Order Code RL34391
Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress
February 26, 2008
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress
Summary
Of the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers, two — Polar Star and Polar Sea
— have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Star is not
operational and has been caretaker status since July 1, 2006. The Coast Guard has
begun initial studies on replacements for the two ships. Under the Coast Guard’s
current schedule, the first replacement ship might enter service in 8 to 10 years.
A 2007 report from the National Research Council (NRC) on the U.S. polar
icebreaking fleet states that “U.S. [polar] icebreaking capability is now at risk of
being unable to support national interests in the north and the south.” Congress, in
the explanatory statement for the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R.
2764/P.L. 110-161 of December 26, 2007), expressed concern about the Coast
Guard’s ability to meet its polar operations mission requirements and directed the
Coast Guard to submit a comprehensive report on the issue.
The Coast Guard estimates that new replacement ships might cost $800 million
to $925 million each in 2008 dollars, and that the alternative of extending the service
lives of Polar Sea and Polar Star for 25 years might cost about $400 million per ship.
Potential policy issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker
modernization include the numbers and capabilities of polar icebreakers the Coast
Guard will need in the future; whether to provide these icebreakers through
construction of new ships or service life extensions of older ships; whether to
accelerate the Coast Guard’s current schedule for acquiring replacement ships;
whether new ships should be nuclear powered; whether new ships should be funded
in the Coast Guard budget or the Department of Defense (DOD) budget; and
whether, as an interim measure, the Polar Star should be repaired and placed back
into service.
Congress’s options regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization
include but are not limited to the following: approving the Coast Guard’s current
plan; holding hearings to solicit additional information on the issue; directing the
Coast Guard to include the option of nuclear power in its studies of requirements for
future icebreakers; directing the Coast Guard to pursue a particular acquisition
strategy for icebreaker modernization; accelerating the procurement of new
icebreakers relative to the Coast Guard’s current plan; funding the procurement of
new icebreakers in the DOD budget rather than the Coast Guard budget; and
directing the Coast Guard to reactivate Polar Star. This report will be updated as
events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Missions of U.S. Polar Icebreakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Three Coast Guard Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
One National Science Foundation Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2007 National Research Council Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Origin of Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Coast Guard Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Current Coast Guard Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Cost Estimates for Certain Modernization Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
New Replacement Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
25-Year Service Life Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Reactivate Polar Star for 7 to 10 Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Reactivate Polar Star for a Single Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Number and Capabilities of Future Polar Icebreakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
New Construction vs. Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acceleration of Current Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Nuclear Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Funding Ships in Coast Guard or Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Reactivating Polar Star as Interim Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Recent Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) . . . . 20
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Polar Icebreakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background, Issues, and
Options for Congress
Introduction
Polar icebreakers can operate in the extreme conditions of, and break through
the thick ice found in, the Arctic Ocean and the waters surrounding Antarctica. Of
the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers, two — Polar Star and Polar Sea — have
exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Star is not operational and
has been caretaker status since July 1, 2006.1 The Coast Guard’s third polar
icebreaker — Healy — is much younger and in operational condition, but has less
icebreaking capability than the other two ships.
The Coast Guard has begun initial studies on replacements for Polar Star and
Polar Sea. Under the Coast Guard’s current schedule, the first replacement ship
might enter service in 8 to 10 years. Until then, the Coast Guard plans to continue
operating Polar Sea and Healy while keeping Polar Star, for the time being at least,
in caretaker status as a reserve asset.
A 2007 report from the National Research Council (NRC) on the U.S. polar
icebreaking fleet states that “Over the last decade, some routine maintenance on
[Polar Star and Polar Sea] has been deferred due to a lack of funds and no major life
extension program has been planned; as a consequence, U.S. [polar] icebreaking
capability is now at risk of being unable to support national interests in the north and
the south.”2
Congress, in the explanatory statement for the FY2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161 of December 26, 2007), expressed
concern about the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its polar operations mission
requirements in light of the condition of the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker fleet, and
directed the Coast Guard to submit a comprehensive report on polar operations.
The issue for Congress that is addressed in this report is whether to approve or
modify the Coast Guard’s plans for modernizing its polar icebreakers. Congressional
decisions on this issue could affect the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its polar
missions, Coast Guard funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial
base.
1 Source for July 1, 2006, date: U.S. Coast Guard email to CRS on February 22, 2008.
2 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of
U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, p. 2.
CRS-2
The issue of polar icebreaker modernization comes at a time of
! increased interest and activities in polar regions, particularly the
Arctic, due to melting of Arctic ice;
! emerging debates over Arctic sovereignty and exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) in the Arctic;
! concerns about the Coast Guard’s ability to perform all of its various
missions within available resources; and
! concerns for the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
Regarding the first two items above, many observers anticipate that the melting
of Arctic ice in coming years will open up potentially important sea transportation
routes through the Arctic and make it possible to explore for oil and gas resources
under the Arctic seabed. Emerging debates over Arctic sovereignty and EEZs in the
Arctic stem to a large degree from these anticipated developments. Russia, Canada,
Denmark, and the United States in the last few years, and particularly since the
summer of 2007, have been taking various actions to either assert their claims
regarding Arctic sovereignty and EEZs, or to gather evidence to support potential
claims.3
The scope of this CRS report is limited to the question of Coast Guard polar
icebreaker modernization. Other CRS reports over other issues relating to the polar
regions.4
3 For additional discussion, see, for example, Caitlin Harrington, “Eyeing Up the New
Arctic,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 16, 2008: 22-27; Richard Burgess, “The New Cold
War?,” Seapower, October 2007: 14-16,18; David Pugiliese, “Wake Up Call?,” Seapower,
October 2007: 19-20, 22; Deborah Zabarenko, “U.S. Resumes Mapping Of Arctic Seabed,”
Washington Times, August 15, 2007; Ian Austen, “Canada Announces Plans For 2 New
Bases In Its Far North,” New York Times, August 11, 2007; “Canada To Strengthen Arctic
Claim,” BBC News, August 10, 2008; C. J. Chivers, “Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic
Seabed,” New York Times, August 3, 2007; and Fred Weir, “As Icecaps Melt, Russia Races
For Arctic’s Resources,” Christian Science Monitor, July 31, 2007.
