Order Code RS21968
Updated March 13, 2008
Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The current government is the product of a U.S.-supported election process
designed to produce a democracy, although many believe it produced a sectarian
government incapable of reconciliation. The Administration says that, partly as a result
of the U.S. “troop surge,” it is now seeing signs of national political reconciliation with
the passage of some key laws. Debate remains over whether to continue to try to
reconcile Iraq’s communities and strengthen Baghdad or to promote regional and
communal autonomy. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of formal occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to
an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly,
provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad), and
a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position on electoral
lists to produce 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the national
ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall
population), perceiving electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats. At the
provincial level, Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s 51-seat council.
Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr boycotted the provincial elections as a sign of
opposition to the U.S.-led political process, and his supporters are underrepresented on
the provincial councils in the mostly Shiite south. After the elections, an interim national
government was formed that U.S. officials said under-represented Sunnis, although it had
Sunnis as Assembly speaker, deputy president, deputy prime minister, defense minister,
and five other ministers. The presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
leader Jalal Talabani and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.

---

CRS-2
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-
thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly
appointed a 55-member drafting committee which included only two Sunni Arabs,
although 15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 more as advisors. In August
2005, the talks produced a draft, including the following provisions: a December 31,
2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the
Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam “a main source” of legislation and
prohibiting laws from contradicting the “established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);1
setting a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowing families to choose which
courts to use for family issues such as divorce and inheritance (Article 41); making only
primary education mandatory (Article 34); and including Islamic law experts and civil law
judges on the federal supreme court (Article 89). These provisions concern many women
who fear that too much discretion was given to males of their families, and Islamic
extremists in Iraq are purportedly citing these provisions to impose, including through
killings, restrictions against women. Article 126 made all orders of the U.S.-led
occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA), applicable until amended.
Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber with its size and powers
to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date).
The major disputes — which continue unresolved — centered on regional versus
central power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new
autonomous “regions,” which was reaffirmed in an October 2006 law on formation of
regions. Article 117 allows each “region” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing
the fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the TAL). Article
109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current
fields” in proportion to population, and gave “regions” a role in allocating revenues from
new energy discoveries. These concepts continue to hold up passage of national
hydrocarbons legislation – Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits,
and favor centralized control of the oil industry and revenues. The Kurds want to maintain
maximum regional control of their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11)
providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December
15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two
months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces of
Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution
was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for
a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. As
1 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

---

CRS-3
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR. The COR was inaugurated on
March 16, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA to
agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22,
the COR approved Talabani to continue as president, and selected his two deputies —
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq
al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front. Another Consensus Front figure, the hardline
Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosen COR speaker.
Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 37-member cabinet (including himself and
two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and
National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of infighting. Of the
37 posts, there were 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; 19 Shiites; and 1 Christian. Four are women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-
28), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15 and September 15 — was required for the United
States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The President has
indicated intent to use the waiver provision. The law mandated a separate assessment by
the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been
achieved, as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside
commission (headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results of the assessments, as well as
subsequent legislative actions and implementation, are shown in the chart below.
Many experts agree that Iraq’s major communities remain sharply divided over their
relative positions in the power structure, but the Administration sees signs of movement,
perhaps attributed to the success of the 2007 “troop surge” in reducing violence. The
February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of two significant
laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law) and the 2008 national budget, represented
clear breakthroughs, although the provincial powers law was vetoed by the presidency
council and is being renegotiated. These recent steps, to some degree, represent
achievement of the steps committed to by signed by Hashimi, Maliki, Talabani, Abd al-
Mahdi, and Kurdish regional president Masoud Barzani in their August 26, 2007, “Unity
Accord”. On the other hand, the effects will ultimately depend on implementation, and
some believe these legislative moves mask deeper rifts, including growing divisions
between the Kurds and Iraq’s Arabs (both Sunni and Shiite). The budget had been help
up over Iraqi Arab assertions that the 17% revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was
too generous – a figure already agreed to in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a
national census to determine long term percentage allocations for the Kurds, and the
budget apparently does not, as the Kurds demanded, fund from government revenues the
Kurds’ peshmerga militia. Many Iraqi Arabs say that a new flag was adopted (January 22,
2008) only because of Kurdish pressure and some factions refuse to fly it. The De-
Baathification reform law adopted January 12, 2008 could result in the expulsion of more
Sunnis from government than it re-instates.
Others signs point to a political stabilization of Prime Minister Maliki, who was
reeling in mid-2007 by the pullout of the cabinet of several major blocs, including the

