Order Code RS22847
March 24, 2008
The NATO Summit at Bucharest, 2008
Paul Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
NATO will hold a summit in Bucharest, Romania, April 2-4, 2008. The allies will
seek to clarify NATO’s mission, with special attention to the stabilization of
Afghanistan. They will also debate how to counter new threats, such as cyber attacks
and energy cut-offs, as well as a possible missile defense system. In addition, they will
decide whether to extend invitations for membership to any of three candidate states —
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia — and whether to put Georgia and Ukraine into the
Membership Action Plan, a preliminary step to membership. See also CRS Report
RL34415, Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, coordinated by Paul
Gallis. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
NATO will hold a summit in Bucharest, Romania, April 2-4, 2008. The allies face
an enduring challenge in their effort to stabilize Afghanistan, and will discuss future steps
there. New threats such as cyber attacks and energy cut-offs have arisen, and the allies
will debate means to counter them. They will also decide whether to invite any of the
candidates for membership — Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM)1 — into the alliance, and review as well the desire of Georgia and
Ukraine to be placed in a Membership Action Plan (MAP), a significant step on the road
to a formal candidacy for membership.
NATO’s Mission
A principal theme of the summit will be the clarification of NATO’s mission. While
the allies agree that collective defense against an aggressor remains NATO’s key mission,
they continue to debate areas of collective security for which they should be responsible.
Stabilization of countries and regions important to allied security may include such tasks
1 The country’s name is in dispute. It will henceforth be referred to as “Macedonia” for the sake
of simplicity only. The United States government recognizes the country by its official name,
the “Republic of Macedonia.”

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as nation-building, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. NATO has found difficulty in
drawing the line between missions that directly threaten their security, and ones that
require a less robust intervention, or that can be left to other international organizations.
Afghanistan. Above all, NATO’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan is proving a test
of allied capabilities and political will. Under a U.N. mandate, NATO has an
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan that is simultaneously
combating a resurgent Taliban and attempting to stabilize the country through an
ambitious rebuilding program.2 Some allies have proven reluctant to send combat forces
to engage the Taliban, and have their forces instead in more secure areas of the country.
This reluctance has led to sharp criticism by allies, such as the United States, Canada,
Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark, which have suffered casualties to their forces that
are frequently engaged in combat. The allies now have approximately 41,000 troops in
Afghanistan, as well as 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs are the core
of NATO’s effort to rebuild Afghanistan by constructing schools, roads, and hospitals,
and urging national and local leaders to improve governance. A continuing problem is
Afghanistan’s narcotics trade, which continues to expand, and to fuel the Taliban
insurgency as well.
Led by the United States, the allies hope to complete a draft of a “strategic vision”
document to lay out NATO’s mission in Afghanistan more clearly, and to serve to
persuade allied publics to provide the necessary resources to stabilize the country. The
debate over this document captures the division in the alliance over collective defense and
collective security. In general, those emphasizing collective defense view a possibly
failed state in Afghanistan as once again supplying a haven from which terrorists can
attack allied states. While some NATO governments believe firmly that both collective
defense and collective security are NATO’s mission, others emphasize that the latter
should be assumed by other international organizations, such as the European Union and
the U.N.3
Global Partnerships. Closely related to the debate over mission is the emerging
place of NATO’s global partnerships with governments that are not part of the Euro-
Atlantic community but nonetheless have a shared interest in stabilizing unsettled regions.
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, for example, have no interest in joining
the alliance, but work alongside NATO governments in stabilizing Afghanistan. Each has
a strong interest in countering terrorism, and in ensuring the supply of energy to global
markets. At the summit, there will be an effort to define more closely the means by which
such governments might integrate their security resources with the alliance.
New Capabilities Against New Threats
A second theme at the summit is likely to be clarification of the means by which
NATO might counter emerging threats that often escape a purely military response. In
spring 2007, a cyber attack against Estonia’s government and banking system seriously
disrupted them for a period of time. The Estonian government states that it traced the
2 See CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Paul
Gallis.
3 Interviews with officials in allied governments, 2007-2008.

