Order Code RL33627
NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of
the Transatlantic Alliance
Updated May 6, 2008
Paul Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

---

NATO in Afghanistan:
A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance
Summary
The mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan
is a test of the alliance’s political will and military capabilities. The allies wish to
create a “new” NATO, able to go beyond the European theater and combat new
threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Afghanistan is NATO’s first “out-of-area” mission beyond Europe. The purpose of
the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mission is a
difficult one because it must take place while combat operations against Taliban
insurgents continue.
U.N. Security Council resolutions govern NATO’s responsibilities. The NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces formidable obstacles:
shoring up a weak government in Kabul; using military capabilities in a distant
country with rugged terrain; and rebuilding a country devastated by war and troubled
by a resilient narcotics trade. NATO’s mission statement lays out the essential
elements of the task of stabilizing and rebuilding the country: train the Afghan army,
police, and judiciary; support the government in counter-narcotics efforts; develop
a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban.
Although the allies agree on ISAF’s mission, they differ on how to accomplish
it. Increasing turmoil in Pakistan has complicated the effort to prevent the Taliban
from infiltrating Afghanistan. Some allies do not want their forces to engage in
combat operations. None, except the United States, wants to engage directly in
destruction of poppy fields in countering the drug trade. The 110th Congress has
supported most Administration policies in Afghanistan, but wishes to see a more
coherent plan for integrating stabilization and reconstruction operations. In
December 2007, Congress appropriated $70 billion for the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
ISAF has proceeded in four stages to take control of the whole of Afghanistan.
ISAF’s principal mechanism to rebuild Afghanistan is the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT). PRTs, composed of military and civilian officials, are charged with
extending the reach of the Afghan government by improving governance and
rebuilding the economy. There are significant differences in how individual NATO
governments run their PRTs.
Most observers predict that ISAF’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require
five years or more. An exit strategy has multiple components: suppressing the
Taliban; rebuilding the economy; and cajoling Afghan leaders to put aside tribal and
regional disputes and improve governance. U.S. leadership of the alliance as well as
NATO credibility are at issue. The allies are sharply critical of aspects of the Bush
Administration’s foreign policy, and sometimes specifically its NATO policy. U.S.
leadership in Afghanistan may well affect NATO’s cohesiveness and its future. This
report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-
War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Purpose of the Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
National Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Counter-Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Stage Three: Establishing Mission and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mission Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Difficulties in Raising Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Disagreements over Treatment of Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Command Structure: Coordinating ISAF and OEF Operations . . . . . . . . . . 12
Stage Three Operations: Allied Viewpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Germany: Rebuild but Avoid Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Netherlands: An Increasingly Decisive Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The United States, Britain, and Canada: A Broad Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
France: Combat and Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Stage Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

---

NATO in Afghanistan:
A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance
Introduction
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is seen as a test of the allies’ military
capabilities and their political will to undertake a complex mission. Since September
11, 2001, the allies have sought to create a “new” NATO, able to go beyond the
European theater and combat new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NATO is seeking to be “global” in its
geographic reach and in the development of non-member partner states that assist in
achieving an agreed mission. This change in overall mission reflects a NATO
consensus that the principal dangers to allied security lie distant from the treaty area
and require new political tools and military capabilities to combat them.
Two military operations in Afghanistan seek to stabilize the country. Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) is a combat operation led by the United States against Al
Qaeda remnants, primarily in the eastern and southern parts of the country along the
Pakistan border. OEF is not a NATO operation, although many coalition partners are
NATO members. Approximately 20,000 troops are in OEF, including approximately
18,000 U.S. forces.1 The second operation is the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), established by the international community in 2002 to stabilize the
country. NATO assumed control of ISAF the following year. By May 2008, ISAF
had an estimated 47,000 troops from 40 countries, with NATO members providing
the core of the force. The United States has approximately 17,000 troops in ISAF.
NATO’s effort in Afghanistan is the alliance’s first “out-of-area” mission
beyond Europe. The purpose of the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction
of Afghanistan. Although NATO has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction
missions before, for example in Kosovo, the scope of the undertaking in Afghanistan
is considerably more difficult. Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants are resisting the
operation, Afghanistan has never had a well-functioning central government, and the
distance from Europe and the country’s terrain present daunting obstacles.
Reconstruction must therefore take place while combat operations, albeit often low-
level, continue. And although the allies agree upon a general political objective,
some have differing interpretations how to achieve it.
The mission in Afghanistan is likely to be important for NATO’s future, and for
U.S. leadership of the alliance. The European allies insisted that a U.N. resolution
govern NATO’s mission to give legitimacy to the insertion of allied troops in
1 See CRS Report RS22633, U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, by JoAnne Bryan and Michael
Waterhouse.

---

CRS-2
Afghanistan. This important political requirement was achieved. In the past several
years, NATO governments have also repeatedly pledged to develop capabilities
making their forces more expeditionary and “deployable.” The mission in
Afghanistan provides a hard test of these capabilities. Several key NATO members,
above all the United States, have insisted that the allies must generate the political
will to counter the greatest threats to their security. Again, Afghanistan provides a
test of will against the concrete danger of international terrorism.
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan also tests U.S. leadership of the alliance. Some
allies question whether the United States will distance itself from inhumane practices
reportedly used in U.S. military-run prisons; and whether the U.S. commitment to the
interests of the allies preserves the mutual sense of obligation that once more clearly
characterized the alliance. The allies also believe that the United States, as a global
power, must provide leadership and resources to counter the destabilizing influences
upon Afghanistan of two neighboring states, Iran and Pakistan.
A highly respected German Marshall Fund poll has found a sharp decline in
European public opinion towards U.S. leadership since 2002. In key European
countries, the desirability of U.S. leadership in the world fell from 64% in 2002 to
36% in June 2007; the approval rating of President Bush in these same countries fell
from 38% in 2002 to 17% in 2007. U.S. policy in the Iraq war is the principal cause
of this decline.2 This decline is complicating the effort of allied governments to
sustain support for the ISAF mission. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave
credence to the political ramifications of the Iraq war when he said in February 2008,
“I worry that for many Europeans the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are
confused.... Many of them...have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project
that to Afghanistan.”3
Afghanistan presents a growing challenge to NATO. Over the past two years,
Taliban attacks have increased in scope and number, and Taliban fighters are
adopting some of the tactics, such as roadside bombs, used by insurgents in Iraq. The
Karzai government in Afghanistan is coming under international criticism, and its
public support has diminished, due to corruption and an inability to improve living
conditions. Some warlords continue to exert influence, and the narcotics industry
remains an entrenched threat to the country’s political health.4 The allies are not in
full agreement how to counter these problems, but allied officials say that they need
a strong and reliable Afghan government to provide reasonable services and
competence to the population if NATO is to succeed.
Turmoil in neighboring Pakistan has complicated ISAF’s mission. The
assassination of presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, possibly
by Islamic extremists, has led to increasing restiveness against President Pervez
2 Transatlantic Trends, German Marshall Fund, September 2007, p. 5-7.
3 “Gates asks Europeans to face Afghan threat,” International Herald Tribune, Be. 9-10,
2008, p. 3.
4 For an overview and analysis of key issues in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

---

CRS-3
Musharraf, widely criticized by NATO governments as unable or unwilling to stem
Taliban movement across the Pakistan border into Afghanistan. The new Pakistani
government, in an effort to bring internal stability to Pakistan, has struck a deal with
Islamic militants in western Pakistan, and sharply reduced military operations against
the Taliban, a step criticized by many as opening the door to greater Taliban freedom
to move across the border into Afghanistan. NATO military officials believe that the
Pakistani army remains trained to fight a conventional conflict against India, and not
a war against insurgents.5
The 110th Congress has largely supported Administration policy in Afghanistan,
but a range of congressional committees in the first session called on the
Administration to develop a more coherent plan to coordinate ISAF’s stabilization
and reconstruction efforts. The Bush Administration led an effort before NATO’s
Bucharest summit in April 2008 to develop a “strategic vision” paper for Afghanistan
that would lay out a rationale for the mission and could be used to garner more public
support for ISAF. The paper made four principal points: the allies promised a “long-
term commitment” to Afghanistan; expressed support to improve the country’s
governance; pledged a “comprehensive approach” to bring civil and military efforts
to effect stabilization; and promised increased engagement with Afghanistan’s
neighbors, “especially Pakistan.”6
The paper represented some strides in bringing together allied views, but it also
masked some important differences. It committed the allies to an indefinite period
of time to stabilize Afghanistan, something that several allies had previously resisted.
But it did not commit governments to pledge more forces; rather, the phrase
“comprehensive approach” is seen by some observers as a euphemism for equating
the importance of reconstruction and combat. Some governments believe that the
military commitment remains paramount if security in the country is to improve so
that reconstruction may proceed throughout Afghanistan. The paper did not present
a plan for engaging Pakistan or Iran; instead, the allies will continue to do so
bilaterally, an approach that has not thus far yielded success in stemming the flow of
arms or fighters into Afghanistan.7
This report follows the path of NATO’s evolution in Afghanistan. The first
section covers the initial two stages of ISAF’s mission, and analyzes key issues in the
mission: use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to stabilize and rebuild the
country; overcoming caveats placed by individual allies on the use of their forces;
and managing the counter-narcotics effort. The next section of the report examines
the debate to develop a refined mission statement and a new organizational structure
for Stage Three by analyzing issues that are both political and military, such as
securing more troops, the treatment of prisoners, and organization of command; it
covers roughly the period December 2005-fall 2006. By spring 2006, the allies began
to realize that Stage Three would require a greater combat capability than originally
believed, and the mission began to change. This adjustment in mission is the subject
5 Interviews with NATO officials, February-May 2008.
6 “ISAF’s Strategic Vision,” NATO summit, Bucharest, April 3, 2008, p. 1.
7 Interviews with officials from European governments and U.S. specialists, April 2008.

