Order Code 97-1058
Updated June 20, 2008
Kazakhstan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Kazakhstan is an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic
location, large territory, ample natural resources, and economic growth, but it faces
ethnic, political, and other challenges to stability. This report discusses U.S. policy and
assistance. Basic facts and biographical data are provided. This report may be updated.
Related products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests.
U.S. Policy
According to the Administration, U.S.
assistance promotes the creation of a
democratic government that will use the
country’s natural resources to foster
sustained economic growth and widespread
prosperity. The United States seeks to
“build upon an already productive
relationship” with Kazakhstan to help it
continue its regional leadership in combating
extremism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, illegal narcotics, and trafficking
in persons.1
During President Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed
a Charter on Democratic Partnership, which recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the
rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001
and September 2006 visits, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in joint statements with
President Bush. In the 2006 statement, the United States and Kazakhstan hailed progress
in “advancing our strategic partnership.” The two presidents called for “deepen[ing] our
1 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Presentation for Foreign Operations,
FY2009.

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cooperation in fighting international
Kazakhstan: Basic Facts
terrorism and the proliferation of WMD
... strengthen[ing] our cooperation to
Area and Population: Land area is 1,049,200 sq. mi.;
enhance regional security and economic
about four times the size of Texas. The population is
integration ... expand[ing] our joint
15.3 million (The World Factbook, mid-2008 est.).
activities to ensure the development of
Ethnicity: 53.4% are Kazakh and 30% are Russian
(1999 Kazakh census). Other ethnic groups include
energy resources ... supporting economic
Uzbeks, Tatars, Uighurs, and Germans.
diversification and reform ... [and]
Gross Domestic Product: $167.6 billion; per capita
accelerating Kazakhstan’s efforts to
GDP is about $11,100 (The World Factbook, 2007
strengthen representative institutions.”
est., purchasing power parity).
In a speech on U.S.-Kazakh relations in
Political Leaders: President: Nursultan Nazarbayev;
Chair of the Majilis: Oral Mukhamed-zhanov; Chair
August 2006, Deputy Assistant
of the Senate: Kasymzhomart Tokayev; Prime
Secretary of State Evan Feigenbaum
Minister: Karim Masimov; Foreign Minister: Marat
stated that the United States “firmly
Tazhin; Defense Minister: Danial Akhmetov.
supports” Kazakhstan’s efforts “to join
Biography: Nazarbayev, born in 1940, moved up
through the ranks of the Kazakh Communist Party
the world’s fifty most competitive
(KCP), becoming its head in 1989. He also was
countries over the next decade [and] to
appointed president by the legislature in 1990. He
create a modern, democratic society.”2
resigned from the KCP in 1991 and won an unopposed
popular election as president in December 1991. A
Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for
1995 referendum extended his rule. He was reelected
in 1999 and 2005. In 2000, legislation granted him
Kazakhstan in fiscal years 1992 through
some official powers for life, and in 2007 he was
2006 was $1.33 billion (FREEDOM
exempted from term limits.
Support Act and agency funds), with
Kazakhstan ranking fifth in aid among
the twelve Soviet successor states. Budgeted aid for FY2007 was $146.3 million
(FREEDOM Support Act and agency funds). Estimated foreign assistance was $25.2
million in FY2008, and the Administration has requested $21.9 million for FY2009
(FREEDOM Support Act and other foreign aid, including the Peace Corps, and excluding
Defense and Energy Department funds). U.S. assistance emphasizes small business
development, improved macroeconomic and fiscal policy-making, and linkages between
energy markets in Central and South Asia. These economic development programs will
receive 50% of their funding through cost-sharing with Kazakhstan. A second U.S. aid
emphasis is on supporting Kazakhstan’s stabilization efforts in Iraq, the interoperability
of Kazakhstan’s military with U.S. and NATO forces, and the destruction of excess
military stockpiles.
