Order Code RL34509
Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and
Implications for U.S. Policy
May 22, 2008
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and Implications for U.S.
Policy
Summary
On March 29, 2008, Zimbabwe held presidential, parliamentary and local
elections. More than a month later, the country’s political future remains uncertain.
For the first time since independence, the ruling party has lost its majority in the
National Assembly. After a month of rising tensions, the results of the presidential
race were belatedly announced on May 2. They indicated that opposition leader
Morgan Tsvangirai had received more votes than the incumbent, President Robert
Mugabe, but had failed to garner the 50 percent needed to avoid a runoff.
Reports of violence and political repression have increased significantly since
the elections, which were held amidst a deepening economic crisis in the Southern
African country. Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased over 40
percent in the last decade, the inflation rate is estimated at over 165,000 percent, and
unemployment is higher than 80 percent. The adult HIV infection rate of 20 percent
has contributed to a sharp drop in life expectancy, and more than a third of the
population is expected to require food aid in 2008. Deteriorating conditions in the
country have led many Zimbabweans to emigrate to neighboring countries, creating
a substantial burden on the region. In South Africa, Zimbabwean immigrants and
others have recently been the target of xenophobic attacks.
President Mugabe’s government is seen as autocratic and repressive by its
critics, and its human rights record is poor. The regime has suppressed freedom of
speech and assembly, and many contend that it restricts access to food, already
scarce, in opposition areas. Many regional and international observers suggest the
presidential runoff, which the government has postponed until June 27, should not
be held amidst the current level of political violence. The U.S. Secretary of State has
labeled Zimbabwe an “outpost of tyranny,” and other Administration officials have
accused the ruling party of rigging the election and orchestrating the current violence.
The United States has enforced targeted sanctions against top Zimbabwe officials and
associates since 2002. Congress has expressed its opposition to the government’s
undemocratic policies in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of
2001(P.L. 107-99) and other subsequent legislation, including H.Con.Res. 100,
S.Con.Res. 25, S. 1500, S.Res. 533, and H.Res. 1230 during the 110th Congress. For
more background, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe.

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Contents
March 2008 Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Election Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Alleged Vote Buying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pre-Election Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Election Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Press Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Election Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Presidency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Runoff Elections Called . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Coalition Government? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Post-Election Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
International Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) . . . . . . . . . 12
The African Union (AU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Current U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Congressional Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Diplomatic Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Economic Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Accountability and Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
List of Tables
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and Implications
for U.S. Policy
President Robert Mugabe, 84, and his party, the Zimbabwe African National
Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), have ruled Zimbabwe since its independence in
1980. Rising inflation and unemployment rates contributed in the late 1990s to the
creation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC
enjoyed initial success, campaigning against a referendum in 2000 that would have
expanded the president’s powers, made government officials immune from
prosecution, and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned land for
redistribution to black farmers. The referendum failed, and the MDC won nearly half
the parliamentary seats in that year’s election. ZANU-PF has since taken numerous,
often undemocratic actions to maintain power.
Following the violent March 2007 assault by police on government critics,
which drew widespread international criticism, South African President Thabo Mbeki
initiated a mediation effort between the Government of Zimbabwe and the
opposition. The main objective of the mediation, as described by Mbeki, was to
create political conditions for free and fair elections, the results of which would be
accepted by all parties. Although the negotiations resulted in the amendment of some
laws seen as restricting press freedom and political activity, the talks were abandoned
after Mugabe announced that elections would be held on March 29, 2008.1 Human
rights activists argue that the legislative changes were cosmetic and that the talks
failed to create a level playing field prior to the elections.2
March 2008 Elections
Election Preparations. Many domestic and international observers assert
that elections since 2000 have fallen short of democratic standards. In the period
preceding the March 2008 elections, civil society activists reported significant pre-
election irregularities. Critics charged that the Zimbabwe Election Commission
(ZEC), which oversees elections, lacked independence, and that it was further
1 The Electoral Laws Amendment Act, which came into effect on January 11, 2008,
eliminated one of the two electoral administration bodies and required polling places to be
located in areas readily accessible to the public. It also established a continual voter
registration process and explicitly prohibited intimidation during the campaign period.
2 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses
and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No.
2(A), March 2008, and International Crisis Group (ICG), Africa Report No. 138, Zimbabwe:
Prospects from a Flawed Election, March 20, 2008.

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crippled by limited administrative capacity and budget shortages.3 The electoral body
is led by Justice George Chiweshe, a former military officer, and reports indicate that
the Commission and its regional offices are staffed by numerous former military
personnel. Reports from domestic groups suggest that the registration process was,
at best, inconsistent, and there is no indication that the ZEC addressed alleged
inaccuracies in the voters’ roll from previous elections. On the eve of the election,
the MDC accused the government of printing nine million ballots, even though there
were only 5.9 million registered voters.4
The March elections were Zimbabwe’s first attempt at holding “harmonized”
elections for all levels of government (local, National Assembly, Senate, and
presidential) simultaneously. In addition to the logistical challenges this posed, civic
groups argued that the complexity of a four-ballot election required a nationwide
voter education campaign. They claim that the ZEC’s education efforts were
inadequate and that independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were
barred from engaging in voter education programs of their own.
The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a domestic observer group
composed of 38 NGOs, alleges that the ruling party had redrawn constituencies5 to
ensure its continued hold on power. In its pre-election report, ZESN argued that there
were not enough polling stations designated for urban areas, where the opposition is
believed to have its strongest support. ZESN’s report also suggested that, as in past
elections, the ruling party manipulated state resources for campaign purposes.6 And
despite amendments to two laws, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which critics suggest
restrict freedom of speech and assembly, advocacy groups argue that the police
selectively interpreted the laws and significantly limited the MDC’s ability to
campaign.7 Sections of POSA which prohibit false statements “prejudicial” to the
state and criminalize statements construed as engendering hostility toward the
president remain in effect.
3 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections be Free and Fair in the Current
Environment? March 18, 2008.
4 “Opposition Party in Zimbabwe Accuses Mugabe of Printing Millions of Extra Ballots,”
Associated Press, March 24, 2008.
5 Parliament passed Constitutional Amendment No. 18 in late 2007, increasing the number
of parliamentary seats from 120 to 210. Following a rushed delimitation exercise, the ZEC
presented its final report, which outlined changes to several constituency and ward
boundaries, with no time for debate before parliament adjourned at the end of January 2008.
6 Lance Guma, “Election Body Calls for More Polling Stations,” SW Radio Africa, March
11, 2008, available at [http://www.allafrica.com].
7 Amendments to POSA allowed groups to present notifications for rallies and
demonstrations to the nearest police station, and if denied approval, provided for appeals to
be dealt with in a timely manner by the local magistrates court rather than the Home Affairs
Minister. Amendments to AIPPA abolished the “journalism without accreditation” offense,
although journalists remain prohibited from covering official events, like elections, without
accreditation. HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral
Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.