4 See, for example, CRS Report RL33941, Polar Bears: Proposed Listing Under the
Endangered Species Act, by Eugene H. Buck, CRS Report RL32838, Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Legislative Actions Through the 110th Congress, First Session,
by Anne Gillis, M. Lynne Corn, and Beth A. Roberts, CRS Report RL34266, Climate
Change: Science Update 2007, by Jane A. Leggett, and CRS Report RS21890, The U.N.
Law of the Sea Convention and the United States: Developments Since October 2003, by
Marjorie Ann Browne.
CRS-3
Background
Missions of U.S. Polar Icebreakers
The missions of U.S. polar icebreakers can be summarized as follows:
! conducting and supporting scientific research in both the Arctic and
Antarctic;
! defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by maintaining a presence
in the region;
! defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic
interests relating to the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north
of Alaska;
! monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the
United States; and
! conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and
rescue, law enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in
Arctic waters, including U.S. territorial waters northe of Alaska.
The mission of conducting and supporting scientific research includes, among
other things, an important annual mission to break through the Antarctic ice so as to
resupply McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the
shore of MucMurdo Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf.
Although polar ice is melting due to climate change, observers generally expect
this development will not eliminate mission demands for U.S. polar icebreakers, and
in some respects might increase them. Even with the melting of polar ice, there are
still significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions. Melting of polar ice could lead
in coming years to increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship
operations, as well as increased oil and gas exploration, in and through the polar
regions — activities that could require increased levels of support from polar
icebreakers. Changing ice conditions in Antarctic waters have made the McMurdo
resupply mission more challenging since 2000.5
Current U.S. Polar Icebreakers
The U.S. polar icebreaker fleet currently includes four ships — three Coast
Guard ships and one ship operated by the National Science Foundation. The ships
are described briefly below, and then summarized in Table 1.
5 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of
U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, pp. 6-7, 14, 63.
CRS-4
Three Coast Guard Ships. The Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers are
multimission ships that can break through ice, support scientific research operations,
and perform other missions typically performed by Coast Guard ships.
Polar Star and Polar Sea. Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-
11),6 sister ships built to the same general design, were procured in the early 1970s
as replacements for earlier U.S. icebreakers. They were designed for 30-year service
lives, and were built by Lockheed Shipbuilding of Seattle, WA, a division of
Lockheed that also built ships for the U.S. Navy, but which exited the shipbuilding
business in the late 1980s.
The ships are 399 feet long and displace about 13,300 tons.7 They are the
world’s most powerful non-nuclear-powered icebreakers, with a capability to break
through ice up to 6 feet thick at a speed of 3 knots. In addition to a crew of 134, each
ship can embark a scientific research staff of up to 20 people.
Polar Star. Polar Star was commissioned into service on January 19, 1976, and
consequently is now beyond its intended 30-year service life. The ship currently is
not in operational condition due to worn out electric motors and other problems. The
Coast Guard placed the ship in caretaker status on July 1, 2006. Under caretaker
status, the Coast Guard is retaining the ship as a non-operational asset with a
potential for being reactivated. The ship is assigned a reduced crew of 34, and the
ship’s major mechanical problems are not being repaired.8 As discussed later in this
report, the ship would require millions of dollars of maintenance and repair work to
be returned to service.
Polar Sea. Polar Sea was commissioned into service on February 23, 1978,
and thus recently exceeded its intended 30-year life. The ship is in operational
condition but due to its age requires increasing amounts of maintenance to remain in
operation.
Healy. Healy (WAGB-20) was procured in the early 1990s as a complement
to Polar Star and Polar Sea, and was commissioned into service on August 21, 2000.
The ship was built by Avondale Industries, a shipyard located near New Orleans, LA,
that has built numerous Coast Guard and Navy ships, and which now forms part of
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding.
Healy is a bit larger than Polar Star and Polar Sea — it is 420 feet long and
displaces about 16,200 tons. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less
icebreaking capability, but more capability for supporting scientific research. The
ship can break through ice up to 4½ feet thick at a speed of 3 knots, and embark a
6 The designation WAGB means Coast Guard icebreaker. More specifically, W means
Coast Guard ship, A means auxiliary, G means miscellaneous purpose, and B means
icebreaker.
7 By comparison, the Coast Guard’s new National Security Cutters — its new
high-endurance cutters — are about 418 feel long and displace roughly 4,000 tons.
8 The Coast Guard’s official term for the ship’s current status is “In Commission, Special.”
CRS-5
scientific research staff of up to 50. The ship is used primarily for supporting
scientific research in the Arctic.
One National Science Foundation Ship. The nation’s fourth polar
icebreaker is Nathaniel B. Palmer, which was built for the National Science
Foundation (NSF) in 1992 by North American Shipbuilding, of Larose, LA. The
ship, called Palmer for short, is owned by Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) of
Galliano, LA, a firm that owns and operates research ships and offshore deepwater
service ships.9 NSF uses a contractor, Raytheon Polar Services Company (RPSC),
to lease the ship from ECO.10 Palmer is considerably smaller than the Coast Guard’s
three polar icebreakers — it is 308 feet long and has a displacement of about 6,500
tons. It is operated by a crew of about 22, and can embark a scientific staff of 27 to
37.11
Table 1. U.S. Polar Icebreakers
Polar Star
Polar Sea
Healy
Palmer
Operator
USCG
USCG
USCG
NSF
U.S.-Government owned?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Noa
Currently in operational
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
condition?