Among congressional actions, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7)
forbade assistance to the government of Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State
determined and reported that Kazakhstan had significantly improved its human rights
record during the preceding six-month period. The Secretary could, however, waive this
prohibition on national security grounds. This language has been continued in yearly
appropriations acts. The Secretary reported in FY2003 and FY2004 that Kazakhstan had
made such progress, eliciting some criticism of these findings from Congress. In FY2005
and thereafter, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (or her designee) has reported to
Congress that Kazakhstan has failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but
that aid restrictions have been waived on national security grounds.
2 U.S. Department of State. Kazakhstan and the United States in a Changed World, Aug. 23,
2006. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Joint Statement, Sept. 29, 2006.

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Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism
In June 2001, Nazarbayev had warned that Taliban actions in Afghanistan
increasingly threatened regional security, and after September 11 he offered overflight
rights and the use of airbases to the U.S.-led coalition, but did not offer troops.
Kazakhstan also facilitated the transshipment of supplies to U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan. A U.S.-Kazakh memorandum of understanding was signed in July 2002 that
permitted U.S. military aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s Almaty airport for emergency military
landings. In September 2003, a five-year military cooperation agreement was signed to
combat terrorism, develop peacekeeping forces, bolster air defense capabilities, and
enhance security in the Caspian Sea. In April 2008, Kazakhstan agreed that it would
facilitate rail shipments of nonlethal supplies to support the operations of NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan’s then-Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev on March 28, 2003,
voiced general support for disarming Iraq. Tokayev later explained that Kazakhstan had
decided to support the coalition because it feared that Saddam Hussein was building
WMD. Reportedly responding to a U.S. appeal, the Kazakh legislature in May 2003
approved sending military engineers to Iraq. The 27 troops are training Iraqis in de-
mining and water purification.
Kazakhstan long argued that there were few terrorists within the country but this
stance began to change in late 2003 with the establishment of an Anti-Terrorist Center as
part of the National Security Committee. Shocking many Kazakhs, it reported the
apprehension in late 2004 of over a dozen members of the obscure Islamic Jihad Group
of Uzbekistan (reportedly an alias of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). It alleged
that the group had ties to Al Qaeda; had cells in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and
had been involved in attacks in Uzbekistan. In mid-2006, authorities detained 15-30
members the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir group. In April 2007, sixteen alleged terrorists were
arrested on charges of planning attacks against security and police forces.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Nazarbayev has stated that the geographic location of Kazakhstan and its ethnic
makeup dictate its “multipolar orientation toward both West and East.” He has pursued
close ties with Turkey, trade links with Iran, and better relations with China, which many
Kazakhs have traditionally viewed as a security threat. There are over one million ethnic
Kazakhs in China, and 300,000 ethnic Uighurs of China residing in Kazakhstan, who
have complicated relations between the two states. While seeking to protect Kazakh
independence, Nazarbayev has pursued close relations with Russia and other
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members for economic and security reasons.
In 1998, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a friendship treaty, in 1998 and 2002 they signed
accords settling Caspian seabed resource claims, and in 2005 they signed a border
delineation agreement. In late 2005, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization merged
with the Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec; Russia and Kazakhstan belonged to
both). Eurasec members Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan plan to launch a customs union
in 2010. In April 2008, visiting Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev endorsed
Nazarbayev’s proposal for a new economic union of Central Asian states, but visiting
Uzbek President Islam Karimov rejected it, saying it had already been tried.

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Kazakhstan still relies heavily on Russia for military training and equipment, but has
expanded defense cooperation with other states. About 49,000 Kazakh troops serve in
the ground force, air force, and navy. There are about 9,000 border guards, about 20,000
Internal Security (police) troops, and 2,500 presidential and government guards (The
Military Balance, February 2008). In 1999, Kazakhstan reaffirmed a CIS Collective
Security Treaty (CST) pledging the parties to provide military assistance in case of
aggression against any one of them. Kazakhstan is also a member of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), composed of Russia, China, and the Central Asian
states (except Turkmenistan), which aims to combat terrorism and facilitate trade ties.
