Order Code RL33869
Rescission Actions Since 1974: Review and
Assessment of the Record
Updated March 14, 2008
Virginia A. McMurtry
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division

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Rescission Actions Since 1974: Review and
Assessment of the Record
Summary
The Impoundment Control Act (ICA) was included as Title X of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, signed into law on
June 12, 1974 (88 Stat. 332). Under the ICA, unless Congress takes action to
approve a rescission request from the President within the 45-day review period
prescribed by the law, the funds must be released. With respect to a presidential
rescission message, Congress may approve more or less than the amount requested
by the President. In addition, absent a specific request from the President, Congress
on its own accord may initiate rescission actions, by cancelling previously
appropriated funds in a subsequent law.
According to data compiled by the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
from FY1974 to FY2006, Presidents requested 1,178 rescissions under the ICA,
totaling somewhat over $76 billion. Close to a third of the proposals were approved
by Congress, with approximately 40% of the total dollar amount of presidential
rescission requests ($25 billion) enacted by Congress. The sum of rescissions
requested by the President and subsequently enacted exceeded $1 billion in only four
of the 30-plus years (FY1981, FY1982, FY1992 and FY1994). During this period
Congress initiated 1,610 rescission actions amounting to $143.5 billion, over five
times the total of presidentially requested rescission subsequently enacted, reflecting
a trend toward an increasing number of rescissions being initiated by Congress.
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (P.L. 93-344), in effect for less than eighteen
months before being overturned by the Supreme Court in 1998, gave the President
enhanced rescission authority by reversing the burden of action regarding rescission
proposals; cancellations of the President became permanent unless disapproved by
Congress (ultimately requiring rejection by a 2/3 majority in both chambers). During
this time, the President also had authority to cancel new items of direct spending and
certain targeted tax benefits as well as items of discretionary spending. Figures from
the Congressional Budget Office indicate that the 82 cancellations made by President
Clinton in FY1998 (including those overturned) totaled some $355 million, with a
projected five-year savings just under $1 billion. President Clinton’s use of the short-
lived enhanced rescission authority thus was not notably different from the prior
annual record of presidential rescissions under the ICA framework.
During his first seven years in office, President George W. Bush sent no formal
ICA rescission requests to Congress, but some controversy developed over his use
of alternative means to propose spending reductions. President Bush, while evidently
reluctant to use existing rescission authority contained in the ICA, has called
repeatedly for enactment of a measure that would give the President greater authority
to reject items of spending. Such a bill passed the House in the 109th Congress and
was reported in the Senate. A contentious issue is whether such a measure might
give preference to presidential spending priorities over congressional spending
priorities, arguably affecting the legislative power of the purse.
This report will be updated as necessary.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Rescission Actions Since 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Developments in the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations . . . . . . . . . 14
Line Item Veto Act (LIVA) of 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
LIVA Cancellations by President Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Developments in the George W. Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Some Concluding Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix: Impoundment Data and Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
List of Tables
Table 1. Rescissions of Appropriated Funds, FY1974-FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Rescissions Requested by the President and Approved by Congress,
1974-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 3. Summary of Enacted Rescissions, 1974-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 4. Rescission Requests and Cancellation Actions by the President
and Approval by Congress, FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

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Rescission Actions Since 1974: Review and
Assessment of the Record
Introduction
The federal budget process involves both Congress and the executive branch.
The Constitution provides in Article I that “no money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law....” Article II stipulates
that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” The practice
of impoundment reflects this sharing of powers between the branches in the
implementation of the federal budget.
The term “impoundment” refers to executive actions to withhold or delay the
spending of funds provided in law. The term “rescission” denotes one type of
impoundment, that involving permanent cancellation of the funds.
While instances of presidential impoundment date back to the early 19th
century, Presidents usually sought accommodation rather than confrontation with
Congress.1 This changed during the Nixon Administration (1969-1974), when
impoundment of funds developed into a major conflict, eventually involving the
courts as well as Congress and the President.2
This report begins by reviewing the framework for handling rescissions
established by the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA, 88 Stat. 332) and by
amendments to it in 1987 (101 Stat. 786). A section with review and analysis of data
on rescission requests and outcomes pursuant to the 1974 law follows, including
comparisons among the respective Administrations. Attention then turns to actions
which took place during the brief period that the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (LIVA,
P.L 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200) was in force. During his first six years as President,
George W. Bush sent no formal ICA rescission requests to Congress, but some
1 For a history of presidential impoundment before 1974, see Louis Fisher, Presidential
Spending Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 147-201; and Ralph
S. Abscal and John R. Kramer, “Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and
Constitutional Framework,” Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 62 (July 1974), pp. 1549-1618.
2 In contrast to previous impoundment actions, President Nixon impounded larger amounts
of funds, ignored explicit expressions of intent by Congress that funds be spent, tried to
terminate entire programs rather than just selected projects, systematically attempted to
withhold funds from programs not included in the President’s budget, and asserted formal
constitutional power to impound. See James P. Pfiffner, The President, the Budget, and
Congress: Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979),
pp. 40-44.

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CRS-2
controversy developed over his use of “cancellation statements” proposing spending
reductions. The final section of the report provides some concluding observations.
Impoundment Control Act of 1974
The Impoundment Control Act (ICA) was included as Title X of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, signed into law on
June 12, 1974 (88 Stat. 332). The act established two categories of impoundments:
deferrals, or temporary delays in funding availability; and rescissions, or permanent
cancellation of the designated budget authority.
The ICA also established new reporting requirements that remain in effect.3 The
1974 law required the President to inform Congress of all proposed rescissions and
deferrals and to submit specified information regarding each such action in a special
message. The President may combine several rescission requests in a single
impoundment message. Section 1014 of the 1974 law also stipulated that the
President transmit to Congress each month a cumulative report on the status of
impoundment actions. In 1975, various of these reporting duties were transferred
from the President to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
via Executive Order 11845.4 The ICA also required the Comptroller General of the
General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office), to
oversee executive compliance with the law and report to Congress if the President
fails to report an impoundment or improperly classifies an action. Both messages
from the President and communications from the Comptroller General are published
in the Federal Register and subsequently printed as House documents.5
The act further stipulated different procedures for congressional review and
control of the two types of impoundment. With a rescission, the funds must be made
available for obligation unless both Houses of Congress take action to approve of the
3 See Appendix for further discussion of reporting requirement for presidential
impoundment actions and of sources for impoundment data.
4 Specifically, President Gerald Ford conferred upon the OMB Director the functions of
transmitting copies of the special rescission and deferral messages to the Comptroller
General and to the Office of the Federal Register, and also the responsibility of submitting
to Congress the monthly cumulative report. U.S. President, 1974-1976 (Ford), Executive
Order 11845, “Delegating Certain Reporting Functions to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget,” Mar. 24, 1975, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
v. 11, Mar. 31, 1975, p. 304; also see 40 F.R. 13299.
5 For example, see U.S. Congress, House, Rescissions: Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting Six New Rescission Proposals Affecting Programs in the
Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, and Labor, Pursuant to
2 U.S.C. 683(a)(1), H. Doc. 101-20, 101st Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: GPO, 1989); and
Review of Rescissions, Deferrals and Revised Deferrals: Communication from the
Comptroller General of the United States Transmitting a Review of the Seventy-three
Rescission Proposals, Three New Deferrals and Three Revised Deferrals Reported in the
President’s Third Special Message for Fiscal Year 1987, Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 685, H. Doc.
100-60, 100th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: GPO, 1987).

