Order Code RL31339
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Updated June 4, 2008
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but during
2004-2007 much of Iraq was wracked by violence caused by Sunni Arab
resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence,
competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq’s government to equitably
administer justice or deliver services. At the same time, mounting U.S. casualties
and financial costs — without clear movement toward national political
reconciliation among Iraq’s major communities — stimulated debate within the
United States over whether the initial goals of the intervention — a stable,
democratic Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terrorism — could ever be
achieved, and, if so, at what cost.
The Administration is claiming success in reversing the deterioration in security
that had become acute by the end of 2006, attributing the gains to a “troop surge”
strategy announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 (“New Way Forward”).
The centerpiece of the strategy was the deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S.
forces to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support for
U.S. policy in Anbar Province. U.S. overall commander in Iraq General David
Petraeus, said in testimony during April 8-9, 2008, that overall violence is down at
least 60% since June 2007, to levels of spring 2005, but that the security situation in
“certain areas” is “still unsatisfactory,” and that progress is “fragile and reversible.”
This fragility was demonstrated in March-April 2008 by an outbreak of intense and
widespread fighting between Shiite-dominated government forces and Shiite militias,
although violence fell in May 2008 to the lowest levels since early 2004. The
Administration argues that Iraqi legislative action in Iraq since the beginning of 2008
represents a substantial measure of the progress on political reconciliation that was
envisioned by the surge, but critics differ with the degree of such political progress
and say that security gains are tenuous. A delay in provincial council elections,
planned for October 1, 2008, is now virtually certain. Going forward, the
Administration believes that the current strategy — “conditions-based” gradual
reductions in U.S. forces and continued building of Iraq’s security forces — is likely
to produce a central government able to defend itself.
Some in Congress believe that the progress is modest and unsustainable without
high levels of U.S. forces, and that winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq
would compel Iraqi leaders to reach needed political compromises. Partly because
there is a perception that the troop surge is succeeding, there has not been the
required level of support in Congress to mandate a troop withdrawal, a timetable for
withdrawal, or a significant change in U.S. strategy, although there appears to be
growing support for compelling Iraq to fund key functions now funded by the United
States.
This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq:
Reconciliation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq:
Reconstruction Assistance
, by Curt Tarnoff; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq:
Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy
, coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.

Contents
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Clinton Administration, the Iraq Liberation Act, and Major
Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Post-September 11, 2001: Regime Change and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Post-Saddam Transition and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Early Transition Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . 10
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Sovereignty Handover/Interim (Allawi) Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.N. Involvement/Coalition Military Mandate/Status of U.S.
Forces/Permanent Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.N. Involvement in Governance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Elections in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Maliki Government, Political Reconciliation, and “Benchmarks” . . . . . . . 17
Iraqi Pledges and Status of Accomplishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Regional and International Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Iraq
Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Human Rights and Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Additional Funding Beyond the IRRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Oil Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Debt Relief/WTO Membership/IMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Security Challenges and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Sunni “Awakening” in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
“Concerned Local Citizen” (CLC/”Sons of Iraq” Fighters) . . . . . . . . . 30
Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Shiite-on-Shiite Violence/March 2008 Basra Battles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Iranian Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Iraq’s Northern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
U.S. Stabilization Strategy and “Troop Surge” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
“Clear, Hold, and Build” Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams . 39
“Troop Surge”/Baghdad Security Plan/“Fardh Qanoon” . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Surge Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
ISF Weaponry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Iraq Study Group Report, Legislative Proposals, and Other Options . . . . . . . . . 49
Iraq Study Group Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Further Options: Altering Troop Levels or Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Further Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Immediate and Complete Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Troop Mission Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Planning for Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Requiring More Time Between Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Stepped Up International and Regional Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Political Reconciliation, Reorganization, and “Federalism” . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Reorganize the Existing Power Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Support the Dominant Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
“Federalism”/Decentralization/Break-Up Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Economic Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
List of Tables
Table 1. Iraq Basic Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. Selected Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 3. Key Security/Violence Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table 4. ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 7. Major Factions in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Table 8. Iraq’s Government
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Table 9. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Saddam-Era Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958). The territory that
is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British
forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in
1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but
were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni
Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance,
facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941,
during World War II. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of
Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence
of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was
killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his young son, Faysal II.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-
Sa’id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of
Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a
Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria,
although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during
Saddam’s rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian
philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was
to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Prime Minister (and
military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif was
killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd al-
Rahim al-Arif. Following the Baath seizure of power in 1968, Bakr returned to
government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the regime’s
number two — Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In that
position, Saddam developed overlapping security services to monitor loyalty among
the population and within Iraq’s institutions, including the military. On July 17,
1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President
of Iraq. Under Saddam, secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis mostly
from Saddam’s home town of Tikrit, dominated the highest positions. Saddam’s
regime repressed Iraq’s Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in
neighboring Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements,
emboldened by Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.

CRS-2
Table 1. Iraq Basic Facts
Population
27.5 million
Demographics
Shiite Arab - 60%; Kurd - 19% Sunni Arab - 14%; Christian and
others - 6; Sunni Turkomen - 1%. Christians are: 600,000 - 1
million total (incl. Chaldean, Assyrian, Syriac, Armenian, and
Protestant). Others are: Yazidis (600,000); Shabak (200,000);
Sabean-Mandaean (6,000).
Comparative Area
Slightly more than twice the size of Idaho
GDP
$100 billion (purchasing power parity, 2007)
GDP per capita
$3,600 per year (2007)
GDP Growth Rate
6.3% in 2007; anticipated 7% in 2008
2 0 0 8 I r a q i
First formulated in October 2007 and passed by Iraqi parliament
Government Budget
Feb. 13, 2008, based on anticipated total $38 billion revenue,
including $31 billion from oil and $6.7 billion from other sources.
Included: $42 billion total expenses, including $13.2 billion for
capital investment; $8.2 billion for Iraqi Security Forces costs
($11 billion planned for 2009); $2.5 billion in direct grants to the
Arab provinces; $800 million to the Kurdish provinces. (In 2007,
Iraq’s ministries spent 50% of their capital budget and the
provincial governments spent 30% of theirs.)
Since budget passage, oil revenue alone now likely to exceed $70
billion at current production and price levels. Iraq has
committed: $5 billion more in capital investment; $300 million in
“Iraqi CERP” for use by U.S. military in small reconstruction
projects; $163 million for “Sons of Iraq” (see report text); $510
million for small business loans; $196 million for joint training
and reintegration programs for former insurgents; and $350
million for reconstruction in battle zones including Mosul, Basra,
and Sadr City and Shula districts in Baghdad.
Reserves of Foreign
$20 - 30 billion in “Development Fund for Iraq,” (most of which
Currency and Gold
held in N.Y. Federal Reserve). About $5.5 billion to be used to
buy 40 new Boeing civilian passenger aircraft.
U n e m p l o y m e n t
17.6% official rate, according to Central Statistics Office of Iraq;
Rate
could be as high as 50% in some areas.
Inflation Rate
12.2 core rate in 2007; 32% in 2006
U.S. Oil Imports
About 700,000 barrels per day
(other Iraqi oil - related capabilities appear in a table later in this
paper)
Food Ration System
Rations cut by 50% in December 2007 because $7.2 billion in
Iraqi funds not approved by Iraqi government. Ration system
utilized by 60% of the population.
Sources: CIA The World Factbook; State Department International Religions Freedom
Report, September 2007; DOD Measuring Stability Report, March 2008.

CRS-3
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to try to do so
militarily because (1) the United Nations had approved only liberating Kuwait; (2)
Arab states in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad; and (3) the
Administration feared becoming bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.1
Within days of the war’s end (February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq
and Kurds in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S.
support, rebelled. The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni
Muslim Republican Guard forces were pulled back into Iraq before engaging U.S.
forces and were intact to suppress the rebellion. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the
United States for not intervening on their behalf. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a
U.S.-led “no fly zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of
northern Iraq and remained autonomous thereafter.
The thrust of subsequent U.S. policy was containment through U.N. Security
Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international economic embargo, and
U.S.-led enforcement of no fly zones over both northern and southern Iraq.2
President George H.W. Bush reportedly supported efforts to promote a military coup
as a way of producing a favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After a
reported July 1992 coup failed, he shifted to supporting (with funds) the Kurdish,
Shiite, and other oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3
The Clinton Administration, the Iraq Liberation Act, and Major
Anti-Saddam Factions

During the Clinton Administration, the United States built ties to and
progressively increased support for several Shiite and Kurdish factions, all of which
have provided leaders in post-Saddam politics but also field militias locked in
sectarian violence against Iraq’s Sunnis who supported Saddam’s regime. (See
Table 7 on Iraq’s various factions.) During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N.
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls
to overthrow Saddam, starting with a FY1998 appropriation (P.L. 105-174). The
sentiment was expressed in the “Iraq Liberation Act” (ILA, P.L. 105-338, October
31, 1998). Signed by President Clinton despite doubts about opposition capabilities,
it was viewed as an expression of congressional support for the concept of promoting
an Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air power. That law, which states that it should be the
policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove the regime headed by
1 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
2 Discussed further in CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs,
Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous levels of $15 million - $20 million. Sciolino,
Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June 2, 1992.

CRS-4
Saddam Hussein, is sometimes cited as indicator of a bipartisan consensus that
Saddam should be toppled. It gave the President authority to provide up to $97
million worth of defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting
funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration. In mid-November
1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime change was a component of
U.S. policy toward Iraq. Section 8 of the ILA stated that the act should not be
construed as authorizing the use of U.S. military force to achieve regime change. The
ILA did not specifically terminate after Saddam Hussein was removed from power;
Section 7 provided for post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi groups with
“democratic goals.”
The signing of the ILA coincided with new Iraqi obstructions of U.N. weapons
inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn, and a three-
day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities
followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5, 1999,
President Clinton designated seven groups eligible to receive U.S. military assistance
under the ILA (P.D. 99-13): the Iraqi National Congress (INC); Iraq National Accord
(INA); the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);4 and the Movement for Constitutional
Monarchy (MCM). In May 1999, the Clinton Administration provided $5 million
worth of training and “non-lethal” equipment under the ILA to about 150
oppositionists in Defense Department-run training (Hurlburt Air Base) on
administering a post-Saddam Iraq. The Administration judged the opposition
insufficiently capable to merit combat training or weapons; the trainees did not
deploy in Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq.
The following is discussion of the major groups working against Saddam Hussein’s
regime, either with the United States or separately.
! Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq
National Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties
and several Shiite Islamist groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National
Congress (INC)” on a platform of human rights, democracy,
pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy). However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of
its groups had authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive
Committee selected Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim, to run
the INC on a daily basis. (A table on U.S. appropriations for the Iraqi
opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).5
4 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally de-listed.
5 Chalabi’s father was president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the
1958 military coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American
University of Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran
afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly with
some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989. In April 1992, he was convicted
in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
(continued...)

CRS-5
! The Iraq National Accord (INA), founded after Iraq’s 1990
invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but
reportedly later earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).6 It is led by Dr. Iyad al-Allawi. The INA enjoyed
Clinton Administration support in 1996 after squabbling among INC
groups reduced the INC’s perceived viability,7 but Iraq’s intelligence
services arrested or executed over 100 INA activists in June 1996.
In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into
northern Iraq, at the invitation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP), to help it capture Irbil from the rival Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). In the process, Baghdad routed both INC and
INA agents from the north.
! The Kurds,8 who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. Historically fearful
of persecution by the Arab majority, the Kurds, to the chagrin of
Turkey, are focused on expanding the high degree of autonomy they
enjoy in their three-province “region,” which is run by a Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG). Both major Kurdish factions — the
PUK led by Jalal Talabani, and the KDP led by Masud Barzani —
are participating in Iraqi politics, but the PUK more so. Together,
the KDP and PUK may have as many as 75,000 peshmerga (militia
fighters), most of which are providing security in the Kurdish-
controlled provinces of Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil Provinces.
Kurdish parties pay the peshmerga with party funds, but Kurdish
leaders have sought, unsuccessfully to date, to have them paid from
the national budget. Some are in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
deployed mostly in northern cities. Peshmerga have sometimes
fought each other; in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK clashed with
each other over territory, customs revenues, and control over the
Kurdish regional government in Irbil. Peshmerga have been largely
uninvolved in Sunni-Shiite Arab sectarian violence.
! Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, ISCI, Da’wa, and Sadr
Factions. Shiite Islamist organizations have become dominant in
post-Saddam politics; Shiites constitute about 60% of the population
but were under-represented and suffered significant repression under
Saddam’s regime. Several of these factions cooperated with the
5 (...continued)
The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors a total of $400 million.
6 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New York
Times
, June 9, 2004.
7 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
8 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman.

CRS-6
Saddam-era U.S. regime change efforts, but others did not. The
undisputed Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is
the “marja-e-taqlid” (source of emulation) and the most senior of
the four Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah
(a grouping of Shiite seminaries).9 He was in Iraq during Saddam’s
rule but adopted a low profile and had no known contact with the
United States. His mentor, was Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-
Khoi, was head of the Hawza until his death in 1992. Like Khoi,
Sistani is a “quietist” — generally opposing a direct political role
for clerics – but he has weighed in on major political issues. 10
! Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Da’wa Party.
These two groups are constrained mainstream Shiite Islamist groups
and pro-Iranian. During the exile of the late founder of the Iranian
Islamic revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s in Najaf, Iraq
(1964-1978), he was hosted by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim,
then head of the Hawza, and the father of the Hakim brothers
(including current leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim). The Hakim
brothers were members of the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party when
they were driven into exile by Saddam’s crackdown in 1980, who
accused Shiite Islamists of trying to overthrow him, a crackdown
that coincided with the start of the war with Iran in September 1980.
Under Iranian patronage, the Hakims broke with Da’wa and founded
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in
1982. Although it was a member of the INC in the early 1990s, ISCI
refused to accept U.S. funds, although it had contacts with U.S.
officials. The group changed its name to ISCI in May 2007. It is
considered the best organized party within the “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA) of Shiite political groupings and has been the most
pro-Iranian. It fields the “Badr Brigade” militia. ISCI says it does
not seek an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but ISCI has received
substantial financial and other aid from Iran.
! The Da’wa Party, which did not directly join the U.S.-led effort to
overthrow Saddam Hussein during the 1990s and which does not
have an organized militia arm, is an ally and sometime rival of ISCI.
The leader of its main faction in Iraq was Ibrahim al-Jafari, a Da’wa
activist since 1966 who fled to Iran in 1980 to escape Saddam’s
crackdown, later going to London. He was transitional Prime
Minister during April 2005-April 2006. His successor as Prime
Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, was named Da’wa leader in July 2007.
9 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
10 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].

CRS-7
! The faction of an “insurgent” Shiite Islamist leader, Moqtada Al
Sadr, is emerging as a major factor in Iraqi politics. This faction
was underground in Iraq during Saddam’s rule, led by Moqtada’s
father, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al Sadr, who was killed by the
regime in 1999. See text box later in this paper for more
information on him and his faction.
Post-September 11, 2001:
Regime Change and War
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been advocates of a
regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy led the Bush
Administration initially to continue its predecessor’s containment policy.11 Some
believe the September 11 attacks provided Administration officials justification to
act on longstanding plans to confront Iraq militarily. During its first year, the
Administration tried to prevent an asserted erosion of containment of Iraq by
achieving U.N. Security Council adoption (Resolution 1409, May 14, 2002) of a
“smart sanctions” plan. The plan relaxed U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to
Iraq of purely civilian equipment12 in exchange for renewed international
commitment to enforce the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq of militarily useful goods.
Bush Administration policy on Iraq clearly became an active regime change
effort after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In President Bush’s State of the
Union message on January 29, 2002, given as major combat in the U.S.-led war on
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq
as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea). Some U.S. officials,
particularly then-deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States
needed to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending states,” such as Iraq,
that support terrorist groups. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in
March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of
confronting Iraq militarily, although the Arab leaders opposed war with Iraq and
urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Some accounts, including the books Plan of Attack and State of Denial by Bob
Woodward (published in April 2004 and September 2006, respectively), say that then
Secretary of State Powell and others were concerned about the potential
consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a
democracy after major hostilities ended. Press reports in May 2007 indicated that
warnings of such difficulties were issued by the CIA before the invasion. Other
accounts include reported memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”) by British
intelligence officials (based on conversations with U.S. officials) saying that by mid-
2002 the Administration was seeking information to justify a decision, already made,
11 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.
12 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations
, by Christopher Blanchard and Kenneth Katzman.

CRS-8
to go to war against Iraq. President Bush and then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair
deny this. (On December 20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-
12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to
the United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate.
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials, including President
Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted
the following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to rebuild
its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N. weapons
inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N. previous
resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of Iraq’s
WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons against its
own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying
that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against
the United States; and (3) that Iraq could transfer its WMD to
terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in potentially catastrophic
attacks in the United States. Critics noted that, under the U.S. threat
of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the 1991
Gulf war. A “comprehensive” September 2004 report of the Iraq
Survey Group, known as the “Duelfer report,”13 found no WMD
stockpiles or production but said that there was evidence that the
regime retained the intention to reconstitute WMD programs in the
future. The formal U.S.-led WMD search ended December 2004,14
although U.S. forces have found some chemical weapons left from
the Iran-Iraq war.15 UNMOVIC’s work was formally terminated by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1762 (June 29, 2007).
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime was directly involved in the September 11 attacks,
senior U.S. officials asserted that Saddam’s regime was linked to Al
Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al Qaeda militant
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq. Although this issue
is still debated, the report of the 9/11 Commission found no
evidence of a “collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq and
13 Duelfer report text is at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
14 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
15 Pincus, Walter. “Munitions Found in Iraq Renew Debate.” Washington Post, July 1, 2006.

CRS-9
Al Qaeda.16 A reported March 2008 study by the Institute for
Defense Analyses for the Joint Forces Command, based on 600,000
documents captured in post-Saddam Iraq, purportedly found no
direct ties between Al Qaeda and Saddam’s regime. (See CRS
Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
As major combat in Afghanistan wound down in mid-2002, the Administration
began ordering a force to Kuwait (the only state that agreed to host the major
invasion force) that, by early 2003, gave the President an option to invade Iraq. In
concert, the Administration tried to build up and broaden the Iraqi opposition and,
according to the Washington Post (June 16, 2002), authorizing stepped up covert
activities by the CIA and special operations forces against Saddam Hussein. In
August 2002, the State and Defense Departments jointly invited six major
opposition groups to Washington, D.C., and the Administration expanded ties to
other groups composed primarily of ex-military officers. The Administration also
began training about 5,000 oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,17 although reportedly
only about 70 completed training at Taszar air base in Hungary, eventually serving
as translators during the war. The Administration blocked a move by the major
factions to declare a provisional government before entering Iraq, believing that
doing so would prevent the emergence of secular, pro-democracy groups.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush addressed
the United Nations General Assembly (September 12, 2002), saying that the U.N.
Security Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq.
The Administration then gave Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with all applicable
Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection. Iraq reluctantly
accepted it and WMD inspections resumed November 27, 2002. In January and
February 2003, UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-Baradei briefed the Security Council on the
inspections, saying that Iraq failed to actively cooperate to satisfy outstanding
questions, but that it had not denied access to sites and might not have any WMD.
During this period, the 107th Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion.
It adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force to “defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and
“to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq.” It passed the
House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and the Senate the following day (77-23). It was
signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
16 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.
17 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,” Washington
Post
, October 19, 2002.