---

CRS-4
of the next section of the report, which discusses Stage Three and overall ISAF
operations beginning in July 2006 through the perspective of several key allies. The
next section discusses Stage Four, in which ISAF has assumed control of the entire
country. The final section of the report assesses ISAF’s progress to date.
Evolution of NATO in Afghanistan:
Stages One and Two
Purpose of the Mission
The United Nations, at the request of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, asked for
NATO’s presence, supported by Security Council resolutions. NATO involvement
began in Afghanistan under U.N. mandate in August 2003. The Security Council
passed the currently governing resolution, Res. 1776, on September 17, 2007, to run
for one year. Like its predecessors, it calls upon NATO to disarm militias, reform
the justice system, train a national police force and army, provide security for
elections, and combat the narcotics industry. The resolution does not provide details
of how NATO should accomplish these tasks; rather, the allies among themselves,
in consultation with the Afghan government, have refined the resolution’s provisions
into active policy.
Some non-NATO states, such as Australia and New Zealand, contribute
resources to the allied effort. Over time, the alliance has laid out four stages to bring
most of Afghanistan under NATO control. NATO leaders have faced considerable
difficulty in persuading allies to contribute forces to ISAF.
In Stage One in 2003-2004, NATO moved into the northern part of the country;
French and German forces predominate in these areas. Stage Two began in May
2005, when NATO moved into western Afghanistan; Italian and Spanish forces are
the core of the NATO force there. These sections of the country are relatively stable.
Stage Three began in July 2006 when ISAF moved into southern Afghanistan, where
U.S., British, Canadian, and Dutch forces predominate. Stage Four began in October
2006, when ISAF took control of the entire country. The U.S.-led OEF will
simultaneously continue its combat operations in border regions still under threat.
National Caveats
Some allies commit forces to a NATO operation, then impose restrictions —
“national caveats” — on tasks those forces may undertake. These restrictions, for
example, may prohibit forces from engaging in combat operations or from patrolling
at night due to a lack of night-vision equipment.8 In addition to caveats, some
governments do not permit their forces to be transferred to other parts of
Afghanistan. Caveats pose difficult problems for force commanders, who seek
maximum flexibility in utilizing troops under their command. NATO must accept
troops from governments and shape the mission to fit the capabilities of and caveats
8 Interviews of NATO officials, February 2006.

---

CRS-5
on those troops. NATO commanders have sought to minimize the number of caveats
on forces dedicated to ISAF, an effort that has met with mixed success.
At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, allied leaders sought
to reduce the caveats in Afghanistan. The United States, Canada, Britain, and the
Netherlands have forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan, highly unsettled areas,
and have appealed to other governments to release combat forces to assist them in
moments of danger. The French government reduced its caveats and agreed to allow
its forces in Kabul and elsewhere come to the assistance of other NATO forces in an
emergency. Germany also allowed its forces to respond in an emergency. Turkey, in
contrast, refused to change its proscription against its forces’ use in combat. The
Italian and Spanish governments said that their force commanders in the field could
make the decision to send forces to assist in an urgent situation. It remains unclear
whether and when these commanders would have to request permission from their
capitals to do so, a complicating factor that could delay a decision.
Some allies have singled out Germany for special criticism, given that Germany
has a large contingent of 2,700 troops in a relatively quiet area of northern
Afghanistan. German troops reportedly patrol only in armored personnel carriers,
and do not leave their bases at night.9
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
NATO officials describe Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as the
“leading edge” of the allies’ effort to stabilize Afghanistan. Some allied governments
believe that poor governance, rather than an insurgency, is the principal problem
impeding stabilization of the country. NATO’s assistance to the Afghan government
in controlling the narcotics trade, disarming militias, reducing corruption, and
building an economic infrastructure is the essence of the effort to bring stability to
the country.10 The purpose of the PRTs is to extend the authority of the central
government into the countryside, provide security, and undertake projects (such as
infrastructure development) to boost the Afghan economy. U.S. PRTs are composed
of soldiers, civil affairs officers, representatives of the U.S. and other government
agencies focused on reconstruction, and Afghan government personnel.
NATO now controls 25 PRTs. U.S. officials say that they would like to see
more NATO and OEF PRTs created in 2008.
There is no established model for PRTs, and they receive mixed reviews. By
most accounts, those serving in U.S. PRTs make an effort to move about surrounding
territory, engage the local governments and citizens, and demonstrate that the U.S.
presence is bringing tangible results. The United States government controls the
funds for its PRTs, in part to ensure that the money does not disappear through the
9 Interviews at the NATO Defense College, Rome, December 2006, and Washington, DC,
April-May 2007; “Germans wavering on Afghan mission,” International Herald Tribune,
August 20, 2007, p. 3.
10 Statement of Nancy Powell (Dept. of State), House Armed Services Committee hearing,
June 22, 2005; interviews with European officials, November 2005- July 2006.

---

CRS-6
hands of corrupt officials in the provinces or in Kabul, and that it goes directly to
designated projects. U.S. PRTs also have the military capacity to respond to any
situation in which their personnel are endangered. While not overtly offensive
military instruments, U.S. PRTs are directed to provide security and respond
aggressively to any threat. There are criticisms of U.S. PRTs, above all that they lack
civilian specialists, particularly agricultural specialists, and are too heavily weighted
with military personnel who lack the expertise to assist in developing important
elements of the economy.11
By most accounts, ISAF PRTs differ considerably from those of the United
States. While their mission is the same, their resources and activities are not. ISAF
PRTs generally have fewer personnel. Some U.S. officials believe that most
European-led PRTs are too hesitant in their engagement of the Afghan population.
Some European-led PRTs are minimally funded, or provide little supervision of how
their funds are managed and dispensed.12 Individual European government
perspectives on PRTs will be more fully discussed in another section that will
illustrate the range of allied thinking on the principal issues confronting ISAF.
In hearings before the 110th Congress, witnesses have urged steps to strengthen
the PRTs. Some witnesses argued that the Administration should increase funding
for the State Department, AID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, three parts
of the government able to provide needed expertise in the PRTs. Witnesses also
repeatedly called for a model for ISAF PRTs that might provide guideposts to “best
practices” to ensure a higher quality of assistance to the Afghan population.13
Counter-Narcotics
The allies are struggling to combat Afghanistan’s poppy crop. Afghanistan
supplies 93% of the world’s opium as of 2007. The crop is a major factor in the
economic life and stability of the country, and by one estimate accounts for 40% of
Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).14 Opium poppy farmers are heavily
concentrated in the southern part of the country.
The repercussions of Afghanistan’s poppy crop for the future of the country and
for ISAF operations are extensive and complex. The Afghan government lacks the
law enforcement apparatus, including a well-functioning judicial system, to combat
11 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - An Interagency Assessment,” Dept.
of Defense, Washington, DC, April 26, 2006; Interviews of U.S. officials, 2006-2008.
12 Interviews of U.S. officials, 2005-2007.
13 For example, see House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
hearing on PRTs, 1st session, 110th Congress, December 5, 2007.
14 See CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher
Blanchard; Pankaj Mishra, “The Real Afghanistan,” New York Review of Books, March 10,
2005, p. 44-48; “L’Afghanistan a fourni 87% de l’ opium mondial en 2004,” Le Monde, July
1, 2005, p. 6; House Armed Services Committee, hearing on “Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” June 28, 2006; “Afghan opium trade hits new peak,” Washington Post,
August 28, 2007, p. A7.

