Order Code RS22570
Updated February 26, 2008
Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs,
Larry A. Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The U.S. military is building up forces on the U.S. territory of Guam to maintain
deterrence and warfighting capabilities for possible responses to crises and disasters,
counter-terrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines,
Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Guam’s role has increased with plans to withdraw some
U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea. The purpose of this CRS Report is to discuss
developments and issues in Guam’s defense build-up in terms of policy considerations,
rather than detailed budgetary issues. This CRS Report will be updated as warranted.
Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup
Guam is a U.S. territory long considered to be strategically significant to U.S.
defense deployments in the Western Pacific. In the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii is about 2,400
miles west of California, and Guam is about 3,800 miles further west of Hawaii. Guam
has two important U.S. military bases: Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base.
The island, three times the size of Washington, DC, is home to about 171,000 residents.
As the Defense Department has faced increased tensions on the Korean peninsula and
requirements to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pacific Command (PACOM),
since 2000, has built up air and naval forces on Guam to maintain U.S. deterrence and
warfighting capabilities against possible threats in Asia. Concerns include crisis response,
counter-terrorism, and contingencies in the western Pacific. Guam’s defense buildup is
estimated to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing approximately 60%.
U.S. Force Relocations from the U.S. Mainland
In 2000, the press reported that the Air Force wanted to base elements of an Air
Expeditionary Force in Guam and had sent B-2 stealth bombers to Guam to broaden the
range of U.S. options for possible contingencies involving North Korea. As PACOM’s
Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair acquired approval to forward deploy air-launched
cruise missiles on Guam for the first time in August 2000. The Air Force moved
precision munitions to be stockpiled on Guam, including Joint Direct Attack Munitions

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and Joint Standoff Weapons.1 In early 2001, the Navy announced that it would station up
to three nuclear attack submarines at Guam, in order to shorten the transit time compared
to traveling from homeports in Hawaii or California to the western Pacific and to shorten
deployments for sailors. The first sub to be based in Guam arrived in October 2002. In
July 2007, the USS Buffalo joined USS Houston and USS City of Corpus Christi as the
three forward-deployed nuclear attack submarines permanently based at Guam.2
In 2002, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces publicly detailed his request for
basing aircraft in Guam. In addition to munition stockpiles and jet fuel, he reportedly
requested F-22 stealth fighters, 767 tankers, C-17 transports, bombers, and Global Hawk
reconnaissance drones.3 An initial two squadrons of F-22s are to be stationed in Alaska
in 2008, and the Commander of Pacific Air Forces has mentioned Guam as a potential
basing site for additional F-22s.4 In March 2003, after a new Air Expeditionary Wing was
activated at Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base, B-1 and B-52 bombers deployed
temporarily on a rotational basis from air bases in Texas and Louisiana as U.S. forces
prepared for war against Iraq.5 Beyond rotation of aircraft, the Air Force began
continuous deployment of aircraft into Guam. As part of this build-up, the first B-52
bombers (stationed out of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota) to deploy to Andersen
arrived in February 2004.6 In April 2005, Commander of Pacific Air Forces, General Paul
Hester, said that B-2 stealth bombers started to fly out of Andersen. In April 2005, F-15
fighters temporarily deployed to Andersen from Idaho. An Air Force official said in 2006
that the Air Force plans to station KC-135 tankers on Guam. In May 2007, the Air Force
announced the deployment of 18 F-16 fighters to Guam for four months. In addition,
Andersen Air Force Base expects to have four to six Global Hawk unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) based permanently there by 2009.7
1 Thomas Ricks, “For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront,” Washington Post, May 26, 2000; Bill
Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, August 25, 2000; Robert
Burns, “Air Force Plan Could Place Bombers Closer to Targets,” Seattle Times, November 30,
2000.
2 Christian Bohmfalk, “Navy Decides to Homeport Up to Three Attack Submarines in Guam,”
Inside the Navy, January 29, 2001; Nathan Hodge, “Navy Basing Subs in Guam,” Defense Week,
October 1, 2002; Navy Newsstand, July 12, 2007.
