Order Code RL34473
Defense: FY2009 Authorization and
Appropriations
Updated May 16, 2008
Pat Towell and Stephen Daggett
Specialists in Defense Policy and Budgets
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
The annual consideration of appropriations bills (regular, continuing, and supplemental) by
Congress is part of a complex set of budget processes that also encompasses the
consideration of budget resolutions, revenue and debt-limit legislation, other spending
measures, and reconciliation bills. In addition, the operation of programs and the spending
of appropriated funds are subject to constraints established in authorizing statutes.
Congressional action on the budget for a fiscal year usually begins following the submission
of the President’s budget at the beginning of each annual session of Congress.
Congressional practices governing the consideration of appropriations and other budgetary
measures are rooted in the Constitution, the standing rules of the House and Senate, and
statutes, such as the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
This report is a guide to one of the regular appropriations bills that Congress considers each
year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense. For both defense authorization and
appropriations, this report summarizes the status of the bills, their scope, major issues,
funding levels, and related congressional activity. This report is updated as events warrant
and lists the key CRS staff relevant to the issues covered as well as related CRS products.
NOTE: A Web version of this document with active links is
a v a i l a b l e t o c o n g r e s s i o n a l s t a f f a t
[http://apps.crs.gov/cli/level_2.aspx?PRDS_CLI_ITEM_ID=73].
Defense: FY2009 Authorization and Appropriations
Summary
The President’s FY2009 federal budget request, released February 4, 2008,
included $611.1 billion in new budget authority for national defense. This total
included $515.4 billion in discretionary new budget authority for the base budget of
the Department of Defense (DOD) — i.e., activities not associated with combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The budget included an additional $2.9 billion
in mandatory spending for the DOD base budget and $22.8 billion for non-war-
related defense costs of the Department of Energy and other agencies. In addition to
the $541.1 billion requested for the base line (i.e., non-war cost) budget, the request
also included $70 billion to cover war costs in the first part of FY2009.
On April 30 the Senate Armed Services Committee approved its version of the
FY2009 defense authorization bill (S3001), authorizing the appropriation of $612.5
billion in new budget authority for national security programs, including $542.5
billion for the base line budget and a $70 billion allowance for war-related costs.
The Senate committee approved without major change the funding requests for
several programs that have been the subject of controversy, including the Army’s
Future Combat Systems (FCS), the Navy’s DDG-1000 destroyer, and the Air Force’s
KC-45A mid-air refueling tanker. The committee bill would add to the request $497
million to either continue or terminate production of the Air Force’s F-22 fighter. It
also would add to the request $465 million to continue development of an alternate
engine for the F-35 Joint Strike fighter and $35 million to improve the engine
currently slated for installation in the planes. The Senate is expected to take up the
bill after the Memorial Day recess.
House Armed Services Committee approved its version of the defense
authorization bill (H.R. 5658) on May 14, authorizing $601.4 billion, including $70
billion for war-related costs. Among the committee’s changes to the Administration’s
budget request is a recommendation to deny authorization of the $2.5 billion
requested for a third ship of the DDG-1000 class. The committee bill would, instead,
allocate those funds to buy three additional ships and to purchase either components
to be used in another DDG-1000 or components that would be used to continue
production of DDG-51 class destroyers, the type the DDG-1000 is intended to
supplant. The committee bill also would cut $200 million from the $3.6 billion
requested for the Army’s Future Combat Systems.
Besides authorizing $3 billion requested to buy 20 F-22 fighters in FY2009, the
committee included in the bill authorization of $523 million to buy components that
would allow the purchase of 20 additional F-22s in FY2010. It also added to the
Administration’s request authorization for $3.9 billion for 15 C-17 cargo planes. The
committee bill would authorize $832 million for production of the KC-45A refueling
tanker, a reduction from the request of $62 million which, the committee said, would
not delay the program. The House may take up the defense authorization bill the
week of May 19.
This report will be updated as developments warrant.
Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Telephone
E-Mail
Valerie Grasso
7-7617
vgrasso@crs.loc.gov
Acquisition
Moshe Schwartz
7-1463
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov
William Knight
7-6247
wknight@crs.loc.gov
Aviation Forces
Anthony Murch
7-0432
amurch@crs.loc.gov
Arms Control
Amy Woolf
7-2379
awoolf@crs.loc.gov
Arms Sales
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Base Closure
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Pat Towell
7-2122
ptowell@crs.loc.gov
Defense Budget
Stephen Daggett
7-7642
sdaggett@crs.loc.gov
Amy Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Gary Pagliano
7-1750
gpagliano@crs.loc.gov
Defense Industry
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
Defense R&D
John Moteff
7-1435
jmoteff@crs.loc.gov
Edward Bruner
7-2775
ebruner@crs.loc.gov
Ground Forces
Andrew Feickert
7-7673
afeickert@crs.loc.gov
Health Care; Military
Richard Best
7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Richard Best
7-7607
rbest@crs.loc.gov
Intelligence
Al Cumming
7-7739
acumming@crs.loc.gov
Military Construction
Daniel Else
7-4996
delse@crs.loc.gov
David Burrelli
7-8033
dburrelli@crs.loc.gov
Military Personnel
Charles Henning
7-8866
chenning@crs.loc.gov
Lawrence Kapp
7-7609
lkapp@crs.loc.gov
National Guard &
Lawrence Kapp
7-7609
lkapp@crs.loc.gov
Reserves
Steven Hildreth
7-7635
shildreth@crs.loc.gov
Missile Defense
Andrew Feickert
7-7673
afeickert@crs.loc.gov
Naval Forces
Ronald O’Rourke
7-7610
rorourke@crs.loc.gov
Nuclear Weapons
Jonathan Medalia
7-7632
jmedalia@crs.loc.gov
Peace Operations
Nina Serafino
7-7667
nserafino@crs.loc.gov
Readiness
Amy Belasco
7-7627
abelasco@crs.loc.gov
Space, Military
Steven Hildreth
7-2508
shildreth@crs.loc.gov
War Powers
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of the Administration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Comparison and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Status of Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Is the Budget Too Small? The 4% Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Potential Issues in the FY2009 Base Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Military Pay Raise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Army and Marine Corps End-Strength Increases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
TRICARE Fees and Co-pays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
War Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Projected Navy Strike Fighter Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
LPD-17-Class Ship Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Funding for DDG-1000 Destroyers versus Other Ships . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Littoral Combat Ship Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
CG-X Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Reliable Replacement Warhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Long-Range Non-Nuclear Prompt Global Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Future Combat Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
F-22 Fighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Mid-Air Refueling Tanker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C-17 Cargo Jet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Congressional Budget Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FY2009 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the Senate Armed
Services Committee Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
FY2009 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the House Armed
Services Committee Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Pay Raise, Tricare, and Other Personnel Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
KC-45A, C-17, F-22, and JSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Future Combat Systems (FCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Anti-Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Shipbuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Iraq Policy Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Other Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. Department of Defense Baseline Budget Discretionary Budget
Authority, FY2008-FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2A. Status of FY2009 Defense Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2B. Status of FY2009 Defense Appropriations Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 3. DOD Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Defense: FY2009 Authorization and
Appropriations
Most Recent Developments
The House Armed Services Committee on May 14 approved its version of the
FY2009 national defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658), which would authorize
$531.4 billion for national defense-related activities of DOD and other federal
agencies and an additional $70 billion for costs related to military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.1
Among the committee’s changes to the Administration’s budget request is a
recommendation to deny authorization of the $2.5 billion requested for a third ship
of the DDG-1000 class. The committee bill would, instead, allocate those funds to
buy an LPD-17-class amphibious landing transport and two additional supply ships
and to purchase either components to be used in another DDG-1000 or components
that would be used to continue production of DDG-51 class destroyers, the type the
DDG-1000 is intended to supplant.
