Order Code RL34356
The DHS Directorate of Science and Technology:
Key Issues for Congress
Updated June 9, 2008
Dana A. Shea
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Daniel Morgan
Analyst in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
The DHS Directorate of Science and Technology:
Key Issues for Congress
Summary
The Directorate of Science and Technology is the primary organization for
research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security. With an
appropriated budget of $830.3 million in FY2008 and a requested budget of $868.8
million in FY2009, it conducts R&D in several laboratories of its own; funds R&D
conducted by other government agencies, the Department of Energy national
laboratories, industry, and universities; and managed operational systems. The
directorate consists primarily of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives;
Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security;
Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have
responsibilities, such as laboratory facilities and university programs, that cut across
the divisions. The directorate is headed by the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Admiral Jay M. Cohen.
Congress and others have been highly critical of the directorate’s performance.
Although management changes have somewhat muted this criticism, fundamental
issues remain. Among these are
! the allocation of R&D funding within the directorate’s programs,
including the balance among basic research, applied research, and
development and the proportion of funds allocated to government,
industry, and academia;
! how the directorate sets priorities, including its use of strategic
planning documents, its system of Integrated Product Teams, and the
extent to which it bases priorities on risk assessment;
! the nature and effectiveness of the directorate’s relationships with
other federal R&D organizations, such as the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, other organizations inside DHS, the Department
of Energy national laboratories, and other agencies;
! the definition of the directorate’s mission, such as identification of
its customers, the scope of its R&D role within DHS, and the extent
of its non-R&D missions;
! the directorate’s budgeting and financial management, including the
quality of its budget documents and the persistence of unobligated
balances;
! the directorate’s responsiveness to industry and Congress; and
! the establishment of metrics and goals for evaluating the
directorate’s output.
Relevant legislation in the 110th Congress includes the Department of Homeland
Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 1684); the FY2008
appropriations legislation (H.R. 2638, S. 1644, and P.L. 110-161); the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53); and several
other bills.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mission, Organization, and Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Laboratories and Other Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Environmental Measurements Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Plum Island Animal Disease Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Transportation Security Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center . . . . . . . . . 6
Homeland Security Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
University Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
DOE National Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Cross-Cutting Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Defining the Directorate’s Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Scope of R&D Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Functions Other than R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Prioritization and Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Planning Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Priorities Reflected in Allocation of Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Integrated Product Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Use of External Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Analysis of Threat Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Balance of R&D by Type and Performer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Basic Research, Applied Research, and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intramural and Extramural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Operational Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Difficulty of Tracking Budget Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Information in the President’s Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Information in DHS Budget Justifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Financial Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Relationships with Other R&D Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Consolidation of R&D within DHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Role of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Relationship with the DOE National Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Metrics and Goals for Directorate Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Responsiveness to Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Expiring Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Overview of Legislation in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
DHS Authorization Act for FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
FY2008 Appropriations Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act . . . . . . . . . 41
Other Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix A. Responsibilities and Authorities of the Under Secretary . . . . . . . 43
Appendix B. Previous Organizational Structure of the S&T Directorate . . . . . . 45
Appendix C. Funding History of the S&T Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix D. Activities of the S&T Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Chemical and Biological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Infrastructure and Geophysical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Command, Control, and Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Borders and Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Research (Laboratory Facilities and University Programs) . . . . . . . . . 50
Innovation (HSARPA and SBIR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Transition (SAFETY Act and Technology Clearinghouse) . . . . . . . . . 51
Test and Evaluation and Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Special Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Agency and International Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Management and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
List of Figures
Figure 1. Organization of the S&T Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 2. FY2008 Funding for the S&T Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 3. DHS R&D by Character of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 4. S&T Directorate Statistics on R&D Performer Types, FY2008 . . . . . 26
List of Tables
Table 1. DHS R&D by Character of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 2. S&T Directorate Statistics on Basic Research, Applied
Research, and Development, FY2004-FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 3. Categories of R&D as Described by the S&T Directorate . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 4. S&T Directorate Unobligated Balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 5. S&T Directorate Budget Authority, FY2003-FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 6. S&T Directorate Budget Authority, FY2007-FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The DHS Directorate of Science and
Technology: Key Issues for Congress
Introduction
The Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) is the primary organization
for research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security. With
a budget of $830.3 million in FY2008, the directorate conducts R&D in several
laboratories of its own; funds R&D conducted by other government agencies, the
Department of Energy national laboratories, industry, and universities; and managed
operational systems.
Congress has been highly critical of the directorate’s performance. For
example, in 2006, the House Appropriations Committee said it was “concerned about
the ability of [the] S&T [Directorate] to advance the use of science and technology
in battling terrorism and against other hazards related to homeland security,” and the
Senate Appropriations Committee called the directorate “a rudderless ship without
a clear way to get back on course” and said it was “extremely disappointed with the
manner in which [the] S&T [Directorate] is being managed.”1
Although management changes since that time have somewhat muted this
criticism, fundamental issues remain. This report describes the evolving mission,
organization, and assets of the S&T Directorate and the activities it conducts. It
outlines key policy issues, including the balance of the directorate’s programs, its
priorities and how they are set, its relationships with other R&D organizations, its
mission, its budgeting and financial management, and other concerns. Other R&D
organizations in the department (such as the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and
the R&D activities of the U.S. Coast Guard) are discussed only to the extent that they
relate to the S&T Directorate.
Mission, Organization, and Assets
Mission
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), which established the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), created within DHS a Directorate of
Science and Technology, headed by an Under Secretary for Science and Technology.
The directorate was not given a concise statutory mission. Instead, the Homeland
Security Act gave the Under Secretary a wide-ranging list of responsibilities and
1 H.Rept. 109-476, p. 110, and S.Rept. 109-273, p. 88.
CRS-2
authorities. (For the complete list, see Appendix A.) The current Under Secretary,
Admiral Jay M. Cohen, has summarized his interpretation of the S&T Directorate’s
multifaceted mission as follows: “The S&T Directorate’s mission is to protect the
homeland by providing Federal, State, local, and Tribal officials with state-of-the-art
technology and resources.”2
Some of the Under Secretary’s responsibilities and authorities are primarily
coordinative. These include
! planning and coordinating the federal civilian effort to develop
countermeasures against terrorist threats;
! collaborating with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the
designation and regulation of biological “select agents”;
! coordinating with other appropriate executive agencies to reduce
R&D duplication and identify unmet needs; and
! coordinating and integrating the department’s activities in R&D,
demonstration, testing, and evaluation.
All these tasks involve stakeholders who do not report to the Under Secretary, so the
Under Secretary’s ability to perform his duties relies on the cooperation of other
agencies.
Another group of responsibilities and authorities are in support of other DHS
organizations. These include
! advising the Secretary on R&D efforts and priorities;
! supporting the Under Secretary for National Protection and
Programs (formerly the Under Secretary for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection) by assessing and testing vulnerabilities
and threats; and
! overseeing department-wide guidelines for merit review of R&D.
Finally, some of the Under Secretary’s responsibilities and authorities specify
functions of the S&T Directorate itself. These include
! establishing and administering the primary R&D activities of the
department;
! conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation;
! establishing a system for transferring technologies to federal, state,
and local governments and the private sector; and
! generally supporting U.S. leadership in science and technology.
2 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, September 7, 2006.
CRS-3
Organization
Under Secretary Cohen reorganized the management structure of the S&T
Directorate soon after his confirmation in August 2006. He previously served as
Chief of Naval Research (2000-2006), and the reorganized structure, described
below, is conceptually similar to the one he established for the Office of Naval
Research. For a discussion of the previous structure of the S&T Directorate, which
may be useful in understanding budgets and other documents from before the
transition, see Appendix B.
Figure 1. Organization of the S&T Directorate
Source: CRS based on DHS documents and presentations.
Notes: T&E = Testing and Evaluation. HSARPA = Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency. The Office of National Laboratories and the Office of University Programs are parts of the
Office of Research. HSARPA is part of the Office of Innovation. As indicated by the dashed lines
and shading, the directors of the Offices of Research, Innovation, and Transition liaise with each of
the six divisions.
The organizational structure of the S&T Directorate is shown in Figure 1. The
directorate consists primarily of six divisions: the Chemical and Biological;
Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security;
Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors Divisions. These are the
directorate’s main performers and funders of R&D in their respective topical areas.
Coordinating the activities of the divisions are the Offices of Research, Innovation,
and Transition; these offices also conduct some activities of their own. Other
functions are performed by the Offices of Test and Evaluation and Standards; Special
Programs; and Agency and International Liaison. Each of these 12 divisions and
offices is headed by a director who reports directly to the Under Secretary. As
CRS-4
indicated by the dashed lines and shading in Figure 1, the directors of the Offices of
Research, Innovation, and Transition liaise with each of the six divisions. For more
information on the activities of the various components, see Appendix D.
The total enacted FY2008 funding for the S&T Directorate was $830.3 million.
Figure 2 shows how this figure was allocated to the divisions, offices, and other
activities. The Management and Administration account funds the Office of the
Under Secretary as well as salaries and benefits for headquarters employees who
work in the other offices and divisions. The Office of Special Programs and the
Office of Agency and International Liaison receive funds indirectly through transfers
from the other programs. For more information on funding, including the
Administration request for FY2009, see Appendix C.
Figure 2. FY2008 Funding for the S&T Directorate
Source: CRS analysis of the explanatory statement for H.R. 2764, Congressional Record, December
17, 2007.
Laboratories and Other Assets
The S&T Directorate has a variety of R&D assets that support its activities.
Some are laboratories that were transferred into the Department of Homeland
Security when it was created in 2002. (The transfers became effective in early 2003.)
Other assets have been established more recently under the authority of the
Homeland Security Act.
Environmental Measurements Laboratory. The Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) in New York City was formerly in the Department
of Energy. It was transferred to the S&T Directorate by Sec. 303 of the Homeland
Security Act. Historically, the focus of EML was detection and monitoring of low-
level radiation releases. The transfer of EML to the S&T Directorate required a
realignment of EML’s activities to meet homeland security goals. According to some
CRS-5
experts, this realignment process was contentious.3 DHS officials reportedly debated
whether EML is most appropriately positioned in the S&T Directorate or the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO, discussed more below); whether EML
should be closed; and whether EML should be reduced in size and the remaining
capabilities relocated. In May 2007, Under Secretary Cohen testified that EML will
remain in the S&T Directorate; that it will continue to operate, supporting both
DNDO and other DHS organizations; and that it will remain in its current location
but in smaller, “right sized” facilities.4
Plum Island Animal Disease Center. The Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC), on Plum Island off the coast of Long Island, NY, was transferred
from the Department of Agriculture to the S&T Directorate by Sec. 310 of the
Homeland Security Act. The PIADC provides a federal facility where R&D can be
performed on animal pathogens that might threaten livestock on a national level. Its
research seeks to find quicker ways to diagnose animal diseases and to develop
vaccines and other veterinary treatments for infected animals. The PIADC has been
in service for over 50 years, and questions have been raised about the state of its
laboratory infrastructure and the adequacy of that infrastructure to continue
performing necessary R&D for DHS.5 The department is currently assessing sites
and proposals for a new National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) to expand
the Department’s R&D capabilities. The NBAF might be built on Plum Island or on
the mainland. The PIADC laboratories would be decommissioned once NBAF
opened. Some policymakers have expressed concern regarding the proposed move
of foot-and-mouth disease research from an island to the mainland,6 and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has testified that more information and
analysis should be performed to determine the magnitude of risks associated with
moving such research from Plum Island to the mainland.7 Through the 2008 farm
3 EML realignment and related issues were discussed at a hearing of the House Committee
on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Transitioning
the Environmental Measurements Laboratory at the Department of Homeland Security, held
May 3, 2007.
4 Under Secretary Jay M. Cohen, statement before the House Committee on Science and
Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Transitioning the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory at the Department of Homeland Security, hearing
held May 3, 2007.
5 Government Accountability Office, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve
Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center, GAO-03-847, September 2003; Plum Island
Animal Disease Center: DHS and USDA Are Successfully Coordinating Current Work, but
Long-Term Plans Are Being Assessed, GAO-06-132, December 2005; and Plum Island
Animal Disease Center: DHS Has Made Significant Progress Implementing Security
Recommendations, but Several Recommendations Remain Open, GAO-08-306R, December
17, 2007.
6 See, for example, statements by Members during House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Germs, Viruses and Secrets:
Government Plans to Move Exotic Disease Research to the Mainland United States, hearing
held May 22, 2008.
7 Government Accountability Office, High-containment Biosafety Laboratories: DHS Lacks
(continued...)
CRS-6
bill, Congress required the Secretary of Agriculture issue a permit to DHS allowing
research on live foot-and-mouth disease virus on the mainland at any successor
facility to PIADC.8 For more information on NBAF, see CRS Report RL34160, The
National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress.9
Transportation Security Laboratory. The Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL) in Atlantic City, NJ, was formerly in the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and before that in the Federal Aviation Administration. It
became part of DHS along with the rest of TSA under Sec. 403 of the Homeland
Security Act. It was transferred to the S&T Directorate in FY2006 as part of an effort
to consolidate the department’s R&D activities. The TSL performs research,
development, and testing and evaluation activities, primarily in the area of detection
and mitigation of explosives and conventional weapons threats.10
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. The
Homeland Security Act established a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis
Center in the Department of Defense (Sec. 1708) and then transferred it, along with
its funding, to the DHS S&T Directorate (Sec. 303). Subsequently renamed the
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), this center
exists as both a program office and a laboratory facility. The facility, currently under
construction in Ft. Detrick, MD, will include high-biocontainment laboratories that
can perform homeland security biodefense research and bioforensics. When
construction is complete, it will be operated by a contractor as a federally funded
research and development center (FFRDC). For more information on NBACC, see
CRS Report RL32891, The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center: Issues for Congress.