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CRS-3
rescission request within 45 days of “continuous session.”6 Recesses of more than
three days are not counted. In practice, this usually means that funds proposed for
rescission not approved by Congress become available for obligation after about 60
calendar days, although the period can extend to 75 days or longer.7 The funds may
be withheld from obligation until the 45-day period elapses or Congress disapproves
the rescission. Congress may alter the amount proposed for rescission by the
President, either increasing or decreasing it, as well as approving or disapproving the
rescission request in toto. Section 1017 of the ICA establishes expedited procedures
for congressional action on “any rescission bill introduced with respect to a special
message” submitted by the President.
In the fall of 1987, as a component of legislation to raise the limit on the public
debt (P.L. 100-119) that also included changes in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,
Congress enacted several other budget process reforms as well. Section 206
effectively eliminated presidential deferrals for policy reasons.8 Section 207 involved
the use of rescission authority. It provides a statutory prohibition against the practice,
sometimes used by Presidents when Congress failed to act on a rescission proposal
within the 45-day period, of resubmitting a new rescission proposal covering
identical or very similar matter. By using such resubmissions repeatedly, the
President might continue to tie up the funds even though Congress, by its inaction,
had already rejected virtually the same proposal. The legislative history of the 1974
act suggests that prohibiting this practice of seriatim rescission proposals may be
consistent with the original intent of Congress. The prohibition on seriatim
rescissions in Section 207 applies for the duration of the appropriation, so that it may
remain in effect for two or more fiscal years. 9
6 In contrast, the original provisions of Title X allowed a deferral to continue in effect for
the period proposed by the President (not to extend beyond the end of the fiscal year so as
to become a de facto rescission), unless either the House or Senate took action to disapprove
it. Such procedures, known as a one-house legislative veto, were invalidated by the 1983
Supreme Court decision in INS v. Chadha (462 U.S. 919). City of New Haven v. United
States (809 F. 2d 900, D.C. Cir. 1987) held that the deferral authority conveyed to the
President in the 1974 law was inseverable from the one-house veto provision. Thus, the
invalidation of the legislative veto also invalidated the deferral authority, except for what
were considered to be “routine” deferrals, authorized by sources predating the ICA.
7 In the past OMB sometimes expanded the 45-day period during which the funds were
unavailable by initiating a deferral prior to formally reporting the rescission to Congress.
In one case in 1986, nearly six months elapsed between the effective date of a specific
appropriation and the submission of the ICA-required rescission message. See CRS Report
RL33365, Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Analysis of Recent Proposals, by Morton
Rosenberg, p. 9.
8 Section 206 of P.L. 100-119 served to codify the Appeals Court decision in the New
Haven case. The provision in the 1974 law, as amended, now authorizes the President to
defer funds only for contingencies, efficiency, or where specifically provided by law.
Section 206 also reaffirmed certain provisions of the 1974 law relating to enforcement
responsibilities of the Comptroller General, who is empowered to sue the executive for
violations of the Impoundment Control Act.
9 See “Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,” in U.S. Congress,
Increasing the Statutory Limit on the Public Debt, Conference Report to Accompany
(continued...)

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Rescission Actions Since 197410
The Impoundment Control Act has been in effect for over 30 years. According
to an assessment of congressional power over impoundments since 1974, coauthored
by a former director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Although the courts
did much to curb presidential impoundments, through Title X of the new Budget Act,
Congress also helped itself to recapture its influence over the impoundment of
funds.”11
In the first few years following enactment of the 1974 law, Congress approved
presidential requests in a number of separate rescission bills. Subsequently, Congress
tended to act upon rescission messages from the President in supplemental and
regular appropriations measures, rather than in individual rescission bills. Under the
ICA, unless Congress takes action to approve of a rescission request from the
President within the 45-day period, the funds must be released. In practice, however,
congressional action on rescission requests has often occurred after the expiration of
the 45-day review period, so that funds are formally available for obligation for some
time before being permanently rescinded.
As noted previously, Congress may approve more or less than the amount
requested by the President. In addition, absent a specific request from the President,
Congress of its own accord may initiate rescission actions, by cancelling previously
appropriated funds in a subsequent law. Such factors can create ambiguities in
interpreting data on rescissions proposed by the President and congressional action
on them. For example, are funds originally proposed for rescission in a special
message, but which again become available for obligation before Congress
permanently rescinds them, to be considered as “congressional approval of a
President’s request” or as a “rescission initiated by Congress”? Table 1 provides
data on rescissions from FY1974 through FY2005 as compiled by GAO. According
to GAO’s methodology, eventual congressional action on a rescission proposed by
the President is generally considered as “approval of a President’s request” even if
the 45-day period has elapsed.12 Data in Table 2 reflect the outcome of rescission
requests of the Presidents since 1974, providing percentages of their respective
requests approved by Congress, both in relation to total dollars requested for
rescission and to the number of separate proposals, by year and by Administration.
In the early months under the new framework, the number of presidentially
proposed rescissions increased. In particular, President Ford attempted to rescind
funding that Congress had added to the President’s budget, mainly involving
9 (...continued)
H.J.Res. 324, H.Rept. 100-313, 100th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1987), pp. 67-68.
10 This section updates and expands upon previous work of the author. See Virginia A.
McMurtry, “The Impoundment Control Act of 1974: Restraining or Reviving Presidential
Power?” Public Budgeting & Finance, vol. 17, fall 1997, pp. 42-47.
11 Rudolph G. Penner and Alan J. Abramson, Broken Purse Strings: Congressional
Budgeting, 1974-88 (Washington: Urban Institute, 1988), p. 19.
12 See Appendix for further discussion of GAO’s methodology.

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CRS-5
domestic social programs, but the effort met with limited success. As characterized
by Louis Fisher, “Instead of performing as a restriction on Presidential power, it [the
new law] was interpreted by the [Ford] Administration as a new source of authority
for withholding funds.... Rescission proposals came up by the bushel; wholesale they
were rejected.”13 As indicated in Table 2, some 34% of President Ford’s rescission
proposals were accepted by Congress. In terms of the percentage of the total dollar
amount requested during the Administration and approved by Congress, President
Ford had less overall success (16%) than any of his successors.
Table 1. Rescissions of Appropriated Funds, FY1974-FY2005
Total Amount of
Number
Total Amount
Number
Number
Total Amount of
Presidential
Fiscal
Proposed
Proposed by
Approved
Initiated
Rescissions
Requests
Year
by the
President for
by
by
Initiated by
Approved by
President
Rescission
Congress
Congress
Congress
Congress
1974
2
$495,635,000
0
$0
3
$1,400,412,000
1975
87
$2,722,000,000
38
$386,295,370
1
$4,999,704
1976
50
$3,582,000,000
7
$148,331,000
0
$0
1977
20
$1,926,930,000
9
$813,690,000
3
$172,722,943
1978
12
$1,290,100,000
5
$518,655,000
4
$67,164,000
1979
11
$908,700,000
9
$723,609,000
1
$47,500,000
1980
59
$1,618,100,000
34
$777,696,446
33
$3,238,206,100
1981
133
$15,361,900,000
101
$10,880,935,550
43
$3,736,490,600
1982
32
$7,907,400,000
5
$4,365,486,000
5
$48,432,,000
1983
21
$1,569,000,000
0
$0
11
$310,605,000
1984
9
$636,400,000
3
$55,375,000
7
$2,188,689,000
1985
245
$1,856,087,000
98
$173,699,000
12
$5,458,621,000
1986
83
$10,126,900,000
4
$143,210,000
7
$5,409,410,000
1987
73
$5,835,800,000
2
$36,000,000
52
$12,359,390,875
1988
0
$0
0
$0
61
$3,888,663,000
1989
6
$143,100,000
1
$2,053,000
11
$325,913,000
1990
11
$554,258,000
0
$0
71
$2,304,986,000
1991
30
$4,859,251,000
8
$286,419,000
26
$1,420,467,000
1992
128
$7,879,473,690
26
$2,067,546,000
131
$22,526,953,054
1993
7
$356,000,000
4
$206,250,000
74
$2,205,336,643
1994
65
$3,172,180,000
45
$1,293,478,548
81
$2,374,416,284
13 Fisher, Presidential Spending Power, pp. 200-201.