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Alleged Vote Buying. In addition to the allegedly partisan administration of
the elections, many observers allege that the government used public resources to buy
votes. In the weeks preceding the polls, President Mugabe announced significant
salary increases for the military and civil servants and signed into law the
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, requiring foreign-owned firms to
transfer 51 percent of their shares to domestic investors. His administration also
reportedly distributed vehicles and agricultural equipment worth millions of U.S.
dollars to ZANU-PF supporters.8 At the same time, in a country where 45 percent of
the population is considered by the World Food Program to be malnourished,
domestic groups reported numerous incidents of opposition supporters being denied
access to state food supplies.9
Pre-Election Violence. According to a domestic human rights group, the
year prior the 2008 elections was marked by a significant increase in incidents of
politically motivated violence from previous years. In 2007, there were 603 reported
incidents of torture, 865 incidents of assault, and 2,766 reports of arrest and
detention. In the months directly preceding the elections, from November 2007 to
March 2008, there were 1775 reported incidents of political violence.10 The
government routinely deployed riot police to break up demonstrations, meetings and
rallies, despite changes to the laws regulating freedom of assembly. In January,
police allegedly teargassed and assaulted protestors in Harare after a local magistrate
overruled a police order banning the march.11 In February, members of the
Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe reported being abducted and beaten by
ZANU-PF supporters; according to their accounts several members of the police and
intelligence service were present during the attacks.12 According to reports, the
perpetrators were not arrested, but the union leaders were charged with violating a
law that prohibits the distribution of pamphlets in public areas.13
Several of the country’s security service chiefs, including the heads of the army
and the police, have publicly announced that they would not recognize an electoral
victory by anyone other that Mugabe.14 In speeches and statements to the press, they
and other public officials, including the President himself, have referred to opposition
leaders as traitors, political witches, and puppets or agents of the West. In October
2007, the International Bar Association issued a report accusing Zimbabwe’s police
of being “blatantly partisan” and suggesting that the force’s failure to guarantee equal
8 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in Zimbabwe be Free and Fair
in the Current Environment? March 18, 2008.
9 “Concern Over Pre-Election Environment, Election Update (1),” ZESN Press Statement,
January 25, 2008.
10 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in Zimbabwe be Free and Fair
in the Current Environment? March 18, 2008.
11 “Zimbabwe: Opposition Activists Teargassed, Beaten,” IRIN, January 23, 2008.
12 HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in
Zimbabwe’s Coming General Elections,Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
13 ICG, “Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election,” March 20, 2008.
14 “Zim Prisons Chief Orders Officers to Vote Mugabe,” Reuters, February 29, 2008.

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protection of the law “is a major obstacle to democracy in Zimbabwe and a
considerable impediment to free and fair elections.”15 As part of the January 2008
electoral reforms, police were banned from the polling stations to allay fears of
intimidation. However, just over a week before the elections President Mugabe
issued a decree allowing police into polling stations, allegedly to help disabled
voters.
Election Monitoring. The Government of Zimbabwe reportedly invited
election observers from over 40 countries and regional organizations, including the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU),
but barred observers from countries considered to be critical of its policies.16 CNN
and other western media organizations and journalists were reportedly denied
permission to cover the elections.17 The AU observer mission, led by former
President of Sierra Leone Tejan Kabbah, issued a preliminary statement after the
elections suggesting that the elections were generally free and fair and expressed the
will of the people. Kabbah urged all parties to accept the results. The SADC observer
mission found the elections to be “a credible expression of the will of the people” but
noted concerns regarding opposition access to the media, inflammatory statements
by senior security officials, the presence of police officers at polling stations, and the
delay in the publication of the voters’ roll. Two members of the delegation, both
from South Africa’s largest opposition party, refused to sign the report, calling the
elections “chaotic” and “deeply flawed.”18 Other observer groups differed with the
SADC findings. The delegation of the World Council of Churches, in a joint
statement with the African Council of Churches, found the elections to be “skewed
in favor of the incumbent who openly utilized state resources to his advantage” and
reported media bias, “violence, intimidation and outright confrontation,” and the use
of food as a “political tool.”19
Press Restrictions. Two international journalists, one a Pulitzer Prize-
winning American correspondent for the New York Times, were arrested on April 3,
2008. After several days in jail, they were released on bail but were blocked from
leaving the country. They were acquitted on April 16. Several other journalists, both
domestic and foreign, have been arrested since the elections. The director of the
ZESN was briefly detained by police on April 14 and questioned about possible ties
to the Washington-based National Democratic Institute, which monitors elections
worldwide. More recently, the editor of The Standard, the country’s only remaining
independent newspaper, was arrested on May 5 for printing an editorial by opposition
15 International Bar Association, Partisan Policing: An Obstacle to Human Rights and
Democracy in Zimbabwe, An International Bar Association Human Rights Institute Report,
October 2007.
16 “First Poll Observers in Zimbabwe,” BBC, March 11, 2008.
17 “CNN Denied Permission to Cover Elections in Zimbabwe,” CNN, March 25, 2008.
18 Statement issued by South African Member of Parliament Diane Kohler Barnard, “DA
Rejects SADC Assessment of Zimbabwe Election as ‘Peaceful and Credible,’” available at
[http://www.da.org.za].
19 “Ecumenical Observers Challenge Zimbabwe Election Process and Demand Respect for
the Will of the People,” World Council of Churches Press Release, April 29, 2008.

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leader Arthur Mutambara entitled, “A Shameful Betrayal of National Independence.”
He was later released, but faces trial for publishing statements prejudicial to the state.
Election Results
Parliament. The MDC, which split into two factions in 2005 (known as
MDC-T and MDC-M for their respective leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur
Mutambara), remained divided for the March elections, and this division likely cost
the party several parliamentary seats.20 The ZEC, widely criticized for its delayed
release of the electoral results, announced the National Assembly results four days
after the election. The MDC factions, which reunited on April 28, won a majority in
the 220-seat National Assembly with 109 seats, over ZANU-PF’s 97.21 Three weeks
after the election, the electoral commission conducted a recount of 23 of these races,
an overwhelming majority of which were won by the opposition.22 The original
results were upheld. On April 6, the ZEC announced that the ruling party had
retained its majority in the Senate, where over one-third of its 93 members are
appointed by the president. Of the 60 seats directly elected, ZANU-PF won 30,
MDC-Tsvangirai 24, and MDC-Mutambara 6. Several senior ruling party members
lost their parliamentary seats, including the Ministers of Justice, Agriculture, Mines,
Energy, and Transport, and several senior MDC-M parliamentarians, including
Mutambara, lost to MDC-T candidates.
The Presidency. The MDC’s decision to contest the election while still
divided may also have cost the party a clear victory in the presidential race. In
February 2008, then-ZANU-PF senior member Simba Makoni announced his
intention to run against President Mugabe in the upcoming elections.23 He was
subsequently expelled from the party and ran as an independent, although he was
rumored to have been supported by several senior ruling party officials. MDC faction
leader Arthur Mutambara, who had planned to run against Mugabe and Tsvangirai,
withdrew as a presidential candidate and expressed his support for Makoni. It is
unclear how many supporters of his faction voted for Makoni instead of Tsvangirai.
The main MDC faction claimed victory for Tsvangirai days after the election
with over 50 percent of the votes cast, basing its claim on tallies of poll results posted
outside the polling stations and constituency centers immediately following the
20 A Financial Times report suggests that ZANU-PF won ten parliamentary seats that would
have been claimed by the MDC had its votes not been split between the two factions.
“Acrimonious Division Cost MDC Success,” Financial Times, April 4, 2008.
21 The Tsvangirai faction won 99 seats and MDC-Mutambara won 10. One seat was won
by an independent, and three seats remain subject to by-elections due to candidates’ deaths.
22 According to press reports, the ZEC conducted the recount in violation of a court order
to stop recounts for 23 parliamentary constituencies. The MDC had petitioned the court on
the basis that ZANU-PF’s requests for recounts were not valid because they were not filed
within 48 hours of the election in accordance with ZEC rules. The court allegedly ruled that
a recount could not be ordered until after the original results were released.
23 Makoni, 57, served as Finance Minister from 2000 to 2002 and was reportedly dismissed
after criticizing the administration’s economic policies.