Homeland Security Institute. The Homeland Security Institute (HSI) is an
FFRDC established under Sec. 312 of the Homeland Security Act and managed on
the S&T Directorate’s behalf by Analytic Services, Inc.11 It assists the directorate in
addressing homeland security issues that require scientific, technical, and analytical
expertise. Its main focus is systems analysis and evaluation. Most of its funds are
received on a per-project basis from programs that request its assistance; for the first
time in FY2008, the institute also has its own appropriation of $5.0 million. Under
a sunset provision in the Homeland Security Act as originally passed, the institute
would have terminated in November 2005. The Department of Homeland Security
7 (...continued)
Evidence to Conclude That Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Can Be Done Safely on the
U.S. Mainland, GAO-08-821T, May 22, 2008.
8 P.L. 110-234, Sec. 7524.
9 Further information from DHS on the proposed NBAF is online at
[http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/editorial_0762.shtm].
10 A more detailed discussion of TSL activities can be found in the testimony of Susan J.
Hallowell, Director, Transportation Security Laboratory, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Science and
Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, April 24, 2008.
11 The HSI website is online at [http://www.homelandsecurity.org].
CRS-7
Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-334) extended this termination date to five years
after the institute’s establishment, i.e. April 2009. Some in Congress have doubted
the institute’s ability to provide effective, independent analysis of DHS programs,
because DHS provides its funding and because, if Congress extends the 2009
termination date, the current contractor may wish to compete for a continuation of
its management contract.12 On the other hand, Congress established the institute
specifically to provide analysis to DHS, and there has been little congressional
criticism of specific Homeland Security Institute reports.
University Centers. The Homeland Security Act requires the Under
Secretary to establish at least one university-based center for homeland security (Sec.
308).13 Eleven university centers of excellence have been established so far:
! the Center for Border Security and Immigration (COE-BSI), led by
the University of Arizona and the University of Texas at El Paso;
! the Center for Explosives Detection, Mitigation, and Response, led
by Northeastern University and the University of Rhode Island;
! the Center for Maritime, Island and Port Security, led by the
University of Hawaii and Stevens Institute of Technology;14
! the Center for Natural Disasters, Coastal Infrastructure, and
Emergency Management, led by the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and Jackson State University;
! the Center for Transportation Security, led by Texas Southern
University in Houston, Tougaloo College, and the University of
Connecticut;15
12 See, for example, questions by Members at House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: Status
Report on the Federal Government’s Assessment of New Radiation Detection Monitors,
hearing held September 18, 2007. (Hearing transcript not yet published. Archived webcast:
[http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.091807.NuclearTerrorism.shtml].)
Recompeted contracts for FFRDCs are sometimes awarded to another contractor. For
example, the Science and Technology Policy Institute, which provides analytic support to
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, was operated by the RAND
Corporation until 2003 but is now operated by the Institute for Defense Analyses.
13 University centers are discussed in more detail in a CRS congressional distribution
memorandum, “Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence Program,” by John
F. Sargent, October 26, 2007.
14 The Center for Maritime, Island and Port Security is divided into two sub-centers, the
Center for Island, Maritime, and Extreme Environment Security (CIMES) at the University
of Hawaii and the National Center for Security and Resilient Maritime Commerce and
Coastal Environments (CSR) at the Stevens Institute of Technology.
DHS states that this center will satisfy the requirement in the SAFE Port Act of 2006 (P.L.
109-347) to establish a Center of Excellence for Maritime Domain Awareness. (Personal
communication, DHS Office of University Programs, October 23, 2007.)
15 This center was mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) and initially funded by the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161).
CRS-8
! the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events
(CREATE), led by the University of Southern California;
! the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), led
by the University of Minnesota;
! the National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease
Defense (FAZD), led by Texas A&M University;
! the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START), led by the University of Maryland;
! the National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic
Event Response (PACER), led by Johns Hopkins University; and
! the Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment (CAMRA),
led by Michigan State University (established jointly with the
Environmental Protection Agency).
These centers are operated by consortia of universities. Some consortia include
non-university partners. Although each consortium contains numerous members,
funding and activities are typically concentrated at the lead institution and a small
number of major partners. Funding for these centers is provided through the S&T
Directorate’s Office of University Programs. The research activities of the centers
are not managed directly by DHS, but rather by administrative staff at each center.
Each center’s research strategy and plan is provided to DHS for review, however, and
the centers attempt to align their work with the needs of the department. As part of
the reorganization begun in 2006, the S&T Directorate plans to align the topics of the
centers more closely with the new research divisions. Over the next several years,
where multiple centers currently align with a single division, some will be closed or
merged, and new ones will be established.
In addition, several university-affiliated activities are sometimes considered
additional centers of excellence:
! four University Affiliate Centers (UACs), led by Rutgers University,
the University of Southern California, the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, and the University of Pittsburgh, that work with
the Institute for Discrete Sciences at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory;
! five Regional Visualization and Analytics Centers (RVACs), led by
Penn State University, Purdue University, Stanford University, the
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and the University of
Washington, that collaborate with the National Visualization and
Analytics Center at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; and
! two centers funded by the Infrastructure and Geophysical Division
(not University Programs): the Southeast Regional Research
Initiative (SERRI) and the Kentucky Critical Infrastructure
Protection Institute (KCI).16
16 SERRI and KCI are discussed in more detail in a CRS congressional distribution
memorandum, “Select Programs Eliminated or Reduced in the FY2008 Budget Request for
the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate,” by Dana A.
(continued...)
CRS-9
The UACs and RVACs support the Division of Command, Control, and
Interoperability. DHS plans not to fund them after FY2008; it expects to establish
the new Center of Excellence for Command, Control, and Interoperability in
FY2009.
The university centers of excellence and the university-affiliated activities
provide the main connection between the S&T Directorate and the academic
community. As such, the university centers of excellence are the primary mechanism
for the S&T Directorate and the academic community to interact on R&D topics.
The details of these centers have been an issue of congressional focus, with special
interest given to how research at university centers of excellence relates to DHS
R&D needs and S&T Directorate priorities. In 2007, Congress considered, but did
not impose, limited terms for the university centers of excellence, and it has since
established new university centers of excellence in specific research areas.
Stakeholders resisted congressional efforts to curtail the duration of the university
centers of excellence, but response to Under Secretary Cohen’s realignment plans has
been more muted.17
DOE National Laboratories. DHS has a special statutory relationship with
the national laboratories of the Department of Energy (DOE):
Notwithstanding any other law governing the administration, mission, use, or
operations of any of the Department of Energy national laboratories and sites,
such laboratories and sites are authorized to accept and perform work for the
Secretary, consistent with resources provided, and perform such work on an
equal basis to other missions at the laboratory and not on a noninterference basis
with other missions of such laboratory or site.18
The S&T Directorate can use this authority to engage the DOE national
laboratories to perform research for DHS as if they were being tasked by DOE. This
authority reduces costs for DHS and gives its tasks equal priority with DOE tasks,
unlike the tasks of other agencies that conduct R&D at the national laboratories under
the status of “work for others.”19 Early in its existence, the S&T Directorate
identified a number of DOE national laboratories that perform R&D potentially
relevant to homeland security, but it was criticized for having no strategy to use that
16 (...continued)
Shea and Daniel Morgan, February 20, 2007.
17 Francis Busta, Neville Clarke, Lynn R. Goldman, et al., “Cuts in Homeland Security
Research,” Letter to the Editor, Science, Vol. 313, September 15, 2006.
18 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Sec. 309(a)(2).
19 “Work for others” is research or technical assistance done by a DOE laboratory or a DOE
technology center for a non-DOE entity, either private or federal. Such work is fully funded
by the non-DOE entity, and national laboratory eligibility to do such work is described in
DOE Order 481.1B. See Work for Others (Non-Department of Energy Funded Work),
Department of Energy Order 481.1B, September 28, 2001. See also 48 C.F.R. 970.1707.
CRS-10
capability.20 DOE and DHS have since entered into a memorandum of agreement
regarding the use of DOE assets by DHS,21 and the S&T Directorate reported in May
2007 that it had aligned its use of the DOE national laboratories with its reorganized
division structure.22 Eleven of the laboratories are included in this alignment; each
division is aligned with between three and seven of them. The goal of the alignment
process is to provide an enduring capability for basic research.23
The relationship between the S&T Directorate and the DOE national
laboratories is discussed further below in the section on “Relationships with Other
R&D Organizations.”
Cross-Cutting Policy Issues
As well as issues associated with the specific organizations and activities of the
S&T Directorate discussed above, the directorate faces a variety of broader policy
concerns. These include
! the evolution of its mission;
! its allocation of resources to basic research, applied research, and
development;
! its choice of intramural or extramural performers for R&D;
! its process for prioritization and strategic planning;
! its relationships with other R&D organizations, both inside and
outside DHS;
! problems with its budget documents and financial management
systems;
! its responsiveness to Congress and industry; and
! metrics for evaluating its performance.
Defining the Directorate’s Mission
The Homeland Security Act did not give the S&T Directorate a concise statutory
mission. Instead, it listed a variety of responsibilities and authorities for the Under
Secretary. These were summarized at the beginning of this report and are reproduced
in full in Appendix A. Different people at different times have had different
conceptions of the directorate’s mission. This section discusses three aspects of that
20 Comments of Charles E. McQueary, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in the
minutes of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, February
26, 2004; and Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a
Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653, May 2004.
21 See Reimbursable Work for the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy
Order 484.1, August 17, 2006.
22 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Strategic Plan,
May 2007, p. 11.
23 Personal communication with DHS Office of National Laboratories, December 10, 2007.
CRS-11
debate: whether the directorate’s “customers” are the other components of DHS, the
ultimate end users, such as state and local first responders, or both; the scope of the
directorate’s R&D mission relative to other DHS components (such as DNDO); and
the extent to which the directorate’s role should include operational and other
responsibilities as well as R&D.
Customers. During the tenure of former Under Secretary Charles E.
McQueary (2003-2006), customers were described as being both internal (other
directorates and units of the department) and external (state and local homeland
security officials and first responders).24 The needs of such a diverse group are broad
and varied, and identifying and meeting those needs proved to be a challenge. In
May 2006, the House Committee on Appropriations reported that
S&T has failed to adequately convey its role or how it supports missions of DHS
component agencies.... Many DHS components express skepticism or even
ignorance about the value of S&T in serving their agencies.25
Since the appointment of Under Secretary Cohen, the directorate has identified
its immediate customers as the DHS components, although still in a formulation that
recognizes end users. In congressional testimony in September 2006, the Under
Secretary referred to his
vision for and realignment of the Directorate to better meet the mission needs of
our customers — the DHS Components; and the customers of our customers —
the first responders and men and women that S&T enables to make the Nation
safer.26
He emphasized the need for the directorate to be more attuned to the needs of its
DHS customers:
Our DHS customers need an organization that is easier to access in order to
utilize technologies and solutions that will make their jobs better, more efficient,
more cost effective, and safer. The S&T Directorate needs to be more accessible
in order for the DHS components to leverage the value added of the good work
the men and women of S&T are bringing to the fight.27
Scope of R&D Role. The subject-matter boundaries of the directorate’s R&D
role within DHS have expanded and contracted since its establishment. As discussed
above, it has absorbed programs from several other DHS organizations, but Congress
rejected proposals that it take over certain Coast Guard activities, and the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office is now a separate organization with responsibility for
24 See, for example, minutes of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee, February 23-24, 2005.
25 H.Rept. 109-476.
26 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, September 7, 2006.
27 Under Secretary Jay M. Cohen, testimony, September 7, 2006.
CRS-12
radiological and nuclear countermeasures. Given that the S&T Directorate is not the
only R&D operation within DHS, questions remain about what principles determine
the types of R&D it should do, and when another organization should take on a
particular R&D topic.
The scope of research undertaken by the S&T Directorate through its component
entities also has been questioned. When DHS was established, Congress also created
within the S&T Directorate the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency (HSARPA), which was to administer a newly developed Acceleration Fund
for Research and Development of Homeland Security Technologies.28 The scope of
research undertaken by this agency has evolved since it was created. Initially, it was
unclear how the S&T Directorate would implement HSARPA; given the similarity
of its name to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), some
experts in the scientific community believed it would, as DARPA does, fund high
risk/high reward research endeavors. Instead, the S&T Directorate used HSARPA
to conduct its extramural research activities while funding mainly traditional R&D
activities.
Under Secretary Cohen, as part of his reorganization of the S&T Directorate, has
redirected the work of HSARPA. The role of HSARPA is much reduced from past
years, when it was responsible for nearly all of the directorate’s extramural R&D.
It is now focused on activities with high risk and high reward. Through its Homeland
Innovative Prototypical Solutions (HIPS) and High Impact Technology Solutions
(HITS) programs, HSARPA now performs research activities more in the DARPA
model.
