Order Code RL34455
Organizing the U.S. Government
for National Security: Overview of
the Interagency Reform Debates
April 18, 2008
Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat Towell
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security:
Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates
Summary
A growing community of interest, including Members of Congress, senior
officials in the executive branch, and think-tank analysts, is calling for a
reexamination of how well the U.S. government, including both the executive branch
and Congress, is organized to apply all instruments of national power to national
security activities. The organizations and procedures used today to formulate
strategy, support presidential decision-making, plan and execute missions, and
budget for those activities are based on a framework established just after World War
II. That framework was designed to address a very different global strategic context:
a bipolar world with a single peer competitor state, the Soviet Union, which was
driven by an expansionist ideology and backed by a massive military force.
Six decades later, in the wake of 9/11, many observers and practitioners note,
the United States faces greater uncertainty and a broader array of security challenges
than before, including non-state as well as traditional state-based threats, and
transnational challenges such as organized crime, energy security concerns, cyber
attacks, and epidemic disease. The “outdated bureaucratic superstructure” of the 20th
century is an inadequate basis for protecting the nation from 21st century security
challenges, critics contend, and the system itself, or alternatively, some of its key
components, requires revision.
Doubts about the adequacy of the system to meet 21st century security challenges
have been catalyzed by recent operational experiences, including Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and responses to Hurricane Katrina. In the
view of many defense and foreign affairs analysts, these operations revealed deep
flaws in the ability of the U.S. government to make timely decisions, to develop
prioritized strategies and integrated plans, to resource those efforts, and to effectively
coordinate and execute complex missions. Such shortcomings, some argue, have had
a deleterious impact on the success of those missions and on the reputation of the
United States as a reliable partner.
Should these “national security reform” debates continue to gain momentum,
Congress could choose to weigh in by holding hearings to clarify identified problems
and to consider the advantages and risks of proposed solutions; by developing
legislation ranging from a new National Security Act to specific changes in executive
branch organization, authorities, or resourcing; or by considering adjustments in
Congress’s own arrangements for providing holistic oversight of national security
issues.
The purpose of this report, which will be updated as events warrant, is to help
frame the emerging debates by taking note of the leading advocates for change,
highlighting identified shortcomings in key elements of the current system, and
describing categories of emerging proposals for change.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Contours of the Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Terms of the Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Key Proponents of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Executive Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Think-Tank Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Congressional Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Identified Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Executive Branch Key Players: “Civilian Agency Capacity
is Too Limited” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Executive Branch Key Players: “DOD Role is Too Large” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Interagency Coordination and Integration Mechanisms: “Insufficient” . . . . . 8
National Security Decision-Making: “Not Rigorous” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
National Security Strategy-Making: “Insufficient Guidelines” . . . . . . . . . . 11
Resource Distribution within the Executive Branch:
“Resources and Strategy Do Not Match” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congressional Oversight: “Poorly Structured” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Proposed Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Executive Branch Key Players: Adjust the Balance
of Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Interagency Coordination and Integration:
Foster Horizontal Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Interagency Coordination and Integration:
Create a New Coordination Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
National Security Decision-Making: Require Greater Rigor . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
National Security Strategy: Strengthen the Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Resources for National Security: Create a National Security Budget . . . . . 15
Congressional Oversight: Reorganize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
What the Debates Might Be Missing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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Organizing the U.S. Government for
National Security: Overview of the
Interagency Reform Debates
Introduction
A growing community of interest, including Members of Congress, senior
officials in the executive branch, and think-tank analysts, is calling for a
reexamination of how well the U.S. Government, including both the executive
branch and Congress, is organized to apply all instruments of national power to
national security activities. The organizations and procedures used today to
formulate strategy, support presidential decision-making, plan and execute missions,
and budget for those activities are based on a framework established just after World
War II. That framework was designed to address a very different global strategic
context: a bipolar world with a single peer competitor state, the Soviet Union, which
was driven by an expansionist ideology and backed by a massive military force.1
Six decades later, in the wake of 9/11, many observers and practitioners note,
the United States faces greater uncertainty and a broader array of security challenges
than before, including non-state as well as traditional state-based threats, and
transnational challenges such as organized crime, energy security concerns, cyber
attacks, and epidemic disease. The “outdated bureaucratic superstructure”2 of the 20th
century is an inadequate basis for protecting the nation from 21st century security
challenges, critics contend, and the system itself, or alternatively, some of its key
components, requires revision.3
1 With the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 Amendment, Congress explicitly
aimed “to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States,”
including “ ... the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments,
agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.” The legislation
laid the foundation of a new national security regime, including the creation of the National
Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, an
independent Department of the Air Force, and a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff. National
Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-235), as amended in 1949, (P.L. 216) and subsequently,
Section 401.