CRS-10
No U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing force was adopted. Countries
opposed to war, including France, Russia, China, and Germany, said the latest WMD
inspections showed that Iraq could be disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely.
On March 16, 2003, a summit meeting of Britain, Spain, Bulgaria, and the United
States, held in the Azores, rejected that view and said all diplomatic options had
failed. The following day, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday
and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war. They refused
and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British-led 30-country18 “coalition of the
willing” force, a substantial proportion of which were in supporting roles. Of the
invasion force, Britain contributed 45,000, and U.S. troops constituted the bulk of the
remaining 335,000 forces. Some Iraqi units and irregulars (“Saddam’s Fedayeen”)
put up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics. Some evaluations (for
example, “Cobra Two,” by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, published in 2006)
suggest the U.S. military should have focused more on combating the irregulars
rather than bypassing them to take on armored forces. No WMD was used by Iraq,
although it did fire some ballistic missiles into Kuwait; it is not clear whether those
missiles were of U.N.-prohibited ranges (greater than 150 km). The regime vacated
Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein appeared with supporters that
day in Baghdad’s mostly Sunni Adhamiya district, near the major Sunni Umm al-
Qura mosque. (Saddam was captured in December 2003, and on November 5, 2006,
was convicted for “willful killing” of Shiite civilians in Dujail in 1982. He was
hanged on December 30, 2006.)
Post-Saddam Transition and Governance
According to statements by President Bush, U.S. goals are for an Iraq that can
sustain, govern, and defend itself and is a partner in the global war on terrorism.
Administration officials have, for the most part, dropped an earlier stated goal that
Iraq serve as a model of democratic reform in the Middle East.
Early Transition Process
The formal political transition has advanced since the fall of Saddam Hussein,
but has not achieved political reconciliation among the newly dominant Shiite Arabs,
Sunni Arabs that have been displaced from their former perch at the apex of Iraqi
politics, and the Kurds who have felt perennially oppressed by Iraq’s Arabs.
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the
fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly based
on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce
democracy. The Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct
18 Many of the thirty countries listed in the coalition did not contribute forces to the combat.
A subsequent State Department list released on March 27, 2003 listed 49 countries in the
coalition of the willing. See Washington Post, March 27, 2003, p. A19.

CRS-11
reconstruction with a staff of U.S. government personnel to administer Iraq’s
ministries; they deployed in April 2003. He headed the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), under the Department of Defense (DOD), created
by a January 20, 2003, Executive Order. The Administration largely discarded the
State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent the year before the war
planning for the administration of Iraq after the fall of Saddam.19 Garner and aides
tried to establish a representative successor regime by organizing a meeting in
Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying views and ethnicities. A
subsequent meeting of over 250 notables, held in Baghdad April 26, 2003, ended in
agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to name an interim
administration.
In May 2003, the Administration, reportedly preferring what they perceived as
stronger leadership in Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace Garner by
heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA). Bremer discontinued Garner’s
transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body: the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). In September 2003,
the IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet” to run the ministries, with roughly the same
factional and ethnic balance of the IGC (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims).
Although there were some Sunni figures in the CPA-led administration, many Sunnis
resented the new power structure as overturning their prior dominance. Adding to
that resentment were some of the CPA’s controversial decisions, including “de-
Baathification” — a purge from government of about 30,000 Iraqis at four top ranks
of the Baath Party (CPA Order 1) and not to recall members of the armed forces to
service (CPA Order 2). Bremer and others maintain that recalling the former regime
armed forces would have caused mistrust among Shiites and Kurds about the
prospects for democracy in post-Saddam Iraq.
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The Bush Administration
initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent on the completion of a new
constitution and the holding of national elections for a new government, tasks
expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah Sistani and others
agitated for early Iraqi sovereignty. In November 2003, the United States announced
it would return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004, and that national elections
would be held by the end of 2005. That decision was incorporated into an interim
constitution — the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), drafted by the major
factions and signed on March 8, 2004.20 The TAL provided a roadmap for political
transition, including (1) elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional
National Assembly; (2) drafting of a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, and
put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005; and (3) national elections for a
permanent government, under the new constitution (if it passed), by December 15,
2005. Any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds majority. In
19 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/]. The project cost
$5 million and had 15 working groups on major issues.
20 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website at [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].

CRS-12
that case, a new draft would be written and voted on by October 15, 2006. The Kurds
maintained their autonomous KRG and their peshmerga militia.
Sovereignty Handover/Interim (Allawi) Government. The TAL did
not directly address how a sovereign government would be formed. Sistani’s
opposition scuttled a U.S. plan to select a national assembly through nationwide
“caucuses.” After considering other options, the United States tapped U.N. envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi to select a government,21 which he did and which began work on
June 1, 2004. The formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004. Dominated
by the major factions, this government had a president (Sunni leader Ghazi al-
Yawar), and Prime Minister (Iyad al-Allawi, see above) with executive power,
heading a cabinet of 26 ministers. Six ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix
was roughly the same as in the IGC. The defense and interior ministers were Sunnis.
As of the handover, the state of occupation ceased, and a U.S. Ambassador
(John Negroponte) established U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first time since
January 1991. A U.S. embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with
about 1,100 U.S. personnel.22 The Ambassador is Ryan Crocker, who took over from
Zalmay Khalilzad (July 2005 - April 2007). In April 2008, the State Department
formally took possession from the construction firm, First Kuwaiti General Trading
and Construction Co., of the new embassy complex, with 21 buildings on 104
acres.23 In conjunction with the handover:
! Reconstruction management and advising of Iraq’s ministries were
taken over by a State Department component called the “Iraq
Reconstruction and Management Office” (IRMO). With the
expiration of that unit’s authority in April 2007, it was renamed the
“Iraq Transition Assistance Office,” ITAO, headed since June 2007
by Mark Tokola. ITAO’s current focus is promoting efficiency in
Iraq’s ministries and Iraq’s management of the projects built with
U.S. reconstruction funds, although Iraq has been unable or
unwilling to take control of a large percentage of completed projects.
The authority has also expired for a separate DOD “Project
Contracting Office (PCO),” under the Persian Gulf Division of the
Army Corps of Engineers, although it is still operating to complete
projects that were in progress. It funded large infrastructure projects
such as roads, power plants, and school renovations.
U.N. Involvement/Coalition Military Mandate/Status of U.S.
Forces/Permanent Basing. Even though the invasion of Iraq was not
authorized by the United Nations, the Administration asserts that it has consistently
21 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post,
April 15, 2004.
22 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.
23 An FY2005 supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592 million (of $658
million requested) to construct a new embassy in Baghdad; an FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $1.327 billion for U.S. embassy operations and
security.

CRS-13
sought and obtained U.N. and partner country involvement in Iraq efforts. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003) recognized the CPA as a legal
occupation authority. To satisfy the requirements of several nations for U.N. backing
of a coalition force presence, the United States achieved adoption of Resolution 1511
(October 16, 2003), authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.]
command.”
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement further by endorsing the
U.S. handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq, and
authorizing a coalition force to protect U.N. personnel and facilities. It also:
! “Authorize[d]” the U.S.-led coalition to contribute to maintaining
security in Iraq, a provision widely interpreted as giving the coalition
responsibility for security. Iraqi forces are “a principal partner” in
— not commanded by — the U.S.-led coalition, as spelled out in an
annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq.
The coalition retained the ability to take and hold prisoners.
! Coalition/U.S. Mandate. Resolution 1546 stipulated that the
coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the request of the
government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this
resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire when
a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and that the
mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so requests.”
Resolution 1637 (November 11, 2005) and Resolution 1723
(November 28, 2006) each extended these provisions for an
additional year, “unless earlier “requested by the Iraqi government,”
and required review of the mandate on June 15, 2006 and June 15,
2007, respectively. In June 2007, Iraq’s parliament passed with 144
votes (in the 275 seat parliament) a “non-binding” motion, led by the
Sadr faction, to require the Iraqi government to seek parliamentary
approval before asking that the coalition military mandate be
extended. Maliki argued that there was no such requirement because
the mandate represents a Security Council decision, not a treaty or
agreement that would require two-thirds parliamentary approval. The
mandate was renewed by Resolution 1790 (December 18, 2007),
with the same provisions as previous.
! Strategic Framework Agreement. On November 26, 2007,
President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed a “Declaration of
Principles” by videoconference under which the U.N. mandate
would be renewed for only one more year (until December 31, 2008)
and that, by July 2008, Iraq and the U.S. would complete a bilateral
agreement that would replace the Security Council mandate. The
“strategic framework agreement” is expected to include, as its core
issues: freedom of action for U.S. (and partner) military forces in
Iraq; rules of engagement; ability to take and hold prisoners;
missions to be performed by U.S. and partner forces; and like issues.
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, in a press conference with visiting

CRS-14
Secretary of State Rice on December 18, 2007, said the Iraqi
government would submit an agreement for parliamentary approval.
Several Members of Congress have expressed concern that the
Declaration indicates that a final agreement might commit the
United States to defend the Iraqi government from both internal and
external threats, and might therefore constitute a treaty requiring
Senate ratification. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker said in April
8-9, 2008, testimony that a final agreement would not include such
extensive commitments and would explicitly not provide for any
permanent U.S. bases. Negotiations began in early March 2008
and are reported to be making only halting progress, probably
because key Iraqi factions, such as many Sunnis and the Sadr
movement, oppose granting wide latitude for U.S. forces to operate
in Iraq. (Section 1314 of P.L. 110-28, the FY2007 supplemental,
says that the President shall redeploy U.S. forces if asked to
officially by Iraq’s government.) 24
! Status of Forces Agreement. Because of the U.N. mandate in effect,
there currently is no Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq.
Such an agreement stipulates which courts and authorities deal with
infractions by employees of the sending country. The
Administration says a SOFA is being negotiated in tandem with the
strategic framework agreement discussed above. P.L. 109-289
(FY2007 DOD appropriations) contains a provision that the Defense
Department not agree to allow U.S. forces in Iraq to be subject to
Iraqi law. A similar provision involving prohibition on use of U.S.
funds to enter into such an agreement is in the FY2008 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 110-161).
! Permanent Basing. The facilities used by U.S. forces in Iraq do not
formally constitute “permanent bases,” although these facilities
conceivably could be made permanent U.S. bases if there were a
U.S.-Iraqi agreement. President Bush said on March 27, 2008 that
the strategic framework agreement would not establish permanent
U.S. bases in Iraq. The Defense Appropriation for FY2007 (P.L.
109-289); the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364);
a FY2007 supplemental (P.L. 110-28); the FY2008 Defense
Appropriation (P.L. 110-116); and the FY2008 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 110-161) contain provisions prohibiting the
establishment or the use of U.S. funds to establish permanent
military installations or bases in Iraq. The P.L. 110-28 law — as
well as P.L. 110-116 FY2008 Defense Appropriation — also say
that the United States shall not control Iraq’s oil resources, a
statement urged by Recommendation 23 of the Iraq Study Group
report. The FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181)
24 For further information, see CRS Report RL34362, Congressional Oversight and Related
Issues Concerning the Prospective Security Agreement Between the United States and Iraq
,
by Michael John Garcia, R. Chuck Mason, and Jennifer K. Elsea.

CRS-15
forbids the use of appropriated funds to establish permanent bases
in Iraq or control Iraq’s oil, and similar provisions are in pending
legislation on a FY2008 supplemental (H.R. 2642) and the FY2009
defense authorization (H.R. 5658).
! Oil Revenues. Resolution 1546 gave Iraq gained control over its oil
revenues (the CPA had handled the DFI during the occupation
period25) and the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), subject to
monitoring (until at least June 2005) by the U.N.-mandated
International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB). Iraq’s oil
revenues continue to be deposited in the DFI. Resolution 1790
(December 18, 2007) extends IAMB monitoring until December 31,
2008, subject to review by June 15, 2008. Resolution 1546 gave the
Iraqi government responsibility for closing out the U.N.-run “oil-for-
food program” under which all oil revenues were handled by a U.N.
escrow account; Security Council Resolution 1483 had ended the
“oil for food program” as of November 21, 2003.
U.N. Involvement in Governance Issues. Several U.N. resolutions assign
a role for the United Nations in post-Saddam reconstruction and governance.
Resolution 1483 (cited above) provided for a U.N. special representative to Iraq, and
“called on” governments to contribute forces for stabilization. Resolution 1500
(August 14, 2003) established U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).26 The size
of UNAMI in Iraq, headed by Swedish diplomat Staffan de Mistura, exceeds 120 in
Iraq (80 in Baghdad, 40 in a newly opened office in Irbil, and others for a yet-to-be-
opened office in Basra), with at least an equal number “offshore” in Jordan. It is
focuses on promoting political reconciliation, election assistance, and monitoring
human rights practices and humanitarian affairs, and is extensively involved in
assisting with the constitution review process discussed further below. U.N. Security
Council Resolution, 1770, adopted August 10, 2007, renewed UNAMI’s mandate for
another year, and enhanced its responsibility to be lead promoter of political
reconciliation in Iraq and to plan a national census. UNAMI also is expected to play
a major role in helping organize provincial elections to take place by October 1,
2008, as discussed further below, as well as in efforts to resolve the Kurdish claim
to Kirkuk and other cities in the north. (In Recommendations 7 and 26 and several
others the Iraq Study Group calls for increased U.N. participation in promoting
reconciliation in Iraq.
)
25 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations
, by Christopher Blanchard and Kenneth Katzman.
26 Its mandate has been renewed each year since, most recently by Resolution 1700 (August
10, 2006).

CRS-16
Elections in 200527
After the handover of sovereignty, the focus was on three votes held in 2005:
! On January 30, 2005, elections were held for a transitional National
Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and the Kurdish regional
assembly. The Sunni Arabs, still resentful of the U.S. invasion,
mostly boycotted, and no major “Sunni slates” were offered,
enabling the UIA to win a slim majority (140 of the 275 seats) and
to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to dominate the national
government formed subsequently as well as the provincial councils.
! Subsequently, a constitution drafted by a committee appointed by the
elected government was approved on October 15, 2005. Sunni
opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in two provinces, but not
in the three needed to defeat the constitution. The crux of Sunni
opposition was the provision for a weak central government
(“federalism”): it allows groups of provinces to band together to
form autonomous “regions” with their own regional governments,
internal security forces, and a large role in controlling revenues from
any new energy discoveries. Sunnis oppose this concept because
their region has thus far lacked significant proven oil reserves and
they depend on the central government for revenues. The
constitution also contained an article (137) that promised a (yet-to-
be-completed) special constitutional amendment process, within a
set six-month post-adoption deadline, intended to mollify Sunnis.
! In the December 15, 2005 election for a full four year term
government, some Sunnis, seeking to strengthen their position to
amend the constitution, fielded electoral slates — the “Consensus
Front” and the National Dialogue Front. With the UIA alone well
short of the two-thirds majority needed to unilaterally form a
government, Sunnis, the Sadr faction, secular groupings, and the
Kurds demanded Jafari be replaced; they subsequently accepted Nuri
al-Maliki as Prime Minister (April 22, 2006). Maliki won approval
of a cabinet on May 20, 2006 (see table at the end of this paper on
the cabinet composition).
27 For results of the elections and the formation of the government, see CRS Report
RS21968, Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman. This report also
contains a table with the Administration and GAO assessments of the Iraqi government’s
performance on 18 stipulated “benchmarks” contained in P.L. 110-28.

CRS-17
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
Born in 1950 in Karbala, has belonged to Da’wa Party since 1968. An expert in Arab
poetry, fled Iraq in 1980 after Saddam banned the party, initially to Iran, but then to Syria
when he refused Iran’s orders that he join Shiite militia groups fighting Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war. Headed Da’wa offices in Syria and Lebanon and edited Da’wa Party
newspaper. Advocated aggressive purge of ex-Baathists as member of the Higher
National De-Baathification Commission after Saddam’s fall and continues to seek rapid
execution of convicted Saddam-era figures, earning him criticism among Sunnis for
sectarian bias. Elected to National Assembly (UIA list) in January 2005 and chaired its
“security committee.” Publicly supported Hezbollah (which shares a background with
Da’wa Party) during July-August 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, prompting
congressional criticism during July 2006 visit to Washington DC. Has tense relations
with ISCI, whose activists accuse him of surrounding himself with Da’wa members. Prior
to 2007, repeatedly shielded Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia from U.S. military sweeps, but
has now fallen out with Sadr. Confrontation of Sadr has bolstered his support among
Sunnis and other factions, boosting Maliki’s political strength as of June 2008. President
Bush maintains regular direct contact with him by video-conference.
Maliki Government, Political Reconciliation,
and “Benchmarks”

Many observers are measuring the effectiveness of U.S. policy by whether or not
it facilitates political reconciliation28 — considered key to the U.S. ability to create
durable stability that would permit the draw down of large numbers of U.S. forces
from Iraq. U.S. officials, including Ambassador Crocker in his April 8-9, 2008,
testimony, have praised legislative achievements in Iraq in 2008, while at the same
time calling for further steps. Ambassador Crocker and other U.S. officials say that
the Iraqi government needs to increasingly focus on provision of public services, a
growing source of public complaint.
The recent gains represent progress, but there continue to be significant splits
in the power structure that could undermine further gains. These splits are between
the dominant Shiites and the Sunni Arabs, within Shiite and Sunni blocs, and
increasingly between the Arabs and Kurds. Several major political blocs pulled their
members out of the cabinet in 2007, leaving Maliki, at one point, with 16 out of the
37 total positions vacant held by acting ministers, or their ministers boycotting the
cabinet. In late October 2007, Maliki replaced two resigned Sadrist ministers (Health
and Agriculture), winning parliamentary confirmation for independent Shiite
replacements. The pullout of the UIA bloc in the COR by the small Shiite Fadilah
Party and the Sadr faction in April and September 2007, respectively, left Maliki with
a bare majority support in the COR — about 142 seats in the 275 seat body.
28 On January 10, President Bush stated that the surge would give the Iraqi government “the
breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas, adding that”most of Iraq’s
Sunni and Shia want to live together in peace — and reducing the violence in Baghdad will
help make reconciliation possible.” Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html]

