Order Code RL34362
Congressional Oversight and Related Issues
Concerning the Prospective Security Agreement
Between the United States and Iraq
Updated February 26, 2008
Michael John Garcia, R. Chuck Mason, and Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorneys
American Law Division

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Congressional Oversight and Related Issues
Concerning the Prospective Security Agreement
Between the United States and Iraq
Summary
On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term
Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the
United States of America. Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to “begin
as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements
between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and
security spheres.” Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties’
intention to enter an agreement that would commit the United States to provide
security assurances to Iraq, arm and train Iraqi security forces, and confront Al Qaeda
and other terrorist entities within Iraqi territory. Officials in the Bush Administration
have subsequently stated that the agreement will not commit the United States to
militarily defend Iraq. The nature and form of such a U.S.-Iraq security agreement
has been a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by General
Douglas Lute, Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, who suggested that
any such agreement was unlikely to take the form of a treaty, subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate, or otherwise require congressional approval.
It is not clear whether the security agreement(s) discussed in the Declaration will
take the form of a treaty or some other type of international compact. Regardless of
the form the agreement may take, Congress has several tools by which to exercise
oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the
arrangement by the United States. This report begins by discussing the current legal
framework governing U.S. military operations in Iraq. The report then provides a
general background as to the types of international agreements that are binding upon
the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of
a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents
as to the role that security agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past
agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines. The report then discusses the oversight role that Congress plays with
respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United
States. Finally, the report describes legislation proposed in the 110th Congress to
ensure congressional participation in the conclusion of a security agreement between
the United States and Iraq, including S. 2426, the Congressional Oversight of Iraq
Agreements Act of 2007, introduced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on behalf
of Senator Hillary Clinton on December 6, 2007; H.R. 4959, Iraq Strategic
Agreement Review Act of 2008, introduced by Representative Rosa DeLauro on
January 15, 2008; and H.R. 5128, introduced by Representative Barbara Lee on
January 23, 2007.

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Contents
I. Current Legal Framework Governing U.S. Military Operations In Iraq . . . . . . . 3
II. International Agreements Under U.S. Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Executive Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Congressional-Executive Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Executive Agreements Made Pursuant to Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Sole Executive Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Choosing Between a Treaty and Executive Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
II. Historical Practice Regarding Security Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Categories of Legally Binding Security Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Collective Defense Agreements/”Security Commitments” . . . . . . . . . 17
Consultation Requirements/”Security Arrangements” . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Other Types of Military Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Agreements Granting the Right to Military Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Examples of Bilateral Security Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
III. Congressional Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Notification Pursuant to the Case-Zablocki Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Notification Pursuant to Circular 175 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Annual Reporting of Security Arrangements Required by
the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Approval, Rejection, or Conditional Approval of
International Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Implementation of an Agreement That Is Not Self-Executing . . . . . . . . . . 36
Continuing Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
IV. Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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Congressional Oversight
and Related Issues Concerning
the Prospective Security Agreement
Between the United States and Iraq
On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term
Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the
United States of America.1 Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to “begin
as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements
between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and
security spheres.”2 Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties’
intention to negotiate a security agreement
To support the Iraqi government in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi
Security Forces so they can provide security and stability to all Iraqis; support
the Iraqi government in contributing to the international fight against terrorism
by confronting terrorists such as Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, other terrorist groups,
as well as all other outlaw groups, such as criminal remnants of the former
regime; and to provide security assurances to the Iraqi Government to deter any
external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq’s territory.3
1 The text of this agreement is available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
/2007/11/20071126-11.html] [hereinafter “Declaration of Principles”]. The Declaration is
rooted in an August 26, 2007 communique, signed by five top political leaders in Iraq,
which called for a long-term relationship with the United States. The strategic arrangement
contemplated in the Declaration is intended to ultimately replace the United Nations
mandate under which the United States and allied forces are responsible for contributing to
the security of Iraq. For further background on the implications of the prospective U.S.-Iraq
agreement, see The Proposed U.S. Security Commitment to Iraq: What Will Be In It and
Should It Be a Treaty?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations,
Human Rights, and Oversight & Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2008 (statement by CRS Specialist Kenneth
Katzman). For further discussion of U.S. operations in Iraq and issues related to Iraqi
governance and security, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by
Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,
coordinated by Christopher Blanchard.
2 Declaration of Principles, supra note 1.
3 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Iraq Declaration of Principles
for Friendship and Cooperation, November 26, 2007, available at [http://www.whitehouse
.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-1.html].

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CRS-2
The New York Times reported in January 2008 that the Bush Administration has
crafted a draft proposal for a U.S.-Iraq security agreement which would, if agreed
upon by the parties, provide the United States with broad authority to conduct
military operations in Iraq, guarantee U.S. military forces and contractors immunity
from Iraqi law, and provide the United States with the power to detain Iraqi
prisoners.4 The New York Times also reported that the draft proposal does not call
for the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq, authorize future troop
levels in the country, or describe the specific security obligations of the United States
should Iraq come under attack.5 During testimony before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services on February 6, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated
that the prospective security agreement would not obligate the United States to
militarily defend Iraq in the event of a threat to Iraqi security.6
It is not clear whether the agreement(s) discussed in the Declaration will take
the form of a treaty or some other type of international compact. However, in a
November 26, 2007 press briefing regarding the Declaration, General Douglas Lute,
Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, stated that the Administration did
not foresee a prospective agreement with Iraq having “the status of a formal treaty
which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the
Congress.”7 According to a February 5, 2008 report by the Congressional Quarterly,
the National Security Council offered to brief Congress on the nature of the
prospective U.S.-Iraq security agreement.8 In a February 13, 2008, op-ed piece for
the Washington Post, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice claimed that the Administration “will work closely with the appropriate
committees of Congress to keep lawmakers informed and to provide complete
transparency. Classified briefings have already begun, and we look forward to
congressional input.”9
Regardless of the form the agreement may take, Congress has several tools by
which to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and
implementation of the arrangement by the United States. This report begins by
4 Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Asking Iraq for Wide Rights in Fighting War,
N.Y. TIMES, January 25, 2008, at A1.
5 Id.
6 Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Armed Services to Receive Testimony on the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2009, the Future Years Defense Program, and the
Fiscal Year 2009 Request for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, February 6, 2008
(statement by Defense Sec. Robert M. Gates in response to questioning by Senator Edward
Kennedy regarding a prospective U.S.-Iraq security agreement).
7 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Gaggle by Dana Perino and General
Douglas Lute, Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan , November 26, 2007,
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-6.html].
8 Adam Graham-Silverman,, White House Backs Off From Asserting Long-Term Security
Agreements with Iraq, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, February 5, 2008 (quoting anonymous
congressional aide).
9 Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, What We Need Next in Iraq, WASH. POST, February
13, 2008, at A19.