2 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has used the phrase in a number of contexts, including
at the April 15, 2008, House Armed Services Committee hearing, “Building Partnership
Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process.”
3 In broad terms, the debates could follow the model of the Goldwater-Nichols process of
the 1980s, which led to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986, October 1, 1986 (P.L. 99-433). That landmark legislation ushered in fundamental
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CRS-2
Doubts about the adequacy of the system to meet 21st century security challenges
have been catalyzed by recent operational experiences, including Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and responses to Hurricane Katrina. In the
view of many defense and foreign affairs analysts, these operations revealed deep
flaws in the ability of the U.S. government to make timely decisions, to develop
prioritized strategies and integrated plans, to resource those efforts, and to effectively
coordinate and execute complex missions. Such shortcomings, some argue, have had
a deleterious impact on the success of those missions and on the reputation of the
United States as a reliable partner.
Should these “national security reform” debates continue to gain momentum,
Congress could choose to weigh in by holding hearings to clarify identified problems
and to consider the advantages and risks of proposed solutions; or by developing
legislation ranging from a new National Security Act to specific changes in executive
branch organization, authorities, or resourcing; or by considering adjustments in
Congress’s own arrangements for providing holistic oversight of national security
issues.
The purpose of this report, which will be updated as events warrant, is to help
frame the emerging debates by taking note of the leading advocates for change,
highlighting identified shortcomings in key elements of the current system, and
describing categories of emerging proposals for change.
3 (...continued)
defense reorganization aimed at diminishing inter-Service rivalries and promoting greater
jointness, through streamlining the chain of command, enhancing the military advisory role
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and adjusting personnel policies and the
budgeting process. For an account of that process by a key participant, see James R. Locher
III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon, College
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002. In the current debates, calls for a
“Goldwater-Nichols for the Interagency” typically refer not to the content of the 1986 Act,
but to aspects of the process that produced it: a comprehensive review of current legislation
and approaches; bipartisan leadership of the reform effort; relatively sweeping solutions; the
use of legislation to prompt closer integration.

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CRS-3
Contours of the Debates
Current national security reform debates are still highly inchoate, with some
emerging points of consensus or disagreement, but without clearly defined schools
of thought. They include participants from across the political spectrum, from a wide
variety of leading think-tanks, and from key “national security” agencies.4
Terms of the Debates
The scope of topics addressed in the debates includes the following:
! the distribution of national security roles and responsibilities among
executive branch key players;
! the capacity of individual agencies on the basis of their current
structure, organization, policies, mandates, and institutional culture
to fulfill their national security responsibilities;
! coordination and integration among agencies with national security
responsibilities, for both planning and execution in the field;
! national security decision-making;
! national security strategy-making;
! the distribution of resources to support national security activities;
and
! congressional oversight.
The debates are somewhat unfocused because there is still no clear consensus
about the proper boundaries of “national security” concerns in the 21st century global
security context.5 Some observers, pointing to the vulnerability of U.S. territory to
terrorist attacks, argue that “homeland security” should be considered an integral part
of national security. Other observers, stressing that international partnerships are key
to security, include the full array of foreign affairs activities under the “national
security rubric.” Some observers emphasize that energy security and economic
prosperity are essential to the nation’s security and should therefore be considered
“national security” concerns. Still others use the term “national security” in a more
narrow sense.
4 In recent years, students at continuing education programs for government officials, such
as DOD’s senior service schools, have made substantial contributions to the debates, often
drawing on their personal operational experiences. See, for example, Martin J. Gorman and
Alexander Krongard, “A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government:
Institutionalizing the Interagency Process,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 39 (October 2005),
pp. 51-58. The authors are a Department of Defense civilian and U.S. Navy officer, who
wrote during their year at the National War College.
5 National Security Presidential Directive-1 (see below)defines the term “national security”
this way: “National security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection
of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests
around the globe. National security also depends on America’s opportunity to prosper in
the world economy.” See President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential
Directive-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” February 15, 2001.

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CRS-4
Another point of confusion is that critics of the current system use different
starting points for their analysis. Some take a top-down approach, focused on
optimizing the national security regime at the systemic level, while others begin with
a specific issue — such as foreign assistance, stabilization and reconstruction, or
counter-terrorism — and discuss systemic-level reform as it relates to that topic.6
Arguments vary concerning how sweeping national security reform ought to be.