---

CRS-7
the narcotics trade successfully. Narcotics traffickers can exploit the country’s
primitive transportation network, as an extensive road system is not needed to move
opium to market; a small load of opium can yield a high financial return.
The opium trade has a corrosive effect on Afghan society. Former CIA Director
John Negroponte told Congress in January 2007 that “the drug trade contributes to
endemic corruption at all levels of government and undercuts public confidence. A
dangerous nexus exists between drugs and insurgents and warlords who derive funds
from cultivation and trafficking.” At the same time, farmers in parts of the country
view the poppy as their only source of income. Eradication of the industry without
a substitute source of income would throw these farmers into destitution, and they
violently resist any effort to destroy their crops. The allies provide training,
intelligence, and logistics to Afghan army units and police who destroy opium labs.15
One former regional commander believes that the Afghan government’s destruction
of poppy fields is too random to be effective, and that the government does not take
decisive action to end warlord involvement in the narcotics trade. There are also
reports that the government primarily destroys the crops of the poorest farmers, and
leaves those of more influential families whose support is needed by the
government.16 The Bush Administration has urged the Karzai government to consider
spraying herbicide on the poppy fields; the Afghan government is considering this
proposal, and studying the possible effects of herbicide on public health and the
environment. No other ally reportedly supports aerial spraying.17
Some western officials in Afghanistan note that the country has very few well-
educated individuals able to serve in the judiciary and in other professions. In the
view of most observers, the entire judicial system is greatly deficient. The police
remain corrupt and distrusted by the population. They lack extensive training and
experience, as well as transport, an issue that will be discussed below in the section
on Stage Three operations. The court system remains in its infancy, with few capable
jurists and attorneys.18 The Italian government leads the effort to build a professional
judicial system. In July 2007, Italy held a conference in Rome to develop a strategy
to build such a system. Governments in attendance pledged $360 million to the
effort over a period of several years; they linked the pledges to specific programs.
Among the principles and steps that the programs will seek to establish are: a code
of conduct, transparency, and accountability for officials in the judicial system; and
equipment, salary support, qualification requirements, and an educational system for
15 Testimony of Director Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment,” Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007; House International Relations Committee,
hearing on “U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan,” March 17, 2005; Mishra, op. cit,
p. 46.
16 Interview, June 20, 2007; and “Opium guerre, le ‘narco-état afghan,” Le Monde
(December 13, 2007), p. 5.
17 Interviews with officials from allied countries, June-December 2007.
18 Interviews with European Union officials, 2006-2007; presentation of former Afghan
Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, Brookings Institution, April 30, 2007; and “McCaffrey Sees
2007 as a Crucial Year,” Washington Post, April 10, 2007, p. A15.

---

CRS-8
those interested in the legal profession. A follow-up meeting was held in Kabul in
October 2007 to begin implementation of these programs.19
Another component of the counter-narcotics effort is to persuade farmers to
switch to alternative crops. Such crops cannot compete with poppies; income from
a hectare of poppies can reach $4,600 a year, while wheat, one of the suggested
substitute crops, can bring only $390. Orchards might bring more money, but they
require years to develop. A more extensive market infrastructure is necessary as
well. U.S. officials believe that an extensive road-building effort is imperative to
modernize the country’s economy.
Stage Three: Establishing Mission and Structure
ISAF’s task in Stage Three was to bring stability to the southern part of the
country, where the writ of the Karzai government has been limited. Initially, in late
2005, the allies believed that Stage Three would emulate Stages One and Two by
seeing a replacement of OEF forces by NATO forces in a stabilizing environment.
The allies nonetheless knew that there would be several significant new challenges
in Stage Three. The Taliban originated in the south, in Qandahar province, and they
retain their most active network there. Poppy farming is widespread in the south,
particularly in Helmand province, where British troops operate, and in Uruzgan
province, where Dutch troops predominate.
Stage Three came into force on July 31, 2006, after having been postponed
several times due to violence and an effort to secure pledges of troops from allied
governments. Elements of ISAF had been present in the region for several months,
preparing for their mission. Several non-allies, such as Australia and New Zealand,
are contributing modest amounts of troops, money, and expertise to ISAF, a sign of
the importance of the mission in South Asia and to the allies’ effort to build a “global
NATO” of members and partner states.
The allies confronted four issues in attempting to develop a coherent force for
Stage Three: writing a mission statement; raising troops to accomplish that mission;
agreeing upon treatment of prisoners; and creating a command structure.
Mission Statement
From fall 2005 through early 2006, the Bush Administration wished to merge
the functions and command of ISAF and OEF. Then Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld asked the allies to assume counter-insurgency and anti-terror
responsibilities in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. Some allies balked,
contending that such combat operations were OEF’s task, that the U.N. resolution
governing ISAF called for a stabilization operation only, and that, in some cases, the
19 “Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan,” Rome, July 2-3, 2007;
interviews of Italian officials, August 2007. The United States pledged $15 million for the
program, and Italy pledged approximately $13.5 million.

---

CRS-9
allies did not have forces available for the counter-insurgency and counter-terror
tasks.20
In December 2005, the allies announced a mission statement for ISAF’s Stage
Three in the form of a communiqué. They pledged to work to extend the authority
of the Afghan government, primarily through development of PRTs. They also
committed themselves to training the Afghan army and police, an effort in state-
building meant to provide a Kabul government with reliable security forces, a
formidable task because such forces were barely in existence. They further
committed themselves to “supporting Afghan government counter-narcotics
efforts.”21 They also agreed upon guidelines for dealing with prisoners.
The mission statement reflected European and Canadian views that Stage Three
operations should concentrate on reconstruction and stabilization, with initial concern
over military threat at a minimum. The Taliban were relatively quiet when the allies
wrote their communiqué, perhaps due to the winter weather in Afghanistan, perhaps
because the Taliban were organizing and seeking to gather their strength. In April
2006, then British Defense Secretary said that he hoped that his country’s forces
could deploy “without firing a shot.”22 Peter Struck, Defense Minister under the
previous German government, said in September 2005 that “NATO is not equipped
for counter-terrorism operations. That is not what it is supposed to do.”23 The Dutch
parliament held a contentious debate in February 2006 over whether to send forces
to ISAF. Some government and opposition members of Parliament opposed sending
Dutch forces for a combat operation; their view was clear that Dutch forces were
primarily to support a stabilization mission.24
By spring 2006, events on the ground in Afghanistan imposed new exigencies
on ISAF’s mission. An attack on the Norwegian-Finnish PRT in normally tranquil
Meymaneh, in western Afghanistan, in February 2006 had given an indication of an
emerging problem: the need for a rapid military response capability for rescue
operations. When the PRT was attacked, no NATO combat forces were in the region
to protect the ISAF personnel. Other NATO forces that were nearby had caveats
prohibiting their use in combat operations. Eventually a British plane and forces
were found to end the attack on the PRT. Before and after the attack on the PRT,
then NATO SACEUR General James Jones called upon the NATO governments to
pledge forces to ISAF that would be capable of combat operations. He waged a
20 “Europeans Balking at New Afghan Role,” New York Times, September 14, 2005, p. 1;
interviews of European officials, September 2005 - February 2006.
21 “Final Communiqué,” North Atlantic Council, NATO, Brussels, December 8, 2005.
22 “UK Warned of More Afghanistan Deaths,” Financial Times, July 3, 2006, p. 3.
23 “Europeans Balking at New Afghan Role,” op. cit. Struck’s view seems to be contradicted
by the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, the alliance’s guiding political document, which
clearly states that counter-terrorism is one of NATO’s new post-Cold War tasks.
24 “Peacekeeping in Afghanistan Is Modern Crisis Management,” in European Affairs,
spring/summer 2006, p. 3-4.

---

CRS-10
constant campaign to cajole allied governments not to place caveats on their forces
that ruled out combat operations.25
NATO governments ultimately agreed to adjust how ISAF would fulfil Stage
Three. They wrote more “robust” rules of engagement, which have not been made
fully public. By May 2006, British General David Richards, then the ISAF
commander, was describing Stage Three as a “combat operation.” He added that
caveats affecting Stage Three forces had been “reduced.” He dismissed the tendency
of some NATO governments to draw a line between OEF’s counter-terror operations
and the supposedly low-level counter-insurgency responsibilities that had crept into
Stage Three responsibilities. He told visiting members of a NATO parliamentary
delegation that counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan were
not always distinguishable.26 When OEF turned southern Afghanistan over to ISAF
on July 31, 2006, some OEF forces remained in the region to continue combat
operations targeted against terrorist elements.
Difficulties in Raising Troops
The debate over mission affected the effort to raise forces for Stage Three. From
2005, NATO officials have experienced difficulty persuading member governments
to supply forces. According to NATO officials, the attack on the Norwegian-Finnish
PRT awakened some governments to the continuing threat posed by instability and
the insurgency.27 Rapid-response forces suddenly became available. Britain, Canada,
and the Netherlands pledged forces for Stage Three.
Secretary Gates has been critical of the allies for not providing more troops,
although he has recently softened his tone. He told the House Armed Services
Committee in December 2007 that another 7,500 troops are needed, in addition to the
41,700 then in ISAF. Of this addition, approximately 3,500 should be trainers for the
Afghan army. He also called for at least 16 more helicopters.28 A week later,
however, after a NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting, he acknowledged that domestic
political problems are preventing some allies from increasing their force levels in
Afghanistan. Allied government officials state privately that their populations are
reluctant to follow the Bush Administration, largely due to the U.S. invasion of Iraq
and subsequent criticism of the United States in Europe and the Middle East.29
Britain initially promised to send 3600 troops to Helmand province by the
beginning of Stage Three operations in July 2006, and has steadily increased its
contribution to 7,800 troops. Canada was one of the first allies to recognize the need
25 Comments by Gen. Jones at NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings in Copenhagen,
November 2005.
26 “Visit to Afghanistan,” report by the Defence Committee of the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, May 23, 2006, p. 2.
27 Interviews with NATO officials, February 2006.
28 Testimony of Sec. Gates, House Armed Services Committee, hearing, 1st Session, 110th
Congress, December 11, 2007.
29 Interviews, June-December, 2007.