It also would add $722 million to the $3.4 billion requested for acquisition of
Virginia-class submarines. The request would buy one sub in FY2009 and
components (including a nuclear powerplant) to be used in another sub slated for
purchase in FY2010. The committee’s increase would let the Navy buy enough
“long lead-time components” in FY2009 to allow the purchase of two subs in
FY2010 thus accelerating by one year the time when the Navy could begin buying
subs at the rate of two per year.
The committee approved the request for $832 million to continue development
of a new mid-air refueling tanker for the Air Force, but denied $62 million requested
for long lead-time components to begin production of the planes. According to the
committee, Air Force officials said elimination of the long lead-time funding would
not delay the program.
The committee also cut $200 million from the $3.6 billion requested to continue
development of the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, an effort to
develop a new generation of digitally-linked vehicles for ground combat.
The committee also added to the Administration’s request $3.9 billion for 15
additional C-17 cargo planes in FY2009 and $523 million for components that would
1 This section is based on the House Armed Services Committee’s summary of its action,
released May 15, 2008. It will be revised as soon as the committee report on the bill
becomes available.
CRS-2
be needed to continue procurement of F-22 fighters in FY2010. For both programs,
the Administration’s FY2009 request includes neither the funds that would be needed
to continue production beyond FY2009 nor the funds that would be needed to shut
down either production line.
Overview of the Administration Request
On February 4, 2008, the Administration released its federal budget request for
FY2009 which included $606.8 billion in discretionary budget authority for national
defense.2 This includes $515.4 billion for the so-called base budget of the
Department of Defense (DOD) — the cost of routine activities excluding U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also includes a lump-sum request for $70
billion to cover war costs in the first part of the year.
The national defense total also includes $16.1 billion for nuclear weapons and
other defense-related programs of the Department of Energy and $5.2 billion for the
defense-related activities of other agencies.
Because it has not submitted a request for funds to cover the full anticipated
costs of operations associated with Iraq and Afghanistan, the Administration is not
in compliance with a provision of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, Section 1008) which requires the President to
include in future annual budget requests funds to cover the anticipated cost of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Administration’s DOD budget request for
FY2008, sent to Congress in February 2007, included a request for $141.7 billion
(subsequently increased to $189.3 billion) to cover anticipated war costs for the entire
fiscal year.
Administration officials raise three arguments to justify the inclusion in the
FY2009 request of a $70 billion funding wedge for war costs rather than an amount
expected to cover operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the whole year. First, they
point out that, at the time the FY2009 request was sent to Congress, legislators had
not yet acted on $102.5 billion worth of the FY2008 war cost request. Second, they
note that the President will not decide until this coming summer whether to reduce
the number of U.S. troops in Iraq below the level deployed in early 2007, before the
“surge” of additional forces that currently are being withdrawn. Third, officials note
that a new president, who will be elected in November and take office in January
2009, will be responsible for U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan during most of
FY2009.
Pressed by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin during a
February 5 hearing to provide an estimate of war costs for all of FY2009, Defense
Secretary Robert M. Gates observed that a simple extrapolation of the FY2008 costs
would amount to $170 billion, but he added that he had no confidence in that
projection because of the uncertainties concerning U.S. combat operations.
2 The budget request includes an additional $4.3 billion in mandatory spending for the
national defense function of the budget (Function 050).
CRS-3
The House may act the week of May 5 on an FY2008 supplemental
appropriations bill that would deal with the balance of the President’s FY2008 war
costs funding request.3
Comparison and Context. The President’s $515.4 billion request for
DOD’s FY2009 base budget is $35.9 billion more than Congress appropriated for the
FY2008 base budget, a nominal increase of 7.5 %. Adjusting for the cost of inflation,
the FY2009 request would provide a real increase of 5.4 %. Roughly two-thirds of
the proposed increase would go to the accounts that pay for current operations:
funding for military personnel would increase by $8.8 billion over the FY2008
appropriation, to $125.2 billion; operations and maintenance funding would increase
by $15.6 billion, to $179.8 billion (see Table 1).
The FY2009 base budget request is $3.3 billion larger than the base budget
request for that year the Administration had projected in February 2007. However,
compared with the earlier projection, the actual request for procurement was lower
by $6.3 billion and the military procurement request was lower by $2.7 billion. On
the other hand, the operations and maintenance request was $5.4 billion higher and
the R&D request $2.4 billion higher than had been forecast in February 2007.
Table 1. Department of Defense Baseline Budget
Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2008-FY2009
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2008
FY2009
Enacted
Request
Change
Military Personnel
116,478
125,247
+8,769
Operation and Maintenance
164,187
179,787
+15,600
Procurement
98,986
104,216
+5,231
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation
76,536
79,616
+3,080
Military Construction
17,763
21,197
+3,434
Family Housing
2,867
3,204
+337
Revolving & Management Funds
2,692
2,174
-518
Total DOD
479,508
515,440
+35,932
Source: Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request: Summary Justification,
February 2008.
3 For congressional action on the supplemental request, see CRS Report for Congress
RL34275, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military
Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes, by Stephen Daggett, et al. For policy
issues raised by that request, see CRS Report for Congress RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
CRS-4
Status of Legislation
Congress has begun action on the annual defense authorization bill with the
Senate Armed Services Committee approving its version (S. 3001) on April 30 and
Senate floor action possible after the Memorial Day recess. The House Armed
Services Committee marked up its version of the bill (H.R. 5658) on May 14. The
House may take up that bill the week of May 19.
Table 2A. Status of FY2009 Defense Authorization
Full Committee
Conference
Markup
Report Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House
Senate
Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House
Senate
Law
S. Rept.
5/14/08 4/30/08
110-335
Action on the FY2009 defense appropriations bill has not yet been scheduled.