3 Jim Wolf, “U.S. General Urges Warplanes Be Sent to Guam,” Reuters, August 23, 2002.
4 “U.S. Air Force stations first squadron of F-22s in Pacific,” Dong-A Ilbo (internet version),
August 21, 2007.
5 PACOM, “B-1Bs, B-52Hs Arrive in Guam,” March 6, 2003; Robert Burns, “Air Force Wants
to Put Fighters and Bombers Back on Guam in Pacific,” AP, January 13, 2004; Michael Sirak,
“U.S. Considers Bomber Presence on Guam,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 21, 2004.
6 PACOM, “Bomber Deployment to Guam,” February 2, 2004; “Bombers Arrive At Andersen,”
AFN; and Katie Worth, “B-52 Bombers Arrive,” Pacific Daily News, February 23, 2004.
7 Martin Matishak, “Hester: Air Force to Bolster Presence in Asia-Pacific Region,” Inside the Air
Force, April 29, 2005; Natalie Quinata, “Fighter Squadron Arrives on Guam,” Pacific Daily
News, April 30, 2005; Gregg Kakesako, “U.S. Military to Beef Up Its Presence on Guam,”
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, June 21, 2006; “United States to deploy 18 F16s to Guam,” Reuters
News, May 24, 2007; Frank Whitman, “No Big Changes at Andersen Right Away, New 36th
Wing Commander Says,” Stars and Stripes, November 18, 2006.

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U.S. Force Relocations from Japan and South Korea
In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed “roadmap” agreement
to broaden military cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces
in Japan. It provides for the relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary
Force and 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. Approximately 7,000
Marines will remain on Okinawa. The cost of the relocation is estimated at $10.27
billion. Of this amount, Japan has pledged to contribute $6.09 billion, including direct
financing of facilities and infrastructure on Guam.8 The Government of Japan’s budget
for fiscal year 2007-2008 allocated $84 million for the relocation.
The Pentagon plans to restructure U.S. forces in South Korea by reducing troop
strength from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008. No decisions have been announced
regarding further withdrawals after September 2008, but U.S. officials have indicated that
further withdrawals of Army forces are possible. The Pentagon indicates that the primary
reason for these troop withdrawals is to cope with the strain on Army and Marine Corps
manpower needed for the active theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the two combat
brigades of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea deployed to Iraq in 2004.9
Concerns and Issues for Congress
Rationales. One rationale for the military build-up on Guam is its status as a U.S.
territory. Thus, the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on
force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld visited Guam in November 2003 and indicated an interest in building
up Guam as he considered a new round of base closings.10 In contrast, the United States
had to close Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines in 1992,
and countries like South Korea could restrict the use of U.S. forces based there. U.S.
forces based in Guam also do not have to contend with political sensitivities over nuclear
powered vessels. Moreover, some countries, including allies, have raised questions about
their support for U.S. forces in a possible conflict between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China (PRC).11
Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S.
force structure. As commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision
for Guam as a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can “surge” to the Asian
theater. He stressed “flexibility,” saying “we need to have forces ready to react,” and we
8 Linda Sieg, “U.S.-Japan Security Overhaul Gives Tokyo Bigger Role,” Reuters News, May 16,
2006; Karl Eiselberg, “Finalized U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Masks Some Deeper Concerns in
Security Alliance,” Daily Report, May 5, 2006.
9 “U.S. officials Raise Possibility of Further Troop Cut in S. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency,
March 10, 2006; Bill Gertz, “S. Korea to Get War Control Over U.S. Troops in 3 Years,”
Washington Times, August 4, 2006; Richard Halloran, “U.S. Turning Out Lights in S. Korea,”
Honolulu Advertiser, July 30, 2006.
10 James Brooke, “Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One,”
New York Times, April 7, 2004.
11 Catherine Armitage, “Downer Assures China on Taiwan,” The Australian, August 18, 2004.

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must have built-in flexibility” to meet emergencies (including disaster relief).12 In 2004,
the Navy held “Summer Pulse 04,” its first exercise of a plan to increase readiness to
“surge” operations in response to a crisis or emergency. In June 2006, PACOM held the
“Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam.