(caretaker
status)
Entered service
1976
1978
2000
1992
Length (feet)
399
399
420
308
Displacement (tons)
13,300
13,300
16,200
6,500
Icebreaking capability (ice
6 feet
6 feet
4.5 feet
3 feet
thickness in feet) at 3 knots
Crew (when operational)
134b
134
67
22
Additional scientific staff
20
20
50
27-37
Sources: Prepared by CRS using data from U.S. Coast Guard, National Research Council, National
Science Foundation and (for Palmer) additional online reference sources.
a. Owned by Raytheon Polar Services Company (RPSC) Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) of Galliano,
LA, and leased to NSF through Raytheon Polar Services Company (RPSC).
b. Currently assigned a caretaker crew of 34.
9 For more on ECO, see the firm’s website at [http://www.chouest.com/].
10 For more on RPSC, see the division’s website at [http://rpsc.raytheon.com/]
11 Sources vary on the exact number of scientific staff that can be embarked on Palmer. For
some basic information on the ship, see:
[http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/support/nathpalm.jsp],
[http://www.usap.gov/vesselScienceAndOperations/contentHandler.cfm?id=22],
[http://www.usap.gov/vesselScienceAndOperations/documents/prvnews_june03.pdf],
[http://nsf.gov/od/opp/antarct/treaty/pdf/plans0607/15plan07.pdf],
[http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1996/nsf9693/fls.htm], and
[http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/usa/nsf.htm].
CRS-6
Unlike the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers, which are multimission ships,
Palmer was purpose-built as a single-mission ship for conducting and supporting
scientific research in the Antarctic. It has less icebreaking capability than the Coast
Guard’s polar icebreakers, being capable of breaking ice up to 3 feet thick at speeds
of 3 knots. This capability is sufficient for breaking through the more benign ice
conditions found in the vicinity of the Antarctic Peninsula, to resupply Palmer
Station, a U.S. research station on the peninsula. Some observers might view Palmer
not so much as an icebreaker as an oceanographic research ship with enough
icebreaking capability for the Antarctic Peninsula. Palmer’s icebreaking capability
is not considered sufficient to perform the MucMurdo resupply mission.
Summary. In summary, the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently includes one
ship that that is used primarily for scientific research in the Arctic (Healy), one ship
that is used for scientific research in the Antarctic (Palmer), one ship that can operate
in either polar area and is capable of performing the challenging McMurdo resupply
mission (Polar Sea), and a fourth ship with similar capabilities that is not in
operational condition and is in caretaker status (Polar Star). Table 1 summarizes
some key features of the four ships.
2007 National Research Council Report
The most recent major study relating to Coast Guard polar icebreakers is the
2007 National Research Council (NRC) report, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing
World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs, which assessed roles and future needs for Coast
Guard polar icebreakers.12 The NRC is a part of the National Academies. The study
was completed in 2006 and published in 2007. Some sources refer to the study as the
2006 NRC report.
Origin of Study. The study was required by report language accompanying
the FY2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations act (H.R.
4567/P.L. 108-334).13 A hearing on the report was held by the Coast Guard and
12 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of
U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, 122 pp.
13 H.R. 4567/P.L. 108-334 of October 18, 2004. The related Senate bill was S. 2537. The
Senate report on S. 2537 (S.Rept. 108-280 of June 17, 2004) stated:
The Committee expects the Commandant to enter into an arrangement with
the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive study of the role
of Coast Guard icebreakers in supporting United States operations in the
Antarctic and the Arctic. The study should include different scenarios for
continuing those operations including service life extension or replacement of
existing Coast Guard icebreakers and alternative methods that do not use Coast
Guard icebreakers. The study should also address changes in the roles and
missions of Coast Guard icebreakers in support of future marine operations in the
Arctic that may develop due to environmental change, including the amount and
kind of icebreaking support that may be required in the future to support marine
operations in the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage; the suitability
of the Polar Class icebreakers for these new roles; and appropriate changes in
(continued...)
CRS-7
Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee on September 26, 2006.
Conclusions and Recommendations. The NRC report makes the
following conclusions and recommendations:
The [study] committee finds that both operations and maintenance of the
polar icebreaker fleet have been underfunded for many years, and the capabilities
of the nation’s icebreaking fleet have diminished substantially. Deferred
long-term maintenance and failure to execute a plan for replacement or
refurbishment of the nation’s icebreaking ships have placed national interests in
the polar regions at risk. The nation needs the capability to operate in both polar
regions reliably and at will. Specifically, the committee recommends the
following:
•
The United States should continue to project an active and influential
presence in the Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government
polar icebreaking capability to ensure year-round access throughout the region.
•
The United States should continue to project an active and influential
presence in the Antarctic to support its interests. The nation should reliably
control sufficient icebreaking capability to break a channel into and ensure the
maritime resupply of McMurdo Station.
•
The United States should maintain leadership in polar research. This
requires icebreaking capability to provide access to the deep Arctic and the
ice-covered waters of the Antarctic.
•
National interests in the polar regions require that the United States
immediately program, budget, design, and construct two new polar icebreakers
to be operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.
•
To provide continuity of U.S. icebreaking capabilities, the POLAR SEA
should remain mission capable and the POLAR STAR should remain available
for reactivation until the new polar icebreakers enter service.
13 (...continued)
existing laws governing Coast Guard icebreaking operations and the potential for
new operating regimes. The study should be submitted to the Committee no later
than September 30, 2005.
The conference report on H.R. 4567 (H.Rept. 108-774 of October 9, 2004) stated:
As discussed in the Senate report and the Coast Guard authorization bill for
fiscal year 2005, the conferees require the National Academy of Sciences to
study the role of Coast Guard icebreakers.