Table 2B. Status of FY2009 Defense Appropriations Bill
Subcommittee
Conference Report
Markup
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House
Senate
Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House
Senate
Law
Is the Budget Too Small? The 4% Debate
Over the past few months, a number of senior military officers, as well as
research groups and advocacy organizations, have been arguing that defense spending
needs to be substantially higher in the next few years to avoid drastic cuts in major
weapons programs or in the size of the force. Many have called for a baseline
defense budget, not including war-related costs, pegged to about four percent of
Gross Domestic Product — an amount that would be anywhere from $70 to $180
billion per year higher over the next few years than the current Administration plan.4
4 For an example of the 4% argument, see Jim Talent and Mackenzie Eaglen, “Providing
for the Common Defense: Four Percent for Freedom,” Heritage Foundation, December 13,
2007. The target is not intended to be very precise — proponents have not specified, for
(continued...)
CRS-5
Senior leaders of the military services have been particularly vocal in arguing
for substantial increases in the defense budget. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Admiral Michael Mullen, has, for some time, urged 4% of GDP for defense. For the
past two years, the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force have argued that the
Air Force needs an average of $20 billion more each year for the next several years
in weapons acquisition accounts. In the past few months, senior Army officials have
pointed out that the Army budget, including war costs, has grown to over $230
billion. Though it may come down some, they say, if forces in Iraq and elsewhere
are brought home, several more years of spending at near that level will be needed
to repair, replace, and upgrade equipment consumed by the war-time pace of
operations. For their part, Navy leaders now calculate that the long-term shipbuilding
plan they have proposed for the past few years will, in the future, cost an average of
$20 billion a year in FY2007 prices, an increase of about 40% over earlier estimates.5
These arguments for a substantial increase in the defense budget, however, come
at a time when, by historical standards, military spending appears to be very robust.
Between FY1998, when the post-Cold War decline in defense spending reached its
zenith, and FY2008, the baseline Department of Defense budget, not including war
costs, has increased by almost 40% above inflation (see Table 2). After adjusting for
inflation, the requested FY2009 baseline DOD budget is more than $100 billion, or
about 20%, greater than the average during the Cold War (measured from the end of
the Korean War in FY1954 through FY1990). Requested funding for weapons
acquisition (procurement plus R&D) in FY2009 is more than $45 billion — or about
one-third — higher than the annual Cold War average.
Table 3. DOD Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2013
(amounts in billions of dollars)
Current Year Dollars
Constant FY2009 Dollars
Total
Base
Total
Base
Supplemental
Supplemental
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
FY1998
258.3
255.4
2.8
357.2
353.2
3.9
FY1999
278.4
269.3
9.1
375.1
362.9
12.2
FY2000
290.3
281.8
8.6
381.4
370.1
11.2
FY2001
318.7
299.3
19.4
405.8
381.1
24.6
FY2002
344.9
328.7
16.2
427.7
407.5
20.1
FY2003
437.7
375.1
62.6
526.0
450.8
75.2
FY2004
470.9
401.4
69.5
547.9
467.0
80.9
FY2005
483.9
381.9
101.9
540.7
426.8
113.9
4 (...continued)
example, whether the 4% goal applies to just the Defense Department budget or to the
national defense budget function — a difference, in itself, of $22-23 billion each year.
5 For Admiral Mullen’s views, see Geoff Fein, “National Discussion Needed On Whether
To Boost DoD Spending Above 4 Percent, Chairman Says,” Defense News, February 1,
2008. For statements by Air Force leaders, see Erik Holmes, “Fewer Airmen, Less Cash:
With Fleet Continuing to Age, Wynne Says Drawdown Savings Are Less than Expected,”
Air Force Times, October 1, 2007. For costs of the Navy shipbuilding plan, see CRS Report
RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-6
Current Year Dollars
Constant FY2009 Dollars
Total
Base
Total
Base
Supplemental
Supplemental
DOD
DOD
DOD
DOD
FY2006
536.5
412.4
124.0
580.3
446.1
134.2
FY2007
603.0
431.7
171.3
635.5
455.0
180.5
FY2008
670.5
481.2
189.3
686.3
492.6
193.8
FY2009
588.3
518.3
70.0
588.3
518.3
70.0
FY2010
527.0
527.0
—
514.8
514.8
—
FY2011
533.1
533.1
—
508.5
508.5
—
FY2012
542.4
542.4
—
504.7
504.7
—
FY2013
552.7
552.7
—
501.8
501.8
—
Source: Total DOD budget and deflators from Department of Defense, National Defense Budget
Estimates Fiscal Year 2009, March 2009; supplemental appropriations by CRS.
The disconnection between the size of the budget and the appeals for more
money appears even more striking when amounts that have been appropriated for war
costs are added to the equation. On top of a baseline DOD budget that has grown
from $255 billion in FY1998, in current year prices not adjusted for inflation, to
almost $520 billion in FY2008, supplemental appropriations for war-related costs
that have grown from $19.4 billion in FY2001, with an initial response to the 9/11
attacks, to $63 billion in FY2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, to an estimated $189
billion in FY2008. While large portions of the supplementals have been consumed
by war-related operating costs, substantial amounts have also been devoted to buying
new equipment, particularly for the Army and the Marine Corps. Although the bulk
of this acquisition has been for force protection communications, and transportation,
the effect has been to modernize much of the basic equipment stock of both services,
in effect augmenting their baseline budgets.
The fact that so large a level of spending appears to the military services to be
so inadequate has several explanations — and the policy implications are,
accordingly matters of varying interpretation.6 Reasons include —
! Future baseline budgets are widely expected to decline: The
Administration plan to balance the federal budget by FY2012
includes limits on defense as well as non-defense spending. White
House budget projections accommodate an increase of about 5%
above inflation in the FY2009 DOD budget, but project a cumulative
decline of about 3% between FY2009 and FY2012. Many unofficial
projections of the deficit situation are less sanguine than the
Administration’s, so many analysts expect, at best, a flat baseline
6 These issues were discussed in a CRS seminar on the FY2009 defense budget on February
11, 2008. A video of the seminar is available on line or as a DVD to congressional offices.
See “FY2009 Defense Budget: Issues for Congress, Online, Video,” at
[http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/MM70107.shtml]. The seminar slides illustrate
points discussed below, and are available at “FY2009 Defense Budget: Issues for Congress:
A Powerpoint Summary,” at [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/documents
/WD06002.pdf].
CRS-7
defense budget for the foreseeable future.7 Increased costs in part of
the budget, therefore, will necessarily come at the expense of
resources available in other areas.
