Order Code RL34387
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches,
Results, and Issues for Congress
Updated March 28, 2008
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches,
Results, and Issues for Congress
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003. The
immediate goal, as stated by the Bush Administration, was to remove the regime,
including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them
available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term objective included helping Iraqis build
“a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.”1 In October 2002, Congress had authorized
the President to use force against Iraq, to “defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,” and to “enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”2
Over time, the focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to the more open-
ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security,
establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. With that shift
in focus, the character of the war has evolved from major combat operations to a
multifaceted counter-insurgency and reconstruction effort.
The next major marker in the development of U.S. Iraq strategy and practice is
likely to be the update reports to the Congress from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan
Crocker and Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
General David Petraeus, scheduled for April 8 and 9, 2008. A second major marker
is a security agreement between the governments of the United States and Iraq,
expected to be achieved by July 31, 2008, and to include the parameters for the
presence of U.S. personnel in Iraq after December 31, 2008.
The most important short-term OIF issue for the Congress concerns the next
steps after the surge — the military strategies and approaches to be adopted in Iraq
after U.S. forces draw down to the pre-surge level. How OIF experiences to date are
evaluated — including policy decision-making, planning, and execution of both the
major combat and post-major combat efforts — are likely to have a significant
bearing not only on further U.S. government decisions about Iraq policy, but also on
broader, longer-term U.S. strategic concerns. Some of these include the future U.S.
military footprint in Iraq, Iraq as a U.S. national security concern, the future of the
U.S. military force, and the distribution of roles and responsibilities among U.S.
government agencies in complex contingencies.
This report is designed to provide background and analysis of Operation Iraqi
Freedom to support consideration of these short-term and long-term issues.
1 See “President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003,” the televised speech that
included a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].
2 See “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” H.J.Res.
114, Section 3(a), signed into law on October 16, 2002, (P.L.107-243). The Senate vote was
77-23, and the House vote 296-133.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Upcoming Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Short-term Issues: Post-Surge Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Longer-term Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Structure and Aim of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Decision to Go to War in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Antecedents in the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Strategic Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Military Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Planning for Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Post-War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Inter-Agency Post-War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Military Post-War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Organizational Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Major Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Early Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Ground Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
End of Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Legal Basis for Coalition Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Formal Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Future Security Framework Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Coalition Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Post-Major Combat: The Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Structure and Footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Headquarters Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Provincial Iraqi Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
U.S. Forces in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Coalition Partner Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Post-Major Combat: Security Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Major Sources and Forms of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Sunni Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Shi’a Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Nature of Sectarian Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Criminality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Other Security Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Military Operations During Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
“Clear, Hold, Build” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Operation Together Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
New Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
“New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case . . . . . . . 51
Surge Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Surge Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Counter-IED Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Special Operations Forces in the Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
The Use of Air Power in the Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
ISF Training: Theory of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . 66
ISF Training: Transition Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Iraqi Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Iraqi Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Iraqi Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Iraqi Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Iraqi Police Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Iraqi National Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Department of Border Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Ministry of the Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Ministry of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
“Awakening” Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Who the “Sons of Iraq” Are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
How the “Sons of Iraq” System Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force . . . . . . . . 90

Concerns About the “Sons of Iraq” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
“Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Detainee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
“COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Detainee Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Civil/Military Partnership in Governance and Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Civil/Military Partnership in Iraq: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Coordination Between PRTs and Military Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Military Role in Governance and Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Assessing the Results to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Security Situation by Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Overall Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Iraqi Civilian Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Weapons Caches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
High-Profile Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Security Situation: Commanders’ Qualitative Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Security Improvement: Commanders’ Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Security Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Theory of the Case: Improved Security Creates Opportunities
for Progress? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Post-Surge Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Conditions-Based Further Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Withdrawal According to a Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Adjustments to the Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Emphasize Counter-Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Emphasize Iraqi Security Forces Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Emphasize Civilian-Led Governance and Economic
Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Additional CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
List of Tables
Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of March 19, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Table 2. Benchmark Assessments as of September 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies,
Approaches, Results, and Issues for
Congress
Introduction
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003. The
immediate goal, as stated by the Bush Administration, was to remove the regime,
including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them
available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term objective included helping Iraqis build
“a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.”3 In October 2002, Congress had authorized
the President to use force against Iraq, to “defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,” and to “enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”4
Over time, the focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to the more open-
ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security,
establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. With that shift
in focus, the character of the war has evolved from major combat operations to a
multifaceted counter-insurgency and reconstruction effort.
Operation Iraqi Freedom is ongoing. While conventional, force-on-force wars
tend to end with the unequivocal defeat of one party, the parameters for “mission
success” in counter-insurgency efforts like OIF tend to be less definitive and more
subject to qualitative interpretation. Therefore, OIF is more likely to end with a
policy decision by the U.S. or Iraqi Government, or both, rather than a decisive
military decision on the battlefield.
Upcoming Events
The next major marker in the development of U.S. Iraq strategy and practice is
likely to be the update reports to the Congress from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan
Crocker and Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
General David Petraeus, scheduled for April 8 and 9, 2008. General Petraeus is
expected to make a recommendation concerning further troop withdrawals after troop
3 See “President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003,” the televised speech that
included a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].
4 See “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” H.J.Res.
114, Section 3(a), signed into law on October 16, 2002, (P.L.107-243). The Senate vote was
77-23, and the House vote 296-133.

CRS-2
levels in Iraq return to their pre-“surge” levels in summer 2008.5 MNF-
I’srecommendations to the President may be balanced by input from U.S. Central
Command, responsible for the entire region including ongoing operations in
Afghanistan; from the three Military Departments whose U.S. Code Title X
responsibilities to “organize, man, train and equip” the force encourage a concern
with sustainability over time, including recruiting and retaining the force; and from
the Department of Defense as a whole, with responsibility to balance OIF with
preparations to meet all current and likely future security threats to the United States.
A second major marker is a security agreement between the governments of the
United States and Iraq, expected to be achieved by July 31, 2008, and to include the
parameters for the presence of U.S. personnel in Iraq after December 31, 2008. Based
on public statements by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, and Congressional testimony from both Departments, the
agreement is not expected to contain a commitment to protect and defend Iraq. This
agreement could shape options available for post-surge OIF strategies and
approaches, as well as for a potential longer-term U.S. force presence.
Issues for Congress
How OIF experiences and lessons to date are evaluated — including policy
decision-making, planning, and execution of both the major combat and post-major
combat efforts — are likely to have a significant bearing not only on further U.S.
government decisions about Iraq policy, but also on broader, longer-term U.S.
strategic concerns.
Short-term Issues: Post-Surge Options. The most important short-term
OIF policy issue concerns the next steps after the surge — the military strategies and
approaches to be adopted in Iraq after U.S. forces draw down to the pre-surge level.
Several major options have been advanced.
Conditions-Based Further Decision-Making. The first option is a
“conditions-based” approach, generally favored by military commanders in Iraq. It
envisages using the post-surge forces in Iraq to continue the same full spectrum of
efforts — combat operations, training and mentoring Iraqi security forces, and
supporting efforts to strengthen governance and foster economic reconstruction. The
goal of U.S. forces in each geographical area would continue to be transitioning their
relationship with Iraqi counterparts from leadership, to partnership, to overwatch.6
Further decisions about U.S. force levels and missions in Iraq would be based on
periodic future assessments of progress.
5 The “surge” refers to a new set of military and civilian approaches, announced by President
Bush in a January 10, 2007, Address to the Nation, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html]. It included a U.S. troop level increase from
about 135,000 in January 2007, to about 168,000 at its peak in October. See “U.S. Forces
in Iraq”, and “New Way Forward,” below.
6 See General David Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, House Foreign
Affairs Committee website, [http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf].

CRS-3
During a February 2008 visit to Iraq, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
appeared to support this approach, at least for the near term. Affirming the idea of
a “pause” once the pre-surge troop level is reached, he noted: “I think that the notion
of a brief period of consolidation and evaluation probably does make sense.”7 And
speaking at the Pentagon on the fifth anniversary of the launch of OIF, President
Bush stated: “Any further drawdown will be based on conditions on the ground and
the recommendations of our commanders.”8
Withdrawal According to a Timeline. A second major option is to draw
down all remaining U.S. forces in Iraq by a set deadline, or in accordance with a set
schedule — for example, as some have proposed, by one Brigade Combat Team per
month. This option is typically less focused on achieving some particular endstate
in Iraq, than on bringing the U.S. military commitment in Iraq to a close, or on
relieving stress on the U.S. military as a whole.
Adjustments to the Mission. A third family of options would adjust the
U.S. mission in Iraq by enhancing certain efforts while drawing down most
conventional forces. Such proposals aim simultaneously at achieving “mission
success” in Iraq and accelerating the return home of U.S. forces. Proposals voiced
to date in this family of options include emphasizing the counter-terrorism effort with
a strong Special Operations Forces presence, backed by intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets; expanding efforts to train and mentor Iraqi Security
Forces; and increasing civilian-led efforts to help strengthen governance and
economic reconstruction.
Each of the three major options would have different implications in terms of
the timeframe of the remaining U.S. force presence in Iraq; the costs of both the draw
down and the remaining commitment in Iraq; the impact on the health of the U.S.
force as a whole; and the likely impact on the situation in Iraq itself.
A number of tools are available to Congress to weigh in on these options.9 For
example, Congress could pass legislation cutting off funding for all but some
specified military activities, such as Iraqi security forces training, or for all but some
specified types of military personnel, such as Special Operations Forces. Congress
could also pass legislation making funding contingent on the achievement of certain
milestones or benchmarks, or urging the President to take specified steps, such as
7 Media Availability with Secretary Gates at Forward Operating Base Falcon, Baghdad,
February 11, 2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4144].
8 “President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror,” March 19, 2008, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/print/20080319-2.html].
9 On options available to the Congress, their constitutionality, and their possible impact, see
CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq,
by Jennifer Elsea, Michael Garcia, and Thomas Nicola. For examples of tools available to
Congress in general for shaping U.S. military operations, see CRS Report RL33803,
Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches
, by Amy Belasco, Lynn
Cunningham, Hannah Fischer, and Larry Niksch.

CRS-4
withdrawing forces according to a specified timetable, or repealing the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.
Longer-term Issues. Operation Iraqi Freedom decision-making, planning,
execution, and results to date also raise a series of longer-term issues concerning both
Iraq and broader U.S. government strategic approaches.
Future U.S. Military Footprint in Iraq. One issue is a potential longer-term
U.S. military footprint in Iraq, beyond Operation Iraq Freedom. The 2008 security
framework agreement may include provisions that serve to constrain some future
options. OIF experiences to date may suggest both potential benefits and drawbacks
to a longer-term presence.
In theory, one option would be establishing permanent U.S. military bases in
Iraqi, to support broader U.S. policy in the region, possibly on the model of those in
Japan, South Korea, Germany and Italy. This option does not appear to enjoy support
from the Administration or from the Government of Iraq. Another option would be
a particularly robust Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), responsible for training
and mentoring Iraqi security forces and building the capacity of Iraqi security
ministries. Following the usual pattern, the OSC would be responsible to both the
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and to the Commander of U.S. Central Command. Issues
for the Congress regarding a future U.S. military presence in Iraq could include costs,
and policy oversight of integrated efforts by Department of State and the Department
of Defense personnel.
Iraq as a U.S. National Security Concern. A second longer-term issue
is the future of Iraq itself as a potential U.S. national security concern — an issue for
Congress in its oversight capacities for U.S. government intelligence capabilities and
preparations to meet global security challenges. For example, it is within the realm
of possibility that Iraq could serve as a haven for terrorists, or that it could fall under
stronger Iranian influence. Iraq could conceivably become a source of instability in
the broader region, should potential internal conflict spill over into neighboring
states. Future threat analysis is likely to take as a starting point the close observations
made during OIF. It is not yet completely clear by what means the U.S. government
will maintain visibility on security-related developments in Iraq as the U.S. military
presence — including its human and technological intelligence assets — decreases.
Future of the Force. A third issue is the impact of OIF experiences on the
future of the force — germane to congressional oversight of the Department of
Defense. How Military Departments fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities to organize,
man, train, and equip — how they make decisions about endstrength and capabilities
required — may depend on lessons drawn from OIF, and on how applicable those
lessons are deemed to be to potential future engagements. For example, lessons
might be drawn from OIF concerning: how to most effectively train foreign security
forces and to prepare U.S. forces for that mission; how increasing the intelligence
assets available to commanders on the ground affects their ability to identify and
pursue targets; how “dwell time” policies for the Active and Reserve Components
can best be implemented; how closer operational integration between Special
Operations Forces and conventional forces might affect their requirements.

CRS-5
For the Department of Defense as a whole, in turn, OIF experiences may be used
to help frame future discussions about the Department’s force planning construct —
a shorthand description of the major contingencies the Department must be prepared
to execute simultaneously — which is used to shape the total force. Analytical
challenges include deciding what kind of contingency OIF represents, how likely it
is to be representative of future contingencies, and which chronological “slice” of
OIF requirements (personnel, equipment) to use to represent the effort.
U.S. Government Coordination in Complex Contingencies. A fourth
long-term issue is U.S. government coordination in complex contingencies, including
both decision-making and execution. Just as the executive branch’s responsibilities
in this area are divided among different agencies, Congressional oversight
responsibilities are divided among different committees of jurisdiction, such that
achieving full integration can be a challenge for both branches of government.
One set of questions prompted by OIF experience concerns the decision-making
process about whether to go to war and if so, how to do so. Key aspects include the
rigor of the inter-agency debates, the effectiveness of the provision of “best military
advice” to key decision-makers, and the thoroughness of the exercise of
Congressional oversight.
Another set of questions raised by OIF concerns the balance of roles,
responsibilities, resources, and authorities among U.S. government agencies to
support implementation of activities such as security forces training, local
governance work, and economic reconstruction.10 In security forces training, OIF
experiences from the formal occupation to the present have included several different
patterns for the distribution of responsibilities between the Departments of Defense
and State. In governance and economic reconstruction work, OIF also provides at
least two potentially instructive organizational models — Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), and cooperation between PRTs and partner military units.11
Structure and Aim of the Report
This report is designed to provide background and analysis of Operation Iraqi
Freedom to support consideration of these short-term and long-term issues. It
describes and evaluates the key developments and debates at each stage — planning,
10 Civil-military cooperation in OIF is reportedly a key case study in the Project on National
Security Reform, a multi-faceted, non-partisan initiative, based at the Center for the Study
of the Presidency and spearheaded by James Locher, aimed at formulating and proposing
substantial revisions to the National Security Act of 1947. See the website for the Project
on National Security Reform, [http://www.pnsr.org/].
11 The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services
Committee has hosted a series of hearings about PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
potential implications for future U.S. inter-agency coordination and organization. The
Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted
interviews with PRT participants and published initial observations. See “PRT Playbook:
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2007.

CRS-6
major combat operations, and post-major combat operations. It will be updated as
events warrant. Major topics addressed include:
! War planning, including stated objectives, key debates in the major
combat and post-major combat planning efforts, and the impact of
apparent short-comings in the planning efforts on post-war
developments.
! Major combat operations, including both successes and challenges
encountered.
! Post-major combat military activities — combat operations, Iraqi
security forces training, and an array of “reconciliation”, governance,
and economic reconstruction efforts — including analysis of
evolutions in strategy and approaches.
! Assessments of the results of strategy and operations to date.
! Detailed analysis of near-term “post-surge” options in Iraq.
Decision to Go to War in Iraq
The Administration’s decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom had
antecedents stretching back to the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath.
Antecedents in the 1990s
In the 1990’s, the United States shared with other countries a concern with the
Iraqi government’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Iraq had
demonstrated a willingness to use WMD against its neighbors during the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq war, and against its own citizens, as it did, for example, against Iraqi Kurds
in Halabja in 1988. U.S. policy after the Gulf War supported the United Nations-led
weapons inspection regime and the economic sanctions imposed to encourage Iraq’s
compliance with that regime. Before they were withdrawn in 1998, U.N. weapons
inspectors located and destroyed sizable quantities of WMD in Iraq.
U.S. post-Gulf War policy also included containment initiatives — “no fly”
zones — imposed by the United States together with the United Kingdom and,
initially, France. The northern “no fly” zone, Operation Northern Watch was
designed to protect the Iraqi Kurdish population in northern Iraq and international
humanitarian relief efforts there. Operation Southern Watch was designed to protect
the Shi’a Arab population in southern Iraq.
These containment measures were periodically marked by Iraqi provocations,
including troop build-ups and attempts to shoot down allied aircraft, and by allied

CRS-7
responses including attacks on targets inside Iraq.12 In December 1998, the United
States and the United Kingdom launched Operation Desert Fox, whose stated
purpose was to degrade Iraq’s ability to manufacture or use WMD.
Also during the late 1990s, a policy climate more conducive to aggressive action
against the Iraqi regime began to take shape in Washington, D.C., as some policy
experts began to advocate actively fostering Iraqi resistance, in order to encourage
regime change.13 In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, authorizing
support to designated organizations among the Iraqi opposition. Some supporters of
this policy approach gained greater access, and in some cases office, under the Bush
Administration after the 2000 presidential elections.
Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations
For many U.S. policy-makers, the September 11, 2001, attacks catalyzed or
heightened general concerns that WMD might fall into the hands of terrorists.
Reflecting those concerns, the first National Security Strategy issued by the Bush
Administration, in September 2002, highlighted the policy of preemptive, or
anticipatory, action, to forestall hostile acts by adversaries, “even if uncertainty
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”14
Throughout 2002, the stated position of the Administration was to aggressively
seek Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions concerning the
inspections regime, while holding out the possibility of U.N Chapter VII action if
Iraq did not comply.15 In September 2002, addressing the U.N. General Assembly,
President Bush stated: “The Security Council Resolutions will be enforced … or
action will be unavoidable.” On that occasion, President Bush also articulated a list
of conditions that Iraq must meet if it wanted to avoid retaliatory action: give up or
destroy all WMD and long-range missiles; end all support to terrorism; cease
12 Overall, some 300,000 sorties were flown. In 2002 for example, Iraqi forces fired on
coalition aircraft 500 times, prompting 90 coalition air strikes against Iraqi targets. See
Suzann Chapman, “The War Before the War,” Air Force Magazine, February 2004.
Chapman cites Air Force General John Jumper as noting in March 2003 that between June
2002 and March 2003, the U.S. Air Force flew about 4,000 sorties against Iraq’s air defense
system, surface-to-air missiles, and command and control.
13 See the December 1, 1997, issue of the Weekly Standard, with a series of articles, under
the heading “Saddam Must Go”, including “Overthrow Him,” by Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul
Wolfowitz.
14 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.15,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf].
15 Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations authorizes the U.N. Security Council
to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression” (Article 39), and should the Council consider other specified measures
inadequate, to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security” (Article 42), see Charter of the United Nations,
available at [http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/].

CRS-8
persecution of its civilian population; account for all missing Gulf War personnel and
accept liability for losses; and end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.16
On November 8, 2002, following intensive negotiations among its “Permanent
5” members,17 the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1441. In it, the Council
decided that Iraq remained in “material breach” of its obligations; that the Council
would afford Iraq “a final opportunity to comply”; that failure to comply would
“constitute a further material breach”; and that in that case, Iraq would “face serious
consequences.”18
This language, though strong by U.N. standards, was not considered by most
observers to imply “automaticity” — that is, that Iraqi non-compliance would
automatically trigger a U.N.-authorized response under Chapter VII.
While the Iraqi government eventually provided a large quantity of written
materials, the Administration deemed Iraqi compliance to be insufficient. The
Administration chose not to seek an additional U.N. Resolution, explicitly
authorizing military action under Chapter VII, reportedly due to concerns that some
Permanent Members of the Council were prepared to veto it.
Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein
The Administration’s intent to take military action against Iraq was formally
made public on March 17, 2003, when President Bush issued an ultimatum to
Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours. “Their refusal to do so,”
he said, would “result in military conflict.”19
War Planning
As the Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz wrote, war planning
includes articulation of both intended goals and how they will be achieved.20 In the
16 President Bush’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002,
New York, NY, available at the White House website [http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html].
17 China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States. Each of the 15
Council members has one vote. Procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at
least 9 of the 15. Substantive matters require nine votes, including concurring votes from
the 5 permanent members. See [http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp].
18 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, paragraphs 1, 2,
4, and 13.
19 President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].
20 Clausewitz made the point more forcefully: “No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his
senses ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that
war and how he intends to conduct it.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and
(continued...)

CRS-9
case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Administration goals included both short-term
military objectives and longer-term strategic goals. To meet that intent, the
Administration planned — though apparently in unequal measure — for both combat
operations and the broader range of operations that would be required on “the day
after” regime removal.
Strategic Objectives
The Administration’s short-term goal for OIF was regime removal. As
President Bush stated in his March 17, 2003, Address to the Nation, “It is too late for
Saddam Hussein to remain in power.” In that speech, he promised Iraqis, “We will
tear down the apparatus of terror…the tyrant will soon be gone.”21
In his March 2003 speech, President Bush declared that in the longer term, the
United States would help Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.” It
would be an Iraq, as he described it, that would not be at war with its neighbors, and
that would not abuse its own citizens.22 Those were the basic “endstate” elements
typically used by war planners. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) OIF
campaign plan, for example, described the strategic objective this way: “A stable
Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based government that renounces
WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its
neighbors.”23
Over time, since the days of war planning to the present, the Administration’s
longer-term strategic objectives have been fine-tuned. In the November 2005
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the Administration stated the long-term goal
for Iraq this way: “Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well-integrated into
the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.”24
In January 2007, at the time the “surge” was announced, the White House
released an unclassified version of the results of its late 2006 internal review of Iraq
policy. That document states: “Our strategic goal in Iraq remains the same: a
20 (...continued)
Peter Paret, eds., Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
21 President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].
22 Ibid.
23 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002 and 2003. From July
2002 to July 2004, the author served as the Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Commanding
General (CG) of U.S. Army V Corps. That service included deploying with V Corps in
early 2003 to Kuwait and then Iraq. In Iraq, the author served as POLAD to the CG of the
Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), and then the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).
24 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, November 30, 2005, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf].

CRS-10
unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself,
and is an ally in the war on terror.”25
And in March 2008, in its regular quarterly update to the Congress, the
Department of Defense used the same language almost verbatim: “The strategic goal
of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can
govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror.”26
Military Objectives
To support the stated U.S. strategic objectives, CENTCOM defined the OIF
military objectives this way: “destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and
provide support to a new, broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability
and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy
terrorist networks in Iraq, gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorists and
war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and
support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the
region.”27
Planning for Major Combat
From a military perspective, there are theoretically many different possible ways
to remove a regime — using different capabilities, in different combinations, over
different timelines. The 1991 Gulf War, for example, had highlighted the initial use
of air power in targeting key regime infrastructure. The more recent war in
Afghanistan had showcased a joint effort, as Special Operations Forces on the ground
called in air strikes on key targets. Key debates in OIF major combat planning
concerned the size of the force, the timelines for action, and the synchronization of
ground and air power.
According to participants, throughout the planning process, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld played an active role, consistently urging the use of a
streamlined force and a quick timeline.28 Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly came into
office with a vision of defense transformation, both operational and institutional.29
A basic premise of that vision, captured in the 2002 National Security Strategy, was
that “…the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our
25 “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review” slides, National Security Council, January 2007,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf].
26 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008,
submitted in accordance with Section 9010, Department of Defense Appropriations Act
2007, P.L. 109-289, as amended by Section 1308 of P.L. 110-28.
27 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002, 2003, and 2008.
28 Interviews with planners who participated in the process, 2002 and 2003. Bob Woodward
cites Secretary Rumsfeld as saying, at a December 4, 2001, planning session, “I’m not sure
that that much force is needed, given what we’ve learned coming out of Afghanistan.” Bob
Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.
29 Conversations with Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2005 and 2006.

CRS-11
force.”30 In general, that meant transitioning from a military “structured to deter
massive Cold War-era armies,” to a leaner and more agile force. At issue in the OIF
planning debates was not only how to fight the war in Iraq, but also — implicitly —
how to organize, man, train and equip the force for the future.
For military planners, the guidance to use a streamlined force reflected a
fundamental shift away from the Powell Doctrine, named after the former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which stressed that force, if used, should be
overwhelming.31
The planning effort started early. Just before Thanksgiving, 2001, President
Bush asked Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a plan for regime removal in Iraq, and
Secretary Rumsfeld immediately gave that assignment to the commander of U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), General Tommy Franks.32
The planning effort for combat operations was initially very “close hold”,
involving only a few key leaders and small groups of trusted planners at each level.
As the effort progressed, the number of people involved grew, but key elements of
the plans remained compartmentalized, such that few people had visibility on all
elements of the plans.33
The starting point for the planning effort was the existing, “on the shelf” Iraq
war plan, known as 1003-98, which had been developed and then refined during the
1990’s. That plan called for a force of between 400,000 and 500,000 U.S. troops,
including three Corps (or Corps equivalents), with a long timeline for the deployment
and build-up of forces beforehand. When General Franks briefed Secretary
Rumsfeld on these plans in late November, Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly asked for
a completely new version — with fewer troops and a faster deployment timeline.34
In early 2002, General Franks briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the “Generated
Start” plan. That plan called for very early infiltration by CIA teams, to build
30 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.29,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf].
31 The ‘Powell Doctrine,’ generally acknowledged as the basis for the first Gulf War, was
a collection of ideas, not a written document. Other key elements included force should
only be used as a last resort, when there is a clear threat; there must be strong public support
for the use of force; there must be a clear exit strategy. The Powell Doctrine derived in part
from the Weinberger Doctrine, named after former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, Powell’s one-time boss, which had been based on some Vietnam “lessons
learned.”
32 Interviews with planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.
33 Information from CENTCOM and CFLCC planners, and Office of the Secretary of
Defense officials, 2002 and 2003.
34 Interviews with planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Michael R. Gordon and General
Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq,
New York: Vintage Books, 2006; and Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2004.

CRS-12
relationships and gain intelligence, and then the introduction of Special Operations
Forces, particularly in northern Iraq and in Al Anbar province in the west. The main
conventional forces effort would begin with near-simultaneous air and ground
attacks. The force would continue to grow up to about 275,000 troops.35
CENTCOM’s air component — the Combined Force Air Component Command
(CFACC) — reportedly urged modifying the plan to include a 10- to 14-day air
campaign at the start, to target and hit Iraq’s missile, radar, command and control,
and other leadership sites, on the model of the Gulf War.36 But the early introduction
of ground forces — rather than an extended exclusively-air campaign — was
apparently intended to take Iraqi forces by surprise.37
Later in the spring of 2002, CENTCOM and subordinate planners developed an
alternative plan called “Running Start,” which addressed the possibility that the Iraqi
regime might choose the war’s start time through some provocation, such as the use
of WMD. “Running start” called for a smaller overall force and a shorter timeline.
It would still begin with infiltration by CIA teams, followed by the introduction of
SOF. Air attacks would go first, and as ground forces flowed into theater, the ground
attacks could begin any time after the first 25 days of air attacks. The ground war
might begin with as few as 18,000 ground forces entering Iraq.38
In the summer of 2002, planners developed a so-called “hybrid” version of these
two plans,39 which echoed key elements of the “Running Start” plan — beginning
with an air campaign, and launching the ground war while other ground forces still
flowed into theater. Specifically, the plan called for: Presidential notification 5 days
in advance; 11 days to flow forces; 16 days for the air campaign; the start of the
ground campaign as ground forces continued to flow into theater; and a total
35 Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002 and 2003. See “Top Secret Polo Step”
collection, “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by the National Security Archive, The
George Washington University, available at [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB214/index.htm].
36 Gordon and Trainor note that this issue was debated at the March 2002 CENTCOM
Component Commanders Conference. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor,
Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage
Books, 2006.
37 Information from planners, 2002, 2003, and 2008.
38 Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002 and 2003. See “Top Secret Polo Step”
collection, “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by the National Security Archive, The
George Washington University, available at [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm]. See also Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E.
Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York:
Vintage Books, 2006.
39 “Hybrid” simply referred descriptively to the plan — it was not the formal name of a plan
— although some senior leaders later seemed to use “Hybrid” as a proper noun.

CRS-13
campaign that would last up to 125 days. This plan, approved for action, continued
to be known as the “5-11-16-125” plan even after the numbers of days had changed.40
By January 2003, at the CENTCOM Component Commanders Conference
hosted by General Franks in Tampa, the plans had coalesced around a modified
version of “Generated Start.” They featured a very short initial air campaign,
including bombs and missiles — a couple days, rather than a couple weeks. The
ground campaign would begin with two three-star-led headquarters — U.S. Army V
Corps, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force — and some of their forces crossing the
line of departure from Kuwait into Iraq, while additional forces continued to flow
into theater. Meanwhile, the 4th Infantry Division would open a northern front by
entering Iraq from Turkey.
The number of forces that would start the ground campaign continued to be
adjusted, generally downward, in succeeding days. On January 29, 2003, Army
commanders learned that they would enter Iraq with just two Divisions — less than
their plans to that point had reflected. At that time, V Corps and its subordinate
commands were at a training site in Grafenwoehr, Germany, rehearsing the opening
of the tactical-level ground campaign at an exercise called “Victory Scrimmage.”
During that exercise, commanders and staff concluded that should they be required
to “secure” cities in southern Iraq, they would have insufficient forces to do so.41
The V Corps Commander at the time, then-Lieutenant General William Scott
Wallace, reflected after the end of major combat in Iraq: “I guess that as summer
[arrived] I wasn’t real comfortable with the troop levels.”42
Post-War Planning
Most observers agree that the Administration’s planning for “post-war” Iraq
— for all the activities and resources that would be required on “the day after,” to
help bring about the strategic objective, a “free and prosperous Iraq” — was not
nearly as thorough as the planning for combat operations.
For the U.S. military, the stakes of the post-war planning efforts were very high.
In theory, civilian agencies would have the responsibility for using political,
diplomatic, and economic tools to help achieve the desired political endstate for Iraq,
while the Department of Defense and its military forces would play only a supporting
role after the end of major combat operations. But by far the greatest number of
coalition personnel on the ground in Iraq at the end of major combat would be U.S.
40 Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002, 2003 and 2008; “Compartmented
Planning Effort”; and Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II.
41 Information from V Corps leaders and staff, 2003.
42 William S. Wallace, Interview, Frontline, Public Broadcasting System, February 26,
2004, available at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/
interviews/Wallace.html]. He quickly added, “But I was comfortable with the degree of
training of those forces that were available to us.”

CRS-14
military forces, and the U.S. military was very likely to become the default option for
any unfilled roles and any unanticipated responsibilities.
A number of participants and observers have argued that the Administration
should have sent a larger number of U.S. troops to Iraq, to provide security in the
post-major combat period. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who served as the
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) throughout the formal
occupation of Iraq, leveled this criticism after departing Iraq. Asked what he would
have changed about the occupation, he replied: “The single most important change
— the one thing that would have improved the situation — would have been having
more troops in Iraq at the beginning and throughout.”43
A logical fallacy in the number-of-troops critique is that “How many troops do
you need?” is not an especially meaningful question, unless what those troops will
be expected to do is clarified. By many accounts, the OIF post-war planning process
did not provide commanders, before the start of combat operations, with a clear
picture of the extent of their assigned post-war responsibilities.44
Inter-Agency Post-War Planning. A primary focus of the interagency post-
war-planning debates was who would be in charge in Iraq, on “the day after.” For
the military, decisions by the Administration about who would do what would help
clarify the military’s own roles and responsibilities. Before making such decisions
— in particular, what responsibilities would be carried out by Iraqis — the
Administration cultivated Iraqi contacts.
Based on months of negotiations, in conjunction with the government of the
United Kingdom, the Administration sponsored a series of conferences of Iraqi
oppositionists, including expatriates and some Iraqis — notably Iraqi Kurds — who
could come and go from their homes. The events included a major conference in
London in December 2002, and a follow-on event in Salahuddin, Iraq, in February
2003.45 These events apparently helped build stronger ties among key opposition
leaders and groups, but did not directly produce U.S. policy decisions about post-war
roles and responsibilities.46
During the same time frame, the Departments of State and Defense were locked
in debate about post-war political plans for Iraq. The State Department supported a
43 See Robin Wright and Tom Ricks, “Bremer Criticizes Troop Levels,” Washington Post,
October 5, 2004. Ambassador Bremer’s remarks were quoted from a nominally off-the-
record talk he gave at DePauw University on September 17, 2004.
44 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC, V Corps, and Division Commanders, 2003, 2004
and 2008, and from Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2003 and 2004.
45 Interviews with event organizers, 2002 and 2003. See Michael Howard, “Conference
Delegates Vie for Political Role in New Iraq,” The Guardian, December 16, 2002; and
Judith Miller, “Ending Conference, Iraqi Dissidents Insist on Self-Government,” The New
York Times
, March 3, 2003.
46 Information from Department of State and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials,
2002 and 2003.