The earlier House report on H.R. 4567 (H.Rept. 108-541 of June 15, 2004) contained
language directing a similar report from the Coast Guard rather than the National
Academies. (See the passage in the House report under the header “Icebreaking.”)
CRS-8
•
The U.S. Coast Guard should be provided sufficient operations and
maintenance budget to support an increased, regular, and influential presence in
the Arctic. Other agencies should reimburse incremental costs associated with
directed mission tasking.
•
Polar icebreakers are essential instruments of U.S. national policy in the
changing polar regions. To ensure adequate national icebreaking capability into
the future, a Presidential Decision Directive should be issued to clearly align
agency responsibilities and budgetary authorities.14
Coast Guard Perspective. The Coast Guard states it “generally supports”
the NRC report, and that the Coast Guard “is working closely with interagency
partners to determine a way forward with national polar policy that identifies broad
U.S. interests and priorities in the Arctic and Antarctic that will ensure adequate
maritime presence to further these interests. Identification and prioritization of U.S.
national interests in these regions should drive development of associated USCG
[U.S. Coast Guard] capability and resource requirements.” The Coast Guard also
states: “Until those broad U.S. interests and priorities are identified, the current USG
[U.S. Government] polar icebreaking fleet should be maintained in an operational
status.”15
Current Coast Guard Plan
As mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard has begun initial studies on replacements
for Polar Star and Polar Sea. Under the Coast Guard’s current schedule, the first
replacement ship might enter service in 8 to 10 years. Until then, the Coast Guard
plans to continue operating Polar Sea and Healy while keeping Polar Star, for the
time being at least, in caretaker status as a reserve asset. Regarding its current plan
for modernizing its polar icebreaker fleet, the Coast Guard states that it:
is awaiting the identification and prioritization of U.S. national policy in the
Polar Regions in order to identify and develop the appropriate capability. In the
meantime, the CG is proceeding with pre-acquisition activities, starting with
project identification, to assess current capability gaps in Coast Guard mission
performance in the high latitudes regions.16
Cost Estimates for Certain Modernization Options
The Coast Guard has provided CRS with cost estimates for four potential
options for modernizing the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker fleet:17
14 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of
U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, pp. 2-3.
15 Source: Coast Guard point paper provided to CRS on February 12, 2008, and dated with
the same date, providing answers to questions from CRS concerning polar icebreaker
modernization.
16 Source: Coast Guard point paper provided to CRS on February 12, 2008, op cit.
17 Source for information and quotations in this section: Coast Guard point paper provided
(continued...)
CRS-9
New Replacement Ships. The Coast Guard estimates that new replacement
ships for the Polar Star and Polar Sea might cost between $800 million and $925
million per ship in 2008 dollars to procure. The Coast Guard says that this estimate:
is based on a ship with integrated electric drive, three propellers, and a combined
diesel and gas (electric) propulsion plant. The icebreaking capability would be
equivalent to the POLAR Class Icebreakers [i.e., Polar Star and Polar Sea] and
research facilities and accommodations equivalent to HEALY. This cost
includes all shipyard and government project costs. Total time to procure a new
icebreaker [including mission analysis, studies, design, contract award, and
construction] is eight to ten years.18
The Coast Guard further states that this notional new ship would be designed
for a 30-year service life.
25-Year Service Life Extensions. One alternative to procuring new
replacement ships would be to extend the service lives of Polar Star and Polar Sea.
The Coast Guard states that performing the extensive maintenance, repair, and
modernization work needed to extend the service lives of the two ships by 25 years
might cost roughly $400 million per ship. This figure, the Coast Guard says, is based
on assessments made by independent contractors for the Coast Guard in 2004. The
service life extension work, the Coast Guard says, would improve the two
icebreakers’ installed systems in certain areas. Although the work would be intended
to permit the ships to operate for another 25 years, it would not return the cutters to
new condition.
Reactivate Polar Star for 7 to 10 Years. The Coast Guard estimates that
it would cost $56.6 million to perform the maintenance and repair work needed to
reactivate Polar Star and extend its service life by 7 to 10 years, which is the
approximate amount of time that would transpire under the Coast Guard’s plan
before a new replacement ship enters service. The work would include system
upgrades that have been installed in recent years on the Polar Sea but not the Polar
Star. An additional cost would be incurred to create and train a full 134-person crew
for the ship.
Reactivate Polar Star for a Single Deployment. The Coast Guard
estimates that it would cost $8.2 million to perform the maintenance and repair work
needed to reactivate the Polar Star and make it ready for a single Deep Freeze
17 (...continued)
to CRS on February 12, 2008, op cit.
18 The Coast Guard states further that the estimate is based on the procurement cost of the
Mackinaw (WAGB-30), a Great Lakes icebreaker that was procured a few years ago and
commissioned into service with the Coast Guard in June 2006. The Mackinaw is 240 feet
long, displaces 3,500 tons, and can break ice up to 2 feet, 8 inches thick at speeds of 3 knots,
which is suitable for Great Lakes icebreaking. The Coast Guard says it scaled up the
procurement cost for the Mackinaw in proportion to its size compared to that of a polar
icebreaker, and then adjusted the resulting figure to account for the above-described
capabilities of the notional replacement ship and recent construction costs at U.S. Gulf Coast
shipyards.
CRS-10
deployment, meaning a deployment to Antarctica, such as the McMurdo resupply
mission. The $8.2 million in work, the Coast Guard says, would require between 12
months and 18 months to perform. Roughly half of the cost, the Coast Guard says,
would be to rebuild the ship’s worn out electric motors. As with the previous option,
an additional cost would be incurred to create and train a full 134-person crew for the
ship.
U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial Base
The status of the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base, particularly the part that
builds military ships for the U.S. government, has been a concern in Congress and
elsewhere since the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, when the rate of
Navy shipbuilding declined substantially. Concern has focused on, among other
things, whether the total amount of work being received by shipyards is sufficient to
maintain their financial health and to preserve key design and construction skills. 19
Other things held equal, construction of one or more new polar icebreakers for the
Coast Guard could increase workloads at the yard or yards involved in their
construction for a period of a few or several years.