! Supplemental appropriations are expected to decline as well: While
plans to withdraw from Iraq are uncertain, the military services
expect that supplemental appropriations will come down within a
few years. Costs for training and equipment maintenance that have
been covered in supplementals, then, will migrate back into the
baseline budget at the expense of other programs, and money to
further upgrade ground forces will have to be found elsewhere.
! Costs of military personnel have grown dramatically in recent years:
Since the end of the 1990s, Congress has approved substantial
increases in military pay and benefits, including pay increases of ½
percent above civilian pay indices in 7 of the past 8 years, three
rounds of “pay table reform” that gave larger raises to personnel in
the middle grades, increased housing allowances to eliminate on-
base and off-base disparities, DOD-provided health insurance for
Medicare-eligible military retirees (known as “TRICARE” for Life),8
concurrent receipt of military retired pay and veterans disability
benefits that had earlier been offset, elimination of a reduction in
retiree survivor benefits that had occurred at age 62, and large
increases in enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and special pays.
While bonuses and some other payments may decline in the future,
most of the past increases in pay and benefits have been built into
the basic cost of personnel. CRS calculates that uniformed
personnel now cost 40% more, after adjusting for inflation, than in
FY1999.9
! Operating costs continue to grow above base inflation: Historically,
military operation and maintenance budgets, which pay for
everything from personnel training, to weapons repairs, to facility
operations, to health care, have increased relative to the size of the
force by about 2.5% per year above inflation. These increases are
not as large as in some areas of the civilian economy, such as health
care, but they do not reflect gains in productivity that are common
in other sectors of the economy. Continued growth in operating
costs, which is now widely seen as a fact of life in defense planning,
erodes the availability of resources for weapons modernization and
other priorities.
7 See, for example, the annual 10 year projections of defense spending by the Government
Electronics and Information Technology Association, at [http://www.geia.org/].
8 TRICARE is a DOD-run health insurance program for military dependents.
9 This reflects the military personnel budget divided by the number of active duty personnel,
indexed for inflation using the consumer price index. See the slides cited in Footnote 6 for
a graph that illustrates the trend.
CRS-8
! Increasing generational cost growth in major weapons programs: It
is generally expected that new generations of weapons will be more
expensive than the systems they replace as weapons technology
advances. The rate of generational cost growth, however, is
becoming a matter of increasing concern within the Defense
Department. New stealthy aircraft, multi-mission ships, advanced
space systems, and networked missiles, guns, and vehicles appear to
be getting more expensive than their predecessors at a greater rate
than in the past. Unless budgets increase more rapidly than costs,
trade-offs between the costs of new weapons and the size of the
force may be required.
! Poor cost estimates: The difficulties engendered by accelerating
inter-generational weapons cost growth are exacerbated by poor cost
estimation. The Government Accountability Office has documented
frequent, substantial increases in costs of major defense systems
compared to original development estimates. A side-effect of
inaccurate cost projections is to exacerbate instability in the overall
defense budget, which entails inefficient production rates for major
weapons programs and increased costs due to changing production
plans.10
! New requirements based on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: The
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to very large increases in
equipment requirements for ground forces, particularly for force
protection, communications, and transportation. National Guard
combat units that earlier were equipped with older systems cascaded
from active units are now seen as part of the rotation base that
require equally modern equipment. And full sets of current
equipment are also expected to be available not only for next-to-
deploy units, but also for units as they begin to reset from overseas
rotations. A key lesson of the war is that what used to be called
“minor procurement” for ground forces was substantially under-
capitalized.
! A broader range of national security challenges: A common
presumption before 9/11 was that forces trained and equipped for
traditional conflicts between national armies would be able to cope
with what were seen as less demanding other challenges such as
stability operations. Now the view is that forces must be designed
not only for traditional conflicts, but for insurgencies and other
irregular wars, support of allies, threats of catastrophic attacks by
non-state actors with weapons of mass destruction, and entirely new
kinds of disruptive attacks on specific U.S. and allied vulnerabilities.
10 For GAO’s most recent annual overview of defense acquisition cost growth, see
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, GAO-08-467SP March 31, 2008, at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items
/d08467sp.pdf].
CRS-9
The effect has been to broaden requirements without, necessarily, an
attendant offsetting reduction in older force goals.
When these factors are taken as a whole, it is not so surprising that military
planners discover some shortfalls. But, for Congress, it may not be so obvious that
the principle answer is simply to provide more money for defense. As a practical
matter, the arguments for more money that senior military leaders have begun to lay
out appear most likely to become matters of debate in Congress once the next
Administration takes office. The next Secretary of Defense, and the 111th Congress,
may, very early on, face a contentious debate about defense resources.
More money is one alternative. Other alternatives may include backing away
from plans to add 92,000 active duty troops to the Army and Marine Corps; shifting
resources among the military services to reflect new challenges rather than allocating
them roughly the same proportions every year; reviewing requirements for expensive
new technologies in view of the presence or absence of technologically peer or near
peer competitors; and shifting resources from military responses to global threats
toward non-military means of prevention. The defense budget environment,
however, appears likely to be troubling enough that it will force some attention to
these matters earlier in the term of the next President rather than much later.
Potential Issues in the FY2009 Base
Budget Request
Following is a brief summary of some of the other issues that may emerge
during congressional action on the FY2009 defense authorization and appropriations
bills, based on congressional action in prior years and early debate surrounding the
President’s pending request.
Military Pay Raise. The budget includes $2 billion to give military personnel
a 3.4% pay raise effective January 1, 2009, an increase that would keep pace with the
average increase in private-sector wages as measured by the Labor Department’s
Employment Cost Index (ECI), as required by law.11 For several years, some have
contended that service members’ pay should increase at a faster rate than the annual
increase in the ECI in order to compensate for a lag in military pay resulting from
budget-constrained pay hikes in the 1990s. DOD officials deny that any such pay-gap
exists, but Congress typically has sided with the advocates of larger increases. For
every fiscal year but one since FY2000, Congress has mandated a military pay
increase one-half percent higher than the rate of increase in the ECI.
Army and Marine Corps End-Strength Increases. The budget includes
$20.5 billion to pay for the costs in FY2009 of the $112 billion multi-year plan to
increase active-duty end-strength by a total of 92,000 Army and Marine Corps
personnel. Most of the additional personnel are slated for assignment to newly
11 See CRS Report for Congress RL33446, Military Pay and Benefits: Key Questions and
Answers, by Charles A. Henning.
