Order Code RS21987
Updated February 29, 2008
When Financial Businesses Fail:
Protection for Account Holders
Walter W. Eubanks
Specialist in Economic Policy
Government and Finance Division
Summary
Lawmakers have long recognized the importance of protecting some forms of
financial savings from risk. Such vehicles clearly include deposits in banks and thrift
institutions and credit union “shares.” Remedial and other safety net features also cover
insurance contracts, certain securities accounts, and even defined-benefit pensions.
Questions over how to fund and guarantee Social Security, along with the troubles of
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, have renewed interest in these arrangements.
This report portrays the salient features and legislation of account protection provided
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund, state insurance guaranty funds, the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and a discussion of Financial
Guarantors (monoline insurance companies). It provides resources for further analysis
of each protective arrangement and will be updated as appropriate.
Analysis
Analysts and lawmakers view many financial businesses as having an important role
in the U.S. economy, receiving protection for their individual account holders against loss,
should the firms fail. Such protections exist both to protect the individuals from risks
they probably could not discern for themselves, and to protect the economy against the
effects of financial panics if failures occur. Panics, the attendant collapses of wealth, and
severe consequences for the economy occurred before Congress created federal deposit
insurance in 1934. Government policy protects customers of depository institutions —
banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions — in full for accounts up to $100,000 and up
to $250,000 for retirement accounts. In addition, customers of insurance companies,
securities broker/dealers, and many pension funds receive government or government-
sponsored guarantees on specified accounts.
This report provides a side-by-side summary of the major features of financial
institutions’ customer protection systems, reflecting safety-net provisions legislated over
time, usually in reaction to specific collapses. Besides these explicit guarantees,

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regulatory bodies can attempt the rescue of failing financial enterprises, using many tools
authorized by laws and regulations and often acting in the background. Such tools include
liquidity lending, arranging memoranda of understanding, issuing cease and desist orders
against risky practices, and arranging mergers of weak entities into stronger institutions.
If the entire financial economy seems threatened by pending collapse of either a sizeable
financial institution that is “too large to fail,” or many financial businesses collectively,
the Federal Reserve (Fed) can step in as the lender of last resort to avert serious adverse
consequences for the economy (e.g., use of the Fed’s liberal bank liquidity policy
immediately after the 911 attacks). Moreover, Congress may have to provide emergency
funding when parts of the federal safety net are under severe pressure. The cleanup of the
savings and loan industry in the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, required
appropriated funds plus a new deposit insurance fund and regulator. Currently, severely
underfunded defined benefit pension plans of steel, airline, and similar businesses suggest
that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation may require much future federal
assistance.1
An important conceptual distinction between support structures is who ultimately
pays for the protection. Lawmakers originally created federal deposit insurance in a “user
fee” model of insurance, in which the government owned and operated each insurance
system and charged member banks for its use. Following the banking failures of the late
20th century, legislation moved deposit protection part way toward an alternative “mutual”
model, in which the burden of financing the system falls more clearly on the banking
industry. Mutual institutions are owned by their customers, such as saving associations’
depositors and insurance companies’ policyholders. As a result, some analysts now claim
that the banking industry “owns” the deposit insurance funds in mutual mode. In reality,
the federal government still owns and operates them. That is so because in all depository
institution cases, the ultimate guarantor is the economic power of the federal government.
History has shown that deposit guarantees short of the federal level have universally been
inadequate to prevent panics, runs, and severe economic damage when called upon.2
Industry-sponsored and state-level programs have contained the collapses of their covered
entities only if the damages have been small. Credit union share insurance, in contrast,
more nearly follows the mutual model. Likewise, state insurance company guaranty and
federally-sponsored securities investor protection arrangements follow the mutual model.
The troubled pension benefit arrangement, however, remains in user fee mode.
The following tabulation lists the major elements and components of these safety
nets. Table 1 outlines the support structures for accounts at depository institutions.
Table 2 does the same for the nondepository supports. Readers may obtain further
analysis of each system in the CRS reports cited for further reading, or via the websites
of the administering agencies noted.
1 See the CRS Current Legislative Issue entry, Pension Security and Retirement Savings, at
[http://beta.crs.gov/cli/cli.aspx?PRDS_CLI_ITEM_ID=446].
2 CRS Report RL31552, Deposit Insurance: The Government’s Role and Its Implications for
Funding, by Gillian Garcia, William Jackson, and Barbara Miles.