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Total Amount of
Number
Total Amount
Number
Number
Total Amount of
Presidential
Fiscal
Proposed
Proposed by
Approved
Initiated
Rescissions
Requests
Year
by the
President for
by
by
Initiated by
Approved by
President
Rescission
Congress
Congress
Congress
Congress
1995
29
$1,199,824,000
25
$845,388,805
248
$18,868,380,121
1996
24
$1,425,900,000
8
$963,400,000
104
$4,974,852,131
1997
10
$407,111,000
6
$285,111,000
96
$7,381,253,000
1998
25
$25,260,000
21
$17,276,000
43
$4,180,814,234
1999
3
$35,040,000
2
$16,800,000
105
$5,081,426,930
2000
3
$128,000,000
0
$0
61
$3,757,774,500
2001
0
$0
0
$0
67
$5,148,137,497
2002
0
$0
0
$0
76
$4,621,092,342
2003
0
$0
0
$0
47
$3,123,436,524
2004
0
$0
0
$0
49
$10,515,464,056
2005
0
$0
0
$0
77
$6,351,133,468
Total
1,178
$76,022,349,690
461
$25,006,704,719
1,610
$143,493,143,006
1974-
2005
Average
37
$2,375,698,428
14
$78,145,922
50
$4,484,160,719
per FY
Source: Government Accountability Office, Updated Rescission Statistics, Fiscal Years 1974-2005,
GAO Report B-306473, November 4, 2005.
In contrast to the record in the Ford Administration, President Carter requested
far fewer rescissions, but enjoyed much greater success in gaining congressional
approval. During the Carter Administration, the same political party (Democrats)
controlled both Houses of Congress along with the White House. Allen Schick has
suggested that given the common party identity, President Carter was “reluctant to
propose rescissions, and Congress [was] reluctant to disapprove those proposed.”
Some 90% of the rescissions proposed by President Carter involved defense
programs, including the cancellation of the B-1 bomber.14
The Administration of President George W. Bush ( “Bush II”) provides a special
case with respect to the record of rescissions since 1974. The Republican Party
maintained a majority in the House for the first six years of this Administration, and
likewise in the Senate for over four years, but President Bush submitted no rescission
requests to Congress. Although the figures of zero are duly entered in the
accompanying Tables 1 and 2, comparisons in this section generally refer to the
14 Allen Schick, Congress and Money (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1980), pp. 405-
406.

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CRS-7
Ford through Clinton administrations. Developments during the “Bush II”
Administration are addressed separately, below.
Table 2. Rescissions Requested by the President and Approved
by Congress, 1974-2005
Percent of
Number of
Total Dollar
President’s
Percent of Total
Rescissions
Amount of
Fiscal Year/
Proposals
$ Amount Requested
Requested
Rescissions
Administration
Accepted
Approved by
by
Requested by
by
Congress
President
the President
Congress
1974
2
$495,635,000
0%
0%
1975
87
$2,722,000,000
44%
14%
1976
50
$3,582,000,000
14%
4.1%
1977
20
$1,926,930,000
45%
42%
1978
12
$1,290,100,000
42%
40%
1979
11
$908,700,000
82%
80%
1980
59
$1,618,100,000
58%
48%
1981
133
$15,361,900,000
76%
71%
1982
32
$7,907,400,000
16%
55%
1983
21
$1,569,000,000
0
0
1984
9
$636,400,000
33%
9%
1985
245
$1,856,087,000
40%
19%
1986
83
$10,126,900,000
5%
1%
1987
73
$5,835,800,000
3%
1%
1988
0
$0
0
0
1989
6
$143,100,000
17%
1%
1990
11
$554,258,000
0
0
1991
30
$4,859,251,000
27%
6%
1992
128
$7,879,473,690
20%
26%
1993
7
$356,000,000
57%
58%
1994
65
$3,172,180,000
69%
41%
1995
29
$1,199,824,000
86%
71%
1996
24
$1,425,900,000
33%
68%
1997
10
$407,111,000
60%
70%

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CRS-8
Percent of
Number of
Total Dollar
President’s
Percent of Total
Rescissions
Amount of
Fiscal Year/
Proposals
$ Amount Requested
Requested
Rescissions
Administration
Accepted
Approved by
by
Requested by
by
Congress
President
the President
Congress
1998
25
$25,260,000
67%
48%
1999
3
$35,040,000
68%
48%
2000
3
$128,000,000
0
0
2001
0
$0
0
0
2002
0
$0
0
0
2003
0
$0
0
0
2004
0
$0
0
0
2005
0
$0
0
0
Ford (FY1974-
152
$7,935,013,000
34%
16%
FY1977)
Carter
122
$5,750,816,000
56%
44%
(FY1977-
FY1981)
Reagan
604
$43,436,587,000
36%
36%
(FY1981-
FY1989)
G.H.W. Bush
169
$13,292,982,690
20%
18%
(FY1989-
FY1993)
Clinton
166
$6,749,315,000
67%
54%
(FY1993-
FY2001)
G.W. Bush
0
0
(FY2001-
0
0
FY2005)
Average per
38
$2,452,333,861
39%
33%
FY, 1974-2005
Source: Government Accountability Office, 2005.
The decline in rescission requests during the Carter Administration proved only
temporary. During his first year in office President Reagan submitted more
rescission proposals (133) than had President Carter during his entire administration.
The largest number of rescission requests in any year (245 in 1985) occurred during
the Reagan Administration, as did the greatest amount in terms of total dollars
involved (more than $15 billion in 1981). Somewhat coincidentally, President
Reagan saw the same percentage acceptance overall of his rescission proposals as the
total dollar value — 36% (see Table 2). While President Reagan’s rescission

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CRS-9
requests focused almost exclusively on domestic programs, most of the Reagan
proposals reflected program cuts rather than targeted terminations via rescissions as
during the Nixon Administration.
The aggregate percentage approval figure of slightly over a third for the Reagan
Administration’s requests masks substantial differences from year to year, however.
As one assessment concluded,
Although President Reagan was, nevertheless, reasonably successful in using this
[rescission] device in fiscal years 1981-1982, obtaining congressional approval
for almost 70 percent of the dollar value of his requested rescissions, the tool was
essentially useless to the president in fiscal years 1983-87, when Congress
approved less than 2 percent of the value of his rescission requests.15
The absence of any rescission requests in FY1988, for the first time since
enactment of the ICA, reflected a special situation. In November of 1987 a
compromise agreement was announced, resulting from the “Budget Summit”
between the White House and Congress. The summit deal specified two-year limits
on discretionary spending for domestic programs, international affairs, and defense.
Provisions of the agreement were implemented as a part of an omnibus
appropriations measure (P.L. 100-202, 101 Stat.1329-1) and a reconciliation bill
(P.L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330). Apparently, President Reagan decided not to submit
formal rescission requests for fiscal 1988, which might have been perceived in
Congress as violating the spirit if not the letter of the agreement. He did, however,
send a message to Congress identifying “wasteful items earmarked in the FY1988
full-year continuing resolution,” with a transmittal letter stating the following:
Accordingly, I am informally asking that the Congress review these projects,
appropriations, and other provisions line by line and either rescind or repeal them
as soon as possible. I reserve the option of transmitting at a later date either
formal rescission proposals or language that would make the funds available for
more worthwhile purposes, for any or all of these items.16
President Reagan refrained from using the rescission mechanism only temporarily.
Before he left office, in January of 1989, the President transmitted a package of six
new rescission proposals affecting FY1989.17
The Administration of George H.W. Bush had an approval rating for rescission
requests considerably below that for President Reagan, and about the same overall
as that of President Ford, with 20% of the total dollars requested approved, and 18%
15 Rudolph G. Penner and Alan J. Abramson, Broken Purse Strings (Washington: Urban
Institute Press, 1988), p. 120.
16 U.S. President, Message Transmitting a Request to Consider the Rescission or Repeal
of Spending Projects that were Included in the 1988 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 100-202),
March 14, 1988, H. Doc. 100-174, 100th Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1988), p. 1.
17 U.S. President, Message Transmitting Six New Rescission Proposals Affecting Programs
in the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, and Labor,
Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 683(a)(1), Jan. 19, 1989, H. Doc. 101-20, 101st Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1989).