---

CRS-4
Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the secular bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-
Allawi. Those withdrawals left the cabinet with about 16 vacant seats out of a 37 seat
cabinet. As of late 2007, Maliki’s government has strengthened somewhat. Maliki filled
two vacancies (agriculture and health ministers) in October 2007 with independent
Shiites, replacing resigned Sadrists, although he failed in November 2007 to win COR
confirmation for new ministers of justice or communications. At the same time, Minister
of Planning Ali Baban broke with his Consensus Front bloc and rejoined the cabinet, but
still leaving the cabinet with 13 vacancies. All blocs, including the Consensus Front, have
ended their 2007 boycotts of the COR. Another positive development came in December
2007 with agreement by the Kurds to delay the contentious, constitutionally mandated
referendum on Kirkuk until June 2008; it was to be held by December 31. U.S. officials
say that the Kurds, with mediation from the U.N. Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI,
further empowered as a mediator by U.N. Resolution 1770) are increasingly focused on
resettling Kurds in traditionally Kurdish cities and might not press the issue of holding
a formal referendum. The Kurds and mainstream Shiite Arab factions remain supportive
of an expansive, long term defense pact being negotiated with the United States, while
Sadr, the Sunni factions, and the secular groups are generally opposed on the grounds that
U.S. forces in Iraq are protecting the Maliki government.
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure of
Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
140
128
of Nuri al-Maliki, and a competing faction) - 25 seats; and independents -
30. Sadr faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni
40
25
parties for Dec. vote. Lost two members in December 2007- now 23 seats
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
—
44
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-
—
11
Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

---

CRS-5
Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
GAO Sept.
14
Administration
Admin.
Subsequent Actions
Report
Report
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
satis.
unmet
satisfactory
CRC continues debating 50 amendments regarding federal vs. regional
(CRC) and completing review
powers; Kurds want Kirkuk issue settled before finalizing constitutional
amendments. Deadlines for CRC recommendations repeatedly extended,
now to May 2008.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
unsatis.
unmet
satisfactory
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by 143 in
Baathification
COR present. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain
their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would receive
pensions instead. But, could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-
Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 ex-Baathists in post-Saddam
security services, and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining
jobs.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure
unsatis.
unmet
unsatisfact.
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over Kurd-Arab
equitable distribution of resources
disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. However,
revenue being distributed equitably, and 2008 budget adopted February
13, 2008 at least temporarily maintains existing 17% revenue share for
Kurdish region.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semi-
satis.
partiall
satis.
Regions law passed October 2006, but main blocs agreed to moratorium
autonomous regions
y met
on implementation until April 2008.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish
satis. on (a) and
overall
satis. on (a)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February
a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial
unsatis. on the
unmet;
and (c).
13, 2008, but vetoed over provision that Baghdad can remove provincial
elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of
others
(a)
governors. Dispute could jeopardize election law (by May 2008) and
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial
met
provincial elections (by October 1, 2008). Some of the nine Higher Election
elections
Commission (IHEC) members to be replaced by UNAMI due to “non-
transparent” selection process, despite passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
conditions do
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty 5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees (almost all Sunnis) held by
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
not allow a
Iraq passed on February 13, 2008. Would not affect 25,000 detainees held
rating
by U.S, and might not lead to freedom for other approximately 20,000
detainees held by Iraq.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
conditions do
unmet
Same as July
No progress on disarmament program or related laws
disarmament
not allow rating
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
satis.
met
met
No change
services committee to support U.S. “surge”

---

CRS-6
Benchmark
July 12
GAO Sept.
14
Administration
Admin.
Subsequent Actions
Report
Report
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
satis.
partial
satisfactory
No change
support U.S. surge
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
unsatis.
unmet
Mixed: satis.
No significant change
make decisions, without political intervention, to
to pursue
pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents
extremists, but
and Shiite militias
political
interference
continues
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing
unsatis.
unmet
overall mixed.
No significant change.
even-handed enforcement of law
Satis. on Iraqi
military,
unsatis on
police
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not
satis.
partial
satis
No change. Mahdi Army at reduced level of activity due to Sadr six
provide a safe haven for any outlaw, regardless of
month suspension (now extended until August 2008) and reported
sectarian affiliation
decline in Iranian weapons shipments.
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Overall mixed.
unmet
same as July
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating. 90,000
eliminating militia control of local security
Satis.(a);
12
Sunni “Sons of Iraq” combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted as potential
unsatis. (b)
Sunni militia forces. Only 20,000 allowed to join ISF to date.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
satis.
met
satis.
No change
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say ISF likely
independently
unable to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and against external threats
not until 2018-2020.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in COR
satis.
met
satis.
No change
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
satis.
partial.
satis.
About 4.5% of the $10 billion for capital projects spent by August 2007;
capital budget for reconstruction projects equitably
another $13.2 billion is in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted February 13, 2008.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not making false
unsatis.
unmet
unsatis.
No change
accusations against ISF members

---