Order Code RL34322
The Gulf Security Dialogue and
Related Arms Sale Proposals
Updated May 9, 2008
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Richard F. Grimmett
Specialist in International Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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The Gulf Security Dialogue and
Related Arms Sale Proposals
Summary
In May 2006, the Administration launched an effort to revive U.S.-Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) security cooperation under the auspices of a new Gulf
Security Dialogue (GSD). The Dialogue now serves as the principal security
coordination mechanism between the United States and the six countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, and Oman. The core objectives of the Dialogue are the promotion
of intra-GCC and GCC-U.S. cooperation to meet common perceived threats. The
Dialogue provides a framework for U.S. engagement with the GCC countries in the
following six areas: (1) the improvement of GCC defense capabilities and
interoperability; (2) regional security issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and Lebanon; (3) counter-proliferation; (4) counter-terrorism and internal security;
(5) critical infrastructure protection; and (6) commitments to Iraq.
The Administration has proposed a series of arms sales intended to enhance the
defense capabilities of the GCC countries and improve the interoperability of their
militaries in line with the objectives of the Gulf Security Dialogue. In particular, the
Administration recently has proposed the sale of defense systems designed to
strengthen the maritime, air, and missile defenses of some GCC members. Under
Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally
notified 30 calendar-days before the Administration can take the final steps to
conclude a government-to-government Foreign Military Sale of: 1) major defense
equipment to a non-NATO government valued at $14 million or more, 2) defense
articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or 3) design and construction
services valued at $200 million or more. Congress may review proposed sales and
take steps to amend or prohibit them.
In late 2007, some Members of Congress expressed concern regarding an
Administration proposal to sell satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) kits to Saudi Arabia. In the Middle East region, to date, the United States
has sold JDAM kits to Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Since August
2007, the Administration has notified Congress of proposals to sell 10,000 JDAM
kits to Israel and 200 JDAM kits to the United Arab Emirates. On January 14, 2008,
the Administration formally notified Congress of a proposal to sell 900 JDAM kits
to Saudi Arabia (Transmittal No. 08-18). On January 15, 2008, Representative
Anthony Weiner introduced H.J.Res. 76 to prohibit the JDAM sale to Saudi Arabia.
The bill was cosponsored by 104 Members of Congress, but was not considered by
the House Foreign Affairs Committee within the 30-calendar day review period
provided by the AECA. Congress has the option of passing legislation to block or
modify any arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved.
This report describes the structure and objectives of the Gulf Security Dialogue;
briefly assesses its regional implications; summarizes related proposed arms sales;
provides an overview of congressional notification and review procedures; and
analyzes recent related activity in the Administration and Congress. It will be
updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Gulf Security Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Structure and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Analysis and Regional Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Related Arms Sale Proposals and Notifications to Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Prospective Sale of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Congressional Review Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Recent Administration and Congressional Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Congressional Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Proposed Arms Sale Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bahrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related
Arms Sale Proposals
Background
The maintenance of stability in the Persian Gulf region has long been a national
security priority for the United States.1 Primary U.S. objectives have included
securing the free flow of the region’s oil and natural gas to international markets and
supporting allied regional governments in their efforts to balance external threats and
maintain internal security. In pursuit of these objectives, successive U.S.
administrations have demonstrated security commitments to the six countries of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Significant arms sales,2 prolonged military
training programs,3 material pre-positioning and basing arrangements,4 joint
exercises,5 and direct military interventions6 have characterized U.S. policy toward
the Gulf region.
1 Direct statements of policy have underscored this priority, such as President Carter’s
January 1980 State of the Union address declaration that the United States would use “any
means necessary, including military force” to prevent any outside power from attempting
to control the Persian Gulf.
2 From the year of the GCC’s founding, 1981, through September 30, 2006, the United
States delivered over $72 billion in weapons, training, equipment, and related services to the
six GCC countries through the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales program.
Over $57 billion of these sales were made to Saudi Arabia. (Note: The aggregate figure
includes recent deliveries made to the United Arab Emirates under a commercial sales
agreement for 80 F-16 Block 60 aircraft.) Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency
data, September 30, 2006.