CRS-18
The intra-Shiite split erupted in major violence throughout southern Iraq and in
Baghdad in late March 2008 when Maliki and ISCI moved unsuccessfully to try to
crush the Sadr and Fadilah militias by sending ISF units to Basra to eliminate
Sadr/Mahdi control of major districts; the initial failure of the operation furthered the
perception that the central government and the Iraqi Security Forces are weak. Prior
to 2007, Maliki had the support of the Sadr faction, but that alliance disintegrated in
early 2007 when the United States insisted that Maliki allow U.S. forces to pursue
Mahdi Army militiamen as part of the stabilization effort facilitated by the “troop
surge.”
U.S. officials point to progress in May 2008 from the Basra crackdown. In
particular, Sunni and Kurdish leaders rallied to Maliki’s side after the crackdown
because the operation showed his willingness to act against fellow Shiites. The city
is said to be now largely under ISF control with some normal life and even rebuilding
occurring, as well as more transparent operations of Basra port. However, Mahdi
and other militias did not surrender their weapons and could re-emerge. Partly as a
result of the confrontation, major Sunni parties began discussions with Maliki to
rejoin the cabinet; if six Sunni-held seats are filled with Sunnis under such an
agreement, that would reduce the number of vacant posts to only four. However, the
Sunnis balked in late May 2008 at what they said were unfair offers to take over
relatively less powerful ministries. An alternative theme in reports out of Iraq is that
Maliki is considering a wholesale cabinet reshuffle to form a government composed
mainly of technocrats.
The January 12, 2008, adoption of a De-Baathification reform law, after many
months of deadlock, was considered a key milestone. This was followed on
February 13, 2008, by the passage by the COR of an amnesty law for detainees and
a law stipulating the power of provincial councils (and setting an October 1, 2008
date for these elections), as well as the 2008 national budget. These steps represented,
in part, implementation of an August 26, 2007, “Unity Accord” signed by the figures
on the presidency council (Talibani and his two Sunni and Shiite deputies, Adel Abd
al-Mahdi of ISCI and Tariq Al Hashimi of the Concord Front), the Prime Minister,
and KRG president Masoud Barzani. In December 2007, U.S. diplomats applauded
a Hashimi, Barzani, and Talabani “Letter of Common Understanding” committing
to political reconciliation and a joint vision of a unified, democratic Iraq.
At the same time, there are growing differences within the Sunni Arab political
structure. The established Sunni parties that participated in the December 2005
elections are now facing challenges from tribally-based Sunnis who are part of the
“Awakening (As Sahwa) Movement,” founded in late 2005 in Ramadi by Shaykh
Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi, to counter Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Movement is credited
with helping stabilize Anbar in partnership with U.S. forces. The movement, now
headed by Shaykh Rishawi’s brother, Ahmad, following Rishawi’s assassination in
September 2007, is seeking political influence as a rival to the more established,
urban-based Sunni Arab parties. The tribal groups are expected to vigorously
contest the planned 2008 provincial elections. Another key figure in their coalition
is Anbar province Governor Mamoun Rashid al-Alwani.
The Kurds are fully engaged in the political structure in Baghdad; no Kurds are
boycotting either the cabinet or the parliament. However, the Kurds are increasingly

CRS-19
at odds with the Arab Iraqi leaders over the KRG’s decision to move forward on oil
and gas development deals with the Kurdish region, in advance of a national oil law.
Iraq’s Oil Minister has called the deals — and a separate KRG oil law — illegal. An
even greater potential concern is the constitutionally mandated (Article 140)
referendum on whether Tamim (Kirkuk) Province will affiliate formally with the
Kurdistan Regional Government, a vote that was to take place by December 31,
2007. The Kurds had insisted — to the point of threatening to pull out of the central
government entirely — that the referendum proceed but UNAMI, backed by the
United States, succeeded in December 2007 in persuading the Kurds to accept a delay
(until June 30, 2008) in the referendum. U.S. officials say the Kirkuk issue might be
resolved without the referendum ever being held, and UNAMI has formally broached
with the KRG the idea of another six month referendum delay (until at least the end
of 2008). In December 2007, UNAMI also succeeded in persuading Sunni Arabs to
return to the fractured Kirkuk provincial council. In another sign of Kurd-Arab
friction, the national budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab assertions that the 17%
revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous — a figure already agreed
to in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to determine long term
percentage allocations for the Kurds, but the Kurds did not get a provision for the
2008 national budget to fund the peshmerga.
The legislation passed in 2008 adds to the 112 laws passed by the COR from
2006-2007, of which 34 were vetoed. Among the recent minor laws enacted was a
measure regulating Iraq’s oil refineries (July 2007) and a law on pensions for
Saddam-era government employees (November 2007). The cabinet approved a draft
law on October 30, 2007 ending a provision that protects private security contractors
— part of the fallout from the September 2007 incident involving Blackwater
security company’s killing of 17 Iraqi civilians at Nisoor Square in Baghdad. (This
type of high level contact is suggested by Recommendation 19 of the Iraq Study
Group report.
)

Iraqi Pledges and Status of Accomplishment. The Bush
Administration is anticipating that enacting and implementing the outstanding major
laws designated as “benchmarks” of progress will further reconciliation. The
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriation Act (P.L. 110-28) conditioned the release of
some funds for Iraq operations upon achievement of 18 stated benchmarks, and
required the Administration to report on progress by July 15 and September 15, 2007.
A presidential waiver provision to permit the flow of funds has been exercised.29 The
July and September reports were relatively negative on progress on the political
benchmarks, although, as discussed, there has been movement since then on several,
as reflected in a U.S. Embassy assessment circulated in May 2008 in response to
congressional questions at the Petraeus/Crocker hearings in April. A mandated (P.L.
110-28) GAO report released September 4, 2007,30 which assessed Iraq’s completion
of the benchmarks, was highly critical of Iraqi performance. P.L. 110-28 also
mandated a separate assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside
commission (headed by retired Gen. James Jones) discussed later.
29 Presidential Determination No. 2007-27 of July 12, 2007, and Presidential Determination
No. 2007-35 of September 28, 2007.
30 Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-07-1220T

CRS-20
The information below is intended to analyze Iraqi performance on the
benchmarks, as compared to what Iraqi leaders pledged in August 2006. This does
not strictly correspond to the 18 benchmarks of P.L. 110-28. A chart on the those 18
benchmarks, along with subsequent developments, is in CRS Report RS21968
, and
Ambassador Crocker testified on April 8-9, 2008, that the U.S. Embassy would
provide a new report on the eighteen benchmarks within weeks.
(1) By September 2006, formation of a committee to review the constitution
under the special amendment process (Article 137); approval of a law to implement
formation of regions; approval of an investment law; and approval of a law
establishing the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC).
The investment
law was adopted in October 2006. The regions law was adopted October 12, 2006,
although, to mollify Sunni opposition who fear formation of a large Shiite region in
as many as nine provinces of southern Iraq, major factions agreed to delay the
formation of new regions until at least April 2008. Iraqi leaders are increasingly
fearful of a push on forming a large Shiite region, although none has materialized
since the April 2008 moratorium expired. The IHEC law — key to implementing
the October 2008 planned provincial elections — was passed on January 23, 2007,
and the nine election commissioners have been appointed, although they are
considered mostly representatives of the major blocs and not necessarily neutral or
fully representative. In addition, the process of choosing IHEC representatives in
each province has been halting — no election commissioners are in place in eight
provinces — and reports say UNAMI might replace some commissioners to induce
more transparency in the election process.
The constitution review committee (CRC), chaired by Humam al-Hammoudi,
a senior ISCI leader, delivered “semi-final” recommendations for constitutional
amendments in late May 2007, but left many sensitive issues, including the powers
of regions versus central government, the status of Kirkuk,and presidential powers,
to be decided by senior faction leaders. With deadlock remaining on 50 amendments
covering these fundamental questions, the CRC has repeatedly extended the deadline
(now extended beyond May 2008) for submitting its final recommendations. Sunni
representatives reportedly seek to alter the constitution so as to require or facilitate
the appointment of a Sunni Arab as president.
(2) By October 2006, approval of a provincial powers law and approval of a
new oil law. The provincial authorities law was passed on February 13, 2008. It was
initially blocked when deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi insisted it not include a
provision for the Baghdad government to dismiss provincial governors, appearing to
threaten the May 2008 deadline for an election law, and the October 1, 2008 target
date for the provincial elections. However, even though his ISCI faction wants to
reduce the powers of the central government and may fear a victory in those elections
by the faction of Moqtada al-Sadr, Abd al-Mahdi, reportedly under some U.S.
pressure, dropped his objection on March 19, 2008 and the new law is in effect. The
cabinet is reviewing the required election law, but it was not passed by the June 1,
2008 deadline, meaning the elections will not be held at least until November 2008.
The elections will likely feature competition in the Sunni areas between established
Sunni parties and the new, emerging Awakening movement. On the Shiite side,
competition is expected to be stiff between the established parties such as ISCI and
Da’wa, on the one hand, and the Sadr faction, on the other.

CRS-21
The oil laws have not been passed, to date. Beginning in mid-2006, a three
member Oil and Energy Committee working under the auspices of the Iraqi cabinet
prepared draft hydrocarbon framework legislation to regulate Iraq’s oil and gas
sector. Following approval by the negotiating committee, Iraq’s cabinet approved a
draft version of the framework law in February 2007. However, the Kurds opposed
a revised version agreed by the cabinet and forwarded to the COR in July 2007, and
the draft has stalled in the COR. The issue became acrimonious as the Kurds went
forward with separate energy development deals and passed their own oil law. A
related draft revenue law (not forwarded to the COR to date) would empower the
federal government to collect oil and gas revenue, and reserve 17% of oil revenues
for distribution to the Kurdish regional government. Two other implementing laws
dealing with the structure of the oil industry and how foreign firms’ investments will
be treated have not yet been approved by the cabinet. On April 17, 2008, Iraqi
government spokespersons said the Kurds and the central government had resolved
some of the differences on the national oil law, particularly how to allow for the
KRG’s separate oil deals in the national framework.
(3) By November 2006, approval of a new de-Baathification law and approval
of a flag and national anthem law. The January 12, 2008 COR adoption of the De-
Baathification law, called the Accountability and Justice Law, was considered a
major development because of the emotions and sensitivity among the dominant
factions to allowing Baathists back into government. The effect of the law on
reconciliation, adopted unanimously by 143 in the COR who were present
(opponents walked out before the vote), depends on implementation. It allows about
30,000 lower ranking ex-Baathists to regain their jobs; 3,500 Baathists (top three
party ranks) would not, but would receive pensions instead. But, the law could allow
for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 ex-Baathists
in post-Saddam security services, and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from
regaining jobs.
On January 22, 2008, the COR voted 110 (out of 165 present) to pass a law
adopting a new national flag that drops the previous Saddam-era symbols on the flag.
However, some facilities dominated by Sunnis, who oppose the new design, have not
flown the new flag to date and accuse the COR of adopting it because of pressure
from the Kurds, who wanted a new flag in advance of a regional Arab
parliamentarians meeting in the Kurdish area in March 2008. There has been no
further progress on the national anthem issue.
(4) By December 2006, approval of laws to curb militias and to offer amnesty
to insurgent supporters. As noted, the law to grant amnesty to about 5,000 “non-
terrorist” detainees held by Iraq was passed on February 13, 2008 and went into
effect on March 2, 2008. Releases thus far have been slow (a few hundred released)
because of slow judicial processes. The law does not affect 25,000 detainees held
by U.S.
No formal laws to curb militias has been passed, but a previous (June 2007)
“Measuring Stability” report said Maliki had verbally committed to a militia
demobilization program, and an executive director of the program was named on
May 12, 2007, but committee members have not been appointed and a
demobilization work plan not drafted. The government’s Basra operation in March

CRS-22
2008 was seen as a government effort against militias, particularly that of Moqtada
Al Sadr and, on April 9, 2008, Maliki stated that no party that continues to field an
illegal militia would be permitted to participate in the planned provincial elections.
(5) By January 2007, completion of the constitutional review process. As noted
above, the constitution review committee has not completed its work.
(6) By February 2007, the formation of independent commissions to oversee
governance. No progress has been reported to date. (This is not one of the formal
benchmarks stipulated by P.L. 110-28.)
(7) By March 2007, holding of a referendum on the constitutional amendments.
See no. 5.
(8) By April 2007, Iraqi assumption of control of its military. Six of the ten
Iraqi Army divisions are now under Iraqi control. This is not one of the P.L. 110-28
benchmarks.
(9) By September 2007, Iraqi security control of all 18 provinces. Iraq Security
Forces now have security control for nine provinces: Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Najaf,
Maysan, Karbala, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk (the latter three are Kurdish provinces
turned over May 30, 2007), and, most recently, Basra (turned over on December 16,
2007 by Britain). (Not one of the P.L. 110-28 benchmarks.) Gen. Petraeus testified
on April 8-9, 2008, that the next provinces to be turned over to Provincial Iraqi
Control, later in 2008, would be Anbar and then Qadissiyah.
(10) By December 2007, Iraqi security self-reliance. Estimates by Iraqi and
U.S. commanders on when Iraqi security forces would be able to secure Iraq by
themselves are discussed in the sections on the ISF later in this paper. (This is not
one of the P.L. 110-28 benchmarks.) The other security related benchmarks of the
eighteen mentioned in P.L. 110-28 — such as applying law even-handedly among all
sects, reducing sectarian violence, and increasing the number of Iraqi security forces
able to operate independently — are security-related and are discussed later.
Regional and International Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Iraq
Stability. The Iraqi government has received some diplomatic support, even
though most of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination
of the regime. There are about 50 foreign missions in Iraq, including most European
and Arab countries, but Ambassador Crocker testified during April 8-9, 2008, that
the U.S. laments that there are no Arab ambassadors currently serving in Iraq and is
pushing Arab states to open full embassies. Saudi Arabia, which considers the
Shiite dominated government in Baghdad an affront to what it sees as rightful Sunni
pre-eminence, told visiting Secretary of State Rice in August 2007 that the Kingdom
will consider opening an embassy in Iraq, but it has implemented only preliminary
steps on that issue thus far. In late March 2008, Bahrain’s King Hamad pledged to
President Bush to open a full Embassy in Baghdad. Some countries, such as
Portugal in March 2007, have closed or reduced their embassies because of security
concerns; there were attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco,
and Russia in 2005 and 2006; Poland’s ambassador was seriously wounded in an
attack in central Baghdad on October 3, 2007.

CRS-23
The United States has tried to build regional support for Iraq through an ongoing
“Expanded Ministerial Conference of Iraq’s Neighbors” process, consisting of Iraq’s
neighbors, the United States, all the Gulf monarchy states, Egypt, and the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council). The first meeting was in Baghdad
on March 10, 2007. Iran and Syria attended, as did the United States. A follow-on
meeting in Egypt was held May 3 and 4, 2007, in concert with additional pledges of
aid for Iraq under an “International Compact for Iraq,” and agreement to establish
regional working groups on Iraq’s security, fuel supplies, and Iraqi refugees. Those
groups have each had several meetings. The latest ministerial meeting was held in
Istanbul on November 2, 2007, but that meeting was reportedly dominated by the
crisis between Turkey and Iraq over safe haven for the Turkish Kurdish opposition
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), discussed further below. The November 2007
meeting did agree to create an institutional support mechanism for the process,
possibly run by UNAMI. The third full “Expanded Neighbors” meeting was held in
Kuwait on April 22, 2008, although without any significant announcements from
major Arab states on opening embassies in Iraq, remitting pledged reconstruction
funds, or writing off Saddam-era debt. No progress on debt relief or related issues
were made at a meeting of the Iraq Compact countries in Sweden on May 30, 2008.
Bilateral U.S.-Iran meetings on Iraq are discussed below.
Human Rights and Rule of Law. The State Department’s report on
human rights for 2007, released March 11, 2008, much as the previous year’s report,
appears to blame much of the human suffering in Iraq on the overall security
environment, the wide scale presence of militias, partisans in the government and
gangs, and not on the Iraqi government writ large. It says that Iraq’s has the legal
framework “for the free exercise of human rights.” U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer
than at any time in the past 30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize
politically. A State Department report to Congress details how the FY2004
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund”
(IRRF) has been spent for programs on this issue (“2207 Report”). These programs
are run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL):

! About $1.014 billion from the IRRF was for “Democracy Building,”
including programs to empower women and promote their
involvement in Iraqi politics, as well as programs to promote
independent media. An FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations
(P.L. 109-102) provided $28 million each to the International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for Iraq
democracy promotion. An FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L.
109-234) provided another $50 million in ESF for Iraq democracy
promotion, allocated to various organizations performing democracy
work there (U.S. Institute of Peace, National Democratic Institute,
International Republican Institute, National Endowment for
Democracy, and others). An FY2007 supplemental appropriation
(P.L. 110-28) provided $250 million in additional “democracy
funding;”


CRS-24
! About $71 million for related “Rule of Law” programs. About $15
million is to promote human rights and human rights education.
! About $159 million to build and secure courts and train legal
personnel, including several projects that attempt to increase the
transparency of the justice system, computerize Iraqi legal
documents, train judges and lawyers, develop various aspects of law,
such as commercial law, promote legal reform. There are currently
1,200 judges working, up 100 since September 2007, reporting to
the Higher Juridical Council.
! About $128 million is for “Investigations of Crimes Against
Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses;
! $10 million is for the Commission for the Resolution of Real
Property Disputes (formerly the Iraqi Property Claims Commission)
which is evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds,
mainly in Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime.
Some additional ESF funds, beyond the IRRF, have been used for activities to
empower local governments, including the “Community Action Program” (CAP)
through which local reconstruction projects are voted on by village and town
representatives; related Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees
(PRDCs); and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), local enclaves to provide
secure conditions for reconstruction. The CAP program has been funded in recent
years at about $50 million per year (ESF account).
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance
The Administration has asserted that economic reconstruction will contribute
to stability. However, the testimony by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
during April 8-9, 2008, indicated substantial bipartisan sentiment, and
Administration concurrence, that Iraq, flush with oil revenues, should begin assuming
the financial burden for its own reconstruction and security costs. (In
Recommendation 67, the Iraq Study Group called on the President to appoint a
Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq, a recommendation that was
largely fulfilled with the February 2007 appointment of Timothy Carney as
Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq. That position is now held by Amb.
Charles Ries.
) For more detailed breakdowns of U.S. aid to Iraq, see CRS Report
RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
A total of about $45 billion has been appropriated for reconstruction funding
(including security forces), of which $20.917 billion has been appropriated for the
IRRF in two supplemental appropriations: FY2003 supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which
appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the FY2004 supplemental appropriations, P.L.
108-106, which provided about $18.42 billion. Of the IRRF funds, $20.05 billion
has been obligated, and, of that, $19.23 billion has been disbursed. According to
State Department reports, the IRRF sector allocations are as follows:
! $5.03 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;

CRS-25
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society (some funds from this category discussed above);
! $1.014 billion for Democracy (as discussed above);
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.724 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $469 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $746 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
Additional Funding Beyond the IRRF. In civilian reconstruction funding
beyond the IRRF (Defense Department funding for the Iraqi security forces is
contained separately in a table in the section of this paper on those forces):
— The regular FY2007 appropriation (P.L. 109-383, as amended) provided: $123
million in ESF for Iraq reconstruction, and $20 million for counter-narcotics. The
FY2007 supplemental, P.L. 110-28 provided: $1.574 billion in ESF; $50 million in
a DOD “Iraq Freedom Fund”; $250 million in a “democracy fund;” $150 million for
counter-narcotics; and $456.4 million in CERP funds (includes for Afghanistan as
well). These are close to requested amounts.
— For FY2008 (regular and supplemental), the Administration requested about $1.3
billion for reconstruction; and about $1 billion in CERP funds (DOD funds for
humanitarian issues). The FY2008 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 110-161) says
that no funds appropriated by that act are for Iraq.
— For FY2009, $300 million in ESF was requested for Iraq. An FY2009
supplemental requests asks for an additional $212 million in ESF for Iraq.
Oil Revenues. Before the war, it was widely asserted by Administration
officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia
and the driver of Iraq’s economy, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs.
The oil industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion
(only about nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has been targeted by insurgents and
smugglers. Protecting and rebuilding this industry (Iraq’s total pipeline system is over
4,300 miles long) has received substantial U.S. and Iraqi attention; that focus is
beginning to show some success as production in May 2008 has reached nearly pre-
war levels. The northern export route, long a target of insurgents, is now operating
at close to its 600,000 bpd pre-war capacity.
Corruption and mismanagement are key issues. The U.S. military reports in
recent “Measuring Stability” reports that elements of the protection forces for the oil
sector (Strategic Infrastructure Battalions and Facilities Protection Service for the Oil
Ministry) are suspected of complicity for smuggling as much as 70% of the output
of the Baiji refinery, cost Iraq as much as $2 billion in revenue per year. Other

CRS-26
accounts attribute the smuggling to tribes based around the Baiji refinery who have
set up numerous gas stations to implement the smuggling scheme there. The Iraqi
government needs to import refined gasoline because it lacks sufficient refining
capacity. A GAO report released August 2, 2007 said that inadequate metering, re-
injection, corruption, theft, and sabotage, likely renders Iraq’s oil production 100,000
- 300,000 barrels per day lower than the figures shown below, taken from State
Department report. (Steps to correct some of these deficiencies in the oil sector are
suggested in Recommendations 62 of the Iraq Study Group report.)

