labeling Program for South Korea; Effort designed to increase consumer
confidence,” June 2, 2008, available at [http://www.tyson.com/Corporate/PressRoom/
ViewArticle.aspx?id=2954]
23 Inside U.S. Trade, “U.S., Korea Close To Beef Deal, To Consult With Stakeholders,” June
20, 2008, p. 9; Dong-A Ilbo Daily, “U.S. Agrees in Banning Exports of Old Beef,” June 20,
2008.
24 U.S. Meat Export Federation, “U.S. Beef Exporters Respond to the Statement from the
Korea Import Beef Association,” June 20, 2008, accessed at [http://www.usmef.org/
TradeLibrary/News08_0620a.asp].
25 Some 5,300 MT of U.S. boneless beef held in cold storage in Korean warehouses since
last fall would be the first to be processed by Korea’s quarantine inspection agency. Once
cleared, this product would reach retail store shelves within a few weeks. However,
uncertainty exists on how quickly consumers will step forward to buy U.S. beef in light of
the public controversy that has occurred, even though its price would be lower compared to
Korean-produced beef. Also, an additional 7,000 MT of boneless beef destined for Korea
(continued...)

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CRS-14
forecasts that U.S. beef exports should reach 50,000 MT in 2008, about twice the
level recorded in 2007. The federation, which promotes the sale of beef overseas, is
optimistic that Korean consumers will resume purchases of U.S. beef because of its
lower price and the quality of the cuts that will be shipped. Its outlook is for U.S.
beef sales to South Korea to return to the 2003 level (247,000 MT) by 2010-2011.26
The beef agreement is intended to resolve an issue that some Members of
Congress said stood in the way of congressional consideration of legislation to
implement the KORUS FTA. If and when South Korea publishes its regulations to
put the agreement into effect, these Members have indicated that they will be
carefully monitoring how Korea’s quarantine inspection agency implements them.
However, while lifting the beef ban is widely regarded as a politically necessary
condition for the Bush Administration to send this trade agreement to Congress, it
has become a less and less sufficient condition, because of other opposition to the
KORUS FTA (e.g., over its auto trade provisions) and increased opposition to FTAs
generally. In other words, even if the beef issue were to be resolved quickly, the
Bush Administration still might not submit the agreement to Congress. One
constraint is that trade promotion authority only provides for a maximum of 90
legislative days of congressional consideration once the President submits a trade
agreement. With adjournment of the 110th Congress currently set for late September
2008, the Bush Administration faces a rapidly diminishing window to submit this
FTA for a vote. If this does not occur, the decision on if, and when, to submit this
FTA to Congress would be left to the next Administration. Under either scenario,
most observers agree that U.S. beef sales to South Korea must resume before
Congress would be willing to consider this trade agreement.
However, in South Korea, the April 2008 beef agreement emerged as an
obstacle to the KORUS FTA’s prospects. The highly visible controversy in Korea
over the beef agreement has weakened the new President’s public standing. This
could make it more difficult to secure approval of the KORUS FTA in the new
parliamentary session, even though the South Korean President’s political party holds
a majority — albeit a slim one — of seats in the National Assembly. To regain
public confidence, President Lee has in recent weeks staked a firm position in talks
with the United States while at the same time seeking not to “renegotiate” the April
2006 agreement. Looking forward, Korean public reaction to the latest reported deal
will be a key indicator of whether the government can recover its standing and begin
to address other pressing national issues. If this deal does takes effect, U.S. beef
sales could resume soon. Then, Korean quarantine officials can be expected to
strictly implement the sanitary rules that apply to U.S. beef imports and be firm with
their U.S. counterparts should problems arise.
25 (...continued)
is stored at West Coast ports awaiting permission to be shipped.
26 Cattle Buyers Weekly, “U.S. Should Sell 50,000 MT to Korea in 2008,” May 26, 2008.

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CRS-15
Appendix A. International Standards to
Prevent Spread of BSE in Beef Trade
The World Organization for Animal Health, frequently referred to by its French
acronym OIE, is the scientific body recognized by the World Trade Organization as the
international reference for matters of animal disease and health. One OIE responsibility is
to develop health standards that countries can use to protect themselves against the
introduction of animal diseases without setting up unjustified sanitary trade barriers.
Soon after countries (including the United States) introduced bans or restrictions on
the import of products from ruminant animals (e.g., cattle, sheep, goats, deer, elk, buffalo)
from countries where BSE had been discovered, the OIE developed guidelines and
recommendations for countries to follow to manage BSE within their borders or to maintain
their BSE-free status. These specify the conditions that should be applied to determine
whether ruminant animals (e.g., cattle), meat products (e.g., beef), and listed byproducts can
be imported or are prohibited from being imported, depending upon the exporting country’s
BSE risk status. The OIE uses three categories to designate BSE risk levels. A designation
is based upon its analysis of a country’s risk assessment that identifies the presence of or
potential for the presence of BSE risk factors, and the measures it has adopted to mitigate
the risk of BSE being transmitted to cattle and to humans. From low to high, countries with
a “negligible risk” designation are subject to the least restrictive conditions for exporting
ruminant animals and products. The “controlled risk” category means that OIE-
recommended mitigation measures are in place to manage all identified risks of BSE in the
country’s cattle population. The “undetermined BSE risk” designation applies to a country
that cannot demonstrate it meets the requirements of another category.
Irrespective of the risk level assigned, the OIE recommends that the veterinary
agencies of importing countries allow for the import of a number of products without the
need to meet any BSE-related condition. Included among these is “deboned skeletal muscle
meat” (i.e., boneless beef) from cattle 30 months of age or less that were not slaughtered
using a specified stunning process to the head, had passed pre- and post-slaughter
inspections, and were processed in a way to avoid contamination with tonsils and distal
ileum — two tissues that are viewed as primary agents for transmitting BSE.
For a “controlled BSE risk” country, the OIE recommends that importing countries
require a veterinary certificate attesting that fresh meat (e.g., boneless and bone-in beef) and
meat products (e.g., offals) from cattle of any age were not slaughtered using the same
stunning process, did pass pre- and post-slaughter inspections, and were processed in a way
that ensures no presence of, or contamination with, agents that can pass BSE on to animals
or humans. These agents are identified to be seven tissues (tonsils, distal ileum, brains,
eyes, spinal cord, skull, and vertebral column), and mechanically separated meat from the
skull and vertebral column (from cattle over 30 months of age). Further, the OIE
recommends that there be no international trade in these seven specified cattle tissues, or a
commodity contaminated by them, to prepare food, feed, fertilizers, cosmetics,
pharmaceuticals, or medical devices, nor trade in any of these end products that contains
these prohibited tissues. Depending upon the age of cattle, the OIE specifies which of these
tissues, and products derived from them, should not be traded. Prohibited are tonsils and
distal ileum from cattle of any age, and the five other tissues from cattle over 30 months of
age when slaughtered.
This description is based on the “International BSE Standards” section in CRS Report
RL32199, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or “Mad Cow Disease”): Current and
Proposed Safeguards, and OIE’s Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2007), Chapter 2.3.13,
‘Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy,’ available at [http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/
en_ chapitre _2.3.13.htm].

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