---

CRS-11
for combat forces. By a close vote in the Canadian parliament in May 2006, the
government designated 2300 troops for Afghanistan until February 2009, most of
which have been sent to Qandahar province.
The debate in the Dutch parliament over assigning troops to ISAF was also
contentious. The Dutch population initially opposed sending forces into a combat
operation. Ultimately, the Netherlands designated 1,400 to 1,700 troops for duty in
ISAF’s Stage Three and Stage Four operations. In December 2007, the Dutch
parliament agreed to keep 1000-1100 troops in Afghanistan, but to begin a
withdrawal in August 2010 until all Dutch forces are withdraw by December 1, 2010.
The parliament expressed dismay that more allies have not been forthcoming in
providing forces for southern Afghanistan.
A key objective of several allies at NATO’s Bucharest summit with combat
contingents in Afghanistan was to persuade other governments to send more forces.
The Canadian government had threatened to withdraw its forces in 2009 if a
commitment of at least1,000 new combat troops was not made. In the end, France
agreed to send 720 combat troops; the Czech Republic and several other allies
pledged smaller contingents, allaying Canadian concerns to some degree. However,
allies with forces in harm’s way continue to criticize other allies that will not send
combat forces or commit them to areas where the Taliban are active.
The views of selected allied governments will be discussed more extensively
later in this report.
Disagreements over Treatment of Prisoners
There was a contentious debate among the allies over the December 2005 final
communiqué guiding NATO operations in Afghanistan. Most of the allies were
critical of U.S. abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq; they extended this
criticism to the U.S. detention policy at Guantanamo Bay, where some prisoners
captured in Afghanistan have been sent since 2001. These allies contended that the
Bush Administration was ignoring the Geneva Convention governing treatment of
prisoners taken in combat, and that the issue was a significant one among their
publics and in their domestic political debates.30
These allies insisted that the communiqué explicitly address the issue of
treatment of prisoners. The final document contains the statement: “In addition to
NATO’s agreed detention policy for ISAF, which is and remains consistent with
international law, we welcome initiatives by Allies to assist the Afghan authorities
in the implementation of international standards for the detention of prisoners.”31
The allies also agreed that prisoners taken by ISAF should be turned over to the
Afghan government. Some allied governments reportedly told the Afghan
30 Interviews with officials from NATO governments, December 2005-February 2006; “En
Afghanistan, l’OTAN évolue de la pacification vers le contre-terrorisme,” Le Monde,
November 20-21, 2005, p. 4.
31 “Final Communiqué,” North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, December 8, 2005.

---

CRS-12
government that they did not wish such prisoners to then be transferred to the United
States government. The Afghan government reportedly insisted upon its sovereign
right to determine the disposition of prisoners in its custody. A new problem,
discussed below, has arisen over allegations that Afghan officials have tortured
detainees turned over to them by ISAF forces.32
Command Structure: Coordinating ISAF and OEF Operations
NATO’s discussion over the command structure for Stages Three and Four in
Afghanistan reflected the U.S. desire to see the allies more fully embrace combat
tasks. Reluctance on the part of some European governments to clash with the
Taliban and warlords was evident in these discussions.
From at least 2004, the Bush Administration began to urge the allies to assume
more responsibilities in the fight against insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan. By
2005 the Administration was urging that ISAF and OEF be merged under one
command. Many allies at first resisted the call to merge the two commands, largely
because of the different nature of the two operations and differing national agendas.
Britain, Germany, and France were the principal allies opposing the U.S. idea
to merge the commands. They did so for differing reasons. Britain and Germany
wished to preserve ISAF as a stabilization, and not combat, mission. Britain, leading
the ISAF anti-narcotics effort, wished to ensure that that initiative remained in the
political sphere; along with other allies, the British believe that using force against
Afghan farmers to eradicate the poppy crop might result in a broadened insurgency.
Germany opposed a merger of the commands because German forces in ISAF were
trained only for stabilization, and not for counter-insurgency operations.
The French view was somewhat different. The French government was close
to the Administration view that some combat operations against the Taliban and
other elements would be necessary. At the same time, France was concerned that the
Administration, after having a U.S. commander in place to guide all military activity
in Afghanistan, might use NATO as a “toolbox” to accomplish Washington’s broader
objectives. Specifically, Paris was concerned that the Administration would designate
more U.S. units from Afghanistan to be sent to Iraq, and leave the allies to stabilize
Afghanistan. Administration officials insist publicly and privately that they have no
intention of sharply reducing forces in Afghanistan.33 In fact, the Bush
Administration has increased the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The
government of President Nicolas Sarkozy, as noted earlier, has decided to increase
its combat contingent in Afghanistan.
In resolving the issue of command structure, the allies sought to address
practical problems for the two operations. ISAF and OEF operate in contiguous
areas, but there is no clear dividing line between regions where the Taliban and Al
Qaeda are active, and the relatively stable regions of the country. A weakness of
32 Interviews with officials from NATO governments, 2005-2007.
33 Interviews with officials from allied governments, December 2005-October 2007.

---

CRS-13
ISAF had been deficient capability for rapid response rescue, should soldiers and
civilian personnel find themselves under fire.
The allies agreed upon a “synergy,” rather than a merger, of the two commands
to solve this problem. The ISAF commander now has three deputies. One deputy
leads the stabilization operations, working closely with the Afghan government to
identify priorities in reconstruction and governance. The Italians, for example, are
leading the effort to build and professionalize an Afghan judiciary. A second deputy
commands air operations, as the hurdles for successful strategic and tactical lift and
search and rescue are formidable.
A third deputy directs security operations. This deputy answers to both the
OEF and ISAF commanders. The purpose of the security commander’s dual role is
to provide coordination between the two operations. For example, if troops in one
operation need air cover or an emergency response, then those resources could come
from either OEF or ISAF, depending on which was nearest to the action and had
available resources. This arrangement was in fact already in place with some allied
governments before Stage Three began. French air combat forces operating out of
Tajikistan, for example, have been providing this function to troops in the field in
both ISAF and OEF since 2005, and other allies’ air components are now prepared
to do the same. In addition, French and Dutch officials say that their air force
components serve both commands by gathering and sharing military intelligence.34
Stage Three Operations: Allied Viewpoints
Once the allies agreed on ISAF’s mission for Stage Three, they began to differ
on how to accomplish it. The previous section analyzed allied views in establishing
the mission and structure of Stage Three. This section discusses the developing
views of allies as Stage Three moved forward. Allied views began to change
between the time of the December 2005 NATO communiqué describing ISAF’s
mission and July 2006, largely due to the surge in Taliban activity. For purposes of
analysis, the range of views begins with governments most hesitant about the use of
combat forces in Afghanistan and proceeds through a list of governments that believe
that a more forceful military hand will be necessary to stabilize and rebuild the
country.
Germany: Rebuild but Avoid Combat
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government had initially expressed a
more decisive commitment to securing stability in Afghanistan than its predecessor.
Germany now has 3,200 forces in ISAF trained for stability operations but not for
combat in the northern part of the country. In September 2006, the German
parliament extended the commitment for German troops, but only gave permission
to send them to relatively secure northern Afghanistan. At NATO’s Riga summit,
however, Germany agreed to send troops to assist allied forces in an emergency. In
spring 2007, the German government assigned six Tornado aircraft to Afghanistan
34 Interviews of officials in allied governments, November 2005-July 2006.