A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. International investment has been assumed to depend on the passage
of the hydrocarbons laws, and some are concerned that the draft oil laws, if
implemented, will favor U.S. firms. However, Iraq has begun pre-qualifying large
oil companies to bid on major oil and gas fields, including Rumaila, West Qurna, and
Zubair. In April 2008, the European Union claimed to be close to an energy
cooperation deal with Iraq. A Russian development deal with Saddam’s government
(the very large West Qurna field, with an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil) was
voided by the current government in December 2007. Poland reportedly is
negotiating with Iraq for possible investments. South Korea and Iraq signed a
preliminary agreement on April 12, 2007, to invest in Iraq’s industrial reconstruction
and, potentially, its energy sector as well, although Baghdad threatened in December
2007 to cut off sales of oil to South Korea because its firms also signed an energy
development deal with the KRG. Other investors in the KRG region include
Norway’s DNO, Turkey’s Genel; Canada’s Western Zagros; Turkish-American
PetPrime; Turkey/U.S.’s A and T Energy; Hunt Oil, and Dana Gas (UAE).
However, the Kurds are constrained in their export routes, dependent on the Iraqi
national pipeline network and on cooperation from Turkey, which is declining
because of the heightened tensions between Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds over the
safehaven for the PKK. The produced oil from some of these projects will, at least
initially, be trucked out. (In Recommendation 63, the Iraq Study Group says the
United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector and assist in
eliminating contracting corruption in that sector.
)

CRS-27
Table 2. Selected Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Oil Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2008 to
(weekly avg.)
(pre-war)
war)
(2006)
(2007)
date)
2.5 million
$31.3
$41
$27.3
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
2.09 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War Load
Current
(hrs. per
Served (MWh)
Load Served
day)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
100,000
7.1
10.0 (9.3 one year ago)
Notes: Power shortages caused lack of water in several Baghdad districts in August 2007 due to
lack of pumping and purification capability. Iraq has begun importing diesel fuel from Kuwait
for electricity generation purposes.
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
May 21 and 28, 2008. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of
the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. In an effort to encourage private U.S. investment
in Iraq, the Bush Administration has lifted nearly all U.S. sanctions on Iraq,
beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under authorities provided by P.L.
108-7 (FY2003 appropriations) and P.L. 108-11 (FY2003 supplemental).
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an Executive Order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait). The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services. Exports

CRS-28
of dual use items (items that can have military applications) are no
longer subject to strict licensing procedures.31
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership/IMF. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt, built up during Saddam’s regime,
with mixed success. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion (not including
the U.N.-administered reparations process from the 1991 Persian Gulf war). In 2004,
the “Paris Club” of 19 industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39
billion Iraq owes them. Most recently, at the May 30, 2008, Iraq Compact meeting
in Sweden, the Persian Gulf states that supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have
resisted writing off Iraq’s approximately $55 billion in debt to those countries
(mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with about $25 billion each). These states are also
far behind on remitting aid pledges to Iraq, according to the GAO.32 On December
17, 2004, the United States signed an agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s
$4.1 billion debt to the United States; that debt consisted of principal and interest
from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi agricultural credits from the 1980s.33 On
December 15, 2007, Iraq cleared its debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
by repaying $470 million earlier than required and has a Stand-By Arrangement with
the Fund. On December 13, 2004, the World Trade Organization (WTO) began
accession talks with Iraq.
Security Challenges and Responses
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States has employed a multi-
faceted approach to stabilizing Iraq. In late 2006, the effort was determined by the
Administration to be faltering due to continuing sectarian violence superimposed on
a tenacious Sunni-led insurgency. In announcing a strategy revision on January 10,
2007, President Bush said, “The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American
people and it is unacceptable to me.”
U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-7, CJTF-7)
is a multi-national headquarters “Multinational Force-Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by Gen.
David Petraeus, who previously led U.S. troops in the Mosul area and the training
and equipping program for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). He is in the process of
31 A May 7, 2003, Executive Order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
32 [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08365r.pdf]
33 For more information, see CRS Report RL33376, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and
Potential Implications for International Debt Relief
, by Martin A. Weiss.

CRS-29
moving to command U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and his former deputy,
General Raymond Odierno, has been named to take over in Iraq later this summer.
The current head of Multinational Corps-Iraq (deputy to Petraeus) is Lt. Gen. Lloyd
Austin.
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq
Until 2008, the duration and intensity of a Sunni Arab-led insurgency defied
many expectations, probably because, in the view of many experts, it was supported
by much of the Iraqi Sunni population that feels humiliated at being ruled by the
Shiites and their Kurdish partners. Some Sunni insurgents have sought to return the
Baath Party to power, while others want to restore Sunni control more generally. The
insurgent groups are believed to be loosely coordinated within cities and provinces,
and some continue to cooperate with Al Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni fighters from around
the Arab and Islamic world who have come to Iraq to fight U.S. forces and Shiite
domination of Iraq. The most senior Baathist still at large is longtime Saddam
confident Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri.

The Sunni insurgency did not derail the political transition,34 but it caused rates
of U.S. casualties sufficient to stimulate debate in the United States over the U.S.
commitment in Iraq. Targets of Sunni insurgent grenades, IEDs (improvised
explosive devices), mortars, direct weapons fire, suicide attacks, and occasional mass
kidnappings are U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security forces, as well as Iraqi
civilians of rival sects, Iraqis working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and aid
workers, oil export and gasoline distribution facilities, and water, power, and other
facilities. In 2007, insurgent groups exploded chlorine trucks to cause widespread
civilian injury or panic on about ten occasions; another chlorine attack occurred in
January 2008. A trend in early 2007 was attacks on bridges, particularly those
connecting differing sects. Some insurgents have been able to choke off power
supplies to rival communities, for example in northern Diyala Province. An April
12, 2007, bombing of the Iraqi parliament, coming amid increasing mortar attacks on
the heavily fortified International Zone, demonstrate the ability of the insurgency to
operate in Baghdad. At the height of the insurgency, Sunni-dominated
neighborhoods of Baghdad, including Amiriya, Adhamiya, Fadhil, Jihad, Amal, and
Dora (once a mostly Christian neighborhood) were serving as Sunni insurgent bases.
Sunni insurgents also made substantial inroads into the mixed province of Diyala,
pushing out Shiite inhabitants, and in Nineveh province as well.
Sunni “Awakening” in 2007. U.S. officials say that a major positive trend
emerged in late 2006, even before the U.S. “troop surge” began in early 2007. Some
Iraqi Sunnis began turning against the mostly foreign-composed Al Qaeda Iraq
(AQ-I) — which has been a key component of the insurgency — because of its
commission of some atrocities and abuses — such as killings of those who want to
cooperate with the Iraqi government, forced marriages, and attempts to impose strict
34 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, April 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, December 2005.

CRS-30
Islamic law. AQ-I, founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (killed in a June 7, 2006,
U.S. airstrike) has been a U.S. focus from very early on in the war because, according
to U.S. commanders, it is responsible for an estimated 90% of the suicide bombings
against both combatant and civilian targets. AQ-I has always been considered by
Iraqis as an “alien” component of the insurgency because it is led by non-Iraqis
with different traditions and whose goals are more worldwide jihadist than Iraq-
specific.35 The Sunni Iraqi turn against AQ-I was begun in Anbar Province by the
“Awakening” (As Sahwa) or “Salvation Council” movement — perhaps to use the
United States against Iraq’s dominant Shiites. The Anbar Salvation Council has
survived the September 13, 2007, assassination of Shaykh Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi.
“Concerned Local Citizen” (CLC/”Sons of Iraq” Fighters). In the
course of the “troop surge,” U.S. commanders have taken advantage of this
Awakening trend by turning over informal security responsibility to 91,000 former
militants called “Concerned Local Citizens” (CLC’s) or “Sons of Iraq” in exchange
for an end to their anti-U.S. operations. (About 80% are Sunni and 20% are anti-
extremist Shiites, according to the U.S. military.) These fighters were recruited in
Anbar by the various tribal Awakening and Salvation Council members, or
represent former urban, non-tribal insurgents from such groups as the 1920
Revolution Brigades who decided by themselves to cooperate with the United States.
U.S. commanders are giving funds to and sharing information with the CLC fighters
— a strategy that is controversial because of the potential of the Sunni Iraqis to
later resume fighting U.S. forces and Iraqi Shiites. U.S. officials say no new
weapons have been given to these groups, although some reports say U.S. officers
allow these fighters to keep captured weaponry. At the same time, these fighters are
increasingly targeted by AQ-I and some Iraqi Sunni insurgents.
The Sons of Iraq program has led to some tensions between Maliki and U.S.
officials. The entire UIA bloc publicly demanded an end to this U.S. strategy on
October 2, 2007, claiming the United States is “embracing ... terrorist elements.”
Continued Shiite political resistance has stalled U.S. plans to integrate all the CLC
fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); fearing empowering Sunnis particularly
in the security services, the government has thus agreed to allow only about 20,000
such volunteers, mostly from the almost exclusively Sunni province of Anbar to join
the ISF. Perceiving they are still distrusted, some Sons of Iraq have reportedly
rejoined insurgent activity. In February 2008, several hundred such fighters in Diyala
Province abandoned their posts to protest alleged sectarianism by the Shiite police
chief in the province. On the other hand, according to General Petraeus in April
2008, the Iraqi government has agreed to fund about $160 million of the costs to pay
the Sons of Iraq fighters, as an apparent alternative to allowing them on the ISF rolls.
Although Ambassador Crocker said on May 25, 2008 that AQ-I “has never been
closer to defeat,” following U.S. and Iraqi offensives against it in the Mosul area, the
true strength of AQ-I might be difficult to discern, and Gen. Petraeus said in his April
2008 testimony that AQ-I remains capable of lethal attacks. AQ-I attacks have
occurred in Diyala and elsewhere since his testimony. U.S. commanders in Iraq have
35 AQ-I is discussed in detail in CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda, by Kenneth
Katzman.

CRS-31
said that if they are able to expel AQ-I from Mosul, which is the major city along its
corridor from the Syrian border into Iraq’s heartland, AQ-I would be, for all practical
purposes, defeated in Iraq. A major suicide bombing in August 2007 killed over 500
members of the Yazidi (Kurdish speaking, pre-Islamic) sect in northern Iraq — the
most lethal attack of the war to date. Amid the optimistic discussions of progress
against AQ-I, since April 2008, there have been an increasing number of major
suicide bombings in previously quiet Ramadi and Fallujah, possibly signaling a re-
emergence of AQ-I or other Sunni insurgent groups there.
Outside Support for Sunni Insurgents. Numerous accounts have said
that Sunni insurgents are receiving help from neighboring states (money and
weapons),36 although others believe that outside support for the insurgency is not
decisive. The March 2008 “Measuring Stability” report said that Syria is estimated
to be the entry point for 90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq, but General
Petraeus, in his April 2008 testimony, said that Syria “has taken some steps to reduce
the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key
network that supports AQ-I.” The Measuring Stability report also noted that Syria
hosted the inaugural meeting (August 2007) of the Border Security working group
formed by the “Expanded Neighbors” process discussed above, and a follow up in
November 2007, and that Syria has made recent efforts to stem the flow of extremists
into Iraq. Largely because of this outside support, the first 17 recommendations of
the Iraq Study Group report call for intensified regional diplomacy, including multi-
lateral diplomacy with Syria and Iran.

Other assessments say the Sunni insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,37 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
As noted above, the Saudi leadership has been notably cool to the Maliki government
publicly — even to the point of refusing visits by him — which likely means that the
Saudi leadership is at least tolerating aid to Sunni insurgents privately.
36 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor,
December 21, 2004.
37 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates By
U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, October 22, 2004.

CRS-32
Table 3. Key Security/Violence Indicators
Indicator
Current Level
Number of U.S. forces
About 150,000 lower than 165,000 at “surge” peak. Will decline to
in Iraq
about 140,000 (15 combat brigades) by July 2008. Drawdown will be
followed by at least 45-day period to assess conditions and decide on
any further reductions.
U.S./Other Casualties
4,088 U.S. forces; 3,331 by hostile action. 3,938 since end to”major
combat operations” declared May 1, 2003. About 260 coalition
(including 170 British). 1,000+ civilian contractors. About 35 U.S.
killed per month during October 2007- March 2008; increased to 50
in April 2008 but declined to 19 in May 2008. 100+ per month killed
early-mid 2007.
Partner forces in Iraq
9,907 from 25 other countries. Down from 28,000 in 2005
Number of Insurgents
25,000 U.S. estimates; Iraqi estimates run to 40,000
AQ-I fighters
1,300 - 3,500 commonly estimated, precise figures not known
Number of Iranian Qods
150+. Shiite militias have killed about 210 U.S. soldiers with Qods-
Forces in Iraq
supplied Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP’s).
Iraq Civilian Deaths
Baseline reduced to about 13/day, down from down from 100/day
in December 2006, including 2 - 5 sectarian murders per day (down
from 33 pre-surge) - levels lower than at any time in 2006, and
relatively steady since November 2007. But, since March 2008 due
to anti-Sadr combat. Sectarian murders also occur regularly in
Kirkuk, Baquba, Mosul, Kut, and other cities.
Number of all
Reduced to 45/day in May 2008, lowest since 2004. Down more
Attacks/day
than 75% from 200/day in June 2007. Major car and other large
suicide bombings down 75% from pre-surge, and attacks in Anbar
down 90%. Debate exists over what incidents are counted in DOD
figures; DOD does not count Shiite-Shiite violence in its enemy-
initiated figures, for example.
Shiite militiamen
60,000 (40,000 Mahdi, 15,000 Badr, 5,000 Da’wa, Fadhila, other)
CLC Fighters
91,000, of which about 20,000 entering ISF. Suffered 100 attacks
per day on them in Jan. 08. Each paid $350/month by DOD (CERP
funds). $100 paid per IED revealed. DOD has spent $173 million
on them as of Mar. 1, 08
Iraqis Leaving Iraq
2 million left, incl. 700,000 to Jordan, 1 million to Syria; another 2
or Displaced since 2003
million internally displaced or relocated. Some families returning
due to reduced violence levels and pressure from host countries.
Iraqis in Detention
About 25,000 by U.S.; about 20,000 in Iraqi custody
Iraqi Army and Police
160+ in operations; up from 104 in November 2006. About 90
Battalions in
Iraqi Army battalions operate with “minimal or no assistance from
operations/In the Lead
Coalition forces.”
Total ISF
559,397 “assigned” (on payrolls, not necessarily present on duty).
Exceeds authorized total of: 539,749
Number of Provinces
9: Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Maysan, Irbil, Dahuk, and
Under ISF Control
Sulaymaniyah (latter three in May 2007), Karbala (October 29),
and Basra (December 16). Anbar, Qadisiyah to turn over in 2008.
Sources: Information provided by a variety of sources, including U.S. government reports on Iraq, Iraqi
statements, the Iraq Study Group report, DOD Measuring Stability report, Petraeus September 2007 testimony,
and press reports, including Reuters Alertnet. See Tables 5 and 6 for additional figures on total numbers of Iraqi
security forces, by force component.

CRS-33
Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War?
Contributing to the deteriorating security environment in 2006 and early 2007
was the increase in Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence. Top U.S. officials said in late
2006 that sectarian-motivated violence — manifestations of an all-out struggle for
political and economic power in Iraq — had displaced the Sunni-led insurgency as
the primary security challenge. Since November 2007, U.S. and Iraqi officials have
presented statistics showing a dramatic drop in Sunni-Shiite violence — attributing
the progress to the U.S. troop surge and the “ceasefire” of the Mahdi Army, called
by Sadr in August 2007 and later formally extended until August 2008, but later
largely voided by the March 2008 outburst of intra-Shiite combat.
Moqtada Al Sadr
Moqtada Al Sadr is the lone surviving son of the Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr,
who was killed, along with his other two sons, by regime security forces in 1999 after he
began agitating against Saddam. Sadr inherited his father’s political base in “Sadr City,”
a large (2 million population) Shiite district of Baghdad, but is also strong in and has
challenged ISCI for control of Diwaniyah, Nassiriyah, Basra, Amarah, and other major
Shiite cities. Since late 2007, he has reportedly been in Qom, Iran, studying Shiite
Islamic theology under Iranian judiciary head Ayatollah Mahmud Shahrudi. He was also
mentored by Qom-based Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Kazem Haeri. Sadr is married to the
daughter of Da’wa Party founder and revolutionary Shiite theologian Ayatollah
Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr (a cousin of his father).
Although Moqtada Al Sadr was initially viewed as a young firebrand lacking religious
and political weight, he is now viewed as a threat by the mainstream Shiite factions. He
has a large following among poor Shiites who identify with other “oppressed Muslims”
and who oppose virtually any U.S. presence in the Middle East. Sadr formed the so-called
“Mahdi Army” militia in 2003, and his younger aides are reportedly pushing for more
aggressive use of Mahdi militia against Iraqi opponents and U.S. forces. The Sadr
supporters won 29 seats in parliament under UIA bloc but pulled out of the bloc in
September 2007; the faction also has two supporters under the separate “Messengers” list.
Prior to its April 2007 pullout from the cabinet, the Sadr faction held ministries of health,
transportation, and agriculture and two ministry of state posts. Sadr is increasingly
perceived as clever and capable — simultaneously participating in the political process
to avoid confrontation with the United States while denouncing the “U.S. occupation.”
His faction opposes the Shiite “region” in the south, opposes the draft oil law as a
“sellout,” and opposes the defense pact with U.S. Sadr's reputation remains clouded by
allegations of involvement in the April 10, 2003, killing in Iraq of Abd al-Majid Khoi (the
son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi and head of his London-based Khoi Foundation).
There is discussion throughout this report about tensions between Sadr’s faction and
other Shiite groups and with the U.S. military.
U.S. officials dated the escalation of Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence to the
February 22, 2006, AQ-I bombing of the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra. The
attack set off a wave of purported Shiite militia attacks on Sunni mosques and
civilians in the first days after the mosque bombing. The Shiite militias — in some
cases supported by sympathetic Shiite members of the ISF — continued retaliating

CRS-34
by driving Sunnis out of mixed neighborhoods. Some observers say that Sunnis
largely “lost” the “battle for Baghdad,” with some accounts saying that Baghdad was
about 35% Sunni Arab during Saddam’s rule but was reduced by the violence to
about 20%. Many victims of sectarian violence turn up bound and gagged, dumped
in about nine reported sites around Baghdad, including in strainer devices in the
Tigris River. The Samarra mosque was bombed again on June 13, 2007 and their
were reprisal attacks on Sunni mosques in Basra and elsewhere, although the attack
did not spark the large wave of reprisals that the original attack did, possibly because
the political elite appealed for calm after this second attack. The shrine is being
reconstructed, with the help of UNESCO.