It seems reasonable to suppose the existence of a constituency for the status quo —
that is, observers and practitioners who prefer the current regime to proposed reforms
— but those voices have not yet joined the debates.
Key Proponents of Change
Several major players and organizations are spearheading the debates by calling
for fundamental change.
Executive Branch. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has emerged as one
of the leading proponents for national security reform, reflecting a long-standing
view of some Pentagon officials that the Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet
the nation’s security challenges alone. At the April 15, 2008, House Armed Services
Committee hearing, Secretary Gates urged thinking “... about how to restructure the
national security apparatus of this government for the long term.”7 At the same
6 For example, Phase II of the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” project, based at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), specifically addressed interagency-level reforms,
including shortcomings and proposals for policymaking and execution, as part of a four-
phase project on defense reform broadly defined. See Clark Murdock and Michele
Flournoy, lead investigators, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense
Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 2005. In turn, a CSIS study addressing foreign assistance derived some
systemic-level recommendations from its primary focus on three specific areas: counter-
terrorism, post-conflict operations, and humanitarian assistance. See J. Stephen Morrison
and Kathleen Hicks, project directors, “Integrating 21st Century Development and Security
Assistance: Final Report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, January 2008. And the CSIS Commission on Smart
Power noted the importance of some systemic-level reforms without offering detailed
recommendations, while focusing on problems and proposals in five specific issue areas:
international partnerships, global development, public diplomacy, economic integration, and
climate change and energy security. See Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., co-
chairs, “A Smarter, More Secure America,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
November 2007.
7 House Armed Services Committee hearing transcript, “Building Partnership Capacity and
Development of the Interagency Process,” April 15, 2008. Secretary Gates also posed the
question: “How can we improve and integrate America’s instruments of national power to
reflect the new realities and requirements of this century?” His testimony built on the
themes of his November 2007 “Landon Lecture,” where he raised the possibility of a new
National Security Act and remarked: “... if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the
world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of
national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and
apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.” See
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CRS-5
hearing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice concurred that the “... challenges of the
21st century require both change within individual departments of our national
security apparatus, and better and stronger means for interagency action and
coordination.”
Think-Tank Efforts. In recent years, a wide variety of think-tanks have put
forward proposals to reform part or all of the current national security system. The
most comprehensive current effort is the Project on National Security Reform
(PNSR), led by James Locher III, who, as a Senate Armed Services Committee
staffer in the 1980s, directed the development of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.8
PNSR, self-consciously modeled on Goldwater-Nichols in the scope of its ambition,
aims at “improving the U.S. government’s ability to effectively provide for the
nation’s security in the 21st century” and, more explicitly, at helping craft a new
National Security Act.9 PNSR brings together, on its Governing Board and among
its researchers, most of the institutional and individual “thought leaders” on national
security reform in the Washington policy community, as well as representation across
the political spectrum.
Congressional Actors. Whereas committees tend to frame questions in
terms reflecting their areas of jurisdiction, committees of jurisdiction for both the
Department of State and the Department of Defense are exploring holistic national
security reform initiatives.
In spring 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is conducting a series
of hearings broadly addressing the integration of military and non-military
components of national power. In a March 5, 2008, hearing, Committee Chairman
Joseph Biden explicitly stated an interest in coming up with a “2009 National
Security Act.”10
7 (...continued)
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Landon Lecture, Manhattan Kansas, November 26,
2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199].
8 The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986; P.L. 110-181) authorized
the Secretary of Defense to contract with an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit
organization for up to $3 million to conduct a study of the national security interagency
process. The provision requires that the report be completed by September 1, 2008.
Pursuant to that authorization, such a contract was awarded on February 22, 2008, to PNSR.
The project also has received grants and pro bono support from several private firms and
think-tanks.
9 See the PNSR website at [http://www.pnsr.org].
10 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Strengthening National Security through Smart
Power — a Military Perspective,” March 5, 2008, with General Anthony Zinni and Admiral
Leighton Smith Jr. Senator Lugar described the focus as “how we can improve our
diplomatic and foreign assistance capabilities and integrate them more effectively with the
military components of national power.” The concept of “smart power” refers to an
integration of traditional hard power (the use of military and economic carrots and sticks to
achieve desired ends) with soft power (“the ability to attract people to our side without
coercion”). The concept is drawn from the study, CSIS Commission on Smart Power,
(continued...)