CRS-10
created combat units — Army brigade combat teams and Marine regiments — which
would enlarge the pool of units available for overseas deployment. This would make
it easier for the services to sustain overseas roughly the number of troops currently
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan while allowing soldiers and Marines to spend more
time between deployments at their home bases for rest and retraining. The plan has
been challenged by some who note that, after the initial investment costs have been
covered, the additional units would cost about $13 billion annually, in a time when
the total DOD budget is expected to be relatively flat. It also has been criticized by
some who contend that the Army in particular needs more units organized and trained
especially for counter-insurgency and advisory missions more than it needs additional
traditional combat units.12
TRICARE Fees and Co-pays. For the third consecutive year, the
Administration’s budget assumes that part of the cost of the Defense Health program
— $1.2 billion in the pending FY2009 request — will be covered by an increase in
fees, co-payments and deductibles charged to retirees under the age of 65 who
participate in TRICARE, DOD’s medical insurance program for active and retired
service members and their dependents. The increases are intended partly to restrain
the rapid growth of DOD’s annual health-care budget — projected to reach $64
billion by FY2015 — and partly to compensate for the fact that TRICARE fees have
not been increased since 1995.13 This year, as in the two previous years, the proposed
fee increases are vehemently opposed by organizations representing service members
and military retirees who argue that giving medical care to retirees on favorable terms
is appropriate given the unique hardships of a military career. Congress rejected the
proposed fee hikes in the FY2007 and FY2008 budget proposals, and the Senate
Armed Services Committee has done so in drafting its version of the FY2009 defense
authorization bill.
War Funding. As has been the case in recent years, this year it appears that
funding for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere will be provided
in emergency supplemental appropriations bills rather than through the regular
defense authorization and appropriations process. A second supplemental FY2008
appropriations bill, which the House plans to take up the week of May 5, is widely
expected to include a $65-70 billion “bridge fund” to cover essential operational
costs well into calendar year 2009 — quite likely though June or July.14 This would
leave it to the next Administration to decide to how much to request in a second, full
year supplemental to finance equipment reset, equipment upgrade, and some other
costs.
12 See CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized
Units? Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
13 For background, see Government Accountability Office report GAO-07-647, Military
Health Care: TRICARE Cost-Sharing Proposals Would Help Offset Increasing Health Care
Spending, but Projected Savings Are Likely Overestimated, May 2007.
14 CRS calculates that $55-$60 billion in supplemental funding, if allocated mainly to Army,
Marine Corps, and Air Force operation and maintenance, to Army personnel, to the JIED
Defeat Fund, and to the Afghanistan and Iraq Security Forces Funds, would be enough to
carry on operations through the end of July, 2009.
CRS-11
The FY2009 defense authorization, however, may also formally approve
FY2009 war-related funding in a separate title of the bill. The Senate Armed
Services Committee included $70 billion for war costs in Title XV of its bill, and the
House Armed Services Committee may do the same. While this will have no direct
effect on funding, which is determined by appropriations bills in any event, some
policy measures may be included in the authorization. In its markup of the
authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee includes provisions
requiring that much of the reconstruction assistance provided to Iraq, a large amount
of which is included in the Defense Department budget,15 be delivered as loans rather
than grants.
Projected Navy Strike Fighter Shortfall. Some analyses of the number
of F-18 strike fighters available to the Navy show a substantial shortfall of aircraft
from about the middle of the next decade until about 2025, when the full planned
number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters becomes available. The number of available
aircraft, however, depends on assumptions about the number of hours that current
aircraft can fly, and at what cost for maintenance, upgrades, and overhauls. Boeing
has recently offered to sell additional F/A-18E/F versions of the aircraft to the Navy
for about $50 million apiece, as much as 10% cheaper than planned for additional
aircraft, if the Navy agrees to buy 170 aircraft in a multiyear contract that would have
early termination penalties. Several Members of Congress have expressed concerns
about the potential shortfall and may propose that the FY2009 authorization approve
a new multiyear deal. Future funding for the additional aircraft, however, might
compete with funds for other projects, particularly if defense budgets level off in the
2010s.16
LPD-17-Class Ship Procurement. For the past two years, the Marine
Corps has included a request for an additional LPD-17-class amphibious ship, which
would be the 10th to be bought, at the top of its unfunded priorities list. There has
been some support in Congress for adding a 10th LPD, but funding might have to
come at the cost of financing for surface combatant ships such as the DDG-1000
destroyer. Support for shifting money from the DDG-1000 to LPDs or other ships
that have been in production for some time comes partly from advocates of the
Marine Corps and from legislators who represent the Gulf coast, where the ship
would be built. In addition, there has been some support for a shift because the cost
and design of the LPD-17 — as for TAKE auxiliary ships and DDG-51 destroyers
— has been stable for some time.17
15 DOD provided assistance includes reconstruction grants distributed by local U.S. military
commanders through the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), which
totaled $850 million in FY2007 for both Iraq and Afghanistan, and security assistance
provided through the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Funds, which, together, totaled
$5.5 billion for Iraq and $7.4 billion for Afghanistan in FY2007.
16 Megan Scully, “Boeing Presses Armed Services Panels To Have Navy Buy More Super
Hornets,” National Journal Congress Daily AM, April 29, 2008.
17 Geoff Fein, “Lawmakers Hope To Add Three More Ships To Navy’s FY ‘09 Procurement
Plan,” Defense Daily, February 28, 2008.
CRS-12
Funding for DDG-1000 Destroyers versus Other Ships. A directly
related issue is whether Congress will agree to continue funding DDG-1000
acquisition. The Administration’s FY2009 request includes $2.6 billion for a third
DDG-1000. Several legislators on the defense committees have proposed
eliminating the funds and using the money instead to buy a mix of LPD-17, TAKE
auxiliary ships, and DDG-51 destroyers. This would spread available shipbuilding
money more widely to sustain the industrial base, provide funding to programs in
which costs are stable and more predictable, and also allocate funds to less expensive
ships that might be built, in the long run, in larger numbers to sustain the Navy’s 313
ship fleet.
Littoral Combat Ship Funding. The Administration has also requested
$920 million for two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). This is a relatively small, lower
cost ship with a common hull to support modular designs for several purposes. It is
intended to be bought in large numbers over time for operations in relatively close-to-
shore waters. The program has suffered significant cost growth, however, raising
questions about the number of ships that can be afforded. Last year, Congress cut
funding for all but one ship and shifted the savings to purchase other ships. This year
may again be a test of congressional support for the ship in view of continuing cost
issues.18
CG-X Design. The CG-X is the current designation for a new ship dedicated
to missile defense missions. Its design was, for many years, expected to be based on
the DDG-1000. Now, however, it appears that the Navy is inclined to build a
substantially larger ship. Some defense committee members have raised questions
about the status of the Navy’s design and about the affordability of the program.