---

CRS-14
for use in surveillance operations. In October 2007 the Bundestag renewed the
commitment for another year to keep German forces and Tornado aircraft in
Afghanistan. Chancellor Merkel rejected an appeal by the NATO Secretary General
to send some of Germany’s forces to the south for stabilization operations.
Public support in Germany for the Afghan mission has steadily declined. In
2002, 51% of those polled supported German involvement in Afghanistan’s
stabilization; as of October 2007, that figure had declined to 34%. Under the
preceding Schroeder government, Berlin was adamant that German forces would not
engage in combat operations; according to NATO officials, the German caveat
against combat has limited the alliance in integrating German forces with those of
other allied governments. Some observers fault Merkel for failing to lay out the
importance of the Afghan mission to the German people.35
Some officials from other allied governments and the EU have criticized the
existing restrictions on German forces and the capabilities of those forces. These
officials say that German troops and civilians rarely venture beyond the perimeter of
their PRTs due to concern that they might arouse Afghan public criticism or come
into contact with armed elements. German troops reportedly do not go on extended
patrols and do not respond to local security incidents. Critics of the German approach
say that it is important to engage local officials and demonstrate that NATO has an
active approach to rebuilding the country and persuading the Afghan population that
the alliance is serving a constructive role.36
Some U.S. and European officials are also critical of the manner in which
Germany managed its task of training the Afghan police force (ANP). The task was
a daunting one, given the low pay provided by the Afghan government and the
modest numbers of police used to cover a broad territory. In this view, the Afghan
police remain “corrupt and hollow” as a force. At the same time, former SACEUR
General Jones said that while training of the Afghan army is “one of the bright
stories, one of the not-so-good stories ... is the inadequacy to bring similar progress
to police reform, which is the responsibility of Germany.” Part of the problem may
lie in the lack of authority of the German government to order police to Afghanistan;
unlike its military forces, German police must volunteer for such an assignment.37
In May 2007, the EU accepted a request by NATO to take the lead in training
Afghanistan’s police, a mission that began in June 2007. The police could play a key
role in Afghanistan’s stabilization because they, along with the Afghan army, have
primary responsibility for destroying poppy fields and opium labs.38 The EU effort
35 Judy Dempsey, “Merkel aloof as public wavers on Afghanistan,” International Herald
Tribune, October 19, 2007, p. 2.
36 Interviews with European and U.S. officials and observers, June-July 2006.
37 Cited in “If Called to Lebanon, NATO ‘Could Go In,’” International Herald Tribune, July
28, 2006, p. 3; interviews, fall 2006.
38 “Foreign Troops in North Afghanistan Say ‘Drug Wars’ the Biggest Threat,” Agence
France Presse, August 30, 2005; “Shake-up of Afghan Police ‘Brought Back Corruption,’”
(continued...)

---

CRS-15
has faltered thus far, for several reasons. Turkey is reportedly blocking any provision
by NATO of intelligence to the EU and the Afghan police because (Greek) Cyprus
and Malta, both in the EU, are not NATO members. Turkey is also blocking any
agreement for NATO to provide protection to police who come under attack by the
Taliban. Turkey’s actions are a side effect of its dispute with the EU over a range of
issues. In September 2007, the German general heading the EU police training
mission reportedly quit in frustration over these complications, and due to the
corruption encountered in dealing with the Karzai government.39
In a February 2008 report by ISAF to the U.N., NATO noted that the Afghan
police “still fall behind the desired level of capability.”40
The Netherlands: An Increasingly Decisive Position
Dutch forces are concentrated in the south, in Uruzgan province, one of
Afghanistan’s most unstable regions and an area that has seen considerable Taliban
activity since spring 2006. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal and U.S. treatment of
prisoners at Guantanamo are important issues in the Dutch debate over Afghanistan.
Dutch officials say that “the rules of the road in fighting terrorism” are not clearly
agreed upon in the alliance. For this reason, Dutch officials were initially reluctant
to have their forces closely associated with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The
Netherlands was the principal proponent of the section of the December 2005 NATO
communiqué detailing allied treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan.41
Initial Dutch efforts in ISAF were tentative and indecisive. However, Dutch
troops have grown increasingly engaged in providing security, in tandem with an
active and well-funded reconstruction effort.
Dutch officials offer a strategic approach to Afghanistan’s problems. They
believe that the alliance must make a more concerted effort to engage regional
countries — above all, Pakistan, India, and Iran — to bring stability to the country,
a view given increasing attention in some allied capitals after the assassination of
Benazir Bhutto. These officials are concerned that NATO’s military operations are
alienating the Afghan population. They advocate creation of a general fund to rapidly
compensate local victims of mistaken attacks by NATO forces. In addition, they
advocate a common approach in NATO and the EU to the problems presented by the
drug trade. In the Dutch view — echoed by Italy — NATO must emphasize
reconstruction more than combat operations.42
38 (...continued)
Financial Times, June 13, 2006, p. 2.
39 “German giving up on Afghan position,” International Herald Tribune, September 12,
2007, p. 1; interviews with officials from allied governments, June-September, 2007.
40 “Quarterly Report to the U.N. on ISAF Operations,” NATO, Brussels, February 1, 2008,
p. 3.
41 Discussions with Dutch officials, September 2005-May 2006.
42 Remarks by Bert Koenders, Minister for Development and Cooperation, The Netherlands,
(continued...)

---

CRS-16
Others counter this argument by saying that “there can be no reconstruction
without security.” The Taliban must be cleared out before reconstruction can
proceed. The issue may be more complicated, however. U.S. General Karl
Eikenberry, now the deputy of the NATO Military Committee, believes that many
Taliban are not individuals who have hidden themselves in Pakistan or elsewhere
outside Afghanistan, but are above all “the unemployed,” those currently without a
stake in Afghan society. In his view, to weaken the Taliban, NATO should build
roads and other economic infrastructure to help create an economy to give Afghans
promise of a future.43 In a sense, his view is close to that of Dutch officials.
The Dutch government was the most publicly critical of U.S. handling of
prisoners taken in the conflict against terrorism. Dutch government spokesmen and
opposition leaders criticized U.S. handling of prisoners who had been sent to
Guantanamo and called for treatment of detainees to meet the strictures of
“international law.” In a memorandum of understanding with the Afghan
government, the Netherlands secured a pledge that prisoners turned over to Kabul
would not receive the death penalty for any crimes committed. The Dutch expressed
their desire to the Afghan government that such prisoners not be turned over to the
United States.44
In the Dutch view, ISAF’s purpose is “to provide a secure and stable
environment for reconstruction.” The government’s policy has been that measures
of “defense, diplomacy, and development” are key to ISAF’s success. When
necessary, Dutch troops will use force to subdue the Taliban to build stability so that
reconstruction projects may take hold. A growing number of combat engagements,
occasionally with U.S. troops, has occurred since late summer 2006, and Dutch
forces have suffered casualties.45 The Netherlands endorsed the “synergy” of ISAF
and OEF commands and has made available four F-16s for missions in both ISAF
and OEF. The aircraft may be used for missions from intelligence gathering to close
air support. The Netherlands now has 1,500 troops in Afghanistan in restive Uruzgan
province. Another 250 Dutch troops serve in Kabul and in northern Afghanistan.
The Dutch government will reportedly begin a drawdown of part of these forces due
to a need to provide rest and retraining.
The Dutch give their funding for PRT reconstruction activities directly to the
Afghan central government, mainly through U.N. and World Bank channels. Dutch
officials note the contrast with the U.S. approach, which is to bring in a “turnkey”
42 (...continued)
at CSIS, Washington, DC, April 16, 2007. Koenders is the highly regarded former President
of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and is well-versed in NATO issues. For a view
advocating EU coordination of reconstruction/civilian programs in Afghanistan, see Julianne
Smith, “How the EU Can Act Now to Assist Global Leadership,” CSIS report, March 26,
2007.
43 Remarks of Gen. Eikenberry at Brookings conference on Europe, April 30, 2007.
44 “Peacekeeping in Afghanistan Is Modern Crisis Management ...,” op. cit., p. 3-4.
45 Bernard Bot, “Saving Democracy in a World of Change,” speech at Georgetown
University, Washington, DC, October 24, 2006; interviews, 2007.