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CRS-3
discussing the current legal framework governing U.S. military operations in Iraq.
The report then provides a general background as to the types of international
agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations
affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the
report discusses historical precedents that security agreements have taken, with
specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan,
South Korea, and the Philippines. The report then discusses the oversight role that
Congress plays with respect to entering and implementing international agreements
involving the United States. Finally, the report describes legislation proposed in the
110th Congress to ensure congressional participation in the conclusion of a security
agreement between the United States and Iraq.
I. Current Legal Framework Governing
U.S. Military Operations In Iraq
U.S. military operations in Iraq are congressionally authorized pursuant to
H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243), which authorizes the President to use the armed forces
of the United States
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to - (1) defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq;
and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq.
It also requires as a predicate for the exercise of that authority that the President
determine that diplomatic efforts and other peaceful means will be inadequate to
meet these goals and that the use of force against Iraq is consistent with the battle
against terrorism.10 H.J.Res. 114 appears to incorporate any future resolutions
concerning the continuing situation in Iraq that the Security Council may adopt, as
well as those adopted prior to its enactment.11 The authority also appears to extend
beyond compelling Iraq’s disarmament to implementing the full range of concerns
expressed in those U.N. resolutions, as well as for the broad purpose of defending
“the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq.”
The United States and Great Britain, along with a number of other countries,
invaded Iraq in March of 2003, asserting the authority to enforce compliance with
10 In March 2003, President George W. Bush reported to Congress the determination that
was required by P.L. 107-243 regarding his exercise of authority for military operations
against Iraq. House Document 108-50. March 19, 2003. A report in connection with
Presidential Determination under Public Law 107-243. Communication from the President
of the United States transmitting a report consistent with Section 3(b) of the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.
11 For an historical overview of Security Council Resolutions addressing the situation in Iraq
prior to 2003, see The United Nations Security Council — Its Role in the Iraq Crisis: A Brief
Overview, CRS Report RS21323.

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CRS-4
earlier Security Council resolutions that addressed the situation in Iraq and Kuwait.12
Other Security Council members disagreed with this interpretation of the previous
resolutions, denying that these resolutions contained a continuing authorization to use
force against Iraq. Despite the initial lack of consensus regarding the legality of the
invasion, the Security Council adopted subsequent resolutions recognizing the
occupation of Iraq and generally supporting the coalition’s plans for bringing about
a democratic government in Iraq.13
The first of these, Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003), recognized the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and underscored the temporary nature of its
obligations and authorities under international law, which it said would cease “when
an internationally recognized, representative government established by the people
of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the [CPA].” (Para. 1). In
paragraph 13, Resolution 1511 authorized
a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the
purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable
and programme [for establishing a permanent government in Iraq] as well as to
contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the
Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim
administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure.
The Security Council included in Resolution 1511 a commitment to “review the
requirements and mission of the multinational force ... not later than one year from
the date of this resolution.” It further established that “in any case the mandate of the
force shall expire upon the completion of the [electoral process outlined previously],”
at which time the Security Council would be ready “to consider ... any future need
for the continuation of the multinational force, taking into account the views of an
internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq.”
The Security Council resolutions do not provide for the immunity of coalition
troops from Iraqi legal processes. No status of forces agreement (SOFA) was
deemed possible prior to the recognition of a permanent government in Iraq.14
Immunity for coalition soldiers, contract workers, and other foreign personnel in Iraq
in connection with security and reconstruction was established by order of the CPA,
which relied for its authority on the laws and usages of war (as consistent with
relevant Security Council resolutions.) CPA Order 17, Status of the Coalition
12 See Sean Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004).
13 For an overview of the process, see Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, CRS
Report RL31339, by Kenneth Katzman.
14 The United States reportedly made an effort to establish a SOFA with the Iraqi Governing
Council prior to the handover of sovereignty and establishment of the Iraqi Interim
Government, but Iraqi officials took the view that only a permanently established
government in Iraq would have the authority to enter binding international agreements. See
Robin Wright, U.S. Immunity in Iraq Will Go Beyond June 30, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004,
at A01.

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CRS-5
Provisional Authority, MNF - Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq,15
established that all personnel of the multinational force (MNF) and the CPA, and all
International Consultants, are immune from Iraqi legal process, which are defined to
include “arrest, detention or proceedings in Iraqi courts or other Iraqi bodies, whether
criminal, civil, or administrative.” Such persons are nevertheless expected to respect
applicable Iraqi laws, but are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their “Sending
States.” States contributing personnel to the multinational force have the right to
exercise within Iraq any criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by
their domestic law over all persons subject to their military law.16
In June, 2004, in anticipation of the dissolution of the CPA and handover of
sovereignty to the Interim Government of Iraq, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1546, reaffirming the authorization for the multinational force in
Resolution 1511 while noting that its presence in Iraq “is at the request of the
incoming Interim Government of Iraq.” The terms of the mandate for the MNF are
expressed in paragraph 12, in which the Security Council
Decides further that the mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed at
the request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this
resolution, and that this mandate shall expire upon the completion of the political
process set out ... above, and declares that it will terminate this mandate earlier
if requested by the Government of Iraq.
Resolution 1546 incorporated letters from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
and Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq Dr. Ayad Allawi. Secretary
Powell wrote:
In order to continue to contribute to security, the MNF must continue to function
under a framework that affords the force and its personnel the status that they
need to accomplish their mission, and in which the contributing states have
responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over their personnel and which will
ensure arrangements for, and use of assets by, the MNF. The existing framework
governing these matters is sufficient for these purposes. In addition, the forces
that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act
consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the
Geneva Conventions.
Prior to the handover of sovereignty to the interim government, Ambassador
Bremer issued CPA Order 100 to revise existing CPA orders, chiefly by substituting
the MNF-Iraq for the CPA and otherwise reflecting the new political situation.17
CPA Order 100 stated, as its purpose,
15 Available online at [http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_
Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf]
16 Id. § 4.
17 CPA Order 100, Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the
Coalition Provisional Authority, June 28, 2004, available at [http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
regulations/20040628_CPAORD_100_Transition_of_Laws__Regulations__Orders__and
_Directives.pdf].

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CRS-6
to ensure that the Iraqi Interim Government and all subsequent Iraqi governments
inherit full responsibility for these laws, regulations, orders, memoranda,
instructions and directives so that their implementation after the transfer of full
governing authority may reflect the expectations of the Iraqi people, as
determined by a fully empowered and sovereign Iraqi Government.18
Under Article 26 of the Transitional Administrative Law of Iraq (TAL),19 “The
laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority
pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded
or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.”
Accordingly, CPA Order 17 (as revised) survived the transfer of authority to the Iraqi
Interim Government, which took no action to amend or rescind it. Iraq’s permanent
constitution was adopted in 2005. Article 130 of the permanent constitution
continues the validity of existing laws, presumably including CPA Orders that were
not rescinded by the Transitional Government.
The U.N. Security Council extended the mandate for the multinational forces
until December 31, 2006,20 and again until December 31, 2007,21 and finally, until
December 31, 2008.22 Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki requested the Security Council
extend the MNF mandate “one last time” until the end of December, 2008, “provided
that the extension is subject to a commitment by the Security Council to end the
mandate at an earlier date if the Government of Iraq so requests and that the mandate
is subject to periodic review before June 2008.”23
By its terms, CPA Order 17 remains in force for the duration of the U.N.
mandate and terminates only after the departure of the final element of the MNF from
Iraq, or at such time as it is rescinded or amended by duly enacted legislation having
the force of law.24 Neither it nor CPA Order 100 establishes a timetable for the
departure of all MNF elements from Iraq after the U.N. mandate ends. Order 17
could be interpreted effectively to expire concomitantly with the U.N. mandate,
because it defines Multinational Force with reference to the U.N. resolutions.25
However, the order appears to have been designed to stay in force for a time after the
expiration of the U.N. mandate, for a long enough period at least to allow the
18 Id. § 1.
19 Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004,
available at [http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html].
20 U.N.S.C. Res. 1637 November 11, 2005).
21 U.N.S.C. Res. 1723 (November 28, 2006).
22 U.N.S.C. Res. 1790 (December 18, 2007).
23 Letter from Nuri Kamel al-Maliki, Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, to the Security
Council, attached as Annex I to U.N.S.C. Res. 1790.
24 CPA Order 17, supra note 15, § 20.
25 Id. § 1 (defining MNF to mean “the force authorized under U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1511 and 1546, and any subsequent relevant U.N. Security Council
resolutions”).