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attacks to Russian governmental sources. For the last several years, Russia has
intermittently disrupted the flow of oil or natural gas to Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, and
other countries, a step widely viewed in the alliance as an effort at political intimidation.
In Bucharest, the allies will discuss means to counter such measures. Should cyber
attacks and energy cut-offs, for example, be considered under Article V, in which all allies
would be called upon to aid the country that has been attacked?
There are various proposals to counter cyber attacks and energy disruptions.
Hardening key elements of a country’s electronic system and providing redundancy are
possible counters to a cyber attack. To diminish the effects of energy disruptions, NATO
governments may discuss such countermeasures as energy conservation, the development
of alternative fuels, the protection of pipelines and energy shipping routes, and the
diversification of supply. Such steps would be financially costly and require substantial
time to develop and implement.4
NATO is also engaged in a continuing debate over missile defense. The Bush
Administration has proposed a site in Poland with10 interceptors and an associated radar
system in the Czech Republic. The Administration contends that the sites would assist
in the defense of NATO Europe and the United States against a developing Iranian missile
threat. Russia contends that the sites are directed against its ballistic missiles. Public
opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic opposes the sites. Warsaw is insisting that the
United States provide resources to upgrade Poland’s air defense system, in the event that
the interceptors’ presence provokes an attack.5 The Administration has preliminarily
agreed to finance such an upgrade. An agreement between the United States and Poland
and the Czech Republic may be near. Some critics contend that the U.S. system is too
rudimentary to counter such a possible attack, and that extensive further testing is
warranted before the system should be put in place. NATO has also been considering a
tactical missile defense system. In Bucharest, the allies will discuss whether the
prospective NATO system might be “bolted onto” the U.S. system, and how the two
systems might be funded. No final decision is expected at the summit.6
Enlargement, and the MAP for Georgia and Ukraine?
The third principal issue to be discussed at Bucharest is the candidacies of Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia for entry into the alliance, and the request by Georgia and
Ukraine to be placed in NATO’s Membership Action Plan, a significant step on the road
to formal candidacy.7
None of the three candidate states has sufficiently large and capable military forces
to contribute significantly to allied operations. Each is in the process of developing
4 See CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin,
and CRS Report RS22409, NATO and Energy Security, by Paul Gallis.
5 CRS Report RL34051, Long Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven Hildreth and
Carl Ek.
6 Interviews with U.S. and European officials, 2008; “Accord on missile defense taking form,
Czechs say,” International Herald Tribune, January 17, 2008, p. 3.
7 For a more detailed discussion, see Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, op. cit.

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specialized “niche” capabilities in order to contribute to allied security. In that sense, this
potential round of enlargement will not be a strategic one. However, given the continuing
instability in southeastern Europe, fueled by Serbia’s aggressive opposition to Kosovo’s
independence, this round of enlargement would potentially be one that could contribute
to regional stability.
At the Bucharest summit, all allied governments, as a first step, must approve each
candidate’s membership application. After that decision, each ally in the coming months
will follow its constitutional processes to approve the Washington Treaty, NATO’s
founding instrument, again, to cover additional territory for defense. All 26 governments
must approve each candidate through their constitutional processes if the candidate is in
fact to become a NATO member, a process that could be completed by the end of 2009.
The Bush Administration is expected to support all three candidate states, but some allies
are more hesitant.
Under its Membership Action Plan (MAP), Croatia has made improvements in
governance and in modernization of its military. Less progress has been made in
persuading a strong majority of the Croatian population to desire NATO membership, a
cause for concern in the event that NATO should undertake a new and controversial
mission. Almost 60% of the Croatian population now supports NATO membership, a
figure that has been rising in recent months. Additional issues are corruption and the
return of Serb refugees from the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. Croatian officials say that
they have passed anti-corruption laws and are now implementing them, a view confirmed
by officials from several allied governments. Approximately one-half of the 300,000 Serb
refugees who fled Croatia in the 1990s have now returned. Officials from allied
governments confirm that Croatia has made an attempt to resettle these refugees, and that
there is little discrimination against them in Croatian society. Croatia has recognized
Kosovo, and some allies view Zagreb as an important channel for discussions to bring
Serbia back into the fold of western-oriented European states.8
Albania is a small and impoverished country; its military resources are modest.
OSCE reports on its recent elections detail a number of irregularities that call into
question its adherence to international standards. The internal political atmosphere
remains tense because of inter-party rivalries. The Albanian government is in the process
of professionalizing and downsizing its military. While Albania has passed anti-
corruption legislation, there remain doubts in the minds of some officials from allied
governments about implementation. At the same time, Albania has pursued a moderate
policy in the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Albania has recognized
Kosovo, and has renounced any effort to merge the two countries, once a point of concern
in Europe because of the overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.9
Macedonia, of the three candidate states, has reportedly made the most progress in
military modernization. However, its political climate remains highly contentious.
Macedonia, like Albania, has passed anti-corruption legislation, but implementation of
the legislation is in an early phase. In addition, a dispute with Greece over Macedonia’s
8 Interviews with Croatian officials and officials from allied governments in Zagreb and Brussels,
February 2008.
9 Discussions with officials from allied governments and Albanian officials, February 2008.