There has also been some support in Congress for building a nuclear powered
cruiser.19
Reliable Replacement Warhead. There has been a great deal of
controversy in Congress in recent years about the Energy Department’s plans to
design a new nuclear warhead intended, according to its advocates, to take advantage
of new technologies to improve safety and reliability in a new warhead to replace
deteriorating older systems. In the past, Congress has provided funding only for
conceptual design of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), but it has not
permitted funds to be used for engineering development. The FY2008 consolidated
appropriations act, P.L. 110-161, which included energy and water appropriations,
provided no DOE funds for the RRW. In the FY2009 budget, DOE has requested
$10 million for RRW design, and the Navy has requested $23 million.20
18 See CRS Report to Congress RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship(LCS) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
19 See CRS Report to Congress RL34179, CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background, Oversight
Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
20 For a full discussion, see CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead
Program: Background and Current Developments, by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS-13
Missile Defense. The Administration requested $9.3 billion for missile
defense R&D in FY2009. While Congress has generally supported about the level
of spending the Administration has requested in recent years, it has frequently
reduced funding for technologically more challenging systems such as the kinetic
energy interceptor program to intercept missiles in the boost phase, and it has
increased funding for currently deployed systems, mainly the Patriot PAC III theater
defense system. For the past two years, Congress has also eliminated money to begin
construction at missile defense sites in Europe, saying in various reports that the
funding was premature because there was no firm agreement with Poland and the
Czech Republic where deployment is planned. The FY2009 request includes $132.6
million for military construction at an interceptor site in Europe, which is planned in
Poland, and $108.5 million for military construction at a radar site, which is planned
in the Czech Republic.21
Long-Range Non-Nuclear Prompt Global Strike. For the past several
years, the Administration has pursued programs that might permit it to deploy
conventional warheads on long-range missiles that now carry nuclear warheads. In
recent years, this effort has focused on the possible deployment of conventional
warheads on Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The funding requests
sought to continue R&D on the reentry vehicle that would carry the warhead, and
have sought to begin modifying and equipping Trident missiles and submarines to
carry the new reentry vehicles. Congress has not approved this funding. In FY2007,
it permitted the continuing R&D on the reentry vehicle, but did not fund the
programs that would modify the missiles and submarines. In FY2008, Congress
again rejected all funding for the conventional Trident modification, and aggregated
the funding for research on the reentry vehicle with other DOD funding for research
on prompt global strike technologies. It directed that DOD explore all options for
achieving the PGS mission, and not focus on the near-term Trident option. Congress
has objected to the Trident option in part because of doubts that the capability is
needed immediately, and in part because of concerns that other nations might mistake
the nature of a U.S. Trident missile launch. Congress appropriated $100 million for
this combined program in FY2008; the Administration has requested $117 million
for FY2009.22
Future Combat Systems. The FY2009 budget request includes $3.6 billion
to continue development and begin production of the Army’s Future Combat Systems
(FCS). FCS is a computer-networked array of 14 types of manned and unmanned
ground and aerial vehicles intended to replace the Army’s current fleet of combat
vehicles, including M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry vehicles, beginning
in 2015. The Army has estimated that the entire program could cost $230 billion over
many years and the Defense Department’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(CAIG) projects the cost to be $300 billion. Critics have assailed the program on
several grounds: some argue that it is unaffordable; some contend that it is optimized
to fight the sort of conventional battles at which the U.S. Army already excels rather
21 For the current status of the program, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic
Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
22 See CRS Report RL33067, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
CRS-14
than the insurgencies, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, that it may be more
likely to confront; and some object that the program as currently scheduled will take
too long to get more effective weapons into the hands of the troops.23 In FY2006-08,
Congress cut a total of $789 million from the Army’s FCS budget requests. This year,
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John P. Murtha has
suggested that near-term funding for the program be increased by $20 billion to
accelerate deployment of those elements of FCS nearest completion, at the expense
of cancelling or delaying other elements of the program.24
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine. For the third consecutive
year, the Administration has proposed cancellation of the effort to develop the
General Electric F-136 engine as a potential alternative to the Pratt & Whitney F-135
currently slated to power the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The $6.7 billion requested for
the F-35 program in FY2009 includes $3.1 billion to continue development of the
plane and $3.7 billion to buy 16 aircraft, but no funds to continue development of the
alternative engine. DOD has argued that the alternative engine is a needless expense
because the process of designing and developing high-performance jet engines has
become much less uncertain than it once was. But Congress has backed development
of the alternate engine since 1996, likening the current situation to the case of the F-
15 fighter in the late 1970s which was handicapped by problems with its
Pratt&Whitney-built engines until Congress mandated development of an alternative
(GE-built) engine. To keep the F-35 alternative engine program going, Congress
added $340 million to the FY2007 budget and $480 million to the FY2008 budget.
F-22 Fighter. Congress may want to consider whether to add funds to the Air
Force’s F-22 fighter program either to shut down production or to continue it.
Although Air Force officials have argued vigorously for purchase of 381 of the
planes, DOD plans to buy only 183, with the last 20 paid for by $3.4 billion included
in the FY2009 budget. However, the request includes no funds to pay for closing the
F-22 production line in an orderly way that would facilitate its resuscitation at a later
date. Reportedly, the shut down could cost as much as $500 million.25 DOD officials
have said they may include in the FY2009 war cost supplemental request — not yet
sent to Congress — funds to buy four additional F-22s which, they contend, would
defer the necessity of a shut down decision until the next Administration had time to
decide whether to continue production or end it.26 However others deny that funding
for four planes would delay the need for a decision long enough to make a difference.
Mid-Air Refueling Tanker. Critics may try to block funding for the KC-45,
a tanker version of the European-designed Airbus A330 which the Air Force selected
rather than a version of the Boeing 767 to replace aging Boeing-built KC-135
23 See CRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
24 Defense News, “Battle Over Proposal to Speed FCS,” by Kris Osborne, March 24, 2008.
25 Aviation Week and Space Technology, “Fate of F-22, C-17 Lines Uncertain in Fiscal
2009,” by Amy Butler and David A. Fulgham, February 11, 2008.
26 Ibid.
CRS-15
refueling tankers.27 Airbus builder EADS has partnered by Northrop Grumman to
build the KC-45. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is reviewing a
protest of the Air Force decision filed by Boeing, which contends that the contract
was awarded unfairly. GAO is expected to rule on the protest by June 19. The
FY2009 budget request includes $62 million for components that would be used in
the first five KC-45s and $832 million to continue developing the tanker.