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CRS-10
of the total proposals accepted. During the presidential election year of 1992,
however, the use of rescissions became a controversial and highly partisan political
issue to an extent not seen since the conflicts of the Nixon Administration.18
During the first four months of calendar year 1992, President Bush requested
128 rescissions, totaling almost $7.9 billion, while reportedly attempting to portray
the Democratic-Party-controlled Congress as more interested in securing domestic
“pork” projects for their constituents than in reducing the budget deficit. Over $7
billion of these proposed rescissions affected the Defense Department, mainly for
weapons programs that the Administration wanted to terminate or items that
Congress added to earlier defense budgets.19 Many of the nondefense rescissions
were for small earmarked projects, added by Congress.
In response to the four packages of rescissions requested by President Bush in
1992, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees devised their own
alternative packages. A conference version with an $8.2 billion package of
rescissions was signed into law on June 4, 1992 (P.L. 102-298). Although the
conference agreement contained over $7 billion in defense funds, only about $1.7
billion of that total came from programs that the Administration had wanted to
rescind. In toto, the law approved less than $2.1 billion of the rescissions requested
by President Bush, but added more than $6 billion in congressionally initiated cuts.20
As indicated in Table 2, the Clinton Administration ranked at the top of the list
of Presidents since 1974 with respect to the percentage of rescission proposals
accepted (67%) and percentage of the total dollar amounts requested that were
approved by Congress (54%). During his first two years (1993-1994) the Democratic
Party controlled both houses of Congress as well as the White House, while in the
remainder of his term, Republicans controlled the House and Senate. Yet President
Clinton achieved his greatest success rate with rescissions, with respect to percentage
of total dollar amount requested that was ultimately rescinded, in FY1995, when
Congress was controlled by the opposition party.
As reflected in columns on the right side of Table 2, President Clinton
submitted relatively fewer rescission requests per year than did his predecessors. In
seven of his eight years in office, the number of rescissions requested by President
Clinton was below the 1974-2005 average of 38 per year. Further, the ranking of the
Administrations by average number of rescissions requested per year (to adjust for
terms ranging from roughly two and a half to eight years), places President Clinton
(annual average of 21 rescissions) only above George W. Bush (with zero). President
Reagan not only submitted the most rescissions in toto (604), but was also number
18 See CRS Issue Brief (archived) IB92077, Rescission of Funds for FY1992: Presidential
Proposals and Congressional Actions, Virginia A. McMurtry, Coordinator (available from
author).
19 See CRS (archived) Report 92-415, Rescissions of Department of Defense Funds During
the Bush Administration, by Stephen Daggett and Paul Potamianos.
20 See U.S. Congress, Rescinding Certain Budget Authority, and for other purposes,
conference report to accompany H.R. 4990, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 102-530
(Washington: GPO, 1992).

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CRS-11
one with respect to a yearly average (76 rescission requests), followed by President
Ford (61), President George H. W. Bush (42), and President Carter (31).
Table 3 presents data on the total dollar amount of all enacted rescissions, and
of the amounts, respectively, proposed by the President and initiated by Congress.
During the Ford Administration, virtually all rescissions were congressionally
initiated. In contrast, during the first three years President Carter was in office, a
preponderance of enacted rescissions came from presidential messages (FY1977,
82.5%; FY1978, 88.5%; and FY1979, nearly 94%). Rescissions requested by
President Reagan likewise predominated during the first two years of his term; in
FY1981, over 74% of the total amount rescinded came from presidential proposals,
and in FY1982, nearly 99%.
Table 3. Summary of Enacted Rescissions, 1974-2005
% of Total
Amount of Enacted
Total Dollar
Amount Requested
Enacted,
Fiscal
Rescissions,
Amount of
by President,
Requested
Year
Initiated
Budget Authority
Enacted
by
By Congress
Rescinded
President
1974
$0
$1,400,412,000
$1,400,412,000
0%
1975
386,295,370
4,999,704
391,295,074
1.3%
1976
148,331,000
0
148,331,000
0%
1977
813,690,999
172,722,943
986,412,943
82.5%
1978
518,655,000
67,164,000
585,819,000
88.5%
1979
723,609,000
47,500,000
771,109,000
93.8%
1980
777,696,446
3,238,206,100
4,015,902,546
19.4%
1981
10,880,935,550
3,736,490,600
14,617,426,150
74.4%
1982
4,365,486,000
48,432,000
4,413,918,000
98.8%
1983
0
310,605,000
310,605,000
0%
1984
55,375,000
2,188,689,000
2,224,064,000
1.6%
1985
173,699,000
5.458,621,000
5,632,320,000
3%
1986
143,210,000
5,409,410,000
5,552,620,000
2.6%
1987
36,000,000
12,359,390,875
12,395,390,876
0.3%
1988
0
3,888,663,000
3,888,993,000
0%
1989
2,053,000
325,913,000
327,966,000
0.6%
1990
0
2,304,986,000
2,304,986,000
0%
1991
286,419,000
1,420,467,000
1,706,886,000
16.8%
1992
2,067,546,000
22,526,953,054
24,594,499,054
8.4%
1993
206,250,000
2,205,336,643
2,411,586,643
8.6%

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CRS-12
% of Total
Amount of Enacted
Total Dollar
Amount Requested
Enacted,
Fiscal
Rescissions,
Amount of
by President,
Requested
Year
Initiated
Budget Authority
Enacted
by
By Congress
Rescinded
President
1994
1,293,478,548
2,374,416,284
3,687,894,832
35.6%
1995
845,388,805
18,868,380,121
19,713,768,926
4.3%
1996
963,400,000
4,974,852,131
5,938,252,131
16.2%
1997
$285,111,000
$7,381,253,000
$7,666,364,000
3.7%
1998
$17,276,000
$4,180,814,234
$4,198,090,234
0.4%
1999
$16,800,000
$5,081,426,930
$5,098,226,930
0.3%
2000
$0
$3,757,774,500
$3,757,774,500
0%
2001
$0
$5,148,137,497
$5,148,137,479
0%
2002
$0
$4,621,092,342
$4,621,092,342
0%
2003
$0
$3,123,436,524
$3,123,436,524
0%
2004
$0
$10,515,464,056
$10,515,464,056
0%
2005
$0
$6,351,133,468
$6,351,133,468
0%
Total
$25,006,704,719
$143,493,143,006
$168,499,847,523
Source: Government Accountability Office, 2005.
The variations from year to year within administrations, as compared with the
record of the respective Presidents overall, constitute a noteworthy feature of the
data in Tables 1 and 2. Both the number and dollar amount of rescission requests
submitted by the President have fluctuated widely in the 30-plus years of experience
under the Impoundment Control Act. While President Clinton had the most success
during a single year — 86% of rescission proposals approved by Congress in 1995
— none of his requests were approved in 2000. Reflecting on rescissions under the
ICA from the perspective of the mid-1990s, Allen Schick concluded,
Rescissions invite conflict between the President and Congress. Every one is a
presidential demand that Congress cancel resources it had previously
appropriated. By implication, rescissions tell Congress that it erred the first time
around and that it wasted government funds. This is not a message that appeals
to legislators, especially when it comes from a president who has different
budget priorities.21
The experience during the 1992 election year provided a prelude to a very
significant development in rescissions since 1974, the increase in number of
congressionally initiated rescissions. By the end of FY1992, Presidents had proposed
over 1,000 rescissions under the ICA, with Congress approving about a third of the
21 Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1995), p. 175.

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CRS-13
Presidential requests, along with over 300 congressionally initiated rescissions.22
During the period from 1974-1992, the total amount rescinded came to nearly $107.7
billion, of which over 80% came from congressionally initiated rescissions.