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CRS-6
In March 2008, the House Armed Services Committee’s (HASC) Panel on
Roles and Missions released the final report of its work. The Panel’s Report, on
protecting American security, included interagency coordination as one of three
primary lines of inquiry and invited fellow Members and citizens “to join us in
rethinking national security.”11
On April 15, 2008, the full HASC continued the dialogue by holding a hearing
addressing the Interagency process. There, Ranking Member Duncan Hunter called
for an “updated national security architecture that is adapted to the full range of 21st
century challenges.”12 On April 17, 2008, following a series of hearings on
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the HASC Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation issued a study of interagency coordination mechanisms based on PRT
“lessons learned.”13
Identified Problems
The “national security system” is a descriptive term, rather than a legal one, and
includes individuals, organizations, structures, and processes. In practice, key
elements include executive branch agencies, formal and informal mechanisms for
coordinating and integrating national security planning and execution among those
agencies, the process for supporting presidential decision-making, guidance from
national security strategy, resource distribution within the executive branch, and
congressional oversight.
Different debate participants, reviewing these elements, describe the “problem”
— and thus the rationale for change — in different ways. In some cases, this is
because they disagree about the “diagnosis.” In others, it is because they focus on
different elements of the system, and in still others, it is because they use different
arguments to point to the same underlying concerns. An unfortunate tendency
throughout the debates is to identify “what’s wrong” primarily in terms of a proposed
“fix”, rather than explaining why a given arrangement is non-optimal. This section
reviews major “problems” identified with each of the key elements of the system.
10 (...continued)
Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, Jr., Co-Chairs, “A Smarter, More Secure America,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007.
11 See House Armed Services Committee, Panel on Roles and Missions, “Initial
Perspectives,” January 2008, p. 7.
12 See hearing transcript, House Armed Services Committee, “Building Partnership Capacity
and Development of the Interagency Process,” April 15, 2008.
13 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation,
“Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008.

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CRS-7
Executive Branch Key Players:
“Civilian Agency Capacity is Too Limited”
National security “key players” within the executive branch include both
agencies and sub-agencies, and their relative weight varies over time in accordance
with the specific issue in question, the global context, and presidential direction.
Key players include, for example, those agencies represented on the National
Security Council and Homeland Security Council. The current National Security
Council includes the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy as statutory members;
the Secretary of the Treasury; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Director of National Intelligence in advisory capacities.14 The current Homeland
Security Council includes the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Treasury, Defense,
Health and Human Services, and Transportation, as well as the Directors of National
Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.15
Some activities of many other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID)16 and the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and Agriculture, also have a bearing on national security. “Key players” also include
agencies’ representatives serving around the world, such as members of country
teams at U.S. embassies, and staff of, or liaisons to, military Combatant Commands
and task forces.
Many debate participants argue that civilian agencies do not have sufficient
capacity, or the necessary capabilities, to support their national security roles and
responsibilities. This is due in part to an overall growth in requirements for civilian
engagement — for the flexible use of soft power — in the post-9/11, globalized
world.
Civilian agencies, it is argued, are under-resourced, under-staffed, non-optimally
organized and trained, and/or lack the necessary expeditionary institutional culture.
For example, civilian agencies were not prepared to quickly deploy large numbers of
personnel to carry out reconstruction work in the immediate aftermath of major
combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Debate participants focus primarily on the
Department of State and USAID, but also refer to other agencies, such as Justice and
Treasury, that might play roles in complex contingencies.
14 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140), Section 932,
December 19, 2007, amended the National Security Act of 1947 to include the Secretary of
Energy as a statutory member of the National Security Council. The NSC website does not
yet reflect this change.
15 The Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the
office of the Director of National Intelligence were created in the wake of 9/11. The
creation of DHS, which became operational in 2003, consolidated 22 different agencies. See
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, November 25, 2002 (P.L. 107-296), and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, December 17, 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
16 Since 2006, the Administrator of USAID has served concurrently as the Director of U.S.
Foreign Assistance at the Department of State.

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CRS-8
“Limited civilian capacity” is a problem primarily, it is argued, because it may
leave unmet important requirements that support U.S. national security goals.
Alternatively, missions for which civilian agencies would be best qualified are passed
to other entities that are available but less qualified, such as DOD, or to contractors.