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elections. Some have differed with the MDC count, suggesting that while Tsvangirai
almost certainly received more votes than Mugabe, he may not have achieved the
necessary 50 percent to avoid a runoff.24 ZESN has noted that results were not posted
in three constituency tabulation centers despite a legal requirement to do so.
The results of the presidential race were not officially announced until five
weeks after the elections. The opposition called for a nationwide strike on April 14
to protest the delayed release of results, asking supporters to stay home rather than
to demonstrate publicly. Dozens of opposition supporters, including a newly elected
member of parliament, were reportedly arrested that day for allegedly trying to incite
violence or for obstructing the freedom of movement. According to reports, the
strike was largely unsuccessful. With over 80 percent unemployment, some analysts
suggest many Zimbabweans could not afford to miss a day’s wages; other
Zimbabweans said they had not heard of the strike.25 On the evening of May 2, the
ZEC declared that Tsvangirai had received 47.9 percent of the votes, while Mugabe
received 43.2 percent and Makoni 8.3 percent. Some in the international community
questioned whether the government’s delay in releasing the presidential results
should be considered a political coup. The MDC appealed unsuccessfully to the
courts to have the results released, but the electoral commission claimed that it could
not do so until a “process of verification of the presidential ballots” was complete.26
Runoff Elections Called. Although the opposition accuses the government
of manipulating the presidential results and initially objected to participating in a
runoff, Morgan Tsvangirai has agreed to stand against President Mugabe in a second
round of voting. The MDC has suggested that the government had access to the ballot
boxes for over two weeks in April without opposition or observer supervision, and
thus they could not be sure the ballots had not been tampered with. ZESN has also
questioned the validity of the presidential results, saying, “ZESN cannot substantiate
ZEC figures as the network is not aware of the chain of custody of the ballot
materials during the aforementioned period” and claiming that the delayed
announcement of the presidential results undermined the impartiality of the ZEC.
These concerns have also been echoed by the United States and others.
Having waited for over a month to hear the final results from the first round of
elections, it appears Zimbabweans will have another delay before the second round.
While the electoral law requires the government to hold a runoff election within 21
days of announcing the initial results, the ZEC has declared that the runoff will not
be held until June 27, three months after the first round. Some analysts have
questioned whether Zimbabwe’s government can afford another election, estimated
to cost up to $60 million. According to official Reserve Bank figures, government
24 According to ZESN, Tsvangirai received 49.4% of the vote and Mugabe 41.8%.”ZESN
poll projections on March 29 presidential elections,” ZESN press release, March 31, 2008.
25 “Zimbabwe Opposition Strike Fails,” BBC, April 16, 2008.
26 “Opposition Unites Against Mugabe,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2008.

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borrowing in the first three months of 2008 was 43 percent above the projected
budget deficit for the year.27

The MDC initially called for the immediate deployment of election observers
from outside Africa (in addition to the SADC and AU observers) as well as the
deployment of regional peacekeepers during the runoff. The party has since modified
its demands and suggests that an increased SADC and AU observer presence will be
sufficient, if combined with an immediate repeal of restrictions on the MDC’s ability
to campaign and an end to political violence. The opposition remains largely unable
to hold public rallies, which were banned by police in the capital in mid-April. MDC
supporters now await the return of Tsvangirai, who has been outside the country
since the elections. The party has expressed concerns about his safety and, given
post-election statements by government officials accusing Tsvangirai of treason,
some believe he will not be allowed to campaign freely inside the country.28 The
opposition leader was tried, and acquitted, for treason in 2004. Many observers also
remain skeptical that the government will publish the second round results in a timely
manner, given the significant first round delay. Based on interviews with high-
ranking Zimbabwean officials, the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that if
the runoff results in a Tsvangirai victory, a military coup will result.29
Coalition Government? Zimbabwe’s state-controlled media has sent mixed
signals about the regime’s post-election plans. On April 23, the government-owned
Herald newspaper printed an editorial that suggested SADC should mediate between
the parties to create a transitional coalition government, led by President Mugabe,
that would organize new elections.30 The following day the paper announced on its
website that a unity government was “not feasible.” The head of South Africa’s
ruling party has called discussions of a unity government one “appropriate” option.31
According to the ICG’s sources, some senior ZANU-PF members, including Vice
President Joyce Mujuru and Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, tried to convince
the president to accept a unity government, but were overruled by senior security
officials. Critics allege that the ruling party may try to exercise influence over the
courts to overturn the MDC’s parliamentary majority. Both parties have challenged
the results of over 50 parliamentary races, and although the new parliament can be
sworn in during the review, the judiciary’s findings could affect the balance of power
in the parliament. Central to ZANU-PF concerns, its critics assert, are questions
regarding immunity for serious human rights abuses committed since independence.
27 “Crisis Looms After Harare Vote-Buying,” Financial Times, April 11, 2008.
28 Referring to an alleged letter between Tsvangirai and Prime Minister Gordon Brown,
Zimbabwe’s Herald accused the MDC leader of plotting “illegal regime change” and quotes
outgoing Justice Minister Chinamasa , “It is clear... that Tsvangirai along with Brown are
seeking regime change in Zimbabwe,and on the part of Tsvangirai, this is treasonous...There
is no doubting the consequences for acting in a treasonous manner.” The MDC says the
letter is a forgery. See “Zimbabwe Opposition Accused of Treason,” CNN, April 17, 2008.
29 ICG, “Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition,” Africa Briefing No. 51, May 21, 2008.
30 “West Should Stop Blocking Zimbabwe’s Way Forward,” The Herald (Harare), April 23,
2008.
31 “Rift Over Zimbabwe Unity Plan,” New York Times, April 24, 2008.

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Both domestic and international observers have expressed concerns that rising
violence in Zimbabwe has contributed to a climate of fear and intimidation that may
inhibit voters from participating in a runoff election. The lead South African
delegate in SADC’s observer mission, Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, has
suggested that the current political climate is too violent for a runoff, saying “You
cannot have the next round taking place in this atmosphere; it will not be helpful.”32
The observer mission had been tasked by President Mbeki with investigating
allegations of violence, and is expected to produce recommendations to the South
African president on how to alleviate tensions. On May 14, SADC’s Executive
Secretary repeated Mamabolo’s findings, “At the moment we can’t say the playing
ground is safe or will be fair.”33 SADC and the AU have announced a significant
increase in the number of poll observers for the runoff.
Post-Election Violence. Although observers suggest that election day was
largely peaceful, reports of politically-motivated violence have since increased to a
level not seen in two decades, according to advocacy groups. Human Rights Watch
has called the reports of violence “a brutal campaign of torture and intimidation” and
has documented direct involvement by Zimbabwe’s security forces and its officers.34
The Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights has reported that its doctors
have treated hundreds of victims with injuries consistent with assault and torture
since the election date, and that “the violence is now on such a scale that it is
impossible to properly document all cases.”35 The MDC alleges that over 40 of its
supporters have been killed. U.S. Ambassador James McGee has implicated the
ruling party in orchestrating the attacks (see U.S. Policy below).36
ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean army have denied involvement with the attacks,
although the army, police, intelligence service, “war veterans”37 and Zimbabwe’s
National Youth Service, also known as the “Green Bombers,” have all been
implicated. One week after the elections, self-styled war veteran leader Jabuli
Sibanda warned, “It has come to our realization that the elections were used as
another war front to prepare for the re-invasion of our country.... As freedom fighters,
we feel compelled to repel the invasion,” echoing a frequent Mugabe refrain that an
opposition victory would be tantamount to the British reinstating colonial rule. The
state-owned Herald newspaper, contributed to fears of a white takeover in the wake
of the election, reporting, “An increasing number of white former commercial
farmers are reportedly threatening resettled black farmers throughout the country with
32 “Zimbabwe ‘Too Violent for Poll,’” BBC, May 8, 2008.
33 “SADC: Zim Not Yet Ready For Fair Vote,” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), May 14,
2008.
34 “Zimbabwe: Army Behind New Wave of Human Rights Abuses,” HRW Press Release,
April 30, 2008.
35 As of May 9, 2008 the group reported treating 900 people. See “Mbeki Meets Mugabe
for Talks,” Al Jazeera, May 9, 2008.
36 Statement by Ambassador James McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in
Zimbabwe,” issued on May 8, 2008.
37 Some “war veterans” have questionable credentials and some were too young to have
participated in the liberation struggle. Other veterans disagree with ZANU-PF’s policies.