The best way to use HSARPA and its attendant funding may continue to be a
topic of congressional interest. Supporters of the DARPA model point out that while
the risks are high, successes from such investment may yield great benefits. Few
investments in this model will be categorically successful though, so it may be that
many research endeavors will need to be funded before a success is realized. Thus,
such high-risk research may require a sustained financial commitment be made in
order to realize the high reward success.
Functions Other than R&D. Although the directorate’s main role is R&D,
its programs include a variety of other related functions. It is currently involved in
standards development, technology testing and evaluation, and technology transfer.
Until 2007, it conducted several operational programs, such as BioWatch, in which
it deployed and operated equipment as well as developing it. It awards scholarships
and fellowships, whose purpose it has sometimes described as “capacity building”
for future R&D — a topic in which Congress has been particularly interested. The
Under Secretary also has several coordinative responsibilities involving other federal
agencies. While the shift of operational programs to other organizations in 2007
suggests an attempt to focus on the main R&D role, the other activities and
responsibilities remain. There has been no definitive explanation of the factors that
determine which non-R&D functions are appropriate for the directorate and what
determines their priority relative to R&D.
28 Section 307, P.L. 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002.
CRS-13
Prior to the establishment of DHS, no single agency had the responsibility for
homeland security, and homeland security was not generally considered as an
independent field of study. While academic R&D capability and educational
programs in national security and defense existed, such capacity was lacking in the
area of homeland security. As part of the S&T Directorate’s efforts in “capacity
building,” the directorate funded scholarships and fellowships in addition to
establishing university research centers. Some analysts have questioned the
effectiveness of this program, as the scholars and fellows receiving financial
assistance from DHS do not necessarily enter into homeland security employment or
R&D.29
Over the next few years, the S&T Directorate plans to reduce the numbers of
scholars and fellows and align scholarship and fellowship activities with those of the
university centers of excellence. This may lead to greater synergies and effectiveness
between the two programs but also may limit the scale of involvement of universities,
students, and scientists interested in homeland security. Whether DHS, as an R&D
funding entity, should continue to attempt to develop an academic homeland security
infrastructure or instead focus on using more federal assets to perform R&D activities
and provide experience and expertise in homeland security may continue to be a topic
of interest to policymakers.
Prioritization and Strategic Planning
A long-standing congressional criticism of the S&T Directorate is that its
planning and prioritization process is opaque. This perception of opacity has led to
concerns about the accountability of the planning process and the quality of the
decisions it produces. Directorate priorities can be somewhat inferred from the
allocation of funding within the directorate, but no planning and prioritization
documents were publicly available. In June 2007, for the first time, the directorate
issued a strategic plan and a five-year R&D plan. As described in these documents,
Under Secretary Cohen has introduced a system of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)
that help provide end users with more input into the prioritization process.
Planning Documents. The 2004 DHS strategic plan enunciates high-level
goals for using science and technology to meet the overall mission of the department.
According to this plan, DHS will
use, leverage and enhance the vast resources and expertise of the Federal
Government, private sector, academic community, non-governmental
organizations and other scientific bodies. We will develop new capabilities to
facilitate the sharing of information and analysis; test and assess threats and
vulnerabilities; counter various threats, including weapons of mass destruction
and illegal drugs; and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. We will also focus
29 For the 2008 DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Program, the S&T Directorate has
included a one-year, full-time service requirement in a relevant homeland security science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics field for all fellowship recipients. The work done
during this service must be applicable to one of the 16 homeland security research areas
(DHS, DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Program — 2008 Competition Guidelines, online
at [http://www.orau.gov/dhsed/2008pages/fellowship.html]).
CRS-14
our efforts on developing technology to detect and prevent the illicit transport of
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. We will develop and
deploy the capabilities, equipment and systems needed to anticipate, respond to
and recover from attacks on the homeland.30
Although the 2004 DHS strategic plan establishes this list of science and technology
priorities, it provides no guidance about their relative importance.
For the first few years of its existence, the S&T Directorate lacked a publicly
available long-term R&D plan. As required by a presidential directive,31 it worked
with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop an annual
R&D plan for critical infrastructure protection,32 but there is no similar requirement
for other R&D topics. The directorate had an annual planning process, but the results
of that process were internal to the directorate and were not publicly reviewed.33
Some conclusions about the success of individual program elements could be drawn
from the results of OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). In the absence
of an overall plan, however, it was difficult for those outside of DHS to gain a
holistic, multi-year perspective.
In June 2007, the S&T Directorate released a separate strategic plan that
includes a five-year R&D plan.34 This document and its attachments briefly discuss
the directorate’s organizational structure, R&D goals, prioritization procedures, and
workforce, but they focus more on describing the directorate’s R&D topics and
programs and providing milestones, budget projections, and program mission
statements. Although these documents provide proposed future funding levels, they
do not describe the process by which the allocation of these funds among the
different homeland security research areas and projects was determined. They
describe a number of specific choices, such as the topics of the six divisions, the
relative emphasis placed on different threats, the selection of particular R&D
30 Department of Homeland Security, Securing Our Homeland — The DHS Strategic Plan,
February 2004.
31 Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), December 17, 2003.
32 The Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, The National Plan
for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2004, April
8, 2005. An update for 2007 was included as a classified appendix to the annual National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. (Personal communication with DHS Legislative Affairs,
January 16, 2008.)
33 Internal reviews of the annual budgeting and planning process are referred to in
Department of Homeland Security, Performance and Accountability Report — Fiscal Year
2006, November 15, 2006.
34 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Strategic Plan
with Attachments, May 2007. Attachment 1 to the strategic plan is the five year research
and development plan (Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate, Five Year Research and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May
2007). Available online at
[http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070627105705-57451.pdf].
CRS-15
projects, and the percentage target for basic research funding, but they do not clearly
explain how these choices were made or how they are linked to a set of high-level
strategic goals. In this sense, the S&T Directorate strategic plan is more an
operational business plan than a strategic plan.35
Priorities Reflected in Allocation of Funding. Independent of any
explicit strategy, the S&T Directorate’s funding allocations give insight into its
priorities. Most notably, they reveal a strong focus on developing countermeasures
to weapons of mass destruction. Countermeasures to biological agents have always
constituted the largest single component in the directorate’s R&D portfolio. The
establishment of DNDO and its growing share of the department’s R&D
expenditures imply a decision to increase the priority of nuclear and radiological
countermeasures. (This may affect the S&T Directorate, even though it is no longer
involved in nuclear and radiological R&D, because such a decision implicitly reduces
the relative priority of other R&D topics that remain in the directorate.) In part, this
focus on unconventional, low-likelihood, high-consequence threats may reflect the
programs transferred to the directorate at its inception, which were heavily focused
on biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.36 The rapid increase in budget
emphasis on radiological and nuclear threats starting in FY2006 appears to be a
strategic choice, however. Although the White House has explained its rationale for
establishing DNDO,37 DHS has given no public explanation of its decision to
increase DNDO’s funding.
In the past, the directorate’s focus on unconventional threats has drawn into
question its ability to meet the conventional needs of other DHS component agencies.
In the directorate’s old budget structure, funding for support of other DHS agencies
was consistently less than for either biological or radiological and nuclear
countermeasures. (See Appendix C.) The new budget structure integrates support
for other DHS agencies into each of the research divisions, so this issue has become
difficult to track through budget trends. The new IPT process includes
35 This criticism and others were made by Members of Congress at a hearing on the strategic
plan held by the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, on June 27, 2007. See, for example,
t h e C h a i r m a n ’ s o p e n i n g s t a t e m e n t a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e a t
[http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070627162512-45822.pdf].
36 Programs transferred to the S&T Directorate in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
included the DOE Chemical and Biological National Security program, activities of the
DOE Life Sciences program related to genomic sequencing of microbial pathogens, the
USDA Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the DOD National Bio-Weapons Defense
Analysis Center, which were all related to biological and chemical threats, as well as part
of the DOE Proliferation Detection program, the DOE Nuclear Assessment program, the
DOE Environmental Measurements Laboratory, and part of the DOE Office of Science
Advanced Scientific Computing Research program, which were all related to radiological
and nuclear threats.
37 Executive Office of the President, The White House, Domestic Nuclear Detection,
National Security Presidential Directive 43 (NSPD-43) and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 14 (HSPD-14), April 15, 2005.
CRS-16
representatives of the DHS operational agencies, however, which may help ensure
that future R&D efforts meet the department’s conventional needs.
Integrated Product Teams. The S&T Directorate has instituted new
procedures to solicit input from the operational components of DHS, to work with
the components in identifying technology gaps and needs, and to develop
mechanisms to meet those gaps and needs. The foundation of these new procedures
is a set of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Ten IPTs, each focused on a different
topic, bring together decision-makers from DHS operational components and the
S&T Directorate, as well as select end-users.38 Each IPT consists of customer
representatives, whose role is to identify gaps in capability; providers from the S&T
Directorate, whose role is to provide technical solutions; acquisition officials and/or
financial officers, whose role is to validate and execute future acquisition plans; and
end user representatives, whose role is to provide the end users’ perspectives.39 The
intent is to help the operational units make informed decisions about technology
investments, based on the S&T Directorate’s understanding of technology and the
state of applicable technology solutions. The specific goal is to identify technology
solutions that can be developed and delivered to the acquisition programs of
operational units within three years.40 Congress and other observers have generally
taken a positive view of the IPT process compared with the directorate’s previous
priority-setting efforts.
One past criticism of the S&T Directorate has been that it has difficulty meeting
the needs of end users. The IPT process explicitly makes the other DHS components
the consumers of the S&T Directorate’s R&D efforts. It identifies requirements and
capability gaps at the federal level. Although there can be input from the state and
local level, the IPT structure does not encourage end users outside DHS, such as state
and local first responders, to communicate their needs directly to the S&T
Directorate. The expectation is that the DHS operational components that work with
state and local agencies will understand their needs and represent their interests.
To provide a direct route for first responders to communicate with S&T, the
directorate has established the TechSolutions program.41 The goal of this program
is to integrate first responder needs into the R&D pipeline and provide solutions
through rapid prototyping or identification of existing technologies. It is unclear,
38 The ten IPT topics are Information Sharing/Management, Cyber Security, People
Screening, Border Security, Chemical/Biological Defense, Maritime Security, Explosive
Prevention, Cargo Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Incident Management (including
first responder interoperability).
39 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Strategic Plan
with Attachments, May 2007, p. 7.
40 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, February 14, 2007.
41 An email address for first responders to communicate with the S&T Directorate through
the Tech Solutions program has been created at techsolutions@dhs.gov. More information
on the TechSolutions program is online at [http://www.dhs.gov/techsolutions].
CRS-17
however, how these needs are prioritized relative to each other or how TechSolutions
interacts with the IPT process.
Use of External Advice. When DHS was established, the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC), an advisory
committee for the S&T Directorate, was also created. While this body met and
attempted to provide the S&T Under Secretary with advice relating to priorities and
effective use of the S&T Directorate assets, its service has been sporadic.42 The
statutory authority for the HSSTAC originally lapsed in 2005, but in 2006 was
reauthorized and the charter extended until the end of 2008.43 The HSSTAC has
been reformed but has not been used to develop or provide a publicly available
strategic overview or to review of the S&T Directorate’s research investment plan.
The DHS also, through the S&T Directorate, relies on the Homeland Security
Institute (HSI), the agency’s FFRDC, for external advice and analysis. The HSI has
contributed in areas such as strategic policy and planning, investment alternatives,
the identification of DOE National Laboratories’ capabilities, chemical and
biological warfare, critical infrastructure protection, threat scenarios, standards
integration, operational analysis, and lessons learned analysis.44 As the HSI provides
its reports directly to DHS, the contents of these reports and the extent to which their
recommendations are implemented are unknown.
Analysis of Threat Information. DHS Secretary Chertoff has stated that
DHS should make decisions based on risk (in this context, the risk that different
threats pose to homeland security).45 While risk methodologies are under exploration
in the S&T Directorate, the extent to which they are incorporated into decision
making is unclear. For example, a presidential directive tasks DHS with completing
a biennial biological risk assessment.46 Although the content of that assessment has
not been made public, many observers expect that it provides sufficient analysis and
detail to identify priority areas for short-, medium-, and long-term R&D investments.
For example, its results are being used by the Department of Health and Human
Services to help prioritize biological countermeasure procurement through Project
Bioshield.47 Another presidential directive requires DHS to develop an integrated
42 For a record of the meeting minutes of the HSSTAC, see online at
[http://www.dhs.gov/xres/committees/gc_1163542152895.shtm].
43 Sec. 302, P.L. 109-347, SAFE Port Act.
44 Homeland Security Institute, Homeland Security Institute Annual Report to Congress
2006/2007, 2007.
45 For example, in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Institute on December 12, 2007, he said
that “spending decisions have to be made based on what’s risk-appropriate and what is most
cost-effective.” See [http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1197513975365.shtm].
46 Executive Office of the President, White House, Biodefense for the 21st Century,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-10), April 28, 2004.
47 See CRS Report RL33907, Project BioShield: Appropriations, Acquisitions, and Policy
Implementation Issues for Congress.