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CRS-7
departure of all MNF personnel. If the U.N. Security Council or the Iraqi
government adopts a timetable for the departure of the MNF, it seems logical that
CPA Order 17 would continue in force until the deadline for departure passes. On
the other hand, if the government of Iraq invites the United States or any other
coalition government to maintain troops in Iraq after the U.N. mandate terminates,
it may be expedient for the Iraqi government to continue to recognize CPA Order 17
until a new agreement establishing the role and status of such troops is reached.
It bears emphasis that the foregoing is subject to the sole interpretation of the
Iraqi government. Whether the immunity of coalition troops and other personnel will
continue in force after the U.N. mandate expires depends on whether the Iraqi
government deems them to be part of elements of the MNF that have not yet departed
or military forces that have overstayed their mandate. It is not clear which branch of
the Iraqi government would make that determination. Even more significantly, the
Iraqi legislature could decide to repeal, amend, or possibly extend the order at any
time, even before the U.N. mandate expires.
Another question regarding the status and role of U.S. forces in Iraq post-U.N.
mandate is whether the congressional authorization to use military force will also
end. H.J.Res. 114 does not contain explicit time requirements or call for the
withdrawal of U.S. troops by any specific date or set of criteria. Presumably,
continued force is authorized under the resolution only so long as Iraq poses a
continuing threat to the United States and the U.S. military presence is not
inconsistent with relevant U.N. resolutions. Because the specific threats posed by
Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime that were emphasized in the preamble to
H.J.Res. 114 no longer exist (with the possible exception of the presence of al Qaida
in Iraq), it may be argued that Iraq no longer poses a danger to the security of the
United States, at least, not of the same kind that led Congress to pass H.J.Res. 114
in the first place. Once the U.N. mandate for the multinational forces in Iraq expires
(and assuming that the U.N. Security Council does not adopt new language
supporting a new U.S. military role in Iraq), it is arguable that the U.S. use of military
force in Iraq is not necessary or appropriate to enforce U.N. Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq. Such conclusions do not necessarily support a view that
U.S. troops are automatically required to be withdrawn when the U.N. mandate
expires,26 but suggest that new legislation may be necessary to support a new role for
U.S. troops under a possible agreement with Iraq.
26 For an analysis of Congress’s role in shaping the mission in Iraq, see generally
Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq, CRS Report RL33837,
by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, and Thomas J. Nicola.

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II. International Agreements Under U.S. Law
Under the U.S. system, a legally binding international agreement can be entered
into pursuant to either a treaty or an executive agreement.27 The Constitution
allocates primary responsibility for entering such agreements to the executive branch,
but Congress also plays an essential role. First, in order for a treaty (but not an
executive agreement) to become the “Law of the Land,”28 the Senate must provide
its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority. Alternatively,
Congress may authorize congressional-executive agreements. Many treaties and
executive agreements are not “self-executing,” meaning that in order for them to take
effect domestically, implementing legislation is required to provide U.S. bodies with
the authority necessary to enforce and comply with the agreements’ provisions.
While some executive agreements do not require congressional approval, adherence
to them may nonetheless be dependent upon Congress appropriating necessary funds
or authorizing the activities to be carried out (where compliance with the agreement
would contravene some statutory provision).
Treaties
Under U.S. law, a treaty is an agreement negotiated and signed29 by the
executive branch, which enters into force if it is approved by a two-thirds majority
27 Not every pledge, assurance, or arrangement made between the United States and a
foreign party constitutes a legally binding international agreement. For discussion of criteria
used to distinguish between legally binding and non-binding international commitments, see
infra at 33. See also 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a); State Department Office of the Legal Adviser,
Guidance on Non-Binding Documents, at [http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/guidance/].
28 U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2. In this regard, it is important to distinguish “treaty” in the
context of international law, in which “treaty” and “international agreement” are
synonymous terms for all binding agreements, and “treaty” in the context of domestic
American law, in which “treaty” more narrowly refers to a particular subcategory of binding
international agreements. It should be noted, however, that the term “treaty” is not always
interpreted under U.S. law to refer only to those agreements described in Article II, § 2 of
the Constitution. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (interpreting statute barring
discrimination except where permitted by “treaty” to refer to both treaties and executive
agreements); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912) (construing the term
“treaty,” as used in statute conferring appellate jurisdiction, to also refer to executive
agreements).
29 Under international law, States that have signed but not ratified treaties have the
obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force January 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter “Vienna Convention”], art. 18. Although the United States has not ratified the
Vienna Convention, it recognizes it as generally expressing customary international law.
See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“we rely
upon the Vienna Convention here as an authoritative guide to the customary international
law of treaties...[b]ecause the United States recognizes the Vienna Convention as a
codification of customary international law...and [it] acknowledges the Vienna Convention
as, in large part, the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”) (internal
citations omitted).

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in the Senate and is subsequently ratified following Presidential signature.30 The
Senate may, in considering a treaty, condition its consent on certain reservations,31
declarations32 and understandings33 concerning treaty application. If accepted, these
reservations, declarations, and understandings may limit and/or define U.S.
obligations under the treaty.34
Executive Agreements
The great majority of international agreements that the United States enters into
are not treaties but executive agreements35 — agreements made by the executive
branch that are not submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. There are three
types of prima facie legal executive agreements: (1) congressional-executive
agreements, in which Congress has previously or retroactively authorized an
international agreement entered into by the Executive; (2) executive agreements made
pursuant to an earlier treaty, in which the agreement is authorized by a ratified
treaty; and (3) sole executive agreements, in which an agreement is made pursuant
to the President’s constitutional authority without further congressional authorization.
The Executive’s authority to promulgate the agreement is different in each case.
Although executive agreements are not specifically discussed in the
Constitution, they nonetheless have been considered valid international compacts
under Supreme Court jurisprudence and as a matter of historical practice.36 Starting
30 Oftentimes, a bilateral treaty will only come into effect after the parties exchange
instruments of ratification. In the case of multilateral treaties, ratification typically occurs
only after the treaty’s instruments of ratification are submitted to the appropriate body in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.
31 A “reservation” is “a unilateral statement... made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.” Vienna
Convention, art. 2(1)(d). In practice, “[r]eservations change U.S. obligations without
necessarily changing the text, and they require the acceptance of the other party.”
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS 11 (Comm. Print 2001); Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23.
32 Declarations are “statements expressing the Senate’s position or opinion on matters
relating to issues raised by the treaty rather than to specific provisions.” TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 11.
33 Understandings are “interpretive statements that clarify or elaborate provisions but do not
alter them.” Id.
34 As a matter of customary international law, States are “obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,” including entering reservations that are
incompatible with a treaty’s purposes. Vienna Convention, arts. 18-19.
35 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 215 (2nd ed. 1996).
36 E.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“our cases have
recognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other
countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate...this power having been exercised since
(continued...)