CRS-15
deliberate political process, including slowly building new political institutions,
based on the rule of law, while, in the meantime, Iraqis would serve only in advisory
capacities. Through the second half of 2002, the State Department’s “Future of
Iraq” project brought together Iraqi oppositionists and experts, in a series of working
groups, to consider an array of potential post-war challenges. While a tacit goal of
the project was to identify some Iraqis who might serve in future leadership
positions, it was not designed to produce a slate of leaders-in-waiting.47 The project
was also not designed to produce formal plans. However, some of the ideas it
generated did reportedly help operational-level military planners refine their efforts,
and the project might have had a greater impact had more of its output reached the
planners.48
The Department of Defense — more specifically and accurately the Office of
the Secretary of Defense — favored putting Iraqis in charge of Iraq, in some form,
as soon as possible, perhaps on the model of Afghanistan. A “real” Iraqi leadership
with real power, some officials believed, might find favor with the Iraqi people and
with neighboring states, and might shorten the length of the U.S. commitment in
Iraq.49 As Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly told President Bush in August 2002, “We
will want to get Iraqis in charge of Iraq as soon as possible.”50
In the fall of 2002, no clear decision emerged about the role of Iraqis in
immediate post-war Iraq. Most U.S. agencies apparently agreed that a U.S.-led
“transitional civil administration” would govern, or help govern, Iraq. However,
during the second half of 2002, there was no agreement about what authority such a
body would have, what its responsibilities would be, how long it would last, or which
Iraqis would be involved.51
In January 2003, Administration thinking coalesced around a broad post-war
political process for Iraq, captured in what was universally known at the time as the
“Mega-Brief.” The approach favored the State Department’s preference for a
deliberate process, rather than an immediate “crowning” of a new Iraqi leadership.
The process would include dismissing top Iraqi leaders but welcoming most lower-
ranking officials to continue to serve; creating a senior-level Iraqi Consultative
Council to serve in an advisory capacity; creating an Iraqi judicial council; holding
a national census; conducting municipal elections; holding elections to a
constitutional convention that would draft a constitution; carrying out a constitutional
47 Interviews with State officials responsible for the project, 2002 and 2003, and
participation in some project sessions.
48 Information from CFLCC planners, 2003 and 2008.
49 OSD’s leading candidate was Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi opposition umbrella
group, the Iraqi National Congress. Information from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Staff, and Department of State officials, 2002 and 2003.
50 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004, p.393. Franks
reports that the remarks were made at a 5 August 2002 session of the National Security
Council.
51 Interviews with officials from the NSC, State Department, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Joint Staff, 2002 and 2003.

CRS-16
referendum; and then holding national elections. It was envisaged that the process
would take years to complete.52
The “Mega-Brief” approach — adopted just as troops were conducting final
rehearsals for the war — implied that many governance tasks would need to be
performed by coalition (non-Iraqi) personnel, whether civilian or military, for some
time to come.
Military Post-War Planning. Military commanders and planners typically
base operational plans on policy assumptions and clearly specify those assumptions
at the beginning of any plans briefing. For OIF planners, the critical policy
assumptions concerned who would have which post-war roles and responsibilities.
OIF preparations reversed the usual sequence, in that military planning began long
before the key policy debates, let alone policy conclusions.
During their planning process, military commanders apparently sought to elicit
the policy guidance they needed by briefing their policy assumptions and hoping for
a response.53 In December 2001, in his first OIF brief to President Bush, General
Franks included as one element of the mission: “establish a provisional Iraqi
government,” but this measure was neither confirmed nor rejected. General Franks
wrote later that as he briefed this to the President, he had in mind the Bonn
Conference for Afghanistan.54 In August 2002, still without a policy decision about
post-war responsibilities, CENTCOM included in its war plans briefing the
assumption: “DoS [Department of State] will promote creation of a broad-based,
credible provisional government prior to D-Day.”55
Unable to determine what Iraqi civilian structure they would be asked to
support, the military sought to elicit guidance about the coalition’s own post-war
architecture and responsibilities. According to General Franks, the CENTCOM war
plans slides briefed to President Bush and the National Security Council on August
52 Information from NSC staff, and Department of State and Office of the Secretary of
Defense officials, 2003 and 2008. Some former Defense officials have argued that in March
2003, the President expressed support for a shorter formal occupation and an earlier naming
of an official Iraqi body. Ambassador Bremer has argued that, even if that March shift took
place, at the time of his own appointment to head CPA in early May, the President’s
direction to him was not to hurry, but to “take the time necessary to create a stable political
environment”. See Tom Ricks and Karen DeYoung, “Ex-Defense Official Assails
Colleagues Over Run-Up to War,” Washington Post, March 9, 2008, which previews the
book War and Decision, scheduled for release in April 2008, by former Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Douglas Feith; and L. Paul Bremer III, “Facts for Feith: CPA History,”
National Review Online, March 19, 2008.
53 Information from CENTCOM planners, 2003 and 2006.
54 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004.
55 “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” brief, part of “Top Secret Polo Step”
collection, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by the National
Security Archive, The George Washington University, available at [http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/Tab%20I.pdf].

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5, 2002, included the intentionally provocative phrase, “military administration,” but
no decision was made at that time.56
Two months later, the OIF plans slides included, for the first time, a full wiring
diagram of the coalition’s post-war structure, describing post-war responsibilities in
a “military administration.” A “Joint Task Force” would be responsible for security,
a civilian “High Commissioner” would be responsible for all other functions; and
both would report to CENTCOM. This chart still failed to prompt a decision,
although Office of the Secretary of Defense staff reportedly spent the ensuing weeks
considering “High Commissioner” candidates, just in case.57
By late 2002, in the absence of detailed policy guidance, military commanders
at several levels had launched “Phase IV” planning efforts, to identify and begin to
prepare for potential post-war requirements. In January 2003, based on a
recommendation that came out of the “Internal Look” exercise conducted in Kuwait
in December 2002, Brigadier General Steve Hawkins was named to lead a new “Task
Force IV.” TFIV, an ad hoc organization, was tasked to conduct post-war planning,
and to prepare to deploy to Baghdad as the nucleus of a post-war headquarters. TFIV
was dispatched immediately to Kuwait, to work under the operational control of the
Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) — the ground forces
component of CENTCOM — and its commanding general, Lieutenant General David
McKiernan.58 TFIV thus provided skilled labor, but no connectivity to the still on-
going Washington policy debates about the post-war division of responsibilities.
In March 2003, CFLCC launched a dedicated post-war planning effort of its
own, led by Major General Albert Whitley (UK), who was part of the CFLCC
leadership. His more comprehensive effort — known as Eclipse II — benefitted
from close connectivity with its sister-effort, CFLCC’s combat operations planning,
but lacked direct access to the broader Washington policy debates.
In addition to lacking policy guidance about post-war roles and responsibilities,
these operational-level planning efforts lacked insight into key aspects of the current
state of affairs in Iraq. For example, planning assumed that Iraqis, in particular law
enforcement personnel, would be available and willing to resume some civic duties
on the “day after.” Also, plans did not recognize the deeply degraded status of Iraqi
infrastructure, such as electricity grids.
Organizational Decisions. On January 20, 2003, by National Security
Presidential Directive 24, the President created the Organization for Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), to serve first as the post-war planning office
in the Pentagon, and then to deploy to Iraq. Throughout, ORHA would report to the
Department of Defense. Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who had led
56 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004.
57 Interviews with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
Department of State, and the NSC staff, 2002 and 2003.
58 Interviews with TFIV leaders and members, and with CFLCC staff, 2003. See also
Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

CRS-18
Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq after the Gulf War, was appointed to lead
ORHA. He quickly brought on board a team of other retired Army general officers
to serve in key leadership positions.59
ORHA held its founding conference on February 20 and 21, 2003, at the
National Defense University. Participants included the fledgling ORHA staff,
representatives of civilian agencies that would contribute to the effort, and
representatives of the military commands — long since deployed to Kuwait — that
would become ORHA’s partners.
As briefed at NDU, ORHA would be responsible for three pillars in postwar
Iraq — Civil Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, and Reconstruction — while the military
would be responsible for security. Those ORHA efforts would commence in each
area as soon as major combat operations ended. The most important constraint was
time — the civilian agencies were not organized to be able to provide substantial
resources or personnel by the start of major combat operations.
ORHA’s command relationships with other Department of Defense bodies were
initially a topic of dispute. During ORHA’s “post-war planning office” days inside
the Pentagon, General Garner reported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld. It was
generally agreed that, once in the field, ORHA would fall under CENTCOM.
CFLCC insisted that ORHA would also fall under CFLCC, but ORHA resisted that
arrangement.60
Shortly after the founding conference at NDU, ORHA deployed to Kuwait with
a skeleton staff and limited resources, and set up its headquarters at the Kuwait
Hilton.
Major Combat Operations
Major combat operations in Iraq, launched in March 2003, roughly followed the
course that had been outlined at the CENTCOM Component Commanders
Conference in January that year. The coalition force was both joint — with
representatives from all the U.S. military services — and combined — with
participants from coalition partner countries.61
59 They included Lieutenant General Ron Adams, Lieutenant General Jerry Bates, Major
General Bruce Moore, and Brigadier General Buck Walters. The initial leadership team also
included one senior leader from the Department of State, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, a
noted Arabist and regional expert.
60 Information from ORHA senior leaders, and CENTCOM and CFLCC staff, 2003.
61 The U.S. Coast Guard, the only military service that reports to the Department of
Homeland Security rather than the Department of Defense, contributed personnel to conduct
maritime-interception operations and to conduct coastal patrols.

CRS-19
Early Infiltration
As long planned, the effort had actually begun before the full-scale launch, with
early infiltration into Iraq by the CIA, including the so-called Northern and Southern
Iraq Liaison Elements (NILE and SILE), whose task was to gather intelligence, form
relationships, and lay the groundwork for the early entry of Special Operations Forces
(SOF).62
SOF, in turn, had also entered Iraq before the formal launch. Among other
missions, SOF secured bases in Al Anbar province in western Iraq, secured suspected
WMD sites, pursued some of the designated “high-value targets,” and worked closely
with Iraqi Kurdish forces in northern Iraq — the pesh merga — to attack a key
stronghold of the designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, Ansar al-Islam.63
Special operations forces in OIF, like the conventional forces, were both joint and
combined — including contingents from the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland.
Defense expert Andrew Krepinevich estimated that “nearly 10,000” SOF took part
in OIF major combat.64
The Launch
The visible public launch of OIF took place on March 20, 2003, shortly after the
expiration of President Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons
(see above, “Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein”).65 After months of debate about the
sequencing of the air and ground campaigns, the planned sequence shifted in two
major ways at the last minute.
By early 2003, the plans called for beginning with a short air-only campaign,
followed by the ground invasion. However, late-breaking evidence gave rise to
stronger concerns that the Iraqi regime would deliberately destroy its southern oil
wells, so the timing of the ground forces launch was moved up, ahead of the
scheduled air campaign launch.
62 See Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004, pp.208-212;
Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
, New York: Vintage Books, 2006, pp.156-157, 188-189,
388; and “Top Secret Polo Step” collection, “Compartmented Planning Effort, 15 August
2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by
the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, available at
[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm].
63 Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2003. See also Andrew
Krepinevich, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment,” Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.
64 Andrew Krepinevich, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.
65 Some discrepancies in contemporary press coverage and later accounts are due to the
eight-hour time difference between Washington D.C., where President Bush issued the 48-
hour ultimatum on the evening of March 17; and Baghdad, where that ultimatum expired in
the early morning of March 20. The timeline of operations, described here, is based on the
time in Baghdad.

CRS-20
Then, even closer to launch time, the CIA obtained what seemed to be
compelling information about Saddam Hussein’s location — at Dora Farms near
Baghdad. In the early hours of March 20, just as the ultimatum expired, a pair of F-
117 fighters targeted the site. That attack narrowly followed a barrage of Tomahawk
missiles, launched from ships at key leadership sites in Baghdad.
That night, coalition ground forces crossed the line of departure from the
Kuwaiti desert into southern Iraq. The following day, March 21, 2003, brought the
larger-scale “shock and awe” attacks on Iraqi command and control and other sites,
from both Air Force and Navy assets. Early Iraqi responses included setting a few
oil wells on fire, and firing a few poorly-directed missiles into Kuwait, most of which
were successfully intercepted by Patriot missiles.66
The Ground Campaign
The ground campaign was led by Army Lieutenant General David McKiernan,
the Commanding General of the Combined Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC), the ground component of CENTCOM. The strategy was a quick, two-
pronged push from Kuwait up through southern Iraq to Baghdad.
Under CFLCC, the ground “main effort” was led by U.S. Army V Corps, under
Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace. V Corps was assigned the western route
up to Baghdad, west of the Euphrates River.67 Meanwhile, the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force (IMEF), led by Lieutenant General James Conway, was assigned
the eastern route, closer to the border with Iran. From a tactical perspective, for both
the Army and the Marines this was a very long projection of force — over 600
kilometers from Kuwait up to Baghdad, and more for those units that pushed further
north to Tikrit or to Mosul. Those long distances reportedly strained capabilities
including logistics and communications.
The Marines were assigned the eastern route up to Baghdad — with more urban
areas than the Army’s western route. The basic strategy still called for a quick drive
to Baghdad. Just across the border into Iraq, IMEF took the far southern port city of
Umm Qasr.
The UK First Armored Division, which fell under IMEF, was tasked to take
Basra, Iraq’s second largest city. The UK Division faced resistance from members
of the paramilitary force Saddam Fedayeen and others still loyal to the Ba’ath Party.
To limit casualties in the large urban area, rather than enter the city immediately in
66 Information from V Corps leaders and staff, 2003. The basic facts of the case, during the
initial days of OIF, were extremely well-documented by the international press. For one
clear account, see Romesh Ratnesar, “Awestruck,” Time, March 23, 2003. See also
Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
67 For an in-depth description from the tactical level of the Army’s role in OIF through
major combat operations, commissioned by the Army and written by participants, see
Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in
Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

CRS-21
full force, the Division used a more methodical elimination of opponents, combined
with outreach to the population to explain their intentions. IMEF supported the
Division’s use of a slow and deliberate tempo. After several weeks of gradual
attrition, the Division pushed into Basra on April 6, 2003.
The main IMEF force encountered some resistance as they pushed north, in
particular at the town of Nassiriyah, a geographical choke-point. At Nassiriyah,
“there were a number of things that seemed to hit us all about the same time, that
dented our momentum,” LtGen Conway later noted. There, the Marines suffered
casualties from a friendly fire incident with Apaches. As widely reported, the
Army’s 507th Maintenance Company lost its way and stumbled into an ambush, in
which some personnel were killed and others, including PFC Jessica Lynch, were
taken hostage. The area was blanketed by fierce desert sandstorms. And the Saddam
Fedayeen put up a determined resistance — “not a shock, but a surprise,” as LtGen
Conway later reflected. Evidence suggested that additional Iraqi fighters, inspired
by the ambush carried out by the Fedayeen, came from Baghdad to Nasariyah to join
the fight.68 After the defeating the resistance at Nasariyah, the Marines pushed up to
Baghdad along their eastern route.
In the west, the Army faced a longer distance but a less-populated terrain. V
Corps began combat operations with two divisions under its command, the Third
Infantry Division (3ID), under Major General Buford Blount, and the 101st Airborne
Division (101st), under Major General David Petraeus.
The 3ID rapidly led the western charge to Baghdad, moving speedily through
the south and reaching Saddam International Airport on April 4. The division
launched its first “thunder run” — a fast, armored strike — into Baghdad on April
5, and the second on April 7. The purpose of the first, according to the Brigade
Commander in charge, Colonel David Perkins, was “to create as much confusion as
I can inside the city.” The purpose of the second was “to make sure, in no uncertain
terms, that people knew the city had fallen and we were in charge of it.”69
The 101st followed the 3ID up the western route through southern Iraq, clearing
resistance in southern cities and allowing the 3ID to move as quickly as possible.
Soldiers from the 101st faced fighting in key urban areas — Hillah, Najaf, Karbala.
Just after mid-April, the division arrived and set up its headquarters in Mosul, in
northern Iraq.70
Like the Marines, the Army was somewhat surprised by the resistance they
encountered from the Saddam Fedayeen. LTG Wallace apparently caused some
68 Interviews with participants, 2003. See also PBS Frontline, “Interview: Lt.Gen. James
Conway,” February 26, 2004, at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/
interviews/conway. html#marines].
69 PBS Frontline, “Interview: COL David Perkins,” February 26, 2004, at
[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/perkins.html#
thunder].
70 See Press Conference with Major General David Petraeus, May 13, 2003, at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2601].

CRS-22
consternation at higher headquarters levels with his candid remarks to the press in
late March: “The enemy we’re fighting is different from the one we’d war-gamed
against.” He explained, “The attacks we’re seeing are bizarre — technical vehicles
with .50 calibers and every kind of weapon charging tanks and Bradleys.”71 Coupled
with major sand storms, these attacks posed challenges to the ground forces’ long
supply lines — “lines of communication” — running up from Kuwait over hundreds
of miles through southern Iraq.72
In the north, on March 26, 2003, about 1,000 soldiers from the 173rd Airborne
Brigade, part of the Army’s Southern European Task Force based in Italy, parachuted
into northern Iraq. They began their mission by securing an airfield so that cargo
planes carrying tanks and Bradleys could land. Once on the ground, the 173rd,
working closely with air and ground Special Operating Forces and with Kurdish pesh
merga
forces, expanded the northern front of OIF.
Initial coalition plans had called for the heavy 4th Infantry Division (4ID) to open
the northern front by crossing into Iraq from Turkey. The intended primary mission
was challenging Iraqi regular army forces based above Baghdad. A more subtle
secondary mission was to place limits on possible Kurdish ambitions to control more
territory in northern Iraq, thus providing some reassurance to the Government of
Turkey and discouraging it from sending Turkish forces into Iraq to restrain the
Kurds.
By early 2003, 4ID equipment was sitting on ships circling in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea, waiting for an outcome of the ongoing negotiations with the
Turkish government. But on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected a
proposal that would have allowed the 4ID to use Turkish territory.
Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat
Iraqi opposition fighters made a very limited contribution to coalition major
combat efforts. Before the war, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had launched
an ambitious program to recruit and train up to 3,000 Iraqi expats, to be known as the
“Free Iraqi Forces.” Training, by U.S. forces, took place in Taszar, Hungary.
Ultimately, the number of recruits and graduates was much lower than originally
projected. Most graduates did deploy to Iraq, where they served with U.S. forces
primarily as interpreters or working with local communities on civil affairs projects.73
71 Rick Atkinson, “General: A Longer War Likely,” Washington Post, March 28, 2003.
Asked whether this suggested the likelihood of a much longer war than forecast, LTG
Wallace replied, “It’s beginning to look that way”. Asked later that day for his reaction to
these comments, Secretary Rumsfeld noted, “Well, I didn’t read the article — I saw the
headline.” See DoD Press Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld, March 28, 2003, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2180]s].
72 Information from V Corps staff, 2003.
73 Information from Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, and CFLCC and CJTF-7
officials, 2003.

CRS-23
Meanwhile, in late March 2003, Iraqi expatriate oppositionist Ahmed Chalabi
contacted U.S. officials with a request to send a group of his own fighters from
northern to southern Iraq to join the fight. After some discussion, agreement was
reached and a U.S. military flight was arranged. In early April, Chalabi and 600
fighters stepped off the plane at Tallil air base in southern Iraq. The forces were
neither equipped nor well-organized. Accounts from many observers, in succeeding
months, suggested that some members of the group engaged in lawless behavior.74
End of Major Combat
On April 9, 2003, the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos square in Baghdad
was toppled. Two days after the second 3ID “thunder run,” this event signaled for
many observers, inside and outside Iraq, that the old Iraqi regime had ended.
Consistent with the war plans from “Generated Start” onward, U.S. forces
continued to flow into Iraq. The 4th Infantry Division (4ID), diverted from its original
northern front plans, had re-routed its troops and equipment to Kuwait. 4ID forces
began entering Iraq on April 12, 2003. The 1st Armored Division (1AD) also began
arriving in April 2003. According to the planning, the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD)
was scheduled to be next in line. However, in April 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld, in
coordination with General Franks, made the decision that 1CD was not needed in
Iraq at that time — a decision that apparently caused consternation for some ground
commanders.75
As soon as it became apparent that the old regime was no longer exercising
control, widespread looting took place in Baghdad and elsewhere. Targets included
government buildings, and the former houses of regime leaders, but also some private
businesses and cultural institutions. Leaders of the Iraqi National Museum in
Baghdad reported, for example, that “looters had taken or destroyed 170,000 items
of antiquity dating back thousands of years.”76 Looters and vandals also targeted
unguarded weapons stockpiles largely abandoned by former Iraqi security forces.77
74 Information from CENTCOM and V Corps officials, 2003. Curiously, Chalabi and the
fighters, apparently viewing themselves as a stronger incarnation of the Taszar training
program, adopted the name “Free Iraqi Forces”. To distinguish them from the Taszar-
trained Iraqis, the Department of Defense called them the “Free Iraqi Fighting Force.”
75 See Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, “Dash to Baghdad left top U.S. Generals
Divided,” The New York Times, March 13, 2006.
76 “Looters ransack Baghdad museum,” BBC News, April 12, 2003. See also John Burns,
“A Nation at War: The Iraqis, Looting and a Suicide Attack as Chaos Grows in Baghdad,”
The New York Times, April 11, 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the
dynamic as “untidiness”, and a manifestation of “pent-up feelings that may result from
decades of repression” directed against the old regime. See Department of Defense News
Briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, April 11, 2003, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2367]
77 See an assessment by an OIF participant: Colonel Mark Klingelhoefer, “Captured Enemy
Ammunition in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its Strategic Importance in Post-Conflict
Operations,” U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005, available at

CRS-24
Some observers and coalition participants suggested that the coalition simply did not
have enough troops to stop all the unlawful behavior.78
Meanwhile, U.S. senior leadership attention had turned to Iraq’s political future.
In April, the President’s “Special Envoy for Free Iraqis,” Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad, chaired two “big tent” meetings of Iraqis. The first was held on April 15,
2003, at the ancient city of Ur, near Tallil air base, and the second was held on April
28, at the Baghdad Convention Center. Participants include expatriate opposition
leaders and Iraqi Kurds, together with a number of in-country community leaders
who had been identified by the CIA and other sources. The sessions focused on
discussion of broad principles for the future, rather than specific decisions about Iraqi
leadership roles.79
On May 1, 2003, President Bush, standing aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln,
declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq. He stated, “In the battle of Iraq,
the United States and our allies have prevailed.”80 At that point, the old Iraqi regime,
though not completely dismantled, was no longer able to exercise control over Iraq’s
territory, resources, or population. Saddam Hussein was captured later, on December
13, 2003, by units of 4ID, outside his hometown Tikrit.
Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization
This Report uses the term “post-major combat” to refer to the period from the
President’s announcement of the end of major combat, on May 1, 2003, to the
present. This period has included evolutions in national and military strategy, and
in the specific “ways and means” used to pursue those strategies on the ground, as
described below. From a political perspective, the major marker after May 1, 2003,
was the June 28, 2004 transition of executive authority from the occupying powers
back to Iraqis. From a military perspective, the period after May 1, 2003 has
included a continuation of combat operations as well as the introduction of many new
missions.
Legal Basis for Coalition Presence
Formal Occupation. From the time of regime removal until June 28, 2004,
the coalition was formally an occupying force. Shortly after the end of major combat,
in May 2003, the United Nations Security Council recognized the United States and
77 (...continued)
[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf].
78 See John Burns, “A Nation at War: The Iraqis, Looting and a Suicide Attack as Chaos
Grows in Baghdad,” The New York Times, April 11, 2003, who quotes a Marine on guard
in Baghdad as saying, “we just don’t have enough troops.”
79 Information from Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense and
CENTCOM officials, and participant observation, 2003.
80 “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” May 1,
2003, at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html].

CRS-25
the United Kingdom as “occupying powers,” together with all the “authorities,
responsibilities, and obligations under international law” that this designation
entails.81 Somewhat belatedly, in October 2003, the United Nations authorized a
“multi-national force under unified command to take all necessary measures to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”82 That language
referred to the coalition military command in Iraq at the time — the Combined Joint
Task Force-7 (“CJTF-7”).
Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force. As the deadline for the “transfer
of sovereignty” — June 30, 2004 — approached, U.S. and new interim Iraqi officials
negotiated the terms for the presence and activities in Iraq, after that date, of the
newly re-organized multi-national force, now called the Multi-National Force-Iraq
(“MNF-I”).
Agreement was reached to reflect the terms of that presence in the unusual form
of parallel letters, one from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, and one from Iraqi
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, to the President of the UN Security Council. Those
letters were appended to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, issued on June 8,
2004.83
That U.N. Resolution reaffirmed the authorization for the multi-national force
and extended it to the post-occupation period — on the grounds that it was “at the
request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq.”84 It repeated the authorization
language used in the October 2003 Resolution, with an important qualifier: the force
was now authorized to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this
resolution.”85
The U.S. letter spelled out the tasks the multi-national force would undertake,
including combat operations, internment, securing of weapons, training and
equipping Iraqi security forces, and participating in providing humanitarian
assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction assistance.
Some of the early US/ Iraqi discussions had considered the possibility that Iraqi
forces might, in some cases, fall under the command of the multinational force.86
However, the U.N. Resolution and the appended letters made clear that the
81 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), 22 May 2003, Preambular
Section.
82 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), 16 October 2003.
83 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004 (letters).
Subsequently, the U.N. mandate was extended annually.
84 Ibid., para. 9.
85 Ibid., para. 10.
86 The ceremony marking the establishment (Full Operational Capability) of the Multi-
National Force-Iraq, in May 2004, included a parade of representatives of each coalition
partner country. An Iraqi General participated in the parade like all the other coalition
members — and then brought the house down when, unscripted, he kissed the Iraqi flag.

CRS-26
command-and-control relationship between the Iraqi government and the multi-
national force would be strictly one of coordination, not command. The Resolution
called the relationship a “security partnership between the sovereign Government of
Iraq and the multinational force.”87
Both letters described coordination modalities to help ensure unity of effort.
Both stated the intention to make use of “coordination bodies at the national,
regional, and local levels,” and noted that multi-national force and Iraqi officials
would “keep each other informed of their activities.”
Further parameters of the MNF-I presence in Iraq were spelled out in a revised
version of Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority, issued on June 27, 2004.
The document addressed issues including legal immunities, communications,
transportation, customs, entry and departure, for government civilians and contractors
as well as military forces. Issued by the legal executive authority of Iraq at the time,
the Order was to remain in force “for the duration of U.N. Resolution mandates
including subsequent Resolutions, unless rescinded or amended by Iraqi
legislation.”88
Future Security Framework Agreement. The legal basis for the presence
of U.S. forces in Iraq is expected to change by the beginning of 2009. The current
U.N. authorization, issued on December 18, 2007, extends through December 31,
2008. In requesting it, in a letter appended to the Resolution, Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki made clear that this would be the final request by the Government of
Iraq for an extension of the current mandate. The Iraqi Government, he wrote,
“expects, in future, that the Security Council will be able to deal with the situation
in Iraq without the need for action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations.”89
On November 26, 2007, President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki signed a
“Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and
Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America.” The
document stated the “aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements between the
two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security
spheres.”90
87 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004 (letters).
88 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (revised), “Status of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq,” available at
[http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition
__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf].
89 UN Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007), December 18, 2007, available at
[http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/650/72/PDF/N0765072.pdf?Open
Element].
90 “Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship
Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America,” November 26, 2007,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-11.html].

CRS-27
The security agreement is expected to have two parts: a standard Status of Forces
Agreement; and a strategic framework, reflecting the topics outlined in the November
declaration of principles.
As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have
described it, the package is expected Ato set the basic parameters for the U.S.
presence in Iraq, including the appropriate authorities and jurisdiction necessary to
operate effectively and to carry out essential missions, such as helping the Iraqi
government fight al-Qaeda, develop its security forces, and stem the flow of lethal
weapons and training from Iran.91 That AU.S. presence is expected to include
contractors as well as government personnel.92
As State Department Coordinator for Iraq explained in Congressional testimony
in March 2008, the documents would not “include a binding commitment to defend
Iraq or any other security commitments that would warrant Senate advice and
consent.”93
Coalition Command Relationships
Since the declared end of major combat operations, the formal relationships
among U.S. military and civilian organizations operating in Iraq have shifted several
times, in important ways.
The period of formal occupation was characterized by multiple, somewhat
confusing relationships.94 In late April 2003, LTG McKiernan, Commanding
General of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), issued a
proclamation stating: “The coalition alone retains absolute authority within Iraq.”95
CFLCC, the military face of the coalition in Iraq, maintained a small headquarters
presence in Baghdad, at the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory, while the majority of
its staff remained in their pre-war location at Camp Doha, Kuwait.
91 Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, AWhat We Need Next in Iraq,@ Washington Post,
February 13, 2008.
92 See Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, AU.S. Asking Iraq for Wide Rights
on War,@ The New York Times, January 25, 2008.
93 See also Testimony of Ambassador David M. Satterfield, Coordinator for Iraq,
Department of State, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcomittees on the
Middle East and South Asia, and on International Organizations, Human Rights and
Oversight, March 4, 2008, available [http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/sat030408.htm],
and Adam Graham-Silverman, “Democrats Don’t Buy Administration’s Assurances on Iraq
Agreements,” Congressional Quarterly Today, March 5, 2008.
94 For an account of the year of formal occupation from one of the key protagonists, see L.
Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future
of Hope,
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. For an account of that year by a journalist
who spent considerable time at CPA headquarters, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life
in the Emerald City
, New York: Vintage Books, 2006. For a hard-hitting critique of both
civilian and military mistakes during the occupation, see Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The
American Military Adventure in Iraq
, New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.
95 Information from CFLCC and V Corps staff, 2003.

CRS-28
The civilian face of the coalition in Iraq, in that time frame, was the
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), whose small
staff had arrived in Baghdad in late April. The basic civil-military division of labor
was clear — CFLCC was responsible for security, while ORHA focused on
reconstruction and humanitarian issues. The command relationship between the two,
debated before the war, was never clearly resolved during the very short duration of
their partnership on the ground in Iraq.
In early May 2003, President Bush announced his intention to appoint a senior
official to serve as Administrator of a new organization, the Coalition Provisional
Authority, which would serve as the legal executive authority of Iraq — a much more
authoritative mandate than ORHA had held. On May 9, 2003, Ambassador L. Paul
“Jerry” Bremer arrived in Baghdad with a small retinue, to take up the assignment.
By mandate, Ambassador Bremer reported through the Secretary of Defense to the
President. Later, in fall 2003, the White House assumed the lead for coordinating
efforts in Iraq, and Ambassador Bremer’s direct contacts with the White House
became even more frequent.
On June 15, 2003, the headquarters of U.S. Army V Corps, now led by
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, assumed the coalition military leadership
mantle from CFLCC — and the new body was named the CJTF-7.96 CJTF-7
reported directly to CENTCOM, and through it to the Secretary of Defense. At the
same time, CJTF-7 served in “direct support” to CPA.97 In the view of many
observers, that dual chain of command and accountability was not a recipe for
success — particularly when the CENTCOM Commanding General and the CPA
Administrator disagreed with each other. In May 2004, CJTF-7 separated into a
higher, strategically-focused headquarters, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
still led by LTG Sanchez, and a lower, operationally-focused headquarters, the Multi-
National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). MNF-I retained CJTF-7’s “direct support”
relationship with CPA until the end of the formal occupation.
CJTF-7 itself was a combined force, including a UK Deputy Commanding
General, and many key staff members, as well as contingents, from coalition partner
countries. As a rule, those representatives maintained direct communication with
their respective capitals. CPA, too, was “combined,” including a senior UK official
who shared the leadership role, though not executive signing authority, with
Ambassador Bremer, and who maintained a regular and full channel of
communication with the UK government in London.
96 The previous day, June 14, The V Corps Commanding General who led V Corps during
OIF major combat, LTG Wallace, handed command of the Corps to LTG Sanchez. LTG
Sanchez had come to Iraq several weeks earlier as the Commanding General of 1st Armored
Division. The few CFLCC staff still remaining in Baghdad redeployed to Kuwait.
97 The phrase, borrowed from field artillery, does not necessarily translate smoothly into
bureaucratic relationships. CPA tended to assume that the military command in Iraq simply
worked for CPA. In May 2003, at his first meeting with the V Corps Commander,
discussing whether their organizations would retain separate headquarters, Ambassador
Bremer pointed his finger at the General’s chest and said, “It is my commander’s intent that
you co-locate with me”. Participant observation, 2003.

CRS-29
On June 28, 2004, at the “transfer of sovereignty,” the Coalition Provisional
Authority ceased to exist. The new U.S. Embassy, led by Ambassador John
Negroponte, inherited none of CPA’s executive authority for Iraq — like other U.S.
Embassies around the world, it simply represented U.S. interests in Iraq. The
relationship between the Embassy and MNF-I — led by General George Casey
beginning on July 1, 2004 — was strictly one of coordination.
Post-Major Combat: The Force
The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), like its predecessor CJTF-7, is a joint,
combined force. It includes some Department of Defense civil servants, and it is
supported by civilian contractors.
Structure and Footprint
Headquarters Organization. The MNF-I headquarters, located in Baghdad,
is the strategic-level headquarters, currently led by U.S. Army General David
Petraeus. The position of MNF-I Deputy Commanding General (DCG) has always
been filled by a general officer from the United Kingdom — since June 2007,
Lieutenant General William Rollo has served simultaneously as MNF-I DCG and
Senior British Military Representative to Iraq. The MNF-I staff is an ad hoc
headquarters, including senior leaders and staff provided individually by the U.S.
military services and by coalition partner countries.
The Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), also located in Baghdad, is the
operational-level headquarters, reporting to MNF-I.98 Its role is synchronizing
coalition forces actions throughout Iraq. MNC-I is built around a U.S. Army Corps.
As of February 2008, the nucleus of MNC-I is the XVIII Airborne Corps, led by
Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, which replaced III Corps, led by Lieutenant
General Ray Odierno. The Army Corps staff is augmented, in each rotation, by
additional U.S. and coalition partner senior leaders and staff.
The structure and staffing of both MNF-I and MNC-I have evolved significantly
from the early days of OIF. When U.S. Army V Corps became the nucleus of CJTF-
7, in June 2003, its pre-war planning and exercising, and its OIF wartime experience,
had been focused on the tactical-level ground campaign. Its senior staff positions
were filled by Colonels, who were only gradually augmented by General Officers
over the course of summer and fall 2003.
Under the command of MNC-I, Divisions or their equivalents are responsible
for contiguous areas covering all of Iraq. The boundaries of the divisional areas of
98 The 2004 split of CJTF-7 into a higher, four-star HQ, and a lower, three-star HQ, was
strongly recommended, in order to give the commanders time to focus full-time on two very
large portfolios — strategic work with U.S. and Iraqi leadership, and supervising operations
throughout Iraq. As of January 2008, MNF-I and MNC-I staff were reportedly beginning
to plan a re-merger of the two headquarters, perhaps to take effect at the following Corps
rotation, to avoid apparent duplication of effort by some staff sections.

