Order Code RS21968
Updated May 12, 2008
Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iraq’s current government, the result of a U.S.-supported election process designed
to produce democracy, is instead a sectarian government incapable of reconciliation. The
Administration says that the passage of some key laws represents progress on national
reconciliation, and is a result of the U.S. “troop surge.” Others say that combat among
Shiite groups since March 2008, possibly motivated by provincial elections planned for
October 2008, shows that force will not stabilize Iraq. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an
appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law”
(TAL). The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly, provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for
Baghdad), and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was
proportional representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a
party, a coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which
nine were multi-party coalitions. A female candidate occupied every third position on
electoral lists to produce 25% female membership. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall
population), perceiving electoral defeat, boycotted and won only 17 seats. At the
provincial level, Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s 51-seat council.
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr boycotted the elections as a sign of opposition to
the U.S.-led political process, and his supporters are under-represented on the provincial
councils in the Shiite south. After the elections, an interim government was formed that
placed Shiites and Kurds in the most senior positions, although it had Sunnis as Assembly
speaker, deputy president, deputy prime minister, defense minister, and five other
ministers. The presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal
Talabani and Da’wa (a Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-
thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly

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appointed a 55-member drafting committee. It included only two Sunni Arabs, although
15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors. In August 2005, the talks
produced a draft, including the following provisions: a December 31, 2007, deadline to
hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the Kurdish region
(Article 140); designation of Islam “a main source” of legislation and prohibiting laws
from contradicting the “established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 setting a 25%
electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowing families to choose which courts to use for
family issues such as divorce and inheritance (Article 41); making only primary education
mandatory (Article 34); and including Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the
federal supreme court (Article 89). Many women opposed the latter provision as giving
too much discretion to males of their families, and Islamic extremists in Iraq purportedly
cite these provisions to impose, including through killings, restrictions against women.
It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA), applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council”
(Article 62), a second chamber with its size and powers to be determined by subsequent
law (not passed to date).
The major disputes — which continue unresolved — centered on regional versus
central power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new
autonomous “regions” – reaffirmed in an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
Article 117 allows each “region” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the
fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL). Article 109
requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields”
in proportion to population, and gives “regions” a role in allocating revenues from new
energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national
hydrocarbons legislation – Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas
deposits, and favor centralized control of the oil industry and revenues. The Kurds want
to maintain maximum regional control of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11,
2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-
December 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another
two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces
of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. As
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR. The COR was inaugurated on
March 16, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA to
1 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

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agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22,
the COR approved Talabani to continue as president, and selected his two deputies —
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front coalition. Another Consensus Front figure, the
hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosen COR
speaker. Maliki won a COR vote for a 37-member cabinet (including himself and two
deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National
Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of infighting. Of the 37 posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-
28), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15, 2007 and then September 15 — were required for
the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The
President has used the waiver provision. The law mandated a separate assessment by the
GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been achieved,
as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside commission
(headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results, as well as subsequent legislative actions and
implementation, are shown in the chart below.
Many experts agree that Iraq’s major communities remain sharply divided over their
relative positions in the power structure, but the Administration, as expressed in the April
8 and 9, 2008 testimony of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, sees signs of
movement, facilitated by a reduction in violence attributed partly to the 2007 - 2008
“troop surge.” The February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting)
of two significant laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law) and the 2008 national
budget, represented possible breakthroughs, although Ambassador Crocker and other U.S.
officials say that their effects will depend on implementation. Others believe that these
legislative moves pale in significance to ongoing, and in some cases deepening, rifts
among Iraq’s major communities. Some see a widening split between Iraq Kurds and
Iraq’s Arabs (both Sunni and Shiite). The budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab
assertions that the 17% revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous – a
figure already agreed to in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to
determine long term percentage allocations for the Kurds. Many Iraqi Arabs say that a
new flag was adopted (January 22, 2008) only because of Kurdish pressure and some
factions refuse to fly it. The De-Baathification reform law adopted January 12, 2008 could
result in the expulsion of more Sunnis from government than it re-instates.
Signs point to a political strengthening of Prime Minister Maliki, who was reeling
in mid-2007 by the pullout of the cabinet of several major blocs, including the Consensus
Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi. Those
withdrawals left the cabinet with about 13 vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet. Of those
three have since been filled by new appointments and one returning Minister (Ali Baban,
Minister of Planning). All blocs have resumed participating in the COR.