3 The U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabian National Guard
Modernization Program have continued since the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. The
programs are administered under bilateral memoranda (28 UST 2409 and 24 UST 1106).
4 Since 1990, the United States has signed or renewed pre-positioning and/or basing access
agreements with each of the GCC countries except Saudi Arabia. Key U.S. facilities in the
region include the 5th Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, U.S. CENTCOM command
facilities in Qatar, and basing and port facilities in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
5 U.S. CENTCOM’s annual Eagle Resolve exercises bring U.S. and GCC military and
security personnel together for joint training in simulated crisis scenarios. The 2007
exercise was held in Qatar and focused on missile defense and attack consequence
management training.
6 Key examples include the re-flagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the 1980s, the expulsion
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War, and the removal of Saddam Hussein’s
regime in 2003.

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The Arab Gulf countries founded the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 as a
mechanism for resolving internal political and economic issues and coordinating
multilateral security cooperation. Both of these goals supported the GCC members
states’ fundamental desire to minimize the potential need for external intervention
in Gulf affairs. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. military posture in the Gulf region and
U.S. attempts to promote GCC security coordination were designed to contain
potential conventional military threats from Iraq and Iran. In the late 1990s, the
Clinton Administration initiated a program to promote cooperation to meet threats
from weapons of mass destruction (see below). The emergence of sophisticated
transnational terrorist and proliferation networks, the removal of Saddam Hussein’s
government in Iraq, and the relative strengthening of Iran have now created a more
complex strategic environment. The Bush Administration established the Gulf
Security Dialogue in May 2006 as a mechanism for reinvigorating established U.S.-
GCC defense cooperation, mitigating emerging terrorism and proliferation threats,
and responding to changes in the regional strategic balance.
The Gulf Security Dialogue
Structure and Objectives. The Administration is seeking to establish the
Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) as the principal security coordination mechanism
between the United States and the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The core objectives of the Dialogue are the promotion of intra-GCC and GCC-U.S.
cooperation to meet common perceived threats. The Dialogue provides a framework
for U.S. engagement with participating GCC countries in the following six areas: (1)
the improvement of GCC defense capabilities and interoperability; (2) regional
security issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Lebanon; (3) counter-
proliferation; (4) counter-terrorism and internal security; (5) critical infrastructure
protection; and (6) Iraq.
The Dialogue serves as a forum for U.S. officials and their counterparts in
participating GCC countries to discuss bilateral and multilateral initiatives to address
issues in these areas. On the U.S. side, GSD engagement is led jointly by Assistant
Secretaries in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To date, formal GSD discussions have been
held semi-annually: the third round of consultations was completed in late 2007, and
a new round is planned for early 2008. At the working level, interagency
representatives from the National Security Council, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
the Joint Staff carry out ongoing bilateral consultations with GCC officials in support
of initiatives coordinated under the GSD. Administration officials have stressed that
the Dialogue is not intended to replace or detract from longstanding bilateral
arrangements between the United States and individual GCC countries, but rather to
ensure the complementarity of ongoing efforts and to promote new multilateral
cooperation. In the case of some GCC member states, traditional bilateral
coordination mechanisms such as established military to military coordination
programs have not yet been replaced by interagency, integrated GSD engagement.
Analysis and Regional Implications. U.S. policymakers have long sought
to balance the security benefits of a sustained U.S. military presence in the Persian
Gulf region with the material and political costs that such a presence creates. As a

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result, successive Administrations have promoted intra-GCC and GCC-U.S.
cooperation as a potential means of reducing regional dependence on U.S. and allied
forces over time. The United States has supported GCC initiatives such as the
creation of the small GCC multilateral force known as Peninsula Shield and the
establishment of the GCC “Belt of Cooperation” air space monitoring network.
During the Clinton Administration, the United States promoted bilateral and
multilateral cooperation with the GCC countries to meet chemical and biological
threats under the auspices of a multi-pillar Cooperative Defense Initiative.7 As such,
the establishment of the Gulf Security Dialogue and the announcement of related
arms sale proposals do not mark significant changes in the overall direction of U.S.
foreign policy in the region, but rather the renewal and consolidation of a policy trend
that has continued over several decades.