CRS-18
risk assessment for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.48 The
connection of these two risk assessments to the directorate’s R&D budgeting process
is not apparent, however, nor is it clear whether the directorate applies or plans to
apply a similar risk assessment methodology to priority-setting in other threat areas
or across all its activities. It should be noted that these risk assessments may contain
information relating to national or homeland security vulnerabilities and, as such,
might be incorporated into the directorate’s planning processes through a nonpublic
mechanism.
Interagency and intra-agency coordination plays an important role in ensuring
that R&D plans and strategies are informed by threat information. The techniques
used and considered by terrorists adapt and evolve. Technological countermeasures
may be available that provide protection against these modified techniques, but they
will be ineffective if they are not deployed prior to the techniques’ use. Transfer of
pertinent threat information from the intelligence community to DHS, and then to the
S&T Directorate, may provide an advantage in developing counterterrorism
technologies and enhancing preparedness.
Balance of R&D by Type and Performer
The scope of the S&T Directorate’s activities is broad. Its R&D activities
address the whole range of threats to homeland security (with the exception, since
2005, of most nuclear and radiological threats, which are addressed by the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, discussed more below). It spans the spectrum from basic
research to operational systems (though most operational functions have now been
transferred to other DHS organizations). It conducts some activities directly in its
own facilities and others indirectly through arrangements with the national
laboratories, industry, universities, and other government agencies. This section
discusses the balance among basic research, applied research, and development; the
balance between R&D performed within the federal government (intramural) and
R&D performed by industry, academia, and others (extramural); and the directorate’s
role in operational activities. The next section discusses how the directorate’s
planning and prioritization processes balance the many R&D topics that it addresses.
Basic Research, Applied Research, and Development. How the S&T
Directorate allocates its resources between research and development is of interest
to both policymakers and other stakeholders. The extent to which the S&T
Directorate invests in basic research in particular is an issue of continuing
congressional interest.49 Investment in basic research is generally believed to address
48 Executive Office of the President, White House, Medical Countermeasures against
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 18 (HSPD-18),
January 31, 2007, Sec. 14(c).
49 See, for example, questioning of Under Secretary McQueary at hearings of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research
and Development, February 25, 2004, and the House Committee on Science, February 15,
2006; and of Under Secretary Cohen at a hearing of the House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology,
(continued...)
CRS-19
long-term needs, provide a basis for future applied research and development, and
lead to advances in knowledge across disciplines. Investment in development
focuses more on the near term, with results that are typically narrower in scope but
more immediately applicable. The directorate’s R&D portfolio has been criticized
as being skewed too much toward development, with not enough expenditure on
basic research.50 As noted below, the directorate’s stated goal is to increase basic
research to 20% of its budget. This goal was not reached in the directorate’s FY2008
budget request, which included 13% basic research.51 In contrast, the FY2009 budget
request, the first budget request developed entirely during Under Secretary Cohen’s
tenure, meets this goal, including 20% basic research funding.52
In the Administration’s annual budget documents, the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) provides an agency-by-agency analysis of federal R&D budget
authority in four categories: basic research, applied research, development, and
facilities and equipment. For this purpose, OMB defines the first three of these
categories as follows:
! basic research: “systematic study directed toward a fuller knowledge
or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of
observable facts without specific applications towards processes or
products in mind.”
! applied research: “systematic study to gain knowledge or
understanding necessary to determine the means by which a
recognized and specific need may be met.”
! development: “systematic application of knowledge or
understanding, directed toward the production of useful materials,
devices, and systems or methods, including design, development,
and improvement of prototypes and new processes to meet specific
requirements.”53
The DHS portion of OMB’s analysis is summarized in the upper portion of Table 1.
Note that these figures do not distinguish between the S&T Directorate and other
DHS organizations. They therefore include R&D activities in the Domestic Nuclear
49 (...continued)
February 14, 2007.
50 See, for example, James Jay Carafano, and Richard Weitz, “Rethinking Research,
Development, and Acquisition for Homeland Security,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder
No. 2000, January 22, 2007; and Rachael King, “Is Homeland Security Too Focused on
Now?” Business Week, December 20, 2007.
51 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, March 8,
2007.
52 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee
on Technology and Innovation, March 6, 2008.
53 Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2008.
CRS-20
Detection Office, the U.S. Coast Guard, and perhaps other organizations, as well as
in the S&T Directorate.54
The National Science Foundation (NSF) also produces annual statistics on
federal R&D spending. The NSF figures describe obligations and outlays, which
reflect how budget authority was actually spent, and therefore they are only available
after a fiscal year is complete.55 Like OMB, NSF uses four categories: basic
research, applied research, development, and R&D plant. It uses the same definitions
as OMB does for basic research, applied research, and development, and its R&D
plant category appears to be equivalent to OMB’s facilities and equipment category.56
The lower portion of Table 1 shows the NSF obligation figures for DHS as a whole
and for just the S&T Directorate.
There appear to be discrepancies between these two sets of figures. See Figure
3. In the NSF figures for the S&T Directorate, basic research is 11% of the non-plant
total each year, applied research 25%, and development 64%. These proportions are
identical (within rounding) in each of the three years for which data are available.
The OMB figures show much more variation, particularly in the balance between
applied research and development. They also show a much smaller proportion of
basic research. The NSF figures are obligations, whereas the OMB figures are
budget authority, so some of the differences may be explained by unobligated
balances carried over from year to year. (The issue of unobligated balances is
discussed more below.) Some of the NSF figures are preliminary. However, CRS
has been unable to determine the cause of the differences.
54 Because of consolidation and deconsolidation of R&D activities, the proportion of DHS
R&D budget authority located within the S&T Directorate varies. Dividing the R&D
appropriation for the S&T Directorate by the total DHS R&D budget authority reported by
OMB yields a S&T Directorate contribution that ranges from 58% in FY2007 to 89% in
FY2005.
55 For more explanation of how budget authority, obligations, and outlays differ, see CRS
Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process.
56 For the NSF definitions, see National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources
Statistics, Federal Funds for Research and Development: Fiscal Years 2004-06, NSF
07-323, June 2007, pp. 339-340.
CRS-21
Table 1. DHS R&D by Character of Work
($ in millions)
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
All DHS (OMB) — Budget Authority
Basic Research
47
68
55
85
247
248
376
Applied
92
247
842
662
434
382
381
Research
Development
549
481
133
659
434
365
380
Facilities/
49
257
152
49
131
148
2,250a
Equipment
Total
737
1,053
1,182
1,455
1,246
1,143
3,287a
All DHS (NSF) — Obligations
Basic Research
—
166
239
268
—
—
Applied
—
247
372
349
—
—
Research
Development
—
533
840
830
—
—
R&D Plant
—
117
182
181
—
—
Total
—
1,063
1,632
1,628
—
—
DHS S&T Directorate only (NSF) — Obligations
Basic Research
—
85
132
133
—
—
Applied
—
199
310
311
—
—
Research
Development
—
507
789
792
—
—
R&D Plant
—
116
181
181
—
—
Total
—
908
1,412
1,418
—
—
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2005 and subsequent years. (FY2003-FY2007 are actual from the budget
two years after the year concerned. FY2008 is estimated and FY2009 is requested, both from the
FY2009 budget.) National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Federal
Funds for Research and Development: Fiscal Years 2004-06, NSF 07-323, June 2007. (FY2005 and
FY2006 are preliminary. FY2007 and FY2008 are not yet available. Comparable FY2003 data do
not exist “because DHS was unable to determine adequate estimates” [Federal Funds for Research
and Development: Fiscal Years 2003-05, NSF 06-313].)
a. In the FY2009 budget, OMB categorized an advance appropriation of $2.175 billion for Project
BioShield as R&D Facilities/Equipment. This funding is located in the Office of Health Affairs,
not the Science and Technology Directorate. Additionally, questions have been raised about its
categorization, as Project BioShield is a program for procuring medical countermeasures, not
for building R&D facilities or purchasing R&D capital equipment. For more information, see
CRS Report RS21507, Project BioShield: Purposes and Authorities, by Frank Gottron, and
CRS Report RL34448, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2009, coordinated by
John F. Sargent.
CRS-22
Figure 3. DHS R&D by Character of Work
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY04
FY05
FY06
OMB
NSF
Basic Research
Applied Research
Development
Facilities/Equipment
Source: DHS R&D budget authority as categorized by OMB, FY2003-FY2009. DHS R&D
obligations as categorized by NSF, FY2004-FY2006. See Table 1 for detailed data. If Project
BioShield funding is removed from the OMB figures for FY2009, the percentages for that year
become basic research 31%, applied research 31%, development 31%, and facilities/equipment 6%.
From time to time, the S&T Directorate has provided its own breakdown of its
activities into basic research, applied research, and development. Two examples are
shown in Table 2. It has not always provided this information on a regular basis,
however, or in a consistent format. While its figures typically give a general picture
similar to those of OMB and NSF, such as a smaller share for basic research than for
the other categories, the details vary and sometimes appear inconsistent.
CRS-23
Table 2. S&T Directorate Statistics on Basic Research, Applied
Research, and Development, FY2004-FY2007
($ in millions)
From S&T Directorate Testimony in February 2005
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
(actual)
(estimate)
(proposed)
Basic Research
68
85
112
Applied Research
243
340
399
Development
470
587
746
Total
781
1,012
1,257
From S&T Directorate Testimony in February 2006
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
(actual)
(estimate)
(proposed)
Basic Research
21
40
15
Applied Research
659
780
671
Development
157
273
120
Total
836
1,092
806
Source: Under Secretary for Science and Technology Charles E. McQueary, Department of
Homeland Security, answers to post-hearing questions, House Committee on Science, An Overview
of the Federal R&D Budget for Fiscal Year 2006, hearing held February 16, 2005, and An Overview
of the Federal R&D Budget for Fiscal Year 2007, hearing held February 15, 2006.
Note: Estimated and proposed funding are reported in budget authority, while actual funding is
reported in obligations. It is unclear whether actual funding refers only to new budget authority
received in the stated fiscal year or if it includes unexpired previous year budget authority.
The S&T Directorate currently prefers to use a somewhat different set of
categories, as shown in Table 3, although it has not provided a detailed breakdown
of current or past expenditures according to these categories. The correspondence
between the directorate’s categories and the ones used by OMB and NSF is only
partial. The definitions of basic research appear similar. OMB’s facilities and
equipment category and NSF’s R&D plant category seem to correspond to the
laboratory operations and construction portion of “other spending.” The “product
transition” category may be similar to development. The “innovative capabilities”
category, however, seems quite different from applied research.
CRS-24
Table 3. Categories of R&D as Described by the S&T
Directorate
Investment
Years to
Category
Description
Target
Delivery
Basic
- Enables future paradigm changes
20%
>8
research
- University fundamental research
- Government lab discovery and invention
Innovative
- High risk / high payoff
10%
2-5
capabilities
- Game changer / leap ahead
- Prototype, test, and deploy
- HSARPA
Product
- Focused on delivering near-term products
50%
0-3
transition
and enhancements to acquisition
- Customer IPT controlled
- Cost, schedule, capability metrics
Other
- Test and evaluation and standards
20%
0-8+
spending
- Laboratory operations and construction
- Management and administration
Source: Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, March 8, 2007.
Investment targets from S&T Directorate briefing charts.
The R&D categories shown in Table 3 fall into two time frames. Basic research
is described as long-term, with products expected more than eight years in the future.
Innovative capabilities and product transition are described as short-term, with results
expected within five years. According to these descriptions, the S&T Directorate’s
investment portfolio does not include mid-term R&D with a time horizon of five to
eight years. This situation may be a barrier to bringing the results of basic research
to fruition in deployable systems.
Intramural and Extramural. Just as Congress is interested in the breakdown
of the S&T Directorate’s activities into basic research, applied research, and
development, it is also interested in the balance between intramural57 and
extramural58 activities. Under Secretary Cohen has said that “we don’t do S&T, we
57 Intramural R&D refers to research and development carried out by and within a federal
agency (Division of Science Resources Statistics, Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and
Economic Sciences, National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Research and
Development Fiscal Years 2000, 2001, and 2002 — Detailed Statistical Tables, Volume 50,
May 2002).
58 Extramural R&D is research and development performed under contract, grant, or
cooperative agreement by organizations outside the federal sector but with federal funds
(Division of Science Resources Statistics, Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic
Sciences, National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Research and Development
Fiscal Years 2000, 2001, and 2002 — Detailed Statistical Tables, Volume 50, May 2002).
CRS-25
resource and we manage S&T.”59 Nevertheless, the S&T Directorate funds both
extramural R&D, through contracts, grants, and other arrangements with industry,
academia, and others, and intramural R&D, conducted by government employees at
DHS and other federal facilities. Before the 2006 reorganization, most extramural
R&D was managed by HSARPA; that is no longer true.
Categorization of the directorate’s activities as extramural or intramural is
complicated by its sponsorship of FFRDCs and university centers and its use of the
DOE national laboratories. The FFRDCs and university centers are established and
overseen by DHS but operated by outside organizations and funded by contracts and
grants. The DOE national laboratories, while government-owned, are also managed
and operated by contractors. The extramural or intramural status of R&D performed
at these facilities is therefore potentially ambiguous.
Annual budget documents typically do not provide a breakdown of funding
between intramural and extramural activities; among industrial, academic, and non-
profit organizations; or between public-sector and private-sector performers. This
type of information is sometimes provided in hearing testimony or in briefings by
directorate staff, however. An example is given in Figure 4.