Iraqi Christians (mostly Chaldean Catholics and Assyrian Christians) and their
churches and church leaders have become major targets of Shiite and Sunni armed
factions, viewing them as allies of the United States. Since the fall of Saddam
Hussein, more than 100,000 Christians might have left Iraq. Christian priests have
been kidnapped and killed; most recently, the body of Chaldean Catholic archbishop
Faraj Rahho was discovered in Mosul on March 13, 2008, two weeks after his
reported kidnapping. However, some Christians in Baghdad felt safe enough to
celebrate Christmas (2007) at churches in Baghdad. The attack on the Yazidis in
August 2007, noted above, also appeared to reflect the precarious situation for Iraqi
minorities. U.S. military forces do not specifically protect Christian sites at all times,
although they might respond to specific threat warnings. Some human rights groups
have alleged Kurdish abuses against Christians and other minorities in the Nineveh
Plain, close to the KRG-controlled region. Kurdish leaders deny the allegations. The
FY2008 Consolidated Appropriation earmarks $10 million in ESF from previous
appropriations to assist the Nineveh plain Christians. A supplemental appropriation
for 2008 (H.R. 2642) would earmark another $10 million for this purpose.
Discussed below are the two major Shiite militias in Iraq: ISCI’s Badr Brigades
and the Mahdi Army. Some believe that the Sunni groups being allowed to operate
by the United States constitute additional militias, but they are relatively segregated
by region and neighborhood and their ultimate form and disposition are not
determined. As noted, the United States is seeking to have these Sunni groups
integrated into the ISF.
! Badr Brigades. Many Badr militiamen have now folded into the ISF,
particularly the National Police and other police commando units.
The Badr Brigades were originally recruited, trained, and equipped
by Iran’s hardline force, the Revolutionary Guard, during the 1980-
88 Iran-Iraq war, in which Badr guerrillas conducted forays from
Iran into southern Iraq to attack Saddam regime targets. Badr
fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners of war held
in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed ISCI as an Iranian
puppet and Badr operations in southern Iraq during the 1980s and
1990s did not shake Saddam’s grip on power. This militia is led by
Hadi al-Amiri (a member of parliament from the “Badr
Organization” grouping of the UIA).
! Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM). The March 2007 “Measuring
Stability” reports said this militia had “replaced AQ-I as the most

CRS-35
dangerous accelerant of potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence
in Iraq.” U.S. assessments of the JAM subsequently softened as the
JAM largely abided by Sadr’s call for a “ceasefire” of JAM activities
in August 2007. That directive might have represented an effort not
to directly confront the U.S. “troop surge.” However, the JAM has
now re-emerged as perhaps the primary adversary of the United
States in the wake of the March 2008 Basra fighting. General
Petraeus and other officials appear to be blurring their previous
distinction between the JAM and Sadr, and the so-called “Special
Groups,” backed by Iran, who are responsible for most of the
atrocities against Sunnis and continuing attacks on U.S. forces.
Shiite-on-Shiite Violence/March 2008 Basra Battles. Shiite-against-
Shiite violence increased in 2007 and accelerated sharply in 2008, perhaps because
the Sadr faction might, in planned provincial elections, achieve political influence
commensurate with what it believes is its popularity. The more established Shiite
parties (Da’wa and ISCI) want to curb Sadrist influence ahead of these elections. Pro-
Sadr candidates did not compete vigorously in the January 2005 provincial elections,
leaving the faction under-represented in most southern provinces, including Basra.
Since early 2007, these tensions had led to consistent but varying levels of
internecine fighting among Shiite groups in southern Iraq — primarily between the
Badr-dominated ISF police and army units on the one side, and Sadr’s JAM on the
other — in a competition for power, influence, and financial resources. This intra-
Shiite skirmishing had increased as international forces, particularly those of Britain,
reduced their presence in southern Iraq. There have been no major concentrations of
U.S. troops there, leaving the security of the city entirely the responsibility of the ISF.
Despite the tensions, Britain expressed optimism for the province when it handed
over control of the province to the Iraqis on December 16, 2007. Britain had
redeployed its forces from the city to Basra airport in September 2007.
Whatever the motives, on March 26, 2008, Maliki ordered the launch of an ISF
offensive against the JAM and other militias in Basra, in an effort to reestablish “rule
of law.” In the fighting, the Badr-dominated ISF units initially performed poorly;
many surrendered their vehicles, weapons, and positions to JAM militiamen, forcing
the U.S. and British military to support the ISF with airstrikes, mentors, and advisers.
The fighting quieted somewhat on March 30, 2008 with an Iran-brokered proposal
by Sadr and welcomed by the Maliki government, that did not require the JAM to
surrender its weapons. As a result of a settlement that appeared to be on Sadr’s terms,
the offensive was widely considered a failure and a major setback to the image of the
Maliki government, and to the U.S. assertions that the ISF is gaining confidence and
capability as a national security institution. Subsequent to the offensive, 1,300 ISF
members were dismissed for refusing to fight, and the Iraqi police and army
commander in Basra were recalled to Baghdad. General Petraeus, in his April 2008
testimony, called the offensive “poorly planned,” and some reports suggest the
Maliki move pre-empted a more deliberate move against the Shiite militias in Basra
planned by MNF-I. However, as a result of subsequent U.S. and Britain-backed
operations by the ISF, JAM activities in Basra have been reduced and some reports
say JAM, Fadhila, Tharallah, and other militia fighters have left the streets and
relatively normal life is returning. Post-offensive tensions escalated briefly on April
12, 2008, with the assassination of a key Sadr aide, Riyadh al-Nuri. Previously, the

CRS-36
most violent single incident took place on August 28, when fighting between the
JAM and the ISF (purportedly mostly Badr fighters within the ISF) in the holy city
of Karbala caused the death of more than 50 persons, mostly ISF and JAM fighters.
Simultaneous with the Basra combat and since, JAM fighters in the Sadr City
district of Baghdad fired volleys of 107 mm Iranian-supplied rockets on the
International Zone, killing several U.S. soldiers and civilians. U.S. and ISF forces
subsequently pushed into the southern districts of Sadr City to take the rockets out
of range. The fighting caused many Sadr City residents to flee, and fighting continued
against U.S. forces, some of which were trying to erect a wall to separate part of Sadr
City and increase U.S. ability to control it. Since mid-May 2008, Sadr City has
quieted considerably, particularly following a mid-May 2008 agreement for the JAM
to permit ISF forces (but not American forces) to patrol in the northern section of
Sadr City.
The intra-Shiite fighting was more than just a linear battle between the Badr-
dominated ISF and the JAM. In Basra, the Fadilah (Islamic Virtue) Party is part of
the power struggle, using its strength among oil workers and the Facilities Protection
Force for the oil infrastructure. A smaller militia that is a factor there is Tharallah
(Vengeance of God). At the national level, and in the March 2008 fighting in Basra,
Fadilah and the Sadr trend were aligned because both Sadr and Fadilah represent
lower class constituents. Both have pulled out of the UIA. However, prior to the
March 2008 fighting, the two parties were competitors in Basra because of the vast
assets up for grabs there (Basra is Iraq’s main oil producing region and the point of
export for about 90% of Iraq’s total oil exports). Fadilah has 12 of the 41 Basra
province seats; ISCI controls 21 seats, leaving Sadr with very little representation on
that council. In April 2007, the Sadrists conducted protests in Basra to try to persuade
the provincial governor, Mohammad Waili, who is a Fadilah member, to resign, a
campaign that is continuing. Fadilah also has thus far successfully resisted Maliki’s
efforts to replace Waili, but, prior to the March 2008 offensive, Maliki threatened
Waili with removal if he failed to curb militia (Fadilah) control of the docks in Umm
Qasr, which is preventing efficient use of the port.
Iranian Support. U.S. officials, most specifically in a February 11, 2007,
U.S. defense briefing in Baghdad — and highlighted in the Petraeus and Crocker
testimonies of April 8-9, 2008, have repeatedly accused the Qods (Jerusalem) Force
of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard of aiding extremist Shiite militiamen with explosives
and weapons, including the highly lethal “explosively forced projectiles” (EFPs). In
the April 2008 testimony, General Petraeus largely repeated his September 2007
testimony’s assertions that Iran was also using its protege, Lebanese Hezbollah, to
train and arm the “Special Groups” of Iraqi Shiite militias to form a Hezbollah-like
Iranian proxy force in southern Iraq. Amid increasing discussion among experts
about a possible U.S. military move to stop the Iranian aid – and increasingly strong
statements by U.S. military leaders about Iran’s “malign” influence in Iraq, General
Petraeus had announced a U.S. briefing on new information on Iranian aid to the
JAM in early May 2008, but the briefing reportedly has been postponed to provide
time for Iraqi negotiators to confront Iran with the information on its involvement.
An Iraqi parliamentary group visited Iran in late April 2008 but to no obvious major
result on this issue. Maliki is expected to raise the issue with Iranian leaders when he
visits Iran in June 2008, which will be his second visit there in one year.

CRS-37
Iran’s support for Shiite militias contributed to a U.S. decision to conduct direct
talks with Iran on the issue of stabilizing Iraq, a key recommendation of the
December 2006 Iraq Study Group (Recommendations 9, 10, and 11). The
Administration initially rejected that recommendation — the President’s January 10,
2007, Baghdad security initiative included announcement of an additional aircraft
carrier group and additional Patriot anti-missile systems to the Gulf, moves clearly
directed against Iran. From December 2006 to September 2007, U.S. forces arrested
twenty alleged Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Forces and other agents. It released
nine of them in November 2007, and another in December, but still holds those of
highest “value.”
In an apparent shift, the Administration supported and participated in the March
10, 2007, regional conference in Baghdad and the follow-up regional conference held
in Egypt on May 3 and 4, 2007. Subsequently, the two sides announced and then held
high profile direct talks, at the Ambassador level, on May 28, 2007. Another
meetings was held on July 24, 2007, with little agreement apparent at the meeting but
with a decision to form a U.S.-Iran working group to develop proposals for both sides
to help ease Iraq’s security difficulties. The working group met for the first time on
August 6. In his September 10 and 11, 2007 testimony, Ambassador Crocker said the
talks with Iran were worth continuing because Iran might, at some point, alter its
stance. Following U.S. assessments of reduced Iranian weapons shipments into Iraq,
the United States agreed to another meeting with Iran in Baghdad, but the planned
December 18, 2007 meeting was postponed over continuing U.S.-Iran disagreements
over the agenda for another round of talks, as well as over Iran’s insistence that the
talks be between Ambassador Crocker and Iranian Ambassador Hassan Kazemi-
Qomi. On May 5, 2008, Iran said it would not participate in any further meetings in
this channel because of the U.S. combat in Sadr City, which Iran says is resulting in
civilian deaths. Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad conducted a visit Iraq on
March 2-3, 2008 - it marked the first such visit since the Iranian revolution of 1979.
During the visit, at least seven economic and other cooperation agreements were
signed between Iran and Iraq, and Iran announced a further $1 billion line of credit
for Iranian exports to Iraq. Secretary of State Rice did not hold any substantive
meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister at the “Expanded Neighbors” meeting in
Kuwait on April 22, 2008, or at the Iraq Compact meeting in Sweden on May 30.
(For more information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.)
Iraq’s Northern Border
At the same time, security on Iraq’s northern border appears to be increasingly
fragile, and U.S. officials fear that the most stable region of Iraq could become an
arena for heightened conflict if Turkey - Iraqi Kurdish disputes are not resolved
peacefully. Turkey’s government alleges that Iraq’s Kurds (primarily the KDP,
whose power base abuts the Turkish border) are harboring the anti-Turkey PKK
guerrilla group in northern Iraq that has killed about 40 Turkish soldiers since
September 2007. The Turkish parliament in October 2007 approved a move into
northern Iraq against the PKK and mobilized a reported 100,000 troops to the border
area. The Turkish military has used that authority sparingly to date, possibly because
U.S. officials are putting pressure on Kurdish leaders not to harbor the PKK, and
because U.S. officials are reportedly sharing information on the PKK with Turkey.

CRS-38
KRG President Barzani cancelled a meeting with visiting Secretary of State Rice on
December 18, 2007, because of the U.S.-Turkey cooperation against the PKK. The
Iraqi Arabs generally favor cooperating with Turkey — and in September 2007
signed an agreement with Turkey to pledge such cooperation. The issue dominated
the expanded neighbors meeting in Istanbul on November 2, 2007, as well as Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with President Bush on November
5, as well as Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s meeting with President Bush on
January 7, 2008.
Tensions began escalating in July 2007 when Barzani indicated that the Iraqi
Kurds were capable of stirring unrest among Turkish Kurds if Turkey interferes in
northern Iraq. Previously, less direct threats by Turkey had prompted the U.S. naming
of an envoy to Turkey on this issue in August 2006 (Gen. Joseph Ralston (ret.),
former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). On February 8, 2007, Turkish
Foreign Minister warned against proceeding with the December 31, 2007,
referendum on Kirkuk, reflecting broader concerns that the referendum could pave
the way for Kurdish independence. That referendum has been postponed at least until
June 2008.
Another emerging dispute is Iran’s shelling of border towns in northern Iraq that
Iran says are the sites where the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), an Iranian
Kurdish separatist group, is staging incursions into Iran. Iran has threatened a ground
incursion against PJAK and Iraq said on September 9, 2007, in remarks directed at
Iran and Turkey, that its neighbors should stop interfering in Iraq’s affairs.
U.S. Stabilization Strategy and “Troop Surge”
Acknowledging the difficulty of the mission, the Administration has tried to
refine its stabilization strategy.38 In prior years, a major focus of U.S. counter-
insurgent (“search and destroy”) combat was Anbar Province, which includes the
cities of Fallujah and Ramadi (provincial capital), the latter of which was the most
restive of all Iraqi cities and in which the provincial governor’s office was shelled or
attacked nearly daily until early 2007. In the run-up to the December 15, 2005,
elections, U.S. (and Iraqi) forces conducted several major operations (for example
Operations Matador, Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and
Ram) to clear contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities
in Anbar, along the Euphrates River. None of these operations produced lasting
reductions in violence, possibly because of the relative insufficiency of U.S. and Iraqi
troops to hold cleared areas.
38 Previously, Congress has mandated two major periodic Administration reports on progress
in stabilizing Iraq. A Defense Department quarterly report, titled “Measuring Stability and
Security in Iraq,” was required by an FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13), and
renewed by the FY2007 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 109-289). Another report (“1227
Report”), is required by Section 1227 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L.
109-163). As noted above, P.L. 110-28 mandated the July 15, 2007 and September 15, 2007
progress reports on the “troop surge,” as well as a GAO report due September 1, 2007 and
an outside commission report (“Jones Commission”) on the Iraqi security forces.

CRS-39
“Clear, Hold, and Build” Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Realizing the weakness of its strategy, in its November 2005 “National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq,” the Administration publicly articulated a strategy called “clear, hold,
and build,” intended to create and expand stable enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces
and U.S. civilian reconstruction experts in areas cleared of insurgents. The strategy
envisioned that cleared and rebuilt areas would serve as a model that could expand
throughout Iraq. The strategy formed the basis of Operation Together Forward (I and
II) of August - October 2006.
In conjunction with the U.S. strategy, the Administration began forming
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a concept used extensively in Afghanistan.
Each PRT in Iraq is civilian led, composed of about 100 U.S. State Department and
USAID officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi governing institutions,
such as the provincial councils, representatives of the Iraqi provincial governors, and
local ministry representatives. Initially, ten PRTs were inaugurated, of which seven
are run by the United States: Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Baghdad, Anbar Province, two
in Salah ad-Din Province, and Baquba. Of the partner-run PRTs, Britain has formed
a PRT in Basra, Italy has formed one in Dhi Qar province, and South Korea runs one
in Irbil. In conjunction with the “troop surge,” another fifteen PRTs were opened in
2007, bringing the total to 25. Of the additional PRTs, six were formed in Baghdad
and three more in Anbar. Of the total number of PRTs, 11 are working at the
provincial level and 14 are embedded with U.S. military concentrations (Brigade
Combat Teams.) There are another seven smaller Provincial Support Teams. A total
of about 400 diplomats and contractors have been added to staff the new PRTs,
although about half of these new positions were filled with military personnel at least
temporarily. Observers who have visited Iraq say that some of the PRTs are
increasingly well staffed and effective in generating employment and establishing
priorities. In December 2007, the PRT in Kirkuk helped broker a return of Sunni
Arabs to the provincial council there; they had been boycotting because of the
Kurdish push to control the city.

An FY2006 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-234, provided $229 million
for the PRT operations. Another $675 million for development grants to be
distributed by the PRTs is funded through the ESF appropriation for Iraq in this law.
The FY2007 supplemental (P.L. 110-28) provided about $700 million (ESF) for PRT
security, operations, and PRT-funded reconstruction projects.
“Troop Surge”/Baghdad Security Plan/“Fardh Qanoon”.
Acknowledging that the initiatives did not bring security or stability, the President’s
January 10, 2007, “New Way Forward” — Baghdad security initiative (referred to
in Iraq as Fardh Al Qanoon, Arabic for “Imposing Law”) was articulated as intended
to bring security to Baghdad and create conditions under which Iraq’s communities
and political leaders can reconcile. The plan, which in many ways reflects
recommendations in a January 2007 report by the American Enterprise Institute
entitled “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,”39 formally began in February
2007, and included the following components:
39 The two principal authors of the report are Frederick W. Kagan and Jack Keane (General,
U.S. Army, ret.).