C-17 Cargo Jet. As with the F-22 fighter program, so with the C-17 long-
range cargo plane. The Administration’s FY2009 budget request includes neither
funds to buy components to continue C-17 production, as many have urged, nor the
funds that would be needed to terminate production. As with the case of the F-22,
the Administration has said that the next President should decide the future of the C-
17 program. While some DOD studies have concluded that the 190 C-17s previously
funded will suffice, critics challenge that assessment on several grounds. While some
in Congress favor production of additional C-17s, others favor upgrades to older C-5
cargo planes DOD plans to retire.28
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action
to Date
Congressional Budget Resolution
Congress has begun, but has not completed, work on the annual congressional
budget resolution, which will include recommended ceilings for FY2009 and the
following four years on budget authority and outlays for national defense and other
broad categories (or “functions”) of federal expenditure. These functional ceilings are
not binding on the Appropriations committees nor do they formally constrain the
authorizing committees in any way. However, the budget resolution’s ceilings on the
so-called “050 function” — the budget accounts funding the military activities of
DOD and the defense-related activities of the Department of Energy and other
agencies — have in the past indicated the general level of support in the House and
Senate for the President’s overall defense budget proposal.
Both the House version of the budget resolution (H Con Res 312), adopted
March 13, and the Senate version ( S. Con Res 70), adopted March 14, set the budget
authority ceiling for the 050 “national defense” function at $612.5 billion. This is
essentially identical to the President’s request ($611.1 billion) with the difference
reflecting recalculation by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the basis of
slightly different technical assumptions.
27 See CRS Report RL34398, Air Force Air Refueling: The KC-X Aircraft Acquisition
Program, by William Knight and Christopher Bolkcom.
28 See CRS Report RL34264, Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5
Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues, by William Knight and Christopher Bolkcom.
CRS-16
FY2009 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the Senate
Armed Services Committee Bill29
The FY2009 defense authorization bill approved April 30 by the Senate Armed
Services Committee would authorize a total of $612.5 billion in new budget authority
for national security programs, including 542.5 billion for the base line budget and
a $70 billion placeholder allowance for war-related costs. This is essentially the
amount requested by the President, except for minor changes recommended by CBO
on the basis of different technical assumptions.
According to the committee’s April 30 press release, the bill:
! authorizes a 3.9 % military pay raise, rather than the 3.4 % increase
requested by the Administration;
! rejects the Administration’s proposal to increase fees, co-pays and
deductibles that would be charged to some military retirees by
DOD’s TRICARE medical insurance program; the bill also would
authorize $1.2 billion for the Defense Health program which the
Administration had not requested in anticipation of revenue from the
proposed higher fees;
! authorizes an increase in Army and Marine Corps end-strength
during FY2009 of 7,000 and 5,000 personnel, respectively, as part
of the Administration’s plan to increase active-duty end-strength of
those two services by a total of 92,000;
! authorizes the services to let a limited number of personnel leave
active service for up to three years and return with no loss of rank or
time-in-service to test the feasibility of allowing service members
more flexibility in pursuing their careers,
! requires DOD to conduct a comprehensive study of the risk that
critical installations could be cut off from their current sources of
energy;
! requires DOD to establish ethics standards to prohibit conflicts of
interest on the part of contractor employees who perform acquisition
functions for the Department;
! bars private security contractors from performing in an area of
combat operations any “inherently governmental functions,” which
are defined to include “security operations if they will be performed
in highly hazardous public areas where the risks are uncertain and
29 This section is based on the Senate Armed Services Committee’s summary of its action,
released May 1, 2008. It will be revised as soon as the committee report on the bill becomes
available.
CRS-17
could reasonably be expected to require deadly force that is more
likely to be initiated by contractor personnel than by others;
! prohibits contractor employees from interrogating detainees during
or in the aftermath of hostilities, a restriction that would take effect
one year after enactment of the bill;
! requires the armed services to ensure that field commanders “urgent
requirements” for specific equipment be presented to senior service
officials for review within 60 days of submission;
! requires boards to review and approve or reject any proposed change
in the requirements a weapons program is to meet that would
increase the cost of the program;
! authorizes the amounts requested to deploy in Poland and the Czech
Republic elements of an anti-missile defense system, but with
restrictions on the use of the money until the host governments
formally approve the deployment and Congress receives certain
reports from DOD relating to the project;
! adds $350 million to the $843 million requested to develop the
Transformational Satellite (TSAT), which would be a key node in a
planned, high-volume, global laser-communication network;
! authorizes the $10 million requested in the Energy Department’s
defense-related budget for research on the Reliable Replacement
Warhead, but denies authorization for the $23 million in the Navy’s
budget request for that proposed new nuclear warhead;
! authorizes with minor changes the administration’s request to fund
eight ships and adds $170 million to buy components for an LPD-
17-class amphibious landing transport;
! authorizes the $3.6 billion requested for the Army’s FCS program;
! authorizes, in addition to the $6.7 billion requested for the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter, $465 million to continue development of the General
Electric alternative engine for that plane and $35 million to fund
improvements to the Pratt&Whitney engine currently slated for use
in the plane;
! adds to the budget request $497 million to be used either for
components that would be used in F-22s that would be funded in
future budgets or to pay for shutting down the F-22 production line;
and
! prohibits, with a few exceptions, the use of funds authorized by the
bill to pay for infrastructure projects in Iraq costing more than $2
million.
CRS-18
FY2009 Defense Authorization: Highlights of the House
Armed Services Committee Bill
The House Armed Services Committee on May 14 approved its version of the
FY2009 national defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658), which would authorize
$531.4 billion for national defense-related activities of DOD and other federal
agencies and an additional $70 billion for costs related to military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Following are highlights of the recommendations to the full committee approved
by the various subcommittees, as announced by the chairs and ranking minority
members of the committee and its subcommittees.30
Pay Raise, Tricare, and Other Personnel Issues. The committee’s bill
authorizes a military pay raise of 3.9 percent, rather than 3.4 percent as requested,
and bars during FY2009 a proposed increase in TRICARE health insurance and
pharmacy fees charged to some military retirees. Congress had prohibited proposed
health care fee increases in each of the two previous budgets. To make up for the lost
revenue the proposed fee hikes had been expected to generate, the committee
proposed $1.2 billion worth of reductions in discretionary spending and reductions
in direct spending totaling $345 million. In a statement, Military Personnel
Subcommittee chair Susan Davis said: “It is unclear that we will be able to continue
to sustain prohibitions on health care fee increases in the future[.] [W]e will need to
work together to find a fair and equitable solution that protects our beneficiaries and
ensures the financial viability of the military health care system for the future.”
The committee approved the Administration’s proposal to continue increasing
the active-duty end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps, but it rejected a proposal
to continue substituting civilians for military personnel in Navy and Air Force
medical care positions. Instead, the subcommittee reaffirmed support for a provision
of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181) prohibiting such
military-to-civilian conversions and recommended adding to the recommended end-
strength of the Navy and Air Force a total of 1,473 medical personnel, who the
Administration had planned to replace with civilians.
The committee also recommended a provision that would allow a limited
number of service members to take sabbaticals from active service for up to three
years and return with no loss of rank or time-in-service. Representative Davis said
the Navy found female junior officers, who wanted to make the Navy a career, were
leaving the service to for family reasons.