Issues for Congress
The issue of Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization presents several
potential policy issues for Congress, including but not necessarily limited to those
discussed below.
Number and Capabilities of Future Polar Icebreakers
One potential policy issue for Congress concerns how many polar icebreakers,
with what capabilities, the Coast Guard will need in the future. Specific questions
within this issue include the following:
! Will the Coast Guard need two polar icebreakers (the number it
currently has in operational condition), three polar icebreakers (the
number it currently has in inventory), or some higher number?
! Should new icebreakers be designed to cut through ice up to six feet
thick, like Polar Star and Polar Sea, or less than six feet thick (like
Healy and many foreign icebreakers), or more than six feet thick
(like certain Russian icebreakers)?20
19 In addition, certain shipyards on the U.S. Gulf Coast, including shipyards that build or
have built ships for the Navy and the Coast Guard, sustained damage to their production
facilities and workforces as a result of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. The affected
yards have since recovered or are now completing their recovery from this damage.
20 A recently completed Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker called 50 Let Pobedy that is
524 feet long and displaces about 25,000 tons is reportedly capable of breaking through ice
(continued...)
CRS-11
! Should new icebreakers be designed with the scientific research
capabilities less than, greater than, or about equal to those of Healy?
In assessing this issue, factors that Congress may consider include, but are not
limited to, the following:
! current and projected mission demands for polar icebreakers,
including an assessment of how those demands might be affected in
coming years by changing ice conditions;
! the potential for these mission demands to be met by non-Coast
Guard icebreakers, including leases or charters of icebreakers owned
by foreign governments or private firms; and
! the Coast Guard’s overall missions-vs.-resources situation, which
includes the Coast Guard’s requirements to perform many non-polar
missions and the Coast Guard’s desire to fund programs, such as the
Deepwater acquisition program, for performing these non-polar
missions.21
Advocates of a Coast Guard polar icebreaker fleet that included two ships —
that is, Healy and one other ship — might argue that the Coast Guard has been able
to operate with such a force since the Polar Star went into caretaker status on July 1,
2006, and that a force with Healy and one other ship would cost less than a larger
icebreaker fleet and thereby permit the Coast Guard to better fund programs for
performing its various non-polar missions.
Advocates of a Coast Guard fleet that included three ships — Healy and two
other icebreakers — might argue that the current force of Healy and one other
operational ship has made it more difficult for the Coast Guard to perform the
McMurdo resupply mission using its own assets, that a force that included Healy and
two other ships would provide the Coast Guard with more flexibility for responding
to contingencies or dealing with mechanical problems on one of the icebreakers, and
that it would still be sufficiently affordable to permit the Coast Guard to adequately
fund programs for performing non-polar missions.
Advocates of a Coast Guard fleet that included Healy and three or more other
icebreakers might argue that such a fleet would provide additional capability for
20 (...continued)
up to 2.8 meters (about 9.2 feet) thick, though not necessarily at a speed of 3 knots.
Somewhat smaller nuclear-powered Russian icebreakers of the Arktika class, such as Yamal,
reportedly can break through ice up to 2.3 meters (about 7.5 feet) thick at a speed of 3 knots.
Yamal displaces about 23,500 tons. (Sources: [http://sr.se/cgi-bin/euroarctic/amnessida.asp?
programID=2460&Nyheter= 0&grupp=2604&artikel=1219680], [http://en.rian.ru/russia/
20070131/59989100.html], and [http://www.coolantarctica.com/Antarctica%20fact%20file/
ships/Yamal_ice_breaker.htm].)
21 For more on the Deepwater program, see CRS Report RL33753, Coast Guard Deepwater
Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-12
responding to potentially increased commercial and military activities in the Arctic,
and more strongly signal U.S. commitment to defending its sovereignty and other
interests in the region. They might argue that although this option would be more
expensive than a smaller fleet, the added investment would be justified in light of the
growing focus on U.S. polar interests.
Regarding the potential for leasing icebreakers owned by foreign governments
or private firms, issues to consider would include, among other things, the potential
availability of ships for lease, leasing costs, regulatory issues relating to long-term
leases of capital assets for the U.S. government, and the ability of leased ships to
perform the missions in question, including the mission of defending U.S.
sovereignty in Arctic waters north of Alaska, the challenging McMurdo resupply
mission, or missions that emerge suddenly in response to unexpected events.22
The 2007 NRC report provided one perspective on the issue of required
numbers and capabilities for U.S. polar icebreakers, stating:
Based on the current and future needs for icebreaking capabilities, the
[study] committee concludes that the nation continues to require a polar
icebreaking fleet that includes a minimum of three multimission ships [like the
Coast Guard’s three current polar icebreakers] and one single-mission [research]
ship [like Palmer]. The committee finds that although the demand for
icebreaking capability is predicted to increase, a fleet of three multimission and
one single-mission icebreakers can meet the nation’s future polar icebreaking
needs through the application of the latest technology, creative crewing models,
wise management of ice conditions, and more efficient use of the icebreaker fleet
and other assets. The nation should immediately begin to program, design, and
construct two new polar icebreakers to replace the POLAR STAR and POLAR
SEA.
Building only one new polar icebreaker is insufficient for several reasons.
First, a single ship cannot be in more than one location at a time. No matter how
technologically advanced or efficiently operated, a single polar icebreaker can
operate in the polar regions for only a portion of any year. An icebreaker requires
regular maintenance and technical support from shipyards and industrial
facilities, must reprovision regularly, and has to effect periodic crew changeouts.
A single icebreaker, therefore, could not meet any reasonable standard of active
and influential presence and reliable, at-will access throughout the polar regions.