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Table 1. Comparing Account Protection: Depository Institutions
Feature
Bank
Thrift Institution
Credit Union
Deposits
Deposits
Shares
Statutory
Federal Deposit
Same
Federal Credit Union
Authority
Insurance Act
Act (Amendment)
Original Date/
1933/1991/2005
1934/1989/1991/2005
1970/2005
Major
Modification
Citations to
64 Stat. 873;
Same
84 Stat. 994;
Authority and
12 U.S.C. 1811 ff.
12 U.S.C. 1781 ff.
Operations
Administrator
Independent
Independent agency:
Independent agency:
agency: Federal
Federal Deposit
National Credit
Deposit Insurance
Insurance
Union
Corporation’s
Corporation’s
Administration
Deposit Insurance
Deposit Insurance
manages National
Fund.
Fund.
Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund.
Funding
Banks pay
Same
All federal and
assessments on
electing states may
deposits to maintain
pay assessments;
fund balance:
none recently.
currently zero for all
Contribution of 1%
but riskiest firms.
of credit union
“shares” required.
Federal
Part of consolidated
Same
Members own off-
Budgetary Status
federal budget.
budget fund.
Federal
$30 billion line of
Same
$100 million line of
Government
credit with U.S.
credit with U.S.
Backstop
Treasury; “full faith
Treasury; “full faith
and credit of the
and credit of the
United States.”
United States.”
Risk-based
Yes: a few cents
Same No
Assessment
more per $100 of
covered deposits.
Tax Deduction
Yes: Business
Same
None usually since
for Assessment
expense deduction
credit unions are
for taxes.
exempt from federal
and most state taxes.
Product Line
None
None
None
Differentiation
Coverage Limit
$100,000 per
Same
Same
account, and $250,
000 for retirement
accounts.
Source: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.

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Table 2. Comparing Account Protection: Nondepository Institutions
Feature
Insurance Policies
Securities Accounts
Pension Accounts
Statutory
State laws;
Securities Investor
Employee Retirement
Authority
McCarran-Ferguson
Protection Act of
Income Security Act of
Act (59 Stat. 33,
1970
1974; Consolidated
1945) removed most
Appropriations Act, 2001;
federal industry
Deficit Reduction Act of
involvement.
2005.
Original Date/
Various.
1970
1974/1994/2000/2005
Major
Modification
Citations to
State laws.
84 Stat. 1636;
88 Stat. 829;
Authority and
15 U.S.C. 78aaa ff.
29 U.S.C. 1001 ff.
Operations
Administrator
Multi state
Non-governmental
“Self-supporting” federal
administrators and
membership
government corporation:
non-profit
corporation, funded
Pension Benefit Guaranty
associations of
by member securities
Corporation.
licensed insurers;
broker-dealers:
coordinated via
Securities Investor
National Association
Protection
of Insurance
Corporation.
Commissioners and
National Conference
of Insurance
Legislators.
Funding
Licensed direct
Assessments on
Employers pay annual
insurers pay after
members for
premium per participant:
actual insolvency; no
“reserve” fund
$30 minimum in single-
funds(s) generally
advancing payments
employer/$8.00 flat in
exist.
to claimants: flat
multi-employer plans.
$150 yearly per firm.
Corporation may
levy revenue-based
assessment, as in
1989 — 1995.
Federal
Not applicable.
Not a budgetary
On-budget.
Budgetary Status
account.
Federal
None, except for a
May borrow $1
Borrowing or appropriation
Government
program of terrorism
billion from U.S.
has not covered fund
Backstop
reinsurance.
Treasury Department
deficits; lacks “full faith
through Securities
and credit” backup.
and Exchange
Commission; lacks
“full faith and credit”
backup.