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eviction from their farms or face the wrath of an anticipated ‘incoming MDC
government.’”38 These pronouncements coincided with farm invasions throughout
the country, and by April 16 the Commercial Farmers Union reported that over 100
of the estimated remaining 400 white farmers had been forced off their lands.
Since independence, Mugabe’s regime has employed terminology associated
with military-style campaigns for government programs ranging from the
implementation of price controls, known as Operation Reduce Prices, to the
demolition of informal urban settlements, or Operation Murambatsvina (translated
as “Clean Out the Filth”).39 Reports suggest that the recent round of violence has its
own campaign name, Operation Mavhoterapapi (“Who did you vote for?”).40 Critics
note the government’s historic use of violent tactics against political opponents,
pointing to the infamous Operation Gukurahundi (“The rain that washes away the
chaff before the rain”), the violent “pacification” campaign by a North Korean-
trained military unit, the 5th Brigade, in the 1980s against alleged dissidents and
supporters of ZANU-PF’s political rival at the time, the Zimbabwe African People’s
Union (ZAPU). Gukurahundi is now better known as the Matabeleland Massacres,
which resulted in the deaths of as many as 20,000 civilians, mostly from the Ndebele
ethnic group in the southwest.41 That 5th Brigade was led by then-Lt. Col. Perence
Shire, now commander of Zimbabwe’s Air Force. Other security officials involved
in the campaign now hold senior government posts, including Defense Minister
Sydney Sekeremayi and Rural Housing Minister Emerson Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa,
then Minister of State Security in charge of intelligence, once reportedly warned that
the government would burn down “all the villages infested with dissidents.” He has
been considered a possible successor to Mugabe within the party and is rumored to
be in charge of Joint Operations Command (JOC), a secretive group of the country’s
security chiefs and top commanders, that some allege now control the government.42
Zimbabwe’s rural areas appear to be the hardest hit by the violence; the U.S.
Embassy in Harare has documented thousands who have fled the countryside for
urban areas. Most Harare medical clinics are at full capacity, according to the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID).43 Zimbabwe’s largest farmers’
union reports that militias have displaced 40,000 farm workers, and there are
38 “White Former Farmers Threaten Blacks with Eviction,” The Herald, May 7, 2008.
39 For more information, see CRS Report RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch.
40 “Zimbabwe: Operation Glossary - A Guide to Zimbabwe’s Internal Campaigns,” IRIN,
May 1, 2008.
41 For further information on Operation Gukurahundi, see the report by the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the
Silence - Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the
Midlands 1980-1988, April 1999, available at [http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf].
42 See, for example, “The Opposition Goes for Broke,” The Economist, May 17, 2008, and
“Zimbabwe Under Military Rule, Former Minister Claims,” Pretoria News, May 12, 2008.
43 USAID, Zimbabwe: Complex Emergency and Drought, Situation Report 1, May 16, 2008.

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CRS-10
widespread reports of burned homes, granaries, and livestock.44 Human Rights
Watch has detailed the “re-education” and torture of more than 70 MDC supporters,
seven of whom reportedly died from their injuries, in Mashonaland province on May
5.45 Amnesty International reports that victims are often denied medical access and
that humanitarian organizations have been targeted by militias for providing
assistance.46 The United Nations’ resident representative in Zimbabwe has warned
of an impending crisis, stating, “there is an emerging pattern of political violence
inflicted mainly, but not exclusively, on suspected followers of the MDC.” The level
of violence was confirmed by an 8-person SADC mission, “we have seen it, there are
people in hospital who said they have been tortured, you have seen pictures, you have
seen pictures of houses that have been destroyed and so on.”47
Some who have fled to the cities have faced further intimidation. On April 25,
police raided the MDC’s Harare office, arresting some 200 people, many of whom
were reportedly supporters who had suffered attacks in their rural homes. Of those
arrested, 29 were released that day, the majority were released four days later. Police
also raided the office of the domestic observation group, ZESN. In both raids the
police, allegedly looking for subversive documents, took computers and documents.
On May 9, police arrested the leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU) based on speeches made at a worker’s day rally. The head of the Progressive
Teacher’s Union has also been arrested. On May 5, more than 50 Zimbabweans were
reportedly beaten by riot police during a public protest against the ongoing violence
in the city of Bulawayo; eleven members of a women’s advocacy group were
arrested.
Some Zimbabwean officials, including the country’s police chief, have accused
the opposition of rigging and inciting violence. According to press reports, over 100
election officers have arrested since the elections on charges of committing fraud and
abusing public office in favor of the MDC, at least five have been convicted.48
Independent reports suggest that teachers, who held many of the election officer
positions, have been targeted by government supporters. There are rumors that so-
called “war veterans” will be disguised as police in polling places during the runoff
to intimidate voters.49
44 “Hunger Drives Post-Election Violence, Deepens Poverty,” IRIN, May 9, 2008.
45 “Zimbabwe: End Violence Before June Runoff,” HRW Press Release, May 16, 2008.
46 Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe Violence Reaches Crisis Levels,” May 16, 2008.
47 “Call for State of Emergency Over Zim Violence,” Mail & Guardian, May 14, 2008.
48 “New Delay in Zimbabwe Elections,” Voice of America, May 5, 2008.
49 “Militias ‘to Rig Zimbabwe Poll,’” BBC, May 9, 2008.

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CRS-11
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe
On April 18, 2008, as the Chinese freighter An Yue Jiang sat in the waters off
South Africa’s port city of Durban waiting to unload its cargo, the High Court of
South Africa issued a court order blocking the cargo’s transfer through South African
territory.50 According to court documents, the ship carried 77 tons of bullets, rocket-
propelled grenades, and mortars bound for Zimbabwe. Freight and dock workers of
the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) had already
refused to unload or transport the shipment. Their protest was backed by the powerful
Congress of Southern African Trade Unions (COSATU) and International Transport
Workers’ Federation (ITF), which called for an international boycott of the vessel,
dubbed by some as the “Ship of Shame.” The unions based their protest on concerns
that the weapons could fuel violence in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s elections.
The international media closely tracked the freighter’s location as it searched for
another African port in which to unload the cargo. Zambia’s President publicly urged
regional governments to bar the An Yue Jiang from entering their waters. He
welcomed Mozambique’s decision not to allow the ship access, “because we don’t
want a situation which will escalate the (tension) in Zimbabwe more than what it is.”
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer called upon both the regional
governments and China to prevent the weapons transfer. On April 22, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that the ship would return to China. The
An Yue Jiang later docked in Angola to refuel and unload construction supplies bound
for the Angolan market, but was denied permission to unload its Zimbabwe cargo.
International Reactions
The international community has been divided over how to respond to the
current political impasse in Zimbabwe. As the weeks progressed after the elections
without the announcement of official results, world leaders began to debate whether
Zimbabwe was “in crisis.”51 MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai traveled throughout the
region to advocate for intervention. The African Union joined the growing number
of calls for the release of the election results on April 20. As the delay continued,
media attention turned to focus on a Chinese arms shipment bound for Zimbabwe.
In an April 23 speech to the House of Commons, British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown called for an international arms embargo against Zimbabwe, accusing the
government of rigging the elections and calling the political situation “completely
unacceptable.”52 The European Union (EU) maintains targeted sanctions against
members of Mugabe’s administration, and EU sanctions already prohibit member
states from selling weapons to the country. The United States, which also prohibits
weapons sales to Zimbabwe and maintains targeted sanctions, has expressed support
for Brown’s proposal.
50 High Court of South Africa Durban & Coast Local Division Case No. 4975/08
51 The U.S. State Department declared the situation a “crisis” in a news briefing by State
Department Spokesman Sean McCormack on April 15, 2008.
52 Statement made during the Prime Minister’s Question Time before the House of
Commons, April 23, 2008, available at [http://www.number-10.gov.uk].