CRS-30
responsibility have shifted somewhat over time, in part to accommodate major
changes in deployments by coalition partner countries.
Provincial Iraqi Control.
The type of coverage varies geographically. In provinces under “Provincial Iraqi
Control” (PIC), the Government of Iraq, represented by the provincial Governor, has
the lead responsibility for security. Conventional coalition forces may have little or
no continual presence.
The PIC designation is the result of a high-level decision process, based on a set
of criteria, with input from Iraqi Government, MNF-I, and U.S. and UK officials, and
a final decision by Iraq’s Ministerial Committee on National Security, which is
chaired by the Prime Minister.99 Some observers have pointed out that there are
obvious qualitative differences in the security environment among PIC provinces —
for example, between relatively calm Sulaymaniyah in the north and occasionally
restive Basra in the south — and therefore, the “PIC” designation alone is not an
especially informative indication of security conditions. The Department of Defense
itself points out an additional flaw — the lack of a “clear, post-PIC assessment
process for determining the degree to which a transitioned province has achieved
sustainable security.”100
U.S. Forces in Iraq
The total number of U.S. forces in Iraq peaked early, during major combat
operations, at about 250,000 troops. Since then, the number has varied greatly over
time, in response to events on the ground, such as Iraqi elections, and to strategic-
level decisions, such as the 2007 surge. The peak surge level of U.S. troops was
about 168,000, in October 2007, up from a relative low of 135,000 troops just before
surge forces began to arrive.
As of March 1, 2008, the total number of U.S. forces in Iraq was 159,700, of
which 134,900 were from the Active Component, and 24,800 from the Reserve
Component.101 The lower total, compared to October 2007, reflects the redeployment
from Iraq without replacement of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 1st
99 As of January 2008, PIC provinces and their dates of designation include Muthanna, July
2006; Dhi Qar, September 2006; An Najaf, December 2006; Maysan, April 2007; Irbil,
Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk, May 2007; Karbala, October 2007; Basrah, December 2007. See
MNF-I Provincial Iraqi Control page at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=1469&Itemid=78].
100 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007.
101 Joint Staff information paper, ABoots on the Ground,@ March 1, 2008. The breakdown
by Service and component: Active Component: 96,800 USA, 8,700 USAF, 5,500 USN,
23,900 USMC. Reserve Component: 14,100 ARNG, 1,100 ANG, 5,100 USAR, 1,000
USAFR, 1,200 USNR, 2,300 USMCR. For more details, and comparisons, see the regularly
updated CRS Report RS22449, U.S. Forces in Iraq, by JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael
Waterhouse.

CRS-31
Cavalry Division, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the 2nd BCT of the 82nd
Airborne Division.
Well before the surge, by many accounts, the demand for forces in Iraq had
placed some stress on both the active and reserve components. The operational
benefits of continuity, and keeping forces in place long enough to gain understanding
and develop expertise, competed against institutional requirements to maintain the
health of the force as a whole, including the ability to recruit and retain personnel.
An additional challenge was that pre-war assumptions only very incompletely
predicted the scope and scale of post-war mission requirements, which meant in
practice, especially early in OIF, that individuals and units deployed without certainty
about the length of their tours. U.S. Army V Corps, for example, was not specifically
given the mission, before the war, to serve as the post-war task force headquarters,
let alone a timeline for that commitment. As the press widely reported after the end
of major combat operations, some members of the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which
had led the Army’s charge to Baghdad, publicly stated their desire to redeploy as
soon as possible. Major General Buford Blount, the 3ID Commanding General,
commented: “You know, a lot of my forces have been over here since September,
and fought a great fight and [are] doing great work here in the city. But if you ask the
soldiers, they’re ready to go home.”102
Sometimes, changes in the situation on the ground — rather than anticipated
political events like Iraqi elections — have prompted decisions to extend
deployments. The earliest and possibly most dramatic example took place in April
2004. The young Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi
(Mahdi Army), staged uprisings in cities and towns throughout Shi’a-populated
southern Iraq, just as the volatile, Sunni-populated city of Fallujah, in Al Anbar
province, simmered in the wake of the gruesome murders of four Blackwater
contractors. The 1st Armored Division (1AD), which had served in Baghdad for one
year, and was already in the process of redeploying, was extended by 90 days — and
then executed a remarkable series of complex and rapid troop deployments to
embattled southern cities.
In early 2007, in an effort to provide greater predictability if not lighter burdens,
the Department of Defense, under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates, announced new rotation policy goals. Active units would deploy for not more
than 15 months, and return to home station for not less than 12 months.103 Reserve
units would mobilize for a maximum of 12 months, including pre- and post-
102 Department of Defense News Transcript, MG Buford C. Blount III from Baghdad, May
15, 2003, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
2608].
103 Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary Gates and General Pace from the
Pentagon, April 11, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=3928]. Secretary Gates clarified that the current expectation was that “not
more than 15 months” would generally mean “15 months.”

CRS-32
deployment responsibilities, rather than 12 months of “boots on the ground,” with the
goal of five years between deployments.104
Coalition Partner Forces105
Since its inception, OIF has been a multinational effort, but the number, size,
and nature of contributions by coalition partner countries has varied substantially
over time. Some of those contributions have been constrained by national caveats.
Four countries provided boots on the ground for major combat — the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, in addition to the United States. Coalition forces
contributions then reached their peak, in terms of the number of both countries and
troops contributed, in the early post-major combat period. Since then, some
countries have withdrawn their forces altogether. A number of other countries have
withdrawn the bulk of their contingents, but have left a few personnel in Iraq to serve
in headquarters staff positions.
Decisions to draw down forces may have been shaped, in some cases, by a
perception that the mission had been accomplished. However, far more frequently,
decisions seem to have been informed by domestic political considerations,
sometimes coupled with apparent pressure from extremists seeking to shape those
decisions. Most notable was the Spanish troop withdrawal, catalyzed by the March
11, 2004, commuter train bombings in Madrid, which killed nearly 200 people. The
attacks took place just days before scheduled Spanish parliamentary elections, in
which the ruling party of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, who had
supported OIF, was voted out of office. The new Prime Minister, Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero, gave orders, within hours after being sworn into office, for
Spanish troops to come home from Iraq.
As of February 2008, the major coalition contributors included the United
Kingdom, Georgia, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and Poland.
The United Kingdom continues to lead Multi-National Division-Southeast,
headquartered in Basra, with about 4,100 troops on the ground as of March 12,
2008.106 Iraqis formally assumed security responsibility for Basra province in
December 2007. As of early 2008, UK forces had pulled back to the Basra airport,
thus maintaining a less visible presence throughout the city and province, and had
shifted their focus from combat operations to training Iraqi security forces. After
104 Department of Defense Press Release, “DoD Announces Changes to Reserve Component
Force Management Policy,” January 11, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10389]. The policy is based on unit rotations; individuals
who transfer between units may find themselves out of synch with the rotation policy goals.
See for example John Vandiver, “Families want answers about deployments and dwell
time,” Stars and Stripes, May 11, 2007.
105 For more detailed information about foreign contributions to Iraq, including coalition
forces, see CRS Report RL32105, Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and
Reconstruction
, by Christopher Blanchard and Catherine Dale.
106 ABrowne visits UK troops in Basra,” The Guardian, March 12, 2008.

CRS-33
coming to office in June 2007, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown initiated a draw-
down of UK forces from about 5,500 in summer 2007, to a projected 2,500 by spring
2008.107 In late March 2008, amidst heavy fighting in Basra between Iraqi security
forces and extremist militias, UK defense officials reportedly suggested that the
spring troop withdrawal plans were temporarily on hold.108
In March 2007, Georgia increased its contribution from 850 to roughly 2,000
troops, a full combat brigade. The contribution is substantial for a country with a
population just over four and a half million, and it is widely believed to be an indirect
part of the Georgian government’s bid to join NATO. In Iraq, the Georgian troops
are based in Wasit province, where many of them man check-points with a particular
view to controlling movement from neighboring Iran. The Georgian brigade serves
under Multi-National Division-Center, whose Commanding General, Major General
Rick Lynch, has praised their efforts and noted with approval that the Georgians are
unconstrained by national caveats.109
Australia initially sent about 2,000 combat troops to Iraq, including Special
Operations Forces, and had about 1,500 troops in and around Iraq as of February
2008.110 Following elections held in November 2007, new Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd stated that Australia=s combat forces C about 550 troops C would leave Iraq
by mid-2008, and these plans were reportedly discussed at the 19th annual Australia-
United States Ministerial Consultations in February 2008. Other Australian forces
are expected to continue their Iraq missions C including maritime security
operations, training, logistics, and headquarters staff functions.111
The Republic of Korea leads Multi-National Division-North East, based in Irbil
and responsible for the largely Kurdish-populated northern provinces of Iraq. The
division focuses primarily on reconstruction. Korean troops arrived in Iraq in 2004
C a sizable contingent of about 3,600, albeit with some caveats. In December 2007,
the Korean parliament voted to extend their mandate for another year.112 The
contingent current includes about 650 troops.113
107 See, for example, Adrian Croft, AUK Brown on unannounced visit to troops in
Iraq,@ Reuters, December 9, 2007.
108 James Hilder, “Basra Crisis Leaves British Withdrawal in Ruins,” London Times, March
28, 2008. See also Thomas Harding, “Gordon Brown Won’t Bring Troops Home Early,”
London Daily Telegraph, March 10, 2008.
109 Conversation with MG Lynch, 2008. A “national caveat” is a restriction, often in formal
written form, imposed by a government on the use of its forces.
110 See Fred W. Baker III, AU.S., Australia Reinforce Defense Relationships,@ American
Forces Press Service, February 23, 2008.
111 See Rohan Sullivan, AAustralian troops home from Iraq in 2008,@ Washington
Post
, November 29, 2007; and Rob Taylor, AAustralia says job is done for
soldiers in Iraq,@ Reuters, February 20, 2008.
112 See AS. Korea extends Iraq deployment,” BBC News, December 28, 2007, and AS. Korea
approves one-year extension in Iraq,@ USA Today, December 28, 2007.
113 ASeoul to dispatch 212 replacement troops to Iraq,@ Korea.net, March 18,
(continued...)

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Poland leads Multi-National Division-Center South (MND-CD), with
responsibility for Qadisiyah province. When Poland assumed command of MND-CS
in September 2003 from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the area of responsibility
included five provinces south of Baghdad, extending to Iraq’s borders with Iran and
Saudi Arabia, but now it includes the single province of Qadisiyah. From 2003
through December 2004, Poland maintained about 2,500 troops in Iraq. That number
was reduced to about 1,700 in January 2005.114 On December 21, 2007, Polish
President Lech Kaczynski approved a plan to withdraw the remaining 900 Polish
troops from Iraq by the end of October 2008.115 U.S. military leaders in Iraq noted
that as of January 2008, Polish troops in Iraq were already preparing for their return
home.116
For outside observers, determining the total number of non-Iraqi, non-U.S.
troops in Iraq is a somewhat complicated process. The actual number is constantly
in flux, as contingents deploy and redeploy, contributing countries decide to change
the size of their contingents, and some individual numbers vary due to injury or
absence. The Department of Defense maintains constantly updated records, but those
records are classified due to requests by some contributors.
Further, foreign troops in Iraq serve in several different organizations — MNF-I
itself; the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I, which falls under the dual
supervision of MNF-I and NATO); and providing security for the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Some of those countries that are usually
listed as part of the coalition deploy troops that directly support MNF-I but are based
outside Iraq — for example, Japan and Singapore.117
According to the March 26, 2008, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” published by
the Department of State, 25 countries other than the United States had forces serving
in MNF-I, with a total of 9,970 troops. Those countries include Albania, Armenia,
Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El
Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Tonga, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom.118 In addition, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Turkey
(...continued)
2008.
114 Information from the Embassy of Poland, Washington DC, October 11, 2007.
115 “Poland to pull troops from Iraq,”,United Press International, December 22, 2007; and
“Polish troops to exit Iraq this year,” CNN, January 31, 2008.
116 Information from MNC-I officials, January 2008.
117 200 Japan Air Self-Defense Forces, based in Kuwait, provide airlift between Kuwait and
Iraq. Information from the Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2007. While
Singapore has never provided “boots on the ground”, it has provided air and naval support,
including deployments of Landing Ship, Tank (LSTs), KC-135 tanker aircraft, and a C-130
transport aircraft. Information from the Embassy of Singapore,Washington, D.C., October
11, 2007.
1 1 8 “Iraq Weekly Status Report, March 26, 2008,” available at
(continued...)

CRS-35
contribute directly to NTM-I but not to MNF-I.119 New Zealand and Fiji provide
security support to UNAMI.120
Post-Major Combat: Security Situation
The security situation in Iraq is multi-faceted, geographically varied, and
constantly evolving. In a society where the rule of law is not completely established,
politics — the struggle for power, resources and influence — more readily and
frequently takes the form of violence. Iraqi people are often faced with imperfect,
pragmatic decisions about who is best suited to protect them and their interests. As
a general trajectory, after a brief period of relative quiet following major combat
operations, forms of violent expression grew in variety, intensity, and frequency until
mid-2007, when the surge reached full strength, but subsequently tapered off in
frequency.
Major Sources and Forms of Violence
Sunni Extremism. One major form of violence in Iraq is terrorism practiced
by Sunni Arabs with stated Islamic extremist goals. As of March 2008, Al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) was the most prominent organization, but the threat may be better
characterized as a loose network of affiliates, including both Iraqis and foreign
fighters. Within the networks, assigned roles range from financiers, and planners of
coordinated attacks, to unskilled labor recruited to emplace improvised explosive
devices (IEDs). Their efforts to recruit primarily young males capitalize on Iraq’s
widespread under-employment, which can make the prospect of one-time payments
appealing,121 and general disaffection spurred by a perceived lack of opportunities in
the new Iraq. The infrastructure used by AQI and its affiliates includes safe houses
and lines of communication reaching, especially, through central and northern Iraq.122
The AQI network is adaptable, quickly shifting its tactics and its footprint as
circumstances change. Pushed out of urban areas, they typically seek refuge and an
opportunity to re-group, in deep rural settings. As surge operations (see below,
“Surge Operations”) pushed AQI and its affiliates out of Baghdad in late 2007, they
118 (...continued)
[http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102858.pdf].
119 See NATO Training Mission-Iraq website, at [http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_
Missions/NTM-I/NTMI_part.htm].
120 See “UN Missions Summary by Country,” September 2007, available at
[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko.dpko/contributors/2007/sept07_3.pdf].
121 Based on accounts from detainees and others, MNF-I leaders assess that
underemployment, more often than unemployment, is a prime motivation for those recruited
to place an IED in return for a one-time cash payment.
122 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January 2008.

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sought new bases of operation to the east and to the north, in the Diyala River Valley
in Diyala province, and in the northern Tigris River Valley in Ninewah province.123
The network capitalizes on Iraq’s still-porous borders. In early 2008, U.S.
Division commanders confirmed that the flow of foreign fighters continued, from
Syria into Iraq. In its most recent quarterly report to the Congress, the Department
of Defense confirmed that “Syria is estimated to be the entry point for 90% of all
foreign terrorists known in Iraq.”124
Shi’a Extremism. Some Shi’a militias have been another major source of
violence. A central figure since the days of major combat operations has been the
young Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Office of the Martyr Sadr
political organization and its armed militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army,
“JAM”). During the year of formal occupation, al-Sadr frequently delivered Friday
sermons at mosques, condemning the coalition and its Iraqi partners and calling for
action against them. In April 2004, his followers staged coordinated, violent
uprisings in cities throughout southern Iraq. While continuing to voice staunch
opposition to the U.S. force presence in Iraq, in August 2007, he declared a ceasefire
to which most of JAM adhered. Rogue elements of JAM — known euphemistically
as “special groups” — defied the ceasefire call and continued to practice violence.125
MNF-I and DoD state that JAM special groups and other Shi’a extremist groups
receive funding and support from Iran.126 Less certain, in most assessments, is the
extent to which elements of the Government of Iran are behind that support.127 The
Iranian government has reportedly pledged to help stop the flow of lethal aid into
Iraq, but reports suggest that training continues at camps inside Iran, and that trained
Iraqi Shi’a extremists continue to make their way back into Iraq after such training.128
According to officials from the Multi-National Divisions that border Iran, the cross-
border flow varies geographically over time, tending to seek the path of least
resistance. The deployment of the Georgian full brigade to Wasit province, for
123 Information from MNF-I, MNC-I, and MND-North officials, January 2008.
124 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, March 2008.
125 Some at MNF-I note that the possibility cannot be ruled out that some JAM special
groups are acting under al-Sadr’s orders.
126 In December 2007, DoD assessed that, compared to September 2007: “There has been
no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq.
Tehran’s support for Shi’a militant groups who attack Coalition and Iraqi forces remains a
significant impediment to progress towards stabilization.” Department of Defense,
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007.
127 Interviews with MNF-I staff, Baghdad, January 2008.
128 Interviews with MNF-I staff, Baghdad, January 2008. During the February 2008 state
visit to Baghdad by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian and Iraqi officials
reportedly signed an agreement on the renovation of border posts along their shared land and
maritime borders. See “Iran, Iraq Emphasize Need for Renovation of Border Posts,” Tehran
IRNA agency in English, February 20 2008.

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example, made that province harder to traverse and pushed traffic north and south.129
Meanwhile, the Iranian government apparently continues to seek influence among
Iraqi Shi’a through the exercise of “soft power,” for example by purchasing a power
plant in the Shi’a-populated Sadr City section of Baghdad.
JAM and JAM “special groups” activities in southern Iraq and Baghdad take
place against the backdrop of a deeply-rooted intra-Shi’a struggle for power and
resources. Some observers assess that, more than the Sunni-based insurgency or any
other issue, the struggle for the Shi’a-populated south may shape Iraq’s future.130 The
other main protagonist is the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (AISCI, formerly
known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), which is backed
by its Badr militia and which, like JAM, provides people with goods and services in
an effort to extend its influence. The power struggle also includes smaller Shi’a
political parties backed by militias, such as Fadila al-Islamiyah (Islamic Virtue)
which is active in the major southern city and province of Basra.
Two upcoming political markers may exacerbate the contest. First, in April
2008, an 18-month moratorium on implementation of a 2006 law on federalism
expires. That law includes provisions for the creation of “regions” from two or more
provinces, and major Shi’a groups in the south have already called for different
approaches to regionalization, based on their popular bases of support. Second,
October 1, 2008, is the deadline for holding provincial elections, in accordance with
the Provincial Powers Law passed in February 2008 and approved by the Presidency
Council, after some reluctance, in March.131
While the power struggle need not necessarily be violent, events on the ground
in March 2008 underscored both the complexity and volatility of the contest. In the
last week of March, based on direction from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi
security forces launched a major operation, Sawlat al-Fursan (Attack of the Knights)
in Basra, with the stated aim of targeting criminals operating under religious or
political cover. The estimated 30,000 Iraqi forces included special operations and
conventional army forces, as well as police. Coalition support included the transition
teams embedded with Iraqi units, and some liaison elements at the Basra Operational
Center.132 Some militiamen reportedly put up fierce resistance. Fighting was also
reported in the southern cities of Al Kut and Al Hillah, as well as in the Shi’a-
populated Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad.
129 Interviews with MNF-I division staff, January 2008.
130 See for example, AShiite Politics in Iraq: the Role of the Supreme Council@,
I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s i s G r o u p , N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 7 , a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5158]. This view is shared by some key
strategists at MNF-I, interviews, January 2008.
131 See Amit R. Paley, “Iraqi Leaders Veto Law on Elections,” Washington Post, February 28,
2008. The Provincial Powers Act was passed as part of a “package deal”, together with the National
Budget and an Amnesty Law. Vice President Abd al-Mehdi initially objected to a provision of the
Provincial Powers Act concerning modalities for the removal of provincial governors.
132 See MNF-I Press Conference, Major General Kevin Bergner, March 26, 2008. The Basra
Operational Center coordinates all Iraqi security forces activities in the province.

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MNF-I stated that the Basra operations “are not directed at the Jaish al-Mahdi”,
though criminal JAM “special groups” may be targeted. Some Muqtada al-Sadr
loyalists apparently viewed the matter differently, and accused the government of
using its armed forces, many of which are strongly influenced by ISCI, to attack a
political rival. International Crisis Group expert Joost Hiltermann characterized the
operations as “a fairly transparent partisan effort by the Supreme Council [ISCI]
dressed in government uniforms to fight the Sadrists and Fadila.”133
Nature of Sectarian Violence. Less a source than a type of violence, Iraq
has struggled for years with sectarian violence, particularly along the fault lines
between populations predominantly of different sectarian groups. Those fault lines,
some observers suggest, are where local populations are likely to feel most
vulnerable, and might in some cases be most open to assurances of protection from
one organized armed group or another.
The displacement of many Iraqis from their homes, and the resulting greater
segregation in urban areas, has reduced the number of fault lines somewhat.134
Sectarian violence in Iraq has tended to perpetuate itself, in cycles of reprisals.
The February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of Shiite Islam’s
holiest shrines, prompted Shi’a reprisals targeting Sunnis and Sunni mosques in a
number of cities. AQI responded in some locations by staging a series of further
attacks.135
Criminality. Another major category of violence is opportunistic criminality,
practiced with a view to sheer material gain rather than political or ideological goals.
The inchoate status of Iraq’s judicial system and law enforcement organizations has
left room for opportunists to steal, loot, smuggle, kidnap and extort.
Other Security Challenges
In addition to the primary adversaries during major combat operations — the
regime’s forces and security structures — and the primary sources of violence in the
period after major combat, coalition forces in Iraq have had to contend with the
presence of two designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations largely unrelated to the
rest of the fight but of deep interest to some of Iraq’s neighbors. Both cases have
133 Quoted by Alexandra Zavis, “Iraqi Shiites Clash in mBasra,” Los Angeles Times, March 26,
2008. See also “Iraq: Al-Basrah Clashes Could Prove Ominous,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio
Liberty, March 26, 2008; Sholnn Freeman and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Intense Fighting Erupts in
Iraq,” Washington Post, March 26, 2008; Michael Kamber and James Glanz, “Iraqi and U.S.
Forces Battle Shiite Militia,” The New York Times, March 26, 2008.
134 To be clear, as human rights groups stress, displacement is not a “solution”. As a rule,
in most situations, people are far more vulnerable in displacement than they are in their
homes.
135 See press accounts including Ellen Knickmeyer and K.I. Ibrahim, “Bombing Shatters
Mosque in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 23, 2006; and Robert F. Worth, “Muslim
Clerics Call for an End to Iraqi Rioting,” The New York Times, February 25, 2006.

CRS-39
consumed substantial time and energy from MNF-I staff in Iraq as well as senior
leaders in Washington, D.C., and both have raised the specter of potential additional
military requirements.
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The first group is the Kurdistan Workers
Party — the PKK, also known over time as KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and the KCK.
The PKK is based in southeastern Turkey, but maintains a presence in northern Iraq
and reportedly uses that area to rest and re-group from its operations in Turkey. The
PKK’s stated goal is the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, and it has
practiced terror to that end, targeting Turkish security forces and civilian officials.
The Secretary of State has designated the PKK a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Since 2003, the Turkish government has pushed for action against PKK
members in northern Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi governments have both strongly
supported the Turkish government=s stand against terrorism C and the PKK C in
principle. In the past, both the Iraqi government and MNF-I have reportedly
expressed concerns that military action against the PKK in Iraq could open a new
Anorthern front,@ taxing their already thinly-stretched forces,136 and the Iraqi
government has stressed its concerns about the sovereignty of its territory and air
space. In December 2007, the Turkish government launched a series of air strikes,
targeting presumed PKK positions in northern Iraq, followed in February 2008 by
coordinated air and ground attacks.137 U.S. senior leaders, reportedly informed in
advance about Turkish intentions, publicly called on the government of Turkey to
keep the operation as short as possible.138
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK). During the year of formal occupation, CJTF-7,
CPA and agency leaders in Washington, D.C., spent considerable time focused on
the disposition of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (“MeK”). Formed by students in Iran in
the 1960’s, in leftist opposition to the Shah and his regime, the MeK later stepped
into opposition against what it calls the “mullah regime” that took power after the
1979 Iranian Revolution. Over time, the MeK has sought opportunistic alliances,
including moving its operational headquarters to Iraq, and making common cause
with the Iraqi government, during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.
Although the MeK is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, some U.S.
officials in the past reportedly considered the possibility of using the MeK as
leverage against Tehran. Several times, some Members of Congress — reportedly
some 200 in the year 2000 — signed letters expressing their support for the cause
advocated by the MeK.139
136 Information from CJTF-7, MNF-I, DoD, and Iraqi officials, 2003 and 2004.
137 See for example ATurkish jets in fresh Iraq strike, BBC America, December 26, 2007.
138 See Alissa J. Rubin and Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkish Troops Enter Iraq in Pursuit of
Kurdish Militants,” The New York Times, February 23, 2008; Lolita Baldor, “Gates: Turkey
Raid Won’t Solve Problems,” Washington Post, February 23, 2008; Yochi Dreazen, “U.S.
Knew of Turkey’s Plan to Hit PKK, Didn’t Object,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2008.
139 Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Terror Watch: Shades of Gray,” Newsweek,
(continued...)

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This awkward policy history was magnified by awkward events on the ground
during OIF major combat operations, when, on April 15, 2003, U.S. Special
Operations Forces signed a ceasefire agreement with MeK leaders. Subsequent
guidance from the Department of Defense through CENTCOM to forces on the
ground was to effect a MeK surrender. Following a series of negotiations with MeK
leaders, the several thousand MeK members were separated from their well-
maintained heavy weapons and brought under coalition control. Efforts have been
underway since that time, in coordination with the Iraqi government and the many
countries of citizenship of the MeK members, to determine appropriate further
disposition. The key operational concern, in the early stages, was that MeK non-
compliance could generate large-scale operational requirements, effectively opening
another front.
Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy
and Operations
Over time, U.S. military strategy for Iraq — and thus also operations on the
ground — have been adapted to support evolving U.S. national strategy. In turn,
national strategy has directly drawn some lessons from OIF operational experience.
The Administration’s basic national strategic objectives have remained roughly
consistent over time. So have the major categories of activities (or “lines of
operation”) — political, economic, essential services, diplomatic — used to help
achieve the objectives. What have evolved greatly over time are the views of
commanders in the field and decision-makers in Washington, D.C., about the best
ways to achieve “security” and how that line of operation fits with the others.
This section highlights key episodes and turning-points in the theory and
practice of OIF military operations, including “Fallujah II”, COIN operations in Tal
Afar, Operation Together Forward, and the operations associated with the 2007 “New
Way Forward”. The review suggests that the application of counter-insurgency
(COIN) theory and practice grew over time, but by no means steadily or consistently.
Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict
Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz argued: “The first, the supreme,
the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to
make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking.”140 In theory,
how the “kind of war” is identified helps shape the tools selected to prosecute it. In
the case of OIF after major combat operations, it proved difficult for senior Bush
Administration officials and military leaders to agree on what “kind of war” OIF was
turning out to be.
139 (...continued)
October 17, 2007.
140 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976, p.88.

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On July 7, 2003, General John Abizaid, an Arabic speaker who had served
during OIF major combat as the Deputy Commanding General of CENTCOM,
replaced General Tommy Franks as CENTCOM Commander. At his first press
conference in the new role, GEN Abizaid referred to the challenge in Iraq as a
“classical guerrilla-type campaign.” Slightly more carefully but leaving no room for
doubt he added, “I think describing it as guerrilla tactics is a proper way to describe
it in strictly military terms.”141
The Pentagon pointedly did not adopt that terminology. Two weeks later, asked
about his reluctance to use the phrase “guerrilla war,” Secretary Rumsfeld noted: “I
guess the reason I don’t use the phrase ‘guerrilla war’ is because there isn’t one, and
it would be a misunderstanding and a miscommunication to you and to the people of
the country and the world.” Instead, in Iraq there were “five different things”:
“looters, criminals, remnants of the Ba’athist regime, foreign terrorists, and those
influenced by Iran.”142
During the year of formal occupation, a UK officer serving as Special Assistant
to the CJTF-7 Commander drafted a paper outlining the concepts of insurgency and
counter-insurgency and their possible application to Iraq. He circulated the paper to
senior CJTF-7 staff and the ideas gained traction.143
However, for years afterward, the Pentagon also resisted the terminology of
“insurgency.” At a November 2005 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Peter Pace, speaking about the adversary in Iraq, said, “I have to use
the word ‘insurgent’ because I can’t think of a better word right now.” Secretary
Rumsfeld cut in — “enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government.” He added, “That
[using the word “insurgent”] gives them a greater legitimacy than they seem to
merit.”144
Military Operations During Occupation
During the formal occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2004, the military command
in Iraq, CJTF-7, was responsible for “security,” while the civilian leadership, the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was responsible for all other governance
141 See BBC, “US faces Iraq guerrilla war,” July 16, 2003, available at
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3072899.stm].
142 Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers,
June 30, 2003, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=2767]. When a reporter read the DoD definition of guerrilla war — “military
and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,
predominantly indigenous forces” — and asked whether that described the situation in Iraq,
Secretary Rumsfeld replied, “It really doesn’t.”
143 Information from that officer and senior CJTF-7 staff, 2003 and 2004.
144 News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace,
November 29, 2005, DOD website, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1492].

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functions.145 In the views of the CJTF-7 leadership, establishing “security” required
more than “killing people and breaking things” — it required simultaneous efforts
to achieve popular “buy-in,” for example by rebuilding local communities and
engaging Iraqis in the process. 146
Accordingly, CJTF-7 built its plans around four basic lines of operation, or
categories of effort — political (governance), economic, essential services, and
security — which differ only slightly from the categories in use in early 2008. Those
lines of operation were echoed in the plans of CJTF-7’s subordinate commands.
CJTF-7 would lead the “security” line, and support CPA efforts in the other areas.
Beginning in 2003, CJTF-7’s basic theory of the case was that the lines of
operation, pursued simultaneously, would be mutually reinforcing. Major General
Peter Chiarelli, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad from 2004 to
2005, argued after his tour that it was not effective to try to achieve security first, and
then turn to the other lines of operation. He wrote: “…if we concentrated solely on
establishing a large security force and [conducting] targeted counterinsurgent combat
operations — and only after that was accomplished, worked toward establishing a
sustainable infrastructure supported by a strong government developing a free-market
system — we would have waited too long.”147
In the “security” line of operation, military operations under CJTF-7 included
combat operations focused on “killing or capturing” the adversary. Aggressive
operations yielded large numbers of Iraqis detained by the coalition — the large
numbers, and frequent difficulties determining whether and where individuals were
being held, were reportedly an early and growing source of popular frustration. In
April 2004, the unofficial release of graphic photos of apparent detainee abuse at Abu
Ghraib generated shock and horror among people inside and outside Iraq. Some
observers have suggested that these developments may have helped fuel the
insurgency.148
145 Neither CPA nor CJTF-7 was responsible for the search for possible weapons of mass
destruction. That mission was assigned to the Iraq Survey Group, which reported jointly to
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DoD’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and
which carried out its work from June 2003 to September 2004. The group’s final Report,
“Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” and commonly
known as the Duelfer Report, was published on September 30, 2004, and is available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html.
146 Information from CJTF-7 leaders, and participant observation, 2003 and 2004.
147 Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace:
The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review, July-August 2005,
available at [http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/
chiarelli.pdf]. The authors characterized the lines of operation as “combat operations, train
and employ security forces, essential services, promote governance, and economic
pluralism.” Echoing the views of CJTF-7 leaders, the authors added, “Further, those who
viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military action alone were
mistaken.”
148 In January 2004, when abuse allegations were brought forward, CJTF-7 issued a press
(continued...)

CRS-43
CJTF-7 military operations also included early counter-insurgency (COIN)
practices for population control. Those practices included creating “gated
communities” — including Saddam’s home town of al-Awja — by fencing off a
town or area and strictly controlling access through the use of check-points and ID
cards. To make military operations less antagonistic, when possible, to local
residents, units substituted “cordon and knock” approaches for the standard “cordon
and search”.149
The security line of operation also included early partnerships with nascent Iraqi
security forces, including mentoring as well as formal training (see below, “ISF
Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation”). Where troop strength so
permitted, for example in Baghdad and in Mosul, Army Military Police were
assigned to local police stations as de facto advisors.150
While the military command did not have the lead role for the non-security lines
of operation, it made contributions to those efforts. To address the most pressing
“essential services” concerns, the military command created Task Force Restore Iraqi
Electricity, and Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil, which were later consolidated into the
Gulf Region Division, under the Army Corps of Engineers.
To help jumpstart local economies — and to provide Iraqis with some visible
signs of post-war “progress” — the military command launched the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP). As initially crafted, CERP provided
commanders with readily available discretionary funds to support small-scale
projects, usually initiated at the request of local community leaders.
In the “governance” field, commanders needed Iraqi interlocutors to provide
bridges into local communities, and advice concerning the most urgent reconstruction
and humanitarian priorities. Since official Iraqi agencies were no longer intact, and
since the CPA did not yet have a sufficient regional presence to help build local
148 (...continued)
release noting that the command had ordered an inquiry into alleged detainee abuses. Abu
Ghraib events prompted a number of investigations and reports. For one account of events
and the policies that shaped them, see the Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review
DoD Detention Operations, chaired by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and
commissioned by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld “to provide independent
professional advice on detainee abuses, what caused them, and what actions should be taken
to preclude their repetition,” available in book form, Department of Defense, The
Schlesinger Report: An Investigation of Abu Ghraib,
New York: Cosimo Reports,
November 15, 2005. For a detailed, critical account of Abu Ghraib events and their
antecedents and impact, see Seymour Hersch, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to
Abu Ghraib
, New York: Harper Perennial, 2005.
149 Information from CJTF-7 and Division leaders, 2003 and 2004.
150 Information from CJTF-7, 1AD, and 101st leaders, and participant observation, 2003 and
2004.