In 1993 testimony, Milton Socolar, from the GAO Office of General Counsel,
called attention to this development:
The data suggest an evolution in the use of rescissions as a budgetary tool....
(T)he share of total enacted rescissions originally proposed by the president has
fallen and the share originating in the Congress has increased.... As the Congress
has come to embrace an equivalent or greater amount of reductions than
proposed by presidents, the debate has shifted from deciding whether to cut to
deciding where to cut [emphasis in original].23
According to Mr. Socolar, however, these enacted rescissions often had no effect in
reducing total spending if an equivalent amount of budget authority was added to
another program, thereby reflecting a shift in priorities rather than a reduction in total
spending.
The proportion of enacted rescissions initiated by Congress rather than by
presidential request has continued to expand (see Table 3). The share of total dollars
rescinded originating with Congress exceeded 91% in FY1992 and FY1993, and by
FY1997 and FY1998, over 99%. Since FY1982, the percentage of total rescissions
enacted included in presidential messages reached double digit figures in only three
years: almost 17% in FY1991, nearly 36% in FY1994, and 16% in FY1996. Since
FY2000, all rescissions enacted have been congressionally initiated. President
George W. Bush has submitted no rescission requests to Congress.
One factor that may have contributed to the growth of rescissions initiated by
Congress relates to the limits on discretionary spending dating to the Budget
Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990.24 As noted previously, Congress came to include
rescission provisions in regular or supplemental appropriations measures. An
appropriations measure could include rescissions of previously appropriated funds
in order to accommodate additional monies for other purposes. The rescission
mechanism on occasion might have proved useful in efforts to avoid breaching a
particular spending cap and possibly triggering across-the-board cuts.
22 See CRS Issue Brief (archived) IB92077, Rescission of Funds for FY1992: Presidential
Proposals and Congressional Actions, Virginia A. McMurtry, Coordinator (available from
author).
23 Milton Socolar, Use and Impact of Rescission Procedures, GAO Testimony, T-OCG-93-5
(Washington: Mar. 10, 1993), pp. 2-3, 6.
24 The BEA was enacted as Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
(104 Stat. 1388, 1-630). See “Budget Enforcement Acts of 1990 and 1997,” in CRS Report
RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium, Clinton Brass, Coordinator.

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CRS-14
Developments in the Clinton and
George W. Bush Administrations
In the last decade, other presidential actions relevant to the review of rescissions
have occurred. For a brief period President Clinton had new authority to rescind
funds under the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. President George W. Bush has
refrained from requesting rescissions under the ICA, but has issued presidential
statements calling for “cancellation” of certain funding. President Bush also has
supported amending the ICA to provide for expedited rescissions.
Line Item Veto Act (LIVA) of 1996
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 amended the ICA to give the President
“enhanced rescission authority” to cancel certain items in appropriations and
entitlement measures and also certain narrowly applicable tax breaks. The act
authorized the President to cancel in whole any dollar amount of discretionary budget
authority (appropriations), any item of new direct spending (entitlement), or limited
tax benefits with specified characteristics, contained in a bill otherwise signed into
law. The cancellation was to take effect upon receipt in the House and Senate of a
special notification message. “Cancellation” in this context meant to prevent from
having legal force; in other words, provisions canceled never were to become
effective unless Congress reversed the action of the President by enacting a
“disapproval bill.” The President was only to exercise the cancellation authority if
he determined (1) that such cancellation would reduce the federal budget deficit, and
(2) it would not impair essential government functions or harm the national interest;
and (3) he notified the Congress in a special message of any such cancellation within
five calendar days after enactment of the law providing such amount, item, or benefit.
The act provided 30 days for the expedited congressional consideration of
disapproval bills to reverse the cancellations contained in the special messages
received from the President. Detailed provisions for expedited consideration of the
disapproval bill in the House and Senate were outlined. Since the President would
presumably veto the disapproval bill, a 2/3 majority in both the House and Senate
ultimately would be necessary to override and disapprove of cancellations. The law
became effective on January 1, 1997, but was subsequently overturned by the
Supreme Court on June 25, 1998 (Clinton v. New York City).25
LIVA Cancellations by President Clinton
On August 11, 1997, President Clinton exercised his new veto authority for the
first time by transmitting two special messages to Congress, reporting his
cancellation of two limited tax benefit provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788) and one item of direct spending in the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251).26
25 For further background on the LIVA, see CRS Report RL33635, Item Veto and Expanded
Impoundment Proposals: Legislative History and Current Status, by Virginia A. McMurtry.
26 The cancellation messages were published in the Federal Register and also as
(continued...)

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CRS-15
On October 6, 1997, President Clinton exercised the new authority to veto items
in appropriations bills by cancelling 38 projects contained in the FY1998 Military
Construction Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-45, 111 Stat. 1142).27 On October 14,
1997, President Clinton vetoed 14 projects in the Department of Defense
Appropriations.28 On October 16, 1997, he used the cancellation authority on a
provision in the Treasury and General Government Appropriations relating to
pension systems for federal employees.29 On October 17, 1997, the President applied
his veto to eight more projects, this time in the Energy and Water Appropriations
Act.30 On November 1, 1997, President Clinton exercised his line item veto authority
in two appropriations acts, canceling seven projects in the VA/HUD measure and
three projects in the Transportation Act. On November 20, 1997, the President
canceled two projects from Interior and five from the Agriculture Appropriations Act.
On December 2, 1997, President Clinton exercised his line item veto authority one
last time by canceling a project in the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations
measure.
All together in FY1997, President Clinton issued 11 special messages
containing 82 cancellations under the LIVA. The 38 cancellations in the Military
Construction Appropriations bill, however, were rejected with the congressional
override of the presidential veto of the bill disapproving the cancellations.31 The
cancellation of the provision in the Treasury bill providing for an open season for
federal employees to switch pension plans was held impermissible under the law, and
26 (...continued)
congressional documents. See Office of Management and Budget “Cancellation Pursuant
to the Line Item Veto Act: Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,” Federal Register, vol. 62, no. 155,
Aug. 12, 1997, p. 43265; and Message from the President transmitting “A Cancellation of
Two Limited Tax Benefits Contained in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, pursuant to Public
Law 104-130 Sec. 2(a),” 105th Cong., 1st sess., H.Doc. 105-116 (Washington: GPO, 1997).
The Office of the Federal Register, Archives and Records Administration assembled and
continues to maintain a site with the “History of Line Item Veto Notices,” providing links
to all 82 of the cancellation notices as they appeared in the Federal Register, along with
other relevant information, available electronically at [http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/
nara004.html].
27 See CRS Report 97-210, Appropriations for FY1998: Military Construction, by Mary T.
Tyszkiewicz, for further discussion of these cancellations.
28 See CRS Report 97-205, Appropriations for FY1998: Defense, by Stephen Daggett, for
further discussion of these cancellations.
29 See CRS (archived) Report 97-991, President Clinton’s Use of the Line Item Veto:
Assessing Cancellation No. 97-56, Pertaining to Retirement Systems for Federal Employees,
by Virginia A. McMurtry, for further discussion of this cancellation.
30 See CRS Report 97-207, Appropriations for FY1998: Energy and Water Development,
by Marc Humphries and Carl E. Behrens, for further discussion of these cancellations.
31 On November 13, 1997, the President vetoed H.R. 2631, the first disapproval bill to reach
his desk under the provisions of the 1996 law. The House voted to override on Feb. 5, 1998
(347-69), and the Senate did likewise on Feb. 25, 1998 (78-20); so the disapproval bill was
enacted over the President’s veto (P.L. 105-159).