In 1994, Kazakhstan joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) and regularly takes part
in PFP exercises, but states that it does not aim to join the Alliance. Military reforms
included naming a civilian defense minister in January 2007. A new military doctrine
adopted in March 2007 calls for creating volunteer armed forces.
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power
(in reality Russia controlled these weapons). All bombers and their air-launched cruise
missiles were removed to Russia by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of
about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and transferred
to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. U.S.
Comprehensive Threat Reduction assistance was used for these efforts, and for
subsequent control and elimination of nuclear materials and former chemical and
biological warfare facilities. The U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center works with
Kazakhstan to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control and security
agreements to enhance peace and prevent the proliferation of WMD.
Political and Economic Developments
Kazakhstan’s moves toward democracy have been halting. The 1995 constitution
establishes strong presidential power. As further fleshed out by a presidential edict, the
legislature does not control the budget, cannot initiate constitutional changes, or exercise
oversight over the executive branch. Most bills are initiated by the president, and if the
legislature fails within 30 days to pass one of his “urgent” bills, he may issue it by decree.
The bicameral legislature consists of a popularly-elected lower chamber, the Majilis, and
an upper chamber, the Senate, whose members are indirectly elected by regional
assemblies or by the president. An extra-constitutional People’s Assembly composed of
cultural and ethnic leaders serves as a presidential propaganda forum.
On December 4, 2005, President Nazarbayev was reelected with 91.1% of 6.74
million votes cast in a five-man race. Many observers credited economic growth in the
country and increases in pensions and state wages as bolstering Nazarbayev’s popularity.
He campaigned widely and pledged democratic reforms and poverty relief. Five pro-
government parties formed a People’s Coalition to back him. Many oppositionists
supported a Movement for a Just Kazakhstan, which backed Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, the
head of the Social Democratic Party. Another candidate, Alikhan Baymenov, had been
nominated by the “moderate opposition” Ak Zhol Party. Observers from the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others assessed the election as
progressive but still falling short of a free and fair race.
The legislature approved constitutional changes in May 2007 that President
Nazarbayev claimed would increase legislative power and boost democratization. The

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changes included increasing the number of deputies in both legislative chambers,
decreasing the president’s term in office from seven to five years, and requiring a court
order in case of detention or arrest. Seemingly non-reformist changes included a
requirement for a two-thirds vote in each legislative chamber to override presidential
alterations to approved bills, a provision that nine deputies of the Majilis (the lower
legislative chamber) are appointed by the People’s Assembly (a group of prominent
citizens headed by Nazarbayev), and a change “initiated” by the legislature excluding
Nazarbayev from term limits. Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher
stated in June 2007 that “these constitutional amendments go in the right direction....
[and] point the way to a stable, democratic system.”3
An early Majilis election was called for August 18, 2007. As per constitutional
amendments and election law changes, the size of the chamber was increased to 107
members. Ninety-eight members were to be elected by party lists and nine by the
People’s Assembly headed by the president. Seven parties were registered for the
election, six of which were pro-government and one of which was an opposition party.
The ruling party, Nur-Otan (Fatherland’s Ray of Light), reportedly received 88.05% of
8.87 million votes cast and won all 98 seats. The other parties were unable to clear a 7%
threshold needed to win seats. Observers from the OSCE praised some positive aspects
of the vote, but judged it as falling short of a free and fair race.4
Although Kazakhstan lobbied extensively for holding the presidency of the OSCE
in 2009, the 15th Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE at the end of November 2007 decided
that Greece would hold the OSCE presidency in 2009, followed in 2010 by Kazakhstan.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evan Feigenbaum in December 2007 stressed that
Kazakhstan at the Ministerial Meeting had pledged to implement various democratic
reforms by the end of 2008.