Nevertheless, changes in the regional security environment since the mid-1990s
have prompted an evolution in the focus of U.S. engagement with the GCC countries.
These changes are reflected in the priorities defined by the Gulf Security Dialogue.
The elevation of counterterrorism and counter-proliferation efforts alongside
conventional military cooperation signals that increased emphasis is now being
placed on these issues. It also suggests that U.S. policy makers may be concerned
that existing initiatives are not sufficient to address transnational threats effectively.
The inclusion of political consultations on Iraq and regional security issues like
Israeli-Palestinian affairs in U.S.-GCC dialogue demonstrates that the United States
has acknowledged the importance of these issues to the security calculations of the
GCC countries. Terrorist threats to and attempted attacks on critical energy
infrastructure in the Gulf region have prompted the opening of discussions on
securing key sites, in spite of historic sensitivities regarding sovereignty and foreign
participation in the regional energy industry.
To date, efforts to promote intra-GCC and GCC-U.S. security cooperation have
faced significant challenges, some of which remain relevant in the current strategic
environment. The GCC countries have unique perspectives on the various security
threats they face and on the preferability of various policy responses. Although
complex transnational threats may compel the GCC countries to pursue more
cooperative policies, some GCC leaders appear to remain reluctant to fully embrace
integrated responses. Arab concern about Iranian intentions and military capabilities
is evident, but the GCC countries continue to reach out to Iranian leaders to avoid the
appearance of siding as a consolidated bloc with the United States against their Gulf
neighbor. The GCC countries have endorsed the International Compact for Iraq and
have made pledges to Iraq regarding debt forgiveness and diplomatic representation.
However, some regional governments led by Sunni Arabs may continue to limit their
engagement with the Iraqi government based on perceptions that some Shiite Iraqi
leaders are motivated by sectarian interests. Intra-governmental politics limit the
willingness of some GCC members to engage in joint military and interagency
consultations, both within their own government and with the United States through
the Gulf Security Dialogue.
7 The Initiative had five pillars: active defense, passive defense, shared early warning,
consequence management, and medical countermeasures. See Jim Garamone, “Cooperative
Defense Initiative Seeks to Save Lives,” American Forces Press Service, April 10, 2000.

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The stability and security of the Persian Gulf region and its energy resources
will likely remain U.S. national security priorities for the foreseeable future. Key
short- and medium-term concerns include evolving terrorism and proliferation
threats, Iranian investment in ballistic missile and nuclear technology, and growing
interest in Gulf security from China, Russia, and India. Looking forward, Congress
may seek to influence U.S. foreign policy toward the GCC countries through the
appropriation of funds for programs coordinated under the Gulf Security Dialogue
and the evaluation of related arms sale proposals. Traditional congressional concerns
about preserving Israel’s so-called ‘qualitative military advantage’ are likely to
persist. Members also may judge appropriations requests and arms sale proposals in
relation to their ability to secure new U.S. objectives in a changing security
environment.
Related Arms Sale Proposals and Notifications to Congress
The Administration has proposed a series of arms sales intended to enhance the
defense capabilities of the GCC countries and improve the interoperability of their
militaries in line with the objectives of the Gulf Security Dialogue. In particular, the
Administration recently has proposed the sale of defense systems designed to
strengthen the maritime, air, and missile defenses of some GCC members. Details
of arms sale proposals to the GCC countries notified to Congress since August 1,
2007 are included below in Appendix A. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA),8 Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar-days before
the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government
Foreign Military Sale of certain equipment or services of defined monetary values
(see below). The fact that an arms sale has been formally notified, and has cleared
Congressional review, does not necessarily mean that a contract has been signed to
implement the proposed sale.
Prospective Sale of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
Technology. During 2007, press reports concerning the prospective sale of Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) technology to Saudi Arabia resulted in public
expressions of Congressional concern (See Recent Congressional Activity below).9
The JDAM is a Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite-aided, inertial guidance
kit that can be attached to unguided MK-82, MK- 83, MK-84, BLU-109, and BLU-
110 conventional bombs.10 The precision guidance of JDAM kits enhance bombing
accuracy considerably. As such, some observers have expressed concern about the
sale of JDAM kits to foreign countries because of the potential consequences of their
use as offensive weapons. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notes in its
technology sensitivity annexes to JDAM sale proposals that successful use of JDAM
kits requires access to accurate target coordinates, GPS capability, and an operational
test and evaluation plan.