Operational Activities. Until 2007, the S&T Directorate contained several
operational programs. The department’s FY2008 budget request announced plans
to transfer the BioWatch, Biological Warning and Incident Characterization, and
Rapidly Deployable Chemical Detection System programs from the S&T
Directorate’s Chemical and Biological Division to the DHS Office of Health Affairs,
and the SAFECOM program from the S&T Directorate’s Command, Control, and
Interoperability Division to the DHS Directorate of National Protection and
Programs. In March 2007, Under Secretary Cohen noted that the four programs to
be transferred “pre-date the IPT process” (discussed above) and “have reached
technical maturity.”60 The moves were also driven by the general reorganization of
the S&T Directorate in 2006 and by the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295), which codified the position of DHS Chief
Medical Officer (CMO), gave him primary responsibility for coordinating the
department’s biodefense activities, and led the department to create an Office of
Health Affairs, headed by the CMO.
59 Quoted in Tom Michael, “The Search for Security,” Innovation: America’s Journal of
Technology Commercialization, February/March 2007.
60 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, hearing held February 14,
2007.
CRS-26
Figure 4. S&T Directorate Statistics on R&D
Performer Types, FY2008
Nonprofit, 2%
FFRDC, 3%
University, 7%
Industry, 40%
Federal, 20%
DOE Laboratory,
28%
Source: S&T Directorate briefing charts, February 14, 2008, based on FY2008 spending plans as of
that date.
Difficulty of Tracking Budget Trends
Annual budget documents, including the Analytical Perspectives volume of the
President’s budget and the S&T Directorate’s own congressional budget
justifications, are the most detailed published sources of information on the
directorate’s activities. It is difficult, however, to use these documents to track
certain types of budget trends.
Information in the President’s Budget. The Analytical Perspectives
volume is a key source of department-wide data on the funding balance among basic
research, applied research, and development (see Table 1 above). Budget analysts
have several causes for concern, however, about the quality of these data for DHS.
One issue is the consistency of how activities are categorized. Another is the scope
of the activities included: sometimes the figures include expenditures that are not
R&D, and sometimes they omit expenditures that are R&D.
The data include wide variations from year to year, particularly in the balance
between applied research and development. For example, they indicate that the share
of the department’s R&D budget authority devoted to applied research went from
23% in FY2004, up to 71% in FY2005, and then back down to 45% in FY2006.
Over the same period, the share devoted to development went from 46% to 11% to
45%. While such swings may reflect annual changes in the nature of the
department’s R&D activities, they may also indicate that in some years development
activities have been recategorized as applied research, or vice versa, as the result of
unexplained changes in accounting or definition.
CRS-27
In addition, the Analytical Perspectives R&D data include some DHS activities
that are not R&D. For example, the FY2006 edition shows total requested DHS
R&D funding of $1.467 billion, even though the FY2006 request for the entire S&T
Directorate including salaries and expenses was only $1.368 billion. The difference
of $99 million is not accounted for by R&D programs in other DHS organizations.61
The department’s R&D total should be less than the S&T Directorate request, not
more, because not all the directorate’s expenditures are for R&D.62 Similarly, the
FY2009 edition includes $2.175 billion of advance appropriation for Project
BioShield, a medical countermeasure procurement program, as R&D facilities
construction funding.63 As a consequence, the apparent funding for R&D activities
for FY2009 is several times greater than the requested budgets for all R&D programs
combined.
Conversely, the Analytical Perspectives data sometimes appear to omit DHS
R&D activities that should be included. For example, in the FY2006 edition, the
estimate of total DHS R&D for FY2005 is $1.185 billion. In the DHS FY2006
congressional budget justification, the total FY2005 funding for the S&T Directorate
(excluding salaries and expenses) and the R&D programs of the Transportation
Security Administration, Coast Guard, and Customs is $1.244 billion. The difference
of $59 million is not accounted for by non-R&D activities in the S&T Directorate.
Instead, it appears to reflect the omission of the Transportation Security
Administration and Customs programs from the Analytical Perspectives data.
Information in DHS Budget Justifications. The directorate’s
congressional budget justifications are the key source of information on the budgets
of individual programs (see Appendix C). The main difficulty in using this
information to track trends from year to year is the changing organization of the
directorate. In many cases, the major reorganization in 2006 makes it impossible to
compare program-level budgets before and after FY2007.64
Smaller organizational changes also present challenges for specific programs
before that date. For example, when the Transportation Security Laboratory was
transferred to the directorate from elsewhere in the department, its funding was first
pooled with some smaller unrelated programs in a category called R&D
Consolidation (FY2006) and then merged into the existing Explosives
Countermeasures category (FY2007). Starting in FY2008 it became part of the
61 The directorate’s request for FY2006 included funding for DNDO, which was not yet a
separate organization; the former TSA and Customs R&D activities, which were being
consolidated into the directorate for the first time; and the Coast Guard R&D activity, which
was proposed for consolidation, even though it was ultimately kept separate.
62 These non-R&D expenditures include, for example, the directorate’s operational
activities, its program of scholarships and fellowships, and under some definitions, the
salaries and expenses of its management.
63 Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Analytical Perspectives, Budget
of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009, February 2008.
64 While DHS provided a crosswalk between the old and new budget structure for FY2007,
the information is not sufficient to recalculate prior year allotments into the new budget
structure.
CRS-28
Laboratory Facilities category. The budget justifications for these years do not allow
the laboratory’s funding to be tracked across the organizational transition. Another
challenge is that the figures reported in the directorate’s budget justifications have
sometimes appeared inconsistent. For example, past-year data is sometimes reported
as budget authority and sometimes as obligations, without clear identification.
Financial Management
When the S&T Directorate was formed, it had to establish an entirely new
financial and budgeting system, because although it incorporated some existing
programs from other agencies, its mission and activities overall were largely new.
In 2004, GAO reported that DHS as a whole faced a “daunting task” in bringing
together the financial management systems of the agencies from which it was
formed.65 Establishing new systems from the ground up may have been an even
greater challenge. Difficulties the S&T Directorate has encountered in this effort
range from insufficient ethics-related management controls66 to unclear
determinations of administrative overhead costs.67 According to the DHS annual
financial report for FY2007, internal financial controls in the S&T Directorate no
longer have material weaknesses (factors that might make financial reporting
inaccurate), but tests of the effectiveness of those controls remain to be completed
in the areas of financial system security, grants management, and payment
management.68
Table 4. S&T Directorate Unobligated Balances
($ in millions)
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Start of Year
0
0
359
381
276
401
End of Year
40
353
381
277
404
291
Source: DHS congressional budget justifications for the fiscal year two years after the one stated.
For example, the figure of $40 million at the end of FY2002 was obtained from the FY2004
congressional budget justification.
Note: Ending amounts do not always match starting amounts for the next year because of subsequent
budget corrections, such as recoveries of obligated funds and rescission of prior year unobligated
balances.
65 Government Accountability Office, Financial Management: Department of Homeland
Security Faces Significant Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774, July 2004.
66 Government Accountability Office, DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management
Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate, GAO-06-206, December 22, 2005.
67 See, for example, H.Rept. 109-476.
68 Department of Homeland Security, DHS Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2007,
November 15, 2007, p. 33. Similar information for previous years is in the performance and
accountability reports at [http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/budget/editorial_0430.shtm].
CRS-29
One aspect that has drawn the attention of Congress is the persistence of
unobligated balances from prior fiscal years. The S&T Directorate has not always
obligated the full amount of its annual appropriation. In the first few years after its
establishment, possible reasons for this included appropriations that were consistently
higher than the directorate had requested and the directorate’s inability to spend funds
rapidly because of its slow progress in hiring program managers. Because funds
appropriated to the S&T Directorate do not expire,69 a significant unobligated balance
accumulated (see Table 4). In response, Congress rescinded $20 million in
unobligated prior-year funds in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-90) and an additional $125 million in the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295).
It should be noted that because Congress places no expiration date on funds it
appropriates to the S&T Directorate, it may be that Congress intends for some
unobligated balance to persist in S&T Directorate accounts. Even if that is the case,
the magnitude of the existing unobligated balance may mean that it will take several
fiscal years to reach the level of carryover desired by Congress.
Under Secretary Cohen has testified that the S&T Directorate is attempting to
reduce its unobligated balance and intends to spend funds in the year for which they
are appropriated. In February 2007, comparing the FY2007 obligation rate to the
FY2006 obligation rate, he said,
I believe you’ll see we’ve made significant progress in getting the books right,
and in terms of our obligations, we have committed as of today 47 percent of our
FY2007 budget. That compares with six percent at the same time last year....70
By the end of FY2007, the directorate had reduced its prior-year unobligated balance
to $74 million, but it had only obligated 75% of its FY2007 appropriation.71 As a
result, an unobligated balance of $291 million was carried forward into FY2008.72
In testimony in April 2008, the Under Secretary noted that the S&T Directorate does
not control the DHS acquisition process and referred to “challenges” with getting
committed funds obligated; he suggested a need to consider “refinement” of
processes in the department that may currently be “suboptimized.”73
69 In many other agencies, funds that are unspent at the end of the year return to the
Treasury. This is not the case for the S&T Directorate, except for its management and
administration account, because its annual appropriations language includes the phrase “to
remain available until expended.”
70 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, February 14, 2007.
71 Personal communication with DHS Legislative Affairs, January 16, 2008.
72 DHS congressional budget justification for FY2009. (See Table 4.)
73 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, April 1, 2008.
CRS-30
Relationships with Other R&D Organizations
Among the statutory responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology are coordinating and integrating the R&D activities of other DHS
components with those of the S&T Directorate, entering into agreements with the
Department of Energy regarding DHS use of its national laboratories, and
coordinating DHS science and technology activities with other federal agencies.
These relationships have raised a variety of issues.
Consolidation of R&D within DHS. When DHS was created, several
components with R&D activities were transferred into the new department in their
entirety, without merging their R&D activities into the S&T Directorate. The largest
of these were the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Customs
Service, and the Coast Guard. Some of these transfers were statutorily protected
from subsequent reorganization. The TSA was to remain intact for two years
following the enactment of the Homeland Security Act.74 The Coast Guard is to be
maintained as a distinct entity within DHS.75 Although the Homeland Security Act
charges the Under Secretary with “establishing and administering the primary
research and development activities of the Department” (Sec. 302(11)), it also states
that
nothing in this title shall be construed to preclude any Under Secretary of the
Department from carrying out research, development, demonstration, or
deployment activities, as long as such activities are coordinated through the
Under Secretary for Science and Technology.76
For the first few years of the department’s existence, a trend toward
consolidation of its R&D activities tended to simplify this coordination role. The
conference report (H.Rept. 108-280) accompanying the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) gave this trend explicit direction.
The R&D activities of the former Customs Service were transferred to the S&T
Directorate in FY2005. The R&D activities of TSA, including its Transportation
Security Laboratory, followed in FY2006. In both years, however, Congress
disapproved the department’s proposals to transfer the Coast Guard’s R&D program.
The Coast Guard program continues to operate independently.
Consolidation was seen by its advocates as having the potential to foster
collaboration, increase synergy between programs, reduce duplication, streamline
processes and procedures, and improve budgeting and oversight. Critics, however,
expressed doubt about the S&T Directorate’s ability to balance R&D priorities across
a growing spectrum of responsibilities. One concern was whether the directorate
would effectively support the department’s non-homeland security missions. (The
fact that the Coast Guard has both homeland security and non-homeland security
responsibilities was a key factor in Congress’s decision to keep its R&D efforts
74 6 U.S.C. 234.
75 6 U.S.C. 468.
76 6 U.S.C. 186.
CRS-31
intact.)77 Another concern was whether the directorate’s heavy emphasis on
countering weapons of mass destruction would result in the neglect of other, smaller
programs.
The directorate’s experiences with consolidation have been mixed. The
integration of the Customs Service R&D program and several other smaller activities
seems to have gone smoothly. In contrast, absorbing TSA’s R&D program was
perceived as being so difficult that in 2006, the Senate Committee on Appropriations
proposed transferring the Transportation Security Laboratory back to TSA:
The Committee is also aware S&T and TSA have not come to agreement on the
research priorities for this portfolio. Given these issues, the Committee believes
TSL would be better managed by TSA.78
This proposal was abandoned after the S&T Directorate and TSA signed a
memorandum of understanding in August 2006.79
The establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in 2005
was the first dispersal of R&D activities away from the S&T Directorate. Created
by presidential directive80 and subsequently given statutory authority by Title V of
the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347), DNDO took over the S&T Directorate’s
radiological and nuclear countermeasures portfolio. Although it became a separate
organization under the direct authority of the Secretary in FY2006, it received its
funding through the S&T Directorate until FY2007.
Whether the establishment of DNDO was a singular event or the beginning of
a more general trend toward deconsolidation remains to be seen. One apparent
motivation for its establishment as a separate organization was Congress’s
displeasure with the management of the S&T Directorate. For example, the House
Committee on Appropriations expressed its dissatisfaction with removing DNDO
from the S&T Directorate but nevertheless approved the move because of “the
liability it would face” otherwise (H.Rept. 109-476). Since the appointment of Under
Secretary Cohen, Congress has appeared more confident in the S&T Directorate’s
77 See, for example, Greta Wodele, “Lawmakers Aim to Keep Coast Guard R&D within
Agency,” Technology Daily, June 23, 2004.
