Order Code RS21922
Updated April 10, 2008
Afghanistan: Government Formation
and Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Post-Taliban Afghanistan has adopted a constitution and elected a president and a
parliament; that body is emerging as a significant force and sometimes challenger to
President Hamid Karzai. The central government’s limited writ, which many Afghans
believe should remain limited, and its perceived corruption, are helping sustain a
Taliban insurgency. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Post-Conflict Political Transition and Political Landscape
For the first time, Afghanistan has a fully elected government, although there were
parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969).
Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were
part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored
agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001,
(“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The subsequent political transition
process is described in the table at the end of this paper.
U.S. policy has been to support and extend the authority of Afghanistan’s President
Karzai and his central government, predicated on the assumption that it is a lack of
governance in the rural areas that cause instability and a turn by the population to the
ousted Taliban as a source of stability and justice. However, many observers believe that
Afghanistan has always been most stable when it has a weak central government and
allows substantial local autonomy. At the same time, the Afghan parliament integrates all
the various ethnicities and sects into governance, and they often express local and
parochial preferences as parliamentary opposition to Karzai. In an attempt to stabilize
Afghanistan, the NATO-led peacekeeping coalition there, of which the United States is
a major part, sometimes seeks to experiment with local security solutions that might
1 For text, see [http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm].

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weaken central government authority or cause unrest among Afghanistan’s minorities who
are wary of further consolidating the dominance of ethnic Pashtuns in governance.

As expected by the structure of the election system, many seats in parliament,
particularly the elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga) are held by personalities and factions
prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars. The lower house appears to be divided into pro-
Karzai, opposition and “independent” deputies. Karzai has decided against forming a
party, but his support base in the Wolesi Jirga includes about 40 former members of the
Hizb-e-Islam party of anti-U.S. former mujahedin leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar;
supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (Kabul Province), a prominent Islamic
conservative mujahedin party leader who was defeated for the speakership; several Karzai
clan members including elder brother Qayyum and cousin Jamil Karzai (both from
Qandahar Province) and relative by marriage, Aref Nurzai. His supporters also include
several former militia and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province),
who had gained fame for directing the Afghan component of the assault on the Al Qaeda
redoubt at Tora Bora during the U.S.-led war; Pacha Khan Zadran, from Paktia Province
who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; and Mullah Abdul
Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol Province. Another pro-Karzai parliamentarian,
Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, ran Bamiyan Province during the Taliban’s destruction
of the large Buddha statues there in March 2001; he was assassinated on January 27,
2007. The Taliban-era Foreign Minister, Wakil Mutawwakil, ran but was not elected, nor
was Taliban-era behavior enforcer, Maulvi Qalamuddin.
The “opposition,” led by ethnic minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) of the
“Northern Alliance,” has shown strength, but it is increasingly frustrated at its failure thus
far to compel him to share power.2 Led by Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni and
former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, both prominent Northern Alliance
figures, the opposition formed a new party in April 2007, called the “National Front.” In
this bloc are not only Northern Alliance adherents, but also both of Karzai’s vice
presidents; and some Pashtun ex-Communist leaders such as the feared Soviet-era Interior
Minister, Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi (Khost Province); and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, an ex-
Communist military leader who now chairs parliament’s defense committee. The National
Front advocates amending the constitution to give more power to parliament and election
of governors and mayors by the elected provincial councils. Fearing growing Pashtun
domination in governance, the bloc opposes Karzai’s repeated offers of negotiations with
Taliban members, while at the same time itself reportedly negotiating with some Taliban
commanders.

The opposition first showed its strength in March 2006, following the December 19,
2005 inauguration of parliament, by requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be approved
individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage over the nominations.
However, Karzai rallied his followers and all but 5 of his 25 nominees were confirmed.
(Three were declared confirmed after receiving plurality votes.) All five replacement
nominees were approved on August 7, 2006, including for Minister of Women’s Affairs
Husn Banu Ghazanfar, a male professor at Kabul University. However, the defeat of a
female nominee for that job left the cabinet with no women. In May 2006, the opposition
compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial body,
2 CRS conversation with former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah. January 25, 2008.