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CRS-12
The Southern African Development Community (SADC). Zambia’s
President, Levy Mwanawasa, who is also head of the regional body SADC, convened
an extraordinary one-day meeting of the Southern African heads of state on April 12,
2008 to discuss Zimbabwe’s elections. SADC has remained largely silent in recent
years as Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis has worsened. Mwanawasa,
however, expressed public concern with the situation in Zimbabwe in 2007, calling
the country “a sinking Titanic whose passengers are jumping out to save their
lives.”53 He convened a similar emergency summit in late March 2007, following the
beating and arrest of opposition officials earlier that month. Although the SADC
leaders reportedly chastised President Mugabe privately at that time, they did not
publicly condemn the regime’s actions and instead appointed South Africa’s
President Mbeki to mediate between the Zimbabwean government and the
opposition.
During the April 12 summit, attended by Tsvangirai and Makoni but not
Mugabe, the SADC leaders declined to call the situation in Zimbabwe a crisis. They
did, however, publicly urge the government to release the electoral results
“expeditiously,” allow opposition representatives to be present when vote tabulations
were verified, and ensure that a runoff, if needed, would be held in a “secure
environment.” The SADC leaders also called on Mbeki to continue his role as
mediator.54 According to some reports, Mwanawasa asked the leaders to seek
solutions that would allow “the people’s verdict” to be heard so that Zimbabweans
could “turn [over] a new leaf in their history.” Zimbabwe civil society groups have
been supportive of SADC’s statements on the electoral results, but critical of its
continued support for Mbeki’s mediation. Mugabe reportedly called the SADC
meeting “a show staged by Britain.”55
The African Union (AU). In a communique on April 17, the African Union
expressed concern over the delayed results, “which creates an atmosphere of tension
that is not in the least conducive to the consolidation of the democratic process that
was so felicitously launched through the organization of the elections.”56 In early
May, Chairman of the AU Commission Jean Ping led an AU mission to Zimbabwe,
Zambia, and South Africa. He called for Zimbabwe’s political actors to:
to conduct their activities in a free, transparent, tolerant, and non-violent manner
to enable eligible Zimbabweans [to] exercise their democratic rights. It is
essential also that peace and security be maintained, and that the will of the
people be respected by all stakeholders once the results are announced.57
53 “Zimbabwe ‘A Sinking Titanic,’”Financial Times, March 22, 2007.
54 SADC Communique, “2008 First Extra-ordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and
Government Issued on 13 April 2008, in Lusaka, Zambia.”
55 Fiona Forde, “Summit on Zim ‘Coup’ Crisis Stalls,” The Sunday Independent, April 13,
2008.
56 African Union Division of Communication and Information, “Communique on the
Situation in Zimbabwe,” April 17, 2008.
57 Statement by the Chairman of the AU Commission on the Situation in Zimbabwe on May
(continued...)

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CRS-13
While the AU has traditionally deferred to regional mediation efforts, reports
suggest the AU Chairman, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete (who is also a
member of SADC), may be considering calls to widen the Mbeki-led SADC
mediation and encourage a greater role by the United Nations. Kenya’s new prime
minister, Raila Odinga, and former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan have
commented that Southern African leaders could do more to resolve the crisis.
Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade has called for the AU to oversee the second
round of elections. Zimbabwe’s state media reports that the government has rejected
AU and SADC plans to expand their monitoring teams for the runoff and that only
the individuals who had been invited to monitor the first round would be allowed to
cover the second.58
It remains unclear what steps the African Union may take if its observers were
to find the runoff election lacking in credibility. The African Union has some
precedent for intervening in support of democracy within its member countries,
should it chose to do so.59 The intervention of AU leaders in the early days of the
2007/2008 Kenyan election crisis is viewed by many as having helped move the two
opposed parties toward negotiations and an eventual post-election agreement. Some
analysts suggest that if they were to play a similar role in Zimbabwe, it could diffuse
the level of political violence, and might allow members of the ruling party who are
rumored to support a transition to play a more open role in discussions about a
possible coalition government. As in Kenya, however, negotiations toward any sort
of transition, or even a power-sharing arrangement, are likely to be extremely
challenging, given that they are expected to have to address immunity issues for
Mugabe and his security officials. But diplomatic pressure, even from regional
leaders, may have a limited effect on the Zimbabwean government. There have been
reports that President Mugabe has refused to take calls from the AU leadership,
including President Kikwete. Some, including the MDC and South Africa’s
opposition, have called for the African Union to send a peacekeeping force to
Zimbabwe.
57 (...continued)
6, 2008, available at [http://www.africa-union.org].
58 “No New Poll Watchers for Zimbabwe’s Runoff: State Media,” Agence France Presse,
May 17, 2008.
59 In 2005, after the death of the President of Togo, the Togolese army installed his son as
president. The AU declared the intervention to be a military coup and the AU Peace and
Security Council demanded the resignation of the new president and urged members to
impose diplomatic, travel, and arms sanctions until elections were held. The president
stepped down the day after sanctions were imposed. It is notable, in the case of Togo, that
the relevant regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
played an important role in denouncing the coup and leading the campaign for sanctions. In
the second instance of AU intervention, the AU suspended Mauritania from all
organizational activities after the country’s military led a successful coup. The president,
in office for 21 years, was considered autocratic, and reports suggest that most Mauritanians
supported the military’s actions. Nevertheless, the AU upheld the suspension because it
opposed the unconstitutional overthrow of a civilian regime. Following an investigation, the
AU decided against sanctions, but held the suspension until elections were held in 2007.

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CRS-14
South Africa. President Thabo Mbeki has been the target of growing criticism
from opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society groups for his reaction to
Zimbabwe’s elections. Mbeki, after visiting Mugabe in Harare on his way to the
April 12 SADC summit, declared he did not believe Zimbabwe was facing a crisis,
that the delayed release of the presidential results was a “natural process,” and that
Zimbabweans must patiently await their release. Tsvangirai has criticized Mbeki for
his “quiet support for the dictatorship.”60
Others within the South African government and its ruling party appear to take
a harder line on the Zimbabwe issue than Mbeki. “In resolving the problem of
Zimbabwe, Thabo Mbeki is not speaking on behalf of the ANC,” a spokesman for
the ruling African National Congress youth wing declared in April.61 The new
president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, who defeated Mbeki in December 2007 for the
party presidency, openly criticized the delayed announcement of the results, saying,
“There is a crisis in Zimbabwe. We ought to stand up and do something about it.”
While not directly charging the Mugabe administration with rigging, he has distanced
himself from Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” approach. In late April, he told reporters,
“Definitely there is something wrong with those elections.... I think the manner in
which the electoral commission has acted has discredited itself, and therefore that is
tantamount to sabotaging the elections.”62 While he has not called for Mbeki to step
down as mediator, Zuma has said “I imagine that the leaders in Africa should really
move in to unlock this logjam,”63 and called for African leaders to “assist” Mbeki as
mediator, “given the gravity of the situation.”64 The new speaker of the parliament
and ANC national chairperson, Baleka Mbete, called the delayed release of results
a “democratic process gone wrong.” In a gathering of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
she urged representatives of 147 countries not to remain silent on the Zimbabwe
issue.65
As ANC president, Jacob Zuma is considered the party’s heir-apparent to
succeed Mbeki as its presidential candidate in the country’s May 2009 elections.66
Many analysts predict that South African policy toward Zimbabwe would change
under a possible Zuma administration.67 In the meantime, public pressure may force
60 Barry Bearak, “Zimbabwe Opponent Criticizes Mbeki,” New York Times, February 14,
2008.
61 “Zimbabwe’s Political Crisis Enters South Africa Domestic Politics,” Voice of America,
April 17, 2008.
62 “Zimbabwe Crisis at Critical Level, Warns Zuma,” CNN, April 24, 2008.
63 “Africa Shows Impatience on Zimbabwe Crisis,” Reuters, April 22, 2008.
64 “Zuma Ratchets Up Rhetoric Over Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, April 22, 2008.
65 Statement by Speaker Baleka Mbete in Cape Town, April 13, 2008, available at
[http://www.parliament.gov.za].
66 Zuma, who has been linked to a number of controversies, was expected to face
corruption charges in August 2008, but his trial date has been postponed. If he were
convicted prior to the elections, he would be ineligible to run.
67 CRS Report RL31697, South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Lauren Ploch.