Some debate participants, particularly in the defense community, argue that using
DOD as the default solution places additional stress on already stretched forces and
reduces their ability to train and prepare for other requirements.17 Some of the
sharpest critiques have come from deployed U.S. Commanders who have wondered,
“Where is the State Department?”18
Executive Branch Key Players: “DOD Role is Too Large”
Other critics of the current balance of roles and responsibilities among executive
branch key players identify the same problem from a different angle, arguing that
DOD has assumed too large a role in various foreign affairs activities such as
economic reconstruction, the training of foreign police forces, and humanitarian
assistance. Some of the sharpest critiques in this category suggest that DOD is
“encroaching” on the purview of civilian agencies, in terms of both the role it is
playing in the field and the share of resources it is receiving to execute those
missions.
Some of these observers argue that an expanded DOD role is a problem
primarily because DOD personnel do not have the expertise for many foreign
assistance missions, and that therefore, their efforts in such areas may do more harm
than good. Others stress that a U.S. military lead role on the ground may send the
wrong messages to international partner states and organizations. Still others stress
that, even when DOD’s stop-gap efforts successfully meet short-term needs, this
problem-solving reduces the impetus in Washington for more adequately resourcing
and preparing civilian agencies to do the job.
Interagency Coordination and
Integration Mechanisms: “Insufficient”
In general, interagency coordination for planning and executing national security
activities is based on an array of formal mechanisms and informal practices. Factors
that may affect the effectiveness of any of these methods include the authorities of
the coordinating bodies or individuals, the resources they control, and the access they
enjoy to top decision-makers.
17 For an institutional view, see General Richard Cody, Statement for the Record, House
Armed Services Committee, April 10, 2008, which notes: “Today’s Army is out of balance.
The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply
and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.” How broadly to
define the range of missions for which U.S. should prepare, and whether to dedicate forces
to non-traditional missions, are current topics of debate within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Services. See, for example, CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need
a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress, by
Andrew Feickert.
18 Information from U.S. Commanders, Multi-National Force-Iraq, January 2008.

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In some cases, responsibility for coordination, or oversight of implementation,
is assigned to the White House staff. One current example is the role of the Assistant
to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan,
currently filled by U.S. Army Lieutenant General Doug Lute, who is responsible for
coordinating executive branch efforts in these two major complex operations.
Another example is the U.S.A. Freedom Corps, whose leadership Council, like the
NSC, includes cabinet members. The Director of the Freedom Corps serves as
Deputy Administrator to the President and is responsible, from that White House
office, for coordinating input from all participating agencies and overseeing
implementation of Freedom Corps initiatives.19
In other cases, responsibility is assigned to a “lead agency,” a flexible concept
that refers to giving a single department or agency the responsibility, in a given issue
area, for coordinating efforts by multiple agencies. A “lead agency” may be
permanent or temporary, and it may or may not be authorized to give direction to
other agencies. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, the Department of
Defense served temporarily as the assigned “lead agency.” At the Department of
State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has
been assigned a permanent “lead agency” role in coordinating planning and execution
for complex contingencies.20
In other cases, to provide coordination among agencies, an “extra-agency” body
is created, whose personnel are drawn from all key concerned agencies. The National
Counter-Terrorism Center follows this model by bringing together experts from
various departments and agencies to integrate and analyze counter-terrorism-related
intelligence and to conduct joint planning.21
In practice, interagency coordination mechanisms often develop more quickly
in the field, driven by operational exigencies. Country teams at U.S. embassies
around the world, under the authority of the Chief of Mission (Ambassador), are the
long-standing model.22 Key recent organizational initiatives include the civil-military
19 See President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13254, January 29, 2002, “Establishing
the USA Freedom Corps,” Federal Register, vol. 67, February 1, 2002, pp. 4869-4871.
20 See National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, “Management of Interagency
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” December 7, 2005, which describes
the “lead agency” responsibilities of the State Department to lead and coordinate
reconstruction and stabilization efforts, as well as the support responsibilities of other
departments and agencies.
21 The NCTC was created by Executive Order 13354, August 27, 2004, and further codified
by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, December 17, 2004
(P.L. 108-458). According to the 2004 Act, Section 1021, the Director of the NCTC reports
directly to the President on joint counterterrorism operations, and to the Director of National
Intelligence on the activities of its Directorate of Intelligence, and on budgetary and
programmatic issues.