8 22 U.S.C. 2751 et. seq.
9 See, for example, Ze’ev Schiff, “Gates says Washington to Sell Smart Bombs to Saudi
Arabia,” Haaretz, April 20, 2007.
10 Details regarding the JDAM system are found in Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, 2007.

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In the Middle East region, to date, the United States has sold JDAM kits to
Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Since August 2007, the Administration
has notified Congress of proposals to sell 10,000 JDAM kits to Israel and 200 JDAM
kits to the United Arab Emirates.11 On January 14, 2008, the Administration
formally notified Congress of a proposal to sell 900 JDAM kits to Saudi Arabia.12
Congressional Review Procedures13
As noted above, under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),14
Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar-days before the Administration can
take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of
major defense equipment to a non-NATO government15 valued at $14 million or
more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and
construction services valued at $200 million or more. These conditions apply in the
case of any arms sale to a GCC country that meets the established value thresholds.
Bahrain and Kuwait have been designated major non-NATO allies, but this
designation does not affect proposed arms sale notification requirements under the
AECA.16 In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of
applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the AECA, is free to proceed with an
arms sales proposal unless Congress blocks it through enactment of a joint resolution
disapproving it under AECA procedures, or by prohibiting the proposed sale through
enactment of specific legislation.
Under current law, Congress faces two fundamental obstacles to blocking or
modifying a Presidential sale of military equipment: it must be able to pass
legislation expressing its will on the sale, and it must be capable of overriding a
presumptive Presidential veto of any such legislation, including a resolution of
disapproval. However, Congress has the option of passing legislation to block or
modify an arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved.
11 See Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals 07-32 (Israel) and 08-01 (UAE).
12 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal 08-18.
13 For a detailed discussion and review of the Congressional review process regarding arms
sales, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Richard
F. Grimmett.
14 22 U.S.C. 2751 et. seq.
15 In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, or New
Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can
proceed with the sale. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for NATO
members, Australia, Japan, or New Zealand. These higher thresholds are: $25,000,000 for
the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of major defense equipment; $100,000,000 for the sale,
enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense services; and $300,000,000 for
the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services, so long as such
sales to these countries do not include or involve sales to a country outside of this group of
nations.
16 See Presidential Determination No. 2002-10, March 14, 2002 (Bahrain), and Presidential
Determination No. 2004-21, January 15, 2004 (Kuwait).

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Such an action, if taken, would, as with a resolution of disapproval, be subject to a
Presidential veto.
Recent Administration and Congressional Activity
Background. In October 2006, then-Director of the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kohler predicted that sales related to the Gulf
Security Dialogue (GSD) would likely increase the number of arms sales proposals
involving the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during 2007. According
to Kohler, improving GCC countries’ missile defense capabilities was “high on the
agenda.”17 Among other potential weapons sales Kohler discussed were border and
maritime security equipment, including radar systems and communications gear. As
noted above, the Administration has since issued formal notifications to Congress of
arms sale proposals to provide some of these systems to some GCC countries.
In early 2007, press reports quoted unnamed U.S. officials as indicating that the
Administration planned to notify Congress of a proposed sale of Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM) technology to Saudi Arabia and that some Israeli officials had
expressed tentative opposition to such a sale.18 In response, some Members of
Congress began expressing concern about the potential sale of JDAM technology to
Saudi Arabia. Some Members of Congress remain opposed to a prospective sale
based on concern for the protection of U.S. and allied forces in the Gulf region and
the preservation of Israel’s so-called ‘qualitative military edge’ over its Arab
neighbors (see below). On January 14, 2008, the Administration formally notified
Congress of a proposal to sell 900 JDAM kits to Saudi Arabia.19
Congressional Initiatives. Since July 2007, Members of Congress have
submitted a series of letters to President Bush expressing concern about potential
weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and calling for the Administration to take specific
actions. Some Members warned that the submission of a formal notification of a
proposal to sell JDAM technology to Saudi Arabia without specific assurances would
result in the introduction of a resolution of disapproval to prevent the sale. Others
vowed to introduce or otherwise support resolutions of disapproval in the event the
Administration informed Congress of any proposal to sell JDAM kits to Saudi
Arabia.