A second consideration is the potential risk of failure in the harsh
conditions of polar operations. Despite their intrinsic robustness, damage and
system failure are always a risk and the U.S. fleet must have enough depth to
provide backup assistance. Having only a single icebreaker would necessarily
require the ship to accept a more conservative operating profile, avoiding more
challenging ice conditions because reliable assistance would not be available. A
22 The potential for using leased ships, and the possible limitations of this option, are
discussed at several points in the 2007 NRC report. The report argues, among other things,
that the availability of icebreakers for lease in coming years is open to question, that leased
ships are not optimal for performing sovereignty-related operations, and that some foreign
icebreakers might be capable of performing the McMurdo resupply mission. See, for
example, pages 80-81 of the NRC report.
CRS-13
second capable icebreaker, either operating elsewhere or in homeport, would
provide ensured backup assistance and allow for more robust operations by the
other ship.
From a strategic, longer-term perspective, two new Polar class icebreakers
will far better position the nation for the increasing challenges emerging in both
polar regions. A second new ship would allow the U.S. Coast Guard to
reestablish an active patrol presence in U.S. waters north of Alaska to meet
statutory responsibilities that will inevitably derive from increased human
activity, economic development, and environmental change. It would allow
response to emergencies such as search-and-rescue cases, pollution incidents, and
assistance to ships threatened with grounding or damage by ice. Moreover, a
second new ship will leverage the possibilities for simultaneous operations in
widely disparate geographic areas (e.g., concurrent operations in the Arctic and
Antarctic), provide more flexibility for conducting Antarctic logistics (as either
the primary or the secondary ship for the McMurdo break-in), allow safer
multiple-ship operations in the most demanding ice conditions, and increase
opportunities for international expeditions. Finally, an up-front decision to build
two new polar icebreakers will allow economies in the design and construction
process and provide a predictable cost reduction for the second ship.23
The position expressed in the NRC report, which is consistent with the report’s
recommendations, is one perspective on this issue; other perspectives are possible.
As mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard, while generally agreeing with the NRC
report, is currently studying requirements for future polar icebreakers. It is possible
that the Coast Guard’s eventual position on required numbers and capabilities of
Coast Guard polar icebreakers will differ in some respects from those of the NRC
report. It is also possible that third parties might come to positions that differ from
those of both the NRC report and the Coast Guard.
New Construction vs. Modernization
A second potential policy issue for Congress is whether requirements for polar
icebreakers over the next 25 to 30 years should be met by building new ships, by
extending the service lives of the Polar Star and Polar Sea, or by pursuing some
combination of these options. In assessing this question, factors to consider include
the relative costs of these options, the capabilities that each option would provide, the
long-term supportability of older ships whose service lives have been extended, and
industrial-base impacts.
Regarding relative costs, as discussed in the Background section, the Coast
Guard estimates that new icebreakers with a 30-year design life might cost $800
million to $925 million per ship, while a 25-year service life extension of Polar Star
and Polar Sea might cost about $400 million per ship. These estimates, however,
should be compared with caution. As discussed earlier, the estimate for building new
ships depends in part on the capabilities that were assumed for those ships, while the
23 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of
U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, p. 2.
CRS-14
estimate for the service-life-extension option dates to 2004 and might consequently
need to be reassessed. Estimates for service-life extension work, moreover, can be
very uncertain due to the potential for discovering new things about a ship’s
condition once the ship is opened up for repair work.
Regarding capabilities provided by each option, the new-construction option
would provide entirely new ships with extensive use of new technology, while the
service-life-extension option would provide ships that, although modernized and
reconditioned, would not be entirely new and would likely make less extensive use
of new technologies. Among other things, new-construction ships might be able to
make more extensive use of new technologies for reducing crew size, which is a
significant factor in a ship’s life cycle operating and support costs.
Regarding long-term supportability of older ships, the Coast Guard has
expressed concern about the ability to support ships whose service lives have been
extended after FY2014, because some contracts that currently provide that support
are scheduled to end that year.24
Regarding potential impact on the industrial base, 25-year service life extensions
would likely provide shipyards and supplier firms with less work, and also exercise
a smaller set of shipyard construction skills, than would building new ships.
Acceleration of Current Schedule
A third potential policy option for Congress, if it is determined that one or more
new ships should be built, is whether to accelerate the Coast Guard’s current
schedule for building those ships. One option for accelerating the schedule would
be to shorten the current phase for studying the requirements for the new ships and
move directly to procurement of the first new ship. Another acceleration option, if
the Coast Guard contemplates procuring two or more replacement ships, would be
to fund a second (and any subsequent) ships sooner than the Coast Guard might
propose. Both of these options could be combined. In the case of a two-ship
procurement, for example, one highly accelerated profile would be to procure both
ships as part of the FY2009 budget, rather than the first ship in a year after FY2009,
and the second ship one or more years after that.
Advocates of accelerated procurement might argue the following:
! It could reduce the total cost over the next several years of operating
the Polar Sea and maintaining the Polar Star in caretaker status by
reducing the number of years that those costs would be incurred
before the replacement ships enter service.
! Accelerating procurement of at least the first replacement ship to
FY2009 would ensure that at least one replacement ship would be
funded prior to the approaching change in Administration — an
event, advocates might argue, that could lead to delays in acquisition
24 Source: CRS discussion with Coast Guard officials, January 30, 2008.
CRS-15
programs for which major procurement funding has not yet been
provided.
! Shortening the period for studying requirements for new icebreakers
would be acceptable because these requirements are already well
understood due to extensive past operational experience, an
understanding of current mission demands, and studies on current
and potential future demands such as the 2007 NRC report.
! Any remaining uncertainties about required capabilities, such as,
perhaps, the extent of the new ships’ scientific research facilities,
could be addressed in an accelerated program by reserving space and
weight in the design for accommodating such facilities.