22 See National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD-38), “Staffing at Diplomatic
Missions and Their Overseas Posts,” June 2, 1982, which confirmed certain authorities of
chiefs of mission over personnel assigned from other agencies to serve on their country
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Provincial Reconstructions Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan; Joint Interagency
Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at Combatant Commands, which include
representatives of civilian agencies in advisory roles; and U.S. Africa Command, a
DOD combatant command in which representatives of civilian agencies hold formal
staff positions.23
Many debate participants argue that agencies do not coordinate sufficiently, in
Washington or the field, on planning or execution of national security activities. This
is a problem, it is argued, for many reasons: it can leave gaps in planning undetected;
it can lead to wasted resources, duplication of effort, or even working at cross
purposes; it can send conflicting messages to partner states; it can inadvertently
demonstrate a lack of national unity; and most of all, it can lead to failures in
execution.
National Security Decision-Making: “Not Rigorous”
The National Security Council system, established by the National Security Act
of 1947, was designed in part to support presidential decision-making on national
security issues.24 It is the system by which designated leaders of executive branch
agencies and presidential advisors review, clarify, and prepare specific issues for
presidential decisions. As a rule, how that decision-support function works in
practice depends on the discretion of each President.25
For example, President Eisenhower, perhaps drawing on his military
background, established a relatively formal NSC system, including a Planning Board,
composed of senior officials, to thoroughly review each issue prior to consideration
by the National Security Council itself, and an Operations Coordinating Board to
22 (...continued)
teams.
23 For further information, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic
Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
24 The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-235), as amended in 1949, (P.L. 216). Section
402(a) notes: “The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to
the integration of domestic, foreign and military polices relating to the national security so
as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”
25 See CRS Report RL30840, The National Security Council: An Organizational
Assessment, by Richard Best. For an overview of NSC arrangements over time, including
primary source documents, see Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, Fateful Decisions:
Inside the National Security Council, New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2004.
Citing the Tower Commission report, the authors note: “There is no magic formula which
can be applied to the NSC structure and process to produce an optimal system ... it must
adapt to each individual President’s style and management philosophy.” The Tower
Commission was established in 1986 to review the Iran-Contra affair, and it issued
recommendations for NSC staff reform. See John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent
Scowcroft, The Tower Commission Report, New York: Random House, 1987.

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oversee implementation.26 His immediate successor, President Kennedy, responding
in part to critiques that the Eisenhower system had been too rigid, began his
administration by abolishing the Operations Board and adopting a less formal
approach.27
The current decision-making system is based on National Security Presidential
Directive-1, which established a system of Policy Coordination Committees, a
Deputies’ Committee, and a Principals’ Committee, composed, respectively, of
departmental Assistant Secretaries or other senior officials, Deputy Secretaries, and
Secretaries. At each level, the interagency body considers issues of cross-cutting
concern, weighs options, and makes recommendations to the next higher level, in
order to tee up well-considered issues for decision by the President.28 That basic
structure, with slightly different terminology, has remained relatively consistent since
the first Bush Administration.29
A number of observers comment that the current U.S. national security
decision-making process — the “NSC process” — is insufficiently rigorous. “Rigor”
may refer, for example, to the timeliness of information- and proposal-sharing among
agencies before committee meetings or to the demonstrated ability of the process to
highlight all important sides of an issue. By failing to ensure what Ambassador
James Dobbins has called a “disciplined, adversarial debate,” it is argued, the system
may not fully and effectively take account of input from key advisors. In addition,
important logical gaps may go undetected or unquestioned.
National Security Strategy-Making: “Insufficient Guidelines”
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act required the President to submit an annual
“comprehensive written report on the national security strategy of the United States.”
That statement is to include a “comprehensive discussion of the vital interests, goals
and objectives of the United States throughout the world,” the capabilities needed to
implement the strategy, the proposed uses of political, economic, military and other
elements of national power; and a discussion of the adequacy of available
26 See President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Executive Order 10483, September 2, 1953.
27 Kennedy’s changes were prompted in part by the “Jackson Subcommittee” report that
criticized the Eisenhower system as overly bureaucratic. See “Organizing for National
Security,” Staff Reports and Recommendations, Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, December 12, 1960.
28 President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-1 (“NSPD-1”),
“Organization of the National Security Council System,” February 15, 2001. In NSPD-1,
President Bush describes the purpose of the NSC this way: “The NSC shall advise and assist
me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States —
domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National
Economic Council (NEC). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate
executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of
those national security policies.” See also Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1,
October 29, 2001, on the organization and function of the Homeland Security Council.
29 See President George H. W. Bush, National Security Directive-1, and President William
Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive-1.