CRS-40
! The deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces to Iraq —
17,500 combat troops (five brigades) to Baghdad; 4,000 Marines to
Anbar Province; and the remainder are support troops and military
police. The plan envisioned that these forces, along with additional
Iraqi forces, would hold neighborhoods cleared of insurgents and
thereby cause the population to reject militants. The forces have
been based, along with Iraqi soldiers, in 100 fixed locations (both
smaller Combat Outposts and the larger “Joint Security Stations”).
! Cooperation from the Iraqi government, such as progress on the
reconciliation steps discussed earlier, the provision of $10 billion in
new capital spending on reconstruction (benchmark 17), and the
commitment of the Iraqi forces discussed previously 3 brigades
(about 6,000 soldiers), plus about 4,000 police commandos and
regular police (benchmark 9). Contributing to previous failures in
Baghdad were Iraq’s deployment of only two out of the six Iraqi
battalions committed.
! Provision of at least $1.2 billion in new U.S. aid, including funds for
job creation and CERP projects, in part to revive long-dormant state-
owned factories.
! Maliki’s cooperation in not standing in the way of U.S. operations
against the JAM. U.S. commanders blamed Maliki for the failure of
“Operation Together Forward I and II” in 2006 because Maliki
insisted they release suspected JAM commanders and dismantle U.S.
checkpoints in Sadr City.
Congressional reaction to the troop surge decision was relatively negative. In
House action, on February 16, 2007, the House passed (246-182) a non-binding
resolution (H.Con.Res. 63) expressing opposition to the sending of additional forces
to Iraq. However, on February 17, 2007, the Senate did not vote to close off debate
on a version of that resolution (S. 574). Earlier, a Senate resolution opposing the
troop increase (S.Con.Res. 2) was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 24 (12-9 vote). A cloture motion failed on February 1, 2007.
Surge Assessments. The first major assessment of the surge was testimony
of General Petraeus on September 10 and 11, 2007, in which he cited numerous
statistics and said “As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are,
in large measure, being met.” In testimony on April 8-9, 2008, updating the
September analysis, General Petraeus said “there has been significant but uneven
progress in Iraq.” On that basis, Gen. Petraeus, in his testimony, said that planned
reductions of U.S. forces by July 2008 to about 140,000 (15 combat brigades),
slightly higher than pre-surge levels, would go forward. However, he recommended
that any further reductions be subject to an assessment of security conditions, of
about 45 days duration. The recommendation was accepted by President Bush in an

CRS-41
April 10, 2008, speech.40 The Administration has said that its intent is to gradually
transition U.S. forces to an “overwatch” posture, relying more on supporting Iraqi
forces rather than leading the combat. In May 2008, General Petraeus said he might
recommend some further reductions – possibly the removal of another combat
brigade – before the end of 2008.
According to the April 2008 testimony, the March 2008 Measuring Stability
report, and press reports — and excluding the spike in violence due to the combat
against the JAM — the surge has produced the following.
! Reduced weekly attacks, Iraqi civilian deaths, and overall violence
trends by over 70%, to the levels of 2004.
! Reduced violence in Baghdad (attacks down 67%) to the point
where 75% of Baghdad’s 474 “districts” are now considered at least
relatively secure. Other commanders said in January 2008 that the
United States would continue to expand the number of neighborhood
outposts in the city (by 30%) during 2008, despite a reduction in
U.S. forces in country overall.
! Attacks in Anbar have been down about 90% and many of its cities
are now seeing a return of normal daily life. U.S. forces are in the
process of closing some of their operating bases there in preparation
for possible transition to provincial Iraqi control later in 2008.
! About 3,600 AQ-I members killed or captured in 2007, including the
loss of 233 identified as “key leaders.”
! Many families returning to Baghdad, and some districts formerly
written off as AQ-I strongholds, such as Amiriyah, the former
Baathist stronghold of Adhamiyah, and the formerly highly violent
Doura district, starting to bustle. Some U.S. commanders say that
they now see large numbers of sporting events take place in
Baghdad, an indicator of relatively normal life. Other accounts,
however, say that the Shiite-dominated security forces and ministries
are not helpful to Sunnis who want to return to their homes.
Some remain pessimistic about the effects of the surge, believing that, because
Iraq’s major communities are not yet reconciled, insurgent activity will increase as
the surge troops are drawn down. According to this view, insurgents will re-infiltrate
quiet neighborhoods once U.S. troops thin out, and the newly empowered
cooperating Sunni armed groups will begin battling in earnest with Shiite-dominated
ISF forces. Critics point to the March 2008 intra-Shiite fighting as evidence of how
violence can easily flare at any time if an when the Iraqis are on their own to maintain
security. Others note that there has been a notable increase in violence and major car
bombs in Sunni areas since the March 2008 Basra fighting, suggesting that progress
throughout Iraq could unravel quickly. The Administration counter-argument is that
40 Text at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/print/20080410-2.html].

CRS-42
there has been sufficient local reconciliation that average Iraqis will cooperate to
prevent insurgents from returning to thwarting reconstruction and normal life.
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)41
A key to whether or not the progress will continue as U.S. forces thin out is the
quality of the Iraqi security forces (ISF). Responsibility for building the ISF lies with
the commander of the U.S.-led ISF training mission, the Multinational Transition
Security Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). The troop surge in some ways hindered the
development of the ISF because U.S. forces are conducting most of the heavy
fighting — a former senior leader of training the ISF, Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, said
in July 2007 that training the ISF had slowed since the “troop surge” began.
On the other hand, General Petraeus testified in April 2008 that “The Iraqi
security forces have continued to develop since September....” He and other U.S.
commanders praised much of the ISF performance in the March 2008 Basra battles,
although many analysts believed the battles demonstrated the ISF shortcomings
rather than their successes. As evidence of ISF maturation and growth, General
Petraeus and others point to the increase in the number of units capable of operating
with minimal coalition support, and to their performance in ongoing combat
operations against AQ-I in northern Iraq. Once the “troop surge” winds down, U.S.
strategy is intended by Administration officials to return, to some extent, to that
articulated by President Bush in a June 28, 2005 speech, when he said: “Our strategy
can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”42
Still, MNSTC-I commander Gen. Dubik and the Iraqi Defense Minister both
separately stated in January 2008 that the ISF would not be ready to secure Iraq from
internal threats until 2012, and from external threasts until 2018-2020, despite the
expanding size of the ISF. The poor performance of the ISF in the Basra battles in
March 2008 could cast further doubt on the ISF’s capabilities. The Measuring
Stability reports discuss and depict the degrees to which the Iraqi government has
assumed operational ISF control, and of ISF security control over territory.
(Recommendations 42, 43 and 44 of the Iraq Study Group report advised an increase
in training the ISF, and completion of the training by early 2008.
)
The Jones Commission report had some praise for the Iraqi Army, while
recommending that the Shiite-dominated National Police commando force be
scrapped entirely and reorganized. Some observers, and with likely new arguments
provided by the March 2008 intra-Shiite fighting, go so far as to say that the ISF is
part of the security problem in Iraq, not the solution, because of incidents of ISF
member involvement in sectarian involvement or possible anti-U.S. activity. Lt. Gen.
Dubik said in July 2007 that it is still difficult to find ISF leaders free of sectarian
loyalties. In addition, the Jones Commission report and recent DOD “Measuring
Stability” reports reiterate previously reported criticisms of the ISF, including
41 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences
, by Jeremy Sharp.
42 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/06/20050628-7.html].

CRS-43

! That the ISF continue to lack an effective command structure or
independent initiative, and that there continues to be a culture of
corruption throughout the ISF structure.

! As much as one-third of ISF members are absent-without-leave or
might have deserted at any given time.

! The ISF, particularly the police, are unbalanced ethnically and by
sect, penetrated by militias or even insurgents, and involved in
sectarian violence, particularly among the police forces. Most of the
ISF, particularly the police, are Shiites, with Kurdish units mainly
deployed in the north, and many Sunnis distrust the ISF as
instruments of repression and responsible for sectarian killings.
Many ISF members view themselves as loyal to their former militias
or party leaders, and not to a national force. In late 2005, U.S. forces
uncovered militia-run detention facilities (“Site 4”) and arrested
those (Badr Brigade and related Iraqi police) running them.

! According to observers, appointments to senior commands continue
to be steered toward Shiite figures, primarily Da’wa Party members,
by Maliki’s “Office of the Commander-in-Chief” run by his Da’wa
subordinate, Dr. Bassima al-Jaidri. She reportedly has also removed
several qualified commanders who are Sunni Arabs, causing Sunni
distrust of the Iraqi military, and she reportedly has routinely refused
to follow U.S. military recommendations to place more Sunnis in
security positions.

! The 144,000 members of the “Facilities Protection Force,” (FPS),
which are security guards attached to individual ministries, are
involved in sectarian violence. The United States and Iraq began
trying to rein in the force in May 2006 by placing it under some
Ministry of Interior guidance, including issuing badges and
supervising what types of weapons it uses. (In Recommendation 54,
the Iraq Study Group says the Ministry of Interior should identify,
register, and otherwise control FPS.
)
On the other hand, while reports continue to point to sectarianism in the Interior
Ministry, U.S. officials have praised Interior Minister Jawad Bolani for trying to
remove militiamen and death squad participants from the ISF. Numerous other ISF
commanders are said by U.S. officials to be weeding out sectarian or non-performing
elements from ISF and support ministry ranks.
The Iraq Study Group (Recommendations 50-61) contain several suggestions
for reforming and improving the police. Among the recommendations are: assigning
the lead role in advising and training the anti-crime portions of the police forces to
the U.S. Department of Justice; and transferring those police forces that are involved
in anti-insurgency operations to the Ministry of Defense from their current
organizational structure under the Ministry of Interior.

CRS-44
ISF Weaponry. Most observers say the ISF are severely underequipped,
dependent primarily on donations of surplus equipment by coalition members. The
Iraqi Army is using mostly East bloc equipment, including 77 T-72 tanks donated by
Poland, but is in the process of taking delivery of 4,200 Humvees from the United
States. Iraq is moving forward with a request (Foreign Military Sales, FMS) to buy
at least $2.3 billion worth of U.S. munitions, including upgrades to UH-1 helicopters,
and various military vehicles. Some of this equipment will be for the Iraqi police.
The potential sale was notified to Congress by the Defense Security Assistance
Agency (DSCA) on September 25, 2007. Iraq had previously ordered about $1 billion
worth of U.S. arms. U.S. officials have thus far decided not to provide the Iraqi Air
Force with combat aircraft, because of the potential for misuse.
In October 2007, it was reported that Iraq also is ordering $100 million in light
equipment from China to equip the ISF police forces. Iraqi President Talabani said
part of the rationale for the China buy was the slow delivery of U.S. weapons. (In
Recommendation 45, the Iraq Study Group said the United States should encourage
the Iraqi government to accelerate its FMS requests and that departing U.S. combat
units should leave behind some of their equipment for use by the ISF.)
There are fears that some of these weapons are falling into the hands of
insurgents, militias, or even terrorist groups. In August 2007, the GAO reported that
the Defense Department cannot fully account for the total of $19.2 billion worth of
equipment provided to the ISF by the United States and partner forces. A New York
Times report in August 2007 said some of the ISF weapons might have ended up in
the hands of anti-Turkish PKK guerrillas (PKK is a named terrorist group by the
United States).
Table 4. ISF Funding
FY2003 and FY2004
$5.036 billion allocated from $20+ billion “Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund,” see above.
FY2005
$5.7 billion in DOD funds from FY2005 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-13).
FY2006
$3 billion appropriated by FY2006 supplemental (P.L.
109-234).
FY2007
Total of $5.54 billion appropriated from: FY2007 defense
appropriation (P.L. 109-289) - $1.7 billion; and from
FY2007 supplemental (P.L. 110-28) — $3.84 billion (the
requested amount).
FY2008
$3 billion (revised) request. FY2008 regular appropriations
(Consolidated, P.L. 110-161) provide $1.5 billion.
FY2009
$2.8 billion request
Total
$20.776 billion provided or appropriated

CRS-45
Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces
(Figures contained in Iraq Weekly Status Report. Numbers might not correspond to those
actually on duty.)
Force
Size/Strength “Assigned”
Iraqi Army
165,437 assigned. Authorized goal is 154,757. Trained for eight
weeks, paid $60/month. Commanders receive higher salaries.
Special
3,477 assigned. Technically a separate bureau not under MOD.
Operations
Authorized size is 4,733. Trained for 12 weeks, mostly in Jordan.
Forces
Support Forces 18,275 assigned and trained. Authorized level is 15,583
Air Force
1,409. Authorized level is 2,907. Has 9 helicopters, 3 C-130s; 14
observation aircraft. Trained for six months. UAE and Jordan to
provide other aircraft and helos.
Navy
1,288. Authorized level is 1,893. Has a Patrol Boat Squadron and a
Coastal Defense Regiment. Fields about 35 patrol boats for anti-
smuggling and anti-infiltration. Controls naval base at Umm Qasra,
Basra port, and Khor al-Amaya oil terminals. Some training by
Australian Navy.
Totals
189,887 assigned and trained. 179,873 authorized.
U.S./Other
U.S. training, including embedding with Iraqi units (10 per battalion),
Trainers
involves about 4,000 U.S. forces, run by Multinational Security
Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I). Training at Taji, north of
Baghdad; Kirkush, near Iranian border; and Numaniya, south of
Baghdad. All 26 NATO nations at NATO Training Mission - Iraq
(NTM-I) at Rustamiyah (300 trainers). Others trained at NATO bases
in Norway and Italy. Jordan, Germany, and Egypt also have done
training.
Recent U.S.
FY2007: $3.558 billion as follows: $780 million infrastructure; $1.51
Funding
billion for equipment and transportation; $58 million for training; and
$1.21 billion for sustainment.
FY2008 supplemental request: $1.487 billion as follows: $298 million
infrastructure; $917 million equipment and transportation; $116
million for training; $154 million sustainment

CRS-46
Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces
Force/Entity
Size/Strength Assigned
Iraqi Police Service
291,497 assigned. Authorized level is 288,001. Gets eight
(IPS)
weeks of training, paid $60 per month. Not organized as
battalions; deployed in police stations nationwide.
National Police
37,685 assigned. Authorized level is 33,670. Comprises
“Police Commandos,” “Public Order Police,” and
“Mechanized Police.” Overwhelmingly Shiite. Gets four
weeks of counter-insurgency training. Iraq Study Group
(Recommendation 50) proposes transfer to MOD control
and Jones Commission recommends disbandment due to
sectarian activity.
Border Enforcement
40,329 assigned. Authorized level is 38,205. Controls over
Department
250 border positions built or under construction. Has
Riverine Police component to secure water crossings. Iraq
Study Group (Recommendation 51) proposes transfer to
MOD control.
Totals (all forces)
369,511 assigned. 359,876 authorized.
Training
Training by 3,000 U.S. and coalition personnel (DOD-lead)
as embeds and partners (247 Police Transition Teams of 10-
15 personnel each). Pre-operational training mostly at
Jordan International Police Training Center; Baghdad Police
College and seven academies around Iraq; and in UAE. Iraq
Study Group (Recommendation 57) proposes U.S. training
at local police station level. Countries doing training aside
from U.S.: Canada, Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland,
UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany
(now suspended), Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore,
Belgium, and Egypt.
Facilities Protection
Accounted for separately, they number about 144,000,
Service (FPS)
attached to individual ministries.
Recent U.S. Funding
FY2007 total is $1.573 billion as follows: $311 million
infrastructure; $583 million equipment and transportation;
$552 million training; $127 million sustainment.
FY2008 total requested is $1.206 billion as follows: $84.7
million infrastructure; $392 million equipment and
transportation; $623.3 million training; $106 million
sustainment.

CRS-47
Coalition-Building and Maintenance
Some believe that, partly because of the lack of U.N. approval for the invasion
of Iraq, the Bush Administration was unable to enlist large scale international
participation in peacekeeping and that the U.S. mission in Iraq is now being
complicated by diminishing foreign military contributions. Some remaining force
contributions are small and appear to be mostly symbolic — such as Kazakhstan’s
contribution of 29 soldiers — or intended to improve relations with the United States.
The Administration view is that partner drawdowns reflect a stabilizing security
environment in the areas those forces are serving. A list of contributing countries, but
not force levels, is in the Department of State’s “Iraq Weekly Status Report.” A
listing of force and financial contributions to Iraq is in CRS Report RL32105: Iraq:
Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction
, by Christopher Blanchard
and Catherine Dale. See also the “security indicators” table above for the current
numbers of non-U.S. contributed forces in Iraq.
Substantial partner force drawdowns began with Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal
of its 1,300 troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004, Madrid
bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had
supported the war effort. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
followed Spain’s withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in
July 2004 after one of its citizens was taken hostage. On the other hand, many nations
are replacing their contingents with trainers for the ISF or financial contributions or
other assistance to Iraq, or with increased force contributions in Afghanistan. Among
other recent major drawdowns are:
! Ukraine, which lost eight soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent attack,
withdrew most of its 1,500 forces after the December 2005 Iraqi
elections. Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit at that time, but
in March 2006 it sent in a 150-person force to take over guard duties
of Camp Ashraf, a base in eastern Iraq where Iranian oppositionists
are held by the coalition.
! South Korea began reducing its 3,600 troop contribution to Irbil in
northern Iraq in June 2005, falling to 1,200 by late 2007. The
deployment has been extended by the South Korean government
until the end of 2008, although at a reduced level of 600.
! Japan completed its withdrawal of its 600-person military
reconstruction contingent in Samawah on July 12, 2006, but it
continues to provide air transport (and in June 2007 its parliament
voted to continue that for another two years).
! Italy completed its withdrawal (3,200 troops at the peak) in
December 2006 after handing Dhi Qar Province to ISF control.
! Romanian leaders are debating whether to withdraw or reduce their
890 forces which operate in southern Iraq.

CRS-48
! In line with a February 21, 2007 announcement, Denmark withdrew
its 460 troops from the Basra area.
! In August 2007, Lithuania withdrew its 53 troops.
! In 2007, Georgia increased its Iraq force to 2,000 (from 850) to
assist the policing the Iran-Iraq border at Al Kut, a move that
Georgian officials said was linked to its efforts to obtain NATO
membership. However, Georgia said in September 2007 that it might
reduce that force to 300 by mid-2008.
! Britain, despite its redeployments discussed above, continues to
constitute the largest non-U.S. foreign force in Iraq. In line with
plans announced in 2007, British forces have been reduced from
7,100 to about 4,000 and are shifting to an “overwatch” mission in
southern Iraq. The force was expected to be reduced to about 2,500
by July 2008, but Britain suspended the planned reduction because
of the March 2008 Basra combat. There is some U.S. concern that
the small size of the international force in the south could leave U.S.
supply lines and withdrawal routes poorly guarded.
! Poland has led the multinational force based near Diwaniyah and
includes forces from the following foreign countries: Armenia,
Slovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania,
Latvia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan. Polish forces number 900, down
from a high of 2,600 in 2005. Following its October 2007 election,
the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, considered less pro-
U.S. than his predecessor, has introduced legislation to parliament
(controlled by Tusk’s party) to withdraw by October 2008.
! On June 1, 2008, in line with announcements by Australia’s Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd, Australia’s 550 person contingent ended
combat operations and began leaving Iraq. The contingent had
already been reduced from 1,500 troops. In part to compensate,
Australia will provide $160 million in aid to Iraqi farmers, and will
keep naval and other forces in the region, and Australian civilians
involved in training the ISF and advising the Iraqi government will
remain.
! El Salvador said on December 11, 2007 that it would continue its
290 soldier contribution into 2008.
NATO/EU/Other Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO countries
have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to contribute funds
or equipment. In talks with visiting Prime Minister Maliki in April 2008, NATO said
it would expand the equip and train mission for the ISF. Several NATO countries and
others are offering to also train civilian personnel. In addition to the security training
offers discussed above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help train Iraqi
police, administrators, and judges outside Iraq.

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Iraq Study Group Report, Legislative Proposals, and
Other Options
In formulating the “troop surge” strategy announced on January 10, 2007,
President Bush said he weighed the December 6, 2006, report of the Iraq Study
Group, as well as input from several other reviews, including one directed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and another by the National Security Council. For a comparison
of various legislative proposals on Iraq, see CRS Report RL34172 Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Detainee Issues: Major Votes from the 110th Congress
, by Kim
Klarman, Lisa Mages, and Pat Towell.
Iraq Study Group Report
The President’s “New Way Forward” plan appeared to deviate from many
aspects of the Iraq Study Group report, although differences later narrowed. The
Administration has noted that the Iraq Study Group said it might support a temporary
surge along the lines proposed by the President.43 Among the most significant of the
79 recommendations, some of which were discussed previously, are the following:44
! Foremost, transition from U.S.-led combat to Iraqi security self-
reliance by early 2008 (Recommendations 40-45), with continued
U.S. combat against AQ-I and force protection, in addition to
training and equipping the ISF. The transition to ISF-led combat
was largely reversed by the “troop surge” strategy, see above.
! Heightened regional and international diplomacy, including with
Iran and Syria, and including the holding of a major international
conference in Baghdad (Recommendations 1-12). After appearing
to reject this recommendation, the Administration later backed the
regional diplomatic process on Iraq discussed above.
! As part of an international approach, renewed commitment to Arab-
Israeli peace (Recommendations 13-17). This was not a major
feature of the President’s plan, although he has authorized stepped
up U.S. diplomacy by Secretary of State Rice on this issue.
! Additional economic, political, and military support for the
stabilization of Afghanistan (Recommendation 18). This was not
43 Full text of the report is at [http://www.usip.org]. The Iraq Study Group itself was
launched in March 2006; chosen by mutual agreement among its congressional organizers
to co-chair were former Secretary of State James Baker and former Chairman of the House
International Relations Committee Lee Hamilton. The eight other members of the Group are
from both parties and have held high positions in government. The group was funded by the
conference report on P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the
U.S. Institute of Peace for operations of the group.
44 A CRS general distribution memo, available on request, has information on the 79
recommendations and the status of implementation.