! Accelerating the procurement of the second and subsequent ship
could reduce the total procurement cost of the ships by allowing
contractors to achieve better economies of scale in terms of things
like ordering materials, manufacturing components, and achieving
optimal learning-curve benefits in moving from one ship to the next.
Opponents of this option might argue the following:
! The cost over the next several years for operating the Polar Sea and
maintaining the Polar Star in caretaker status is relatively modest, so
shortening the period during which these costs are incurred by a year
or two will consequently produce only modest savings. These
modest savings are not worth the risk that a shortened period for
studying new requirements might overlook important issues or
considerations that, if left unaddressed, could lead to the
construction of new icebreakers that are less operationally effective
or cost-effective than they could be.
! The best way to ensure that the icebreaker modernization program
is not delayed by the approaching change in Administration is to
show that the issue has been thoroughly studied and that the
recommended course of action is thus well-founded.
! Although past operational experience, an understanding of current
mission demands, and previous studies can inform an understanding
of future mission requirements, that understanding might not be
complete, particularly given changing conditions in the polar regions
and the need to take the views of U.S. government agencies other
than the Coast Guard into account.
! Uncertainties about the ships’ required capabilities cannot be
completely mitigated by reserving space and weight for certain
features, and reserving such space and weight might result in a
design that is larger and more expensive than needed.
CRS-16
! Accelerating the program is not necessary to achieve a procurement
profile that permits the ships to be constructed in an efficient and
manner.
Nuclear Power
A fourth potential policy option for Congress, if it is determined that one or
more new ships should be built, is whether those ships should be nuclear-powered,
as are 7 of Russia’s 20 polar or Baltic icebreakers.25 Some interest has been
expressed in Congress in using nuclear power on a wider array of U.S. Navy surface
ships in the future, and Section 1012 of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R.
4986/P.L. 110-181) makes it U.S. policy to build certain future classes of U.S. Navy
surface combatants with nuclear power unless the Secretary of Defense submits a
notification to Congress that using nuclear power for a given new ship class is not in
the national interest. The issue of nuclear power for U.S. Navy surface ships is
discussed in detail in another CRS report.26
Advocates of building new Coast Guard polar icebreakers with nuclear power
might argue the following:
! Nuclear power would provide the icebreakers with operational
advantages in terms of virtually unlimited cruising endurance at any
speed. Such endurance could permit the ships, for example, to make
high-speed sprints from one polar region to the other, so as to
respond to sudden contingencies, without needing to stop or slow
down along the way to be refueled. These operational advantages
are one reason why Russia has built some of its polar icebreakers
with nuclear power.
! If oil costs in the future remain relatively high, and if the icebreakers
consume significant total amounts of energy over their 30-year lives
to perform their missions, then much or perhaps even all of the
additional procurement cost of nuclear power could be offset over
the ships lives by avoided fossil-fuel costs.
! Building icebreakers with nuclear power could improve economies
of scale in the production of nuclear propulsion components for U.S.
Navy nuclear-powered ships, reducing the costs of those Navy ships,
further offsetting, from a national standpoint, the additional
procurement cost of nuclear power for the icebreakers.
25 Source: National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An
Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington, 2007, p. 59 (Table 6.4). These figures include a
nuclear-powered icebreaker named 50 Let Pobedy that reportedly entered service in early
2007, and two conventionally powered Russian icebreakers that, at the time of the 2007
NRC study, were leased to the Netherlands.
26 CRS Report RL33946, Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and
Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-17
! Due to the additional up-front costs and increased operational
capabilities of building a ship with nuclear power, building U.S.
nuclear-powered icebreakers could send a strong signal to Russia or
other countries of U.S. commitment to defending its polar interests,
particularly in the Arctic.
Opponents of building new Coast Guard polar icebreakers with nuclear power
might argue the following:
! Although nuclear power provides operational advantages in terms of
unrefueled cruising endurance, conventional power has proven
sufficient for performing U.S. polar icebreaker missions. Russia’s
requirements for its icebreakers differ from U.S. requirements for its
icebreakers, so Russia’s decision to build some of its icebreakers
with nuclear power does not necessarily imply that the United States
should do the same.
! Based on data in a 2006 Navy report to Congress on nuclear power
for Navy surface ships, building a U.S. icebreaker with nuclear
power rather than conventional power might increase its
procurement cost by several hundred million dollars.27 That
additional cost might not loom very large for a Navy surface
combatant that might cost $2 billion to $3 billion even when
conventionally powered, but it might increase by as much as two-
thirds the procurement cost of an icebreaker that might otherwise
cost $800 million to $925 million to procure. In a situation of
constrained budget resources, such an increase in procurement cost
could easily result in the procurement of one replacement icebreaker
rather than two. A single icebreaker, even one with nuclear power,
might not be enough to meet future U.S. needs.
! The Coast Guard has not operated nuclear-powered ships and
consequently does not have a maintenance or training infrastructure
in place to support the operation of such ships. The Coast Guard
would need to either create this infrastructure (which would require
time and money) or pay the Navy to use its infrastructure.
! The U.S. can send a sufficiently strong signal of its commitment to
defending its polar interests by building new, highly capable,
conventionally powered polar icebreakers.
27 As discussed in CRS Report RL33946, the 2006 Navy report concluded, among other
things, that in constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious
ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to
$800 million to its procurement cost. A nuclear power plant for a polar icebreaker might
be smaller and consequently cost somewhat less than the nuclear power plant in the Navy
surface combatant.