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capabilities.30 Each strategy is thus intended to provide guidance for carrying out
national security activities. In practice, strategies have been submitted periodically
but not always annually.31
Some critics point out that, as a rule, National Security Strategies crafted under
this mandate describe, but do not prioritize, national security challenges and goals,
and they do not describe how the various instruments of national power are to be
applied and integrated to achieve each of those goals.32 The problem, it is argued, is
that individual agencies, in developing their own strategies, doctrines, and
requirements, receive too little guidance about balancing their own capabilities with
those of other agencies.
Resource Distribution within the Executive Branch:
“Resources and Strategy Do Not Match”
The categories of the President’s annual budget request to Congress are based
on agencies, such as the Departments of State and Defense, rather than on functional
areas, such as “national security” or “foreign assistance.” Each agency prepares its
own portion of the budget request, on the basis of a working topline provided by the
Office of Management and Budget.33
Some debate participants stress that within the executive branch, insufficient
efforts are made to match strategy to resources. In the development of the President’s
budget request, there is no regular forum to rigorously debate which resources, or
which combinations of resources, to apply to holistic efforts like “national security”
that involve multiple agencies. The problem, it is argued, is that, absent clearly
articulated national priorities or rigorous systemic-level debate, the President’s
budget requests tend to reflect individual agency equities and concerns.34
30 See the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October
1, 1986 (P.L. 99-433), Section 603.
31 The current Bush Administration issued The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America in September 2002, and a document with the same title in March 2006.
32 A singular historical contrast was NSC-68, “United States Objectives and Programs for
National Security,” a (now de-classified) top secret document produced by President
Eisenhower’s National Security Council on April 14, 1950. NSC-68 described in detail the
(Cold War) strategic context, noted the intentions and capabilities of both the United States
and the Soviet Union, and provided possible courses of action together with assessments.
33 For background, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, by
Robert Keith.
34 For a critique of U.S. government budgeting and resource planning for national security,
including proposed reforms, see (forthcoming) Gordon Adams, Buying National Security:
How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home, New York: Routledge
Press, September 2008.

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Congressional Oversight: “Poorly Structured”
In general, Congress’s oversight role includes reviewing, monitoring, and
supervising the implementation of public policy.35 That role includes, for example,
conducting the budget, authorization, and appropriations processes; ensuring that
execution by the executive branch matches legislative intent; evaluating program
performance; and specifying the organization, functions, and authorities of federal
agencies.
Most oversight is carried out through Congress’s committee structure, including
Appropriations Subcommittee review of fiscal matters and standing and select
committee review of activities in their areas of jurisdiction; these portfolios roughly
correspond to those of key national security departments.
Some debate participants argue that these congressional oversight mechanisms
are poorly designed for holistic consideration of issues such as national security that
involve multiple agencies. Budget requests are considered by agency, rather than
functional area. Although full Appropriations Committees arguably take a
“systemic” view when they divide the budget among their subcommittees, they do
not have the time or ability, it is argued, for detailed consideration of possible areas
of overlap or of tradespace among the elements of national power.
In turn, ongoing oversight mechanisms by standing committees do not provide,
it is argued, any regular forum for systemic-level consideration of cross-departmental
challenges and possible solutions. Joint hearings, and some overlap in committee
membership, may provide some limited cross-fertilization.
This arrangement is a problem, it is argued, because it gives agencies an
incentive to demonstrate fulfillment of their individual mandates, but it does not
necessarily reward contributions to systemic-level efforts. Further, the arrangement
does not foster development of systemic-level expertise on the Hill, like the ability,
for example, to weigh the use of hard and soft power to achieve national objectives.
Proposed Reforms
The current debates, informed by a wealth of large-scale studies and individual
assessments, include a broad array of specific proposals for change. Many but not all
are theoretically mutually compatible. These proposals tend to be presented as
laundry lists, rather than as carefully crafted strategies including timing and
sequencing of proposed reform measures, together with their likely ramifications.
This section highlights proposals for adjusting the major elements of the national
security system.
35 For a comprehensive overview, see CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight
Manual, by Frederick Kaiser, Walter Oleszek, T.J. Halstead, Morton Rosenberg, and Todd
B. Tatelman.

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Executive Branch Key Players: Adjust the Balance
of Roles and Responsibilities
A number of participants in the national security reform debates urge adjusting
the balance of roles and responsibilities among executive branch agencies. This
group of observers includes those concerned that DOD is doing “too much” and those
worried that the Department of State (DOS) is doing “too little.” It is frequently
noted, for example, that for foreign affairs activities, DOS has most of the authorities
while DOD has most of the resources; adjustments could target either of those
categories.