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Some experts viewed fighting in southern Iraq and in Shiite sections of Baghdad in
late March 2008 as a setback to the assertions of progress on political reconciliation -
whether “top-down” or “bottom-up.” The fighting was sparked by a decision by Maliki
to send about 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to Basra to defeat militias (Sadr’s Jaysh
al-Mahdi, or JAM, and Fadhila Party) in the oil export hub. Major fighting ended with a
reported Iran-brokered ceasefire announced by Sadr on March 30, 2008, which did not
require the JAM to surrender or disarm, and in which 1,300 ISF deserted the fight. Critics
viewed the action as Maliki’s attempts to defeat Sadr in advance of planned October 1,
2008 provincial elections in which Sadr’s movement is expected to do well, but the
Administration asserted the move was a bold decision by Maliki to confront criminals and
illegal militias. Sunni and Kurdish leaders saw the move as an indicator of increased
sectarian even-handedness, and subsequently rallied to Maliki; the Consensus Front is
currently negotiating a possible return to the cabinet (six seats). Subsequently, the ISF
has slowly gained control over formerly JAM controlled areas of Basra, but clashes have
continued with the JAM in Baghdad, despite a May 10, 2008 tentative ceasefire
agreement, as U.S. and Iraqi forces seek to stop JAM rocket attacks on U.S. installations.

Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
140
128
of Nuri al-Maliki, and a competing faction) - 25 seats; and independents -
30. Sadr faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
40
25
parties for Dec. vote. Lost two members in December 2007- now 23 seats
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
—
44
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-
—
11
Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

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Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
GAO Sept.
14
Administrati
Admin.
Subsequent Actions
on Report
Report
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
satis.
unmet
satisfactory
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional powers
(CRC) and completing review
and presidential powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing
amendments. Some progress on technical, judicial issues. Deadlines for
recommendations repeatedly extended, now to May 2008.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
unsatis.
unmet
satisfactory
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by 143 in COR
Baathification
present. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and
3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would receive pensions instead. Could
allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 ex-
Baathists in post-Saddam security services, and bars ex-Saddam security
personnel from regaining jobs. Seven members to be nominated to High
Commission that will implement the law.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
unsatis.
unmet
unsatisfact.
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab disputes; only
ensure equitable distribution of resources
framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably,
and 2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 maintains 17% revenue share KRG.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
satis.
partly
satis.
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshhold to form new
semi-autonomous regions
met
regions, but main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. No active
movement to form new regions yet evident.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
satis. on (a)
overall
satis. on (a)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13,
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
and unsatis.
unmet;
and (c).
2008, took effect April 2008 after dropping of presidential council objection to
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
on the others
(a) met
provision for Baghdad to remove provincial governors. Election law due by May
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a
2008 and provincial elections planned by October 1, 2008. Some of the nine
date for provincial elections
Higher Election Commission (IHEC) members to be replaced by UNAMI due to
“non-transparent” selection process, despite passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
conditions do
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 detainees held by Iraq, passed on
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
not allow a
February 13, 2008. Only a few hundred released to date due to slow judicial
rating
process. Does not affect 25,000 detainees held by U.S.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
conditions do
unmet
Same as July
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bush Administration as move
disarmament
not allow
against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as
rating
condition for their parties to participate in October 2008 provincial elections.
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
satis.
met
met
No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
satis.
partial
satisfactory
No change. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge.
support U.S. surge

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Benchmark
July 12
GAO Sept.
14
Administrati
Admin.
Subsequent Actions
on Report
Report
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities
unsatis.
unmet
Mixed: satis.
No significant change. Still some, although diminished, concern over the
to make decisions, without political
to pursue
Office of the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over
intervention, to pursue all extremists, including
extremists,
appointments to the ISF - favoring Shiites and excluding many Sunnis. Still,
Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
but unsat on
some politically-motivated leaders remain in ISF. In the past year, the
political
commander of the National Police has fired over 5,000 officers for sectarian
interference
or politically-motivated behavior.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
unsatis.
unmet
overall
Administration interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law
providing even-handed enforcement of law
mixed. Satis.
even-handedly, but acknowledges continue militia influence and infiltration in
on Iraqi
some units.
military,
unsatis on
police
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will
satis.
partial
satis
No change. Administration sees ISF acting against JAM in Sadr City, and
not provide a safe haven for any outlaw,
ethno-sectarian violence fallen sharply in Baghdad.
regardless of sectarian affiliation
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Overall
unmet
same as July
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating despite Basra
eliminating militia control of local security
mixed.
12
operation. 90,000 Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
Satis.(a);
as potential Sunni militia forces. Only 20,000 allowed to join ISF to date.
unsatis. (b)
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
satis.
met
satis.
No change. Over 50 joint security stations operational, many more than the 33
planned.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely unable
independently
to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and against external threats not until 2018-
2020. Basra operation widely viewed as exposing continued factionalism and
poor leadership in ISF, but also ability to rapidly deploy.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in
satis.
met
satis.
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
COR
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
satis.
partial.
satis.
An estimated 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was
capital budget for reconstruction projects.
spent. Another $18 billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted February 13, 2008.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not making
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.
Some governmental interference in ISF operations still observed.
false accusations against ISF members

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