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Feature
Insurance Policies
Securities Accounts
Pension Accounts
Risk-based
No.
No.
Yes: Underfunded single-
Assessment
employer plans pay extra
$9/1,000 on unfunded
vested benefits, varying
with interest rates
Tax Deduction of
Yes: Life insurers in
Essentially not
Yes: Employers’ business
Assessment
45 states and
applicable, although
expense deduction for
property-liability
business expense tax
federal and state taxes.
insurers in 20 may
deduction is
deduct assessments
nominally available.
from premium taxes;
business expense
deduction for federal
and state taxes.
Product Line
Insurers are assessed
None.
Program for single-
Differentiation
by market share in
employer plans; another for
particular types of
multi-employer plans.
insurance.
Coverage Limit
Coverage limits vary
Stocks, bonds, and
Varies. Single-employer
by state
cash registered to
plan basic benefits to
holders in closed
$51,750 annually for
broker/dealers;
retirees starting at age 65,
$500,000 of which
adjusted for age and
$100,000 may be
inflation. Multi-employer
cash; not protected
plan formula is 100% of
against changing
first $11 of monthly
market values.
benefits per year of service
plus 75% of the next $33 of
such benefits, not adjusted.
Source: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
Financial Guarantors (Monoline Insurance Companies)
Financial guarantors are insurance companies that insure the credit quality of
securities that banks, securities firms, insurance companies, among others hold as assets.
Even though state insurance regulators have sole authority to supervise them3, financial
guarantors’ safety and soundness may have a critical impact on the safety and soundness
of all financial businesses including federal regulated banks.4 The failure of one or more
3 While New York state supervises financial guarantors, it’s insurance guaranty funds do not
cover monoline insurance companies.
4 See the testimony of Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Director, Division of Research and Statistics
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before U.S. House of Representative,
the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises,
(continued...)

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financial guarantors could possible bring about other financial business failures because
credit rated securities backed by guarantors’ insurance on, for example, a national bank’s
books would be downgraded, requiring the banks to add capital. If the bank is unable to
acquire the necessary capital, the bank could suffer losses or even fail due to the falling
prices of its insured assets, which might no longer cover its liabilities, including deposits.
Financial guarantors provide insurance against credit defaults of securities.
Specifically, they focus on insuring the timely payment of principal and interest on
securities, including municipal bonds, asset-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). The guarantors’ insurance raises the credit rating of the underlying
securities, which in turn lowers the interest costs to the issuer and makes the securities
more attractive to a wider range of investors. The nine New York monoline insurance
companies insure $2.5 trillion of domestic and international debt. An increasing part of
this debt was CDOs backed by subprime residential mortgage-backed securities. Such
debt led to losses for these monoline companies because these securities were being sold
at substantial discounts. The growing possibility of more losses caused the rating
agencies to lower the treble A ratings of several of these financial insurance companies.
The treble A credit rating is required for the guarantors to offer treble A credit ratings on
securities issuers offer. Because some guarantors were downgraded, the securities they
insured are being downgraded as well, which means that banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies, among others holding these downgraded assets must increase their
capital as the price of these assets falls. New York state insurance regulators and the U.S.
Treasury are seeking ways to help these financial guarantors get recapitalized.
For Further Reading
CRS Report RL34364, Bond Insurers: Issues for the 110th Congress, by Baird Webel and
Darryl E. Getter.
CRS Report RS20724, Federal Deposit and Share Insurance: Proposals for Change, by
Walter Eubanks.
CRS Report RL32175, Insurance Guaranty Funds, by Baird Webel.
CRS Report 95-118, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: A Fact Sheet, by John
Topoleski.
CRS Report RS21741, Securities Investor Protection Corporation, by Gary Shorter.
CRS Report RS22671, Terrorism Risk Insurance Program: Current Issues, Legislation,
and Background, by Baird Webel.

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4 (...continued)
C o m m i t t e e o n F i n a n c i a l S e r v i c e s , F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 2 0 0 8 .
[http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/parkinson20080214a.htm].