78 S.Rept. 109-273.
79 H.Rept. 109-699.
80 Executive Office of the President, The White House, Domestic Nuclear Detection,
National Security Presidential Directive 43 (NSPD-43) and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 14 (HSPD-14), April 15, 2005.
CRS-32
competence.81 If that confidence continues, further deconsolidation may be less
likely.
Role of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The establishment of
DNDO as a free-standing office outside the S&T Directorate (like the continued
existence of a small R&D activity in the Coast Guard) raises questions about how
effectively the Under Secretary for S&T will be able to carry out his responsibility
of “coordinating and integrating all research, development, demonstration, testing,
and evaluation activities of the Department.”82 In providing statutory authority for
DNDO, the SAFE Port Act required that the Under Secretary and the director of
DNDO provide joint notifications to Congress regarding nuclear and radiological
detection and directed DNDO to coordinate with the Under Secretary on “basic and
advanced or transformational research and development efforts relevant to the
mission of both organizations.”83 It is unclear how effective this coordination has
been. The rapid growth of DNDO, both in absolute terms and relative to the S&T
Directorate, arguably represents a shift of R&D authority away from the Under
Secretary. If S&T Directorate budgets decline or remain constant while DNDO
budgets increase, the DHS R&D budget may become increasingly weighted towards
DNDO efforts. Although much of DNDO’s activity is operational, and operational
activities have been transferred out of the S&T Directorate with little objection,
DNDO also funds a substantial amount of R&D. It also conducts substantial testing
and evaluation, some of which has been heavily criticized.84 Finally, as noted above,
the establishment of DNDO appears to reflect an increase in the priority DHS places
on countering radiological and nuclear threats. If that priority should shift, the
separation of DNDO from the S&T Directorate may make it more difficult to
rebalance the department’s R&D activities.
Relationship with the DOE National Laboratories. The close
relationship between DHS and the DOE national laboratories has raised issues about
the role of national laboratory personnel in the directorate’s planning and how that
role may interact with the directorate’s decisions about awarding R&D contracts.
As well as performing R&D on behalf of the S&T Directorate, under the terms
of the special statutory arrangement previously mentioned, the DOE national
81 For example, in its report on the Senate’s FY2008 homeland security appropriations bill
(Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008; S. 1644), the Senate
Committee on Appropriations stated that “The Committee is pleased with the rapid progress
S&T appears to be making toward resolving past difficulties. The new Under Secretary has
restructured the directorate’s programs, worked to obligate resources in a timely fashion,
and instituted a capable budget office able to deliver timely, accurate, and comprehensible
documents.” (S.Rept. 110-84)
82 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 302(12).
83 Homeland Security Act, Sec. 1802(a)(6), as amended by the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-
347), Sec. 510(a).
84 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal
Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All
the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits, GAO-07-133R, October 17, 2006.
CRS-33
laboratories also frequently provide the directorate with technical experts for program
planning and oversight. In some cases, these experts work for the directorate for a
limited period under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA, 5 U.S.C. 3371-76)
with the expectation of subsequently returning to their original laboratories. The
directorate’s extensive use of national laboratory employees, including IPA
employees, has been an issue of congressional interest, especially with respect to the
influence these employees have on the choice of contractors and the formulation of
funding opportunities.85
In addition, the national laboratories can compete for the directorate’s R&D
funding. Each year, the directorate issues several Broad Agency Announcements
soliciting R&D proposals from outside the department. Proposals submitted in
response to these announcements have largely come from industry, but because the
Broad Agency Announcement process is an open, competitive solicitation, national
laboratories may also participate, unless specifically excluded. Questions have been
raised about whether this situation is appropriate and sound; whether the national
laboratories have an undue advantage over industry (for example, because of their
long history of conducting classified and sensitive R&D for the federal government);
and whether the department has an explicit or implicit policy about the balance
between awards to industry and awards to the national laboratories.
Soon after its establishment, the directorate tried to resolve these issues by
designating some of the DOE national laboratories as intramural and others as
extramural. The intramural laboratories would have had a closer relationship with
the directorate but would have been ineligible for competitively awarded contracts,
such as funds awarded through Broad Agency Announcements. The extramural
laboratories would have been eligible for competitive awards, but not for other
funding from the directorate. This plan was soon abandoned when it encountered
congressional opposition.86
Interagency Coordination. As well as requiring coordination with other
DHS components, the Homeland Security Act requires the S&T Directorate to
interact with a variety of other executive branch agencies. The Under Secretary is
required by Sec. 302 of the Homeland Security Act to develop, in consultation with
other agencies, a national policy and strategic plan for federal civilian efforts to
identify and develop countermeasures against terrorism; to coordinate those efforts;
and to identify priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for them. He or she has
specific responsibility to collaborate with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the designation and
regulation of biological “select agents.” The directorate makes extensive use of the
DOE national laboratories and relies on Department of Defense facilities to house
bioforensics laboratories, while the Department of Agriculture uses the directorate’s
Plum Island laboratory for research not directly related to homeland security. In
85 See Government Accountability Office, DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related
Management Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate, GAO-06-206, December
22, 2005.
86 For a summary of this episode, see Caitlin Harrington, “DHS Drops Contracting Plan for
National Laboratories,” CQ Homeland Security, March 4, 2004.
CRS-34
these and other areas, the effectiveness of interagency coordination is of continuing
importance.
The national policy and strategic plan has not yet been released, and the
obstacles its development has encountered illustrate the challenges of working with
other agencies. As of March 2007, according to Under Secretary Cohen, a draft
existed that had been in preparation for about two years, but it was “perceived by the
other departments and agencies as mandat[ing] what they would do for Homeland
Security ... how they, through their efforts, could contribute to Homeland Security.”
As a result, he said, “it had a very difficult time coming to fruition.”87 A few months
later, he explained that the directorate had originally interpreted the requirement to
work in consultation with other agencies as requiring the concurrence of those
agencies, a process that he described as “tortuous.” He stated that he would
reinterpret consultation as giving other agencies an opportunity to comment, and
under that interpretation, he would “work to get this through OMB ... to the best of
my ability before the end of [FY2007].”88 In December 2007, the S&T Directorate
released Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology.89 According
to the foreword of this document, it is a “descriptive baseline for homeland security
research and development measures across the federal government . . . developed
with the cooperation of [other] federal agencies” and is a “first step in developing a
more prescriptive plan.”
The coordination document states that it will be updated annually to report on
performance measures and progress toward homeland security goals. The first
update will take place in FY2009 as part of the first Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review.90 Under Secretary Cohen has testified that the document’s continued
development “will play an important role in helping align strategies and missions to
adapt to a fast changing world and an ever evolving enemy.”91 Even though the 2007
document is not prescriptive, it may, by establishing a common framework, help
agencies to identify synergies and unmet needs. If agencies indeed align their
87 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee
on Technology and Innovation, March 8, 2007.
88 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, June 27, 2007.
89 Department of Homeland Security, Coordination of Homeland Security Science and
Technology, December 2007.
90 The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (FY2009 budget request: $1.65 million) will
recommend a long-term homeland security strategy, establish national homeland security
priorities, and comprehensively examine homeland security programs, assets, budget,
policies, and authorities. Secretary Michael Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security,
testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
February 15, 2008.
91 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, April 1, 2008.
CRS-35
strategies, that consensus may lower barriers to achieving a more prescriptive
homeland security R&D strategy.
The S&T Directorate uses a variety of mechanisms for interagency coordination.
These include memoranda of understanding, participation in interagency committees
and working groups, sponsorship of interagency meetings and conferences, joint
management of programs, and joint strategy development.92 Formal coordination
takes place at a high level through several White House groups, including the
Homeland Security Council, National Security Council, National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC), and Office of Science and Technology Policy. The
Under Secretary for Science and Technology cochairs the NSTC Committee on
Homeland and National Security. On specific R&D topics, coordination sometimes
takes place through the multiagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG),
overseen by the Departments of State and Defense. The S&T Directorate and several
other DHS organizations participate in TSWG. The S&T Directorate’s strategic plan
notes that within the directorate, the Interagency Programs Division facilitates
government-wide coordination, and the Office of National Laboratories coordinates
with DOE regarding the national laboratories. The R&D plan accompanying the
strategic plan does not explicitly identify areas of overlap or synergy with other
federal agencies.
One prominent program for which interagency coordination has been an issue
is Project BioShield. Under this program, the Secretary of Homeland Security is
responsible for assessing whether a particular biological, chemical, radiological, or
nuclear agent poses a “material threat” to national security. In practice, the analysis
that underpins this assessment is performed by the S&T Directorate. (The Office of
Health Affairs also participates.) Once the Secretary makes a material threat
determination, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) may procure
countermeasures for that agent using a 10-year block of funds that were appropriated
to DHS in FY2004. Congress and other stakeholders have criticized DHS for making
material threat determinations too slowly and thereby slowing the pace of
countermeasure procurement by HHS. Management and oversight of the program
are complicated by discrepancies between DHS and HHS about the amount of funds
that remain available. For more details, see CRS Report RL33907, Project
BioShield: Appropriations, Acquisitions, and Policy Implementation Issues for
Congress.
Metrics and Goals for Directorate Output
When the S&T Directorate was established, its optimal investment strategy was
unclear. The range of threats and vulnerabilities was broad, and the directorate
initially placed a premium on identifying technologies in an advanced stage of
development, transitioning them into deployable equipment, and providing this
equipment to end users. One DHS official believed, “there’s a lot of low-hanging
92 For some examples, see Appendix C, “S&T Directorate Interagency Interactions,” in the
prepared testimony of Under Secretary Charles E. McQueary, hearing of the House
Committee on Science, February 16, 2005.
CRS-36
fruit out there, capability that already exists, either commercially or in laboratory
prototypes.”93
As the directorate matures and its R&D results are implemented and deployed,
this focus on “low-hanging fruit” may need to evolve into a more diverse strategy
that also includes more fundamental research and riskier investments. Fundamental
or basic research is often identified as a key source of future technologies, and
research with innately higher risk, but also higher reward, may have more potential
for significant breakthroughs. Some experts advocate more S&T Directorate
investment in these types of research:
Failure to invest in longer-term research limits the prospects for future
breakthroughs that could dramatically improve DHS’s ability to fulfill its
mission. As the S&T Directorate matures, so must its S&T portfolio — which
means investing in a portfolio of both near-term and long-term research. I
understand that the S&T Directorate’s leadership now shares this view. I
particularly welcome Admiral Cohen’s plans to fund some high-risk but
potentially very high payoff projects. A serious pathology that can overtake a
technology development program is to become failure intolerant, forcing it to
settle on safe bets that are less ambitious than its mission requires. Admiral
Cohen will need your support if he hopes to avoid this — you will have to make
sure he fails often enough, and to hold him accountable if he doesn’t.94
A key component of such a strategy is assessing the progress of funded research
projects. Without effective assessment, it may be difficult to sustain investment in
long-term research activities that appear to be progressing slowly, or conversely, it
may be difficult to terminate projects that appear productive but are not leading
toward an appropriate goal. Depending on the stage and purpose of the research
activity, criteria for success (and thus for continued investment by the directorate)
may vary. Substantial investments in planning may be needed to establish
appropriate criteria and assess programs effectively.
The difficulty of establishing quantitative goals and metrics for R&D
effectiveness is a well known challenge for the evaluation of R&D programs.95 The
impact of longer-range research may not be evident for years after its completion.
Even if success can be measured, success rates may vary widely between comparably
93 Comments of Penrose Albright, Assistant Under Secretary for Science and Technology,
Department of Homeland Security, at the American Association for the Advancement of
Science meeting “Overview of the FY 2006 Research & Development Budget,” March 10,
2005.
94 Testimony of Gerald L. Epstein, Center for Strategic and International Studies, before the
House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation, March 8, 2007.
95 See, for example, General Accounting Office, Measuring Performance: Strengths and
Limitations of Research Indicators, GAO/RCED-97-91, March 1997, which states that “the
very nature of the innovative process makes measuring the performance of science-related
projects difficult. For example, a wide range of factors determine if and when a particular
R&D project will result in commercial or other benefits. It can also take many years for a
research project to achieve results.”
CRS-37
effective programs, depending on the character of the R&D undertaken. For
example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funds high-
risk, high-reward R&D. The likelihood of success for any individual DARPA
activity is low, but that is expected. The success of the program overall is judged by
the impact of the activities that are successful. In contrast, an R&D program engaged
mainly in incremental end-stage development, where there is lower risk of failure,
might be expected to have a higher individual success rate but less impact for each
individual result.
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA, P.L. 103-62)
attempted to address metrics and goals for federal agencies, creating greater
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in federal spending, and requiring
agencies to set goals and to use performance measures for management and,
ultimately, for budgeting.96 Although the outcome of GPRA has been a foundation
of performance-based planning for federal agencies, evaluation of strategic planning
continues to be a weakness.97
The Administration has also set a priority on performance measures as part of
the budgetary process, establishing the program assessment rating tool (PART) as
part of the performance assessment methodology used under the President’s
Management Agenda.98 Some of the S&T Directorate’s research portfolios have
undergone PART assessments, with a range of results.99 Some programs, such as the
biological countermeasures program, were assessed as effective, while others, such
as the chemical and explosive countermeasures program, were not. The PART
assessment process highlights the series of factors that complicates assessment of the
S&T Directorate programs. Existing programs transferred in whole or in part into
the S&T Directorate may have lacked an initial homeland security focus, blunting
their efficacy. New programs developed by the S&T Directorate with the necessary
homeland security focus lack a history of operation and management, challenging the
smooth and efficient implementation of the programs’ stated goals.