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in the World War II era, reliance on executive agreements has grown significantly.37
Whereas 27 executive agreements (compared to 60 treaties) were concluded by the
United States during the first 50 years of the Republic, between 1939 and 2004 the
United States concluded 15,522 executive agreements (compared to 1,035 treaties).38
Although some have argued that certain agreements may only be concluded as
treaties, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate,39 this view has generally
been rejected by scholarly opinion.40 Adjudication of the propriety of executive
agreements has been rare, in significant part because plaintiffs often cannot
demonstrate that they have suffered a redressable injury giving them standing to
36 (...continued)
the early years of the Republic”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (“an
international compact...is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the
Senate”).
37 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 38-40.
38 WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (5th
ed. 2007). Between 1789 and 2004, the United States entered 1,834 treaties and 16,704
executive agreements, meaning that roughly 10% of agreements concluded by the United
States have taken the form of treaties. Id.
39 E.g., Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements: A Reply, 54 YALE L. J. 616
(1945) (arguing that the congressional-executive agreement is not a constitutionally
permissible alternative to a treaty, and that sole executive agreements are permissible in
limited circumstances); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995)
(arguing that the Treaty Clause is the exclusive means for Congress to approve significant
international agreements); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: the Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001) (arguing that treaties
are the constitutionally required form for congressional approval of an international
agreement concerning action lying outside of Congress’s constitutional powers, including
matters with respect to human rights, political/military alliances, and arms control, but are
not required for agreements concerning action falling within Congress’s powers under Art.
I of the Constitution, such as agreements concerning international commerce).
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 303 n.8 (1987) (“At one time it was
argued that some agreements can be made only as treaties, by the procedure designated in
the Constitution.... Scholarly opinion has rejected that view.”); HENKIN, supra note 35, at
217 (“Whatever their theoretical merits, it is now widely accepted that the Congressional-
Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete
alternative to a treaty...”); Yoo, supra note 39, at 759 (noting that “a broad intellectual
consensus exists that congressional-executive agreements may serve as full substitutes for
treaties”). Cf. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 799 (1995) (arguing that developments in the World War II era altered historical
understanding of the Constitution’s allocation of power between government branches so
as to make congressional-executive agreement a complete alternative to a treaty); Myres S.
McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (parts I and II), 54 YALE L.
J. 181, 534 (1945) (arguing that historical practice supports the interchangeability of
congressional-executive agreements and treaties).

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challenge an agreement,41 or fail to make a justiciable claim. In 2001, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the issue of whether the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a treaty requiring approval by two-thirds of the
Senate presented a nonjusticiable political question.42 It does not appear that an
executive agreement has ever been held invalid by the courts on the grounds that it
was in contravention of the Treaty Clause.43 Nonetheless, as a matter of historical
practice, some types of agreements have been concluded as treaties, while others
have been concluded as executive agreements.44
Congressional-Executive Agreements. In the case of congressional-
executive agreements, the “constitutionality...seems well established.”45 Unlike
treaties, where only the Senate plays a role in authorization, both Houses of Congress
are involved in the authorizing process for congressional-executive agreements.
Congressional authorization takes the form of a statute passed by a majority of both
Houses of Congress. Historically, congressional-executive agreements cover a wide
variety of topics, ranging from postal conventions to bilateral trade to military
assistance.46 NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are
notable examples of congressional-executive agreements.
41 RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, at § 302, n. 5; HENKIN, supra note 35, at 142-148. See also
Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the propriety of the form taken by an
international agreement between the United States and United Kingdom). Executive
agreements dealing with matters having no direct impact upon private interests in the United
States (e.g., agreements concerning military matters or foreign relations) are rarely the
subject of domestic litigation, in part because persons typically cannot demonstrate that they
have suffered an actual, redressable injury and therefore lack standing to challenge such
agreements. RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, at § 303, n. 11.
42 Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).
43 In 1997, a federal district court in Texas ruled petitioner was not extraditable pursuant to
a federal statute implementing an executive agreement, and held that extradition requires an
extradition treaty ratified by the President and approved by two-thirds of the Senate. In re
Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D.Tex. 1997). The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the district court’s finding and held that a person could be extradited
by statute rather than treaty. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999).
44 See Yoo, supra note 39 (discussing the kinds of agreements historically taking the form
of treaties in contrast to those taking the form of executive agreements). See also infra at
16-23 (discussing form that different types of U.S. security agreements have historically
taken).
45 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 5. See also
HENKIN, supra note 35, at 215-18.
46 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 5. Reciprocal
trade agreements which were once concluded as treaties now typically take the form of
congressional-executive agreements. RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, at § 303, n. 9. See also
19 U.S.C. § 2111 (conditionally authorizing the President to enter trade agreements with
other nations); CRS Report 97-896, Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as
Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather than as Treaties, by Jeanne Grimmett.

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Congressional-executive agreements also may take different forms. Congress
may enact legislation authorizing the Executive to negotiate and enter agreements
with other countries on a specific matter.47 A congressional-executive agreement may
also take the form of a statute passed following the negotiation of an agreement
which incorporates the terms or requirements of the agreement into U.S. law.48 Such
authorization may be either explicit or implied by the terms of the congressional
enactment.49
Executive Agreements Made Pursuant to Treaties. The legitimacy of
agreements made pursuant to treaties is also well established, though controversy
occasionally arises as to whether the agreement was actually imputed by the treaty
in question.50 Since the earlier treaty is the “Law of the Land,”51 the power to enter
into an agreement required or contemplated by the treaty lies fairly clearly within the
President’s executive function. However, the Senate occasionally conditions its
approval of a treaty upon a requirement that any subsequent agreement made
pursuant to the treaty also be submitted to the Senate as a treaty.52
Sole Executive Agreements. Sole executive agreements rely on neither
treaty nor congressional authority for their legal basis. There are a number of
provisions in the Constitution that may confer limited authority upon the President
to promulgate such agreements on the basis of his power to conduct foreign affairs.53
The Litvinov Assignment, under which the Soviet Union assigned to the United
States its claims against American nationals, is an example of a sole executive
agreement.
If the President enters into an executive agreement pursuant to and dealing with
an area where he has clear, exclusive constitutional authority — such as an agreement
to recognize a particular State for diplomatic purposes — the agreement is legally
47 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1822(a) (authorizing the Secretary of State to negotiate international
fishery agreements); 22 U.S.C. § 6445(c) (authorizing the President to enter binding
agreements with other nations pledging to end practices violating religious freedom).
48 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (approving agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT).
49 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3471 (authorizing U.S. participation in and appropriations for
Commission on Labor Cooperation, established by a supplemental NAFTA agreement not
expressly approved by Congress).
50 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 5.
51 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“the laws of the United States...[and] all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land”).
52 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, § 303 cmt. d.
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America...”), § 2 (“The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States...”), § 3 (“he shall receive ambassadors and other public
ministers...”). Courts have recognized foreign affairs as an area of very strong executive
authority. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