CRS-44
governments, commanders helped select provincial and local councils to serve in
temporary advisory capacities.151
By most accounts, by the end of the year of formal occupation, in June 2004, the
security situation had worsened — catalyzed in April by the simultaneous unrest in
Fallujah and al-Sadr-led uprisings throughout the south. Many observers have
suggested that none of the lines of operation — whether civilian-led or military-led
— was fully implemented during the year of formal occupation, due to a lack of
personnel and resources. If that is so, then CJTF-7’s basic assumption — that
establishing security required simultaneous application of all the lines of operation
— was never fully put to the test.
Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II)
One of the first very high-profile military operations after major combat was
Operation Phantom Fury, designed to “take back” the restive city of Fallujah in the
Al Anbar province. In November 2004, Phantom Fury — or “Fallujah II” —
highlighted the intransigence of the emerging Sunni Arab insurgency, early coalition
military efforts to counter it, and the complex intersection of political considerations
and “best military advice” in operational decision-making.152
During major combat operations and the early part of the formal occupation, the
military command practiced first an “economy of force” approach to Al Anbar
province, and then a quick shuffling of responsible military units, which left little
opportunity to establish local relationships or build expertise.153 Building
relationships with the population is critical in any counter-insurgency, and it may be
particularly important in Al Anbar, where social structure is based largely on
complex and powerful tribal affiliations.
Coalition forces in Al Anbar during major combat were primarily limited to
Special Operations Forces. After CJTF-7 was established, the first unit assigned
responsibility for the large province was the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment —
essentially a brigade-sized formation. In fall 2003, the much larger 82nd Airborne
Division and subordinate units arrived in Iraq and were assigned to Al Anbar, but
their tenure was brief — after six months they handed off responsibility to the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF).154
151 These efforts continued an initiative to help form district and neighborhood advisory
councils in Baghdad, launched by ORHA but discontinued by CPA.
152 For a detailed account of the military operations, and the political and military events that
led up to them, see Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for
Fallujah
, New York: Bantam Books, 2005.
153 Al Anbar province, in western Iraq, covers about one-third of Iraq’s territory but is
relatively lightly populated.
154 IMEF headquarters and the 1st Marine Division returned to Iraq in spring 2004, after a
short stay at home after major combat operations.

CRS-45
The city of Fallujah, like the rest of Al Anbar, is populated largely by Sunni
Arabs. Under the old Iraqi regime, Fallujah had enjoyed some special prerogatives
and had produced a number of senior leaders in Iraq’s various security forces. Many
residents therefore had some reason to be concerned about their place in the post-
Saddam Iraq.
On March 31, 2004, four American contractors working for Blackwater, who
were driving through Fallujah, were ambushed and killed — and then their bodies
were mutilated and hung from a bridge. Photos of that grisly aftermath were rapidly
transmitted around the world — riveting the attention of leaders in Baghdad,
Washington, and other coalition country capitals.
What followed, in April 2004, was a series of highest-level deliberations in
Baghdad and Washington concerning the appropriate response. Some key
participants in the debates initially favored immediate, overwhelming military action,
but those views were quickly tempered by concerns about the reactions that massive
military action — and casualties — might produce. Several key Sunni Arab
members of the Iraqi leadership body, the Iraqi Governing Council — threatened to
resign in the event of an attack on Fallujah.155 And some senior U.S. officials
expressed concerns about the reactions of other governments in the region, and of
Sunni Arabs elsewhere in Iraq.156
The Administration’s guidance, after the initial debates, was to respect the
concerns of Iraqi leaders and to avoid sending U.S. military forces into Fallujah.
What followed, instead, was a series of “negotiations” by CPA and CJTF-7 leaders
with separate sets of Fallujah community representatives, some of them brokered by
Iraqi national-level political leaders. And what emerged was a “deal” initiated by
IMEF with a local retired Iraqi Army General and a group of locally-recruited
fighters, who formed the “Fallujah Brigade” and pledged to restore and maintain
order.157
When the Fallujah Brigade collapsed that summer, the city of Fallujah had not
been “cleared” by either the Brigade or IMEF. Over the summer, insurgents
reportedly strengthened their hold on the city.
Decisive military action — Operation Phantom Fury — was launched by IMEF
in November 2004. Several factors may have shaped the timing of the Operation.
By November, the new interim Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Ayad
Allawi, had had some time to establish its credibility — perhaps enough to help quell
155 The Iraq Governing Council (IGC) was a critical part of the U.S. strategy for
transitioning responsibility and authority to Iraqi leaders. The plans, articulated in the
Transitional Administrative Law approved in March 2004, called for the IGC to relinquish
its advisory role to a new, appointed Iraqi Interim Government, to which CPA, in turn,
would return full governing authority by June 30, 2004. An IGC collapse, it was considered,
could disrupt or delay the plans.
156 Information from CPA and CJTF-7 officials, and participant observation, 2004.
157 Information from CJTF-7 and IMEF leaders, 2004. See also Bing West, No True Glory:
A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah
, New York: Bantam Books, 2005.

CRS-46
citizens’ concerns in the event of large-scale military action. Key Iraqi elections were
scheduled for January 2005, and eliminating a hotbed of insurgency beforehand
might increase voter participation. And earlier in November, President Bush had
been re-elected, which may have reassured some Iraqi leaders that if they agreed to
the military operation, the U.S. Government — and coalition forces — would be
likely to continue to provide support to deal with any aftermath.
The Marines began the Fallujah operations by setting conditions — turning off
electrical power, and urging the civilians of Fallujah to leave the city. The vast
majority of residents did depart — leaving about 500 hardcore fighters, who
employed asymmetrical tactics against a far larger, stronger force. That coalition
force included one UK battalion, 3 Iraqi battalions, 6 U.S. Marine battalions and 3
U.S. Army battalions. The operation reportedly included 540 air strikes, 14,000
artillery and mortar shells fired, and 2,500 tank main gun rounds fired. Some 70 U.S.
personnel were killed, and 609 wounded. In Fallujah, of the city’s 39,000 buildings,
18,000 were damaged or destroyed.158
In the aftermath, coalition and Iraqi forces established a tight security cordon
around the city, with a system of vehicle searches and security passes for residents,
to control movement and access. Fingerprints and retinal scans were taken from
male residents. Observers noted that by spring 2005, about half the original
population, of 250,000, had returned home — many of them to find essential services
disrupted and their property damaged.159 The scale of destruction was criticized by
some observers inside Iraq and in the Middle East region more broadly.
The effects of the comprehensive “clearing” were not lasting. Al Qaeda
affiliates gradually returned and made Fallujah a strong-hold and base of operations
(see below, “Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar”).
Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar
Military operations in the town of Tal Afar, in 2005, marked an early, multi-
faceted, and successful application of counter-insurgency (COIN) approaches, and
successful results, in OIF. In Washington, “Tal Afar” gave birth to a new Iraq policy
lexicon, and in Iraq — though not immediately — to the expanded use of COIN
practices.
Tal Afar is located in Ninewah province, along the route from the provincial
capital of Mosul to Syria. Its mixed population of about 290,000 includes Sunni
Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Yezidis. From April 2003 until early 2004, the 101st
Airborne Division had responsibility for Ninewah and Iraq’s three northern, largely
Kurdish-populated provinces. Because the north was relatively quiet, due in part to
the effectiveness of the Kurdish pesh merga forces, the 101st was able to concentrate
primarily on Ninewah — a relatively high troops-to-population ratio. In early 2004,
158 Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah, New York:
Bantam Books, 2005.
159 See for example Richard Beeston, “At home in the rubble: siege city reborn as giant
gated community,” The Times Online, May 19, 2005.

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when the 101st redeployed, responsibility for the area passed to a much smaller
Stryker brigade. That brigade, in turn, was periodically asked to provide forces for
operations elsewhere in Iraq, so the coalition force footprint in Ninewah was
substantially reduced. Tal Afar — with a convenient trade route location, and a
mixed population “perfect” for fomenting sectarian strife — become a base of
operations for former regime elements and Sunni extremists, including suicide
bombers.
In May 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR), now commanded by
Colonel H.R. McMaster, arrived in Tal Afar. COL McMaster was familiar with OIF
issues from his previous service as the Director of GEN Abizaid’s Commander’s
Action Group at CENTCOM.160 At CENTCOM, he had helped the command to
think through the nature of the Iraqi insurgency, and to craft appropriate responses
including targeted engagements with key leaders. As the author of a well-known
account of Vietnam decision-making, COL McMaster could also readily draw key
lessons from that earlier complex engagement.161
In early 2005, the 3ACR began their deployment preparations at home in Fort
Carson, Colorado — studying COIN approaches, training and exercising those
approaches, and learning conversational Arabic. Later, in Iraq, COL McMaster
described the Regiment’s mission in the classical COIN lexicon of “population
security”: “...the whole purpose of the operation is to secure the population so that
we can lift the enemy’s campaign of intimidation and coercion over the population
and allow economic and political development to proceed here and to return to
normal life.”162
In practice, that meant taking “a very deliberate approach to the problem,”
beginning with months of preparatory moves. Those preparatory steps included
beefing up security along the Syrian border to the west, and targeting and eliminating
enemy safe havens out in the desert. They also included constructing a dirt berm
ringing Tal Afar, and establishing check points to control movement in and out of the
city.
Before the launch of full-scale operations in September 2005, the Regiment
urged civilians to leave Tal Afar. Then 3ACR cleared the city deliberately — block
by block. After the clearing operations, 3ACR had sufficient forces to hold the city,
setting up 29 patrol bases around town, every few blocks.163
160 A Commander’s Action — or Initiatives — Group, is small group of smart thinkers,
hand-selected by the commander to serve as his personal, in-house “think-tank.”
161 His book Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Lies that led to Vietnam
(published by Harper Perennial, 1998) is widely read in U.S.
military educational programs and elsewhere.
162 Department of Defense Press Briefing, H.R. McMaster, September 13, 2005, available
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2106].
163 See Thomas E. Ricks, “The Lessons of Counterinsurgency,” Washington Post, February
16, 2006; “The Insurgency: Interview with COL H.R. McMaster”, Frontline, PBS, February
(continued...)

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Basing coalition forces among the population was an unusual approach at the
time. Though common in the early days of OIF, by 2005, most coalition forces in
Iraq had been pulled back to relatively large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), secure
and separate from the local population. That strategy was driven in part by the theory
that the visible presence of coalition forces — and their weapons and their heavy
vehicles — could antagonize local communities.164
3ACR’s COIN approaches also included working closely with their Iraqi
security forces counterparts — the 3rd Iraqi Army Division. COL McMaster credited
that partnership as essential to the strategy: “What gives us the ability to…clear and
hold as a counterinsurgency strategy is the capability of Iraqi security forces.”165 The
key to the success in Fallujah, he added — and the major difference from “Fallujah
II” — was popular support: “we had the active cooperation of such a large
percentage of the population.”
COL McMaster’s use of the phrase “clear and hold” was not accidental — it had
been the name of the counter-insurgency approach introduced in Vietnam by General
Creighton Abrams, following years of General William Westmoreland’s “search and
destroy” approach.166
“Clear, Hold, Build”
A short time later, the Administration adopted and expanded on the “clear,
hold” lexicon to describe the overall strategy in Iraq.167 In October 2005, in
testimony about Iraq before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice began by stating: “Our political-military strategy has to be
clear, hold, and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely,
and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions.”168 About three weeks later, in a
163 (...continued)
21, 2006, available at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/insurgency/interviews/
mcmaster/html]; and George Packer, “Letter from Iraq: The Lesson of Tal Afar,” The New
Yorker
, April 10, 2006.
164 Information from CENTCOM and CJTF-7 leaders, 2004.
165 Department of Defense Press Briefing, H.R. McMaster, September 13, 2005, available
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2106].
166 Ibid.
167 David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post that in 2005, a number of key Iraq decision-
makers and practitioners, including COL McMasters’ former boss at CENTCOM General
Abizaid, were reading Lewis Sorley’s book, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and
the Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam
(New York: Harcourt, 1999), which
favorably describes General Abrams’ “clear and hold” approach. See David Ignatius, “A
Better Strategy for Iraq,” Washington Post, November 4, 2005.
168 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, October 19, 2005, available at [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/
55303.htm]. To be clear, “strategy” refers in general to a set of “ways and means”, linked
with the “ends” they are intended to achieve. “Clear, hold, build” referred to a new set of
(continued...)

CRS-49
major Veterans Day speech, President Bush echoed Secretary Rice’s “clear, hold,
build” language almost verbatim.169
The following month, November 2005, the Administration issued a new
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The Strategy argued — roughly consistent
with the military’s long-standing lines of operation — that success required three
major tracks, security, political and economic. Consistent with the basic theory of
the case since 2003, these tracks were to be pursued simultaneously, and would be
“mutually reinforcing.” As the Strategy states, “Progress in each of the political,
security, and economic tracks reinforces progress in the other tracks.”170
The new Strategy prominently adopted the “clear hold build” lexicon, with a
twist. “Clear, hold, build” was now the prescribed set of approaches for the security
track alone. The political and economic tracks were also each based on a trinitarian
set of approaches. In the security track, “build” now referred specifically to the Iraqi
security forces and local institutions. “Build” also appeared in the other two tracks
— capturing the focus on national-level institutions from the earlier public statements
by President Bush and Secretary Rice.171
By March 2006, a complete, official narrative had emerged, in which Tal Afar
operations had tested and confirmed both the “clear, hold, build” strategy, and the
interdependence of the three major tracks. As a White House Fact Sheet, titled
“Clear, Hold, Build”, stated: “Tal Afar shows how the three elements of the strategy
for victory in Iraq — political, security, and economic — depend on and reinforce
one another.”172
168 (...continued)
approaches — of “ways and means” — but the Administration’s broad stated goals had not
changed.
169 He said, “Our strategy is to clear, hold, and build. We’re working to clear areas from
terrorist control, to hold those areas securely, and to build lasting, democratic Iraqi
institutions through an increasingly inclusive political process.” See “President
commemorates Veterans Day, Discusses War on Terror,” November 11, 2005, Tobyhanna,
Pennsylvania, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/print/
20051111-1.html].
170 The Strategy describes the security mandate to “clear, hold, build” this way: “Clear areas
of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and
denying them safe haven; hold areas freed from enemy influence by ensuring that they
remain under the control of the Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force
presence; and build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver
services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.” See National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq
, November 30, 2005, p. 2, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf]
171 Ibid., pp.1-2.
172 White House Fact Sheet: “Strategy for Victory — Clear, Hold, Build,” March 20, 2006.

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Operation Together Forward
In June 2006, Iraqi and Coalition forces launched “Operation Together
Forward,” officially based on “clear, hold, build” and aimed at reducing violence and
increasing security in Baghdad. Baghdad was chosen as the focus because it was “the
center that everybody [was] fighting for — the insurgents, the death squads…the
government of Iraq.”173 The Operation was predicated on basic counter-insurgency
principles — “to secure the citizens’ lives here in Baghdad.”174
Together Forward included some 48 battalions of Iraqi and coalition forces —
about 51,000 troops altogether, including roughly 21,000 Iraqi police, 13,000 Iraqi
National Police, 8,500 Iraqi Army, and 7,200 coalition forces.175 Iraqi forces were
in the lead, supported by the coalition. The effort included clearing operations, as
well as a series of new security measures including extended curfews, tighter
restrictions on carrying weapons, new tips hotlines, more checkpoints, and more
police patrols.176
Together Forward theoretically included the other major tracks of the November
2005 National Strategy — political and economic efforts, as well as security,
although the coalition’s primary focus was security. As MNF-I spokesman Major
General William Caldwell noted in July 2006, “It’s obviously a multi-pronged
approach…but those [other tracks] are mostly the government of Iraq side of the
house.”177
MNF-I stated publicly from the start that Together Forward was expected to take
months, not weeks. For several months after the operation was launched, the levels
of violence in the capital rose. As MG Caldwell explained in October 2006, “the
insurgent elements, the extremists, are in fact punching back hard.” Once the Iraqi
and coalition forces cleared an area, the insurgents tried to regain that territory, so the
173 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 24, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1201&Itemid=131].
174 MNF-I spokesman MG Caldwell attributed that phrase to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki, see Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National
Forces-Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].
175 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].
176 Press Conference of the President, the Rose Garden, June 14, 2006, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060614.html].
177 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].

CRS-51
Iraqi and coalition forces were “constantly going back in and doing clearing
operations again.”178
Many observers attributed that circle of violence to a lack of sufficient forces
— whether coalition or Iraqi — to “hold” an area once it was “cleared.” The vast
majority of participating forces were Iraqi, and at that juncture, some observers
suggest, their capabilities were limited. MNF-I Spokesman MG Caldwell noted in
July 2006: “We are by no means at the end state, at the place where the Iraqi security
forces are able to assume complete control of this situation.”179
By October 2006, MNF-I admitted that Together Forward had not achieved the
expected results — it had “not met our overall expectations of sustaining a reduction
in the levels of violence.”180 In the event, from the experiences of Tal Afar,
Operation Together Forward had applied the principle of close collaboration with
host-nation forces, but only the “clear” element of the “clear, hold, build” mandate.
New Way Forward
By late 2006, senior diplomats and commanders in Iraq had concluded that the
approaches in use were not achieving the intended results — indeed, levels of
violence were continuing to climb. Several strategic reviews were conducted in
parallel, options were considered, and a decision was made and announced by the
Administration — to pursue a “New Way Forward” in Iraq.
“New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case. While
the basic long-term objectives for Iraq did not change, the New Way Forward
introduced a fundamentally new theory of the case. Until that time, Iraq strategy had
assumed that the major tracks of effort — security, political, economic — were
mutually reinforcing, and should therefore be implemented simultaneously.
The New Way Forward agreed that all of the tracks — plus a new “regional”
track — were important, but argued that security was a prerequisite for progress in
the other areas.181 As a White House summary of the results of the strategy review
stated, “While political progress, economic gains and security are all intertwined,
political and economic progress are unlikely absent a basic level of security.”182 And
178 Press Briefing by Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
October 19, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=6585&Itemid=131].
179 Operations Update with Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq, July 20, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=1027&Itemid=30].
180 Press Briefing by Major General William B. Caldwell, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
October 19, 2006, available at [http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=6585&Itemid=131].
181 See “Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq,” January 10, 2007, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-3.html].
182 “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” National Security Council, January 2007,
(continued...)

CRS-52
as President Bush stated in his address to the nation on this topic, in January 2007,
“The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security.”183
This thinking, though new as the premise for U.S. Iraq strategy, was not new.
Some practitioners on the ground in Iraq had suggested as early as 2003 that
substantial political and economic progress could not be expected, absent basic
security conditions that allowed Iraqis to leave their homes, and civilian coalition
personnel to engage with local communities.184
The “New Way Forward” theory of the case was that security improvements
would open up space and opportunities for the Iraqi government to make
improvements in other areas. As General David Petraeus described it in March 2007,
one month into his tour as the new MNF-I Commander, if security improves,
“commerce will return and local economies will grow.” And at the same time, “the
Iraqi government will have the chance it needs to resolve some of the difficult issues
it faces.”185
By early 2008, the basic premise had met with very broad but not universal
support among practitioners and observers. For example, in October 2007,
Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Conway told a think-tank audience,
“Certainly you have to have a level of security before you can have governance.”186
But retired Marine Corps General James Jones, who led a Congressionally-mandated
review of Iraqi Security Forces in 2007, suggested that the relationship between two
major components of politics and security — national reconciliation and sectarian
violence — is more complex: “It’s a little bit of a chicken-and-egg question…The
real overall conclusion is that the government of Iraq is the one that has to find a way
to achieve political reconciliation, in order to enable a reduction in sectarian
violence.”187
Surge Forces. In his January 10, 2007, address to the nation, President Bush
announced that to help implement the New Way Forward, the United States would
182 (...continued)
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf].
183 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
184 Conversations with ORHA, CPA and CJTF-7 staff, 2003 and 2004.
185 Press Briefing by GEN David Petraeus, March 8, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10475&Itemid=131].
186 He added, “I think you have to have governance and security before you can have a
viable economics plan.” See “Remarks by General James T. Conway, Commandant of the
Marine Corps,” Center for a New American Security, October 15, 2007.
187 Remarks by General James Jones, Meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United States,
Washington, D.C., September 12, 2007. General Jones led the Independent Commission on
the Security Forces of Iraq, required by U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 110-28, Section
1314. The Report is available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf], and
discussed below.

CRS-53
deploy additional military units to Iraq, primarily to Baghdad. Their mission, a
paraphrase of the “clear, hold, build” language, would be: “to help Iraqis clear and
secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure
that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad
needs.”188
The surge forces would eventually include five Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs),
an Army combat aviation brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), two Marine
infantry battalions, a Division headquarters, and other support troops. Surge force
levels reached a peak of about 168,000 U.S. troops in October 2007 (see above, “U.S.
Forces in Iraq”).
The surge effort also included a civilian component — increasing the number
of civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the size of their staffs
(see below, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams”). A White House Fact Sheet stated,
“PRTs are a key element of the President’s ‘New Way Forward’ Strategy.”189
Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case. The fundamental premise
of the Iraqi and coalition surge operations was population security. This marked an
important shift from previous years, when the top imperative was transitioning
responsibility to Iraqis.190 The two efforts were not considered mutually exclusive —
during the surge, efforts would continue to train, mentor and equip Iraqi security
forces to prepare for transitioning increasing responsibilities to them. But the relative
priority of the “population security” and “transition” efforts was adjusted.
In early 2008, some Division Commanders commented that their guidance from
their higher headquarters — MNC-I — was to practice patience, not to be in too
much of a hurry to move to an overwatch posture or to transition responsibility to
Iraqi security forces.191 The mission statement of one division provides a good
illustration of the new priorities — population security first, with a view to laying the
groundwork for future transition. The division, “in participation with Iraqi security
forces and the provincial government, secures the population, neutralizes insurgents
and militia groups, and defeats terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, to establish
sustainable security and set conditions for transition to tactical overwatch and Iraqi
security self-reliance.”192
188 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
189 See “Fact Sheet: Helping Iraq Achieve Economic and Political Stabilization,” January
8, 2008, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080108-4.html].
190 A famous quote by T.E. Lawrence — “Lawrence of Arabia” — appears frequently in
briefings and on office walls, of coalition forces in Iraq: “Do not try to do too much with
your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their
war, and you are there to help them, not to win it for them.” The quote, although still
popular, more closely reflects an emphasis on “transition” than on “population security.”
191 Conversations with Division Commanders, January 2008.
192 Mission statement of one Multi-National Division, January 2008.

CRS-54
The surge aimed to provide “population security” not merely with greater troop
strength, but also by changing some of the approaches those troops used. One major
emphasis was population control — including the extensive use of concrete barriers,
checkpoints, curfews, and biometric technologies for identification including
fingerprinting and retinal scans.
In April 2007, some key Baghdad neighborhoods were entirely sealed off using
these approaches, prompting the use of the moniker “gated communities.” In an Op-
Ed piece, Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray Odierno
explained that the “communities” were “being put up to protect the Iraqi population
by hindering the ability of terrorists to carry out the car bombings and suicide
attacks.”193 As counter-insurgency expert Dave Kilcullen described it, “once an area
is cleared and secured, with troops on the ground, controls make it hard to infiltrate
or intimidate…and thus [they] also protect the population.”194
Some initial press coverage took note of some citizens’ dismay at the tighter
controls that gated communities brought.195 By early 2008, coalition and Iraqi leaders
reported anecdotally that Iraqi residents were pleased at the added protection the
“gated community” measures provided them — by “keeping the bad guys out.”196
Another key set of population security approaches involved troop presence —
including not only increasing the number of troops but also changing their footprint.
From late in the formal occupation through 2006 — including Operation Together
Forward — coalition forces in Iraq had been consolidated at relatively large Forward
Operating Bases (FOBs). Surge strategy called for getting troops off of the FOBs and
out into local communities, to live and work among the population.
As Major General James Simmons, III Corps and MNC-I Deputy Commanding
General, stated: “You have to get out and live with the people.”197 Multi-National
Force-West leaders agreed that the key is “living with the population”, because “it
makes Iraqis see us as partners in the fighting and rebuilding.”198
193 Ray Odierno, “In Defense of Baghdad’s Walls,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2007.
194 Dave Kilcullen, “The Urban Tourniquet — Gated Communities in Baghdad,” April 27,
2007, at Small Wars Journal, [http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/the-urban-
tourniquet-gated-com/]. Dr. Kilcullen has served at MNF-I in Baghdad as an advisor to
GEN Petraeus.
195 See for example Karin Brulliard, “‘Gated Communities’ for the War-Ravaged,”
Washington Post, April 23, 2007. See also Tim Kilbride, “Coalition Positioned to Break
Iraq’s Cycle of Violence,” American Forces Press Service, May 25, 2007, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46184]).
196 Information from Division and Brigade Commanders, January 2008.
197 Interview, January 2008, Baghdad. MG Simmons brought to bear considerable
comparative perspective. He held the post of III Corps DCG for over four and a half years,
and thus also served as MNC-I DCG on the Corps’ first tour in Iraq as the nucleus of MNC-
I, from 2004 to 2005.
198 Conversation with MNF-West leaders, January 2008.

CRS-55
Accordingly, coalition forces established scores of small combat outposts
(COPs) and joint security stations (JSSs) in populated areas. A JSS includes co-
located units from coalition forces, the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Army. Each
component continues to report to its own chain of command, but they share space
— and information. A COP is coalition-only, usually manned by a “company-
minus.” As of January 2008, for example, Multi-National Division-Center had
established 53 such bases in their restive area south of Baghdad.
Senior commanders at all levels stress the critical role JSSs and COPs have
played in the surge. General Petraeus noted in March 2007 that they allow the
development of relationships with local populations.199 Multi-National Division-
Baghdad leaders called the creation of these outposts the “biggest change over time”
in coalition operations in Iraq.
Surge strategy still called on Iraqi and coalition forces to “clear, hold, build.”
Administration and coalition leaders admitted that in the past — in Operation
Together Forward in 2006 — insufficient forces had been available to “hold” an area
once it was cleared. The surge was designed to correct that.
As the President noted in his January 10, 2007, address to the nation, “In earlier
operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and
insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This
time,” he added, “we’ll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been
cleared.”200 General Petraeus confirmed the approach, and the contrast with past
operations, in March 2007: “Importantly, Iraqi and coalition forces will not just clear
neighborhoods, they will also hold them to facilitate the build phase of the
operation.”201 Key outside observers agreed. Retired General Jack Keane, a strong
surge advocate, noted, “We’re going to secure the population for the first time. What
we’ve never been able to do in the past is have enough forces to stay in those
neighborhoods and protect the people.”202
President Bush announced one other major change which would make surge
military operations different from those of the past — the lifting of political
restrictions on operations, which had been imposed in the past by an Iraqi leadership
concerned about its own fragility. In the past, President Bush noted, “political and
sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into
neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence.” But this time,
199 Press Briefing by GEN David Petraeus, March 8, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10475&Itemid=131].
200 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
201 Press Briefing by General David Petraeus, March 8, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10475&Itemid=131].
202 Adam Brookes, “Bush Iraq plan likely to cost dear,” BBC news, January 11, 2007,
available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6250657.stm].

CRS-56
Iraqi leaders had signaled that Iraqi and coalition forces would have “a green light”
to enter those neighborhoods.203
Surge Operations. In February 2007, just as surge forces began to flow into
Iraq, U.S. and Iraqi forces launched Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, often referred to as
the Baghdad Security Plan. Its primary emphasis was population security, and the
primary geographical focal point was Baghdad, broadly defined.204 As MNC-I
Commander LTG Odierno put it, “The population and the government are the center
of gravity.”205
The basic theory of the case was another paraphrase of “clear, hold, build.” At
the outset of operations, Major General Joseph Fil, Commander of 1st Cavalry
Division and the Multi-National Division-Baghdad, described the plan as “clear,
control, and retain.” That meant, he explained, clearing out extremists, neighborhood
by neighborhood; controlling those neighborhoods with a “full-time presence on the
streets” by coalition and Iraqi forces; and retaining the neighborhoods with Iraqi
security forces “fully responsible for the day-to-day security mission.”206
The specific targets of the Operation included Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its
affiliates, and rogue Shi’a militia elements including the Jaish al-Mahdi “special
groups.”
“Baghdad” was defined to include the surrounding areas, or “belts,” which had
been providing bases of operation and transit points, with access into the capital, for
both Sunni and Shi’a extremists. LTG Odierno’s guidance to his subordinate
commanders was to stop the flow of “accelerants of the violence” through those areas
into Baghdad.207
Operating in the “belts” required shifting the footprint of coalition forces to
cover all the major supply lines leading into Baghdad. Coalition presence in many
of the belt areas had previously been very light. During the spring of 2007, incoming
surge brigades were deployed into Baghdad and its belts. April 1, 2007, a new
division headquarters was added — the Multi-National Division-Center, led by 3rd
Infantry Division — to cover parts of Baghdad province and other provinces just
south of Baghdad.208
203 President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at White House website,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html].
204 “Baghdad” is the name of both the capital city and the province where it is located.
205 See Department of Defense Press Briefing with Lieutenant General Odierno, May 31,
2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
3973].
206 See Department of Defense press briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, February 16, 2007,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3891].
207 Information from Division Commanders and staff, January 2008.
208 Information from MNC-I and Division officials, January 2008. See also Kimberly
Kagan, “The Real Surge: Preparing for Operation Phantom Thunder,” Iraq Report, The
(continued...)

CRS-57
Beginning in June 2007, once all the coalition surge forces had arrived in Iraq,
coalition forces, in coordination with Iraqi counterparts, launched a series of
operations: Phantom Thunder, followed by Phantom Strike, and then Phantom
Phoenix. As “Corps-level operations,” these were sets of division- and brigade-level
actions coordinated and integrated across Iraq by MNC-I. They have included close
coordination with U.S. Special Operations Forces as well as with Iraqi military and
police forces.
The city of Baghdad is the most complex battlespace in Iraq, due to the strong
presence of both AQI and JAM special groups, the many potential fault lines among
different neighborhoods, and a security “temperature” that can vary on a block-by-
block basis. In the series of Corps-level operations, the Multi-National Division-
Baghdad, led by the 4th Infantry Division since December 2007, focused first on
clearing the city, and then on establishing a strong presence to hold each
neighborhood.209
The area just south of Baghdad and along the Tigris River, with its mixed Shi’a/
Sunni population, had long provided safe havens and a gateway to Baghdad for AQI
and its affiliates from Al Anbar and Iraq’s western borders, and for Shi’a extremists
coming from southern Iraq or from Iraq’s border with Iran. As part of the Corps-
level operations, Multi-National Division-Center, led by 3ID, has focused on clearing
these restive areas, narrowing down to more specific pockets of resistance, including
Salman Pak and Arab Jabour, as progress is made.
To the north, Multi-National Division-North, led by 1st Armored Division since
October 2007, has focused on clearing and then holding those areas where AQI
affiliates sought refuge as they were pushed out of Baghdad.210 Many AQI affiliates,
pushed out of Baghdad by surge operations, initially relocated to Baquba, the capital
city of Diyala province east of Baghdad. Reports suggested they had renamed it the
new “capital of the Islamic State of Iraq.”211 As operations by MND-North and Iraqi
security forces pushed AQI out of that city, some AQI moved east up the Diyala
River Valley, into the so-called “breadbasket” of Iraq near the city of Muqtadiyah —
a focal point for the Division’s operations in January 2008. Working in Diyala in
partnership with the Iraqi 5th Army Division, the combined forces uncovered a
number of major weapons caches, and had “some very tough fights.”212
208 (...continued)
Institute for the Study of War and The Weekly Standard, February 14, 2007-June 15, 2007,
available at [http://www.understandingwar.org/IraqReport/IraqReport05.pdf].
209 Information from MND-Baghdad, January 2008.
210 Retired Army Major General Scales provides a clear description of the early stages of
these operations, based on a visit to Iraq in Robert H. Scales MG (ret), “Petraeus’s Iraq,”
Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2007.
211 Information from MND-North, January 2008.
212 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Mark Hertling, January 22,
2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4124].

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Other AQI affiliates sought to regroup and establish a new stronghold in the
northern city of Mosul.213 On January 25, 2008, Prime Minister Maliki announced
a major new Iraqi and coalition offensive against AQI in Mosul and stated that it
would be “decisive.”214
In Al Anbar province to the west, the Multi-National Force-West, led by II
Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), working closely with Iraqi counterparts, has
focused surge operations on a pocket of AQI concentration around Lake Thar Thar,
northwest of Baghdad. As AQI was pushed out of major population centers
including Ramadi and Fallujah, they tended to attempt to regroup in the desert, so
another major coalition and Iraqi focus in Al Anbar has been targeting the AQI
remnants in rural areas.215
Counter-IED Efforts. Complementing other surge efforts, MNC-I under III
Corps, and its subordinate divisions, made it a top priority to counter the enemy’s
“weapon of choice” — improvised explosive devices (IEDs).216 As of early 2008,
over 78% of those detained by coalition forces were interned based on suspicion of
some IED-related activity.217
IEDs — usually made with technologically simple, off-the-shelf materials —
have long been the leading cause of coalition casualties in Iraq. The potential hazard
IEDs pose for ground convoys has also driven changes in coalition operations —
including an increased reliance on air lift for transportation of personnel and cargo.
The premise of the counter-IED efforts has been to “attack the network.” That
involves not just capturing the IED emplacers, usually hired for a one-time payment,
but also, in the words of one Division Commander, “influencing the decisions of
those who place IEDs.”218 More broadly, it includes mapping the relationships
among emplacers, financiers, and overall strategists, including the support they
receive from outside Iraq.
To strengthen the effort, MNC-I and its subordinate Divisions created dedicated
counter-IED cells. The effort includes information-sharing about the latest enemy
tactics, techniques and procedures, distributing and providing training for the latest
counter-IED technology, training the force to recognize how the network operates,
213 Information from MND-North, January 2008.
214 See for example “Iraq to Go After Al-Qaeda in Mosul,” Associated Press, Washington
Post
, January 25, 2008.
215 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Maj.Gen. Walter Gaskin, December 10,
2007, [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4103].
216 Communication from LTG Odierno, and information from MNC-I staff, January 2008.
217 Information from Task Force-134, Baghdad, January 2008.
218 Conversation with Division Commander, January 2008.