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CRS-16
a District Court judge ordered its reinstatement early in 1998.32 So slightly more than
half of the original cancellations (43 of 82) remained in effect when the Supreme
Court overturned the LIVA in June 1998.
According to figures provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
President Clinton’s cancellations in FY1998 under the LIVA amounted to about $355
million out of a total budget of $1.7 trillion (less than 0.02%). Of this total, about
$30 million came from the 39 cancellations overturned, leaving a net budgetary effect
for FY1998 of $325 million. CBO estimated total savings over a five-year period
from the FY1998 cancellations as less that $600 million.33
Table 4 presents data for FY1998 both from rescission requests under the
Impoundment Control Act and from cancellation actions under the Line Item Veto
Act. The figures are not entirely comparable, since cancellations under the LIVA
included not only actions affecting items in appropriations acts, but also items of new
direct spending and targeted tax benefit provisions. The combined totals are of
course larger than those for the ICA or LIVA alone.
Table 4. Rescission Requests and Cancellation Actions by the
President and Approval by Congress, FY1998
Total Dollar
Percent of
Percent of
Total Dollar
Amounts of
President’s
Total $
Authority for
Number of
Amounts of
President’s
Proposals
Amount
Rescission/
Rescissions/
President’s
Proposals
Accepted
Requested
Cancellation
Cancellations
Requests/
Accepted by
by
Approved
Cancellations
Congress
Congress
by Congress
Impoundment
25
$25,260,000
$17,276,000
67%
48%
Control Act
Line Item Veto
82
$355,000,000
$325,000,000
52%
92%
Act of 1996
TOTAL
107
$380,260,000
$342,276,000
60%
90%
Source: Government Accountability Office, 2005; Congressional Budget Office, 1998.
Nonetheless, if the bottom line totals in Table 4 were substituted for the ICA-
only data for FY1998 in Tables 1 and 2, the most notable feature, arguably, is that
the larger combined totals only marginally impact the broader picture of the data over
the three decades. The number of rescissions/cancellations, total dollar amounts
from the President, and total dollar amounts accepted by Congress would not become
32 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Order by Judge Thomas Hogan regarding
Civil Action No 97-2399, Jan. 6, 1998. Judge Hogan’s order found that the President lacked
authority under the LIVA to make this cancellation, and so it was “invalid and without legal
force and effect.”
33 Congressional Budget Office, “The Line Item Veto Act After One Year,” CBO
Memorandum, April 1998, pp. 12-13. Had the 39 cancellations that were no longer in force
as of April 1998 been included, CBO estimated the total five-year savings as just under $1
billion.

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CRS-17
anywhere near the highest during the period. The percentage of the President’s
proposals accepted by Congress actually drops slightly when the LIVA cancellations
are included (from 67% to 60%). Only the percentage of the combined total dollar
amount called for by the President and accepted by Congress would set a new high
of 90%, as compared with 80% for President Carter in FY1979, the prior record.
With respect to comparing figures across administrations (see bottom of Table 2),
the addition of the LIVA data would leave the percentage of President Clinton’s
proposals accepted by Congress unchanged, but increase the percentage of total
dollar amount requested and approved by Congress to 56%.
Developments in the George W. Bush Administration
As noted previously, President Bush submitted no formal rescission requests
under the ICA during the first seven years of his Administration. Some controversy
occurred, however, regarding presidential statements calling for “cancellation” of
certain funds.
On October 28, 2005, President Bush forwarded to Congress a package of $2.3
billion in rescissions. As explained in an OMB press release, “Unused balances in
55 Federal programs would be rescinded in keeping with the President’s pledge to
reduce unnecessary spending elsewhere in the budget as hurricane recovery efforts
continue.”34 In a press briefing, OMB Director Joshua Bolten further explained:
The unobligated balances that I referred to are — is money that has not been
spent in programs which — into accounts into which it as appropriated. We have
stepped in, and where the program was either a low priority, or where we believe
it’s clear that the amount of money in that account is not necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the program, we’ve gone in and proposed to take that money out and
use it as savings to the federal treasury.35
Congress eventually approved $400 million of the proposed $2.3 billion in
cancellations forwarded by the President.36
According to OMB staff, the October package constituted a proposal for
cancellations, not rescission requests under the ICA, and agencies were told not to
withhold funds in anticipation of an impending rescission. The Comptroller General,
however, deemed it necessary to contact each agency affected by the President’s
proposal, since GAO has responsibility under the ICA to monitor possible
impoundments of budget authority. In a letter to then OMB Director Bolten, the
34 OMB, “President Bush Requests Rescission and Reallocation Packages,” Oct. 28, 2005.
Available electronically at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2005/
factsheet_rescission.pdf].
35 White House, “Press Briefing by Conference Call with OMB Director Joshua Bolten,
“Oct. 28, 2005. Available electronically at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/10/20051028-9.html].
36 OMB, “Fiscal Year 2006: Keeping the Commitment to Restrain Spending,” Dec. 22,
2005. Available electronically at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2005/
fact_sheet_restraining _spending_122205.pdf].

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CRS-18
Comptroller General “identified 12 instances where agencies withheld budget
authority from obligation in direct response to the October 28 proposal totaling over
$470 million,” with an attachment table detailing each case in point. In what
arguably amounted to an indirect admonishment of OMB, the letter closed with this
advice:
In the future, when the President chooses to propose cancellations of budget
authority rather than rescissions of budget authority pursuant to the procedures
specified in the Impoundment Control Act, your office should ensure that
agencies appreciate the distinction and do not withhold budget authority from
obligation in anticipation of a possible rescission. Agencies that withhold budget
authority in this manner violate the Impoundment Control Act.37
In an apparent effort to avoid any further confusion, an OMB memorandum
went out to all federal agencies the following month, emphasizing the important
distinction between proposed cancellations like those contained in the FY2007
Budget and rescission requests identified in special messages from the President
pursuant to the ICA. Under the ICA, funds requested to be rescinded may be
withheld for 45 days of continuous congressional session. In contrast, cancellations
such as those in the FY2007 budget “are proposals subject to the normal legislative
process” and should not be withheld “pending congressional action on the President’s
proposed legislation.”38 The revised version of OMB Circular A-11, “Preparation,
Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” issued on June 30, 2006, reiterated the
differences between a rescission under the ICA and cancellation proposals by the
President to reduce budgetary resources, with the latter such amounts not to be
withheld from obligation and “subject to the normal apportionment instructions.”39
Meanwhile, GAO found that agencies were not improperly withholding funds
proposed for cancellation in the President’s FY2007 budget submission. The
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee
requested such an assessment from GAO in March 2006. In a letter sent in early
August 2006, the Comptroller General reported that GAO identified proposed
cancellations in the FY2007 Budget affecting 40 programs. According to GAO, in
only one instance were funds “mistakenly” withheld by an agency, and the funds
were released following GAO’s inquiry about them.40
The George W. Bush Administration has offered no public explanation as to
why the President chooses to propose cancellations rather than formal rescissions
under the ICA. As noted already, an apparent advantage of the rescission request
option is that under the ICA, the funds identified in a special message from the
37 GAO, Comptroller General, “Impoundments Resulting from the President’s Proposed
Rescissions of October 28, 2005,” B-307122, Mar. 2, 2006, p. 2.
38 OMB, Memorandum M-06-10, “Reminder: Treatment of the Cancellation Proposals in
the President’s FY2007 Budget,” Apr. 7, 2006.
39 OMB Circular No. A-11 (2006), Section 112, p. 2.
40 The Maritime Administration had withheld $2 million from a guaranteed loan program.
See GAO, Comptroller General, “Status of Funds Proposed for Cancellation in the
President’s Fiscal Year 2007 Budget,” B-308011, Aug. 4, 2006, pp. 1-2.