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Mbeki to take a stronger position on the growing violence in neighboring Zimbabwe:
in mid-May, President Mbeki visited Zimbabwe for the second time since the
elections and dispatched six retired generals to investigate reports of attacks on the
opposition. The generals have reportedly expressed shock at the level of violence.68
A recent outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa has some, including
ANC Treasurer Matthews Phosa, calling for early elections in South Africa.69 In May
2008, Zimbabweans and other foreign nationals were targeted by mobs in several
South African townships; at least 40 have been reportedly killed and over 25,000
have fled their homes. South Africa is home to some three to five million illegal
immigrants, most from Zimbabwe, and some South Africans blame them for the
country’s high crime and unemployment rate and rising food prices. Mbeki and
Zuma have both condemned the attacks, but the opposition has condemned the
government for not addressing the tensions earlier. On May 21, Mbeki deployed the
army internally for the first time since the end of apartheid to stem the violence.
The United Nations. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has joined the
United States, Great Britain, and France in calling on the U.N. Security Council to
address the Zimbabwe situation. In remarks to the Security Council on April 16, Ban
expressed his deep concern with the delayed release of the electoral results, warning,
Absent a transparent solution to this impasse, the situation could deteriorate
further with serious implications for the people of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean
authorities and the countries of the region have insisted that these matters are for
the region to resolve but the international community continues to watch and
wait for decisive action. The credibility of the democratic process in Africa could
be at stake here.
The Secretary-General is now engaging world leaders to determine how the
international community could “help the Zimbabwean people and authorities to
resolve this issue.”70 His concern has been echoed by UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights Louise Arbour, who said, “I am particularly concerned about reports
of threats, intimidation, abuse and violence directed against NGOs, election monitors,
human rights defenders and other representatives of civil society,” and called on the
Zimbabwean government and its security forces to “ensure the protection of all
Zimbabweans, irrespective of whom they do or do not support politically.”71
President Mbeki chaired the April 16 Security Council meeting, which was
originally called by South Africa, as rotating chairman of the Council, to discuss
cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad recommended that a U.N.-AU mission visit
the country. The only African representative to address the Zimbabwe issue at the
68 “Anxiety Grows for Kidnaped Zimbabwe Activist,” Voice of America, May 18, 2008.
69 “Anti-Foreigner Violence Escalates in South Africa,” Reuters, May 19, 2008.
70 “U.N. Council and AU to debate Zimbabwe,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
71 “Alarmed by Violence in Zimbabwe, Arbour Urges Restraint,” U.N. Press Release, April
27, 2008.

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meeting was Tanzanian President Kikwete, who praised SADC for working to
“ensure that the will of the people of Zimbabwe is respected,” and suggested that the
regional body would meet again soon to discuss Zimbabwe.72
The U.N. Security Council held a special session on April 29 to discuss
Zimbabwe, reportedly at the behest of incoming Security Council chair Britain.
European and Latin American members pressed for a U.N. envoy to visit the country,
while other delegations, including South Africa’s, rejected the proposal. President
Mugabe has denounced the closed session as “sinister, racist, and colonial.”73
U.S. Policy on Zimbabwe
Current U.S. Policy. Although the United States’ ability to influence internal
developments in Zimbabwe is limited, the U.S. government has been an outspoken
critic of the Mugabe Administration. U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe has included a
combination of targeted sanctions against the Government of Zimbabwe, including
financial and visa sanctions against select individuals;74 a ban on transfers of defense
items and services; a suspension of non-humanitarian assistance to the government;
and support for South Africa’s attempt to mediate between the government and the
opposition.

In reaction to the uncertainty following the March elections, the Bush
Administration repeatedly called for the immediate release of the results, and in April
called for all parties to accept and implement legitimate election results, “including,
as appropriate, changes in the parliament, changes in the government.”75 The State
Department has since expressed “deep concern” about the inadequate “chain of
custody” of the ballot boxes in the weeks after the election, and has expressed its
view that conditions on the ground would not currently allow for a free and fair
runoff. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer has accused Mugabe of “trying
to steal the election,” saying, “My preferred option would be that the will of the
people be accepted. That Mr. Mugabe does the honorable thing and steps down.”76
The Bush Administration has been highly critical of the government’s role in
the current wave of violence. A State Department spokesman recently urged Mugabe
72 “Spotlight Turned on Zimbabwe at UN Council,” Reuters, April 16, 2008.
73 “Zimbabwe Dismisses U.N. Talks,” Reuters, April 30, 2008.
74 President Bush imposed these sanctions through Executive Order 13288, issued in March
2003. The Order prohibits transactions with persons, entities, or organizations found to be
undermining democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe, who are included in a
Specially Designated Nationals(SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
75 News Briefing by State Department Spokesman Tom Casey on April 22, 2008.
76 News Briefing by State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack on April 15, 2008, and
“Mugabe Trying to Steal Elections, Says U.S. Official,” CNN, April 24, 2008.

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to “call off his dogs,”77 and U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe James McGee has
publicly condemned what he refers to as a “systematic campaign of violence
designed to block this vote for change...orchestrated at the highest levels of the ruling
party.”78 On May 13, Zimbabwean police tried to interfere with a multi-country
diplomatic convoy outside Harare.79 The convoy had been visiting hospitals and an
alleged interrogation center, and during the encounter a policeman reportedly
threatened to beat a U.S. embassy official. Ambassador McGee described seeing
evidence of violence of a “massive” scope, including proof that civilians had been
interrogated at “torture camp” the convoy visited.80 He was later reportedly
summoned by Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister for allegedly violating diplomatic
protocol and was warned not to interfere in internal affairs. Embassy staff are
collecting evidence and documenting abuses to submit to the United Nations, SADC,
and the African Union.
The Administration has increased its calls for African governments to play a
greater role in resolving the political impasse. During a visit by the British Prime
Minister to Washington, President Bush told the media, “The United Nations and the
A.U. must play an active role in resolving the situation in Zimbabwe.”81 Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice has said more bluntly, “It is time for Africa to step up.”82
Secretary Rice has engaged several SADC leaders on how to proceed, and the United
States is expected to continue to press the Security Council to discuss the situation.
U.S. Assistance. The United States is one of the largest donors of
humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe, providing over $93 million in food aid in
FY2007 and $55 million to date in FY2008. The Administration’s FY2009 request
for $45.4 million includes $19.4 million for health programs and $26 million in
Economic Support Funds, much of which are designated for either governance or
economic recovery efforts.83 This reflects a substantial increase from previous years;
$23.2 million was obligated in FY2007 and $22.9 million in FY2008. Democracy
and governance assistance has been augmented by funding from USAID’s global
Elections and Political Processes fund (EPP). These resources support political party
strengthening, voter registration, and training of election monitors. According to the
State Department’s Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), “in anticipation of a
more moderate government arising in 2008,” FY2009 funding will support programs
77 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Tom Casey, May 1, 2008.
78 Statement by Ambassador McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in
Zimbabwe,” May 8, 2008, available at [http://harare.usembassy.gov].
79 The convoy included the ambassadors of the United States, Britain, the EU, and Japan;
the deputy ambassadors of Tanzania and the Netherlands; and embassy staff and journalists.
80 “U.S. Ambassador Says Zimbabwe Government Doing Nothing to Stop Post-Election
Violence,” Voice of America, May 14, 2008.
81 Remarks by President Bush during a press conference with Prime Minister Brown at the
White House, April 17, 2008.
82 On-the-Record Briefing by Secretary Rice in Washington, DC, April 17, 2008.
83 This amount does not include food aid, which is allocated throughout the year in response
to need.