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and integrating all available intelligence assets to better define — and target — the
networks.219
Special Operations Forces in the Surge. U.S. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) have played an integral role throughout the surge, including targeting key
enemy leaders. MNF-I leaders note that as of January 2008, SOF and conventional
forces work in a much more closely integrated way than they did earlier in OIF. SOF
is particularly well-suited to infiltrate difficult areas to reach key individual targets.
But according to MNF-I and MNC-I leaders, SOF often rely on conventional units’
detailed, daily familiarity with their battlespace, based on long-standing relationships
with local Iraqi counterparts. Further, commanders stress, after a SOF action, it is
the conventional forces — in partnership with Iraqi forces — that stay to “hold” the
area.
The Use of Air Power in the Surge. Most press coverage of the surge, and
of OIF in general, has focused on the role of ground forces — the Army and the
Marine Corps — including the number of troops on the ground, the approaches they
have used, and the stress on those two Military Services.220 Air power is also an
integral element of the OIF effort — and importantly from an analytical perspective,
an element that has evolved over time.
The role of air power in Iraq is multi-faceted, including providing critical
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and facilitating
mobility — particularly given the lack of mass transit of troops by ground.221
One of the major shifts has been in the kinetic use of air power — defense
expert Anthony Cordesman has pointed to its “steadily more important role over
time.”222 In November 2007, Major General Dave Edgington, MNF-I Air Component
219 At the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, led since
December 2007 by Lieutenant General Tom Metz, is mandated to facilitate the rapid
development, production and fielding of new technologies and approaches.
220 Indeed, the ground Services themselves may tend to view counter-insurgency primarily
as a ground forces effort. In his provocative monograph, “Shortchanging the Joint Fight?,”
Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap notes that the new Army and Marine Corps COIN
doctrine, FM 3-24, devotes only a 5-page appendix to the role of air power in COIN, and
argues for a “genuinely joint approach” that takes account of “the full potential of today’s
airpower capabilities.” See Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, “Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An
Airman’s Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine,”
A i r U n i v e r s i t y m o n o g r a p h , D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 7 , a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/121007dunlap.pdf].
221 For a detailed discussion of air operations in support of OIF and Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan, including the widespread use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, see
Mark Benjamin, “Killing ‘Bubba’ from the Skies,” Slate.com, February 15, 2008, available
at [http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/02/15/air_war/].
222 Anthony H. Cordesman, “US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2007.

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Coordination Element Director, confirmed a recent sharp spike in the number of
weapons dropped from fighters and bombers.223
Statistics released in January 2008 by the Combined Force Air Component
Command (CFACC), the air component of CENTCOM, provided further detail about
the upswing in the use of weapons. The yearly number of close air support (CAS)
strikes, with munitions dropped, in OIF, rose from 86 in 2004, to 176 in 2005, to
1,770 in 2006, to 3,030 in 2007. During 2007, the monthly number of CAS strikes
rose from 89 in January, then 36 in February, to 171 in June, 303 in July, and 166 in
August, before dropping back to double-digits for the rest of the year.224
In January 2008, Maj. Gen. Edgington explained that close air support — or
“on-call” support — is the type of kinetic air power that has been most in demand in
Iraq. Coordinated air/ground operations during the first several months after the
arrival of the full surge force produced the heaviest CAS requirements, but afterward
the demand tapered off. The significantly higher demand for CAS had been less a
reflection of a deliberate strategy to use more air power, than a natural result of a
significantly larger number of U.S. troops, working significantly more closely with
Iraqi counterparts and in local neighborhoods, and getting better information that
made target identification much easier. As of January 2008, in a shift from mid-2007,
the majority of weapons dropped were targeting deeply buried IEDs.225
Some counter-insurgency specialists have questioned the use of kinetic air
power in counter-insurgency operations because it risks civilian casualties that could
fuel the insurgency. For example, Kalev Sepp has written: “These killings drive
family and community members into the insurgency and create lifelong antagonisms
toward the United States.”226
Commanders stress, in turn, that although there is always a chance of accidental
civilian casualties, the likelihood has greatly diminished with the development of
precision capabilities. Further, the decision cycle before a weapon is dropped
includes a series of decision points that give commanders the opportunity to stop an
action if new and better information becomes available about a civilian presence in
the target area.227 In his December 2007 assessment of the use of air power in Iraq
223 MNF-I press briefing, Major General Dave Edgington, MNF-I Air Component
Coordination Element Director, November 4, 2007, available at [http://www.mnf-
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15033&Itemid=128].
224 “2004-2007 Combined Forces Air Component Commander Airpower Statistics,” U.S.
CENTAF Combined Air and Space Operations Center, January 3, 2008.
225 Information from Maj. Gen. Edgington, Baghdad, January 2008.
226 See “The Insurgency: Can it be Defeated?” Interview with Kalev Sepp, PBS Frontline,
February 21, 2006, available at [http://www/pbs.org/wgbh.pages/frontline/insurgency/can/].
Other observers question the use of kinetic air power simply on the grounds that any risk of
inadvertent civilian loss of life is unacceptable.
227 Conversations with MNF-I and MNC-I leaders, January 2008.

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and Afghanistan, Anthony Cordesman concludes that “considerable restraint was
used in both wars.”228
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
As of early 2008, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) consisted of three major
groups: the Army, Navy and Air Force under the Ministry of Defense (MoD); the
Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, and the Department of Border Enforcement
under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), as well as the Facilities Protection Service that
was still being consolidated under the MoI; and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces
that report to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, under the office of the Prime Minister.
Developing the ISF and the security Ministries that oversee them is a critical
component of the role of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq — a role that has evolved
over time in response to events on the ground and changes in U.S. strategy.
Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces
The scope of the challenge has been extensive, since none of Iraq’s pre-war
security forces or structures were left intact or available for duty after major combat
operations.
U.S. pre-war planning had foreseen an immediate and practical need for law
enforcement, and for security more broadly, after major combat — particularly since
some challenges to law and order might reasonably be expected after the collapse of
the old regime. Planning had also stressed the need for security providers to have an
“Iraqi face,” to calm and reassure the Iraqi people.
However, pre-war planning had erroneously assumed that Iraqi local police
forces would be available, as needed, to help provide security for the Iraqi people.
Instead, in the immediate aftermath of major combat, coalition forces found that
civilian law enforcement bodies had effectively disappeared.
Meanwhile, military pre-war planning had also assumed that Iraqi military units
would be available for recall and reassignment after the war, as needed. Military
plans counted on the “capitulation” of Iraqi forces, and included options for using
some of those forces to guard borders or perform other tasks.229
Instead, on May 23, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued
CPA Order Number 2, which dissolved all Iraqi military services including the Army.
228 Anthony H. Cordesman, “US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007”, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2007.
229 Information from CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Michael R.
Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq
, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.)

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That decision foreclosed the option of unit recall to support security or reconstruction
activities, or to serve as building blocks for a new, post-Saddam army.230
Post-war Iraq was not, however, a blank slate in terms of trained and organized
fighters. The Kurds in northern Iraq had long maintained well-trained and well-
equipped forces — the pesh merga — which had worked closely with coalition
forces during major combat (see above, “The Ground Campaign”). Somewhat more
equivocally, a major Shi’a Arab political party, the Supreme Council of the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, later ISCI), maintained its own militia, the Badr Corps,231
which had been trained in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Like the pesh merga, Badr
members were trained and equipped, but unlike them, they had no history of
cooperation with coalition forces in Iraq. In the early days of the formal occupation,
in various contexts, both militias offered their services to help provide security. The
coalition — then the executive authority of Iraq — thus faced the additional
challenge of whether and how to incorporate these militias into official Iraqi security
structures.
ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation
During the year of formal occupation, Iraqi security forces training was led and
primarily executed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Particularly in the
earliest days, the efforts were characterized by limited long-term strategic planning,
and by resources too limited for the scope and scale of the tasks.
Police training began as a function of the CPA “Ministry of the Interior” office,
initially under the leadership of former New York Police Commissioner Bernard
Kerik. He was supported by a skeleton staff in Baghdad, and by some resources from
the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL). Based on priorities articulated by Washington, the team focused
initially on the capital city, including rebuilding the Baghdad Police Academy. The
office also launched a call-back and re-training effort for former Iraqi police officers,
but the effort was constrained by limited resources and staff — including a very
limited presence outside Baghdad.232
Meanwhile, military units throughout Iraq had recognized an immediate need
for some Iraqi law enforcement presence on the ground in their areas of
2 3 0 See CPA Order 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” available at
[http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entiti
es_with_Annex_A.pdf]. Note that the date of the Order is given incorrectly on the CPA
website table of contents, but is correctly printed on the Order itself.
231 Previously the “Badr Brigade,” subsequently the “Badr Organization.”
232 Regarding funding for the Iraqi civilian law enforcement system, Ambassador Bremer
writes that CPA began with $25 million from the State Department to assess the Iraqi
criminal justice system, and Ambassador Bremer allocated an additional $120 million from
Iraqi government funds for training and equipping Iraqi police. See Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2006.

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responsibility. To the frustration of some CPA officials,233 military commanders
launched police re-training initiatives in their areas, initially in the form of three-
week courses, with the goal of quickly fielding at least temporary Iraqi security
providers. Ambassador Bremer eventually instructed CJTF-7 to cease police
recruiting.234
CPA also initially had responsibility for rebuilding Iraq’s Army, under the
supervision of Walt Slocombe, the CPA Senior Advisor for National Security, and
a former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In an August 2003 Order, CPA
directed the creation of the New Iraqi Army (NIA).235 The training effort, led day-to-
day by Major General Paul Eaton, focused on recruiting and training Iraqi Soldiers
battalion-by-battalion. The plan was to create higher headquarters later on — and in
particular, once an Iraqi civilian leadership was in place to provide civilian control
of the military. The initial, ambitious goal was the creation of 27 battalions in two
years, which was adjusted to the even more ambitious goal of 27 battalions in one
year.236
In early September 2003, as a stop-gap measure, at the urging of CJTF-7 with
backing from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CPA announced the
establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The ICDC would be a
trained, uniformed, armed “security and emergency service agency for Iraq.”237 In
accordance with the Order he signed, establishing the ICDC, Ambassador Bremer
delegated responsibility for its development to the senior military commander in Iraq
— LTG Sanchez. Under CJTF-7’s authority, Division Commanders launched ICDC
recruiting and training programs, supporting the efforts in part with their own organic
assets, and in part with CERP funding.
233 Personal communications from CPA officials, 2003. Also, in his Iraq memoir,
Ambassador Bremer minces no words. He quotes Doug Brand, the U.K. Constable who
replaced Kerik, as saying: “The Army is sweeping up half-educated men off the streets,
running them through a three-week training course, arming them, and then calling them
police. It’s a scandal, pure and simple.” See Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope
, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, page
183.
234 In his memoir, Ambassador Bremer recalls an October 2003 meeting with CJTF-7
Commander LTG Sanchez, when he instructed CJTF-7 to stop recruiting police. The
incident underscored the difficult position in the chain of command of CJTF-7 (see above),
which was in direct support of CPA, but still reported to CENTCOM — which had
instructed CJTF-7 to recruit and train police. Communications from CJTF-7 officials, 2003,
and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of
Hope
, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
235 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 22, “Creation of a New Iraqi Army,” 18 August
2003, available at [http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_
Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf].
236 See Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future
of Hope
, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
237 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order 28, “Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps,” 3 September 2003, available at [http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20030903_CPAORD_28_Est_of_the_Iraqi_Civil_Defense_Corps.pdf].

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Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq

In 2003 and early 2004, the various ISF training efforts — for the police, the
NIA and the ICDC — proceeded in parallel, led by separate entities within the
coalition, with little opportunity for integrated strategic planning and resourcing.
The military command in Iraq had sought for some time to be assigned
responsibility for the entire ISF training mission, based on the view that CPA did not
have the capacity to accomplish all of it, or to coordinate its many elements in a
single strategy. Ambassador Bremer resisted this design, based on the view that the
military was not trained to train police forces.238
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 36, which assigned the mission of organizing, training and
equipping all Iraqi security forces (ISF) to CENTCOM. This included both directing
all U.S. efforts, and coordinating all supporting international efforts. It explicitly
included Iraq’s civilian police as well as its military forces.239
CENTCOM, in turn, created the Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq (MNSTC-I), a new three-star headquarters that would fall under the Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), to bring together all Iraqi security forces training under
a single lead in Iraq.240
Since December 2004, in keeping with the original NSPD mandate concerning
international contributions, the MNSTC-I Commander has been dual-hatted as the
Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). NTM-I provides training,
both inside and outside Iraq, to Iraqi security forces; assistance with equipping; and
technical advice and assistance. Its permanent mission in Iraq includes
representatives of 12 countries. Major initiatives have included helping the Iraqi
Army build a Non-Commissioned Officer Corps; helping establish and structure Iraqi
238 Conversations with CPA and CJTF-7 leaders, 2003 and 2004. In his memoir,
Ambassador Bremer describes a September 2003 meeting at which GEN Abizaid and LTG
Sanchez proposed that CJTF-7 take over the police training mission. He observes in his
memoir: “I didn’t like it…Although our soldiers were the best combat troops in the world,
they had been trained and equipped for fast-moving operations where they killed the enemy,
not for community policing and criminal investigations.” See Ambassador L. Paul Bremer
III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2006, pp.168-169.
239 See National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations
in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, available at Federation of American Scientists website,
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd051104.pdf].
240 In May 2004, CJTF-7 split into a higher, four-star headquarters, MNF-I, and a lower,
three-star headquarters, MNC-I, (see above).

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military educational institutions; and — with a strong contribution from Italy’s
Carabinieri — helping update the skills and training of Iraq’s National Police.241
On October 1, 2005, MNSTC-I was given the additional responsibility of
mentoring and helping build capacity in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.242
ISF Training: Theory of the Case
At the heart of the ISF training mission is the practice of embedding coalition
forces and other advisors and experts — now called “transition teams” — with Iraqi
military or civilian units, to train, mentor and advise them.
That practice, though it has grown over time, is not new. In early 2004, under
CJTF-7, some Army units embedded teams with the newly-generated New Iraqi
Army battalions. Under General George Casey, MNF-I, together with MNSTC-I
(then led by LTG Petraeus), initiated a more aggressive embedding strategy, and the
effort expanded still further in scope when GEN Petraeus assumed command of
MNF-I in February 2007.243
What has changed over time is the focus of that embedding.
As MNSTC-I’s name suggests, the initial stated goal of MNSTC-I and the ISF
training effort in general was to transition security responsibility to Iraqis. The
sooner the Iraqis were capable of providing security for themselves, the sooner U.S.
and other coalition forces could go home.244 Accordingly, embedded teams worked
241 See [http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTM-I.htm].
242 See for example LTG Martin Dempsey, Statement before the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, June 12, 2007, available at HASC website,
[http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI061207/Dempsey_Testimony061207.pdf]. The US
Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Embassy’s Iraq Transition Assistance
Office, share responsibility for facilitating the development of all other Iraqi Ministries.
243 See Major General Carter F. Ham, “Transition Team’s Role in Iraq,” Military Training
Technology
, Vol.12, Issue 1, April 10, 2007, available at [http://www.military-training-
technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1972]. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group had
recommended sharply enhancing the embedding program — down to the company level in
the Iraqi Army — and “paying” for this increase in embedded troops with reductions in the
number of troops assigned to combat brigades. See The Iraq Study Group Report, James
A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, December 6, 2006, Recommendation 44, p.
51, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_
group_ report.pdf].
244 In his memoir, Ambassador Bremer provides a clear example of the early focus on
transition, citing verbatim a memorandum from Secretary Rumsfeld to himself and General
Abizaid: “Our goal should be to ramp up the Iraqi numbers, try to get some additional
international forces and find ways to put less stress on our forces, enabling us to reduce the
U.S. role. The faster the Iraqi forces grow, the lower the percentage will be of U.S. forces
out of the total forces.” Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to
Build a Future of Hope
, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, pp. 162.

CRS-66
with their Iraqi counterparts with a view to the earliest possible independence of
those Iraqi units.
In early 2007, in keeping with the Administration’s New Way Forward and the
surge emphasis on “population security” as a prerequisite for complete transition, the
emphasis of the training and embedding mission shifted. The ultimate goal was still
to transition security responsibility to Iraqis, but the timeline was relaxed. The
primary focus, in the near term, was working with Iraqi units to help them better
provide population security. Working closely with U.S. counterparts on real-world
missions, Iraqi units would be practicing the skills they would need to operate
independently.245
ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities
Under MNF-I, specific responsibilities for training Iraqi Security Forces and
their respective headquarters institutions have shifted somewhat, over time, among
MNF-I subordinate bodies. MNSTC-I’s broad mandate is still to “assist with the
organization, manning, equipping, training and basing of the Iraqi Security Forces”
— including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces, National Police,
Provincial Police, and Border Police — and to “assist the institutional capacity
development of the Iraqi Security Ministries” — Defense, Interior, and Counter-
Terrorism Bureau.246
In practice, MNSTC-I divides those responsibilities with Multi-National Corps-
Iraq (MNC-I), the three-star operational command that also reports directly to MNF-
I. In general, MNC-I focuses on the “tooth” — fielding military and police forces
through training, mentoring and embedding. MNSTC-I, in turn, focuses on the “tail”
— improving ministerial performance, and generating and replenishing the forces.
MNSTC-I is slated to transform, eventually, into a more traditional U.S. office of
security cooperation.
Under MNC-I, the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), a one-star command created
in February 2005, is the “principal coordinating agency for the Iraqi Security Forces”
within MNC-I. Originally, the IAG “owned” all the transition teams that embed with
Iraqi units, but a major change was made in mid-2007. At that time, transition teams,
while still assigned to the IAG, were attached to the brigade combat teams
responsible, respectively, for the areas in which the teams were working. As
previous IAG commander Brigadier General Dana Pittard explained, the change
provided “unity of effort and unity of command in a brigade combat team’s area of
operations.”247
245 Conversations from MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I officials, Baghdad, January 2008.
246 Information from MNSTC-I, January 2008.
247 U.S. Central Command Press Release, “Iraq Assistance Group Supports the Feature
Performance,” May 17, 2007, available at [http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom2
/FrontPage%20Stories/Iraq%20Assistance%20Group%20Supports%20the%20Feature%
20Performance.aspx].

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The IAG continues to serve as the executive agent for transition teams
throughout Iraq, ensuring they have the training and support they need. This includes
synchronizing the curricula at the transition team training sites inside and outside
Iraq, providing the teams with equipment and related training, and supporting the
teams’ Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) as they arrive
in Iraq.
The IAG also directly supports transition teams working with three Iraqi
headquarters staffs: the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the National Police
headquarters, and the Department of Border Enforcement headquarters. And the IAG
is helping spearhead the creation of an Iraqi Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)
Corps — as of January 2008, newly trained Iraqi NCOs were running and teaching
the new NCO training courses, and a second, more advanced “commando course”
had begun.248
ISF Training: Transition Teams
Transition teams have been called the “linchpin of the training and mentoring
effort.”249 The teams vary in size, composition and focus, based on the needs of the
Iraqi forces they partner with and the specific local circumstances, but the theory of
the case is consistent: the teams simultaneously “advise, teach, and mentor,” and
“provide direct access to Coalition capabilities such as air support, artillery, medical
evacuation and intelligence-gathering.”250
Transition teams work with units in each of the Iraqi military and police
services, with key operational headquarters, and with the security ministries. Due in
part to resource constraints, coverage of Iraqi units by training teams is not one-to-
one.
For Ministry of Interior forces, the Department of Defense reported that as of
March 2008, there were 28 border transition teams (BTTs) working with about two-
thirds of Department of Border Enforcement units at battalion-level or above; and 40
National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) which were partnering with about 80%
of National Police units at battalion-level or above. For the Iraqi Police, there were
263 Police Transition Teams (PTTs) working with Iraqi police at local, district and
provincial levels. DoD reported in December 2007 that while the ratio of PTTs to
police stations is 1:1 in Baghdad, it was as high as 1:7 in some provinces.251
248 Information from the IAG, January 2008.
249 See Major General Carter Ham, “Transition Team’s Role in Iraq,” Military Training
Technology
, Vol.12, Issue 1, April 10, 2007, available at [http://www.military-training-
technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1972]. Then-MG Ham wrote this piece while serving
as the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, which was assigned responsibility for
preparing transition teams to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. LTG Ham now serves as the
Joint Staff Director for Operations (J3).
250 Ibid.
251 See Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007,
(continued...)

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The overall Police Transition Team mission is led by a U.S. Military Police
brigade — since October 2007, the 18th MP Brigade — which falls under MNC-I.
The MPs’ efforts are complemented by International Police Advisors (IPAs) who,
according to the Department of Defense, “provide civilian law enforcement expertise
in criminal investigation and police station management.” Some contemporary
observers have suggested — echoing the CPA’s Ambassador Bremer — that military
forces, including MPs, are not optimally suited to train civilian law enforcement
personnel, and have urged the expansion of the IPA program.252
For Ministry of Defense forces, the Department of Defense reported in March
2008 that the Navy is supported by a Maritime Strategic Transition Team (MaSTT)
advising the headquarters, and a Naval Transition Team (NaTT) embedded with
sailors at the Umm Qasr Naval Base. The Coalition Air Force Transition Team
provides advisor teams to the Iraqi Air Staff, Air Operations Center, and squadrons.
For the Iraqi Army, as of March 2008 there were 207 Military Transition Teams
(MiTTs) working with Iraqi units from battalion to division level. At the Iraqi
division level, the standard pattern calls a 15-member team led by a Colonel (or
equivalent); at the brigade level — a 10-member team led by a Lieutenant Colonel;
and at the battalion level — an 11-member team led by a Major. The teams, though
small, include a wide array of specializations — including intelligence, logistics,
maneuver trainers, effects, communications, and medical expertise.253
The methodology for forming the MiTTs and preparing them for their
assignments has evolved significantly over the short duration of the program.
Initially, in the push to field trainers quickly, teams were pulled together from
individual volunteers and trained at seven different locations in the U.S., without
specific standards.
Subsequently, the Army consolidated a training program for Army, Navy, and
Air Force transition team members, under the auspices of the 1st Infantry Division at
Ft. Riley, Kansas.254 The program includes 72 days at Ft. Riley, including 12 days
251 (...continued)
pp. 37-38.
252 See for example the Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of
Iraq, September 6, 2007, p.18, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
The Commission noted: “U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement
personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has
inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of
the training and advisory effort”. “…The number of civilian international police advisors
is insufficient.” DoD apparently agrees — and refers to the low level of funding for, and
availability of, IPAs.
253 IAG and other officials note that it would be difficult to streamline the teams any further,
given their small size and the array of expertise they include.
254 The Marine Corps created a separate program to prepare trainers — the Marine Corps
training and Advisory Group (MCTAG). Its mission is to “coordinate, form, train and equip
Marine Corps advisor and training teams for current and projected operations.” See
Corporal Margaret Hughes, “USMC Forms MCTAG, Consolidates Reconnaissance
(continued...)

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of inprocessing and 60 days of training, followed by a theater orientation at Camp
Buehring, Kuwait, and then by further counter-insurgency training and hands-on
equipment training at Camp Taji, Iraq. The program sends new team leaders out to
the field for a brief visit, at the very beginning of their training at Ft. Riley, and it
solicits “lessons learned” from Transition Team members both mid-tour and at the
end of their tours in Iraq.
While the program of preparation has improved markedly, the participants were
still, as of January 2008, individual volunteers, who could come from any
occupational specialty. As one program leader commented, the curriculum at Ft.
Riley includes a measure of “move, shoot, and communicate” skills, as a refresher
for all the “professors and protocol specialists” who volunteer.255
As of January 2008, the Department of the Army, the Joint Staff and multi-
national force leaders in Iraq were actively considering how best to continue to
source the Transition Team mission in Iraq.256 Some officials in Iraq suggested that
in the future, brigade combat teams in Iraq, possibly augmented with training experts,
could simply split their focus between the fight and the training mission.
The majority of MiTTs in Iraq come out of the Ft. Riley-based system.
However, to help meet demand, about 20% of the MiTTs are “taken out of hide” —
that is, their members are pulled from U.S. units already serving in Iraq.257
In practice, several different patterns of training partnerships are in use.
Sometimes, particularly when Iraqi capabilities are more urgently needed to
contribute to the fight, “standard-sized” MiTTs are augmented with thirty to forty
additional personnel and equipment, to boost the ability of Iraqi partner unit to
operate more autonomously.
In other cases, some U.S. combat brigades have established more
comprehensive partnerships. In early 2008, in northern Babil province, the 4th BCT
of the 3rd Infantry Division, under MND-Center, established a robust partnership with
254 (...continued)
Training,” Marine Corps News, November 14, 2007, available at
[http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/ad983156332a819185256cb600677
af3/2e2ee9165ebacf9a85257395006859a2?OpenDocument].
255 Conversation with training official, January 2008.
256 The “Iraq” training debate has helped fuel a larger, on-going debate about sourcing the
full array of future training requirements. Most provocatively, Army Lieutenant Colonel
John Nagl has proposed that the Army create a permanent, standing Advisor Corps, of
20,000 combat advisors, to develop the security forces of international partners. The three-
star-led Corps would be responsible for doctrine, training, and employment, and would be
prepared to deploy as needed. See John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time
for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps,” The Future of the U.S. Military Series, Center for
a New American Security, CNAS website [http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145].
257 The balance varies both by area and over time — for example, in January 2008, in MND-
Center, a much higher percentage of training teams had been “taken out of hide.”

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the entire 8th Iraqi Army Division, with regular leadership contacts at brigade and
division level, in addition to the work of the embedded MiTT teams.258
In 2007, in the turbulent area of Mahmudiyah and Yusufiyah south of Baghdad,
Colonel Mike Kershaw, Commander of the 2nd Brigade of 10th Mountain Division,
tasked his entire field artillery battalion to embed with the 4th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi
Army Division and its battalions. The de facto transition team — 350 soldiers, staff,
and all of their enablers — was far more robust than a MiTT, and had the added
value of providing a visible example of how a U.S. battalion is organized and
functions. The results in terms of Iraqi operational capabilities were apparently
positive. Near the end of the brigade’s tour, COL Kershaw reported, “We really
conduct almost no operations where we do not have Iraqi forces either embedded
with us, or where they are in the lead.”259
Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers
MNF-I noted that as of February 29, 2008, there were 544,725 assigned
members of the Iraqi Security Forces.260 The Department of Defense reported that as
of March 19, 2008, the following numbers of Iraqi Security Forces, by category, had
been “authorized” by the Government of Iraq; “assigned” based on payroll data; and
“trained.”261
Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of March 19, 2008
Component
Authorized
Assigned
Trained
Ministry of the Interior
Police
288,001
279,870
166,037
National Police
33,670
33,531
44,156
Border Enforcement
38,205
40,852
28,023
Total MoI
359,876
354,253
238,216
Ministry of Defense
Army
186,352
160,248
180,263
Support Forces
17,369
18,087
19,750
258 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Colonel Tom James, February 22, 2008.
259 Department of Defense Press Briefing, Colonel Mike Kershaw, Pentagon, October 5,
2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4053].
260 Information from MNF-I, March 2008.
261 The chart does not include Ministry staff. The chart also does not reflect the Facilities
Protection Service (FPS), an armed, uniformed service that provides critical infrastructure
protection for ministries and other government organizations. A new FPS Reform Law
directed the consolidation of the FPS under the Interior Ministry (with a few exceptions
including the Ministries of Oil and Electricity) but accordingly to MNSTC-I, the
consolidation process was incomplete as of early 2008.

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Air Force
2,907
1,344
1,370
Navy
1,483
1,123
1,194
Total MoD
208,111
180,802
202,577
Counter-Terrorism Bureau
Special Operations
4,857
3,144
3,709
Total ISF
572,844
538,199
444,502
Source: Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 26, 2008
The three categories — authorized, assigned, and trained — are not a
continuum. Some of those “trained” may not currently be “assigned” — on the
payroll — for example due to casualties, or having left the service for other reasons.
Further, in some cases the numbers “assigned” have outstripped the numbers
“authorized”, frequently due to hirings at the provincial level not yet approved at the
national level. Finally, the Department of Defense notes that the Iraqi Ministry of the
Interior still faces challenges accounting for its personnel, and thus it is not certain
how many of the 354,253 assigned personnel are actually reporting for duty.
The overall numbers of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to grow, driven by
revised estimates by the Government of Iraq of the forces required to provide
security; by provincial-level requests for more police forces; and by the consolidation
of forces from other ministries under the Defense and Interior Ministries.
MNSTC-I and MNF-I estimate that the ISF numbers are likely to grow further
in the near future. The Ministry of Interior total force is projected to grow to about
389,000 by the end of 2008.262 In January 2008 Congressional testimony, MNSTC-I
Commander Lieutenant General James Dubik noted that the total ISF may exceed
580,000 by the end of 2008, and that the Government of Iraq has a “general goal of
about 600,000 to 650,000” for the future.263
Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results
The total numbers of ISF alone provide only a partial gauge of progress toward
the broadly recognized ultimate goal of independent and self-sustaining Iraqi security
forces. Recent qualitative assessments of capabilities and gaps, by current officials
and outside experts, provide a more complete picture.
Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole. Both internal and external assessments
of the ISF point to growing evidence of operational capabilities, but raise some
questions about how close Iraqi forces and their oversight ministries are to
completely independent and competent functioning.
262 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
263 Lieutenant General James Dubik, Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee,
January 17, 2008.

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Overall, MNF-I underscores that while challenges remain in all of the ISF, all
of them have made, and are continuing to make, progress. As one leader with
multiple tours in Iraq noted, improved ISF capabilities are the single biggest
difference between now and several years ago.264 Operationally, another leader
observed, “The Iraqis are holding their ground, responsible for their own turf.”265
Every day, at MNC-I’s Battle Update Assessment, Division Commanders describe
to the MNC-I Commander operations carried out unilaterally, or with coalition
tactical overwatch, by Iraqi forces.
Based on a recent visit to Iraq, retired General Barry McCaffrey also concluded
that the ISF are making operational contributions. He wrote after the trip that while
the Iraqi police are “a mixed bag”, and “much remains to be done” in the Iraqi Army,
overall, the “Iraqi Security Forces are now beginning to take a major and independent
successful role in the war.”266
By far the most comprehensive external assessment to date of the ISF was
carried out in 2007 by the Congressionally-mandated Commission on the Security
Forces of Iraq, led by retired Marine Corps General James Jones (the “Jones
Commission”).267 The Commission benefitted from the participation of many senior
leaders with years of experience in policing as well as military matters, and from
spending considerable time in Iraq with the ISF. In its September 2007 Report, the
Commission concluded, somewhat pessimistically, that “…in the next 12 to 18
months, there will be continued improvement in their [ISF] readiness and capability,
but not the ability to operate independently.”268
In the views of some advisors, the biggest long-term challenges faced by the
Iraqi Security Forces as a whole may be institutional, rather than operational. These
include improving ministerial capacity and effectiveness; clarifying chains of
command; and crafting long-term, integrated force modernization plans for personnel
and equipment.
264 Communication from an MNC-I leader, January 2008.
265 Communication from an MNC-I leader, January 2008.
266 General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (ret), “Visit to Iraq and Kuwait, 5-11 December 2007,
After Action Report,” December 18, 2007.
267 See The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,
September 6, 2007, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf]. The Report
was required by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 110-28. Section 1314(e)(2)(A)
mandated DoD to commission an “independent private sector entity” to assess three things:
(i) the readiness of the ISF to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity
of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, and bringing greater security to Iraq’s
18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and bringing an end to sectarian violence to
achieve national reconciliation; (ii) the training, equipping, command control and
intelligence capabilities, and logistics capacity of the ISF; and (iii) the likelihood that, given
the ISF’s record of preparedness to date, following years of training and equipping by U.S.
forces, the continued support of U.S. troops would contribute to the readiness of the ISF to
fulfill the missions outlined in clause (i).
268 Ibid, p. 12.

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Some advisors stress that the most critical issue, instead, may be overcoming
lingering sectarianism. The ISF as a whole is one of the most powerful national-level
Iraqi institutions. A resurgence of sectarianism in the ranks could potentially turn
key tools of the Iraqi government — the capabilities of its security forces — into
potential threats to the unified whole state.269
Iraqi Army. By the numbers, both the size and the overall capabilities of the
Iraqi Army continue to grow. The Department of Defense reports that as of February
1, 2008, the Iraqi Army had 123 battalions conducting operations, with an additional
37 battalions currently planned or in force generation.270
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group provided a very cautious overall
assessment of the Army’s capabilities, noting: “The Iraqi Army is making fitful
progress toward becoming a reliable and disciplined fighting force loyal to the
national government.”271 In September 2007, the Jones Commission noted more
positively that the Iraqi Army was increasingly effective at COIN, and increasingly
reliable in general, but progress among units has been uneven.272 Since actual ISF
capabilities appear to be evolving quickly, both assessments could have been accurate
snap-shots at those two junctures.
More recently, coalition commanders in Iraq have noted that Iraqi Army
operational capabilities are improving. Major General Mark Hertling commands
Multi-National Division-North, with responsibility for the provinces east and north
of Baghdad where many AQI affiliates sought refuge in the wake of early surge
operations. In January 2008, he noted that the Division partners with four different
Iraqi army divisions, “growing in size and capacity every day.” He commented,
“Where we can’t be, they can be, and in many cases we’re conducting operations
with them.”273
Also in January 2008, as part of Operation Phantom Phoenix, the 3rd Brigade of
the 1st Iraqi Army Division deployed independently, with less than a week’s notice,
from Al Anbar province in the west to Diyala in the east to support combat
operations in the Diyala River Valley.274 According to MNF-I leaders, while not as
attention-grabbing as combat operations, the move demonstrated a different but very
269 Conversations with coalition advisors, January 2008. See CRS Report RS22093 The
Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenges of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences
, by Jeremy
Sharp.
270 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
271 See James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, p.12, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf].
272 The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September
6, 2007, p. 14, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
273 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Mark Hertling, January 22, 2008,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4124].
274 See Press Briefing, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, January 17, 2008, available at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4122].