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name must be resolved between the two countries if Athens is to accept Macedonian
membership in the alliance. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis said on March 3, 2008,
that progress has been slow on this issue. “No solution — no invitation,” he said.10
Macedonian officials counter that they should have the right to name their own country,
that they have amended the Macedonian constitution to renounce all territorial claims on
Greece or any neighboring country, and have changed the country’s flag to eliminate
possible reference to Greece’s northern province that is also called Macedonia.
Macedonian officials have supported Kosovo’s independence, and express concern about
Serbia’s unwillingness to contribute to regional stability.11
A debate over whether to place Georgia and Ukraine in the MAP process is causing
controversy in the alliance. Some Administration officials contend that both countries
have made sufficient progress in governance and other requirements to be eligible for the
MAP. Russia strongly opposes the two countries’ entry into the MAP. Moscow contends
that the idea of a MAP invitation is fueled by conservative elements in the United States
that wish to diminish Russia’s role in the Caucasus.12 Administration officials and some
allies contend that Russia must not be given a veto over countries qualified for NATO
membership.
Georgia’s economy has improved in the last several years, and the country has a
western orientation. At the same time, the OSCE found irregularities in the country’s
January 2008 presidential elections, and some observers believe that governmental
corruption is widespread.13 Some allies wish to evaluate Georgia’s performance in spring
legislative elections before considering the country for the MAP. Those elections will
follow the Bucharest summit. In addition, prospective NATO members must resolve
conflicts with their neighbors; Georgia has two continuing internal separatist conflicts,
in part fueled by Russian interference in the country’s affairs.
Ukraine’s leaders now desire NATO membership, but polls over the past year
indicate that 60%-70% of the population oppose drawing closer to the alliance. Almost
one-fifth of the population is ethnic Russian; these elements, joined by a sizeable
proportion of ethnic Ukrainians, appear to be oriented more towards Russia, or to prefer
a more neutral stance in foreign affairs. An apparent factor in the equation of the
population’s view of NATO is that the Afghan and Iraq wars are highly unpopular in
Ukraine. Some allies believe that Ukraine must first demonstrate a clear western
orientation before being placed in the MAP.14 Supporters of placing Ukraine in the MAP
process note that the country has great economic potential, and is geographically strategic.
The country also has functioning democratic institutions, even if its domestic political
10 Statement of Prime Minister Karamanlis, Athens, March 3, 2008.
11 Interviews with Macedonian officials and officials from allied governments, December 2007-
February 2008.
12 “Interview with Russia’s ambassador to NATO,” Spiegel Online, March 10, 2008, at
[http://www.spiegel.de/international/world].
13 “Western observers harden view of January 5 vote,” Washington Post, March 5, 2008, p. A16.
14 Interviews of officials in allied governments, January-March 2008; “La Georgie intensifie ses
efforts pour intégrer l’Otan,” Le Monde, October 21-22, 2007, p. 5.

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situation is occasionally tumultuous. In February 2008, the WTO judged Ukraine’s
market development and economic progress sufficient to merit an invitation to join.
Energy security is an issue of growing importance in the alliance. Some allies averse
to placing Georgia and Ukraine in the MAP say that the alliance must first resolve issues
in energy security. How, for example, would the allies come to the assistance of Georgia
and Ukraine if Russia were to cut off the two countries’ gas supplies?15 At the same time,
this is already an issue for countries now in the alliance, as a gas cut-off could affect a
number of allied states.
Other Issues
Kosovo. NATO carried out a bombing campaign against Serbian forces in 1999
in a successful attempt to stop Serb “ethnic cleansing” of the majority Albanian
population in Kosovo, then a Serbian province. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution
1244 (1999), the United Nations established a protectorate mission (UNMIK) in Kosovo.
In 2006-2007, U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari developed a plan for Kosovo’s “supervised
independence” and Serbian minority rights under EU leadership. Russia would not accept
the Ahtisaari plan, and threatened to veto it in the Security Council.
After long preparation, the European Union and the United States together decided
to implement the Ahtisaari plan. Kosovo declared itself sovereign and independent on
February 17, 2008. The United States and a majority of EU countries quickly followed
with a recognition of Kosovo’s independence, which Serbia and Russia continue to
oppose. On February 21, government-sponsored demonstrations in Belgrade led to the
burning of part of the U.S. embassy there, and the evacuation of U.S. personnel. The
United States contributes approximately 1,600 troops (in a force of 16,000) to NATO’s
KFOR, charged with maintaining a peaceful environment in Kosovo.
A majority of allied governments are convinced that NATO and the EU must make
a strong response to any Serbian effort to destabilize Kosovo. The Serbian government
continues to stir up a dissident Serb minority in Kosovo’s north. Some violent elements
of this minority have been forcibly removed by U.N. and NATO forces from government
buildings that they had seized. A long-term objective of the alliance is to persuade Serbia
that its future lies in the Euro-Atlantic community,16 and that it must give up what NATO
Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer calls “a sullen nationalism.”
Russia. The allies continue to seek accommodation with Russia on a range of
issues. During the past two years, President Putin has become increasingly obstructionist
in dealing with NATO. His support for Serbia and Serb separatists in Kosovo is but one
element of his policy. Russia’s cut-off of energy to neighboring countries, interference
in Georgia’s internal conflicts, and possible cyber attacks against Estonia are others.
Putin is scheduled to meet with allied leaders at Bucharest, and these and other issues
such as missile defense are likely to be on the agenda.
15 Interviews with officials from allied governments, February-March 2008.
16 “Strife could unravel stability in Kosovo,” International Herald Tribune, March 21, 2008, p.
3.

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