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including to not reappoint the 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as
chief justice. Parliament approved his new choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained
in modern jurisprudence.
In May 2007, the National Front achieved a majority in parliament to oust Karzai ally
Rangin Spanta as Foreign Minister. However, Karzai refused to replace him, instead
seeking a Supreme Court ruling that Spanta should remain, on the grounds that his ouster
was related to a refugee issue (Iran’s expulsion of 100,000 Afghan refugees back to
Afghanistan), not a foreign policy issue. The Court has, to date, supported Karzai, and
some National Front members continue to threaten to boycott parliament. Karzai did not
block the simultaneous removal of Minister for Refugee Affairs Akbar Akbar. On
November 27, 2007 Qanooni led an opposition “walkout” of parliament, accusing Karzai
of ignoring a parliamentary vote to suspend officials in Baghlan Province for allegedly
failing to fully investigate the November 6 suicide bombing in the province that killed 6
parliamentarians and more than 60 others, mostly children. An internal U.N. report said
that jittery guards may have caused some of the deaths.
On less contentious issues, the executive and the legislature appear to be working
well. Since the end of 2007, the Wolesi Jirga has passed and forwarded to the Meshrano
Jirga several laws, including a labor law, a mines law, a law on economic cooperatives,
and a convention on tobacco control. The Wolesi Jirga also has recently confirmed Karzai
nominees for a new Minster of Refugee Affairs, head of the Central Bank, and the final
justice to fill out the Supreme Court.
Recently, a prominent member of the National Front, Uzbek leader Abdurrashid
Dostam, has embarrassed the bloc. Dostam is often referred to as a “warlord” because of
his command of forces and partisans in his largely Uzbek redoubt in northern Afghanistan
(Jowzjan and parts of Balkh Province), and he is widely accused of human rights abuses
of poltical opponents in the north. To take him away from his militia, in 2005 Karzai
appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces, requiring him to reside in
Kabul. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa n response to
reports that his followers attacked and beat an ethnic Turkmen rival; Dostam was not
arrested but Afghans say Karzai continues to contemplate seeking his arrest. Another
prominent Tajik political leader is former Herat governor Ismail Khan, who Karzai has
curbed by appointing him Minister of Energy and Water; he visited Washington, D.C. in
early March 2008 to sign agreements with USAID on funding for new energy projects in
Afghanistan. Karzai is reportedly in talks with former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah, a Qanooni ally, about rejoining the cabinet.

Karzai and the National Front often battle for the support of the many “independent”
deputies in the Wolesi Jirga. Among them are several outspoken women and intellectuals,
including 32-year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), an outspoken women’s rights
advocate and leading critic of major faction leaders. In May 2007 parliament voted to
suspend her for this criticism, for the duration of her term, but she is pursuing the issue
through the courts. Others are Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai,
editor of Woman Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai
minister who champions parliamentary powers. The U.S.-based International Republican
Institute (IRI) is working to organize and train the estimated 93 independents; the
National Democratic Institute (NDI) is assisting the major factions discussed earlier.
Some traditionalists in parliament oppose the independents.

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Karzai has fewer critics in the Meshrano Jirga because of his bloc of 34
appointments. However, this body is also considered more conservative. Karzai
engineered the appointment of an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, as Speaker of that body.
Mojadeddi is a noted Islamic scholar who headed the post-Communist mujahedin
government for one month (May 1992) and who now heads the effort to reconcile with
Taliban figures. The deputy speaker is Hamid Gaylani, member of a pro-Karzai family
with five members in parliament. Karzai also appointed Northern Alliance military leader
Muhammad Fahim, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister, although
Fahim resigned after only a few months and later joined the National Front. Other Karzai
appointments included former Taliban religious affairs deputy minister Arsala Rahmani.
There is one Hindu. There are 23 women in this body; 17 Karzai appointees and 6
selected in their own right. This body has been vocal; in May 2007, after a spate of
civilian casualties caused by U.S. combat, it passed a resolution calling for international
forces to coordinate operations with Afghan authorities. However, international human
rights organizations criticized the Meshrano Jirga on February 3, 2008 for issuing a
statement of support for a death sentence against 23 year old journalist Sayed Kambaksh
for allegedly distributing material critical of Islam; the upper house subsequently retracted
the statement. Kambaksh apparently has several levels of appeal remaining, and Karzai
is reportedly mulling a pardon if the sentence is upheld.
Both houses of parliament, are assisted by a staff of about 275 Afghans, reporting
to a “secretariat.” Staff was hired a year before parliament convened, limiting factional
influence, and it and the members received training from the U.N. Development Program
and the State University of New York (SUNY) under an $8 million USAID contract.
There are 18 oversight committees, each with two staffers. There is a small research group
and library. The parliament’s budget is controlled by the Ministry of Finance.
Government Performance3
U.S. policy has been to help build Afghan institutions based on merit and technical
competence, and not party or factional loyalties. Observers report that Afghan ministries
are increasingly capable and equipped with administrative technology. However, U.S.
officials have refrained from criticizing Karzai when, in the interests of political harmony,
he has indulged faction leaders with appointments and tolerated corruption. A National
Security Council review of Afghanistan policy (reported by the Washington Post on
November 25, 2007) reportedly concluded that, partly as a result of these compromises,
building government capacity is proceeding slower than hoped, contributing to the
resilience of the Taliban insurgency and to the failure to make progress on drug
trafficking. On the other hand, Karzai has kept his government together without major
violence against faction leaders (other than the Taliban) or all-out rifts. Some of these
arguments are noted in recent research reports on Afghanistan, including a January 30,
2008 report by the a study group, chaired by Gen. James Jones and Ambassador Thomas
Pickering, for the Center for the Study of the Presidency. To try to recruit more
technically competent governors, in November 2007 Karzai placed the governor (and
3 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in
Afghanistan for 2007. March 11, 2008 [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100611.htm];
and the International Religious Freedom Report, released September 14, 2007.
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2007/90225.htm]