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important set of capabilities that Iraqi units will need to master, to operate
independently in the future.275
U.S. Commanders also assess that Iraqi Army capabilities are growing at the
headquarters levels. In December 2007, Major General Joseph Fil, the out-going
commander of Multi-National Division-Baghdad, commented on the status of the
Baghdad Operational Command, a headquarters led by General Abud Qanbar, which
includes two Iraqi Army divisions and has responsibility for the capital. MG Fil
noted: “They are making good tactical decisions. They are planning true operations
that involve multiple forces, combined operations that are frequently intelligence-
driven.”276
The list of the major developmental challenges faced by the Iraqi Army —
endstrength, leadership, and logistics — has remained relatively consistent over time,
although commanders and advisors on the ground point to specific incremental marks
of progress in each area.277
In theory, an Army’s endstrength reflects, in part, the missions those forces are
expected to accomplish. The Iraqi Army, currently focused primarily on counter-
insurgency operations, is expected to shift its primary focus, in coming years, from
internal to external security challenges, as civilian forces are able to assume more of
the responsibility for providing internal security.278 In September 2007, the Jones
Commission concluded that the Iraqi Army did “not have sufficient forces to enhance
border security and conduct counterinsurgency operations simultaneously.”279
Reflecting that perceived need for more forces, the Government of Iraq has continued
to increase the Army’s authorized endstrength — by five divisions altogether in
2007.
Like all the other Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi Army has faced the challenge
of quickly developing a capable leadership cadre. As many U.S. military
commanders in Iraq point out, a basic problem is that leadership abilities depend in
part on experience — their production cannot easily be “accelerated.” The Army’s
leadership challenge may be more acute than that faced by the other security forces,
since it is both large and, unlike the Iraqi Police, a nationally-based service whose
leaders must be able to command diverse mixes of soldiers in all regions of Iraq.
275 Conversations with MNF-I leaders, January 2008.
276 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, December 17, 2007,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107].
277 Concerning the consistency of the challenges, see Department of Defense Press Briefing,
Colonel H.R. McMaster, September 13, 2005, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2106]. COL McMaster, describing his partnership
with Iraq Army units in Tal Afar in September 2005, commented that the Iraqi army needed
“… the ability to command and control operations over wide areas…greater logistical
capabilities … more experienced and effective leadership….”
278 Information from MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials, January 2008.
279 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p. 13, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].

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In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group pointed out simply that the Iraqi
Security Forces lacked leadership.280 In September 2007, the Jones Commission also
noted that the Army was “short of seasoned leadership at all levels,” and pointed in
particular to “marginal leadership at senior military and civilian positions both in the
Ministry of Defense and in the operational commands.”281 In Congressional
testimony in January 2008, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mark Kimmitt
indicated that the most important gap was in mid-level leadership282 — non-
commissioned officers and field grade officers, who are required in far greater
numbers than senior leaders. To help redress the situation, the Iraqi Army has
launched several initiatives, including accelerated officer commissioning for
university graduates, waivers to promotion requirements, and recruitment of former
Army officers.283 It is possible that it will prove easier to generate leaders “on
paper”, than to accelerate generation of leadership qualities.
Finally, logistics and sustainment — which are absolutely essential to an Army’s
ability to operate independently — remain an area with room for improvement.284
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group pointed out that the Iraqi Army lacked
logistics and support to sustain their own operations.285 Later, in September 2007,
the Jones Commission called logistics the Army’s “Achilles’ heel,” and observed:
“The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is
substantial and hampers their readiness and capability.”286 The Commission further
concluded that the Army would continue to rely on coalition forces for combat
support and combat service support — though the Commission did not estimate for
how long that reliance would continue.
Testifying before Congress in January 2008, MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dubik
agreed that the Army “…cannot fix, supply, arm or fuel themselves completely
enough at this point.”287 As of March 2008, the Army now feeds itself - a key
280 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/ iraq_study_group_report.pdf].
281 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.14 and p.9, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
282 Mark Kimmitt, Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, January 17, 2007.
283 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
284 Virtually every famous military commander in history has made note of the crucial role
of logistics — some of them quite memorably. Alexander the Great is credited with
observing, “My logisticians are a humorous lot — they know that if my campaign fails, they
are the first ones I will slay.”
285 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/
1206/iraq_study_group_ report.pdf].
286 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.14 and p.13, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
287 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
(continued...)

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component of life support. The Army’s maintenance backlog continues, but they
have better visibility than previously on what needs to be repaired. The Army has
some ability to allocate fuel, although some fuel is still provided by coalition forces.
The Army is developing a national-level maintenance and supply system, including
the new National Depot at Taji which is scheduled to be completed by late summer
2008.288 Meanwhile, according to DoD, the Army’s ability “to maintain
accountability for U.S.-provided equipment remains a challenge.”289
Iraqi Air Force. As of March2008, the Iraqi Air Force had about 1,300
personnel on its payrolls, out of an authorized force of about 2,900.290 The Iraqi Air
Force expects to have about 6,000 personnel by the end of 2009.291
By any measure, the Iraqi Air Force is still a fledgling institution, in the early
stages of recruiting and training personnel. To date, it has focused exclusively on
COIN.292 In September 2007, the Jones Commission assessed that the Air Force was
“well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not
for the future needs of a fully capable air force.”293 In his December 2007
assessment, however, General McCaffrey argued that the Iraqi Air Force’s progress
in COIN was still limited. The ISF, he wrote, “lacks any semblance of an Air Force
with a robust lift and attack helicopter force and fixed-wing C-130 lift to support
counter-insurgency.”294
Commanders on the ground confirm that the training effort is still in its early
stages. Air Force Major General Robert Allardice, the Commander of the Coalition
Air Force Transition Team, noted in early February 2008 that an accelerated training
effort had begun one year earlier. At that time, the Iraqis were flying only about 30
sorties per week.295 As MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dubik testified in January 2008,
287 (...continued)
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008.
288 Information from MNSTC-I, January 2008. See Dubik testimony, January 17, 2008, and
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
289 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
290 Department of State, “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” March 19, 2008.
291 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Robert Allardice, March 17,
2008.
292 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Robert Allardice, March 17,
2008.
293 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.9,15, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
294 General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (ret), “Visit to Iraq and Kuwait, 5-11 December 2007,
After Action Report,” December 18, 2007.
295 Brig. Gen. Robert R. Allardice, Council on Foreign Relations, interview by Greg Bruno,
February 5, 2008, audio tape available at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/15421/allardice.
html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion% 2F405%2Firaq]. Allardice was promoted to Major General
on February 25, 2008, between the interviews cited here.

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as of December 2007, the Iraqi Air Force was conducting about 300 patrols a week
— “up 1,000 percent from just a year ago.”296
As of March 2008, the small Iraqi air fleet included 59 assigned aircraft and 146
pilots, including Soviet-built Mi-17 and UH-1H “Huey” helicopters, 8 light Cessna
172’s, and three C-130 transport aircraft, as well as the first of six King Air 350’s,
which provide ISR capability, and which are expected to be delivered in 2008. Maj.
Gen. Allardice noted in March that current Iraqi Air Force missions, which they do
fly independently, include transportation of troops and medical supplies, and
providing intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance support to joint
counterinsurgency operations.297 According to Lieutenant Colonel Cy Bartlett, whose
team trains and advises Iraqi helicopter operations, as of January 2008, Iraqi
helicopter pilots had completed over 500 combat missions.298
Maj. Gen. Allardice noted that in its next phase, the training effort will shift
focus from battlefield mobility, to “more aggressively shooting from the skies”. A
final, eventual stage is expected to be the use of jet aircraft to defend Iraq’s air space.
The Iraqi Air Force relies on contracted support for maintenance. Maj. Gen.
Allardice estimated that Iraqis could have a self-sustaining Air Force with these
capabilities “in about the 2011 or 2012 timeframe,” depending on the investments
they make.299
An open question for the future is what sort of air force — with what
capabilities, personnel, and equipment — the Iraqi Ministry of Defense will
determine it needs, to meet its full spectrum of security requirements.
Iraqi Navy. Like the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy is still in the early stages
of development. The Department of Defense notes that as of March 2008, the Iraqi
Navy included about 1,100 assigned personnel, and that number was expected to
increase to about 1,500 by fall 2008. The small Navy is based primarily in the
southern port city of Umm Qasr, and includes an operational headquarters, one
squadron afloat, one support squadron, and one battalion of Marines.300 Its missions
including protecting Iraq’s coastline and offshore assets.
In September 2007, the Jones Commission assessed that the Iraqi Navy was not
yet large enough to fulfill its mission. The Commission added that so far, the Navy
296 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008.
297 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Robert Allardice, March 17,
2008.
298 Kristen Noel, “Iraqi Air Force Coming on Strong, U.S. Commander Says,” American
Forces Press Service
, January 15, 2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=48663].
299 Brig. Gen. Robert R. Allardice, Council on Foreign Relations, interview by Greg Bruno,
February 5, 2008, audio tape available at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/15421/allardice.
html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion% 2F405%2Firaq].
300 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.

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had not been the government’s top military priority: “Its maturation is hampered by
the Ministry of Defense’s understandable focus on ground forces and
counterinsurgency operations.”301 As for the Air Force, the Ministry’s “future force
vision” for the Iraqi Navy is expected to continue to mature.
Iraqi Special Operations Forces. Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF),
an early priority for Iraqi and coalition forces leaders, now include one brigade
composed of an elite counter-terrorism battalion, three commando battalions, and
support units. Four regional commando battalions are currently in generation, to be
based in Basra, Mosul, Diyala, and Al Asad.302 The Department of Defense reports
that as of March 2008, there were over 3,100 personnel on the ISOF payrolls, out of
nearly 4,900 authorized personnel.
According to both U.S. commanders in Iraq and outside assessments, the ISOF
are extremely competent.303 As the Jones Commission reported in September 2007,
“The Special Operations brigade is highly capable and extremely effective.”304 The
selection process is reportedly very competitive, and training — conducted by U.S.
SOF — highly demanding.305
As of January 2008, ISOF reports not to the Ministry of Defense, but to the
Counter Terrorism Bureau, under the Prime Minister’s office. Although this is not
an uncommon arrangement in the region, one possible issue for Iraqi leaders in the
future will be ensuring adequate integration of the ISOF and Iraqi conventional
forces.
Iraqi Police Service. The Iraqi Police Service includes three categories —
patrol police, station police, and traffic police. All are based on the principle of local
recruitment and local service. Over time, the Iraqi Police (IPs) are expected to
assume a greater share of the responsibility for providing internal security, backed up
by the National Police (see below, “Iraqi National Police”), while the Iraqi Army
turns its focus toward external security challenges.
The Department of Defense reported that as of March 2008, almost 280,000 IPs
were assigned to the Ministry of the Interior. 166,000 IPs had been trained, leaving
a backlog for the initial 80-hour training (and possibly more, since some of those
trained may no longer be serving).306 According to MNSTC-I, the through-put of
Iraqi police training facilities is expected to increase in early 2008. As of January
301 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.16, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
302 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
303 Communications from MNC-I leaders and Division Commanders, January 2008.
304 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.16, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
305 See for example Monte Morin, “Turning Iraqi Recruits into Commandos,” Stars and
Stripes
, March 14, 2006.
306 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.

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2008, both Ministry of Interior and MNF-I officials were reportedly considering
interim measures, such as shorter initial training courses, to bring new recruits and
recalled former police officers on board more quickly.307
In September 2007, the Jones Commission concluded that Iraqi Police
capabilities are improving at the local level, particularly when the IPs are locally
recruited from relatively ethnically homogenous neighborhoods.308 In December
2007, General McCaffrey similarly observed that “many local units are now
effectively providing security and intelligence penetration of their neighborhoods”.309
While both assessments pointed to emerging IP capabilities, both also indicated
substantial room for improvement. The Jones Commission noted that the IPs were
“…incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi
neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence”, in part because they were
“compromised by militia and insurgent infiltration.”310
In early 2008, a number of U.S. military commanders in Iraq described recent
examples of specific operations planned and carried out in their areas of
responsibility by Iraqi Police, stressing that these capabilities to plan and act
independently — and successfully — have emerged relatively recently. Commanders
also stressed the importance of the visible presence of the IPs at police stations and
on patrol in local neighborhoods, and together with Iraqi Army and coalition forces
at joint security stations, in helping provide population security.311
Iraqi National Police. The Iraqi National Police (NPs), unlike the IPs, are
intended to be a national asset, not a regionally-based one. While they initially
focused on Baghdad, the Interior Ministry’s plan is that the NPs will “regionalize,”
eventually establishing a presence in every province, where they will provide backup
for the IPs.312
The Department of Defense reported that as of March 2008, 38 NP battalions
were operational, of which 9 were judged to be “capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining operations with coalition support.”313
307 Conversations with MNF-I staff, January 2008.
308 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.9, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
309 General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (ret), “Visit to Iraq and Kuwait, 5-11 December 2007,
After Action Report,” December 18, 2007.
310 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.18,10, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
311 Information from U.S. commanders, January 2008. In one example, the local IP
commander briefed the multi-national division commander in detail on the IPs’ plans for the
upcoming Ashura holiday. The plans included some coalition ISR assets — requested at the
initiate of the IPs.
312 Information from MNSTC-I officials, January 2008.
313 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.

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To date, the NPs have more consistently prompted concerns about competence,
corruption, and sectarian bias, than any other Iraqi security force. In June 2007, out-
going MNSTC-I Commander Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey testified to
Congress that the NPs are “the single organization in Iraq with the most sectarian
influence and sectarian problems.”314 In September 2007, the Jones Commission
stated flatly: “The National Police have proven operationally ineffective.
Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the force is not
viable in its current form.”315
Outside experts have suggested several possible remedies. The Iraq Study
Group recommended moving the NPs from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of
Defense, and giving them closer supervision.316 The Jones Commission
recommended disbanding the NPs altogether.317
The Iraqi leadership opted for a different approach. One step was replacing NP
senior leaders. Between late 2006 and January 2008, both of the NP division
commanders, all 9 brigade commanders, and about 18 of 28 battalion commanders
were replaced.318 The other major step was re-training — or “re-bluing” — both
leaders and ranks at the Numaniyah National Police Academy. In January 2008,
MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dubik testified that the re-bluing process was one
hundred percent completed.319
The most recent NP training initiative is a close partnership with Italy’s
Carabinieri, under the rubric of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, launched in
October 2007. The curriculum is based on Carabinieri tactics, techniques and
procedures.
In early 2008, some U.S. commanders in Iraq confirmed that there have been
serious problems with the NPs, and suggested that the leadership changes and re-
education have produced mixed results. As one Brigade Commander noted, “The
314 Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, June 12, 2007, audio transcript
available at [http://www.house.gov/hasc/hearing_information.shtml].
315 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.20, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
316 See James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/iraq_study_group_ report.pdf].
317 See Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September
6, 2007, p.20, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
318 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008. LTG Dubik pointed out that “ten out of
nine” brigade commanders were replaced, since two changes were made to one brigade’s
command.
319 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008.

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National Police have been terrible!”320 One Division Commander praised the work
of one NP brigade in solving problems in his area of responsibility, while noting that
another NP brigade actually is the problem.321
The current NP leadership apparently recognizes that the organization continues
to face challenges of both fact and perception. One coalition leader credits Iraqi
National Police Commander Major General Hussein with this remark: “The National
Police has two enemies — the insurgency, and our own reputation.”322
Department of Border Enforcement. The Department of Border
Enforcement (DBE) faces the daunting task of protecting Iraq’s 3,650 kilometers of
land borders, some of it rugged and mountainous, against apparent infiltration by
extremist groups from some neighbor countries, as well as controlling the usual flow
of cross-border traffic.
In March 2008, the DBE had nearly 41,000 assigned personnel (of 38,000
authorized), organized into 12 brigades of 44 battalions. About 28,000 personnel had
been trained. The training gap — and the relatively low level of training in general
— impinge on the DBE’s effectiveness.323 Given the ratio of distances to personnel,
and the current capabilities of those personnel, the DBE — as DoD put it in
December 2007 — is “stretched thin.”324 The Jones Commission stated more flatly:
“Iraq’s borders are porous.”325
The Iraqi Government’s proposed way forward includes constructing up to 585
border forts, to establish a line-of-sight perimeter, and increasing the use of biometric
scan systems and personal information databases. In the near future at least, DBE
efforts are expected to be supported by coalition overwatch.326
Both coalition advisors and outside assessments have pointed out that the DBE
continues to face additional challenges from corruption of several kinds. In early
2008, coalition officials in Iraq agreed with the assessments by the Jones
Commission that the DBE is infiltrated by outside interests, and that some members
are apparently involved in cross-border smuggling.327
320 Information from Brigade Commander, Baghdad, January 2008.
321 Information from Division Commander, January 2008.
322 Information from MNF-I staff, January 2008.
323 Information from coalition advisors, January 2008.
324 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007.
325 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p.20, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
326 Information from MNSTC-I officials, January 2008.
327 Information from MNF-I officials, January 2008, and Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007, p.20, available at
[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].

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Ministry of the Interior. Both coalition advisors and outside assessments
have consistently pointed to two serious shortcomings in the Ministry of Interior
(MoI) itself: a lack of capacity and corruption.
Capacity challenges apparently plague most of the Ministry’s activities. The
Department of Defense reported in December 2007: “Coalition advisors continue to
report steady but sometimes inconsistent improvement in the MoI’s ability to perform
key ministry functions, such as force management, personnel management,
acquisition, training, logistics and sustainment, and developing and implementing
plans and policies.”328
One particularly serious constraint, according to coalition officials, is that the
Ministry of Interior lacks sufficient capacity to process the large and growing demand
for personnel — to screen recruits, to train them, and to continue to account for
them.329 To address this shortcoming, the Ministry is expanding the capacity of its
training base; rapidly generating officers through a recall and training program for
former army and police officers; and improving personnel accountability in part with
a new automated pay system.330
Corruption — and the perception of corruption — may be the even more
difficult challenge for the MoI to eradicate. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group
concluded flatly that the MoI was corrupt. In September 2007, the Jones
Commission assessed that “…sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the MoI”,
and that the Ministry is “…widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian.”331
In January 2008, one coalition advisor stated bluntly that the MoI is filled with “card-
carrying gangsters.”332
The MoI has apparently taken some steps to battle internal corruption. The
Department of Defense reported that in 2007, the MoI had opened 6,652
investigations of ministry personnel. Of these, 6,159 were closed during 2007,
including 1,112 that resulted in firings, 438 in disciplinary actions, and 23 in forced
retirement.333 According to MNSTC-I Commander LTG Dubik, the MoI had also
328 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
329 Information from coalition advisors, January 2008.
330 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008, and Department of Defense, “Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
331 See James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_
report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf], and Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007, p.17, available at
[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
332 Comment by coalition advisor, January 2008.
333 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.

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opened 500 cases, of which 61 had gone to the Iraqi court system, of which 31 had
ended in convictions.334
Ministry of Defense. In September 2007, the Jones Commission concluded
that the Ministry of Defense (MoD) suffered from “bureaucratic inexperience,
excessive layering, and over-centralization.”335 In March 2008, the Department of
Defense agreed that the Ministry continued to face leadership and staffing
challenges.336
MNF-I officials suggest, however, that compared to other Iraqi ministries, the
MoD is a model of progress — it has not faced the magnitude of corruption endemic
at the MoI, and with close advisory support from the coalition, it has made
substantial progress in both management and strategic planning.337
One major future challenge for the Ministry of Defense will be clarifying and
rationalizing the chain of command. As the Jones Commission pointed out in
September 2007: “Parallel lines of direct communication to military units have been
established under the control of the Prime Minister. He is perceived by many as
having created a second, and politically-motivated, chain of command.”338 Coalition
advisors confirmed this assessment in January 2008, and DoD noted in March 2008
that “the lines of command remain opaque and serve to encourage control at the
highest level.”339 The Iraqi Ground Forces Command reports to the Joint
Headquarters, which reports to the MoD, but some ground forces skip portions of this
chain.
Currently, the 6th and 9th Army Divisions report to the Baghdad Operations
Command (BOC), which reports directly to the office of the Prime Minister. The
Basra Operations Center reports to the MoD. Other Operations Centers have been
established in Ninewah, Samarra, Diyala, Karbala and Anbar.340 For the future, the
Defense Ministry is reportedly considering turning the BOC and analogous
Commands into three-star Army Corps headquarters.341
334 Lieutenant General James Dubik, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2008.
335 Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, pp.9,12, available at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
336 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
337 Conversations with MNF-I officials, January 2008.
338 Conversations with MNF-I officials, January 2008, and Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007, pp.13, available at
[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf].
339 Information from coalition advisors, January 2008, and Department of Defense,
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
340 Information from MNF-I, March 2008.
341 Information from coalition advisors, January 2008.

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Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation”
A central tenet of counter-insurgency is reaching out to the local population and
securing at least their acceptance, if not their active support.
In Iraq, a number of commanders have pointed to changes in the attitudes and
behavior of the Iraqi population as the most important difference between 2007 and
earlier periods. In December 2007, for example, the out-going commander of Multi-
National Division-Baghdad, Major General Joseph Fil, noted: “I attribute a great
deal of the security progress to the willingness of the population to step forward and
band together against terrorist and criminal militia.”342
Coalition and Iraqi government efforts to reach out to the Iraqi population have
increasingly fallen under the broad semantic rubric of “reconciliation.” As of 2008,
the term is very broadly used — from U.S. national strategy, to Congressional
legislation, to the names of Iraqi government structures and of offices and job titles
in coalition headquarters.343 The term is variously used, but in the broadest sense, it
refers to a multi-lateral reconciliation among all sub-groups and members of Iraqi
society, except the self-designated truly “irreconcilables” and those who may have
disqualified themselves by some egregious action.
In practice, “reconciliation” in Iraq has taken a number of forms, several of
which, discussed below, have played critical roles in shaping the security climate.
Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected
Early in OIF, coalition forces recognized the importance of reaching out to
disaffected Iraqi communities, but coalition efforts were constrained by lack of
expertise, limited resources, and — initially — policy decisions.
In 2003, some CPA and CJTF-7 leaders recognized the importance and the
complexity of tribal dynamics in Iraq.344 As coalition forces commanders on the
ground throughout Iraq frequently engaged with local tribal leaders, it rapidly became
apparent that the coalition lacked detailed expertise in tribal history and dynamics.
The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) — the first national-level advisory body,
established by CPA in July 2003 — included very little tribal representation.345
342 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, Pentagon, December
1 7 , 2 0 0 7 , a v a i l a b l e a t [ h t t p : / / w w w . d e f e n s e l i n k . m i l / t r a n s c r i p t s /
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107]. His comments echoed H.R. McMaster’s assessment of
the role of local population in 3ACR’s successful COIN operations in Tal Afar in 2005.
343 At the national level in Iraq, the key agency is the Implementation and Follow-up
Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR), appointed by Prime Minister Maliki.
344 For information about Iraqi tribes, see CRS Report RS22626, Iraq: Tribal Structure,
Social and Political Activities
(archived), by Hussein Hassan.
345 Some members of CPA admitted that gaining a complete understanding of tribal
dynamics and capturing them adequately in the IGC, in a very short time frame, was simply
(continued...)

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In summer 2003, coalition forces launched a concerted outreach effort to Sunni
Arab communities in the restive “Sunni Triangle” in central and north-central Iraq.
On August 7, 2003, CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid convened
community leaders from throughout the region to urge them to cease all tacit support
for insurgents, in exchange for future assistance with reconstruction needs, political
representation, and other concerns. However, for most of the rest of that year, the
very limited presence of coalition civilian experts in these provinces, and limited
resources for reconstruction, made it difficult to fully implement the proposed
“bargain.”
By early 2004, CPA established an outreach office, to engage directly with both
tribal leaders and leaders of other disaffected groups, including some religious
extremists. Also in early 2004, U.S. national leadership crafted a series of “Sunni
engagement strategies” that included “carrots” such as greater political
representation, economic assistance, and detainee releases.
By 2005, coalition leaders in Iraq began to pursue more direct contacts with
insurgents and their supporters — in coordination with, and often brokered by, Iraqi
leaders. As a rule, those talks were reportedly based on a familiar theme — a
cessation of violent action against Iraqis and the coalition, in exchange for benefits
that might include amnesty for some detainees, and improved opportunities to
participate politically or economically in Iraqi society.346
Some critics have suggested that “negotiating” with known or suspected
perpetrators of violence is an ethically ambiguous practice that, moreover, is unlikely
to succeed because it depends for its success on commitments by those who have
violated the rule of law.
Coalition leaders confirm that they understand who these interlocutors are. In
December 2007, MNF-I official Major General Paul Newton, a UK officer leading
the outreach effort, commented: “Do we talk to people with blood on their hands?
I certainly hope so. There is no point in us talking to people who haven’t.”347 As a
senior MNC-I leader with considerable experience in Iraq described it, “You
reconcile with your enemy, not with your friend.”348
In the view of some participants and observers, what may distinguish the 2007
outreach from earlier efforts is a change in the perceptions of insurgents and would-
345 (...continued)
too complex, and the risks of error too great. Conversations with CPA officials, 2003.
346 See for example Rory Carroll, “US in talks with Iraqi insurgents,” The Guardian, June
10, 2005; Ned Parker and Tom Baldwin, “Peace deal offers Iraq insurgents an amnesty”,
The Times, June 23, 2006; and Colin Freeman, “British general to talk to Iraqi insurgents”,
Telegraph, December 11, 2007.
347 See Colin Freeman, “British general to talk to Iraqi insurgents”, Telegraph, December
11, 2007.
348 Communication from MNC-I official, January 2008.

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be insurgents about their own prospects. As the senior MNC-I leader added, “You
can only reconcile with an enemy when he feels a sense of hopelessness.”349
“Awakening” Movements
In the views of many practitioners and observers, “awakening” movements are
powerfully reshaping the security climate as well as the political climate in many
parts of Iraq. While they all have “ground-up” origins — and borrow from one
another’s experiences — they vary greatly in character, and in likely impact, by
region.
Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar. The movements got
their start in Al Anbar province. As described by Multi-National Force-West leaders,
in the aftermath of regime removal, Al Anbar was a “perfect storm”: The region was
traditionally independent-minded, and relatively secular, but dependent on the central
government for key resources. After the old regime collapsed, the province’s big
state-owned enterprises closed, state pensions were not being paid, De-
Ba’athification policies meant lost jobs, and many Anbaris felt disenfranchised and
left out of national-level politics.350
That context provided fertile ground for Al Qaeda affiliates to infiltrate the
region with promises to “rescue” the population, but their actions proved to be
absolutely brutal — including swift and violent punishment, or even death, for
perceived infractions. One observer has called it a “campaign of murder and
intimidation”, including the murders of prominent local tribal leaders.351
The first rising in Al Anbar took place in 2005 — a movement that became
known as the “Desert Protectors”. Members of local tribes in al Qaim and Haditha
volunteered to begin working with some U.S. Special Operating Forces and later with
the Marines.352
The movement that became known as the “awakening” developed later, in Al
Anbar’s capital Ramadi, drawing on the model of the Desert Protectors — including
the premise of an alliance among several key tribes. The initial leading figure of the
awakening was Sheikh Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, of the Albu Risha tribe,
who was killed on September 13, 2007, by a roadside bomb. In late 2006, he had
spearheaded the signing of a manifesto denouncing Al Qaeda and pledging support
to coalition forces. According to MNF-West, by January 2008, of the eleven sheikhs
349 Communication from MNC-I official, January 2008.
350 Information from MNF-West leadership, January 2008. Information from coalition
officials, and Al Anbar provincial and community leaders, 2003 and 2004.
351 Bill Roggio, “Anbar Rising,” Long War Journal, May 11, 2007, available at
[http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/05/anbar_rising.php]. See also Mario
Loyola, “Return of the Sheik,” National Review, October 8, 2007.
352 Information from MNF-West staff, 2007.

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who initially stood up to challenge Al Qaeda, six were dead.353 The movement,
initially known as Sahawa al Anbar when it formed around a core from the Albu
Risha tribe, changed its name to Sahawa al Iraq as more tribes joined the cause.354
According to MNF-West, leading sheikhs in the awakening movement describe
their relationship with Al Qaeda as a “blood feud.” The tribal leaders do not want
coalition forces to stay forever — they simply want help killing Al Qaeda.355
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North. During 2007,
awakenings began to “spread” through the provinces of north-central Iraq —
Ninewah, Salah ad Din, Kirkuk (At Ta’amin), and Diyala — drawing on the Al
Anbar example. The northern “climate” includes several dynamics that could prompt
more Sunni Arabs to self-organize to protect their interests.
As in Al Anbar, there is an Al Qaeda affiliate presence in the north-central
provinces. In the wake of successful surge operations in Baghdad, Al Qaeda
affiliates took up residence in several parts of the region, including Mosul and the
upper Diyala River Valley.356
Sunni Arabs in northern provinces, like those in Al Anbar, have some grounds
for feeling politically disenfranchised. In Ninewah, for example, Sunni Arabs, who
constitute about 75% of the province’s population, generally did not vote in
provincial elections and are thus under-represented on the Provincial Council.357
Across the north (and unique to the region), according to Multi-National
Division-North leaders, de facto Kurdish expansion continues, extending beyond the
Green Line into parts of Mosul and oil-rich Kirkuk. In Kirkuk, in particular, many
Kurds are taking up residence — or returning to live — in anticipation of a popular
referendum that will decide Kirkuk’s political future.358 Coalition officials judge that
Sunni Arabs in the region could find this dynamic threatening.359
Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South. Both security
conditions on the ground, and direct exposure to “awakenings” elsewhere in Iraq,
have helped generate nascent “awakening” movements among some tribal leaders in
largely Shi’a-populated southern Iraq. These incipient initiatives share with their
Sunni Arab counterparts their ground-up impetus, based on a desire for security and
opportunity for their families, and a disinclination to be imposed on by outsiders.
353 Information from MNF-West leadership, January 2008.
354 See William S. McCallister, “Iraqi Islamic Party, Kurds, and the Tribal Awakening,”
January 18, 2008, unpublished paper.
355 Information from MNF-West leadership, January 2008.
356 Information from MNF-I, MNC-I, and MND-North officials, January 2008.
357 Information from MNF-I and MND-North officials, January 2008.
358 Information from Multi-National Division-North, January 2008.
359 Conversations with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January 2008.

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The character of the southern movements, however, is distinctly different from
those in north-central Iraq, due to a quite different political and religious backdrop,
and thus quite different “targets” of frustration.360 The most prominent feature of
politics in southern Iraq is the power struggle between two major political groupings
and the militias that back them: on one hand, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq
(ISCI, formerly SCIRI) and its Badr militia; and on the other hand, the Office of the
Martyr Sadr, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and its militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM).
Schisms in the Jaish al-Mahdi, in the wake of al-Sadr’s declared ceasefire, produced
splinter groups — “special groups” — apparently acting independently, that
continued to practice violence (see above, “Shi’a Extremism”).
MNF-I leaders suggest that the southern “awakening” movements are motivated
primarily by growing popular impatience with both of the leading contenders for
political power in the south, and in particular, with their past or current Iranian
connections. ISCI’s Badr forces were trained in Iran, during the Iran-Iraq War.
Muqtada al-Sadr has maintained personal ties with clerics in Iran, and as of January
2008, JAM “special groups” were benefiting from Iranian training and support.361
Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq”
Military commanders in Iraq have credited the “Sons of Iraq” (SOIs) with
playing an essential and substantial role in the improvement of security in Iraq,
beginning in late 2007. Both terminology and specific characteristics vary by region,
but in general, SOIs are local residents who have stepped forward, in some organized
way, to help protect and defend their communities.362
Who the “Sons of Iraq” Are. MNF-I noted that as of March 27, 2008, there
were 91,349 SOIs in Iraq altogether; 4,733 in MNF-West’s area, Al Anbar province;
20,044 in MND-North’s area, which includes the four provinces north and east of
Baghdad; 30,278 in MND-Baghdad’s area; 34,291 in MND-Center’s area, which
includes four provinces immediately south of Baghdad; 2,003 in MND-Center
South’s area, which is Qadisiyah province; and none in MND-Southeast’s area,
which includes the four southernmost provinces.363
The majority of SOIs, but not all of them, are Sunni Arabs. The Department of
Defense reports that as of March 2008, about 71,500 were Sunni and about 19,500
360 For additional and slightly different views about the differences among awakening
movements, see Mohammed Fadhil, “Why Southern Iraq Won’t Awaken Like Anbar,”
November 7, 2007, available at [http://pajamasmedia.com/2007/11/post_252.php].
361 Information from MNF-I staff, January 2008. MNF-I notes that before regime change,
70% of the members of the Ba’ath Party were Shi’a.
362 The term “Sons of Iraq” replaced “concerned local citizens” in January 2008, apparently
based on consultations with the Government of Iraq. Information from MNC-I staff,
January 2008.
363 Information from MNF-I staff, March 2008.