CRS-18
Funding Ships in Coast Guard or Defense Budget
A fifth potential policy option for Congress, if it is determined that one or more
new icebreakers should be built, is whether those ships should be funded through the
Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account, or the
Navy’s shipbuilding account, called the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)
account, or the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), which is a Department of
Defense (DOD) budget account where DOD sealift ships and Navy auxiliary ships
are funded. There is precedent for funding Coast Guard icebreakers in the DOD
budget: The procurement of Healy was funded in the FY1990 in the DOD budget —
specifically, the SCN account.28
Advocates of funding new icebreakers in the SCN account or the NDSF might
argue that this could permit the funding of new icebreakers while putting less
pressure on other parts of the Coast Guard’s budget. They might also argue that it
would permit the new icebreaker program to benefit from the Navy’s experience in
managing shipbuilding programs. Opponents might argue that funding new
icebreakers in the SCN account or the NDSF might put pressure on these other two
accounts at a time when the Navy and DOD are facing challenges funding their own
shipbuilding and other priorities. They might also argue that having the Navy
manage the Coast Guard’s icebreaker program would add complexity to the
acquisition effort, and that it is unclear whether the Navy’s recent performance in
managing shipbuilding programs is better than the Coast Guard’s, since both services
have recently experienced problems in managing shipbuilding programs — the Coast
Guard with the procurement of new cutters under the Deepwater program, and the
Navy in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and the LPD-17 class amphibious
ship program.29
Reactivating Polar Star as Interim Measure
A sixth potential policy option for Congress, if it is determined that one or more
new icebreakers should be built, is whether, as an additional interim measure, Polar
Star should be reactivated for either one additional deployment or for multiple
deployments over the next 7 to 10 years. In assessing this issue, factors to consider
would include the following, among others:
28 The FY1990 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 3072/P.L. 101-165 of November 21, 1989)
provided $329 million for the procurement of Healy in the SCN account. (See pages 77 and
78 of H.Rept. 101-345 of November 13, 1989). The NDSF was created three years later, in
FY1993, as a fund for procuring DOD sealift ships, among other purposes, and since
FY2001 has been used to fund Navy auxiliary ships as well.
29 For more on the Deepwater, LCS, and LPD-17 programs, see CRS Report RL33753,
Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke,
and CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning
Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS-19
! the cost to reactivate Polar Star for either a single additional
deployment or for an additional 7 to 10 years of operations;
! the additional time and cost needed to create and train a full 134-
person crew for Polar Star;
! the ability of the Coast Guard to perform its polar missions in
coming years with Polar Sea and Healy; and
! the likelihood that a major mechanical breakdown or some other
event could put Polar Star or Healy temporarily out of operation.
With regard to the first item above, as discussed in the Background section, the
Coast Guard estimates that it would cost $8.2 million to reactivate Polar Star and
make it ready for a single additional deployment, or $56.6 million to reactivate Polar
Star and make it ready for 7 to 10 additional years of operation. There would be an
additional cost to create and train a full 134-member crew for Polar Star, and
additional operational costs to undertake deployments, such as costs for fuel.
Options for Congress
Potential options for Congress, several of which arise out of the policy issues
discussed in the previous section, include but are not limited to those listed below.
Some of the options could be combined. The options are as follows:
! approve the Coast Guard’s current plan to study requirements for
future icebreakers and then derive an acquisition strategy based on
the results of these studies — a plan that might result in an initial
replacement icebreaker entering service 8 to 10 years from now;
! hold hearings to solicit additional information on the issue of polar
icebreaker modernization;
! direct the Coast Guard to include the option of nuclear power in its
studies of requirements and design options for future icebreakers;
! direct the Coast Guard to pursue a particular acquisition strategy for
icebreaker modernization, such as new construction, 25-year service
life extension, or some combination of these two approaches;
! accelerate the procurement of new icebreakers relative to the Coast
Guard’s current plan by shortening the study period, procuring
multiple ships in a single fiscal year, or both;
! fund the procurement of new icebreakers in the SCN account or the
NDSF rather than in the Coast Guard’s budget; and
CRS-20
! as a risk-mitigation measure, direct the Coast Guard to reactivate
Polar Star and make it ready for either a single additional
deployment or for another 7 to 10 years of operations.
Recent Legislative Activity
FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161)
FY2008 funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which
includes the Coast Guard, was provided in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161 of December 26, 2007). The explanatory statement for
H.R. 2764/P.L. 100, which is intended to be the equivalent of a conference report for
the bill, states the following in its discussion of Division E (the FY2008 DHS
appropriations act):
National Interests in the Polar Regions
The Committees on Appropriations are concerned about Coast Guard’s
ability to meet its polar operations mission requirements and provide the United
States with the capability to support national interests in the polar regions. These
mission requirements include, but are not limited to: global reach to the North
and South poles; monitoring of U.S.-bound vessel traffic transiting international
waterways in the far north; support of the International Ice Patrol; and support
of other governmental and scientific organizations in pursuit of marine and
atmospheric science activities in the polar regions. The Committees on
Appropriations are specifically concerned whether Coast Guard’s aging polar
icebreaking fleet can meet current mission performance goals and whether this
fleet and the service’s small cadre of specialized polar operations personnel are
capable of meeting projected mission performance goals in light of changing
environmental conditions and increased activity in the polar regions. The
National Academy of Sciences made several recommendations in this regard in
September 2006, but the Administration has taken no action to implement those
recommendations.
Therefore, the Commandant is directed to submit a comprehensive polar
operations report that fully assesses the Coast Guard’s ability to meet current and
projected polar mission requirements and includes an evaluation of how Coast
Guard’s current capabilities and resources must be adapted or enhanced to
account for changing environmental conditions and increased activity in the polar
regions. This report is to include an analysis of the need for any permanent,
forward operating presence in the polar regions in order to meet mission
requirements and an assessment of the Coast Guard’s ability to meet the
requirements of partner agencies operating in the polar regions, such as the
National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Departments of Commerce and
Defense, under current and projected environmental conditions. Finally, this
report should include an appraisal of the sustainability of the current operations
and maintenance cost sharing arrangement between the Coast Guard and NSF to
support both current and projected polar icebreaker operations.