A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the “tyranny of
distance.” PACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that
encompasses almost 60% of the world’s population, over 50% of the earth’s surface, the
Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones, and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S.
forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where the United States has alliances with
Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. Combat aircraft on Guam
can reach the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula in two hours.13 The United States
also has concerns in Asia about threats to peace and stability in the East China Sea, South
China Sea and over terrorist threats in Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises, and security
for sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca.
Table 1 compares sailing distances and time from Guam, Honolulu, Seattle, and San
Diego to the Philippines, a key ally.
Table 1. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time
To Manila, from:
statute miles
days at 20 knots
days at 30 knots
Guam
1,724
3.1
2.1
Honolulu
5,482
9.9
6.6
Seattle
6,853
12.4
8.3
San Diego
7,595
13.8
9.2
Notes: Sailing distances in statute miles were calculated using nautical miles reported by “Distances
Between Ports,” 2001, published by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Also, 1 nautical mile
equals 1.15 statute miles, and 1 knot equals 1.15 mph.
Concerns. As U.S. forces relocate to Guam, the state of its infrastructure has been
of concern to some policymakers. Also, Guam’s political leaders have expressed concerns
about the impact of additional deployments on its infrastructure, including utilities, roads,
and water supplies. Guam’s location in the Western Pacific also requires construction of
protection for U.S. forces and assets against typhoons. In the fall of 2006, PACOM
officials briefed Guam on some aspects of an undisclosed draft plan for military
expansion, the Integrated Military Development Plan, with possible military projects
worth a total of about $15 billion.14 In addition, Guam’s remoteness and conditions raise
more questions about hosting military families, training with other units in Hawaii or the
west coast, and costs for extended logistical support. Addressing another concern, a
12 Richard Halloran, “Guam Seen as Pivotal U.S. Base,” Washington Times, March 11, 2006.
13 David Axe, “U.S. Air Force jets deploy to Okinawa,” Washington Times, March 7, 2007.
14 KUAM News, September 12, 2006; Pacific Daily News, September 13, 2006; Stars and Stripes,
September 17, 2006.

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former commander of Marine Forces Pacific urged that Guam’s buildup include more
than infrastructure to develop also human capital, communities, and the environment.15
Guam’s higher military profile could increase its potential as an American target for
terrorists and adversaries during a possible conflict. China has a variety of ballistic
missiles that could target Guam. North Korea reportedly has developed a new
intermediate range ballistic missile (Taepodong-X) that could reach Guam. Any such
vulnerabilities could raise requirements for both counter-terrorism measures and missile
defense. Also, some say that Guam is still too distant from flash points in the Asia and
advocate closer cooperation with countries such as Singapore, Australia, the Philippines,
and Japan.16 Building up the U.S. presence in those countries could enhance alliances or
partnerships, increase interoperability, and reduce costs for the United States.
Alliances. The Guam Integrated Military Development Plan, parts of which were
reported in October 2006, indicates that U.S. Army units withdrawn from South Korea
are not likely to be stationed on Guam.17 The Pentagon’s restructuring plan reportedly
intends to maintain U.S. air power in South Korea, particularly the three squadrons of F-
16 fighters based at Osan Air Base. If most U.S. ground forces are withdrawn after
September 2008, U.S. troop strength in South Korea would fall to around 10,000, based
on Air Force units, including three F-16 squadrons. The greater emphasis on U.S.
offshore forces in South Korean security conceivably could affect decisions regarding the
mix of U.S. forces based on Guam and rotated into Guam from other bases. This might
especially be true of heavy bombers, which the Air Force rotates into Guam from bases
in the United States. Concerns about maintaining deterrence after U.S. withdrawal of
ground forces might lead PACOM to increase exercises of heavy bombers and/or aircraft
carrier strike groups near Korea.18
Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. concerns involve possible conflict
between China and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku islands (called
Diaoyu islands by China) in the East China Sea. The United States administered the
islands after World War II and turned them over to Japanese administration in 1972.