KC-45A, C-17, F-22, and JSF. The committee denied authorization of $62
billion requested for long lead-time components to begin procurement of the
30 This section is based on published statements by the chairs and ranking minority members
of the House Armed Services Committee and its subcommittees on May 14, 2008, during
the committee markup of H.R. 5658. It will be revised following action by the full House
Armed Services Committee. These statements are available on the committee’s website,
[http://www.house.gov/hasc/].
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Northrop Grumman KC-45A refueling tanker, but approved the request for $832
million to continue development of the aircraft. Some members have objected to the
Air Force’s selection of the Northrop Grumman system, based on a European-
designed Airbus for this mission rather than a tanker version of the Boeing 767.
According to the committee, denial of the long lead-time funding would not delay the
program.
The committee approved $3 billion requested for 20 F-22 fighters. However, it
also added to the bill authorization of $523 million for long lead-time components
that would be used to build an additional 20 F-22s in FY2010. The Administration’s
request includes neither the funds that would be needed to continue production of the
F-22 beyond FY2009 nor the funds that would be needed to close down the
production line. The Senate Armed Services Committee included in its version of
the FY2009 defense authorization bill $497 million to be used for either purpose, as
determined by the Administration that will take office in January 2009.
The committee also added to the request $3.9 billion to buy 15 C-17 cargo
planes. The budget request included neither funds to continue production of this type
nor funds to shut down the production line.
The committee bill authorizes the requests for $3.1 billion to continue
development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and $3.7 billion to buy 16 of the
planes. But it would add to the Administration request $525 million to continue
development of an alternative engine for the JSF.
Future Combat Systems (FCS). The committee cut $200 million from the
$3.6 billion requested for the Army’s FCS program, cuts that Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee chair Neil Abercrombie said were targeted to slow production of some
components until they were more thoroughly tested. If the proposal were enacted,
it would mark the fourth consecutive budget in which Congress trimmed the funding
request for FCS.
The committee also added to the bill several legislative restrictions on the FCS
program, reportedly including a requirement for annual reports to Congress on cost
growth in the program’s eight types of manned ground vehicles, an independent
report on potential vulnerabilities of the digital communications web intended to link
FCS components, and a provision that would bar the program’s lead system
integrators, Boeing and SAIC, from producing major components of the program.31
During the committee’s May 14 markup, it rejected by a vote of 33-23 a
proposal to authorize the Administration’s $3.6 billion request for FCS in FY2009.
31 Inside the Army, “House Panel Votes to Cut $200 Million From FCS, Boost Oversight,”
by Daniel Wasserbly, May 12, 2008. For additional background on DOD’s use of
contractors as “lead system integrators,” see CRS Report to Congress RS22631, Defense
Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators (LSIs): Background, Oversight Issues and
Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso.
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Anti-Missile Defense. The committee bill authorizes a total of $10.1 billion
for missile defense programs, which would be $719 million less than the President
requested, but $213 million more than Congress appropriated for these programs in
FY2008. Among the reductions were cuts totaling $372 million from the $954
million requested to begin deploying in Poland and the Czech Republic an anti-
missile system intended to deal with long-range missiles launched from Iran.
During the markup, the committee rejected by a vote of 34-24 a proposal to
authorize the entire amount requested for the European system.
The committee also cut from the request $100 million of the $354 million to
develop a multiple-warhead interceptor able to hit several attacking missiles. The
committee rejected by a vote of 34-25 a proposal to restore that reduction.
The committee also cut from the Administration’s request $10 million, the
entire amount requested for the Space Test Bed, an experiment to test the feasibility
of space-based anti-missile interceptors. A proposal to approve $5 million for that
project was rejected by a vote of 33-26.
Shipbuilding. The committee authorization of $2.5 billion requested in
FY2009 to build a third ship of the DDG-1000-class. Instead, the panel
recommended that funds be added to the request for a tenth ship of the LPD-17 class
of amphibious landing transports ($1.7 billion) and two additional T-AKE-class
supply ships, designed to replenish warships in mid-ocean ($278 million). The
subcommittee also recommended authorization of $400 million which the Navy
could use either to buy components that could be used to build an additional DDG-
1000 or to resume production of the much less expensive DDG-51-class destroyers.
Seapower Subcommittee chair Gene Taylor urged the Navy to use the funds to
continue DDG-51 procurement.
The committee approved the request to buy two additional Littoral Combat
Ships, but authorized $840 million rather than the $920 million to take account of the
fact that the contractors could use components previously purchased for ships of this
class that had been cancelled.
The committee added $722 million to the $3.4 billion requested for acquisition
of Virginia-class submarines. The request would buy one sub in FY2009 and
components (including a nuclear powerplant) to be used in another sub slated for
purchase in FY2010. The committee’s increase would let the Navy buy enough
“long lead-time components” in FY2009 to allow the purchase of two subs in
FY2010 thus accelerating by one year the time when the Navy could begin buying
subs at the rate of two per year.
It also recommended adding to the bill a provision requiring that future classes
of large amphibious landing ships be nuclear powered.
Iraq Policy Provisions. The committee included in the bill provisions
intended to increase the Iraqi government’s contribution to the cost of reconstructing
that country. It authorized $1 billion of the $2 billion requested for training and
support of Iraqi Security Forces, and it required that Iraq contribute one dollar for
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every two dollars spent by the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP),
a fund available to U.S. commanders in Iraq for reconstruction projects. The
committee also directed DOD to report on how the Iraqi government’s increasing
income was being factored into the request for CERP funds.
The committee included in the bill provisions requiring that future budget
requests list separately those items related to operations in Iraq and those items
related to operations in Afghanistan. The bill also would continue a prohibition in
current law on the use of funds either to establish permanent bases in Iraq or to
control Iraqi oil revenues.
Other Highlights. Among other provisions of H.R. 5658 as reported by the
House Armed Services Committee are the following:
! Authorization of $118 million, as requested, for development of a
long-range, conventionally armed missile for “prompt global strike.”
No funds had been requested to develop a conventionally armed
version of the Navy’s Trident submarine-launched, nuclear-armed
missile, which Congress has refused to fund in prior budgets.
! Authorization of $1 billion as requested to continue development of
the VH-71, a new fleet of White House helicopters. Citing cost
overruns in the Lockheed Martin program, which is based on a
European-designed aircraft, the committee directed DOD to report
alternatives for future production.
! Authorization of $448 million not requested by the administration
to repair the wings of P-3C Navy patrol planes, designed to hunt
submarines, but which are being extensively used in Iraq.
! Prohibition for one year of so-called “A-76” competitions in which
private contractors bid to take over work currently performed by
federal employees.
! A requirement that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
draft a government-wide definition of “inherently governmental
functions” that should be performed by federal employees rather
than by contractors.