In its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 (released March 2008)
the U.S. State Department did not report whether or not the Kazakh government’s human
rights record had improved during the year, but did identify ongoing problems. These
included detainee and prisoner torture and other abuse; arbitrary arrest and detention; lack
of an independent judiciary; restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and
association; pervasive corruption; prohibitive political party registration requirements; and
human trafficking. The vast majority of media appear to be owned or controlled by the
state, and the government otherwise uses restrictive laws, licensing regulations,
harassment, and other means to control media and limit freedom of expression. Any group
of ten or more persons wishing to form an organization must register or face prosecution.
Among other requirements, a prospective political party must gather 50,000 signatures
to register, and a single mistake renders the application invalid.
Kazakhstan is the most economically developed of the former Soviet Central Asian
republics. According to The World Factbook, GDP grew about 8.5% in 2007, led by
growing oil exports, and inflation was 10.8%. Up to one-third of GDP is generated by the
3 U.S. Embassy, Astana, Kazakhstan. Interview by ... Richard A. Boucher with Aybek
Aldabergenov of Era TV, June 6, 2007.
4 OSCE. ODIHR. Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections, 18 August 2007: Election
Observation Mission Report, October 30, 2007.

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oil and gas sector. Kazakhstan is the sixth largest producer of wheat in the world and a
major exporter. Up to one-fifth of the population lives below the poverty level. In
January 2006, Nazarbayev launched economic reforms he claimed would bring
Kazakhstan into the ranks of the top fifty developed countries by 2012. He called for
finalizing efforts to join the World Trade Organization, revamping tax and budgetary
policies, and developing export-oriented firms to reduce over-dependence on the energy
sector as the engine of GDP growth. However, the government also has boosted taxes
and made other moves that discourage foreign investment. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has estimated that GDP growth will slow to about 5% in 2008, as banks
tighten their lending practices.5
Energy. Second to Russia, Kazakhstan has the largest oil and gas reserves of the
Caspian Sea regional states, holding promise of large export revenues. The U.S. Energy
Department in February 2008 estimated that there were 9 billion to 40 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves (comparable to Algeria on the low end and Libya on the high end).
It also reported estimates of 100 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven gas reserves
(comparable to Turkmenistan). Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are about 1.2 million
barrels per day (bpd). The Kazakh government plans for production to reach 3.5 million
bpd by 2015. Kazakhstan expects to be a net gas exporter in 2008. U.S. foreign direct
investment (FDI) plays a dominant role in the development of Kazakhstani oil and gas
resources, and amounted to about $12.6 billion in Kazakhstan (27% of all FDI in the
country) as of 2006. Some U.S. energy firms and other private foreign investors have
become discouraged in recent months by harsher Kazakh government terms, taxes, and
fines that some allege reflect corruption within the ruling elite.
Russia seeks maximum influence over Kazakhstan’s energy resources by providing
the primary pipeline export routes and by becoming involved in production. Russian
shareholders have a controlling interest, 44%, in the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC),
which built a 980-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk that carried 690,000 bpd of oil in 2007. Kazakhstan also currently
transports about 100,000 bpd by rail and barge to Baku. Kazakhstan agreed with
Azerbaijan in 2006 that it will boost these shipments to help fill an oil pipeline from
Azerbaijan to Turkey, which will reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on routes through
Russia. This dependence also has been lessened somewhat by construction of a 597-mile
oil pipeline from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China.
Kazakhstan began delivering oil through the pipeline in May 2006. Initial capacity is
146.6 million barrels per year. At Atasu, it links to another pipeline from the town of
Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan. On Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea border, China has
finished construction of an oil pipeline from the port city of Atyrau eastward to the town
of Kerkiyak. The last section of the route from the Caspian Sea to China, a link between
the towns of Kerkiyak and Kumkol, began to be built in late 2007 and is expected to be
completed in 2009.
5 IMF. Republic of Kazakhstan, 2008 Article IV Consultation: Preliminary Conclusions of the
IMF Mission, April 30, 2008.

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