---

CRS-17
operation in which U.S. officials are trained to undertake reconstruction projects,
using U.S. manpower and equipment. The Dutch argue that the Karzai government
itself must undertake responsibility for planning and implementation of projects to
rebuild the country. Only in this way, the Dutch believe, can the Afghans learn good
governance and management of their own affairs. The Dutch are directly involved
in some projects, providing clean water to villages and almond trees and seeds to
farmers for alternative crops, for example. Some U.S. officials believe that the Dutch
practice of providing assistance funds directly to the Afghan government has led to
the money being spent on other governmental purposes or landing in the pockets of
corrupt Afghan officials.46
The United States, Britain, and Canada: A Broad Mandate
The governments of the United States, Britain, and Canada share similar views
on how ISAF should fulfil its mission. They have sent combat forces to Afghanistan,
maintain PRTs in the most unstable parts of the country, and have engaged the
Taliban resurgence aggressively.
Many of the British and Canadian forces for Stage
Three began to arrive in Afghanistan in spring 2006, and worked under OEF
command fighting the Taliban. On July 31, 2006, most of these forces were
“rebadged” as NATO forces serving ISAF’s Stage Three mission.
The United States has approximately 18,000 troops in OEF. The U.S.-led OEF
controlled southern Afghanistan until ISAF’s succession there at the end of July
2006. The United States now has approximately17,000 troops in ISAF. There is a
debate in the Pentagon over whether a possible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq
could open the door to more U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Pentagon has
reportedly discussed a plan with President Bush to increase U.S. forces in
Afghanistan by 7,000 in 2009, necessitated at least in part by some allies’ refusal to
agree to a greater sharing of the burden.47
U.S. officials believe that ISAF must undertake tasks “from the lowest level of
peacekeeping to combat operations against the Taliban and warlords.” OEF’s task
should be counter-terrorism against Al Qaeda. These officials concede that the line
between the two operations is blurred, given that OEF has been fighting both an
insurgency led by the Taliban and searching for Al Qaeda.48 Some allied governments
believe that the U.S. combat effort is overly aggressive and, in some instances, has
been counterproductive. President Karzai has said that U.S. air strikes have
sometimes been poorly targeted and have carelessly killed civilians, which he
believes may be alienating the population in some areas of the country. In July 2007,
NATO announced a new policy. ISAF will postpone a combat response, where
46 Discussions with Dutch and U.S. officials, February-July 2006.
47 Discussions with officials from the Dept. of Defense, October-December 2007; “An
Afghan mission short of troops,” International Herald Tribune, May 3-4, 2008, p. 3.
48 Discussions with U.S. officials, 2006-2007.

---

CRS-18
possible, when civilians are present near the Taliban; in addition, ISAF aircraft will
use smaller bombs to limit damage to an area.49
The Bush Administration has a well-developed view of the role of PRTs, but
some observers believe that there is a lack of qualified civilian personnel to
accomplish key tasks. U.S. PRTs, as noted earlier, are a mixture of combat forces
and civilians. In one view, there are 100 troops for every one AID specialist and one
State Department official. The U.S. military is not trained to accomplish the tasks
assigned to civilian personnel. Above all, there is a glaring deficit in U.S.
agricultural specialists on the ground in Afghanistan.50 In the U.S. view, PRTs
should be initially established in remote areas where most non-governmental
organizations will not go. The PRTs should undertake reconstruction projects such
as road building to enhance economic development and irrigation networks to assist
in agricultural development and diversification, and political tasks, ranging from
gaining the confidence of local officials to “workshops” to educate officials and tribal
leaders in governance and long-term reconstruction plans.51
The British view largely mirrors the U.S. view of NATO’s role in Afghanistan.
Britain has ISAF and OEF contingents, and its combat aircraft support both missions.
Most of Britain’s ISAF troops, numbering approximately 7,800 in the entire country
and 4,200 in the south, are combat units. British forces in the south are largely in
Helmand province, the principal poppy-growing region in the country; Britain leads
the ISAF effort in counter-narcotics. British forces have an “inkblot” strategy, in
which they clear an area of Taliban, then undertake reconstruction projects, such as
road building, moving out from a village into the countryside.52 The new British
government under Gordon Brown has reaffirmed the U.K.’s commitment to ISAF.
Britain had reportedly hoped to increase its force contingent at the Bucharest summit,
but increased violence in Iraq has kept combat elements tied down there.
From a hesitant position on ISAF’s mission in early 2006, noted earlier, the
British government has adopted a more aggressive stance, caused by the increase in
Taliban activity in southern Afghanistan. Britain has a clearly vested interest in
ISAF’s stabilization mission, not only out of concern that terrorist activity has
emanated from south Asia but because most of the heroin found in the United
Kingdom comes from Afghanistan. U.S. officials believe that Britain’s PRT in
Helmand province is well-funded and concentrates on local governance and
economic development.53
49 “NATO plans to reduce Afghan casualties,” Financial Times, July 30, 2007, p. 1.
50 Discussion with U.S. official, February 2008.
51 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams ...,” op. cit., Dept of Defense, p. 9-20; interviews with
U.S. officials serving in PRTs, 2005-2007.
52 “For British in an Afghan province, initial gains against the Taliban,”New York Times,
August 5, 2007, p. 1.
53 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams ...,” op. cit., Dept. of Defense, p. 22; “Opium War an
Absolute Disaster,” Financial Times, July 5, 2006, p. 3.

---

CRS-19
At the same time, a debate over the proper balance between combat missions
and reconstruction continues in Britain. Prime Minister Brown’s government now
reportedly believes that more emphasis must be given to an effort to reconcile
elements of the insurgency with the Karzai government. The British government
reportedly believes that there are “hard-core” Taliban elements incapable of
accepting the Karzai government, but that there are other levels of Taliban supports
not affiliated with Islamic extremism that can be persuaded to lay down their arms.
A key component of such an approach would be a successful reconstruction effort
that would provide jobs and broadened economic growth.54
The United States and Britain disagree about Britain’s plan to arm tribal militias
to combat the Taliban, a step proposed by London to aid ISAF’s overstretched forces.
U.S. General Dan McNeill, ISAF’s commander, expressed concern that the plan
could fan inter-tribal conflict.55 The plan would appear to conflict with NATO’s
effort to disarm regional militias.
Canada also has primarily combat forces in Afghanistan, in both OEF and ISAF.
There is a vigorous debate in Canada over the country’s involvement in Afghanistan.
In 2006, by a narrow vote of 149-145, the Canadian parliament approved Ottawa’s
plan to commit 2300 troops to ISAF until February 2009. Public support for the
mission has fallen, however. In 2002, 66% of those polled supported sending
Canadian forces to Afghanistan, but only 44% supported the two-year extension until
2009. By April 2007, support for keeping Canadian forces in Afghanistan had
dropped to 52%. While Canadians appear to support their country’s long involvement
in U.N. peace operations, the need for combat operations in Afghanistan has eroded
support for the ISAF mission. When the alliance produced more combat forces for
southern and eastern Afghanistan at the Bucharest summit, Ottawa withdrew its
threat to remove its troops in 2009. On March 13, 2008, the Canadian parliament
extended the commitment to keep troops in Afghanistan until 2011.56
Canadian forces joined U.S. and British forces in summer and fall 2006 OEF
combat operations against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Some of these
operations, led by Canadian teams, were joined by Afghan army (ANA) elements in
Qandahar province. The Canadians eventually wish to turn over such operations to
the ANA. Some of the Canadian forces assigned to OEF were transferred to ISAF’s
Stage Three operations on July 31, 2006, and Qandahar province is their principal
region of responsibility. Canada leads a PRT in the province.
France: Combat and Stabilization
The French government believes that ISAF must be a combat force that
buttresses the efforts of the Afghan government to build legitimacy and governance.
54 “Fields of little glory,” Financial Times, November 19, 2007, p. 10.
55 “Top U.S. general warns on Afghan self-defence plan,” Financial Times, January 3, 2008,
p. 4.
56 “Canadian and Dutch Publics Feeling Stretched ...,” op. cit.; “Troop Pullout Bill Defeated
in Canada,” Washington Post, April 25, 2007, p. A12.

---

CRS-20
Unlike German forces, for example, many French forces are trained both for combat
and stabilization. As of May 2008 France has 1,500 troops in ISAF; most are in a
stabilization mission in Kabul and in army training missions elsewhere in the
country. French officials express concern that ISAF will fail “if not accompanied by
increased capacity by the Afghan police and judicial system.”57
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has reaffirmed Paris’s commitment to ISAF.
France moved 6 Mirage fighter bombers from a French base in Tajikistan to the
NATO base in Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan. These jets are used in intelligence
and close air support missions; their relocation to Kandahar will allow them to spend
more time in the air on mission rather than on the long return to Tajikistan for
resupply.58 France also supplies C135 tankers to refuel French and other allied
aircraft. France has built 4 operational “OMLTs”, a term used to describe a joint
allied and Afghan combat force, and participates in another with Dutch forces. These
forces are in the east and south where combat is at the highest levels. U.S. and
French forces are jointly training Afghan special forces teams.
As noted above, President Sarkozy pledged approximately 720 combat troops
for Afghanistan at the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008. Two hundred are
special forces, and some of these may join U.S. forces in OEF; the rest are in mobile
combat units. These troops will be under U.S. command in eastern Afghanistan
where, according to NATO, Taliban operations “continue at a high level.”59
The opposition Socialist Party in France has strongly criticized Sarkozy’s
decision to increase French force levels in Afghanistan. The Socialist leader in the
National Assembly characterized the decision as asking “France to support in
Afghanistan the American war burden in Iraq” as part of the French president’s
“Atlantic obsession;” in this view, European forces in Afghanistan free the United
States to send or keep forces in Iraq, a war that is highly unpopular among the French
public. Prime Minister François Fillon responded that in fact the troops will be sent
to Afghanistan as part of a NATO “common strategy.” President Sarkozy has
described ISAF’s mission as one to counter global terrorism.60
The French government, mindful of civilian casualties and Afghan criticism of
ISAF, is emphasizing more restrictive rules of engagement for its forces. Its troops
have been instructed to use force “proportional” to a threat, to avoid bombing civilian
57 Interview with Defense Minister Morin in “Hervé Morin: ‘La situation se dégrade en
Afghanistan,” Le Monde, December 21, 2007, p. 5.
58 “La France redéploie ses avions de combat dans le Sud afghan,” Le Monde, August 31,
2007, p. 4.
59 NATO quarterly report to the U.N., op. cit.; “Mille soldats français en renfort dans l’Est
afghan,” Le Monde, April 2, 2008, p. 4.
60 “L’Opposition français craint un ‘enlisement’ en Afghanistan,” Le Monde, April 3, 2008,
p. 6; and “A Kaboul, M. Sarkozy évoque un effort militaire français,” Le Monde, December
25, 2007, p. 4.