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specified in the President’s January 10 plan, although, separately,
there have been increases in U.S. troops and aid for Afghanistan.
(See CRS Report RL30588: Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
.)
! Setting benchmarks for the Iraqi government to achieve political
reconciliation, security, and governance, including possibly
withholding some U.S. support if the Iraqi government refuses or
fails to do so (Recommendations 19-37). The President opposed
reducing support for the Iraqi government if it fails to uphold
commitments, but he signed P.L. 110-28 which linked U.S.
economic aid to progress on the benchmarks.
! Giving greater control over police and police commando units to the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense, which is considered less sectarian than the
Ministry of Interior that now controls these forces, and reforming the
Ministry of Interior (Recommendations 50-58). The Administration
has sought reform of the Ministry of Interior, with mixed results, but
the police forces are still under MOI control.
! Securing and expanding Iraq’s oil sector (Recommendations 62-63).
The Administration is prodding Iraq to pass the pending oil laws,
which would encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s energy sector.
! Increasing economic aid to Iraq and enlisting more international
donations of assistance (Recommendations 64-67). The President’s
plan increased aid, as discussed above, although U.S. aid is now
being reduced because of healthy Iraqi oil income.
In the 110th Congress, an amendment to H.R. 2764, the FY2008 foreign aid bill,
would have revived the Iraq Study Group (providing $1 million for its operations) to
help assess future policy after the “troop surge.” The provision was not incorporated
into the Consolidated appropriation (P.L. 110-161). In the Senate, some Senators
from both parties in June 2007 proposed legislation (S. 1545) to adopt the
recommendations of the Group as U.S. policy.
Further Options: Altering Troop Levels or Mission
The sections below discuss options that have been under discussion even before
the report of the Iraq Study Group or the troop surge, and some of these options
remain under active debate. Some of the ideas discussed below may be similar to
some of the recommendations of the Study Group as well as the President’s plan. The
debate over the U.S. troop presence, present and future, is likely to accelerate in view
of the unexpected upsurge of violence in southern Iraq, which to some extent
contradicts Administration assertions of uninterrupted reductions in violence because
of the troop surge. In the Petraeus-Crocker hearings in April 8-9, 2008, some
Members criticized the Administration for lack of a clear definition of the conditions
that would permit further U.S. troop reductions.

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Further Troop Increase. Some argued that the “surge” was too limited —
concentrated mainly in Baghdad and Anbar — and that the United States should have
increased troops levels in Iraq even further to prevent Sunni insurgents from re-
infiltrating cleared areas. However, this option appears to have faded because of
security progress resulting from the surge already in place. A more recent version of
this option, advocated by some, was to keep the surged force in place until at least
the end of 2008 and not to reduce to pre-surge levels, as has now been authorized.
Immediate and Complete Withdrawal. The Administration adamantly
opposes this option, arguing that the ISF are not ready to secure Iraq alone and that
doing so would result in full-scale civil war, safehaven for AQ-I, emboldening of Al
Qaeda more generally, and increased involvement of regional powers in the fighting
in Iraq. Supporters of the Administration position say that Al Qaeda terrorists might
“follow us home” — conduct attacks in the United States — if there were a complete
withdrawal.
Some Members argue for immediate withdrawal by saying that the decision to
invade Iraq was a mistake and unjustified, that the large U.S. presence in Iraq is
inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S.
casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Other Members argue that U.S.
forces are now policing a civil war rather than fighting an insurgency. Those who
support a withdrawal include most of the approximately 70 Members of the “Out of
Iraq Congressional Caucus,” formed in June 2005. In the 110th Congress, some have
introduced legislation (H.R. 508 and H.R. 413) that would repeal the original
authorization for the Iraq war.
In the 109th Congress, Representative John Murtha, ranking member (now
chairman) of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, introduced a resolution
(H.J.Res. 73) calling for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable date” and the
maintenance of an “over the horizon” U.S. presence, mostly in Kuwait, from which
U.S. forces could continue to battle AQ-I. A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written
by Representative Duncan Hunter, then chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee), expressed the sense “that the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be
terminated immediately;” it failed 403-3 on November 18, 2005. Representative
Murtha introduced a similar bill in the 110th Congress (H.J.Res. 18); a Senate bill (S.
121) as well as a few other House bills (H.R. 663, H.R. 455, and H.R. 645) contain
similar provisions.
Withdrawal Timetable. The Administration has opposed mandating a
withdrawal timetable on the grounds that doing so would allow insurgents to “wait
out” a U.S. withdrawal. The Iraq Study Group suggests a winding down of the U.S.
combat mission by early 2008 but did not recommend a firm timetable. Some forms
of this option continue to exhibit some support in Congress.
The House leadership inserted a binding provision of FY2007 supplemental
appropriations legislation (H.R. 1591) that would require the president, as a condition
of maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq, to certify (by July 1, 2007) that Iraq had made
progress toward several political reconciliation benchmarks, and by October 1, 2007
that the benchmarks have been met. Even if the requirements were met, the
amendment would require the start of a redeployment from Iraq by March 1, 2008,

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to be completed by September 1, 2008. The whole bill passed the House on March
23, 2007. In the Senate-passed version of H.R. 1591, a provision would set a non-
binding goal for U.S. withdrawal of March 1, 2008, in line with S.J.Res. 9 cited
above. The conference report adopted elements of both bills, retaining the benchmark
certification requirement and the same dates for the start of a withdrawal but making
the completion of any withdrawal (by March 31, 2008, not September 1, 2008) a goal
rather than a firm deadline. President Bush vetoed the conference report on May 1,
2007, and the veto was sustained. The revised provision in the FY2007 supplemental
(H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28) was discussed previously.
A House bill, (H.R. 2956), which mandates a beginning of withdrawal within
120 days and completion by April 1, 2008, was adopted on July 12, 2007 by a vote
of 223-201. A proposed amendment (S.Amdt. 2087) to H.R. 1585 contained a similar
provision. A Senate bill (S. 433), would set a deadline for withdrawing combat
troops by March 31, 2008.
On November 13, 2007, some in Congress revived the idea, in an FY2008
supplemental request for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (H.R. 4156), of
setting a target date (December 15, 2008) for a U.S. withdrawal, except for force
protection and “counter-terrorism” operations. The bill would require the withdrawal
to start within 30 days of enactment. The bill passed the House but cloture was not
invoked in the Senate. The debate over whether or not to mandate a timetable for
withdrawal has continued in consideration of a FY2008 supplemental appropriation
(H.R. 2642).
In the 109th Congress, the timetable issue was debated extensively. In November
2005, Senator Levin introduced an amendment to S. 1042 (FY2006 defense
authorization bill) to compel the Administration to work on a timetable for
withdrawal during 2006. Then-Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
John Warner subsequently submitted a related amendment that stopped short of
setting a timetable for withdrawal but required an Administration report on a
“schedule for meeting conditions” that could permit a U.S. withdrawal. That
measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006 should be a period of
significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-partisan support, passing
79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications by House conferees, in the
conference report on the bill (H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163). On June 22, 2006, the
Senate debated two Iraq-related amendments to an FY2007 defense authorization bill
(S. 2766). One, offered by Senator Kerry, setting a July 1, 2007, deadline for U.S.
redeployment from Iraq, was defeated 86-13. Another, sponsored by Senator Levin,
called on the Administration to begin redeployment out of Iraq by the end of 2006,
but with no deadline for full withdrawal. It was defeated 60-39.
Troop Mission Change. Insisting that the “troop surge” is producing positive
military results, President Bush opposes a major scale-back of the U.S. mission until
the ISF is able to secure Iraq on its own. However, as noted above, the
Administration is already planning to try to move to an “overwatch” role.
Some argue that the United States should not be “policing a civil war” and
should instead scale back its mission to: (1) operations against AQ-I; (2) an end to
active patrolling of Iraqi streets; (3) force protection; and (4) training the ISF. The

CRS-53
intra-Shiite fighting in March 2008 might support the argument that Iraqi factions
remain unreconciled and that reducing U.S. combat would force the factions to share
power. The rationale for changing the U.S. mission would be to maintain a U.S.
presence, possibly long term, to assist the Iraqi government and protect core U.S.
interests but without incurring large U.S. casualties. A press report in June 2007
(Washington Post, June 10, 2007) said that, if this were the new mission of U.S.
forces, fulfilling the mission might require retaining about 50,000 - 60,000 U.S.
forces. Of these forces, about 20,000 would be assigned to guarantee the security of
the Iraqi government or assist the ISF if it is having difficulty in battle. A reduced
U.S. mission similar to those described are stipulated in H.R. 2451. A change of
mission — but without a deadline for withdrawal — was proposed by several
Senators for consideration of the FY2008 defense authorization (H.R. 1585) but was
not in the conference report on the bill.
Planning for Withdrawal. Administration officials say they will not publicly
discuss whether or not there is planning for a withdrawal because doing so would
undermine current policy. However, Secretary Gates toured facilities in Kuwait in
August 2007 in what was reported as an effort to become familiar with the
capabilities of the U.S. military to carry out a redeployment, if ordered. Some
Members want the Administration to plan for a substantial U.S. redeployment from
Iraq and to inform Congress accordingly. A bill, introduced in July 2007 by
Representative Tanner (H.R. 3087), would require the Administration to give
Congress a plan for redeployment from Iraq. That bill was passed by the House on
October 2, 2007 by a vote of 377-46. Senator Hillary Clinton reportedly was briefed
on August 2, 2007 by Defense Department officials on the status of planning for a
withdrawal, if one is decided, and she and several others introduced legislation on
August 2, 2007 (S. 1950), to require contingency planning for withdrawal.
Requiring More Time Between Deployments. Some Members who favor
at least a partial pullout do so on the grounds that the Iraq effort is placing too much
strain on the U.S. military. A Senate amendment to H.R. 1585, requiring more time
between deployments to Iraq, was not agreed to on September 19, 2007 because it
only received 56 affirmative votes, not the needed 60 for passage. A similar House
bill, H.R. 3159, was passed in the House on August 2, 2007 by a vote of 229-194.
Stepped Up International and Regional Diplomacy
As noted above, many of the Iraq Study Group recommendations propose
increased regional, multi-lateral, and international diplomacy. One idea, included in
the Study Group report, is to form a “contact group” of major countries and Iraqi
neighbors to prevail on Iraq’s factions to compromise. The Administration has taken
significant steps in this direction, including a bilateral meeting with Syria at the May
3-4, 2007 meeting on Iraq in Egypt, and the bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad
discussed above. In the 110th Congress, a few bills (H.R. 744, H.Con.Res. 43, and
H.Con.Res. 45) support the Iraq Study Group recommendation for an international
conference on Iraq. In the 109th Congress, these ideas were included in several
resolutions, including S.J.Res. 36, S.Res. 470, S.J.Res. 33, and S. 1993, although
several of these bills also include provisions for timetables for a U.S. withdrawal.

CRS-54
Other ideas involve recruitment of new force donors. In July 2004, then-
Secretary of State Powell said the United States would consider a Saudi proposal for
a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform peacekeeping in Iraq,
reportedly under separate command. Some Iraqi leaders believed that such
peacekeepers would come from Sunni Muslim states and would inevitably favor
Sunni factions within Iraq. On the other hand, several experts believe that the lack
of progress in stabilizing Iraq is caused by internal Iraqi disputes and processes and
that new regional or international steps would yield minimal results. For more
information, see CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,
coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
Another idea is to identify a high-level international mediator to negotiate with
Iraq’s major factions. Some Members of Congress wrote to President Bush in
November 2006 asking that he name a special envoy to Iraq to follow up on some of
the Administration’s efforts to promote political reconciliation in Iraq.
Political Reconciliation, Reorganization, and “Federalism”
Many proposals focus on the need for more progress toward a “political
solution,” a requirement acknowledged by Gen. Petraeus and almost all senior U.S.
officials, and one consistently discussed by many Members of Congress. These
proposals involve differing methods for altering Iraq’s power structure — beyond the
reconciliation measures already advocated by U.S. officials — so that no major
community feels excluded or has incentive to back violence.
Reorganize the Existing Power Structure. Some believe that more
sweeping political reconciliation efforts are needed beyond those that would be
achieved by the passage of the laws identified as “benchmarks,” discussed above.
However, there is little agreement on what additional or alternative incentives, if any,
would persuade Sunnis leaders and their constituents to support the Shiite-dominated
government. Some believe that Sunnis might be satisfied by a wholesale
cabinet/governmental reshuffle that gives several leading positions, such as that of
President, to a Sunni Arab, although many Kurds might resent such a move because
a Kurd now holds that post. Some maintain these Sunni grievances can be addressed
in the Constitutional Review process under way, and discussed above. Others oppose
major governmental change because doing so might necessitate the voiding of the
2005 elections, a move that would appear un-democratic.
Some argue that Iraq could adopt the “Lebanon model” in which major positions
are formally allotted to representatives of major factions. For example, Iraqis might
agree that henceforth, the President might be a Sunni, the Prime Minister might be
Shiite, and the COR Speaker might be Kurdish, or some combination of these
allocations. Some believe such as system has worked relatively well in Lebanon
helping it avoid all out civil war since the late 1980s, although others argue that
Lebanon is perpetually unstable and that this model is not necessarily successful.
Support the Dominant Factions. Another view expressed by some is that
the United States should place all its political, military, and economic support behind
the mainstream Shiite and Kurdish factions that have supported the U.S.-led political
transition process and now dominate Iraq’s government. According to this view,

CRS-55
which some refer to as the “80% solution” (Shiites and Kurds are about 80% of the
population),45 the Sunni Arabs will never accept the new order in Iraq and the United
States should cease trying to pressure the Shiites and Arabs to try to satisfy them.
Some who take this perspective say the Sunni Arabs might begin supporting the new
political order if they perceive that the United States might, at some point, cease
trying to make accommodations for them. Others say that the recent U.S. cooperation
with Sunni insurgent groups has angered the Shiites and Kurds, and further risks all-
out civil war if the United States were to draw down its forces.
Opponents of this strategy say that it is no longer needed because Sunnis have
now begun cooperating with the United States, and are beginning to reconcile with
the Shiites and Kurds. Others say this is unworkable because the Shiites have now
fractured, and the United States now supports one group of Shiites against another -
the Sadrists and their allies. These factors demonstrate, according to those who hold
this view, that it is possible to build a multi-sectarian multi-ethnic government in
Iraq. Others say that Iraq’s Sunni neighbors will not accept a complete U.S. tilt
toward the Shiites and Kurds, which would likely result in even further repression of
the Sunni Arab minority. Still others say that a further U.S. shift in favor of the
Shiites and Kurds would contradict the U.S. commitment to the protection of Iraq’s
minorities.
“Federalism”/Decentralization/Break-Up Options. Some maintain that
Iraq cannot be stabilized as one country and should be broken up, or “hard
partitioned,” into three separate countries: one Kurdish, one Sunni Arab, and one
Shiite Arab.46 This option is widely opposed by a broad range of Iraqi parties as likely
to produce substantial violence as Iraq’s major communities separate physically, and
that the resulting three countries would be unstable and too small to survive without
domination by Iraq’s neighbors. Others view this as a U.S. attempt not only to usurp
Iraq’s sovereignty but to divide the Arab world and thereby enhance U.S. regional
domination. Still others view any version of this idea, including the less dramatic
derivations discussed below, as unworkable because of the high percentage of mixed
Sunni-Shiite Arab families in Iraq that some say would require “dividing bedrooms.”
This recommendation was rejected by the Iraq Study Group as potentially too violent.
A derivation of the partition idea, propounded by Senator Biden and Council on
Foreign Relations expert Leslie Gelb (May 1, 2006, New York Times op-ed), as well
as others, is form — or to not prevent Iraqis from forming — three autonomous
regions, dominated by each of the major communities. A former U.S. Ambassador
and adviser to the Kurds, Peter Galbraith, as well as others,47 advocates this option,
which some refer to as a “soft partition,” but which supporters of the plan say is
implementation of the federalism already enshrined in Iraq’s constitution. According
to this view, decentralizing Iraq into autonomous zones would ensure that Iraq’s
45 Krauthammer, Charles. “The 20 Percent Solution.” Washington Post op-ed, July 20, 2007.
46 The pros and cons of some of these plans and proposals is discussed in Cordesman,
Anthony. Pandora’s Box: Iraqi Federalism, Separatism, “Hard” Partitioning, and U.S.
Policy. Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 9, 2007.
47 Joseph, Edward and Michael O’Hanlon. “The Case for Soft Partition.” USA Today,
October 3, 2007.

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territorial integrity is preserved while ensuring that these communities do not enter
all-out civil war with each other. Others say that decentralization is already de-facto
U.S. policy as exhibited by the increasing transfer of authority to Sunni tribes in the
Sunni areas and the relative lack of U.S. troops in the Shiite south, and that
formalizing the policy would merely confirm the existing direction of U.S. policy and
of events on the ground in Iraq. Others say that the Sunni Arabs, who initially
opposed federalism in the constitution, now are reconsidering that view and might
even want to form their own autonomous Sunni region.
The idea will be tested in April 2008 when the voluntarily moratorium ends on
forming new regions, agreed in October 2006 by the major factions when the regions
law was adopted. However, some believe that popular Shiite support for ISCI’s drive
to form a major Shiite region in southern Iraq, spanning as many as nine provinces,
has faded since the regions law was passed, in part because of the Iranian influence
in the south which is increasingly resented.
Proponents of the idea say that options such as this were successful in other
cases, particularly in the Balkans, in alleviating sectarian conflict. Proponents add
that the idea is a means of bypassing the logjam and inability to reconcile that
characterizes national politics in Iraq. Some believe that, to alleviate Iraqi concerns
about equitable distribution of oil revenues, an international organization should be
tapped to distribute Iraq’s oil revenues.
Opponents of the idea say it is being proposed for expediency — to allow the
United States to withdraw from Iraq without establishing a unified and strong central
government that can defend itself. Still others say the idea does not take sufficient
account of Iraq’s sense of Iraq national identity, which, despite all difficulties, is still
expressed to a wide range of observers and visitors. Others maintain that any soft
partition of Iraq would inevitably evolve into drives by the major communities for
outright independence. Observers in the Balkans say that the international community
had initially planned to preserve a central government of what was Yugoslavia, but
that this became untenable and Yugoslavia was broken up into several countries.48
Others say, drawing some support from recent events between Turkey and the Iraqi
Kurds, that the autonomous regions of a decentralized Iraq would inevitably fall
under the sway of Iraq’s neighbors. Still others say that, no matter how the concept
is implemented, there will be substantial bloodshed as populations move into areas
where their sect or group predominates.
The federalism, or decentralization, plan gained strength with the passage of on
September 26, 2007, of an amendment to the Senate version of H.R. 4986 (P.L. 110-
181), an FY2008 defense authorization bill. The amendment passed 75-23 (to H.R.
1585, the original version that was vetoed over other issues), showing substantial
bipartisan support. It is a “sense of Congress” that states that:
! The United States should actively support a political settlement,
based on the “final provisions” of the Iraqi constitution (reflecting
the possibility of major amendments, to the constitution, as
48 CRS conversations in Croatia, October 2007.