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CRS-19
President typically may be withheld from obligation for a period of about two
months.
President Bush, while evidently reluctant to use existing rescission authority
provided in the ICA, has repeatedly called for enactment of a measure that would
give the President greater authority to reject items of spending and that also would
pass constitutional muster.41 On March 6, 2006, President Bush sent a draft bill titled
the “Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006” to Congress,42 and the measure was
introduced the next day as H.R. 4890 and S. 2381 (109th Congress). Title
notwithstanding, the bills would have amended the Impoundment Control Act of
1974 (ICA) to incorporate a typical expedited rescission framework, intended
through procedural provisions to require an up-or-down vote on presidential requests
to cancel certain previously enacted spending or tax provisions. In testifying on H.R.
4890, Edward Lorenzen, Policy Director of the Concord Coalition, stated, “President
Bush has never used his authority under current law to submit rescissions of earmarks
or other spending he considers low priority, so it is unclear whether granting him this
additional authority would have much of an impact at all.”43 The House passed H.R.
4890 by vote of 247-172 on June 22, 2006,44 but floor action on a companion
measure did not occur in the Senate before the 109th Congress adjourned.45 On
January 24, 2007, the Senate failed to invoke cloture in order to vote on similar
expedited rescission provisions, offered by Senator Judd Gregg as a floor amendment
to H.R. 2, the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007.46
Some Concluding Observations
According to GAO data, from FY1974 to FY2006, Presidents requested 1,178
rescissions under the ICA, totaling somewhat over $76 billion. Close to a third of the
proposals were approved by Congress, with approximately 40% of the total dollar
amount of presidential rescission requests ($25 billion) enacted by Congress. The
sum of rescissions requested by the President and subsequently enacted exceeded $1
billion in only four of the 30-plus years since the ICA was enacted (FY1981,
FY1982, FY1992 and FY1994).
41 See CRS Report RL33635, Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals: Legislative
History and Current Status, by Virginia A. McMurtry.
42 President’s message, along with press briefing and fact sheet available electronically at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060306-5.html].
43 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, Line-Item Veto: Perspectives on
Applications and Effects, hearing on H.R. 4890, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 25, 2006
(Washington: GPO, 2006), pp. 18-19.
44 “Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006,” debate and vote in the House, Congressional
Record, daily edition, vol. 152, June 22, 2006, pp. H4433-41, H4467-93.
45 For further discussion of legislative consideration of H.R. 4890 and related Senate bills
in the 109th Congress, see CRS Report RL33635, Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment
Proposals: Legislative History and Current Status, by Virginia A. McMurtry.
46 Floor vote was 49-48; 60 votes are needed to invoke cloture. See Congressional Record
vol 153, Jan. 24, 2007, p. S1019.

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During the same period Congress initiated 1,610 rescission actions amounting
to $143.5 billion, over five times the total dollar amount of presidentially requested
rescissions enacted. The trend toward an increasing number of rescissions being
initiated by Congress has already been noted.
Whether considering rescissions requested by the President, presidential
rescission proposals enacted by Congress, and/or rescissions initiated directly in
Congress, from FY1974 to FY2006, the totals appear modest compared with annual
budget outlays topping $2.5 trillion in FY2006 and federal budget deficits exceeding
$300 billion in three of the last four years.47 Acting CBO Director Donald Marron
provided this assessment at a 2006 hearing:
Presidents have made very little use of the authority to recommend rescissions.
From 1976 through 2005, Presidents proposed about $73 billion in rescissions,
about one-half of 1 percent of the more than $15 trillion in total discretionary
budget authority legislated in those years.48
Supporters of changing the ICA framework to make it easier for the President’s
rescission proposals to prevail point to limitations in the current process as
contributing to the low number of rescissions in the last 30 years. Under the ICA,
there is no requirement that Congress even consider a President’s rescission requests.
Funds proposed for rescission by the President in a special message must be made
available for obligation unless Congress acts to approve the President’s requested
rescission(s) within 45 days of continuous session. The ICA, moreover, allows the
President to request rescissions only of discretionary spending, a portion of the
budget which accounts for 38% of annual outlays, while 62% of outlays go to
mandatory spending (controlled by law other than appropriations acts, including net
interest).49
The record of cancellations during the brief time in FY1997 and FY1998 that
the 1996 LIVA was in effect arguably serves to rebut such criticisms of the current
ICA process. As discussed above, the LIVA reversed the burden of action regarding
rescission proposals; cancellations of the President became permanent unless
disapproved by Congress (ultimately requiring rejection by a 2/3 majority in both
chambers to override a presidential veto of a disapproval bill). During this period the
President also had authority to cancel new items of direct (mandatory) spending and
certain targeted tax benefits as well as items of discretionary spending. CBO figures
indicate that all the cancellations made by President Clinton in FY1998 (including
those overturned) totaled some $355 million, with a projected five-year savings just
47 U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Treasury Statement, October 2006, and OMB, Fiscal
Year 2007 Historical Tables (Wshington: GOPO, 2006), p. 26.
48 U.S. Congress, Senate Budget Committee, To Consider S. 2381, A Bill to Amend the
Congressional Budget & Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to provide Line Item Rescission
Authority, hearing, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 2, 2006, p. 2. Available electronically at
[http://budget.senate.gov/republican/hearingarchive/testimonies/2006/2006-05-
01Marron.pdf]. Note that the CBO total covers FY1976-FY2005, whereas the GAO data
cited above encompasses FY1974-FY2005.
49 CRS Report RL32812, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2006, by Philip D. Winters.

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under $1 billion. When the cancellations disapproved by Congress are excluded, the
estimated amount to be saved over five years was less than $600 million.50 The brief
experience in the Clinton Administration does not necessarily reflect how enhanced
rescission authority might be exercised by other Presidents in other circumstances.
Still, “President Clinton’s use of the 1996 line-item veto statute is consistent with
how little the 1974 law’s rescission system has been used.” 51
Another concern, in terms of budgetary impact of rescissions under the ICA,
is that funds rescinded do not necessarily reduce outlays; monies rescinded may
simply allow for increased spending elsewhere. As Acting CBO Director Marron
testified in 2006, “Under current practice, rescissions seem to have been used
primarily to pay for other spending, rather than to reduce spending overall.”52 Some
proposals to modify the ICA framework have sought to avoid this outcome. The
LIVA provided for a “lockbox” mechanism to ensure that deficit reduction would
result from cancellations. In 2006 the Legislative Line Item Veto Act (H.R. 4890,
109th Congress) as passed by the House and Title I of the Stop Over Spending Act (S.
3521, 109th Congress) as reported in the Senate both specified that amounts rescinded
would be dedicated only to deficit reduction and not be used as an offset for a
spending increase elsewhere.53
Although many observers do not view modifying the ICA framework to give the
President expanded rescission authority as an effective means to achieve significant
savings or deficit reduction, a number of studies indicate that governors use the
stronger item veto mechanism to favor executive priorities over legislative
priorities.54 In 1995, during hearings on the Line Item Veto Act, then CBO Director
Robert Reischauer testified that, rather than generating much budgetary savings,
granting the President item veto or enhanced rescission authority would have a more
important impact in giving presidential spending a preference over congressional
spending. Presidents could use expanded rescission authority to redirect greater
resources to their own spending agendas.55
A similar perspective on possible effects of proposals such as those to expand
the President’s rescission authority appeared in testimony by GAO Assistant
Comptroller General Harry Havens in 1992. According to Mr. Havens, the most
significant impact would likely be in the balance of power between the legislative
and executive branches and not in budgetary savings. Various item-veto or rescission
50 Ibid.
51 To Consider S. 2381..., p. 3.
52 Ibid.
53 See CRS Report RL33517, Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006: Background and
Comparison of Versions, by Virginia A. McMurtry.
54 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Item Veto: State Experience and Its
Application to the Federal Situation, Comm. Print, 99th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO,
1986).
55 Line Item Veto, joint hearings before the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 62.

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proposals “would represent a major shift of power from Congress to the President in
an area that was reserved to Congress by the Constitution and which has historically
been one of clear legislative primacy.”56
The experiences in 1992 with the George H.W. Bush Administration’s
rescission proposals and the congressional response, as discussed above, arguably
prove illustrative regarding the subject of competing spending priorities between the
President and Congress. Using the existing ICA framework, President Bush
transmitted four special messages proposing 128 rescission and totaling almost $7.9
billion. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reviewed the President’s
request, and each chamber reported and passed substitute packages. A conference
version containing $8.2 billion was signed into law, containing less than $2.1 billion
of the President’s proposals but over $6 billion in congressionally initiated cuts.
During Senate floor debate on its substitute rescission package in 1992, Senator
Robert Byrd, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, referred to the President’s
recent reference to the “wasteful spending” of Congress, and stated the following:
So to hear the Chief Executive speak on that occasion, to the effect that only
Congress is guilty of wasteful spending — and the President singled out some
examples of what he considered to be wasteful spending, and the Senate has gone
along with some of them, but the President did not say anything about wasteful
spending in the executive branch. Let me bring a few examples of wasteful
spending to the attention of my colleagues, and to the attention of the American
people.57
Senator Byrd then proceeded to describe examples of what he termed “wasteful
executive branch spending” included in the Senate substitute, such as a grant from
the National Science Foundation to study sexual aggregation of fish in Nicaragua, or
from NIH to study the incidence of dental fear in the population.58
Supporters of the existing ICA framework might note that in 1992 the President
was able to gain public attention for his proposed rescissions. When Congress
crafted an alternative package of rescissions, largely congressionally initiated and
saving more than the President’s requested rescissions, the spending priorities of
Congress ultimately prevailed, arguably upholding the power of the purse.
Reviewing the history of impoundments, a law review article in 1974 stated,
“Every President from George Washington to Richard Nixon almost certainly has
impounded appropriated funds.”59 The framework established by the ICA in 1974
has provided the opportunity for greater accountability in reporting of rescissions and
56 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Legislative Line-Item Veto Proposals,
hearing, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992), p. 274.
57 Sen. Robert Byrd, “Rescission of Certain Budget Authority,” remarks in the Senate,
Congressional Record, vol. 138, May 5, 1992, p. 10143.
58 Ibid.
59 Niles Stanton, “History and Practice of Executive Impoundments of Appropriated Funds,”
Nebraska Law Review, vol. 53, no. 1, 1974, p. 207.