---

CRS-21
infrastructure, and to have “visual recognition” of a target before releasing bombs.61
As noted above, France may send additional combat forces to southern Afghanistan
in early 2008.
The Afghan mission has marked important changes in French NATO policy.
France supported the invocation of Article V, NATO’s mutual security clause, after
the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States. Those attacks were decisive
in the French government’s change of position on NATO’s “out-of-area”
responsibilities. For many years, Paris had argued that NATO was a European
security organization, and must only operate in and near Europe. After September
11, the French government embraced the emerging view that NATO must be a global
security organization able to combat terrorism and WMD proliferation around the
planet. French officials say that ISAF is NATO’s most important mission.62
Since the late 1990s, NATO has urged member governments to construct more
“deployable,” expeditionary forces, and gave the notion a concrete base in the Prague
Capabilities Commitment (PCC) in 2002, when allies pledged to develop capabilities
such as strategic lift, aerial refueling, and more special forces.63 Among the European
allies, France has made considerable progress along this path. As noted above,
French aerial tankers refuel not only French aircraft in the Afghan theater, but U.S.,
Dutch, and Belgian aircraft as well. These capabilities contribute to the improving
integration of NATO forces in the Afghan theater, according to U.S. officials, and to
the ability of ISAF and OEF to share capabilities and command.64 U.S. officials give
French forces high marks for their ability and their willingness to fight.
The French government has clearly defined its interests in Afghanistan. French
officials argue that the allies must commit to a long effort to assist the Afghan
government in eradicating the opium industry, in part because heroin finds its way
into western societies, in part because it fuels terrorist groups. Ultimately, French
officials believe that the Afghan government itself must learn to govern the country,
and that NATO and partner states cannot do this for Kabul. To this end, the French
have a contingent in place that assists in training the Afghan army. France does not
believe that PRTs can play a meaningful role in Afghanistan, and believes that the
Karzai government must itself exercise the initiative and build good governance to
gain the confidence of its people. France does not accept the view, held by some
U.S. officials but nowhere present in NATO’s ISAF mission statement, that part of
NATO’s brief is to build democracy in Afghanistan. In the French view, Afghanistan
61 “À Kandahar, dans la base sous haute sécurité, d’où opèrent les Mirages français en
Afghanistan,” Le Monde, November 25-26, 2007, p. 5.
62 Interviews with French and U.S. officials; Remarks by Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-
Marie at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly plenary, Paris, May 30, 2006.
63 CRS Report RS21659, NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment, by Carl W. Ek.
64 Interviews with U.S. and French officials, 2005-2007; “France Quietly Offers More
Military Help,” Army Times, August 29, 2005; “Français et Américains louent une
coopération exemplaire en Afghanistan,” Le Monde, October 24-25, 2004, p. 3.

---

CRS-22
is a highly diverse ethnic state with no tradition of democracy; at best, for the
foreseeable future, a more representative and tolerant society can be built.65
France also contends that the EU and other civilian institutions, such as the U.N.
and the World Bank, are more suited to undertake development projects than NATO.
In Paris’ view, NATO should concentrate on collective defense.
Stage Four
On October 5, 2006, ISAF extended its responsibilities to cover all of
Afghanistan. OEF will continue its operations under U.S. leadership against terrorist
elements.
In September 2006, former NATO SACEUR General James Jones expressed
frustration at the limitations that some allies place on their troops. “It’s not enough,”
he said, “to simply provide forces if those forces have restrictions on them that limit
them from being effective.”66 He had specifically requested that Germany send some
of its force in northern Afghanistan into the south to combat Taliban activity, but the
German government refused this request.
European public opinion on the NATO mission in Afghanistan is complicating
allied efforts to sustain ISAF. The German Marshall Fund poll noted earlier found
that while 64% of those polled support the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, only
30% support combat operations against the Taliban.67
In Stage Four, the United States transferred 10,000 to 12,000 of its own troops
to ISAF, who will serve under the NATO commander U.S. General Dan McNeil.
ISAF now has approximately 47,000 troops.
Congressional Action
A bipartisan consensus continues to support the Afghan mission in the 110th
Congress. The Afghan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327), as amended,
authorizes U.S. aid for reconstruction, military operations, counter-narcotics efforts,
election reform, and human rights assistance. A succession of appropriations bills
has met or exceeded authorization targets.68 In hearings during the first session of the
110th Congress, Administration officials told Members that the United States spends
approximately $2 billion a month in Afghanistan on troops and reconstruction.
65 Interviews with French officials, August 2005-July 2006; Alliot-Marie, op. cit.
Afghanistan supplies an estimated 90% of the heroin that finds its way to France; “Hervé
Morin: ‘La situation...,” op. cit.
66 “NATO Commander Asks Member Nations to Drop Troop Limits,” Mideast Stars and
Stripes, October 25, 2006.
67 Transatlantic Trends, op. cit., p. 17-18.
68 See CRS Report RL33999, Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations, by Pat
Towell, Steve Daggett, and Amy Belasco, continuously updated.

---

CRS-23
During the first session, congressional committees increasingly pressed Secretary
Gates and other officials to provide Congress with a more detailed accounting of
ISAF’s operations, and urged the Administration to persuade the allies to provide a
greater proportion of ISAF’s forces.
Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations bill on December 16, 2007, and
the President signed it into law on December 26 (P.L. 110-161). The law will
provide $70 billion for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other military
operations. The bill also provides $838.4 million for economic reconstruction, of
which $495 million is in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF), primarily to
strengthen regional governance, health care and education, development of the rural
economy, and civilian infrastructure.69
During the second session, more oversight hearings are likely, with particular
attention to troop levels, counter-narcotics programs, progress in the stabilization
effort, and the relative need for more resources for PRTs.
Assessment
The allies have maintained a basic unity of purpose in Afghanistan. Their desire
to stabilize the country to prevent the return of a terrorist state has led to an ongoing
general consensus. Member states that refused to contribute troops to the U.S. effort
to bring order to Iraq are present in Afghanistan. The allies believe that there is a
tangible benefit to ISAF. If ultimately successful, ISAF can help to build a state that
is relatively stable, no longer a source of international terrorism., and one that
attempts to diminish a narcotics trade that is a threat to European societies.
Nevertheless, NATO faces complex issues in its own ranks and on the ground
in Afghanistan that are likely to concern ISAF over the next several years. Although
the allies agree on their overall mission to stabilize the country, they often differ on
the means to reach that objective and on the amount of resources to be made
available.
Although ISAF does not explicitly have a counter-terror mission, it is clear that
contributing governments believe that fighting the Taliban, warlords, and the
narcotics trade can prevent the return of Al Qaeda or radical Islamic groups inimical
to western interests.
NATO leaders have at times had difficulty in persuading allies to contribute
forces to ISAF. Of equal difficulty today is the effort to persuade governments to
contribute the money necessary to rebuild Afghanistan. Some governments have
pledged money but have not yet contributed it. Key allied governments say that they
are committed to staying for a period of years to stabilize the country. Some EU
officials believe that five years or more will be necessary to build a market economy
69 For a detailed description, see CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental
Appropriations for Global War on Terror, Military Operations, International Affairs, and
Other Purposes, by Steve Daggett et al., continually updated.