! In August 2007, 114 Members of Congress signed a letter to
President Bush expressing “deep opposition to the proposed sale of
high technology armaments to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” and
17 Sebastian Sprenger, “New Persian Gulf Security Effort Expected to Fuel Arms Sales in
FY-07,” Inside the Pentagon, Vol. 22, No. 45, November 9, 2006.
18 David S. Cloud and Helene Cooper, “Israel’s Protests Are Said to Stall Gulf Arms Sale,”
New York Times, April 5, 2007.
19 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal 08-18.

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vowing to vote against unspecified proposed sales in the event that
resolutions of disapproval are submitted.20
! On November 15, 2007, Representative Mark Kirk, Representative
Chris Carney, and 186 other Members of Congress signed a letter to
President Bush stating that unless the Administration provided
assurances that the sale of JDAM kits to Saudi Arabia will not
“harm U.S. forces in the region or undercut Israel’s qualitative
military advantage,” they would be prepared to oppose any proposed
JDAM sale. The letter also called for regular reporting, tight
Congressional oversight, and intense consultations” with Israel.
Representatives of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) have stated that AIPAC “supports the Kirk-Carney letter
and efforts by Congress to seek assurances from the Administration
that ironclad measures will be included in the final arms package to
ensure the safety of American troops and [U.S.] allies in the
region.”21
! On November 15, 2007, Representative Anthony Weiner and 116
other Members of Congress signed a letter to President Bush
requesting that formal notification regarding any proposals to sell
“high technology armaments to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” be
postponed until January 15, 2008.22
In a January 12, 2008 letter responding to Representative Mark Kirk, the
Administration stated that it had “made arrangements to ensure the security and
proper employment” of precision guided munitions proposed for sale to Saudi
Arabia.23 The response letter indicated that the details of those arrangements were
classified and committed to keeping Congress informed about the sale and potential
changes via “proper channels.” The response letter also stated that the
Administration could assure Congress that the sale would not affect Israel’s
qualitative military advantage and warned that Saudi Arabia could seek precision
guidance munition capabilities from other sources, to the possible detriment of “the
best interests of the United States, and of the entire region.”
20 See Office of U.S. Representative Anthony Weiner (NY-9), “Broad Bipartisan Coalition
of 114 Congressional Members Release Letter to President Bush Opposing Arms Sale to
Saudi Arabia, Say Will Vote to Stop Sale,” August 2, 2007.
21 See Office of U.S. Representative Mark Kirk (IL-10), “Kirk, Carney Circulate Bipartisan
Letter to President Requiring Assurances on Smart Weapons Sales to Saudi Arabia,”
October 4, 2007; and, AIPAC Press Secretary Jennifer Cannata quoted in Eli Lake, “Bush
Urged To Place Rules On $20B Saudi Arms Sale”, New York Sun, November 15, 2007.
22 See Office of U.S. Representative Anthony Weiner (NY-9), “State Department Agrees to
Request from Weiner and 116 Members of Congress to Delay Notification of Saudi Arms
Deal until January,” December 4, 2007.
23 Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mary Beth
Long and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Ambassador
Stephen Mull to Representative Mark Kirk, January 12, 2008.

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On January 15, Representative Anthony Weiner introduced a joint resolution of
disapproval (H.J.Res. 76) to prohibit the sale. The bill was cosponsored by 104
Members of Congress, but was not considered by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee within the 30-calendar day review period provided by the AECA.24 At
a press conference on January 15, Representative Weiner and Representative Robert
Wexler stated their intent to request that Chairman Lantos and other House leaders
reconsider and allow the Committee, and ultimately the full House, to vote on the
resolution. The 30-calendar day review period lapsed on February 14, 2008, clearing
the Administration to proceed with negotiation of a potential sale of JDAM
technology to Saudi Arabia.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency indicated that a Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA) was set to be presented to the Saudi government in May 2008.25
The agency expects the Saudis to sign the letter, and deliveries of JDAM systems will
not begin until 2011. Congress has the option of passing legislation to block or
modify any arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved.