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permissible regardless of Congress’s opinion on the matter.54 If, however, the
President enters into an agreement and his constitutional authority over the subject
matter is unclear, or if Congress also has constitutional authority over the subject
matter, a reviewing court may consider Congress’s position in determining whether
the agreement is enforceable as U.S. law.55 If Congress has given implicit approval
to the President to enter into the agreement, or is silent on the matter, it is more likely
that the agreement will be deemed valid. When Congress opposes the agreement and
the President’s constitutional authority to enter the agreement is ambiguous, it is
unclear if or under what circumstances a court would recognize such an agreement
as controlling.
Because sole executive agreements do not rely on treaty or congressional
authority to support their legality, they do not require congressional approval to
become binding, at least as a matter of international law. Courts have recognized,
however, that if a sole executive agreement conflicts with pre-existing federal law,
the earlier law will remain controlling in most circumstances.56
Even if a sole executive agreement does not conflict with prior federal law,
Congress may still act to limit the agreement’s effect through a subsequent legislative
enactment, so long as it has constitutional authority to regulate the matter covered by
the agreement.57 In the security context, Congress has clear constitutional authority
to enact measures that would limit the effect of sole executive agreements involving
54 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, § 303 (4).
55 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (establishing that Congress’s implicit
approval of executive action, such as historical practice of yielding authority in a particular
area, may legitimize an agreement); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his powers are at their maximum.... Congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may... invite, measures of independent Presidential responsibility.... When the
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”) (Jackson, J., concurring).
56 Executive agreements have been held to be inferior to conflicting federal law when the
agreement concerns matters expressly within the constitutional authority of Congress. See,
e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953) (finding that
executive agreement contravening provisions of import statute was unenforceable);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, § 115, n.5. However, an executive agreement might trump
pre-existing federal law if it concerns an enumerated or inherent executive power under the
Constitution, or if Congress has historically acquiesced to the President entering agreements
in the relevant area. See id.; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (“[a]ll
Constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have
as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature”) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay)); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654 (upholding sole
executive agreement concerning the handling of Iranian assets in the United States, despite
the existence of a potentially conflicting statute, given Congress’s historical acquiescence
to these types of agreements).
57 The “last in time” rule establishes that a more recent statute trumps an earlier,
inconsistent international agreement, while a more recent self-executing agreement may
trump an earlier, inconsistent statute. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).

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military commitments. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution accords Congress the power
“To lay and collect Taxes ... to ... pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence,”“To raise and support Armies,” “To provide and maintain a Navy,” “To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” and
“To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water,” as well as “To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” and “To
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”58 Further,
Congress is empowered “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ...” as well as “all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.”59
In addition to the constitutional provisions that provide Congress with authority
to legislate on matters concerning military affairs,60 Congress also has virtual plenary
power over appropriations — authority not qualified with reference to Congress’s
enumerated powers under Article I, § 8. The Appropriations Clause provides that
“[n]o money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act
of Congress.”61 Accordingly, adherence to pledges made in sole executive
agreements may be dependent upon the availability of appropriations authorized by
Congress. Congress may specify the terms and conditions under which
appropriations may be used, so long as it does not impose unconstitutional conditions
upon the use of appropriated funds.62
Choosing Between a Treaty and Executive Agreement
A recurring concern for the executive and legislative branches is whether an
international commitment should be entered into as a treaty or an executive
agreement. The Senate may prefer that significant international commitments be
entered as treaties, and fear that reliance on executive agreements will lead to an
erosion of the treaty power. The House may want an international compact to take
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
59 Id.
60 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority to Limit
U.S. Military Operations in Iraq, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, and Thomas
J. Nicola.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Congress may specify the terms and conditions under which
appropriations may be used, so long as it does not impose unconstitutional conditions on the
use of appropriated funds.
62 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding invalid an
appropriations proviso that effectively nullified some effects of a presidential pardon and
that appeared to prescribe a rule of decision in court cases); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946)(invalidating as a bill of attainder an appropriations provision denying
money to pay salaries of named officials). For further discussion of Congress’s ability to
use its appropriations power to limit the deployment or use of U.S. military forces, see CRS
Report RL33837, supra note 26, at 29-35, 41-49.

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the form of congressional-executive agreement, so that it may play a greater role in
the consideration. In cases where congressional action is necessary for an agreement
to be implemented, the Executive may prefer to submit an international compact as
a congressional-executive agreement, so that approval of the agreement and
necessary implementing legislation may be accomplished in a single step. The
Executive’s preference as to whether an international compact takes the form of a
treaty or executive agreement may also be influenced by the agreement’s prospects
for approval by a two-thirds majority of the Senate or a simple majority of both
Houses.
State Department regulations prescribing the process for coordination and
approval of international agreements (commonly known as the “Circular 175
procedure”63) include criteria for determining whether an international agreement
should take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Congressional preference
is one of several factors considered when determining the form that an international
agreement should take. According to State Department regulations,
In determining a question as to the procedure which should be followed for any
particular international agreement, due consideration is given to the following
factors []:
(1) The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting
the nation as a whole;
(2) Whether the agreement is intended to affect state laws;
(3) Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of
subsequent legislation by the Congress;
(4) Past U.S. practice as to similar agreements;
(5) The preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement;
(6) The degree of formality desired for an agreement;
(7) The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of
an agreement, and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term
agreement; and
(8) The general international practice as to similar agreements.
In determining whether any international agreement should be brought into force
as a treaty or as an international agreement other than a treaty, the utmost care
is to be exercised to avoid any invasion or compromise of the constitutional
powers of the President, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole.64
In 1978, the Senate passed a resolution expressing its sense that the President
seek the advice of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in determining
whether an international agreement should be submitted as a treaty.65 The State
Department subsequently modified the Circular 175 procedure to provide for
consultation with appropriate congressional leaders and committees concerning
63 Circular 175 initially referred to a 1955 Department of State Circular which established
a process for the coordination and approval of international agreements. These procedures,
as modified, are now found in 22 CFR part 181 and 11 Foreign Affairs Manual (F.A.M.)
chapter 720.
64 11 F.A.M. § 723.3 (2006).
65 S.Res. 536, S. Rep. 95-1171, 95th Cong. (1977).

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significant international agreements.66 Consultations are to be held “as appropriate.”67
Congressional consultation on the substance and form of international agreements is
discussed in more detail later in this report.68
II. Historical Practice Regarding
Security Agreements
The Bush Administration has characterized the proposed security arrangement
with Iraq as being of a kind commonly entered by the United States, and has stated
that “[t]he U.S. has security relationships with over 100 countries around the world,
including recent agreements with nations such as Afghanistan and former Soviet bloc
countries.”69 Some U.S. security relationships take the form of legally binding
treaties or executive agreements, whereas others involve non-binding assurances or
pledges. Whereas some security agreements are publicly available, others remain
classified. Though the Bush Administration and Maliki government have issued a
Declaration of Principles setting the parameters for a future security arrangement
between the United States and Iraq, it is not yet clear whether the arrangement will
be governed by treaty, executive agreement, non-binding pledges, or some
combination of the three.
Categories of Legally Binding Security Agreements
The following sections provide a general overview of the categories of security
agreements entered into by the United States of a legally binding nature. Such
categories of security agreements predominantly take the form of a treaty, while
others typically take the form of an executive agreement.
Although some categories of security agreements have historically been
concluded as treaties and others as executive agreements, this does not necessarily
mean that future arrangements must follow the same pattern. An arrangement that
has typically been entered into as a treaty might instead be concluded as a
congressional-executive agreement, and vice versa.70 Similarly, while some security
arrangements have historically been entered as sole executive agreements, Congress
might effectively limit such agreements in the future via statutory enactment71 — e.g.,
66 11 F.A.M. § 724.4(b)-(c) (2006).
67 Id. at § 724.4(c).
68 See infra at 35.
69 Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
70 But see Yoo, supra note 39, at 830 (arguing the military commitments like NATO can
only be effectuated by treaty, and not a congressional-executive agreement).
71 Legislation proposing to limit the usage of sole executive agreements has periodically
been introduced, but thus far no bill has been enacted. See, e.g., S.Res. 85, 91st Cong.
(1969) (non-binding resolution passed by the Senate expressing its sense that national
commitments should be entered pursuant to treaty or executive agreement specifically
(continued...)