---

CRS-24
and proficient governance.70 Press reports state that the allies produced a classified
document at the Bucharest summit that lays out a 5-year plan for ISAF to stabilize
the country and turn most combat operations over to the Afghan National Army.71
Afghanistan’s long history without a central government able to extend its reach
over the country’s difficult geographic and political terrain is presenting the allies
with problems rivaling the threat of the Taliban. Political differences within the
alliance over how to manage Afghanistan’s future are apparent in ISAF’s operations.
The allies’ description of PRTs as the “leading edge” of their stabilization effort
masks a divergent reality. Some PRTs are clearly effective, building needed
infrastructure and by most accounts gaining the confidence of local populations.
Others, in the view of some U.S. and European officials, are no more than
showcases, aimed more at demonstrating an ally’s desire to participate in an
important NATO mission than at producing concrete results for the stabilization plan.
In the view of these same officials, NATO may be expecting too much from some of
its new member governments, which, only recently coming out of communism, lack
the experience and the funds to mount an effective reconstruction effort in a distant,
impoverished country.72
The declining fortunes of the Karzai government also present a difficult
obstacle. NATO is attempting both to respect the policies of a nascent representative
government and to urge it forward to better governance. The Karzai government’s
own problems are apparent: discontented warlords, a vigorous drug trade, the
Taliban, and a rudimentary economy and infrastructure. In the view of General
Eikenberry, “The enemy we face is not particularly strong, but the institutions of the
Afghan state remain relatively weak.”73 There is a widespread view that President
Karzai is losing the confidence of the Afghan people; he blames the slow pace of
reconstruction and insufficient financial support from the international community.
General Ed Butler, the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, said in
May 2006: “This year we need to be seen to be making a difference. It is a real
danger that if people do not feel safer, we may lose their consent.” In his view, poor
governance and not the Taliban insurgency is the country’s central problem, a view
widely reflected by other officials from NATO governments.74 NATO, in this view,
must prepare to deal with successive governments of unknown composition and
policies should the Karzai government fail to endure.
NATO’s effort to assist the Karzai government in weakening the narcotics trade
demonstrates the central dilemma of ISAF’s mission. The allies must fight an
insurgency tied to the opium industry with forceful means while at the same time
70 “EU/Afghanistan: Europeans must Prepare for Losses ...,” Atlantic News, July 20, 2006,
p. 2.
71 “Mille soldats français...,” op. cit.
72 Interviews with U.S. and European officials, 2006-2007.
73 House Armed Services Committee, hearing on “Security and Stability in Afghanistan,”
June 28, 2006.
74 “UK Troops ‘Must Beat Back the Taliban this Year,’” Financial Times, May 23, 2006,
p. 7; interviews with U.S. and European officials, 2006-2007.

---

CRS-25
attempt to win the confidence of the Afghan people through reconstruction of the
country. In this view, “breaking down suspected insurgents’ doors in the morning
[makes] it difficult to build bridges in the afternoon.”75 While NATO officials state
publicly that allied forces are not burning poppy fields and are depending instead on
the Afghan army and police to do the job, farmers are well aware that it is ISAF that
supplies the intelligence, training, and logistics enabling government security forces
to attack the industry, the lifeline of many poor Afghans.76
NATO’s training of Afghan officials has made measured progress in some areas,
and very little in others. Although the Karzai government has complained that
NATO is not building a sufficiently large army, most allies believe that substantial
progress has been made in developing a professional and reliable force. Since the
beginning of Stage Three, British, French, and Canadian troops have reportedly given
more and more responsibility to the ANA in joint operations.77 As of February 2008,
the ANA has 38,500 troops of which 21,000 are classed by NATO as capable of
counter-insurgency operations with allied support.78
NATO and the broader international community are now making a more
substantial effort to reform the judicial system and build an effective police force.
Italy has successfully urged donor nations to provide more funding to build a judicial
system and to begin implementation of specific programs using the funds. The EU
has assumed responsibility for training the police, and put professional trainers on the
ground in June 2007, an effort yet to bear significant fruit.
The quality and practices of NATO’s own forces have also come into question
by some U.S. and European officials. It has already been noted that some of NATO’s
newer member states attempt to manage PRTs with troops not yet trained for a
stabilization mission in a dangerous environment. U.S. PRTs lack appropriate
civilian specialists.
Some NATO forces also do not have the appropriate equipment for their tasks.
They may lack night-vision equipment, or the technology necessary to detect roadside
bombs. Some NATO governments send forces inappropriate for the task, forces that
are heavy on support functions but light on combat capability. These governments
tend to be reluctant to send their forces into the field to confront the Taliban and to
control warlords and their militias. The result, in this view, has been that British,
Canadian, Dutch, Danish, French and U.S. forces bear a disproportionate share of the
most dangerous tasks.79
75 “Mission Impossible? Why Stabilising Afghanistan Will Be a Stiff Test for NATO,”
Financial Times, July 31, 2006, p. 9. The quotation is a paraphrase by the Financial Times
of a French official who was reflecting on a similar dilemma for French forces in Algeria
in the 1950s.
76 Interviews with U.S. and British officials, 2005-2007.
77 “Army Woefully Unready, Afghans Say,” Globe and Mail, November 16, 2006, p. A13.
78 “Quarterly report to the U.N....,” op. cit.
79 Ibid.

---

CRS-26
The United States has made an evident effort through its PRTs to engage local
Afghan leaders and the general population to convince them of the worth of ISAF’s
mission. While some progress has clearly been made, several U.S. officials have
noted that Afghanistan is a society where personal contact and developed
relationships are critical in building trust and in persuading Afghans to pursue better
governance. The short rotations of some allied forces impede this effort. Some
allied governments, however, are now sending troops into Afghanistan for two-year
rotations, which provide a better opportunity to gain the confidence of the population.
Cohesiveness of command is another lingering issue. While the allies reached
agreement on a command structure linking ISAF and OEF, some observers believe
that national commands will preserve the authority to make final decisions about use
of their forces. The Dutch parliamentary debate clearly signaled this inclination.
ISAF may be having a residual, positive effect on the militaries of some NATO
members, particularly new member states. U.S. military personnel say that true
reform of new members’ militaries can best take place in the field, under difficult
conditions, and through operations with more experienced NATO militaries. By
several accounts, this experience is being gained in Afghanistan.80
The allies have a consensus that reconstruction is the key to building a viable,
functioning Afghan state. Officials in allied governments repeatedly point to the
need for more road building to extend the reach of Kabul and to provide the
infrastructure to diversify and strengthen the economy of a country lacking the
capacity to develop enduring market practices. General Eikenberry, when asked by
a congressional committee what he needed to build a stable society, responded,
“Would I prefer to have another infantry battalion on the ground of 600 U.S. soldiers
or would I prefer to have $50 million for roads, I’d say ... $50 million for roads.”81
His view has been echoed by calls from the NATO Secretary General for allies and
international institutions to provide more funds for reconstruction.
Prospects
The Afghanistan mission is an important test of NATO’s out-of-area capability.
In a view of growing prevalence, Afghanistan exemplifies conditions in which
“extreme belief systems, ... unstable and intolerant societies, strategic crime and the
globalization of commodities and communications combine to create a multi-
dimensional threat transcending geography, function, and capability.”82
The attacks of September 11, 2001, led the Bush Administration to abandon its
skepticism about nation-building as a task for the United States or for NATO. Today,
80 Interviews with military officers from NATO governments, 2006-2007.
81 House Armed Services Committee, June 28, 2006, op. cit.
82 Julian Lindley-French, “Big World, Big Future, Big NATO,” NATO Review, Winter 2005,
p. 5.

---

CRS-27
the Pentagon gives great attention to training forces for nation-building; other allies
have also embraced stabilization and reconstruction as central to NATO’s mission.
NATO’s exit strategy requires laying the economic foundations and providing
the security for a fledgling government to find a stable political footing that excludes
violence, reduces corruption, and creates a climate conducive to representative
institutions. External factors will affect realization of this exit strategy. Stabilization
of Afghanistan is closely linked to developments in and the intentions of neighboring
Iran and Pakistan, a situation that many in the alliance believe demands a continuing
U.S. presence.83 For these reasons, the allies believe that the success of the mission
will also be a test of the United States’ ability and commitment to lead NATO, even
if they do not always agree with every element of U.S. policy in the country.
U.S. leadership of the alliance appears to be at a key moment. The Bush
Administration has been unable to persuade the allies to play a major role in Iraq.
Among the allies, broader U.S. Middle East policy is widely seen as a failure. U.S.
support for the development of democratic governments is a controversial policy. In
Iraq and the Palestinian Authority, where democratic elections have taken place at
U.S. urging, factions supported by Iran have fared well, enhancing Tehran’s influence
in a region where it was long kept at bay. Strong U.S. support for Israel is another
factor seen in Europe as serving to radicalize Arab populations against western
interests.84 In contrast, the United States and its NATO allies have greater unity of
purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of NATO’s effort to stabilize
Afghanistan and U.S. leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the
alliance and Washington’s ability to shape NATO’s future.
83 Olivier Roy, “Afghanistan: La Difficile Reconstruction d’un État,” Cahiers de Chailliot,
December 2004.
84 “US Policy in the Middle East Unravels,” Financial Times, August 4, 2006, p. 3;
“Washington, en s’alignant sur Israël, a perdu son influence dans la région,” Le Monde, July
20, 2003, p. 3.

---

CRS-28
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan

---