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district security officials) selection process in a new Independent Directorate for Local
Governance – and out of the Interior Ministry. Karzai has empowered two key figures to
reduce corruption, to instill confidence in the justice sector, and enhance government
accountability – Supreme Court chief justice Abdul Salam Azimi and Attorney General
Abdul Jabbar Sabit. Karzai also has formed an anti-corruption commission. In one major
move, in March 2008 he removed governor of Helmand Asadullah Wafa for his inability
to expand governance or to curb poppy cultivation in that most violent of all Afghan
provinces; he was replaced by Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province and is
viewed as effective.

On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s
human rights record remains poor, but primarily because of the continuing insurgency,
and the weakness of and corruption in the central government. The security forces are
widely cited for abuses and corruption, including torture and abuse of detainees.
Parliament has both contributed to and, in some cases, slowed progress on human rights.
Parliament’s views contributed to Karzai’s dropping of a July 2006 proposal to revive,
although in a far more circumscribed form, a “Ministry of Supporting Virtue and
Discouraging Vice,” a ministry that was used by the Taliban to commit abuses. On the
other hand, in February 2007 both houses passed a law giving amnesty to the so-called
“warlords.” Karzai altered the draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses;
Karzai did not sign a modified version in May 2007, leaving the status “unclear,”
according to the State Department. In debate over a new press law, both houses of
parliament have approved a joint version, but Karzai has vetoed it on the grounds that it
gives the government too much control over private media. Since the Taliban era, more
than 40 private radio stations, seven television networks, and 350 independent newspapers
have opened.
Minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face
discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy
in May 2007. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty after a
four year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. Others note lack of action to prevent sexual
trafficking (Afghanistan is placed in Tier 2 in the State Department’s June 12, 2007
Trafficking in Persons report).
Funding Issues. USAID has spent about $440 million (FY2002-2007) to build
democracy and rule of law, and assist the elections. A revised request for FY2008
supplemental funding included $100 million to assist with the presidential elections
planned for 2009. For FY2009, $707 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) has been
requested which will be used in part to enable the Karzai government to “extend the reach
of good governance....”

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Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security
Administration
positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader by
June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.”
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency, a
rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential power, but
gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women equal rights under
the law, allows for political parties (90 formed to date) as long as they have no foreign
affiliations or are un-Islamic; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam
(Chapter 7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary
position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for five year term, held October 9, 2004.
Election
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia Masud, a
Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was
assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks, and Karim Khalili, a
Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter, Northern Alliance
figure (and then Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female ran, who got about
1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Uzbek strongman Abdurrashid
Dostam won 10% of the vote. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40
million from U.S. (FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary
Elections held September 18, 2005 on Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
Elections
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga,
House of Elder). Voting was for one candidate only, although number of representatives varied
by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17;
Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11 seats each. Target quota for lower house is
25% women - top two women vote getters per each of 34 provinces. Upper house appointed
by Karzai (34 seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 to Upper House on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million
registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million from U.S.
(FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
Provincial
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections. Exact
Elections/
powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial councils size
District Elections
range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. 3,185 candidates, including 279
women. According to constitution, provincial governors appointed by Karzai, not the
provincial councils. Some criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately
weighted toward large districts within each province. District elections have not been held due
to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Cabinet
Full-term 27 seat cabinet named by Karzai in December 2004. Heavily weighted toward
Pashtuns, and created new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. Rahim Wardak named Defense
Minister, replacing Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad Fahim. Qanooni not in
cabinet, subsequently was selected Wolesi Jirga Speaker. Northern Alliance figure Dr.
Abdullah replaced as Foreign Minister in March 2006.
Next
Presidential elections to be held in fall 2009; provincial and presumably district elections in
Elections
2010, although discussion persists about combining all. Karzai indicated in March 2008 that
he would seek reelection. Qanooni or Rabbani might run. Rumors persist that U.S. Ambassador
to U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, might run, particularly if Karzai does not. Each
election to cost $100 million.
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