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limiting the availability of appropriations to carry out commitments made in a sole
executive agreement.72
Collective Defense Agreements/”Security Commitments”. The State
Department currently lists the United States as being party to seven collective defense
agreements, under which members are obligated to assist in the defense of a party to
the agreement in the event of an attack upon it: the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance; the North Atlantic Treaty; the Australia, New Zealand, and
United States Security Treaty; the Southeast Asian Treaty; and bilateral security
treaties with Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea.73 All seven agreements take
the form of treaties that were ratified by the United States between 1947 and 1960.74
It is important to note that each of these agreements, with the exception of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the first to be ratified by the United
States), includes a provision specifying that the agreement’s requirements are to be
carried out in accordance with the parties’ respective constitutional processes. These
provisions were included to assuage congressional concerns these agreements could
be interpreted as sanctioning the President to engage in military hostilities in defense
of treaty parties without further congressional authorization (i.e., a declaration of war
or resolution authorizing the use of military force).75
71 (...continued)
authorized by Congress); H.R. 4438, 94th Cong. (1976) (proposing to require the President
to transmit any agreement involving a national commitment to Congress, and allowing the
agreement to take effect only if Congress did not pass a measure disapproving it within 60
days).
72 The Constitution provides that “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
73 State Department, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements, at
[http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/].
74 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 62 Stat. 1681, entered into force
December 3, 1948; North Atlantic Treaty, 63 Stat. 2241, entered into force August 24, 1949;
Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, 3 U.S.T.
3420, entered into force April 29, 1952; Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Republic of the Philippines, 3 U.S.T. 3947, entered into force August
27, 1952; Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic
of Korea, 5 U.S.T. 2368, entered into force November 17, 1954; Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty, 6 U.S.T. 81, entered into force February 19, 1955; Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1632,
entered into force June 23, 1960 (replacing Security Treaty Between the United States of
America and Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3329, entered into force April 28, 1952). In 1954, the United
States entered a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan), 6 U.S.T. 433,
but this agreement was terminated by President Carter in 1979.
75 For background, see S. REP. 797, 90th Cong., at 14-15 (1967) (describing ratification
history of North Atlantic Treaty); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 92-97 (1995)
(describing Senate deliberations on North Atlantic Treaty).

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In addition to these defense treaties, the United States has also adopted security
commitments with respect to several former territories and possessions,76 including
pursuant to congressional-executive agreement. Congress has approved compacts
changing the status of certain territories to Freely Associated States (FAS), while also
imposing upon the United States the “the obligation to defend the [FAS]...from attack
or threats thereof as the United States and its citizens are defended.”77 Arguably,
these security commitments are distinct from other international defense
arrangements, as they concern commitments to newly sovereign entities over whom
the United States formerly exercised extensive and long-standing control.78
Consultation Requirements/”Security Arrangements”. The United
States also has established security arrangements with other countries in which the
U.S. pledges to take some action in the event that the other country’s security is
threatened. In a 1992 report to Congress listing U.S. security commitments and
arrangements, President George H.W. Bush claimed that unlike “security
commitments,” which oblige the United States to act in the common defense of a
country in case of an armed attack, “security arrangements” generally
oblige the United States to consult with a country in the event of a threat to its
security. They may appear in legally binding agreements, such as treaties or
executive agreements, or in political documents, such as policy declarations by
the President, Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense.79
Most legally binding “security arrangements” listed in the President’s report
constituted sole executive agreements, including agreements with Israel, Egypt,
Pakistan, and Liberia.80 Only one arrangement, committing the United States to the
76 For example, the Panama Canal treaties provided that the United States and Panama
would, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the Canal from
attack. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal,
with Annexes and Protocol, 33 U.S.T. 1, entered into force October 1, 1979.
77 Act Approving Compacts of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands
and the Federated States of Micronesia, P.L. 99-329, § 311 (1986). See also Act approving
Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Government of Palau, P.L.
99-658, § 352 (1986) (recognizing an attack on Palau as a danger to the United States, and
pledging that the United States “would take action to meet the danger to the United States
and Palau in accordance with its constitutional processes”).
78 Some have argued that these agreements are “more akin to the Texas and Hawaii
annexation resolutions than to international defense arrangements,” given the historical
status of the FAS. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional
Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, n. 184 (2001).
79 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 248 (quoting A
REPORT ON UNITED STATES SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS WITH OTHER
NATIONS, SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1457 OF PUBLIC
LAW 101-510, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1991, August 17, 1992).
80 Id. See also Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the
United States Concerning Assurances, Consultations, and United States Policy on Middle
East Peace, 32 U.S.T. 2160, entered into force February 27, 1976; Agreement Between the
(continued...)

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establishment of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, could clearly be
described as a congressional-executive agreement.81
Although some scholars and government officials have characterized the terms
“security commitment” and “security arrangement” as having distinct and particular
meanings, this practice is by no means uniform. Indeed, the question of what
constitutes a “security commitment” has long been a subject of dialogue and dispute
by the executive and legislative branches.82
Other Types of Military Agreements. The United States is also a party to
a significant number of defense agreements that do not obligate the United States to
take action when another country is attacked, but nonetheless involve military affairs.
Categories of such agreements include:
! military basing agreements, permitting the United States to build or
use permanent facilities, station forces, and conduct certain military
activities within a host country;83
! access and pre-positioning agreements, permitting the stationing of
equipment in a host country and the improvement and use of the
country’s military or civilian facilities, without establishing a
permanent military presence;84
80 (...continued)
United States and Egypt Concerning Implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
of March 26, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 2148, entered into force March 26, 1979; Agreement of
Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Pakistan, 10 U.S.T. 317, entered into force May 19, 1959; Agreement of Cooperation
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia,
10 U.S.T. 1598, entered into force July 8, 1959.
81 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 248. See also
Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution, P.L. 97-132 (1981).
82 See The Proposed U.S. Security Commitment to Iraq: What Will Be In It and Should It
Be a Treaty?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights,
and Oversight & Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2008 (statement by Prof. Michael J. Matheson) (recognizing
distinction between “security commitment” and “security arrangement,” while
acknowledging that the “question of what constitutes a ‘security commitment’...has been the
subject of dialogue between the executive branch and Congress for decades”). See also
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 213-215, 247-250
(discussing legislation considered and enacted by Congress in response to concerns that the
Executive had entered agreements imposing national commitments upon the United States
without congressional notification or approval).
83 See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece
Concerning Military Facilities, 4 U.S.T. 2189, entered into force October 12, 1953.
84 An example of such an agreement is the 2005 memorandum of understanding between the
United States and Norway, discussed in more detail at American Forces Press Service,
Rumsfeld Signs Pre-positioning Agreement With Norway, June 8, 2005, at [http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16458].