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Shi’a.364 Most groups are relatively homogenous but some are mixed. For example,
in the area of Multi-National Division-Center, a mixed region south of Baghdad, 60%
of the SOI groups are Sunni Arab, 20% are Shi’a Arab, and 20% are mixed.365
Coalition force commanders readily admit that the SOIs include former
insurgents. One Brigade Commander commented, “There’s no doubt that some of
these concerned citizens were at least tacitly participating in the insurgency before
us,” and one Division Commander stated more boldly: “80% of these guys are former
insurgents.”366 Other commanders note that the SOIs include not only “reformed”
insurgents, but also some infiltrators currently affiliated with extremist groups.367
Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement. The SOI movement was not
the product of a carefully-crafted strategy by the Government of Iraq or by coalition
forces. Instead, like the “awakenings”, it began from the ground up — in this case,
as a series of ad hoc, neighborhood watch-like initiatives by Iraqis who self-
organized and “deployed” to key locations in their own communities, to dissuade
potential trouble-makers. The response by coalition forces to the dynamic was also
initially ad hoc, as some coalition units provided volunteers in their areas with
equipment, or payments in kind for information, or other forms of support.
Frequently, coalition forces named their new partners — with heroic-sounding names
like the “Ghazaliyah Guardians”, or with NFL team names.
MNF-I leaders and commanders on the ground have observed that SOIs initially
come forward only after Al Qaeda affiliates and other threats are eliminated from an
area. Some commanders also point out that SOIs volunteer to serve once a coalition
forces presence has been established — they have to be convinced that coalition
forces will actually remain in the area and not pull back to their FOBs.368
How the “Sons of Iraq” System Works. After its ad hoc beginnings, the
SOI system was loosely standardized by coalition forces, in coordination with Iraqi
security forces counterparts.
SOIs are paid by coalition forces, with funding from the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP), based on 90-day renewable contracts. The
364 Department of Defense, “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,” March 2008.
365 Information from MND-C leaders, January 2008.
366 Department of Defense press briefing with Colonel Mike Kershaw, Pentagon, October
5, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4053]; and conversation with a Division Commander, January 2008.
367 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Mark Hertling, January 22, 2008,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4124].
368 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I leaders, and division commanders, January 2008.
See also Department of Defense News Briefing with Major General Walter Gaskin,
C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l , M N D - W , I I M E F , D e c e m b e r 1 0 , 2 0 0 7 ,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4103], where Maj. Gen.
Gaskin noted that coalition forces’ elimination of Al Qaeda plays a role in prompting local
Iraqis to serve.

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money is paid to a single contractor, often a tribal sheikh or other community leader,
who is then responsible for paying the SOIs’ salaries and providing any uniforms,
vehicles or other equipment that may be required. In practice, most SOIs earn about
$300 per month, roughly equivalent to about two-thirds of the total income of a
member of the Iraqi Police.369
In theory, SOIs “work for” the ISF, while the coalition forces pay them.
Division and brigade commanders on the ground, interacting with SOIs, reinforce
that message. In practice, however, SOIs are designed to fill the gaps — to “thicken
the ranks” — where ISF presence is limited, so they may be more likely to have
regular interaction with coalition forces counterparts.370 In any case, SOI groups are
only created in areas where their work can be supervised.
Most SOIs are hired to man check points or to protect critical infrastructure, and
to provide information about suspicious activity. MNF-I leaders and commanders
on the ground stress that SOI contributions have directly saved lives and equipment
— as a rule, when an SOI group is established in an area, the level of IED attacks
goes down.371 Some commanders wryly admit that part of the reason may be that
some SOIs themselves were formerly IED emplacers.
Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force. Multi-
National Force-West leaders noted in the past that “‘concerned local citizen’ was not
a term of art in Al Anbar province,” where security volunteers have been organized
in several alternative ways.
In Al Anbar, early tribal offers to provide volunteers were channeled into the
formation of “provincial security forces” (PSF) — a gateway step to joining the Iraqi
security forces in a more permanent capacity. Members of the PSF, who all receive
80 hours of training from the Marines, are formally personnel of the Ministry of
Interior, and the MoI pays their salaries.372 Other local residents in Al Anbar have
self-organized into neighborhood watch-style organizations.373
369 Details provided by MNC-I staff, January 2008.
370 Participant observation, and information from division and brigade commanders, January
2008.
371 Conversations with MNF-I, MND-Baghdad, MND-Center and MND-North leaders,
January 2008. See also Department of Defense Press Briefing with COL Mike Kershaw,
October 5, 2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=4053]. COL Kershaw notes that in his battlespace, SOIs had established
their own check points and secured those roads. He adds that, since the SOIs began
working, IED attacks were down, and the SOIs had turned in, or given information about,
“over 85 terrorists.”
372 Information from MNF-West staff, 2007.
373 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Walter Gaskin, December 10,
2007, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4103].

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Concerns About the “Sons of Iraq”. The SOI movement has raised some
concerns among both Iraqis and some outside observers.
Iraqi Government officials, and representatives of official and unofficial groups
in Iraq, who might otherwise have extraordinarily little in common, do share a
concern that the SOIs could return to violence, form new militias, or otherwise pose
a threat to the authority or influence they currently enjoy.374
Key Shi’a leaders of the Government of Iraq are apparently concerned about a
potential ground-up challenge to their leadership, based on Shi’a tribal organizations,
which could theoretically grow out of SOI groups in the south. Prime Minister
Maliki named a very close associate, a Shi’a Arab, to head the Implementation and
Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR), the body responsible,
among other matters, for facilitating the integration of SOIs into Iraqi government
structures.375 In turn, neither supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr nor members of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq — or the militias that support them — are
apparently eager to face competition for influence in Shi’a-populated southern Iraq.
Meanwhile, a leading Sunni Arab political party, the Iraqi Islamic Party,
apparently views the SOIs and related awakening movements as potential organized
competitors for support among Sunni Arab Iraqis. And northern Kurds, in turn, may
be reluctant to see the rise of more organized Sunni Arab constituencies, included
armed potential fighters, in politically contested cities such as Kirkuk.
In December 2007, at a session of the Ministerial Committee on National
Security (MCNS), Iraqi government and coalition leaders reached an agreement
confirming the ground rules for the SOI program. Those rules included a cap on the
total number of SOIs nationwide, of 103,000, as well as a complete prohibition
against SOI recruitment and hiring in Multi-National Division-Southeast’s area —
Iraq’s four southernmost, largely Shi’a-inhabited, provinces. The rules also
stipulated, for example, that SOIs could not represent political parties, that SOI
groups must reflect the demographic balance in their area, and that coalition forces
could not arm the SOIs.376
Following the December MCNS session, key Iraqi leaders — including Prime
Minister Maliki, his National Security Advisor Mowaffaq al-Rubbaie, and ISCI
leader Abdul Aziz Hakim — have all publicly expressed support for the SOI
program.
Meanwhile, outside observers have expressed concerns that the SOI movement
may be creating and alternative — and a potential future challenge — to the national
374 Assessments by MNF-I and MNC-I leaders and staff, January 2008. See also William
S. McCallister, “Iraqi Islamic Party, Kurds, and the Tribal Awakening”, January 18, 2008,
unpublished paper.
375 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I leaders and staff, including some who have worked
personally with IFCNR, January 2008.
376 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I staff, January 2008.

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government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, by empowering new
forces that may or may not support the central government in the future. “At worst,”
one observer commented, “it will perpetuate a fractured and fractious Iraq.”377
Some SOIs have also registered frustration. In February 2008, some SOIs in
Diyala province left their posts to urge replacement of the province’s police chief.
In other locations, allegations that coalition forces had killed SOIs have fueled
resentments;378 in practice, such allegations may be complicated by the fact that many
SOIs are reportedly former insurgents.
“Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs. The Government of
Iraq (GoI) and coalition forces have agreed that the SOI program is temporary. The
agreed way forward includes, in principle, integrating some SOIs — roughly 20% —
into the Iraqi security forces, and facilitating employment for the rest in the public or
private sector. In either case, the plans include getting the SOIs off of the CERP
payroll.379 In March 2008, the Department of Defense expressed concern at the “lack
of a cohesive plan to transition the Sons of Iraq to the Iraqi forces and civilian
employment.”380
The Department of Defense reported that as of March 2008, more than 9,000
former SOIs had joined various Iraqi forces in Baghdad381. For most of the SOIs
interested in joining the ISF, the top choice is the Iraqi Police, which would allow
them to continue to serve in their local communities. An application process is in
place for SOIs seeking to become IPs, but it is cumbersome. After the SOI declares
his interest, local-level screenings are carried out by coalition forces, local civilian
officials, local tribal sheikhs, and appropriate ISF representatives. The review
process considers, among other issues, an applicant’s background, proof of residency,
and any special skills the applicant may have, as well as the area’s demographic
balance. Formal ISF requirements also include literacy, a physical fitness test, and
a medical check. Those candidates who pass through these reviews are referred to
the Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR),
attached to the office of the Prime Minister, for approval. Candidates approved by
IFCNR are forwarded to the Ministry of Interior for vetting, selection and — if
successful — the issuing of hiring orders. Applications do not specifically state that
a candidate is a SOI.382
377 Anthony Bubalo, “Lawrence of Arabia is out of place in Iraq,” Financial Times,
November 11, 2007. See also, for example, Interview with Toby Dodge, Foreign Policy
Online, September 2007, available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?
story_id=3982].
378 See Sudarsan Raghavan and Amit R. Paley, “Sunni Forces Losing Patience with U.S.,”
Washington Post, February 28, 2008.
379 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I staff, January 2008. A deadline of July 2008 was
initially proposed, but by January 2008, that seemed less realistic to coalition officials.
380 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
381 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, March 2008.
382 Information from MNF-I, MNC-I, and commanders, January 2008.

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One constraint, regardless of intent, is that the Interior Ministry’s personnel and
training systems are overloaded, and cannot easily absorb a large influx of new
personnel (see above, “Ministry of Interior”).
For those SOIs not incorporated into the ISF, the broad intent of the government
of Iraq and the coalition forces is to facilitate their transition into civilian jobs —
ideally, jobs that are both sustainable and actually productive.383 One major
constraint is the absence of a thriving and diverse private sector, so most proposals
and programs to date have focused on potential state sector jobs.
The Coalition is working with several Iraqi ministries to implement the new
Joint Technical Education and Reintegration Program (JTERP), launched in two pilot
locations on March 23, 2008.384 The program is expected to include vocational
training, on-the-job training, and job placement, with priority to SOIs and recently
released detainees.385
Another innovative initiative, launched by MNC-I based on the recommendation
of commanders on the ground, would create new “Civil Service Departments”
(CSDs), as part of a new Civil Services Corps, modeled loosely on the New Deal-era
Civilian Conservation Corps.386 As planned, the CSDs would provide essential
services such as electricity, sewage, and sports, to complement, not replace, those
already provided by the central Baghdad government. MNC-I has launched a pilot
CSD project in the Ar Rashid district of Baghdad. Each of the initial three CSDs -
“public works battalions” - is expected to train and employ about 400 personnel,
drawing heavily from former SOIs.
The coalition plans to provide some initial funding for the project with the goal
of transferring full funding responsibility to the Iraqi government some time in
calendar year 2009. The theory, explained one Brigade Commander, is “build it and
they will come” — that is, once the new structure demonstrates its worth, the Iraqi
government would fully embrace the initiative.387 For its part, IFCNR has expressed
support, encouraging increasing both the size and number of the proposed CSDs, and
reportedly agreeing to pay the salaries of CSD employees, while the coalition
provides equipment and training costs.388

383 The U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, runs a Community
Stabilization Program, which typically pays relatively low salaries — approximately $90 per
month — in exchange for tasks such as garbage collection. For SOIs’ transition into the
civilian world, the goal is to find, where possible, more directly productive employment.
384 The two pilots are located in Tikrit and Mahmudiyah. The second phase is scheduled to
include two larger pilots, in Kirkuk and Fallujah. Information from MNF-I, March 2008
385 See Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008; and
information from MNF-I, January and March 2008.
386 Information about the CSD initiative, including the Jihad pilot, from MNC-I officials,
January 2008.
387 Conversation with Brigade Commander, January 2008.
388 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I, March 2008.

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Detainee Operations
The broad “reconciliation” intent extends to an additional subset of the Iraqi
population — those who have been detained by coalition forces.
Accountability. By the beginning of 2008, coalition detainee operations had
evolved markedly from the days of the formal occupation, when they were
characterized by under-staffing, limited facilities, and — due to ongoing aggressive
military operations — a large and quickly growing detainee population. In the early
days, it was common to find local communities frustrated first by detentions they
perceived to be groundless, and then by the difficulty of determining the location and
status of those detained.389
One important, gradual change since then, according to coalition officials, is
much better accountability, based on the introduction of biometrics, better
information-sharing throughout the detention system, and simply better cultural
familiarity with the multi-part names commonly used in the region.390
“COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program. A second major change,
introduced by the current MNF-I leadership, is a set of “COIN inside the wire”
practices, designed to identify and separate the truly “irreconcilables” from the rest
of the detainees.391
This new approach is based partly on a better understanding of the detainee
population, which apparently includes far more opportunists than ring-leaders — for
example, under-employed young men who agree to emplace an IED in exchange for
a one-time payment. The opportunism seems to be corroborated by the low
recidivism rate — about 9 out of 100.392
According to coalition officials, in the past, the coalition used its theater
internment facilities simply to “warehouse” detainees. Those facilities effectively
served as “jihadist universities” where detainees with extremist agendas could recruit
and train followers. Today, the coalition cultivates the majority of the detainee
population by providing detainees with voluntary literacy and vocational training, and
bringing in imams to offer literacy and religious education. A family visitation
program allows about 1,600 visits per week.393 According to a senior coalition
389 Information from CPA and CJTF-7 officials, 2003 and 2004.
390 Information from MNF-I officials, January 2008.
391 Information from MNF-I officials, January 2008.
392 Over 78% of those detained by coalition forces are interned based on suspicion of some
IED-related activity. The recidivism rate is based on numerical data. The under-employment
assessment is based on accounts from detainees. Information from Task Force-134,
Baghdad, January 2008.
393 Information from MNF-I officials, January 2008, and see Donna Miles, “Anti-Insurgency
Tactics Succeeding in Iraqi Detention Facilities,” American Forces Press Service, March
12, 2008.

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official, “Now detainees themselves point out the trouble-makers.”394 To support this
effort, two Theater Internment Reintegration Facilities are under construction, in Taji
and Ramadi, to provide further education and skills training.395
Detainee Releases. A third initiative is a planned release of detainees,
projected to include a majority of the 23,845 current detainees in the coalition
detention facilities. During 2007, the detainee population grew from about 14,000
at the start of the year to 25,000, due to surge operations and better incoming
information from Iraqi sources.396 The release initiative is motivated partly by the
overall emphasis on reconciliation, and partly by concerns that the forthcoming
“security framework agreement” (see above, “Future Security Framework
Agreement”) may place new constraints on coalition detainee operations.
The targeted release program draws on the results of “COIN inside the wire” in
separating the hardcore cases from one-time offenders. The program makes use of
a guarantor system, in which tribal sheikhs and other local leaders may vouch for,
and accept responsibility for, the future good conduct of detainees released back to
their communities.397
The release program calls for giving ground commanders the opportunity to
comment on proposed releases. Some commanders have expressed concerns about
the practical implications of the program, wondering in particular how jobs will be
found for the released detainees, and what will restrain them from low-level,
opportunistic criminality in the future if full-employment jobs are not found.398
Civil/Military Partnership in Governance
and Economics
From the earliest days after major combat operations, civilian and military
coalition leaders in Iraq have recognized the central importance of the governance
and economics “lines of operation” — indeed, military commanders have
consistently viewed them as essential counterparts to security. The 2007 surge
“theory of the case” adjusted the sequencing — improved security would now lay the
groundwork for progress in governance and economics — but all three lines
remained essential to long-term success (see above, “‘New Way Forward’ National
Strategy: Theory of the Case”). The Iraqi government would have the lead role in
394 Information from Task Force-134, Baghdad, January 2008.
395 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008.
396 Information from Task Force-134, Baghdad, January 2008, and from MNF-I, March
2008.
397 The use of a “guarantor system” for targeted detainee releases was initially applied in
Iraq in 2004, Information from CJTF-7, 2004.
398 Conversations with ground commanders, January 2008. One commander, asked for his
views about the process, simply exclaimed, “Don’t go there!”

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governance and economics, but the coalition, including civilian and military
personnel, would support their efforts.
The key tension over time has centered on the balance of civilian and military
roles and responsibilities in these areas. While all agree that civilian agencies are
best placed, by training and experience, to lead the governance and economics lines
of operation, civilian efforts have been hampered by the relatively limited resources
of their agencies, and by delayed and limited staffing. Military forces, with far
greater numbers of “boots on the ground,” have sometimes stepped in to spearhead
these efforts, and have consistently played at least a supporting role.
Relatively recent developments include a revitalization of the civilian/military
Provincial Reconstruction Team effort, as part of the surge. At the same time, as
surge operations have helped improve security in many areas, military units have
turned a greater share of their own attention to governance and economic activities.
Civil/Military Partnership in Iraq: Background
The idea to apply coordinated civilian and military capabilities at the provincial
level in Iraq dates from before the start of the formal occupation. Throughout, that
“coordination” has had two important aspects: coordination within civil/military
teams assigned to the provinces, and coordination between those teams and their
military unit counterparts.
Early military operational-level post-war plans called for provincial-level
“Governorate Support Teams”, led by State Department personnel and including
military Civil Affairs officers and representatives of the U.S. Agency for
International Development.399
Under CPA, those plans began to be realized, with some delays and in slightly
modified form. The State Department (and some coalition partner countries)
provided Foreign Service Officers to serve as “Governorate Coordinators,”
eventually supported by small, civil/military staffs. In August 2003 — before most
provinces were staffed — CPA and CJTF-7 launched what became a regular series
of regional meetings, bringing Division Commanders and CPA Coordinators from
the regions of Iraq to Baghdad, to share concerns and lessons learned.400
At the end of the formal occupation — and thus the tenure of the CPA — the
new U.S. Embassy established several regional offices to provide consular services,
but the provincially-based “GC” system was disestablished.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), per se, were established in Iraq in
2005, as provincially-based offices led by State Department representatives, with
399 Information from CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2003.
400 Information from CPA and CJTF-7 staff, and participant observation, 2003.

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mixed civilian/military staffs. The term “PRT” was borrowed from Afghanistan,
where PRTs take a wide variety of forms, depending in part on which coalition
country leads them. As of January 2008, the stated purpose of the PRTs was: “To
assist Iraq’s provincial and local governments’ capacity to develop a transparent and
sustained capability to govern, while supporting economic, political, and social
development and respect for the rule of law.”401
In 2007, as part of the surge, the PRT effort was expanded in scale, on the
premise that increased security would create growing opportunities for meaningful
economic and governance work at the provincial level. In June 2007, President Bush
praised the effort, noting: “Much of the progress we are seeing is the result of the
work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring together military
and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen
moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.”402
PRTs are based on a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of
State and the Department of Defense, signed on February 22, 2007 and retroactively
applicable to previously-established PRTs. The Memorandum names PRTs “a joint
DoS-DoD mission,” which falls “under joint policy guidance from the Chief of
Mission and the Commander of MNF-I”. By mandate, the Department of State leads
the PRTs, the PRTs report to the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) at the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad, and the Chief of Mission “provides political and economic
guidance and direction to all PRTs.” Brigade Combat Team commanders partnered
with PRTs exercise authority only for “security and movement of personnel.”403
As of March 2008, there were 31 PRT-like structures in Iraq, with about 800
total staff. These teams “cover” all of Iraq — but that coverage is uneven. The 31
teams included 9 U.S.-led full PRTs; 3 coalition-led full PRTs, in Irbil (Republic of
Korea), Dhi Qar (Italy), and Basra (UK); 13 smaller “embedded PRTs” (ePRTs)
partnered with Brigade Combat Teams; and 6 non-self-sustaining “provincial support
teams” which are based with a PRT but cover another location — for example,
personnel based in Irbil cover Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk in northern Iraq, and
personnel based in Dhi Qar cover Muthanna and Maysan in southern Iraq.404
The size and composition of the various forms of PRTs varies substantially,
from a four-person core staff at the smallest ePRT to the 123 personnel at the
Baghdad PRT. OPA notes that an ePRT typically has between 4 and 12 members,
and a PRT — between 90 and 100.
401 Information from the Office of Provincial Affairs, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, January 2008.
402 Cited in “Iraq PRTs” brochure, U.S. Agency for International Development, September
2007.
403 “Memorandum of Agreement,” dated February 22, 2007, signed by Deputy Secretary of
State Negroponte and Deputy Secretary of Defense England.
404 Information from Office of Provincial Affairs, January 2008; and see U.S. Embassy
Baghdad Press Release, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Fact Sheet”, March 20, 2008.

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In January 2008, the single largest group of PRT personnel was “locally engaged
staff.” Of the 798 personnel on duty, 73 were State Department Foreign Service
Officers, and 25 were USAID Foreign Service Officers. The U.S. Departments of
Agriculture and Justice provided specific, critical expertise in small numbers — 16
and 6, respectively. Contractors and Department of Defense personnel — civilian
and military — filled many of the remaining slots.405
Within PRTs, the civil/military balance of responsibilities varies by location.
At the Baghdad PRT, for example, as of January 2008, members of the U.S. military
had the lead responsibility for PRT operations, and for all infrastructure projects and
half of the rule of law efforts (including police, detainees, and prisons). They shared
responsibility with civilian counterparts for economics and governance initiatives.406
Coordination Between PRTs and Military Units
Perhaps more important in terms of current impact than civil/military
coordination within PRTs, is civil/military coordination between PRTs and the
military units they partner with. In Iraq in early 2008, these relationships varied a
great deal.
Each ePRT is co-located and partnered with a Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
In theory, all ePRTs operate independently, but in practice, if an ePRTs lacks its own
transportation and force protection assets, it relies on the BCT to support its
operations. The ePRTs formally report up to the Office of Provincial Affairs at the
U.S. Embassy, but anecdotal evidence suggests that in some cases, BCT commanders
request information and point out areas where ePRTs could help. Some ePRTs may
thus function more like a BCT staff section than a partner organization.407
The much-larger full PRTs typically operate much more independently. There
is great variation in the type of military units PRTs are partnered with, which range
from a BCT that has responsibility for the same province, as in north central Iraq; to
a single two-star headquarters, as in the partnership with MNF-West in Al Anbar
province; to, in the case of the Baghdad PRT, two Division headquarters (MND-
Baghdad, responsible for the city, and MND-Center, responsible for other parts of the
province).
In general, military commanders praise the expertise and contributions of their
PRT counterparts, but stress the need for far more of that expertise and presence,
particularly right now, during the general improvement in the security climate. Some
commanders ask, “Where’s the civilian surge?” while some officials at MNF-I put
it more bluntly: “Get State out here!”408 Some commanders have expressed particular
405 Information from Office of Provincial Affairs, January 2008. In 2007, DoD temporarily
filled 129 slots formally assigned to DoS, with DoD civilians.
406 Information from Office of Provincial Affairs, January 2008.
407 Information from BCT staff and PRT members, January 2008.
408 Conversations with Division and BCT Commanders, and MNF-I officials, January 2008.
(continued...)

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frustration at the lack of comprehensive PRT coverage — for example, the coverage
of Najaf and Karbala provinces by teams based in Hillah, in Babil province.409 OPA
officials, in turn, stress that the current PRT presence is the civilian surge.410
Some OPA and PRT officials, meanwhile, express frustration with the military
in Iraq for trying to do too much governance and economic work, instead of leaving
those missions to far better qualified civilian experts. As one civilian official
expressed: “The military needs to start transitioning governance and economics to
other agencies”.411 Apparently most military commanders would agree — many note
that they would readily transition responsibilities whenever civilians are available to
receive them.412
Many practitioners and outside observers note that institutional cultural
differences help shape the PRT/military relationships. One civilian official in Iraq
commented, only partly tongue in cheek, that it’s a case of “‘sit back and reflect’
versus ‘take that hill!’”413 For example, one Division, frustrated by delays in the
arrival of ePRTs, launched a campaign to “recruit” ePRT members from its own staff
and subordinate units. Officials of OPA, to which PRTs and ePRTs report, viewed
that initiative as stepping on their prerogatives.414
Other practitioners stress that individual personalities play the key role. As one
civilian official commented: “It’s mostly about personalities — it’s not something
you can just fix.”415
Some civilian and military officials suggest that more appropriately-targeted
training might better prepare civilians for PRT service, particularly those scheduled
to work closely with military units. Some current civilian PRT members note that
their pre-deployment visit to Ft. Bragg, and their counter-insurgency training at the
Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq, were invaluable, primarily for the exposure
they provided to military culture and organization.
Military Role in Governance and Economics
While civilian and military officials generally agree that governance and
economics-related tasks might in theory be better performed by civilian experts, as
408 (...continued)
It has been a common practice, throughout OIF, for military commanders to use “State” as
a somewhat misleading shorthand to refer to civilian expertise from multiple agencies.
409 Conversation with Division Commander, January 2008.
410 Conversation with OPA, January 2008.
411 Conversation with PRT member, January 2008.
412 Conversations with Division and Brigade Commanders, January 2008.
413 Conversation with OPA official, January 2008.
414 Conversations with Division staff, and with OPA and PRT officials, January 2008.
415 Conversation with PRT official, January 2008.

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of early 2008, coalition forces in Iraq continued to play significant roles in those
fields.
Governance. The Office of Provincial Affairs briefing materials state: “PRTs
serve as the primary U.S. Government interface between U.S., coalition partners, and
provincial and local governments throughout all of Iraq’s 18 provinces.”416 It might
be more accurate to say that PRTs play the “lead” role in governance, rather than the
“primary” one, given the sheer magnitude of ongoing interaction by coalition forces
with Iraqi provincial and local officials.417
In Baghdad, for example, the full Baghdad PRT interacts with the Governor, the
Mayor, and the Provincial Council Chair, while ePRTs are tasked to work with the
district- and neighborhood-level councils. A small ePRT, with responsibility for a
given district, might work closely with that district council, but due to personnel and
resource constraints, the ePRT might have difficulty working equally closely and
frequently with all of the subordinate neighborhood councils within that district.
Military units are likely to have far more frequent interactions with Iraqi
officials. Battalion commanders meet regularly with neighborhood councils, Civil
Affairs units and other military staff work continually with local officials on essential
services and other public works projects, and Captains and their staffs at Joint
Security Stations — and their ISF counterparts — meet often with local officials who
use the JSSs as community meeting sites.418
A central and long-standing focus of coalition governance efforts is helping
Iraqis achieve connectivity between the top-down national ministries and their
appointed representatives for each province, on one hand, and the ground-up
provincial and local governments chosen by local populations, on the other. Military
commanders in every region attest that provincial officials have no authority over —
and little relationship with — the ministerially-appointed representatives for their
province.419
As described by Colonel Tom James, commander of the 4th BCT of 3rd Infantry
Division, stationed south of Baghdad in early 2008: “One of the things we really
focused on is linkages, making sure that local governments are representative of the
416 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” brief, Office of Provincial Affairs, January 2008.
417 Coalition military “governance” efforts in 2008 are very similar to those in 2003. In
2003, faced with a very limited civilian presence, commanders “leaned forward” and
worked with Iraqis to form provincial and local councils, to help Iraqis articulate,
prioritize, and represent their concerns.
418 Conversations with BCT commanders, BN commanders, CA personnel, and PRT
officials, January 2008.
419 Conversations with commanders and staff in MNF-West, MND-North, MND-Baghdad,
and MND-Center, January 2008. The problems were in part legacies of the centrally-
controlled old regime, including Iraq’s 1969 Law of Governorates, based on a “strong
center” model, which named specific authorities that provincial governments could exercise
— for example, “consulting on ministerial regional appointments”, and “promoting
sanitation and public health.”

CRS-101
people, and they they’re linked to higher governments so that we can process,
prioritize, and resource the people that need things.”420 Commanders at every level
have expressed hope that the Provincial Powers Law, passed by the Iraqi parliament
on February 2008 and approved by the Iraqi presidency in March, will take
constructive steps toward clarifying the relationships.421

Current governance efforts by coalition forces include fostering connectivity
among the levels of government, by mentoring Iraqi interlocutors at each level. For
example, in one town, community leaders were apparently frustrated because they
felt disconnected from the deliberations of the nearest local council. The Army
Captain leading the JSS in the city started bringing local community leaders together
regularly, challenging and helping them to articulate and prioritize their concerns.
Coalition forces then connected that informal body with the Iraqi officials formally
chosen to represent that area. That mentoring has been backed up by higher levels
of the Captain’s chain of command, on their frequent visits.422
In another area, a Brigade Commander and representatives of his subordinate
units regularly review the membership of all the local councils, based on the units’
frequent interactions with them, checking for vacancies, for the presence of
“outsiders” from outside a given neighborhood, and for roughly accurate reflections
of the demographic balance. Where local councils fall short, the units that regularly
engage them point out the concerns to them and urge improvement.423
In the views of many commanders, PRTs and ePRTs are simply not robust
enough to conduct the governance mission comprehensively. As one Division staff
member framed the issue: “The Division needs to help the PRTs help establish
governance”.424
Economics. Military commanders in Iraq confirm that for U.S. personnel,
economic policy guidance is provided by the U.S. Embassy, and that PRTs have the
lead role in the economic line of operation. But as for governance, since the earliest
post-major combat days, the U.S. military has played a role in the economic
reconstruction of Iraq.
The military role in economic reconstruction has typically focused on local-level
initiatives. In early 2008, one economic focus for the military was neighborhood
economic revitalization — usually measured in terms of the number of small shops
opened. The first shops to re-open in a neighborhood, as security improves, typically
include fruit and vegetable stands, and shops selling convenience foods like bottles
of soda. To facilitate that process, commanders may seek a local Iraqi partner to serve
420 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Colonel Tom James, February 22, 2008.
421 Conversations with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and Division and Brigade Commanders,
January 2008. The law calls for provincial elections to be held by October 1, 2008.
422 Conversations with Division, Brigade, Battalion and Company Commanders, and
participant observation, January 2008.
423 Conversations with Brigade staff, January 2008.
424 Conversation with Division staff, January 2008.

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as the primary contractor for reconstruction in a neighborhood, and to encourage
other local entrepreneurs to come onboard.425
Commanders also make available micro-grants, through a Department of
Defense program, which allows them to provide fledgling Iraqi businesses with start-
up funds ranging from several hundred to several thousand dollars, to purchase
equipment or raw materials. For example, a micro-grant enabled one man in
Baghdad to buy power saws and raw wood to jumpstart his furniture-making
business.426
Both civilian and military officials in Iraq point out that the number of open
shops alone may be a good way to gauge the security climate — how safe the local
population feels. Longer-term, sustainable development, civilian and military
officials note, requires not just local shops but also production — which in turn
requires sustainable and secure systems of supply and distribution, as well as a
customer base.427 Civilian development experts in Iraq caution that this will simply
take time. Military commanders, meanwhile, have been tasked to keep an eye open
for potential “medium-sized businesses” to support.428
Meanwhile, military commanders continue to make use of the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP), which provides brigade commanders with
discretionary funding for a wide array of projects. As of early 2008, the majority of
CERP funding was being used to support essential services, and other sustained
initiatives such as the Sons of Iraq program (see above, “Security Volunteers and
‘Sons of Iraq’”). Anecdotally, in some instances, CERP may have lost some of its
initial flexibility — in the accounts of several BCT commanders, who may nominally
spend CERP funds at their own discretion, they must now seek approval from their
Division headquarters to spend CERP money.
As of January 2008, there was no formal requirement for military units to
coordinate CERP spending with Iraqi officials. At the same time, Division, Brigade
and Battalion Commanders noted that most projects nominated for CERP support are
initially put forward by local Iraqi officials and residents. Further, although it is not
mandated, the military typically cross-walks proposed initiatives with the existing
425 In January 2008, coalition forces in the Ar Rashid district of southwest Baghdad were
working closely with Iraqi cardiac surgeon and local resident, Dr. Moyad, on the
revitalization of the 60th Street market area. Dr. Moyad had already successfully facilitated
revitalization of another nearby market area.
426 Conversations with brigade and battalion commanders, January 2008.
427 Conversations with MNF-I and PRT officials, and brigade staff, January 2008.
428 In the midst of a discussion with subordinates about possible medium-sized business
opportunities in their area, one Brigade Commander sensibly interrupted, “Somebody tell
me what a medium-sized business is!” Some civilian officials question the role of the
military in developing medium-sized businesses.

CRS-103
plans of local Iraqi councils.429 There is also no formal requirement for the military
to coordinate CERP spending with PRT or ePRT counterparts.
Some OPA and PRT officials have raised concerns regarding the apparent lack
of complete coordination of economic reconstruction spending among the military’s
CERP, the QRF funding available to PRTs,430 and Iraqi government funding. Too-
liberal use of CERP funding, some civilian officials argue, could counteract the broad
policy goal of encouraging Iraqis to solve as many problems as possible by
themselves.431
Assessing the Results to Date
Strategically-based decision-making about the United States’ next steps in Iraq
and its future relations with that country requires a clear assessment of the security
situation status quo, an clear explanation of the causes of the security changes to
date, and an evaluation of the validity of the overall theory of the case — the
proposition that security improvements would help create opportunities for the Iraqi
government to make broader progress. Numerical metrics can provide a starting
point, but a full assessment requires qualitative evaluations and the exercise of
subjective judgment.
Security Situation by Metrics
Multi-National Force-Iraq leaders use a series of quantitative metrics to track
and describe both snapshots of the security situation and trajectories over time. The
qualitative significance of the metrics is open to some interpretation, but overall,
current metrics suggest a marked though not steady improvement in the security
situation from the start of surge operations to the present.
Overall Attacks. The metric usually described first is “overall attacks” —
including attacks against Iraqi infrastructure and government facilities; bombs found
and exploded; small arms attacks including snipers, ambushes, and grenades; and
mortar, rocket and surface-to-air attacks.
429 Conversations with Brigade and Battalion Commanders, January 2008. For example,
residents of one town approached coalition forces at a JSS with a request for an ambulance.
Checking with the local council, the unit found there were no immediate plans to meet that
need, so the unit sought CERP funding to support the request. On the other hand, when the
same local residents sought funding to renovate local schools, the unit discovered that the
responsible Iraqi council had already formulated — though not yet implemented —
prioritized school renovation plans, so the coalition unit did not seek CERP support for the
schools.
430 According to the Office of Provincial Affairs in January 2008, $125 million in QRF
funding is available to PRTs in Fiscal Year 2007. PRT officials added that QRF funds
cannot be used for security-related projects; and that they can be used in smaller amounts
— and thus more flexibly — than CERP. Conversations with OPA and PRT officials,
January 2008.
431 Conversations with OPA and PRT officials, January 2008.