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CRS-18
to “re-establish and strengthen democratic institutions, processes and systems, and
to build legislative consensus on democratic reform.” Such programs would support
legal reforms, national dialogue on key issues, civil society advocacy, and enhanced
media capacity. In the event of no change in government in 2008, the CBJ proposes
to reprogram these resources to aid opposition efforts to press for reforms.
Congressional Interest. Several Members of Congress have issued
statements highly critical of the Mugabe Administration, the delayed release of the
election results, and the ongoing political violence. Some have written letters to Bush
Administration officials or African leaders. On April 25, the Senate passed S.Res.
533, introduced by Senator John Kerry, calling for the immediate release of the
presidential results, an end to the political violence and intimidation, and a peaceful
transition to democratic rule. The resolution also supported calls for an international
arms embargo and other targeted sanctions against the Mugabe regime, and
encouraged the creation of a comprehensive political and economic recovery package
in the event a democratic government is installed. The House of Representatives is
now considering legislation by Representative Donald Payne condemning the
violence and calling for a peaceful resolution to the political crisis.
President Mugabe frequently claims that Western sanctions are to blame for the
collapse of the country’s economy, despite the absence of trade sanctions against
Zimbabwe. In 2001, Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act (ZDERA) (P.L. 107-99), criticizing the “economic mismanagement”
and “undemocratic practices” in Zimbabwe. This legislation called for consultations
with allies on economic sanctions and a travel ban. It also prohibited U.S. support for
financial assistance to Zimbabwe by international financial institutions until the
President has been able to certify that certain conditions pertaining to the rule of law,
democratic elections, and legal and transparent land reform have been met.
Zimbabwe is, however, already ineligible to receive loans from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s International Development Association
(IDA) because it is in arrears to those institutions for debt payments.
Policy Options84
Diplomatic Pressure. Human rights advocates have urged the United States
and other governments to continue diplomatic calls for Zimbabwe’s government to
stop the violence, allow international observers for the runoff, and cease government
interference with freedoms of speech and assembly. Many analysts suggest that the
SADC governments may have the greatest leverage with the Mugabe Administration,
but that international support for their efforts could prove helpful. The MDC and
others have called for the United Nations to deploy human rights monitors to
84 There have been a number of studies conducted on policy options to re-engage Zimbabwe,
including, Michelle D. Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR) Special Report No. 31, October 2007; Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, The
Day After Comrade Bob: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe, Center for
Global Development Working Paper no. 72, December 2005; and “After Mugabe: Applying
Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe,” Africa Policy Journal, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, vol. 1, Spring 2006.

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CRS-19
investigate the ongoing violence. Although South Africa and SADC have already
deployed inquiry teams, the presence of U.N. monitors could be influential. The
international community also has the option of urging the U.N. Secretary-General to
appoint a special envoy to Zimbabwe, although results from the appointment of such
an envoy in 2005 were limited.85 Nevertheless, as recent developments in the region
have shown, President Mugabe’s allies within the international community may be
less willing to publicly support his government than in the past. Some analysts have
suggested that the U.S. government should take greater initiative to expose external
sources of support for the government of Zimbabwe.86
Diplomatic efforts toward Zimbabwe may progress toward one of three possible
outcomes.87 Some have suggested that the United States, and others, should push
unequivocally for Mugabe’s exit, preferably through diplomacy aimed at Southern
African leaders.88 Certain senior members of ZANU-PF are reportedly amenable to
negotiating a power-sharing arrangement with the MDC. According to reports, initial
discussions have already begun, but have encountered stiff resistance from senior
security officials (See Accountability below). Given observations that the current
security climate will not allow for a credible runoff, a negotiated settlement may
provide the most timely solution to the stalemate. However, details regarding
possible immunity deals, the compliance of the security forces, and a timetable for
future elections will not be easy. If talks progress, though, the United States will
have to determine whether to lift of some of its targeted sanctions on select ZANU-
PF members who may be invited to join a coalition government.
Recognizing that these negotiations may fail, SADC may be poised to engage
the parties on steps to ensure that the runoff election meets SADC’s Principles
Governing Democratic Elections,89 and that the government announces the results in
a timely manner and initiates a peaceful democratic transition. Should the election
fail to meet these principles, or should the security forces try prevent a democratic
transition, the international community may consider tightening sanctions, declaring
85 In 2005, the Zimbabwean government implemented Murambatsvina, a massive demolition
program aimed at allegedly illegal urban structures, which rendered over 700,000 homeless.
Then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan named Tanzanian-born Anna Tibaijuka, Executive
Director of UN-HABITAT, as the U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in
Zimbabwe to investigate the humanitarian impact of the demolitions. The presentation of
her report to the U.N. Security Council stirred controversy and China, Algeria, Benin, and
Russia objected to debate on it. The majority of Security Council members voted to allow
its discussion, albeit in a closed session. Many observers suggest the Zimbabwean
government did little to respond to the U.N. envoy’s recommendations.
86 Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, CFR Special Report No. 31, October 2007.
87 Further discussion of these outcomes may be found in ICG, “Negotiating Zimbabwe’s
Transition,” Africa Briefing No. 51, May 21, 2008.
88 Stephen Morrison and Mark Bellamy, “The Close of the Mugabe Era,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, April 29, 2008.
89 The 1992 Treaty establishing SADC commits member states to “consolidate, defend and
maintain democracy, peace, security and stability” in the region. The Principles on
Elections commits members to adhere to basic democratic standards. These principles can
be found at [http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/political_affairs/index.php].

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the Mugabe Administration illegitimate and/or recognizing Tsvangirai as President,
or referring members of the regime to international justice regimes. Other options,
including a possible AU suspension of the Mugabe-led government, have been
discussed above (see African Union above).
Humanitarian Assistance. The food security situation in Zimbabwe
remains critical, with an estimated 4 million people in need of food assistance in
2008. Several Southern African countries have suffered from chronic food insecurity
in recent years, stemming from a combination of weather-related and man-made
factors, including prolonged drought, floods, poor economic performance, and the
impact of HIV/AIDS. Although drought is partly to blame for Zimbabwe’s food
shortages, analysts believe that disruptions to the farming sector resulting from
Mugabe’s land seizure program are the main reason for reduced food production.90
Nearly all of the country’s 4,500 commercial farms have now been taken by the
government and redistributed or divided. The government’s land redistribution
program is reportedly plagued by inefficiencies, with large portions of redistributed
land not being actively farmed. Tractors and other inputs to production are in short
supply. Thousands of experienced farm workers were reportedly forced to flee seized
commercial farms, and many of those who now hold farmland have no agricultural
expertise. The displacement of farm workers and vandalism that has followed the
March elections also contributes to food insecurity. The 2008 maize harvest has been
severely affected by a combination of flooding followed by extreme dry weather. The
crop production deficit in much of the country is estimated at 75 to 100 percent.
Global food needs have increased dramatically since the beginning of the 2008,
primarily due to rising commodity and fuel prices, and the competition for
international resources may severely affect the international community’s ability to
address food insecurity in Zimbabwe. In May 2008, the World Food Program
reported a shortfall of $272.7 million in its required resources for the country’s
feeding program from 2008 to 2010. Of the $46.3 million already received from
international donors, over half, $26 million, has been provided by the United States.
Poor sanitation and water shortages pose serious health risks in Zimbabwe’s
urban centers. Basic hygiene items, such as soap, have become too expensive for
many residents. In the country’s second largest city, Bulawayo, service delivery,
including garbage collection, has declined severely because of budget shortages, and
reports suggest many ambulances and fire trucks sit unused because the city council
cannot afford fuel or spare parts. According to U.N. reports, the current violence has
impeded the delivery of assistance by NGOs.
90 On the land takeovers in Zimbabwe, see AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger — Violations
of the Right to Food, October 15, 2004.