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! status of forces agreements (SOFAs), defining the legal status of
U.S. forces within a host country and typically according them with
certain privileges and immunities from the host country’s
jurisdiction;85
! burden-sharing agreements, permitting a host country to assume
some of the financial obligations incurred by the stationing of U.S.
forces within its territory;86 and
! agreements providing for arms transfers, military training, and joint
military exercises.87
Historically, almost all agreements have taken a form other than treaty.
Sometimes these arrangements have been concluded as sole executive agreements;
while others could be deemed executive agreements pursuant to treaty (e.g., military
stationing agreements concluded with other NATO parties); while still others have
been explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute and may be considered
congressional-executive agreements.
Agreements Granting the Right to Military Intervention. Besides the
categories of agreements described above, the United States has, on occasion, entered
into long-term agreements that grant the United States the legal right to intervene
militarily within the territory of another party to defend it against internal or external
threats. Unlike collective defense agreements, these security agreements provide the
United States with the right, but not the duty, to militarily intervene when the security
of the other country is threatened. Such agreements may also be distinguished from
the authority to intervene recognized under the United Nations Charter. Whereas
military intervention agreements discussed below provide the United States with the
positive legal right to intervene in a country, the U.N. Charter merely provides that
its provisions do not “impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.”88
85 See, e.g., Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, 11
U.S.T. 1652, entered into force June 23, 1960. The only SOFA agreement to which the
United States is a party that was concluded as a treaty is the North Atlantic Treaty Status of
Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA), 4 U.S.T. 1792, entered into force August 23, 1953. All
supplementary agreements to the NATO SOFA have been executive agreements.
86 See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between The Ministry of National Defense
Republic of Korea and the United States Forces in Korea Regarding The Construction of
Facilities at 2nd ID USA To Improve Combined Defense Capabilities, 34 U.S.T. 125,
entered into force February 2, 1982.
87 See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy Between the Governments
of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey in Accordance with Articles
II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty, 32 U.S.T. 3323, entered into force December 18,
1980.
88 Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, entered into force October 24, 1945, art. 51
(italics added).

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In the early part of the 20th Century, the United States entered into legal
agreements with several Latin American countries under which the United States was
granted the right to use military force either to defend those countries from external
threat or to preserve domestic tranquility.89 All of these agreements were concluded
as treaties. In 1903, following the Spanish-American War, the United States
concluded a treaty with the newly independent Republic of Cuba under which the
United States was expressly given “the right to intervene for the preservation of
Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection
of life, property, and individual liberty.”90 Similarly, in the aftermath of the U.S.
invasion and occupation of Haiti in 1915, a treaty between the two countries was
concluded that provided the United States with the right to intervene in Haiti when
the United States deemed it necessary.91 In 1904, the United States ratified a treaty
with Panama that provided the United States “the right, at all times and in its
discretion” to employ its armed forces for the safety and protection of the Panama
Canal and the shipping occurring therein.92 In 1907, the United States concluded a
treaty with the Dominican Republic establishing plans for the financial rehabilitation
of that country, and authorizing the United States to use military force necessary to
effectuate the carrying out of those plans.93
There have been numerous instances where a country has permitted or invited
the United States to use military force within its territory,94 but authority to intervene
89 See generally CHARLES HENRY HYDE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 27-36 (1922).
90 Treaty on Relations Between the United States and Cuba, May 22, 1903, 33 Stat. 2248,
at art. III. In 1906, acting pursuant to this authority, the United States intervened in Cuba
following serious revolutionary activity in order to establish a stable government there.
91 Treaty on Administration of Haiti: Finances and Development, entered into force
November 15, 1915, T.S. 623 1915 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at art. XIV (providing that “The high
contracting parties shall have authority to take such steps as may be necessary to insure the
complete attainment of any of the objects comprehended in this treaty; and, should the
necessity occur, the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian
Independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life,
property and individual liberty.”).
92 Isthmian Canal Convention with the Republic of Panama, entered into force February 26,
1904, 33 Stat. 2234, at art. XXIII. More generally, the agreement provided that the United
States “guarantees and will maintain the independence of Panama.” Id. at art. I. The
agreement also provided the United States with authority to ensure public order in the cities
of Panama City and Colon if, in the opinion of the United States, the government of Panama
was unable to maintain order. Id. at art. VII.
93 Treaty Between the United States and Dominican Republic Concerning the Collection and
Application of Dominican Customs Revenues, proclaimed July 25, 1907, 35 Stat. 1880.
94 For example, in 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower deployed U.S. troops to Lebanon at
the invitation of its government to help protect against a threatened insurrection. Congress
had passed legislation in 1957 that authorized such action. See P.L. 85-7 (1957).
Specifically, the legislation permitted the President to “undertake, in the general area of the
Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area
desiring such assistance.” The enactment further provided that “if the President determines
(continued...)

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has not been given via treaty. When the Senate initially opted not to approve a treaty
authorizing U.S. military and financial involvement in the Dominican Republic,
President Theodore Roosevelt entered a temporary “modus vivendi” executive
agreement adopting similar policies as the unapproved treaty. This agreement, which
elicited significant opposition from many Members of Congress as an
unconstitutional usurpation of the Senate’s treaty power, was terminated following
Senate approval of a modified version of the treaty in 1907.95 Another example of
a significant security agreement taking a form other than treaty occurred in 1941
when, prior to the United States entering World War II, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt concluded sole executive agreements concerning the stationing of U.S.
troops in Iceland and Greenland to protect those territories from attack.96
For the most part, however, it appears that bilateral arrangements authorizing
U.S. military intervention, when not concluded as treaties, have not taken the form
of a legally binding, permanent agreement.97 Instead, in non-treaty arrangements
authorizing U.S. intervention, the host country generally appears to retain full
discretion as to the degree and duration of U.S. presence within its territory. The
Executive’s authority to enter such arrangements, and, more broadly, to engage in
military operations in other countries without congressional approval has been the
subject of long-standing dispute between the Congress and the Executive.98
94 (...continued)
the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such
nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any
country controlled by international communism: Provided, that such employment shall be
consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the
United States.”
95 For further discussion, see W. STULL HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 212-229
(1933) (discussing events leading to the ratification of the 1907 treaty with the Dominican
Republic). In his autobiography, Roosevelt suggested that a treaty was preferable to the
executive agreement he entered with the Dominican Republic, because “a treaty..was the
law of the land and not merely...a direction of the Chief Executive which would lapse when
that particular executive left office.” Ackerman & Golove, supra note 40, at 819 (italics
omitted) (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 510 (1920)).
96 Agreement Between the United States and Denmark Concerning the Defense of
Greenland, signed April 9, 1941, 55 Stat. 1245; Agreement Concerning Defense of Iceland
By United States Forces, July 1, 1941, 55 Stat . 1547.
97 See supra note 94 (discussing U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958) In 1962, for
instance, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
issued a joint declaration in which Secretary Rusk expressed “the firm intention of the
United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression
and subversion.” The United States thereafter deployed armed forces to Thailand to assist
the government in combating communist forces. For text of the joint declaration, see DEPT.
OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1962, pp. 1091-1093.
98 See S. Rep. 91-129 (1969) (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report in favor of the
National Commitments Resolution, S. 85, criticizing the undertaking of “national
commitments” by the Executive, either through international agreements or unilateral
pledges to other countries, without congressional involvement). The vast majority of U.S.
military interventions in other countries have been to protect U.S. persons, property, or
(continued...)