Clinton and Bush Administration officials have stated that the Senkakus fall under the
scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance.19 In September 2005, the PLA Navy deployed five naval
ships to the disputed area in the East China Sea with competing territorial and oil claims.
China. Commentators commonly assert that the U.S. defense build-up on Guam
partly has been directed against the PRC, which has threatened to use the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. U.S. policy on helping Taiwan’s self-defense is
15 W. C. “Chip” Gregson, “New Thinking Needed on Pacific Frontier,” Honolulu Advertiser,
December 7, 2007.
16 Thomas Donnelly, “Rebasing, Revisited,” American Enterprise Institute, December 2004.
17 Murayama Kohei, “U.S. to Triple Troops in Guam, but No Earlier Than 2010 for Marines,”
Kyodo News, October 3, 2006.
18 Bill Gertz, “More Muscle, With Eye on China,” Washington Times, April 20, 2006; Robert
Burns, “U.S. Air Power in East Asia Has Grown,” Associated Press, October 11, 2006.
19 “U.S.-Japan Treaty Covers Disputed Isles,” Reuters, November 28, 1996; and Yoichi
Funabashi, “Maintain the Armitage Doctrine Quietly,” Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 2004.

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governed not by a defense treaty but by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8.
Some concerns about the PLA’s accelerated modernization since the Taiwan Strait Crisis
of 1995-1996 also have expanded beyond a focus on Taiwan to include PLA preparations
for possible conflicts with the United States and Japan. In Southeast Asia, despite
reduced tensions since the mid-1990s, China claims much of the South China Sea as well
as the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands in that sea as its “sovereign territory.” In April
2007, PACOM Commander Admiral Timothy Keating visited Guam and acknowledged
that the defense buildup on Guam was partly due to concerns about any tensions over
Taiwan and a need to deter North Korea. At the same time, he stressed U.S. transparency
about this buildup, saying “we’re not doing this under the cover of darkness.”20
Still, a policy challenge has been to deter any aggression by China as well as to
assure it that the U.S. goal is closer cooperation with this rising power as a “responsible
stakeholder.” In official media reports and discussions, some in China have expressed
suspicions that Guam’s build-up is aimed at China. The PLA has increased its attention
to Guam and has been building up its submarine force (both nuclear-powered and diesel-
electric). In November 2004, the PLA Navy sent a Han-class nuclear attack submarine
to waters off Guam before intruding into Japan’s territorial water.21 Nevertheless, General
Hester, Commander of Pacific Air Forces, said in May 2005 that the PLA’s modernization
gave him “pause for interest” but did not make a difference in significant force
redeployment.22 Also, in 2006, Guam became a focal point for improving military-to-
military relations with China, a policy area of concern to Congress. In an effort to blunt
charges that Guam’s build-up targets China, PACOM Commander Admiral Fallon invited
PLA observers to the U.S. “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers
to waters off Guam in June 2006. The PLA Navy sent a Deputy Chief of Staff and
specialist in submarine operations to lead the observers, who also boarded a U.S. aircraft
carrier and visited Guam’s air and naval bases.23
Congress. In July 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report
(S.Rept. 109-286) on the Military Construction and Veteran Affairs Appropriations Act,
which expressed concerns about a construction program on Guam estimated to cost $10.3
billion (with Japan paying approximately 60%) and expectations of a Guam master plan
from the Defense Secretary by December 29, 2006. In the Consolidated Appropriations
Act for FY2008 (that became P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007), the Appropriations
Committees decided against a Senate provision that would have required the Defense
Secretary to submit the master plan by December 29, 2007, and decided to provide more
time for completion of a report on plans for Guam by September 15, 2008. The
Secretary’s report is to include the status of Japan’s contribution of about $6.1 billion.
20 Audrey McAvoy, “U.S. Pacific Commander Says Taiwan is Factor in Guam Buildup,”
Associated Press, April 15, 2007.
21 Kyodo World Service, November 16, 2004.
22 Interview with Inside the Air Force, May 6, 2005.
23 Xinhua [New China News Agency], June 23, 2006.

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