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for increased congressional oversight and control of impoundment actions. Although
budgetary savings realized from rescissions since 1974 appear modest, any budgetary
tool that helps restrain spending, even in a small way, may prove useful in a time of
large budget deficits.

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Appendix: Impoundment Data and
Reporting Requirements
Until the 1970s, accurate and systematic data concerning impoundments were
often lacking.60 Congress first attempted to facilitate the availability of relevant data
by stipulating reporting requirements in the Federal Impoundment and Information
Act of 1972.61 However, there was an initial delay in OMB’s compliance with the
law, and subsequent concerns in Congress about the completeness of the information
provided. 62 On March 8, 1973, Congress sought to tighten up the requirements by
requiring quarterly reports on impoundment actions from OMB.63
The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 established the current reporting
requirements. As noted above, the law requires the President to inform Congress of
all proposed rescissions and to submit certain information regarding each such action.
The President may combine several rescission requests in a single impoundment
message. The law also requires the Comptroller General of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to oversee executive compliance with the law and
report to Congress if the President fails to report an impoundment or improperly
classifies an action. Both the messages from the President and the communications
from the Comptroller General are to be printed in the Federal Register and issued as
House documents.64 Section 1014 of the 1974 law also stipulated that the President
transmit to Congress each month a cumulative report on the status of impoundment
60 For example, the Senate Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers under the late Sen.
Sam Ervin in 1968 requested a complete listing of impoundment actions since 1945 from
the Bureau of the Budget, but received only a listing of selected examples. See Frank
Church, “Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of Congressional Control over
Executive Discretion,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 22, June 1970. p. 1243.
61 This requirement was enacted as an amendment to a measure increasing the public debt
ceiling, P.L. 92-599, 86 Stat. 1325.
62 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget: Evolving Roles and Future Issues, Committee Print., 99th Cong., 2nd sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1986), p. 29.
63 P.L. 93-9, 87 Stat. 7.
64 For example, see U.S. Congress, House, Rescissions: Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting Six New Rescission Proposals.... Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 683(a)(1),
H. Doc. 101-20, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, GPO, 1989); and Review of Rescissions,
Deferrals and Revised Deferrals: Communication from the Comptroller General of the
United States Transmitting a Review of the Seventy-three Rescission Proposals, Three New
Deferrals and Three Revised Deferrals Reported in the President’s Third Special Message
for Fiscal Year 1987, Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 685, H. Doc. 100-60, 100th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1987).

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actions.65 In 1975 various of these reporting duties were transferred from the
President to the Director of OMB via Executive Order 11845.66
Although President George W. Bush has submitted no rescission requests to
Congress, there were two deferral requests from the Administration in FY2001, and
the monthly cumulative reports from OMB appeared through September, 2001.
There have been no cumulative reports on rescissions and deferrals since June 17,
2002, because there have been no presidential messages. OMB stated in the last
report that as of June 1, 2002, no funds were being deferred.67 Therefore, according
to OMB, “Pursuant to P.L. 93-344, until such time as the President transmits a
special message on Congress on subsequent rescission proposals or deferrals no
cumulative reports are required to be transmitted to the Congress.”68
For a number of years OMB prepared informal reports at the end of each fiscal
year, which provided a convenient resource for compiling aggregate data on
rescissions. These year-end reports also proved useful as research reference
documents, since the October cumulative report would commence with the new fiscal
year and would not capture actions occurring during September, the final month of
the previous fiscal year. These reports were apparently discontinued in the 1990s.69
The House Appropriations Committee also has compiled data on rescissions.
In interpreting the respective sources, it is necessary to keep in mind that the
Appropriations Committee includes in “rescissions approved by Congress”
congressionally initiated actions to cancel funds previously appropriated, even in the
absence of a rescission request by the President. The approach used by the
Appropriations Committee makes sense from the perspective of tracking the status
of appropriations law and any amendments thereto. On the other hand, OMB, in
reporting rescissions pursuant to the 1974 law, only considers the outcome of
rescissions proposed by the President — what was requested by the President and
what action was taken by Congress, if any.
65 The cumulative reports are published in the Federal Register and issued as House
documents.
66 Specifically, President Ford conferred upon the OMB Director the functions of
transmitting copies of the special rescission and deferral messages to the Comptroller
General and to the Office of the Federal Register, and also the responsibility of submitting
to the Congress the monthly cumulative report. U.S. President, 1974-1976 (Ford),
Executive Order 11845, “Delegating Certain Reporting Functions to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget,” Mar. 24, 1975, Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, v. 11, Mar. 31, 1975, p. 304; 40 F.R. 13299.
67 OMB explained that on May 31, 2002, two previously reported FY2002 deferrals were
reapportioned, “removing the deferral designations based on a recent analysis that
determined that the funds do not meet the definition for deferrals contained in P.L. 93-344.”
See OMB, Report on Rescissions and Deferrals, printed as H. Doc. 107-226, 107th Cong.,
2nd sess., June 17, 2002 (Washington: GPO, 2002), p. 3.
68 Ibid., p.3.
69 The last End-of Year Report contained in the CRS files was dated of Oct. 9, 1996.

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From 1974 until 1992 GAO on occasion informally provided a variety of
statistical data on rescissions proposed and enacted pursuant to the ICA. Following
the increased level of interest in rescissions, GAO decided in 1992 to regularize the
data collection and reporting processes with respect to rescissions. Beginning with
a submission dated April 30, 1992, GAO has periodically provided to Congress
updated rescission data in a standardized format. One table shows by fiscal year
from 1974 to the present the aggregate number and amount of rescissions: proposed
by the President, enacted by Congress, and initiated by Congress, with grand totals
for each category. A second table indicates by fiscal year from 1974 to the present,
by administration, the aggregate number and amount of rescissions proposed and
enacted, as well as those congressionally initiated, with grand totals for each
category. GAO acknowledged that the 1992 compilation reflected
a number of revisions and adjustments to previously submitted historical tables.
For example, we have added several rescissions which were not styled as such
in the applicable legislation; credited certain rescissions to a different fiscal year
than we had previously credited them; and added additional rescissions which
our initial search, for various reasons, did not discover.70
In the letter accompanying the tables, GAO noted that should the need for further
adjustments be identified, they would be included in future submissions. There was
also a discussion of scope and methodology for the compilations by GAO of the
historical data on rescissions.71
The most recent submission from GAO covers the period from FY1974 to
FY2005.72 Most of the figures presented in this report are derived from that 2005
compilation. Since no rescissions were requested in FY2006, discussion sometimes
refers to the first six years of the George W. Bush Administration, although the
formal GAO update covering FY2006 has not yet appeared.
70 Letter from Comptroller General to Sen. Robert Byrd, Chairman, Senate Appropriations
Committee, Apr. 30, 1998. Reprinted in Congressional Record, vol. 138, May 5, 1992, p.
10145.
71 Ibid., pp. 10145-10148.
72 See GAO, Comptroller General, B-306473, Updated Rescission Statistics, Fiscal Years
1974-2005, Nov. 4, 2005.

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