Analysis. Debate in the 110th Congress over weapons sales to the GCC states
in general, and to Saudi Arabia in particular, largely mirrors past congressional
debate over the sale of major weapons systems to the Gulf region. Since the early
1980s, most Members have accepted successive Administrations’ arguments about
the importance of arms sales as a component of the U.S. security commitment to and
cooperation with the GCC countries. However, as in past debates, some Members
simultaneously express concern about the potential fate of U.S. weaponry and threats
to U.S. forces in the region should currently allied Gulf governments suffer abrupt,
hostile regime changes. Others also argue that sales of sophisticated weaponry to the
GCC countries may erode Israel’s “qualitative edge” over its Arab neighbors in the
event of potential Arab military action against Israel. Successive Administrations
have maintained that the Gulf states are too dependent on U.S. training, spare parts,
and technological support to be in a position to use sophisticated U.S.-made arms
against the United States, Israel, or any other U.S. ally.26
In the past, Congress has sought and received specific assurances from the
President regarding the security and use of weapons systems sold to Saudi Arabia.27
Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) states that U.S. defense articles
24 Lynne Weill, a spokeswoman for then-Chairman Tom Lantos, stated that the Chairman
did “not intend to ask the committee to consider any resolutions of disapproval on [the
proposed JDAM sale].” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Effort to Block Saudi Arms Deal is
Doomed,” January 15, 2008.
25 DSCA response to CRS inquiry, May 9, 2008.
26 Gopal Ratnam and Amy Svitak, “U.S. Would Keep Tight Rein on Missile Sold to
Bahrain,” Defense News, September 11, 2000.
27 For example, Section 131 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act
of 1985 (P.L. 99-83) reviewed President Reagan’s 1981 statement to the Senate in which he
made certain commitments regarding the sale of E-3A Airborne Warning and Control
Systems (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia. P.L. 99-83 required President Reagan to
submit a written certification to Congress that the conditions set forth in his 1981 statement
had been met before the AWACS aircraft were transferred to Saudi Arabia.

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and defense services shall be sold to friendly countries “solely” for use: 1) in
“internal security,” 2) for use in “legitimate self-defense,” 3) to enable the recipient
to participate in “regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations,” 4) to enable the recipient to participate in “collective
measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
international peace and security,” and 5) to enable the foreign military forces “in less
developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities
helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries.” The
U.S. Government has other options under the AECA to prevent transfer of defense
articles and services for which valid contracts exist. These options include finding
a foreign country in violation of an applicable defense sale agreement with the United
States, suspension of deliveries of defense items already ordered, and refusal to allow
new arms orders.
In July 2007, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that Israel had received,
“a detailed and explicit commitment” from the United States “to ensure [Israel’s]
qualitative military edge over the Arab states.”28 During an October 2007 visit to
Washington, DC, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated that Israel has
“understandings and arrangements with the Administration that make us confident
that Israel’s military qualitative edge will be kept.” He added that the Israeli
government did “not intend to oppose the deal.”29 These statements from the current
Israeli administration led many U.S. observers to conclude that Israel’s short term
concerns regarding proposed U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other GCC
countries had been addressed in an unspecified manner. Some wire service and
Israeli press reports citing Israeli sources have claimed that the Bush Administration
has conveyed to Israeli officials its intention to provide Israel with advanced JDAM
kits equipped with additional laser guidance and/or anti-jamming capabilities.30
Although Israeli leaders have gone on record stating their confidence in U.S. pledges
to preserve “Israel’s qualitative military edge,” U.S. and Israeli officials have not
specifically confirmed any plans to sell more capable JDAM systems to Israel.
28 Yaakov Katz, “Jerusalem Wary of U.S. Arms Sale to Saudis,” Jerusalem Post, July 30,
2007.
29 Nathan Guttman, “Contradictory Signals From Israel and its Supporters on Saudi Arms
Deal,” The Forward, October 24, 2007.