Measuring outcomes from programs with long time scales, where results are not
expected to be seen for several years, may pose a challenge to the PART technique.
As stated by the White House Office of Management and Budget, “the
Administration is aware that predicting and assessing the outcomes of basic research
in particular is never easy.”100 At a minimum though, the PART documentation for
S&T Directorate programs aims to provide clearer information about program goals
96 For more information, see CRS Report RL32671, Federal Program Performance Review:
Program Assessment and Results Act and Other Developments.
97 Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has
Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38, March 2004.
98 For more information on the President’s Management Agenda, see online at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/index.html].
99 Detailed results from PART assessments can be found online at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/].
100 Office of Management and Budget, The White House, “Guidance for Completing 2007
PARTs,” Program Assessment Rating Tool Guidance No. 2007-02, January 29, 2007.
CRS-38
and performance, R&D management, and effective practices. To the extent that this
is successful, this information helps to inform outside analysts of the directorate’s
plans.101
Some observers had hoped that the directorate’s strategic planning process
would identify quantitative metrics and goals. This was not the case, however. The
program work statements in the 2007 R&D plan mostly describe qualitative increase,
improvement, and development, rather than quantitative criteria.
Another, similar approach would be to use the Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee or an outside body, such as the National Academy
of Sciences, to independently validate the directorate’s strategic planning documents,
with goals and metrics for the short, medium, and long terms. Statute has mandated
comparable requirements in other S&T fields.102 While the S&T Directorate uses
committees of the National Academies for advice on an ad hoc basis, it has not
engaged the National Academies or any other organization to perform a rigorous,
end-to-end assessment of the directorate’s research activities.
Responsiveness to Stakeholders
Industry. The inability of industry and others to obtain information from the
S&T Directorate is a recurring criticism.103 Entrepreneurs with technologies
potentially applicable to homeland security problems have sometimes had difficulty
identifying appropriate contacts at the S&T Directorate. The directorate makes its
Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) available on a website104 and via an e-mail
mailing list, and it announces R&D solicitations targeted at small businesses on
another website.105 All funding opportunities are also listed on the government-wide
website FedBizOpps.106 The preferred mechanism for submission of unsolicited
proposals is through the Office of Procurement Operations.107 Such submissions are
sent to the Headquarters Office of Procurement Operations rather than directly to the
101 For a discussion on criticisms of PART, see CRS Report RL32663, The Bush
Administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), by Clinton T. Brass; and
Government Accountability Office, Performance Budgeting — PART Focuses Attention on
Program Performance, but More Can Be Done to Engage Congress, GAO-06-28, October,
2005.
102 See, for example, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2004 (P.L. 108-136), in
which Congress required the Department of Defense to develop a space science and
technology strategy that included goals and a process for achieving those goals.
103 See, for example, Spencer S. Hsu, “DHS Terror Research Agency Struggling,” The
Washington Post, August 20, 2006.
104 [http://www.hsarpabaa.com]
105 [https://www.sbir.dhs.gov/]
106 [http://fedbizopps.gov/]
107 For more information on how unsolicited proposals are received and handled by the
Office of Procurement Operations, see online at [http://www.dhs.gov/xopnbiz/opportunities/
editorial_0617.shtm].
CRS-39
S&T Directorate. The S&T Directorate itself maintains an email address for
submissions of concepts and ideas.108 In May 2007, the directorate held a stakeholder
conference for which Under Secretary Cohen described the message as “we are open
for business, and we know how to do business.”109 Announcements of subsequent
stakeholder conferences have listed goals such as
describ[ing] the business opportunities for private sector organizations and
universities, ... demonstrating business partnership opportunities in S&T
research, ... [and] explaining how to do business with the DHS S&T research
enterprise.110
In November 2007, the directorate released a “DHS S&T Long Range Broad
Agency Announcement.” This BAA was partly a response to concerns that
entrepreneurs and researchers might be unable to bring their ideas to the directorate
if there is no open request for proposals or BAA. The long-range BAA is open
through December 31, 2008, and provides a vehicle for submission of a broad range
of homeland security R&D ideas and proposals. It states, “Readers should note that
this is an announcement to declare S&T’s broad role in competitive funding of
meritorious research across a spectrum of science and engineering disciplines.”111
Under Secretary Cohen has also identified continued outreach efforts on the part
of the directorate and the components of the directorate as efforts to encourage
greater industry participation.112 The directorate has held or partnered with other
groups to hold conferences in the United States and the United Kingdom to engage
stakeholders and provide attendees with access and contact. Emphasizing the
importance of maintaining good contacts with industry and others, Under Secretary
Cohen testified, “As I have often said, no one knows where good ideas come from
and for that reason I have been personally proactive in both seeking out and receiving
technology briefs and opportunities from all sources. This is a culture I am working
to instill throughout the DHS S&T Directorate.”113
108 This e-mail address is S&T-Transition@dhs.gov. Personal communication with DHS
Legislative Affairs, January 16, 2008.
109 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, June 27, 2007.
110 Email announcement of “Putting First Responders First,” the 2008 Homeland Security
S&T Stakeholders Conference — West, held January 14-17, 2008.
111 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, “DHS S&T
Long Range Broad Agency Announcement,” BAA 08-01, November 8, 2007.
112 See, for example, Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen,
Department of Homeland Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, April 1,
2008.
113 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, April 1, 2008.
CRS-40
Congress. Difficulties in obtaining information have sometimes extended to
Congress as well. Congress has criticized the directorate, along with DHS as a
whole, for not providing it with information in a timely manner. For example, the
House committee report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007 bill stated that
the Committee is very disappointed by S&T’s poor response to Congressional
requests for information, including a failure to provide congressionally directed
reports. After three years, there has been no measurable improvement in this
area, which is unacceptable.114
Under Secretary Cohen responded to such congressional concerns. The month
after he was confirmed, he stated that
the S&T Directorate will execute appropriations as intended by Congress. We
will also be fiscally accountable to our DHS Customers, the Congress and the
American people.
The S&T Directorate CFO ... [will] help put in place the systems and protocols
to enable S&T Directorate to be fully responsive and transparent in the
development, presentation and execution of the budget.115
Expiring Authorities
Several statutory authorities related to the S&T Directorate will expire in the
coming months. Authority for the Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee will expire on December 31, 2008 (6 U.S.C. 191(j)). Authority
for the Homeland Security Institute will expire in April 2009, five years after its
establishment (6 U.S.C. 192(g)). The authority for DHS to enter into “other
transaction agreements” for R&D projects expires on September 30, 2008 (6 U.S.C.
391(a)). Policymakers have expressed interest in the S&T Directorate’s use of these
entities and authorities, including holding hearings specifically on such topics.116
Overview of Legislation in the 110th Congress
In contrast to other federal departments and agencies, the DHS lacks budget
authorization legislation. Several attempts have been made, in the 110th and previous
Congresses, but none have been passed into law. Instead, changes to particular
programs have been made in the annual appropriations bills and their accompanying
reports, in stand-alone bills devoted to specific topics, and in specific provisions
114 H.Rept. 109-476.
115 Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, September 7, 2006.
116 House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, Other Transaction Authority: Flexibility at the
Expense of Accountability? hearing held February 7, 2008.
CRS-41
within broader legislation. As a result, changes to the responsibilities, components,
and activities of the S&T Directorate occur outside of a holistic context, with the
focus of the change usually coinciding with the focus of the particular topic of the
stand-alone bill. Examples of such legislation are provided below.
DHS Authorization Act for FY2008
The Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
(H.R. 1684) contains provisions relating to several aspects of the S&T Directorate.
It would authorize and expand cybersecurity R&D activities; require submission of
a homeland security R&D strategic plan; and reform the University Centers of
Excellence program by extending its authorized funding, increasing the inclusion of
minority serving institutions, and commissioning a National Academies study of the
Centers. Additionally, the act aims to streamline the SAFETY Act procedures
currently in place at the S&T Directorate, increase international cooperation through
establishing an international cooperation office, and establish a fee-driven process by
which testing and evaluation facilities owned or operated by DHS could be used by
the private sector to test equipment to further secure the homeland. Finally, the act
increases federal, state, and local information sharing by making available to state
and local officials computer simulations of terror attacks to improve preparedness
and response.
FY2008 Appropriations Legislation
The S&T Directorate is funded, along with the rest of the Department of
Homeland Security, in the annual homeland security appropriations bill. For
FY2008, the House and Senate versions of this bill were H.R. 2638 and S. 1644; the
final appropriation was made by an omnibus bill (P.L. 110-161). (See Table 6 in
Appendix C.) For more information, see CRS Report RL34004, Homeland Security
Department: FY2008 Appropriations, and CRS Report RL34048, Federal Research
and Development Funding: FY2008.
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L.
110-53) directs DHS to establish a National Biosurveillance Integration Center;
authorizes R&D programs to improve the security of public transportation, railroads,
and over-the-road buses; and directs the Under Secretary for Science and Technology
to establish a Science and Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative
Programs Office.
Other Legislation
The 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-234) addressed permitting requirements for foot-
and-mouth disease research at a successor facility to PIADC, such as the proposed
National Bio- and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF). A free-standing bill, H.R. 1717,
would provide statutory authority for the NBAF. For more information, see CRS
Report RL34160, The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress.
CRS-42
The Homeland Security Technology Advancement Act (H.R. 4290) would
extend DHS’s R&D other transactions authority and allow others to use S&T
Directorate facilities, for an appropriate fee, for the testing of items designed to
advance the homeland security mission.
The National Bombing Prevention Act of 2007 (S. 2292) would direct the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology to establish a technology transfer program for
countermeasures to terrorist attacks using explosives within the United States. The
National Bombing Prevention Act of 2008 (H.R. 4749) contains similar provisions.
H.R. 3916 would extend by four years the authorization of the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee; mandate a National Research
Council study of basic research needs for border and maritime security; and direct the
Under Secretary for Science and Technology to establish new R&D programs in
tunnel detection and anti-counterfeit technologies.
H.R. 130 would direct the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to study
whether additional electromagnetic spectrum should be allocated for emergency use
by state and local first responders.
CRS-43
Appendix A. Responsibilities and Authorities of the
Under Secretary
The responsibilities and authorities of the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology were established by Sec. 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-296). References to radiological and nuclear threats were deleted from
paragraphs (2) and (5)(A) by Sec. 501 of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347). The full
text as amended (6 U.S.C. 182) is quoted here for reference:
Responsibilities and Authorities of the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology. The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, shall have the responsibility for —
(1) advising the Secretary regarding research and development efforts and
priorities in support of the Department’s missions;
(2) developing, in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a
national policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals, objectives and
policies for, and coordinating the Federal Government’s civilian efforts to
identify and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, and other
emerging terrorist threats, including the development of comprehensive,
research-based definable goals for such efforts and development of annual
measurable objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate the goals
for such efforts;
(3) supporting the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection, by assessing and testing homeland security vulnerabilities and
possible threats;
(4) conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing,
and evaluation activities that are relevant to any or all elements of the
Department, through both intramural and extramural programs, except that such
responsibility does not extend to human health-related research and development
activities;
(5) establishing priorities for, directing, funding, and conducting national
research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement of technology and
systems for —
(A) preventing the importation of chemical, biological, and related weapons
and material; and
(B) detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist
attacks;
(6) establishing a system for transferring homeland security developments or
technologies to Federal, State, local government, and private sector entities;
(7) entering into work agreements, joint sponsorships, contracts, or any other
agreements with the Department of Energy regarding the use of the national
laboratories or sites and support of the science and technology base at those
facilities;
CRS-44
(8) collaborating with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Attorney General as
provided in [7 U.S.C. 8401];
(9) collaborating with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
Attorney General in determining any new biological agents and toxins that shall
be listed as ‘select agents’ in Appendix A of [42 C.F.R. 72], pursuant to [42
U.S.C. 262a];
(10) supporting United States leadership in science and technology;
(11) establishing and administering the primary research and development
activities of the Department, including the long-term research and development
needs and capabilities for all elements of the Department;
(12) coordinating and integrating all research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation activities of the Department;
(13) coordinating with other appropriate executive agencies in developing and
carrying out the science and technology agenda of the Department to reduce
duplication and identify unmet needs; and
(14) developing and overseeing the administration of guidelines for merit review
of research and development projects throughout the Department, and for the
dissemination of research conducted or sponsored by the Department.
CRS-45
Appendix B. Previous Organizational Structure of
the S&T Directorate
The present organizational structure of the S&T Directorate was announced by
Under Secretary Cohen soon after his confirmation in August 2006. The
restructuring changed both the directorate’s functional organization and its operating
policies. An understanding of the previous structure may be helpful when
considering budgets and other documents from the period before the change.