CRS-57
discussed above), that creates a federal Iraq and allows for federal
regions.
! A conference of Iraqis should be convened to reach a comprehensive
political settlement based on the federalism law approved by the
COR in October 2006.
! The amendment does not specify how many regions should be
formed or that regions would correspond to geographic areas
controlled by major Iraqi ethnicities or sects.
Subsequently, with the exception of the Kurds and some other Iraqi Arab
officials, many of the main blocs in Iraq, jointly and separately, came out in
opposition to the amendment on some of the grounds discussed above, although
many of the Iraqi statements appeared to refer to the amendment as a “partition” plan,
an interpretation that proponents of the amendment say is inaccurate. A U.S.
Embassy Iraq statement on the amendment also appeared to mischaracterize the
legislation, saying “As we have said in the past, attempts to partition or divide Iraq
by intimidation, force, or other means into three separate states would produce
extraordinary suffering and bloodshed. The United States has made clear our strong
opposition to such attempts.”
“Coup” or “Strongman” Option. Another option that received substantial
discussion in 2007, a time of significant U.S. criticism of Maliki’s failure to achieve
substantial reconciliation. Some Iraqis believe the United States might try to use its
influence among Iraqis to force Maliki to resign — or to force a vote of no-
confidence against him in the COR — and replace him with a military strongman or
some other figure who would crack down on militias, or someone who is more
inclined to reach compromise with the restive Sunni Arabs. Some say former Prime
Minister Allawi still is trying to position himself as such an alternative figure.
However, experts in the United States see no concrete signs that such an option might
be under consideration by the Administration, and other accounts say that Iraqi
leaders are divided over who would replace Maliki, thus ensuring deadlock and his
continuation in office. Some accounts say that this option is adamantly opposed by
Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who seeks, above all, to preserve Shiite unity. Using U.S.
influence to force out Maliki would, in the view of many, conflict with the U.S. goal
of promoting democracy and rule of law in Iraq. Some press reports say that
President Bush is opposed to this option, but editorials in January 2008 suggested
that some Iraqi leaders continue to agitate against Maliki.49
Economic Measures
Some believe that the key to calming Iraq is to accelerate economic
reconstruction, and they see the draft oil law as drawing in the foreign investment to
Iraq’s key energy sector that is needed to drive economic development. Accelerated
reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment, improving
public services, and creating confidence in the government. This idea, propounded
49 Ignatius, David. “A Surge Against Maliki.” Washington Post, op-ed. January 9, 2008.

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by DOD reconstruction official Paul Brinkley (Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Business Transformation in Iraq), was incorporated into the President’s January 10
initiative, in part by attempting to revive state-owned factories that can employ
substantial numbers of Iraqis. Prior to that, the concept of using economic
reconstruction to drive political accommodation was reflected in the decision to form
PRTs, as discussed above. Others doubt that economic improvement alone will
produce major political results because the differences among Iraq’s major
communities are fundamental and resistant to economic solutions. Another idea has
been to set up an Iraqi fund, or trust, that would ensure that all Iraqis share equitably
in Iraq’s oil wealth. In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (December 18, 2006)
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator John Ensign supported the idea of an
“Iraq Oil Trust” modeled on the Alaska Permanent Fund.
Some Members believe that Iraq, now flush with oil revenues and unspent
assets, should now begin assuming more of the financial burden for Iraq and that the
United States should sharply cut back reconstruction and security funding for Iraq.
In April 2008, following the Petraeus and Crocker testimony, some Members began
advocating that any or all U.S. reconstruction funding for Iraq be provided as loan,
not grant. A similar provision to make about half of the $18 billion in U.S.
reconstruction funds in the FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 106-108), discussed above,
was narrowly defeated on the floor (October 16, 2003, amendment defeated 226-
200).
The Administration argues, based on the Iraqi budget figures provided above
and discussed in the Petraeus-Crocker April 2008 testimony, that Iraq is already
assuming more of the burden. Gen. Petraeus testified that, as one example, Iraqi
increases in its own security funds had allowed the Administration to reduce its
FY2009 request for ISF funding to $2.8 billion, from an otherwise $5 billion.

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Table 7. Major Factions in Iraq
Major Shiite and Kurdish Factions
Iraq National
The INA leads the main secular bloc (Iraqis List) in parliament. Allawi, about
Accord
62 years old (born 1946 in Baghdad), a former Baathist who helped Saddam
(INA)/Iyad al-
silence Iraqi dissidents in Europe in the mid-1970s. Subsequently fell out with
Allawi
Saddam, became a neurologist, and presided over the Iraqi Student Union in
Europe. Survived an alleged regime assassination attempt in London in 1978.
He is a secular Shiite, but many INA members are Sunni ex-Baathists and ex-
military officers. Allawi was interim Prime Minister (June 2004-April 2005).
Won 40 seats in January 2005 election but only 25 in December 2005. Spends
most of his time outside Iraq and reportedly trying to organize a non-sectarian
parliamentary governing coalition to replace Maliki. Now boycotting the
cabinet.
Iraqi National
Chalabi, who is about 67 years old, educated in the United States
Congress
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. One of the rotating
(INC)/Ahmad
presidents of the Iraq Governing Council (IGC). U.S.-backed Iraqi police
Chalabi
raided INC headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing documents as
part of an investigation of various allegations, including provision of U.S.
intelligence to Iran. Case later dropped. Since 2004, has allied with and fallen
out with Shiite Islamist factions; was one of three deputy prime ministers in the
2005 transition government. No INC seats in parliament, but Chalabi remains
chair of the Higher National De-Baathification Commission and has resisted de-
Baathification reform efforts. Serves as liaison between Baghdad neighborhood
committees and the government in attempting to improve public services,
giving him entree to senior U.S. military and diplomatic officials, leading to
assessments that he is rebuilding his influence.
Kurds/KDP and
Together, the main factions run Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with
PUK
its own executive headed by “president” Masud Barzani, Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani, and a 111 seat legislature (elected in January 30, 2005
national elections). PUK leader Talabani remains president, despite March
2007 health problems that required treatment in Jordan and the United States.
Barzani has tried to secure his clan’s base in the Kurdish north and has
distanced himself from national politics. Many Kurds are more supportive of
outright Kurdish independence than are these leaders. Kurds field up to
100,000 peshmerga militia. Their joint slate won 75 seats in January 2005
national election but only 53 in December 2005. Grudgingly supported
framework draft oil law sent to parliament, but strongly oppose related draft
implementing law that would place 93% of Iraq’s oil fields under control of a
revived Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). Both factions intent on securing
control of Kirkuk.
Grand
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. About 87 years old, he was born
Ayatollah Ali
in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. No
al-Sistani
formal position in government but has used his broad Shiite popularity to
become instrumental in major political questions. Helped forge UIA and
brokered compromise over the selection of a Prime Minister nominee in April
2006. Criticized Israel’s July 2006 offensive against Lebanese Hezbollah.
However, acknowledges that his influence is waning and that calls for Shiite
restraint are unheeded as Shiites look to militias, such as Sadr’s, for defense in
sectarian warfare. Does not meet with U.S. officials but does meet with U.N.
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Has network of agents (wakils)
throughout Iraq and among Shiites outside Iraq. Treated for heart trouble in
Britain in August 2004 and reportedly has reduced his schedule in early 2008.
Advocates traditional Islamic practices such as modest dress for women,
abstention from alcohol, and curbs on Western music and
entertainment.

CRS-60
Major Shiite and Kurdish Factions
Supreme
Best-organized and most pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist party and generally allied
Islamic Council
with Da’wa Party in UIA. It was established in 1982 by Tehran to centralize
of (ISCI)
Shiite Islamist movements in Iraq. First leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim,
killed by bomb in Najaf in August 2003. Current leader is his younger brother,
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric and a member of
parliament (UIA slate), but he holds no government position. Hakim currently
undergoing lung cancer treatment, instilling uncertainty in ISCI leadership. One
of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is now Finance Minister, and another, Adel Abd
al-Mahdi, is a deputy president. Controls “Badr Brigades” militia. Son, Ammar
al-Hakim, is a key ISCI figure as well and is said to be favored to take over
ISCI should his father’s condition become fatal. As part of UIA, ISCI has 29
members in parliament. Supports formation of Shiite “region” composed of
nine southern provinces and dominates provincial councils on seven of those
provinces. Supports draft oil law to develop the oil sector, and broad defense
pact with the United States.
Da’wa (Islamic
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active against Saddam
Call) Party
Hussein in early 1980s. Its founder, Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr, uncle of
Moqtada Al Sadr, was ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung by
Saddam regime in 1980. Da’wa members tend to follow senior Lebanese Shiite
cleric Mohammad Hossein Fadlallah rather than Iranian clerics, and Da’wa is
not as close to Tehran as is ISCI. Has no organized militia and a lower
proportion of clerics than does ISCI. Within UIA, its two factions (one loyal to
Maliki and one loyal to another figure, parliamentarian Abd al-Karim al-Anizi,
control 25 seats in parliament. Da’wa generally supports draft oil law and
defense pact with U.S. The Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa allegedly committed
a May 1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December
1983 attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. (It was reported in
February 2007 that a UIA/Da’wa parliamentarian, Jamal al-Ibrahimi, was
convicted by Kuwait for the 1983 attacks.) Lebanese Hezbollah, founded by
Lebanese Da’wa activists, attempted to link release of the Americans they held
hostage in Lebanon in the 1980s to the release of 17 Da’wa prisoners held by
Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s.
Moqtada Al-
See text box above.
Sadr Faction
Fadilah Party
Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, who was a leader of the Sadr
movement after the death of Moqtada’s father in 1999 but was later removed
by Moqtada and subsequently broke with the Sadr faction. Fadilah (Virtue)
won 15 seats parliament as part of the UIA but publicly left that bloc on March
6, 2007 to protest lack of a Fadilah cabinet seat. Holds seats on several
provincial councils in the Shiite provinces and dominates Basra provincial
council, whose governor is a party member. Also controls protection force for
oil installations in Basra, and is popular among oil workers and unions in Basra.
Opposes draft oil law as too favorable to foreign firms. Considers itself
opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq and wants a small (one - three provinces)
Shiite region in the south.
Hezbollah Iraq
Headed by ex-guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the
IGC and now in parliament. Party’s power base is southern marsh areas around
Amara (Maysan Province), north of Basra. Has some militiamen. Supports a
less formal version of Shiite region in the south than does ISCI.
Tharallah
Led by Sayyid Yusuf al-Musawi. Small Shiite faction in southern Iraq formed
from former marsh guerrillas against Saddam. Purportedly pro-Iranian.

CRS-61
Major Shiite and Kurdish Factions
Islamic Amal
A relatively small faction, Islamic Amal (Action) Organization is headed by
Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a moderate cleric. Power base is in
Karbala, and it conducted attacks there against Saddam regime in the 1980s.
Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime in the 1980s
and 1990s. One member in the cabinet (Minister of Civil Society Affairs).
Ayatollah
Another Karbala-based faction, loyal to Ayatollah Mahmoud al-Hassani, who
Hassani Faction
also was a Sadrist leader later removed by Moqtada. His armed followers
clashed with local Iraqi security forces in Karbala in mid-August 2006.
Major Sunni Factions
Iraqi Consensus
Often referred to by Arabic name “Tawafuq,” Front is led by Iraqi Islamic Party
Front
(IIP), headed by Tariq al-Hashimi, now a deputy president. COR Speaker
(Tariq al-
Mahmoud Mashadani, a hardliner, is a senior member; in July 2006, he called
Hashimi and
the U.S. invasion “the work of butchers.” IIP withdrew from the January 2005
Adnan al-
election but led the Sunni “Consensus Front” coalition in December 2005
Dulaymi)
elections, winning 44 seats in COR. Front, critical but accepting of U.S.
presence, also includes Iraqi General People’s Council of the hardline Adnan
al-Dulaymi, and the National Dialogue Council (Mashhadani’s party). Opposes
draft oil law as sellout to foreign companies and distrusts Shiite pledges to
equitably share oil revenues. Several factions want to limit U.S. latitude in any
defense pact with U.S. Pulled five cabinet ministers out of government on
August 1, but Hashimi still deputy president. Adnan Dulaymi widely accused
by Shiite Iraqi leaders of hiding weapons for Sunni insurgents, using properties
owned by himself and his son.
Iraqi Front for
Head is Saleh al-Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis on the
National
new constitution, but was dissatisfied with the outcome and now advocates
Dialogue
major revisions. Bloc holds 11 seats, generally aligned with Consensus Front.
Opposes draft oil law on same grounds as Consensus Front, and generally
opposes broad defense pact with U.S.
Muslim
Hardline Sunni Islamist group led by clerics Harith al-Dhari and Abd al-Salam
Scholars
al-Qubaysi, has boycotted all post-Saddam elections. Believed to have ties
Association
to/influence over insurgent factions. Wants timetable for U.S. withdrawal from
(MSA)
Iraq. Iraqi government issued a warrant for Dhari’s arrest in November 2006
for suspected ties to the Sunni insurgency, causing Dhari to remain outside Iraq
(in Jordan). Headquarters raided at behest of pro-government Sunni
Endowment organization in November 2007. Opposes draft oil law and U.S.
defense pact.
Sunni Tribes/
Not an organized faction per se, but begun in Anbar by about 20 tribes, the
“Awakening
National Salvation Council formed by Shaykh Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi
Movement”/
(assassinated on September 13) credited by U.S. commanders as a source of
Concerned
anti-Al Qaeda support that is helping calm Anbar Province. Some large tribal
Local Citizens
confederations include Dulaym (Ramadi-based), Jabburi (mixed Sunni-Shiite
tribe), Zobi (near Abu Ghraib), and Shammar (Salahuddin and Diyala regions).
Trend has spread to include former Sunni insurgents now serving as local anti-
Al Qaeda protection forces (Concerned Local Citizens) in Baghdad, parts of
Diyala province, Salahuddin province, and elsewhere. Somewhat supportive of
U.S. defense pact.

CRS-62
Major Sunni Factions
Iraqi Insurgents
Numerous factions and no unified leadership. Some groups led by ex-Saddam
regime leaders, others by Islamic extremists. Major Iraqi factions include
Islamic Army of Iraq, New Baath Party, Muhammad’s Army, and the 1920
Revolution Brigades. Perceived as increasingly opposed to AQ-I.
Al Qaeda in
AQ-I was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian national, until his death
Iraq (AQ-I) /
in U.S. airstrike June 7, 2006. Succeeded by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (Abu
Foreign
Ayyub al-Masri), an Egyptian. Estimated 3,000 in Iraq (about 10-15% of total
Fighters
insurgents) from many nations, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but
increasingly subordinate to Iraqi Sunni insurgents under the banner of the
“Islamic State of Iraq.” See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda.

CRS-63
Table 8. Iraq’s Government
Position
Name
Ethnicity/Bloc/Party Status
President
Jalal Talabani
Kurd/PUK
Deputy President
Tariq al-Hashimi
Sunni/Consensus Front
Deputy President
Adel Abd-al-Mahdi
Shiite/UIA/ISCI
Prime Minister
Nuri Kamal al-
Shiite/UIA/Da’wa
Maliki
Deputy P.M.
Barham Salih
Kurdistan Alliance/PUK
Deputy P.M.
Salam Zubaie
Sunni/Consensus Front/vacant
Min. Agriculture
Ali al-Bahadili
independent Shiite named in October
2007, replaced resigned Sadrist
Min.
Muhammad Tawfiq
Shiite/Allawi bloc/boycotting; Maliki
Communications
al-Allawi
failed to obtain confirmation of
replacement in late November 2007.
Min. Culture
vacant
was held by Consensus Front bloc
Min. Defense
Abdul Qadir al-
Sunni independent
Ubaydi
Min. Displacement
Abd al-Samad Sultan
Shiite Kurd/UIA
and Migration
Min. Electricity
Karim Wahid
Shiite/UIA/independent
Min. Education
Khudayiir al-Khuzai
Shiite/UIA/Da’wa (Anizi faction)
Min Environment
Mrs. Narmin Uthman
Kurdistan Alliance/PUK
Min. Finance
Bayan Jabr
Shiite/UIA/ISCI
Min. Foreign
Hoshyar Zebari
Kurdistan Alliance/KDP
Affairs
Min. Health
Saleh al-Hasnawi
Independent Shiite named October
2007; was held by UIA/Sadr bloc.
Min. Higher
Abd Dhiyab al-Ajili
Sunni/Consensus Front/IIP/boycotting
Education
Min. Human Rights
Mrs. Wijdan Mikhail
Christian/Allawi bloc/boycotting
Min. Industry and
Fawzi al-Hariri
Christian Kurd/Kurdistan
Minerals
Alliance/KDP
Min. Interior
Jawad al-Bulani
Shiite independent

CRS-64
Position
Name
Ethnicity/Bloc/Party Status
Min. Justice
Safa al-Safi
UIA/independent/acting. Was held by
Hashim al-Shibli (Consensus Front.)
Replacement not confirmed.
Min. Housing and
Mrs. Bayan Daza’i
Kurdistan Alliance/KDP
Construction
Min. Labor and
Mahmud al-Radi
Shiite/UIA/Independent
Social Affairs
Min. Oil
Husayn al-
Shiite/UIA/Independent/close to
Shahristani
Ayatollah Sistani
Min. Planning
Ali Baban
Sunni/Consensus Front/IIP/ no longer
boycotting
Min. Trade
Abd al-Falah al-
Shiite/UIA/Da’wa (Anizi faction)
Sudani
Min. Science and
Ra’id Jahid
Sunni/Allawi
Technology
bloc/Communist/boycotting
Min. Municipalities
Riyad Ghurayyib
Shiite/UIA/ISCI (Badr)
and Public Works
Min. Transportation
vacant
was held by UIA/Sadr
Min. Water
Latif Rashid
Kurdistan Alliance/PUK
Resources
Min. Youth and
Jasim al-Jafar
Shiite Turkomen/UIA
Sports
Min. State for Civil
Mrs. Wijdan Mikhail
Christian/Allawi bloc/boycotting
Society
Min. State National
Akram al-Hakim
Shiite/UIA/ISCI (Hakim family)
Dialogue Affairs
Min. State National
Shirwan al-Waili
Shiite/UIA/Da’wa
Security
Min. State Foreign
Rafi al-Issawi
Sunni/Consensus Front/boycotting
Affairs
Min. State
vacant
was held by Allawi bloc
Provincial Affairs
Min. State Tourism
vacant
was held by UIA/Sadr
and Antiquities
Min. State for
Mrs. Fatin Mahmoud
Sunni/Consensus Front/boycotting
Women’s Affairs
Min. State for COR
Safa al-Safi
Shiite/UIA/independent/acting
Affairs

CRS-65
Table 9. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Saddam-Era Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
INC
War crimes Broadcasting
opposition
Total
activities
FY1998

2.0
5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio
Free Iraq”)
FY1999
3.0
3.0

2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000

2.0

8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002



25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1


6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-
(about 14.5
FY2003
million of this
went to INC)
FY2004



0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (April 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and an
estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to funding
disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on how U.S.
funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department agreed that the
Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s “Information
Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end its funding
of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its use of U.S.
funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was overthrown, but was
halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do not include covert aid
provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war crimes” funding was
used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi human rights; the
translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the Administration
donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war crimes tribunal is
formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See General Accounting
Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress
Support Foundation
, April 2004.


CRS-66
Figure 1. Map of Iraq