30 Herb Keinon and Yaakov Katz, “Bush Expedites Saudi Smart Bomb Deal,” Jerusalem
Post, January 8, 2008; and Dan Snyder, “Israel to get ‘smarter’ U.S.-made bombs than
Saudis,” Reuters, January 13, 2008.

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CRS-10
Appendix A. Proposed Arms Sale Notifications
Since August 1, 2007 the following proposals for various arms sales to some
GCC countries under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program have been formally
notified to Congress. The information below is derived from notices prepared by the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and briefly describes the basic
elements of the proposed sales on a country by country basis, including the
notification transmittal numbers, the DSCA estimate of the potential value of the
sale, and the date Congress was formally notified about each sale.31
Bahrain
! On August 3, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of six
Bell 412 Air Search and Recovery Helicopters configured with
PT6T-9 engines and electronic engine control, spare and repair parts,
publications and technical data, personnel training and training
equipment, U.S. Government support, and contractor
representatives’ engineering and technical support services, and
other related elements of logistics support. The estimated value of
the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $160
million. Transmittal No. 07-38.32
Kuwait
! On October 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale to
upgrade three L-110-30 aircraft, (a commercial version of the C-
130 aircraft) to include modifications, spare and repair parts,
support equipment, publications and technical data, flight engineer
training, communications equipment, maintenance, personnel
training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor
engineering and logistics support services, preparation of the aircraft
for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support. The
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as
high as $250 million. Transmittal No. 08-08.33
! On November 9, 2007 Congress was notified of a possible sale of
technical logistics support, contractor maintenance, and
technical services, in support of the F/A-18 aircraft to include
contractor engineering technical services, contractor maintenance
support, avionics software, engine component improvement and
spare parts, technical ground support equipment, spare and repair
parts, supply support, publications and technical data, engineering
change proposals, U.S. Government and contractor technical and
31 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) provides the details of major arms
sales notifications at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/36b_index.htm].
32 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Bahrain_07-38.pdf].
33 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Kuwait_08-08.pdf].

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CRS-11
logistics personnel services and other related elements of program
support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised,
could be as high as $90 million. Transmittal No. 08-14.34
! On December 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
80 PAC-3 missiles, PATRIOT GEM-T Modification Kits to
upgrade 60 PAC-2 missiles, 6 PATRIOT System Configuration
3 Modification kits to upgrade PATRIOT Radars to REP II,
communications support equipment tools and test equipment, system
integration and checkout, installation, personnel training, containers,
spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, U.S.
Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel
services, and other related elements of program support. The
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as
high as $1.363 billion. Transmittal No. 08-23.35
! On January 3, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
2,106 TOW-2A Radio Frequency Missiles, 21 Buy-to-Fly
missiles, 1,404 TOW-2B Radio Frequency missiles, 14 Buy-to-
Fly missiles containers, spare and repair parts, supply support,
publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor
technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements
of program support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options
are exercised, could be as high as $328 million. Transmittal No.
08-22.36
Saudi Arabia
! On October 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) and High Mobility Multi-
Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and associated
equipment. Specifically, 37 Light Armored Vehicles-Assault Gun
(LAV-AG); 26 LAV-25mm; 48 LAV Personnel Carriers; 5
Reconnaissance LAVs; 5 LAV Ambulances; 3 LAV Recovery
Vehicles; 25 M1165A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV); 25 M1165A1 HMMWV with winch; 124
M240 7.62mm Machine Guns; 525 AN/PVS-7D Night Vision
Goggles (NVGs); various M978A2 and M984A2 Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Trucks, family of Medium Tactical Vehicles,
120mm Mortar Towed, M242 25mm guns, spare and repair parts;
sets, kits, and outfits; support equipment; publications and technical
data; personnel training and training equipment; contractor
engineering and technical support services and other related
elements of logistics support. The estimated value of the sale, if all
34 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Kuwait_08-14.pdf].
35 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Kuwait_08-23.pdf].
36 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Kuwait_08-22.pdf].