Then, as now, the directorate had a matrix organization. Research areas known
as portfolios were established in the Office of Programs, Planning, and Budget (PPB,
subsequently the Office of Programs, Planning, and Requirements). The directorate’s
budgeting aligned with these portfolio topics. Actual management of R&D projects,
however, was the responsibility of three other offices, depending on the nature of the
work. Intramural R&D was managed by the Office of Research and Development
(ORD), extramural R&D by the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency (HSARPA), and systems engineering and prototype transition by the Office
of Systems Engineering and Development (SED). The heads of PPB, ORD,
HSARPA, and SED each reported directly to the Under Secretary. Only the
congressionally authorized HSARPA survives in the current structure, and its scope
is greatly reduced.
This matrix structure had some potential advantages. The manager of each
portfolio could allocate funds flexibly either within the government or outside it.
Portfolio managers could facilitate information flow in their research topic between
federal researchers and the private sector. Meanwhile, because ORD, HSARPA, and
SED each managed parts of multiple portfolios, they could identify and act upon
synergies between research areas.
On the other hand, the matrix structure created management challenges and
complicated reporting and oversight. The manager of any given R&D project
reported to the head of either ORD, HSARPA, or SED but was funded by a portfolio
manager in PPB. Conversely, the manager of a portfolio in PPB had only indirect
authority over the project managers who executed the R&D he or she was funding.
Management reporting chains and lines of budget responsibility met only in the office
of the Under Secretary. In addition to its inherent difficulties, this situation was
unfamiliar and confusing to outside observers, including many in Congress.
CRS-46
Appendix C. Funding History of the S&T Directorate
For reference, Table 5 and Table 6 present historical funding data for the S&T
Directorate from its inception in FY2003 through the request for FY2009. This
report does not attempt to track the appropriations process. For more detailed
information on FY2009 funding, see CRS Report RL34482, Homeland Security
Department: FY2009 Appropriations, and CRS Report RL34448, Federal Research
and Development Funding: FY2009.
Table 5 is in the directorate’s old portfolio structure, as explained in Appendix
B. Table 6 is in the present division structure, as explained in the body of this report.
Note that funding for FY2007 appears in both tables: FY2007 funds were
appropriated in the old structure, but DHS provided a crosswalk into the new
structure for comparison purposes (for FY2007 only).
Funding for DNDO is shown in Table 5 in order to allow historical
comparisons. Even though DNDO is not part of the S&T Directorate, it evolved
from the directorate’s radiological and nuclear countermeasures portfolio before
FY2006, and its funding was appropriated together with the directorate’s funding in
FY2006.
CRS-47
Table 5. S&T Directorate Budget Authority, FY2003-FY2007
(old portfolio structure, $ in millions)
FY2003 FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Enacted Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacteda
Biological Countermeasures
362.6
286.5
397.7
380.0
350.2
Chemical Countermeasures
Explosives Countermeasures
}
52.0
53.0
95.0
60.0
7.0b
9.5
19.7
44.0
86.6
Radiological and Nuclear
75.0
127.0
122.6
19.1
—
Countermeasures
Domestic Nuclear Detection
—
—
—
318.0
481.0
Officec
Threat and Vulnerability,
36.1
93.5
65.8
43.0
35.0
Testing and Assessmentsd
Standards
20.0
39.0
39.7
35.0
22.1
University and Fellowship
3.0
70.0
70.0
63.0
50.0
Programs
Emerging Threats
16.8
21.0
10.8
8.0
}19.5e
Rapid Prototyping
33.0
75.0
76.0
35.0
Support to the Components /
—
34.0
54.7
80.0
85.6
Conventional Missions
Counter MANPADS
—
60.0
61.0
110.0
40.0
Critical Infrastructure
—
6.0
27.0
40.8
35.4
Protection
SAFETY Act
—
—
10.0
7.0
4.7
Office of Interoperability and
—
—
21.0
26.5
27.0
Compatibility
Cyber Security
—
—
18.0
16.7
20.0
R&D Consolidation
—
—
—
99.9
—
Pacific Northwest National
—
—
—
—
2.0
Laboratory
Management and
—
44.7
68.6
81.1
135.0
Administration
Subtotal (including DNDO)
553.5
918.2
1,115.5
1,502.1
1,454.1
Subtotal (excluding DNDO)
553.5
918.2
1,115.5
1,184.1
973.1
Prior-Year Rescission
—
—
—
(20.0)
(126.2)
Supplemental (S&T)
—
—
—
—
5.0
Supplemental (DNDO)
—
—
—
—
135.0
Total (including DNDO)
553.5
918.2
1,115.5
1,482.1
1,467.9
Total (excluding DNDO)
553.5
918.2
1,115.5
1,164.1
986.9
Source: FY2005 congressional budget justification, H.Rept. 108-280, H.Rept. 108-774, H.Rept.
109-241, H.Rept. 109-699, and P.L. 110-28.
a. Figures for FY2007 are not adjusted for transfers. See note to Table 6.
b. In FY2003, Chemical Countermeasures and Explosives Countermeasures were treated as a single
Chemical and Explosives Countermeasures portfolio.
c. DNDO is not part of the S&T Directorate but was funded through S&T in FY2006. Its funds were
appropriated in a separate account starting in FY2007.
d. This portfolio was renamed Threat Awareness starting in FY2006.
e. In FY2007, the Emerging Threats and Rapid Prototyping portfolios were treated as a single
Emergent and Prototypical Technologies portfolio.
CRS-48
Table 6. S&T Directorate Budget Authority, FY2007-FY2009
(new division structure, $ in millions)
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
Enacteda
Enacted
Request
Chemical and Biological
229.5
208.0
200.4
Explosives
105.2
77.7
96.1
Infrastructure and Geophysical
74.8
64.5
37.8
Command, Control, and Interoperability
57.6
57.0
62.4
Borders and Maritime Security
33.4
25.5
35.3
Human Factors
6.8
14.2
12.5
Laboratory Facilities
105.6
103.8
146.9
University Programs
48.8
49.3
43.8
Innovation
38.0
33.0
45.0
Transition
24.0
25.3
31.8
Test and Evaluation and Standards
25.4
28.5
24.7
Homeland Security Institute
—
5.0
—
Management and Administration
134.0
138.6
132.1
Subtotal
883.0
830.3
868.8
Rescission of Prior-Year Funds
(126.2)
(0.2)
—
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
5.0
—
—
Total
761.8
830.1
868.8
Source: H.Rept. 110-181; P.L. 110-161 and accompanying explanatory statement in the
Congressional Record, December 17, 2007; and FY2009 DHS congressional budget justification
[http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/budget/]. Totals may not add due to rounding.
a. Enacted FY2007 amounts are adjusted for the following transfers that were announced in the
budget request for FY2008: $84.1 million from Chemical and Biological to the Office of Health
Affairs; $5 million from Command, Control, and Interoperability to the Directorate of National
Preparedness and Protection; and $1 million from Management and Administration to the Office
of Health Affairs.
CRS-49
Appendix D. Activities of the S&T Directorate
A description of the directorate’s activities follows. The six divisions are
discussed first, followed by the various offices, and finally activities funded by the
directorate’s management and administration account. This aligns with the
categories now used in the directorate’s congressional budget justifications and in the
committee and conference reports on the annual homeland security appropriations
bill.117 (In the appropriations bill itself, all the activities except for management and
administration are combined into a single account for research, development,
acquisition, and operations.)
Chemical and Biological. The Chemical and Biological Division (FY2008
funding: $208.0 million) is the largest of the six research divisions. It works to
increase preparedness against agricultural, biological, and chemical threats through
improved threat awareness, advanced surveillance and detection, and protective
countermeasures. The agriculture component develops veterinary vaccines and other
animal disease countermeasures and models the spread of animal diseases. The
biological countermeasures component includes programs in systems studies and
decision support tools, threat awareness, surveillance and detection R&D,
surveillance and detection operations, forensics, and response and restoration, but not
R&D related to human medical countermeasures, which are the responsibility of the
Department of Health and Human Services. The chemical countermeasures
component includes chemical threat analysis, development of forensic tools, R&D
on chemical detection technologies, and development of technologies for response
and recovery.
Explosives. The Explosives Division (FY2008 funding: $77.7 million)
develops technologies to detect, interdict, and lessen the impacts of nonnuclear
explosives used in terrorist attacks against mass transit, civil aviation, and critical
infrastructure. The bulk of its effort is devoted to explosives detection, largely
through R&D programs that were transferred from the Transportation Security
Administration in FY2006. It also includes R&D on protecting commercial aircraft
against shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles (known as MANPADS, for MAN-
Portable Air Defense Systems).
Infrastructure and Geophysical. The Infrastructure and Geophysical
Division (FY2008 funding: $64.5 million) carries out activities in two main areas:
critical infrastructure protection and preparedness and response. The infrastructure
protection component includes technology development for specific infrastructure
sectors and geographical regions, modeling and simulation for decision support, and
preparation of the National Plan for Research and Development in Support of
Critical Infrastructure Protection. The preparedness and response component
develops technologies such as protective equipment for first responders and
information-management, decision-making, and training tools for incident
commanders.
117 The Homeland Security Institute, which was a separate funding category for the first time
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), is not discussed in this
appendix. See the main text in the section “Laboratories and Other Assets.”
CRS-50
Command, Control, and Interoperability. The Command, Control, and
Interoperability Division (FY2008 funding: $57.0 million) is focused on
communications for emergency responders, the security and integrity of the Internet,
and other information-related topics. Its conducts R&D on the interoperability and
compatibility of communications equipment; cyber security; knowledge management
tools; reconnaissance, surveillance, and investigative technologies; and threat
assessment.
Borders and Maritime Security. The Borders and Maritime Security
Division (FY2008 funding: $25.5 million) researches, develops, and transitions
technologies to improve the security of U.S. borders and waterways. It has two focus
areas, border protection and cargo security. The border protection component
(known as Border Watch) develops tools for border security law enforcement officers
and technologies for detection, identification, apprehension, and enforcement at land
and maritime borders. The cargo security component develops sensor and
communications technologies to improve the integrity of cargo container shipments.
Human Factors. The Human Factors Division (FY2008 funding: $14.2
million) focuses primarily on the social and behavioral sciences. Its R&D activities
include developing biometric technologies for identifying known terrorists and
criminals; understanding user acceptance and application of new technologies;
improving the integration of human operators and technology for transportation
security screening; understanding terrorist motivation, intent, and behavior; making
risk communications more effective; and better identifying public needs during
emergencies.
Research (Laboratory Facilities and University Programs). The
Office of Research includes the directorate’s Laboratory Facilities (FY2008 funding:
$103.8 million) and University Programs (FY2008 funding: $49.3 million). Its
director also liaises with the six research divisions as discussed above. Laboratory
Facilities funds operation and construction of the S&T Directorate’s own
laboratories. The activities of the Laboratory Facilities program are executed by the
Office of National Laboratories, one of a handful of organizational components of
the S&T Directorate that were established by statute.118 University Programs
manages the directorate’s university centers and a program of scholarships and
fellowships.
Innovation (HSARPA and SBIR). The Office of Innovation (FY2008
funding: $33.0 million) includes the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency (HSARPA), another component that was established by statute.119 HSARPA
has two main programs. The Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions program
is designed to demonstrate prototypes of high-payoff technologies in two to five years
with moderate to high risk. The High Impact Technology Solutions program is
designed to conduct high-risk basic research that provides proofs of concept for
potential breakthroughs. HSARPA also manages the S&T Directorate’s program of
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), which is funded through a mandated
118 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), Sec. 309(g).
119 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Sec. 307(b).
CRS-51
set-aside from each of the directorate’s R&D programs. The director of the Office
of Innovation also liaises with the six research divisions as discussed above.
Transition (SAFETY Act and Technology Clearinghouse). The Office
of Transition (FY2008 funding: $25.3 million) oversees interactions with DHS
components outside the S&T Directorate to expedite technology transition. It also
manages the Office of SAFETY Act Implementation, which evaluates and qualifies
technologies for liability protection in accordance with the SAFETY Act,120 and the
statutorily mandated Technology Clearinghouse.121 Its director also liaises with the
six research divisions as discussed above.
Test and Evaluation and Standards. The Office of Test and Evaluation
and Standards (FY2008 funding: $28.5 million) provides technical support and
coordination to help emergency responders assess the safety, reliability, and
effectiveness of equipment and procedures. It also aids in establishing test and
evaluation methodology for the directorate and acts as the test and evaluation
executive for the Department as a whole.
Special Programs. The Department of Homeland Security has original
classification authority and funds some R&D projects that are classified (although
Sec. 306(a) of the Homeland Security Act directs that “to the greatest extent
practicable, research conducted or supported by the department shall be
unclassified”). The Office of Special Programs oversees the directorate’s classified
projects. Its FY2008 funding, drawn from the other programs listed above, is $5.8
million.
Agency and International Liaison. The Office of Agency and International
Liaison oversees the directorate’s international outreach activities and interagency
coordination responsibilities. Its FY2008 funding, drawn from the other programs
listed above, is $4.0 million.
Management and Administration. Other activities of the directorate,
including the Office of the Under Secretary, are funded by a separate appropriation
for management and administration (FY2008 funding: $138.6 million). This account
also pays the salaries and expenses of all the directorate’s federal employees.
120 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title VIII, Subtitle G.
121 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Sec. 313.