Interagency Coordination and Integration:
Foster Horizontal Integration
Other debate participants focus on improving “horizontal integration” among
executive branch agencies as a means to improve coordination in planning and
execution. This emphasis is distinct from, but theoretically mutually compatible
with, calls to adjust the division of labor among agencies.
Some proposals follow the Goldwater-Nichols emphasis on human capital.
These include calls for greater opportunities for interagency shared training,
exercising, and education, as well as enhanced exchange programs supporting tours
of duty in other agencies. Proponents of such approaches usually note that they
would likely require personnel policy adjustments, ensuring, for example, that such
interagency service figures positively in promotion criteria and creating a sufficient
personnel “float” in civilian agencies to backfill posts.
Other proposals seek to adjust and synchronize U.S. government agency
representation in the field. These include, for example, giving greater authority to
Chiefs of Mission to coordinate or direct representatives of other agencies serving in
their country teams; aligning the definitions of geographical regions of the world
used by various U.S. government agencies; creating and empowering “regional
ambassadors”, with areas of responsibility corresponding to those of military
combatant commands; or strengthening the representation of civilian agencies at
regional combatant commands.
Interagency Coordination and Integration:
Create a New Coordination Body
To foster stronger coordination of national security efforts, a number of debate
participants have proposed creating a new coordinator post. One school of thought
advocates giving the role to the White House, creating, for example, a Deputy
Assistant to the President or NSC Senior Director post with responsibility for
interagency coordination of “national security operations.” Another school of
thought proposes creating a Cabinet-level position and new agency, with direct
control of some resources, for national security efforts.

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National Security Decision-Making: Require Greater Rigor
Although many observers note that the national security decision-making
process is imperfect, most add that its dynamics depend greatly on presidential
discretion and the personalities of key participants. Some observers propose that the
Senate confirmation process could pay more attention to how a prospective
Department Secretary would play his or her role as a member of the NSC. Others
propose that the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
be subject to Senate confirmation.
National Security Strategy: Strengthen the Guidance
Some observers, emphasizing that national security guidance is key to effective
national security efforts, call for the preparation of more focused National Security
Strategies, including clear priorities and timelines. Some suggest that the White
House should also coordinate and produce national security planning guidance —
that is, instructions to all relevant agencies concerning the development of plans and
capabilities to implement the strategy, including clarification of the roles and
responsibilities of each agency.
Resources for National Security: Create a National Security
Budget
To foster holistic consideration of national security challenges and solutions, a
number of debate participants propose instituting a “national security” budget
request, as a separate section of the President’s budget request to Congress.
Congressional Oversight: Reorganize
Some debate participants suggest the establishment of House and Senate Select
Committees on National Security. Such committees could play a role in considering
budget requests related to national security (whether or not submitted as a discrete
request) and could take a holistic approach to national security challenges.
Other participants have suggested appointing some Members to serve on
committees of jurisdiction for multiple key national security agencies, such as Armed
Services and Foreign Relations/Affairs, to provide some over-arching visibility.
What the Debates Might Be Missing
To help sharpen and focus the emerging, multi-faceted debates about national
security reform, the following areas may merit further exploration.
As a rule, reform proposals are based, usually explicitly, on some assumptions
about the global security context, including for how long those identified conditions
are likely to persist. In theory, there might be some advantages in orienting a
“national security system” toward the major challenges of its day, just as the National
Security Act of 1947 was designed for the post-WWII Cold War world. On the other

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hand, there might be different advantages in building some flexibility into the system,
to allow for both unexpected events and change over time.
Most national security reform proposals to date list specific initiatives but do not
bring them together in a single plan of action. For example, most proposals do not
prioritize their recommendations, and most do not propose a sequence for the
introduction of changes. Most do not spell out what might be accomplished through
presidential directive alone, versus what might require congressional action.
Almost entirely missing from the debates, to this point, are counter-arguments
about the strengths of the status quo. The nature of such arguments, and the strength
of various constituencies in favor of the status quo, is not yet clear.
Even small-scale or incremental change would affect some current ways of
doing business. It might be useful to consider the possible risks and unintended
consequences of various change proposals, such as whether they might negatively
affect some current processes and efforts that appear to be working effectively.

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