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According to MNF-I, overall attacks grew from a low point in mid-2004, when
records begin, to a peak of over 1,500 weekly attacks in June 2007, just as the final
surge units arrived in Iraq and Operation Phantom Thunder was launched. That
gradual growth was punctuated by sharp upward spikes at key Iraqi political
junctures, including the January 2005 elections and the October 2005 constitutional
referendum, and, less sharply, during Ramadan each year. Between June 2007 and
March 2008, according to MNF-I, overall attacks declined by 60 percent, to levels
comparable with those in early 2005.432
Commanders on the ground point out that a low level of attacks in a given
geographical area does not necessarily mean that no adversaries remain there. It
could also indicate that a place — such as Arab Jabour south of Baghdad — is being
used as a sanctuary.433 In turn, a high level of attacks is generally expected, at least
temporarily, during major operations in an area, as extremist groups attempt to push
back.434
Iraqi Civilian Deaths. Another key metric tracked by MNF-I is the number
of Iraqi civilian deaths due to the actions of extremists.435 The number of monthly
deaths peaked in late 2006, before the launch of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon in early
2007. MNF-I reports that beginning in July and August 2007, after the start of the
Phoenix-series of operations, the level of civilian deaths fell sharply and then
continued to decline through January 2008, a decline of over 72%, before rising
slightly in February 2008. Early 2008 civilian death levels were roughly comparable
with those in early 2006, before the Samarra mosque bombing.436
Weapons Caches. A further metric regularly recorded and tracked is the
number of weapons caches found and cleared. That number skyrocketed from 1,711
in 2004 (the first year of full, available records), to 6,955 in 2007, and 2,436 in the
first three months of 2008 alone.437
The cache numbers alone, however, tell an incomplete story, first of all because
the sizes of the caches are not indicated. In addition, there is no way to confirm the
432 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008; and
slide “Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends, September 25, 2004-March 21, 2008” provided
by MNF-I, March 2008.
433 Observation from MND-C, January 2008.
434 MNF-I and MNC-I observations, January 2008.
435 MNF-I tracks Iraqi civilian deaths by compiling coalition forces’ reports of “significant
acts”; by reviewing Iraqi reports from the Coalition Intelligence Operations Center which
may be unverified; and then by checking where possible for redundancies. Reporting
depends on coverage by coalition or Iraqi personnel — and may not be comprehensive.
436 Information from MNF-I, January 2008, and slide “Civilian Deaths January 1, 2006-
March 21, 2008” from MNF-I, March 2008. See also Department of Defense, “Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008. MNF-I tracks civilian deaths using both
“coalition reports only”, and “coalition and Iraqi reports” - which may contain some overlap.
437 Slide, “Caches Found and Cleared, January 9, 2004-March 21, 2008”, provided by MNF-
I, March 2008. MNF-I notes there were 2,862 caches in 2005, and 2,660 in 2006.

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discovery success rate by comparing the number of caches found with the total
number of weapons caches in Iraq at any given point. Larger numbers of found
caches could indicate that the problem is growing — for example, that more weapons
are coming into Iraq. Larger numbers could also simply reflect more aggressive —
and more successful — operations, based on better information from Iraqi sources
about cache locations.
High-Profile Attacks. MNF-I also tracks the category of “high profile
attacks” — including explosions involving the use of car bombs, suicide car bombs,
and individuals wearing suicide vests. In 2007, the monthly total reached a peak of
about 130 in March before falling, unevenly, to about 40 in December. MNF-I noted
that erecting barriers and hardening sites, as well as kinetic operations against would-
be perpetrators, had helped lower the total of vehicular attacks.438 High profile
attacks rose slightly in January and February 2008 in all categories, and particularly
suicide vests.439
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). MNF-I tracks improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) based on two metrics — the number of IED explosions, and
the total number of IED incidents including explosions, IEDs found and disarmed,
and IED hoaxes. The second metric can be viewed as a broader measure of adversary
intent.
MNF-I reports that the total number of IED explosions reached a high point of
1,700 in June 2007, just before the start of the series of Corps-level offensives, and
fell to a low point in November 2007, before rising slightly in December, to just
under 700. The number of total IED incidents followed a similar trajectory over that
time period. In early January 2008, Al Anbar, Baghdad, and the area south of
Baghdad were relatively quiet, but the area north of Baghdad was more active —
with 61% of all IED incidents.440
IED use can also be evaluated qualitatively, as well as quantitatively. By the
end of 2007, less sophisticated forms of IEDs — such as command wire- and
pressure plate-detonated devices — had become the most common, possibly
indicating a degradation in the supply networks or ability to coordinate and operate
of the adversary. In turn, by far the most deadly form of IEDs are explosively-formed
penetrators (EFPs), supplied as a rule from Iran. Trends in EFP incidents — such as
a brief early January 2008 incident spike followed by a quick decline — may indicate
changes in the networks and transit routes that facilitate the flow of these weapons.
438 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I officials, January 2008.
439 Slide “High Profile Attacks (Explosions), May 1, 2006-March 21, 2008”, provided by
MNF-I, March 2008, and Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in
Iraq,” March 2008.
440 Information from MNF-I and MNC-I staff, January 2008.

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Security Situation: Commanders’ Qualitative Assessments
Testifying to Congress in September 2007, several months into Corps-level
operations utilizing the full surge force, General Petraeus stated, “As a bottom line
up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met.”441 In
addition to using security metrics, commanders on the ground describe progress in
meeting military objectives in terms of the impact to date on the adversary.
According to commanders, by January 2008, the capabilities of Al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) and its affiliates had been seriously diminished, and its members were focused
on survival — as they lost key personnel, access to external funding and support, and
long-standing bases of operation.442 Yet as one Brigade Commander in Baghdad
noted, “As we push them out of one place, they go to another,” so completing the
mission would still take some time.443 In other locations, AQI operatives had
apparently gone to ground, ceasing activities but, according to one Division
Commander, “lurking in the shadows, where they are working quietly, secretly, and
I think very determinedly to regain power….”444
According to both the Department of Defense and commanders in Iraq, in
March 2008 AQI remained a “serious threat,”445 still capable of carrying out
“spectacular and highly lethal terrorist attacks.”446 AQI had shifted much of its focus
to targeting Sons of Iraq and other Iraqi community leaders.447 As MND-North
441 See General David Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, House Foreign
Affairs Committee website, [http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf]. The
September 2007 reports to the Congress by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were
required by U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 110-28, Section 1314(b)(3).
442 Department of Defense News Transcript, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, January
17, 2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4122].
443 Communication from a brigade commander, Baghdad, January 2008.
444 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, December 17, 2007,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107].
445 Department of Defense News Transcript, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, January
17, 2008, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
4122].
446 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, March 2008.
447 In January 2008, for example in Adhamiyah in Baghdad, a retired Iraqi Colonel who had
become a key leader of the Sons of Iraq (SOI, previously known as Concerned Local
Citizens, see below) was killed in a complex attack, which included the use of a suicide vest,
at the Sunni Endowment building. Also in early January 2008, five SOIs were found
beheaded, north of Muqtadiyah, with hand-written notes attached to them including threats
against the SOI program. Information from MNC-I, January 2008.

CRS-107
Commander Major General Mark Hertling stated, “The fight against these extremists
is a tough one, and there is more fighting ahead.”448
By January 2008, the ability of Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) “special groups” to carry
out attacks had also been diminished but not entirely eliminated, according to
commanders. One Division Commander noted that the biggest thing that keeps him
up at night is the possibility that Muqtada al-Sadr might call off his unilateral
ceasefire, and that the full JAM might return to the fight.449
Overall, in early 2008, MNF-I leaders continued to note positive trends but
urged caution — the security situation was still “tenuous” and “reversible”, and the
fight was not yet over.450 As one Division Commander noted, “We’re making
progress but we’re not dancing in the end zone.” Another described a recent
conversation with an important tribal sheikh who said, “You don’t take a cake out of
the oven when it smells good — you wait until it’s done.”451
Security Improvement: Commanders’ Explanations
MNF-I leaders and commanders on the ground attribute the improvements in
the security situation not just to one or two key factors, but to a compendium of
factors. Moreover, commanders note, those factors are made particularly effective
by their interaction effects — for example, coalition personnel who have previous
service in Iraq, making use of more sophisticated technologies.
The most fundamental factor is the strategic shift, under the New Way Forward
strategy, from an emphasis on transition — a quick hand-over to Iraqis — to a focus
on achieving population security. Additional key factors more frequently cited by
commanders include targeted operations by special operations forces; operations and
much greater presence by conventional coalition forces; operations, presence, and
greatly improved capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces; efforts by the Sons of Iraq and
other security volunteers, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire.452
In addition, according to commanders, compared to the first years of OIF, far
more intelligence assets are available in-country, and at lower levels of command,
greatly improving commanders’ ability to make decisions and respond in a timely
way.453 New technologies — particularly rapidly fielded counter-IED equipment and
448 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Mark Hertling, January 22, 2008,
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4124].
449 Conversation with Division Commander, January 2008.
450 Conversations with MNF-I leaders, January 2008. See also “Interview with General
Petraeus,” National Public Radio, March 18, 2008.
451 Conversations with Division Commanders, January 2008.
452 Conversations with MNF-I leaders, MNC-I leaders, and Division Commanders, January
2008.
453 Conversations with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and Division and Brigade Commanders,
(continued...)

CRS-108
approaches — are helping coalition forces against the adversaries’ deadliest weapons
and, according to commanders, saving lives.454
Not only are various components of the coalition forces contributing to the fight,
their efforts are far better integrated than they were several years ago, and that
integration helps explain security improvements to date. For example, commanders
note that the air component now contributes more intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets to ground commanders, to support and inform their
operations. The greater ground forces presence, and the better information from
Iraqis that it generates, in turn, have made possible the more frequent and more
effective use of air strikes. Commanders note that conventional forces continue to
rely on SOF and their high-end capabilities to reach some high-profile targets in their
areas, while conventional forces are increasingly contributing insights based on their
presence in local neighborhoods, to make SOF efforts more effective.
Finally, as many practitioners on the ground point out, force leaders, staff,
commanders, and troops in the field now bring significant previous experience to the
mission. Most leaders and commanders have served at least one previous tour in
Iraq, and their familiarity with Iraqi governing structures, basic laws, and customs,
is markedly greater than the limited knowledge the first coalition teams brought to
Iraq.455 Leaders also point out that they have had time to absorb the lessons from
their earlier tours, including absorbing the 2006 COIN manual that captured lessons
from recent operational experience.456
Security Benchmarks
The Congress, too, has sought — and legislated — mechanisms for assessing
progress in Iraq. In spring 2007, the Congress mandated that the President and the
Comptroller-General of the United States each provide an assessment of progress to
date. The legislation was based partly on a December 2006 recommendation by the
Iraq Study Group to establish clear benchmarks, and to link progress in those areas
to positive and negative reinforcement.457
453 (...continued)
January 2008.
454 Conversations with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and Division and Brigade
Commanders, January 2008.
455 Participant observation 2003 and 2004, and conversations with coalition leaders, staff,
and commanders, 2008.
4 5 6 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, available at
[http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf].
457 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report,
December 6, 2006, available at [http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf]. The ISG recommended that “…the United States
should lay out an agenda for continued support to help Iraq achieve milestones, as well as
underscoring the consequences if Iraq does not act,” (p.42). It also stated: “If the Iraqi
government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on
(continued...)

CRS-109
The legislation established 18 benchmarks — 9 of them security-related. It
required the President to provide an initial report by July 15, 2007, and a second
report by September 15, 2007, addressing “whether satisfactory progress toward
meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.”458 The legislation also
required the Comptroller General of the United States to report, not later than
September 1, 2007, on “whether or not each such benchmark has been met.”459
Table 2 depicts the September 2007 assessments of the nine security-related
benchmarks, by the White House and by the Government Accountability Office.
Some discrepancies are apparently due to a key semantic difference between the two
mandates — progress that “is being achieved” versus benchmarks that “have been
met.” Some other differences are apparently due to choices of emphasis in the
assessments of benchmarks that address more than one subject.
In all cases, the conclusions pertain to the situation that pertained in September
2007 or earlier, when the assessments were conducted. It is likely that specific
conditions on the ground have evolved significantly since that time, but the
benchmarks still suggest broad analytical categories that might usefully be employed
to gauge progress in Iraq.
Table 2. Benchmark Assessments as of September 2007
Benchmark
White House September 2007
GAO
(viii) Establishing supporting Satisfactory.
Met.
political, media, economic,
and services committees in
support of the Baghdad
Security Plan.
(ix) Providing three trained Satisfactory.
Partially met.
and ready Iraqi brigades to The MoD generated 8 BDE HQs 9 BNs, in 90-day rotations, have
support Baghdad operations. and 27 BNs to support Baghdad been provided. Of 19 units to
operations. “Some of these units date, only 5 performed well (Page
have performed exceptionally 41).
well…some units have been less
impressive.”
457 (...continued)
national reconciliation, security and governance, the United States should reduce its
political, military or economic support for the Iraqi government,” (p.43).
458 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act of 2007, P.L. 110-28, Section 1314(b)(2). Section 1314(b)(1)(A) lists
the 18 benchmarks.
459 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act of 2007, P.L. 110-28, Section 1314(e)(1)(A).

CRS-110
Benchmark
White House September 2007
GAO
( x ) P r o v i d i n g I r a q i Partially satisfactory.
Not met.
c o mma n d e r s wi t h a l l Iraqi commanders have been Iraqi commanders faced political
authorities to execute this given the necessary authorities, intervention (Page 12).
plan and to make tactical and but political intervention in
operational decisions, in operations continues.
consultation with U.S
c o m m a n d e r s , w i t h o u t
political intervention, to
include the authority to
p ursue all extremists,
including Sunni insurgents
and Shiite militias.
(xi) Ensuring that the Iraqi Partially satisfactory.
Not met.
Security Forces are providing Progress with the Iraqi Army is “The government has not always
even handed enforcement of satisfactory “though much ensured that ISF were providing
the law.
remains to be done.” The “Iraqi even-handed enforcement of the
police has not made satisfactory law.” (Page 12)
progress.”
(xii) Ensuring that, according Satisfactory.
Partially met.
to President Bush, Prime There has been “a steady “Opportunities for creating safe
Minister Maliki said ``the improvement in population havens still exist due to the
Baghdad security plan will security…but work remains to be political intervention of Iraqi
not provide a safe haven for done, especially in the Sadr City government officials and the
any outlaws, regardless of area of Baghdad and in strong sectarian loyalties and
[their] sectarian or political Kadhamiyah.”
militia infiltration of security
affiliation.”
forces.” (Page 9, 46)
(xiii) Reducing the level of Partially satisfactory.
Not met.
sectarian violence in Iraq and Satisfactory progress has been “We could not determine if
eliminating militia control of made toward reducing sectarian s e c t a r i a n v i o l e n c e h a d
local security
violence, but not toward declined….since the perpetrator’s
eliminating militia control of intent is not always clearly
local security.
known.”
“Militia control of local security
forces remains a problem.” (Page
9, 51)
(xiv) Establishing all of the Satisfactory.
Met.
planned joint security stations 30 JSSs, and 31 coalition combat 32 of 34 JSS’s established.
in neighborhoods across outposts, established as of August
Baghdad.
31, 2007.
(xv) Increasing the number of Not satisfactory.
Not met.
Iraqi security forces units There is progress in the “The number of Iraqi army units
c a p a b l e o f o p e r a t i n g development and operation of o p e r a t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y
independently.
ISF, but not significant progress decreased from March to July
toward increasing the number of 2007.” (Page 58).
u n i t s a b l e t o o p e r a t e
independently.
(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq’s Not satisfactory.
Not met.
political authorities are not Some “progress is clearly being Evidence of undermining and
undermining or making false made” but “there remains much false accusations was found.
accusations against members work to be done.”
(Page 12)
of the Iraqi Security Forces.
Sources: The White House’s “Benchmark Assessment Report, September 14, 2007,” at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914.pdf]; and “Securing, Stabilizing and
Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security and Economic
Benchmarks,” GAO-07-1195, United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C.,
September 2007.

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Theory of the Case: Improved Security Creates Opportunities
for Progress?

The Administration’s “New Way Forward” strategy, announced in January
2007, aimed at improving security in order to give the Iraqi government “breathing
space” to make progress in governance, economics, and reconciliation.460 Many
proposals for “post-surge options” in Iraq are based in part on assessments of how
effectively the strategy has worked. While most observers agree that security in Iraq
has improved, many disagree about the extent of “reconciliation” progress to date,
and thus about the validity of the basic strategy.
Some observers argue that there has been little or no progress. For example,
Andrew Bacevich writes, “As the violence in Baghdad and Anbar province abates,
the political and economic dysfunction enveloping Iraq has become all the more
apparent.”461 Some stress that the problem is the lack of a truly functioning central
government. For example, retired General Barry McCaffrey writes, “Incompetence,
corruption, factional paranoia, and political gridlock have paralyzed the state.”462
Other observers give the Iraqi government a mixed report card, pointing to
advances including de facto oil revenue sharing, and the recent passage of key
legislation on De-Ba’athification and Provincial Powers, but noting that some
political benchmarks have not yet been met.463 As one observer notes, on the basis
of an early-2008 assessment in Iraq, “Major improvements are still required in the
Iraqi government and in governance at the national, provincial, and local levels.”464
Rigorously assessing the validity of the theory that security improvements can
create “space” for progress by the Iraqi government is a challenge, because the theory
contains no timelines and no guarantees. The theory assumes that even after security
improves, political and economic progress would still depend on additional efforts
and choice by Iraqi leaders.
460 See President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html]; and “Fact Sheet:
The New Way Forward in Iraq,” January 10, 2007, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html].
461 Andrew Bacevich, “Surge to Nowhere,” Washington Post, January 20, 2008. In a
virtually unqualified indictment, he also refers to Iraq as “…a ramshackle, ungovernable and
unresponsive dependency that is incapable of security its own borders or managing its own
affairs.”
462 General Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5-11
December 2007,” December 18, 2007, submitted as a Statement for the Record for the
HASC O&I Subcommittee hearing on January 16, 2008.
463 See for example Michael O’Hanlon, Frederick Kagan, Jack Keane, “Making Iraq Safe
for Politics,” The Washington Post, January 20, 2008; and Max Boot, “We Are Winning,
We Haven’t Won,” The Weekly Standard, January 28, 2008.
464 Anthony Cordesman, “Creating a Stable and Secure ‘Iraqracy’: The Continuing Need
for Strategic Patience,” February 14, 2008, available at [http://www.csis.org/index.php?
option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4334].

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Some observers who believe there has been some political progress in Iraq
attribute that progress directly to the security results of the surge. As one group of
observers writes, “The political progress resulted from a year’s worth of substantial
effort to reduce violence in Iraq.”465 It seems likely that to the extent that there has
been some political progress, security improvements played a role in bringing it
about.
It is also possible that improved security is the most important prerequisite for
political progress, but that more time is required for “improved security” to have its
full effect. One possible gauge — to avoid an absolutely open-ended assessment —
is to expect to see national-level leaders make progress at about the time that Iraqis
in local communities turn their attention from personal security to other concerns.
In early 2008, U.S. commanders in Baghdad, south of Baghdad, and in Al Anbar,
reported that increasingly, the top concerns of community leaders and local residents
were unemployment and electricity, rather than violence in their neighborhoods.466
Further, it is possible that security improvements alone can do little to spur
broader progress. To the extent that other factors — such as institutionalized
sectarianism or even inflexible personalities — are also hindering full reconciliation,
security improvements alone may not be enough to facilitate political progress by the
Iraqi government.
Post-Surge Options
While the Administration has not yet articulated a concrete policy, and the
Congress has not yet proposed specific legislation this year, past proposals and
debates suggest several major post-surge options and their possible ramifications.
In general, an option’s “success” should be measured against the objectives it is
designed to achieve. These objectives are not the same in every case, or even among
all the proponents of the same course of action.
All of the options envisage some form of troop withdrawal from Iraq. Any
future withdrawal plans will be shaped in part by several sets of constraints,
including available ground and air transportation for withdrawing personnel and
equipment from Iraq, and both the willingness and capacity of neighboring states to
provide access and transit.
Conditions-Based Further Decision-Making
One option is to continue the status quo — that is, continue to apply all of the
current lines of operation, including the military’s current activities, while drawing
down U.S. forces to pre-surge levels (15 brigade combat teams) by summer 2008,
with the intention of making future decisions about force levels and missions based
465 Michael O’Hanlon, Frederick Kagan, Jack Keane, “Making Iraq Safe for Politics,” The
Washington Post,
January 20, 2008.
466 Information from Division and Brigade Commanders, January 2008.

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on future assessments of progress — in particular, the status of the fight against
various adversaries, and the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Commanders on the ground in Iraq generally favor a “conditions-based
approach.” General Petraeus has spoken in favor of taking an “operational pause”
following the redeployment of the surge troops, as a “period of consolidation and
evaluation after reducing our ground combat forces by over a quarter.”467 Speaking
at the Pentagon in March, on the fifth anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, President Bush indicated his inclination to support such an approach: “Any
further drawdown will be based on conditions on the ground and the
recommendations of our commanders - and they must not jeopardize the hard-fought
gains our troops and civilians have made over the past year.”468
This option is highly dynamic. MNF-I expects a progression over time in its
relationships with ISF partners — from “leadership” to “partnership” to tactical and
then operational “overwatch,” with the caveats that the progression is unlikely to be
steady, and that it will vary from area to area, and even within areas.469 The process
would be expected to include the hand-over of Joint Security Stations and Combat
Outposts (see above) to Iraqi forces, to maintain the security footprint needed to
secure the population. As the out-going Commander of MND-Baghdad described
it, in December 2007: “The plan that we believe makes the most sense at this point,
and that we’re embarking upon, is one of simply thinning the ranks, if you will, in
areas that are going well, retaining some coalition presence there to continue to work
with the Iraqi security forces and these security volunteers…so that there’s tactical
overwatch or operational overwatch, if you will, and retaining [U.S. troop] strength
in the areas where we’re still working hard.”470
Proponents argue that this approach supports well-informed decision-making,
and is the most responsive to changing circumstances on the ground, since decisions
are made close to the time of execution rather than a long time in advance. It would
avoid the danger, in the words of some commanders, of “going too quickly”. In this
view, a too-hasty withdrawal, unguided by conditions on the ground, could allow
AQI affiliates and Shi’a renegade militias to reassert themselves and attempt to
regain lost ground, before Iraqi security forces are capable of making up the
difference.
Some observers, including many who are inclined to support this approach,
nevertheless point with caution to the inherently open-ended nature of a conditions-
based commitment. How, some wonder, with such an approach, can Iraqi leaders be
467 Cameron Barr, “Petraeus: Iraqi Leaders Not Making ‘Sufficient Progress’, Washington
Post
, March 14, 2008.
468 See “President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror,” March 19, 2008, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/print/20080319-2.html].
469 See General David Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, House Foreign
Affairs Committee website, [http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf].
470 See Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, December 17,
2007, [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107].

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pressed to assume greater responsibility and make more marked progress toward
reconciliation?
Opponents of the conditions-based option argue from two very different vantage
points. Some, for whom the primary objective is reducing the U.S. troop
commitment in Iraq as soon as possible, are dissatisfied because this approach does
not necessarily support that goal.
Other opponents, whose assessments of current status differ from those by
commanders on the ground, argue that the status quo should be changed because
either the current strategy or the current approaches are not working. Some of these
opponents argue that the strategy is ineffective because security gains have not in fact
led to substantial political and economic progress. Others argue that current
approaches on the ground — for example, “offering arms and bribes to Sunni
insurgents”, a reference to the SOI program — are ineffective at best or even
potentially harmful.471
Withdrawal According to a Timeline
A second option is to draw down all remaining U.S. forces in Iraq by a set
deadline, or in accordance with a set schedule — for example, as some have
proposed, by one Brigade Combat Team per month.
Most proponents of this “bring the troops home” option focus on different
objectives than the future of Iraq, per se. For some of them, the primary objective
is simply to end the U.S. commitment in Iraq — on the grounds that the mission
simply should not be a top U.S. national priority. This option would meet that
objective by definition.
Other proponents of a scheduled withdrawal stress that the U.S. troop and dollar
commitments in Iraq are detracting from the United States’ ability to prepare to meet
other security challenges. Some point in particular to stress on the ground forces —
the Army and the Marine Corps — and argue that a near-term draw down would
relieve that stress, help guarantee the availability of forces for Afghanistan and other
contingencies, and make it easier for the Services to recruit and retain.472
A few proponents base their support at least in part on the view that the U.S.
troop presence in Iraq — and the antipathy that may be generated by the presence of
a de facto occupier — could be hindering further progress. They suggest in turn that
471 Andrew Bacevich, “Surge to Nowhere,” Washington Post, January 20, 2008.
472 In his December 2007 assessment, retired General Barry McCaffrey, who advocates not
a complete withdrawal but rather drawing down to 12 BCTs by January 2009, commented
that “The Army is starting to unravel,” pointing to current recruiting campaigns that are
bringing on board “those who should not be in uniform” due e.g. to drug use or criminality;
to the loss of mid-career officers and NCOs; and to the “stretched and under-resourced”
Reserve Component. See General Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit Iraq and
Kuwait 5-11 December 2007,” December 18, 2007, submitted as a Statement for the Record
for the HASC O&I Subcommittee hearing on January 16, 2008.

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a troop withdrawal could spur progress by encouraging Iraqi leaders to accelerate
their own efforts, and international partners to increase their constructive
involvement.473
One practical advantage of this option is the clarity and certainty it would
provide concerning costs, timelines, and requirements. U.S. military planners could
plan each step with reasonable fidelity, U.S. diplomats could work well in advance
with neighboring countries on access needed to support the withdrawal, and Iraqi
leaders and security forces could plan in detail how to adjust.
Some opponents of this option suggest that its deliberateness could prove
advantageous to various adversaries in Iraq, who might take advantage of the
predictability to target U.S. forces as they redeploy. Other adversaries, with an end
to the U.S. force presence and therefore the ability to operate more freely in sight,
might choose to lie low in the meantime — making them more difficult to target and
leaving the bulk of the challenge for Iraqis to face on their own.
More broadly, some opponents of this option argue that its primary strategic
drawback is that it consigns the Iraq mission itself to failure — that Iraqi institutions
are simply not ready to assume full responsibility, and so a too-early withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Iraq would be likely to prove destabilizing and could place Iraq’s
future in jeopardy.474
Adjustments to the Mission
A third family of options — theoretically compatible with one another — would
refocus the mission in Iraq in one or more directions, while drawing down
conventional forces. What is attractive for some about such options, in theory, is that
they aspire to the best of all possible worlds — bringing the troops home, reducing
costs, and furthering progress in Iraq by continuing, or increasing, the most important
current initiatives. As a rule, those who support this option accept the theory of the
case that security improvements can open space for political and economic progress,
as well as the empirically-based argument that recent approaches have indeed helped
improve security in Iraq.
The viability and likely results of these options depends on analysis of which
factors, and in what combinations, are responsible for the changes apparent on the
ground in Iraq in late 2007 and early 2008.
473 See for example Kevin Benson, “Shift the Debate on Iraq from ‘When’ to ‘How’,”
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 12, 2007. Colonel Benson was the lead OIF planner
for CFLCC.
474 For a similar argument, see National Intelligence Estimate, “Prospects for Iraq’s
Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead,” January 2007, available at
[http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070202_release.pdf], which notes: “If Coalition
forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate [12-18 months from
publication], we judge t hat this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the
scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq.”

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Emphasize Counter-Terrorism. The first variant of the “adjust the
mission” option calls for emphasizing the counter-terrorism effort with a strong SOF
presence, backed by sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets. Commanders on the ground stress, however, that “you can’t get Al Qaeda by
just using SOF.” MNF-I officials note that coalition forces tried the SOF-only
approach in Ramadi for four years, but it ultimately proved insufficient. They add
that SOF is most effective when it draws on conventional forces’ intimate knowledge
of local communities, based on the close contacts conventional forces have with ISF,
SOIs, and local tribes. Then, following SOF actions, conventional forces play the
essential role of “holding” the area, with a strong, visible presence.475
Some observers point out that Iraqi security forces, rather than U.S.
conventional forces, could be the ones to partner with U.S. SOF — providing the
local knowledge and “holding” areas. That suggestion — and thus the strength of
this “focus on counter-terrorism” option — would depend on the ability of the ISF
to function independently.
Emphasize Iraqi Security Forces Training. Another variant of the
“adjust the mission” option calls for focusing on ISF training. In December 2007,
for example, retired General Barry McCaffrey proposed strengthening the emphasis
on ISF training, and “massively resourcing the creating of an adequate Iraqi Security
Force.”476
The strength of this variant rests in part on how effective an ISF training mission
would be in the absence of a sizable U.S. conventional force in Iraq.
One consideration is the extent to which the current ISF training effort relies
directly on support from conventional forces. Of course, the 20% of all Transition
Teams currently “taken out of hide” rely entirely on conventional forces already
serving in Iraq, so this “ISF” variant would presumably have to account for that
shortfall. Further, MNSTC-I officials and commanders on the ground note that, in
the standard pattern, Transition Teams do draw key resources from the BCTs to
which they are attached — such as access to intelligence, logistics support, or
augmentation by additional staff.
A second consideration is the extent to which the ISF training effort relies
indirectly on the work of conventional forces. Commanders on the ground in Iraq
stress the impact that the presence of conventional forces in local communities has
made, in terms of both information-gathering and discouraging potential perpetrators
of violence. As out-going MND-Baghdad Commander Major General Joseph Fil
commented concerning Baghdad: “There’s no question that although the incidents
of violence are down significantly here, they’re down because we have a force
475 Conversations with MNF-I leaders and staff, January 2008.
476 See General Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5-11
December 2007,” December 18, 2007, submitted as a Statement for the Record for the
HASC O&I Subcommittee hearing on January 16, 2008.

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presence that is almost throughout the city.”477 By their presence, as well as their
operations, conventional forces have been providing the ISF with “space” to focus
on developing their own capabilities. A withdrawal of U.S. conventional forces could
significantly increase the ISF’s near-term requirements to conduct operations and
provide presence even while they continue to develop.
Emphasize Civilian-Led Governance and Economic Rehabilitation.
A third variant of the “adjust the mission” option stresses a strengthened focus on
governance and economics — led by civilian agencies and experts, with remaining
U.S. forces in a supporting role. In practice, military units in many areas are already
playing strong supporting roles in governance and economics (see above, “Military
Role in Governance and Economics”). Some observers and commanders on the
ground in Iraq underscore the magnitude of the tasks — particularly at the provincial
and local levels — and urge a more robust civilian role, particularly as U.S. forces
draw down.478
The Office of Provincial Affairs suggests that there are no current plans by the
Department of State to increase the scope of the Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) effort inversely as U.S. forces draw down.479 However, OPA is reportedly
considering plans to establish “satellite PRTs” in additional major cities of key
provinces, to help push PRT presence down to the municipal as well as the provincial
level.480
The primary constraint on this “civilian surge” variant is a lack of capacity at the
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other
civilian agencies.
Another key consideration is whether PRTs could operate in Iraq without a
substantial co-located or nearby coalition military presence. The Italian-led PRT in
Dhi Qar, which moved to the “provincial Iraqi control” (“PIC”, see above,
“Provincial Iraqi Control”) designation in September 2006, could be one model. The
proposed relocation of two PRTs from their “remote” location in Babil province to
their “homes” in Karbala and Najaf, both PIC provinces where the coalition force
presence is very limited, could also serve as useful test cases.481
To assess that question, one general factor to consider is the security situation
in a given area — a security force presence may be necessary to “hold” a location for
some time after it has been “cleared,” to allow space for political and economic work.
Even in areas where combat operations are no longer necessary, the mere presence
477 Department of Defense News Briefing, Major General Joseph Fil, December 17, 2007,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4107].
478 As one Division Commander put it, as U.S. forces draw down, there will be a need for
“increasing enablers,” not fewer. Conversation with Division Commander, January 2008.
479 Conversation with OPA official, January 2008.
480 Information from PRT officials, February 2008.
481 Najaf and Karbala, in the MND-Center area of responsibility, are “PIC” — Provincial
Iraqi Control — provinces (see above).

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of large numbers of forces may continue to play a role for some time in containing
potential violence or encouraging steps toward reconciliation. Over time, Iraqi
Security Forces may increasingly be able to perform this “hold” function, in place of
coalition forces. Another factor is resourcing — including the extent to which the
PRTs’ higher headquarters, OPA, would be able to support and sustain them in every
sense, from transportation and force protection to basic life support.
Additional CRS Reports
For further information about Iraq-related issues, see CRS Report RL31339,
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RL32105, Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction, by
Christopher Blanchard and Catherine Dale; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq:
Reconstruction Assistance
, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11
, by Amy
Belasco; CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global
War on Terror Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes
, by
Stephen Daggett et. al.; CRS Report RL34362, Congressional Oversight and Related
Issues Concerning the Prospective Security Agreement Between the United States
and Iraq
, by Michael John Garcia and R. Chuck Mason; and CRS Report RS22449,
U.S. Forces in Iraq, by JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse.


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Figure 1. Map of Iraq
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.