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Economic Recovery.91 In tandem with diplomatic pressure, the Bush
Administration and other international actors have discussed financial incentives and
assistance to facilitate Zimbabwe’s economic recovery in the event of a democratic
transition. Zimbabwe’s economy has collapsed in the last decade, and every sector
of the economy has been affected. Annual outputs of wheat, maize, and tobacco,
once Zimbabwe’s largest foreign exchange earner, have plummeted. Manufacturing
output dropped over 47 percent in the decade between 1996 and 2006. Zimbabwe’s
mining sector has been similarly affected, although the platinum industry remains a
major income earner for the government.92 World Bank and IMF lending has been
suspended for more than six years due to nonpayment of arrears, and foreign currency
for essential imports, particularly fuel, is in extremely short supply. Zimbabwe’s
inflation rate, at almost 165,000 percent according to official government figures, is
the highest in the world and has contributed significantly to the country’s economic
collapse. Zimbabweans continue to face steep rises in the prices of food and non-food
items, including rents. These factors all contribute to increasing pressure on both the
people of Zimbabwe and members of Mugabe’s regime.
According to the IMF, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s quasi-fiscal activities
are primarily responsible for the surge in the country’s money supply in recent years.
Losses from such activities were estimated to be 75 percent of GDP in 2006. These
activities include monetary operations to absorb excess liquidity; subsidized credit;
sustained foreign exchange losses through subsidized exchange rates for selected
government purchases and multiple currency practices; and financial sector
restructuring. After the government implemented its price control policy in June
2007, cutting prices of basic commodities by 50 percent in an effort to stem inflation,
manufacturing output fell more than 50 percent within six months and many firms
were forced to close. The price controls also resulted in a shortage of basic goods
and have contributed to worsening social indicators. The government’s fast track
land reform and more recent policy changes like the Indigenization and Economic
Empowerment Act, have created significant uncertainty over property rights,
deterring foreign direct investment and lowering consumer confidence.
The MDC has outlined its program to revive the economy.93 The party has
committed to stop printing new money, eliminate price controls, open foreign
91 Information in this section was drawn from a variety of sources, including David Coltart,
“A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe: Economic Collapse and Political Repression under
Robert Mugabe,” CATO Institute Development Policy Analysis No. 5, March 24, 2008;
Sonia Munoz, “Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A Note,”
IMF Working Paper, April 2007; and “Zimbabwe: Article IV Consultation - Staff Notes,”
IMF Country Report No. 05/360, October 2005.
92 Zimbabwe has the world’s second largest reserves of platinum, behind South Africa. The
largest mining operations in the country are controlled by Impala Platinum and Anglo
Platinum, respectively. These South African-owned companies are the world’s largest
platinum producers.
93 See, for example, Morgan Tsvangirai, “Freedom for Zimbabwe,”The Wall Street Journal,
March 21, 2008.

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exchange,94 and bring in the IMF to assist in reforming the government’s fiscal
policies. Tsvangirai has also floated the idea of replacing the Zimbabwe dollar with
a new currency.95 Some analysts have suggested that the existing dollar could be
temporarily linked to either the South African rand or the U.S. dollar to stabilize its
value. The party’s economic policy stresses a free market approach, and promises to
privatize most state-owned companies, dismantle patronage networks, and simplify
the tax code. In recognition that the government’s bloated budget has contributed
significantly to current economic woes, Tsvangirai has promised a significantly
smaller cabinet, should he become president, as part of a deficit-reduction strategy.
In addition, the MDC has proposed a land audit and a program to “harmonize” land-
tenure so that those on communal lands can hold an individual title. The party would
consider compensation for those who lost land illegally.
The State Department’s FY2009 budget request states that “If political change
ensues and legislative restrictions are lifted, Zimbabwe will need significant support
from the United States, in coordination with other donors, to reform, rebuild, and
recover.” Western donors, including the United States, met twice in Europe in 2007
to explore reconstruction options, and their representatives meet regularly in Harare
to coordinate existing aid programs. Some reports suggest, however, that there has
been little concrete planning on what this reconstruction support should entail.96
Another donor meeting is expected in Europe in summer 2008, and a pledging
conference may be considered. Norway has pledged a major economic stabilization
package from Nordic countries in return for “a true democratic election” and the
adoption of sound fiscal policies, although the exact amount of such a package has
not been announced. Britain has made similar pledges, and maintains its willingness
to release funds to pay for parts of an orderly land redistribution program if Mugabe
retires and the rule of law is returned. By some estimates, the cost of Zimbabwe’s
economic recovery may be almost $4 billion over a five-year period to cover food
support, land reform, health services and education, infrastructure, balance of
payment and budget support, and emergency aid programs. In the event of political
change in Zimbabwe, ESF funds in the State Department’s FY2009 request would
be directed toward support for “monetary and fiscal policy reform and economic
revitalization, specifically agricultural and private sector productivity and
improvement of the business enabling environment.”
The World Bank and the IMF have developed strategies for Zimbabwe’s
economic recovery, but the IMF suggests that liberalizing the foreign exchange rate
will require careful management. Given the need to cut government spending to
reduce the government deficit, significant donor assistance will be required to rebuild
the public health sector, which according to reports may have lost as much as 80
percent of its skilled workforce. Reviving the country’s agriculture industry will
require delicate handling to address historical grievances against white Zimbabweans
94 The Reserve Bank made a major change to its fiscal policy in May 2008, allowing the
Zimbabwe dollar to float to address hyperinflation. Analysts have expressed doubts that the
government will maintain this policy if the Zim dollar depreciates faster than expected.
95 “Tsvangirai Promises New Zimbabwe Currency,” The Australian, March 28, 2008.
96 Morrison and Bellamy, “The Close of the Mugabe Era,” op cit.

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regarding land distribution and tenure97 Congress authorized $20 million in its
ZDERA legislation for land reform assistance for FY2002, and some analysts suggest
this level of annual assistance may still be appropriate.98
Accountability and Reform. The inability of the country’s judicial system
to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide due process to those seeking
remedy or compensation, suggests a fundamental crisis in the implementation of the
rule of law in Zimbabwe. Analysts suggest that the country will require significant
judicial and security sector reforms as part of larger constitutional reforms. The
people of Zimbabwe will also have to determine what level of accountability they
may seek, not only for recent political violence, but for historical grievances and
alleged official corruption under the Mugabe Administration. Tsvangirai has
proposed the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission similar to that of
South Africa, “striking a healthy balance between reconciliation and
accountability.”99 He has offered Mugabe “an honorable exit as... father of the
nation,” but it is unlikely that such an offer will be extended to all senior security
officials implicated in acts of violence.100 Mugabe and other senior officials,
however, may resist a negotiated peaceful exit from power if they fear subsequent
prosecution, as occurred with the former presidents of Liberia, Chad, and Zambia.101
crsphpgw
97 The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has suggested that raising the yields
of communal farming areas, which compose almost 50 percent of Zimbabwe’s land, could
guarantee its food security. The country’s annual maize requirement for human
consumption is estimated at 1.4 million metric tons. The FAO estimates that a $50 million
investment annually for three years to train farmers and provide seeds and fertilizer would
significantly increase yields and cost less than what Zimbabwe now pays to import food. See
“Zimbabwe: Small Scale Farmers Seen as Backbone of Food Security,” IRIN, May 15,
2008.
98 Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign Relations Special
Report No. 31, October 2007.
99 Morgan Tsvangirai, “Freedom for Zimbabwe,”The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2008.
100 “Zimbabwe Opposition Seeks Peacekeepers for Run-off,” Reuters, May 11, 2008.
101 Former Liberian President Charles Taylor now faces war crimes charges before the
Special Court for Sierra Leone at the Hague; former Chadian President Hissan Habre is
expected to be tried in Senegal for human rights abuses committed by his regime; and
former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba is on trial in Zambia for corruption.

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