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CRS-12
options are exercised, could be as high as $631 million. Transmittal
No. 08-03.37
! On December 7, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
five sets of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Command,
Control and Communications (C3) mission equipment/Radar
System Improvement Program (RSIP) Group B kits for
subsequent installation and checkout in five E-3 Airborne
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS). This proposed sale
will also include spare and repair parts, support equipment,
publications and technical documentation, contractor engineering
and technical support, and other related elements of program
support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised,
could be as high as $400 million. Transmittal No. 08-28.38
! On December 7, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
40 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods, aircraft
installation and checkout, digital data recorders/cartridges, pylons,
spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical
documentation, contractor engineering and technical support, and
other related elements of program support. The estimated value of
the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $220
million. Transmittal No. 08-29.39
! On January 14, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 900
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kits (which include
550 Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-38 kits for MK-82 bombs, 250
GBU-31 kits for MK-84 bombs, and 100 GBU-31 kits for BLU-
109 bombs). Also included are bomb components, mission
planning, aircraft integration, publications and technical manuals,
spare and repair parts, support equipment, contractor engineering
and technical support, and other related support elements. The
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as
high as $123 million. Transmittal No. 08-18.40 According to
DSCA, a Letter of Offer and Acceptance for the sale was to be
presented to Saudi officials in May 2008. Deliveries would not
begin until 2011.41
37 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Saudi_08-03.pdf].
38 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Saudi_08-28.pdf].
39 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Saudi_08-29.pdf].
40 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Saudi_Arabia_08-18.
pdf].
41 DSCA response to CRS inquiry, May 9, 2008.

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CRS-13
United Arab Emirates
! On October 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 300
AGM-114M3 Blast Fragmentation Warheads and 900 AGM-
114L3 HELLFIRE II Longbow missiles, 200 Blast
Fragmentation Sleeve Assemblies, containers, spare and repair
parts, test and tool sets, personnel training and equipment,
publications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and
logistics personnel services, Quality Assurance Team support
services, and other related elements of logistics support. The
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as
high as $428 million. Transmittal No. 08-04.42
! On December 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
upgrades and refurbishment for three used, excess defense
articles (EDA) E-2C Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft
with radar and antennae. These upgrades/refurbishments
include E2C Group II Navigation Upgrade configuration, 8 T56-
A-427 Turbo Shaft engines, Phased Maintenance Inspection, spare
and repairs parts, support equipment, personnel training and training
equipment, technical data and publications, tactical software and
software laboratory, system software development and installation,
testing of new system modifications, U.S. Government and
contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other
related support elements. The estimated value of the sale, if all
options are exercised, could be as high as $437 million. Transmittal
No. 08-25.43
! On December 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 Air Defense Missile
System, consisting of 288 PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3
(PAC-3) missiles, 216 Guidance Enhanced Missiles-T (GEM-T),
9 PATRIOT Fire Units that includes 10 phased array radar sets, 10
Engagement Control Stations on trailers, 37 Launching Stations (4
per fire unit), 8 Antenna Mast Groups (AMG) on trailers, 8 Antenna
Mast Group (AMG) Antennas for Tower Mounts, AN/GRC-245
Radios, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems
(SINGARS, Export), Multifunctional Information Distribution
System/Low Volume Terminals, generators, electrical power units,
trailers, communication and support equipment, publications, spare
and repair parts, United States Government and contractor technical
assistance and other related elements of logistics support. The
42 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/UAE_08-04.pdf].
43 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/UAE_08-25.pdf].

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CRS-14
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as
high as $9 billion. Transmittal No. 08-17.44
! On December 19, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of
various munitions and weapons and associated equipment and
services. Specifically, this possible sale would include the sale of
224 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) Air Intercept Missiles, 200 GBU-31 Guided Bomb
Unit (GBU) Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kits, 224
MK-84 2,000 pound General-Purpose Bombs (GPB), 450 GBU-
24 PAVEWAY III with MK-84 2,000 pound GBU, 488 GBU-12
PAVEWAY II with MK-82 500 pound GPB, 1 M61A 20mm
Vulcan Cannon with Ammunition Handling System, containers,
bomb components, spare/repair parts, publications, documentation,
personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and
logistics personnel services, and other related support elements. The
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as
high as $326 million. Transmittal No. 08-01.45
44 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/UAE_08-17.pdf].
45 Details available at [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/UAE_08-01.pdf].

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