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CRS-23
Although publicly available agreements expressly granting the United States the
legal right to intervene militarily in another country have generally taken the form of
a treaty, this report does not discuss whether any classified agreements have taken
another form.
Examples of Bilateral Security Agreements
The following sections discuss in greater detail the form, nature, and content
of bilateral security agreements made by the United States with Afghanistan,
Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
Afghanistan. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is “an act to promote the
foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples
of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external
security , and for other purposes.”99 Part I of the act, addressing international
development, established policy “to make assistance available, upon request, under
this part in scope and on a basis of long-range continuity essential to the creation of
an environment in which the energies of the peoples of the world can be devoted to
constructive purposes, free of pressure and erosion by the adversaries of freedom.”100
Part II of the act, addressing international peace and security, authorizes “measures
in the common defense against internal and external aggression, including the
furnishing of military assistance, upon request, to friendly countries and international
organizations.”101 The act authorizes the President “to furnish military assistance on
such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or
international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen
the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise
eligible to receive such assistance ...”102 The authorization to provide defense articles
and services, noncombatant personnel, and the transfer of funds is codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2311. While this authorization permits the President to provide military
assistance, it limits it to “assigning or detailing members of the Armed Forces of the
United States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of
a noncombatant nature.” 103
98 (...continued)
interests. See CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces
Abroad, 1798-2007, by Richard F. Grimmett. The Executive has historically claimed broad
authority to deploy armed forces to protect these interests, even in the absence of clear
congressional authorization. See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 4A U.S.
OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 185, Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad
Without Statutory Authorization (1980) (alleging presidential authority to deploy forces to
protect, and retaliate for injuries suffered by, U.S. persons and property).
99 75 Stat. 424.
100 Id. at 425.
101 Id. at 434.
102 Id. at 435.
103 22 U.S.C. § 2311(a)(2) (italics added).

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In 2002, the United States and Afghanistan, by an exchange of notes,104 entered
into an agreement regarding economic grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961,105 as amended, and for the furnishing of defense articles, defense services and
related training, including pursuant to the United States International Military and
Education Training Program (IMET),106 from the United States to the Afghanistan
Interim Administration.
An agreement exists regarding the status of U.S. military and civilian personnel
of the U.S. Department of Defense present in Afghanistan in connection with
cooperative efforts in response to terrorism, humanitarian and civic assistance,
military training and exercises, and other activities.107 Such personnel are to be
accorded “a status equivalent to that accorded to the administrative and technical
staff” of the U.S. Embassy under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of
1961.108 Accordingly, U.S. personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by
Afghan authorities, and are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction except
with respect to acts performed outside the course of their duties.109 In the agreement,
the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan110 explicitly authorized the U.S.
government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, and the
government of Afghanistan is not permitted to surrender U.S. personnel to the
custody of another state, international tribunal, or any other entity without consent
of the U.S. government. The agreement does not appear to provide immunity for
contract personnel.
The agreement with Afghanistan does not expressly authorize the United States
to carry out military operations within Afghanistan, but it recognizes that such
operations are “ongoing.” Congress authorized the use of military force there (and
elsewhere) by joint resolution in 2001, for targeting “those nations, organizations, or
persons [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001....”111 The U.N. Security Council implicitly
recognized that the use of force was appropriate in response to the September 11,
104 Exchange of notes at Kabul April 6 and 13, 2002. Entered into force April 13, 2002. Not
printed in Treaties and Other International Acts Series (T.I.A.S.).
105 P.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (September 4 1961).
106 22 U.S.C. § 2347 et seq.
107 T.I.A.S. Exchange of notes September 26 and December 12, 2002 and May 28, 2003.
Entered into force May 28, 2003.
108 Id.
109 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, T.I.A.S. 7502; 23 U.S.T.
3227.
110 The transitional government has since been replaced by the fully elected Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. For information about the political development of
Afghanistan since 2001, see Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance, CRS
Report RS21922, by Kenneth Katzman.
111 P.L. 107-40 (September 18, 2001); 115 Stat. 224.

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2001 terrorist attacks,112 and subsequently authorized the deployment of an
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan.113 Later U.N.
Security Council resolutions provide a continuing mandate for the ISAF (NATO
peacekeeping force),114 calling upon it to “work in close consultation with” Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF — the U.S.-led coalition conducting military operations in
Afghanistan) in carrying out the mandate.115 While there is no explicit U.N. mandate
authorizing the OEF, Security Council resolutions appear to provide ample
recognition of the legitimacy of its operations, most recently by calling upon the
Afghan Government, “with the assistance of the international community, including
the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom
coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they
evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan
posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, other extremist groups and criminal activities....”116
The United States and Afghanistan entered an acquisition and cross-servicing
agreement, with annexes, in 2004.117 An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
(ACSA) is an agreement providing logistic support, supplies, and services to foreign
militaries on a cash-reimbursement, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of equal value
basis.118 After consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to enter into an ACSA with a government of a NATO country, a
subsidiary body of NATO, or the United Nations Organization or any regional
international organization of which the United States is a member.119 Additionally,
the Secretary of Defense may enter into an ACSA with a country not included in the
above categories, if after consultation with the Secretary of State, a determination is
made that it is in the best interests of the national security of the United States.120 If
the country is not a member of NATO, the Secretary of Defense must submit notice,
at least 30 days prior to designation, to the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed
112 U.N.S.C. Res. 1368 (September 12, 2001) (“Recognizing the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence in accordance with the [UN] Charter,” and expressing its
“readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks”).
113 U.N.S.C. Res. 1386 (December 20, 2001).
114 The ISAF has its own status of forces agreement with the Afghan government in the form
of an annex to a Military Technical Agreement entitled “Arrangements Regarding the Status
of the International Security Assistance Force.” The agreement provides that all ISAF and
supporting personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national
elements for criminal or disciplinary matters, and that such personnel are immune from
arrest or detention by Afghan authorities and may not be turned over to any international
tribunal or any other entity or State without the express consent of the contributing nation.
115 See U.N.S.C. Res. 1776 § 5 (September 19, 2007); U.N.S.C. Res. 1707 § 4 (2007).
116 U.N.S.C. Res. 1746 § 25 (2007).
117 T.I.A.S. Signed at Doha and Kabul January 22 and February 16, 2004. Entered into
force February 16, 2004.
118 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2350.
119 Id. at § 2342(a)(1).
120 Id. at § 2342(b)(1).

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Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.121
On May 23, 2005, President Hamid Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint
declaration” outlining a prospective future agreement between the two countries.122
It envisions a role for U.S. military troops in Afghanistan to “help organize, train,
equip, and sustain Afghan security forces” until Afghanistan has developed its own
capacity, and to “consult with respect to taking appropriate measures in the event that
Afghanistan perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is
threatened or at risk.” The declaration does not mention the status of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, but a status of forces agreement can be expected to be part of the final
arrangement.
Germany. In 1951, the United States and Germany entered into an
agreement123 related to the assurances required under the Mutual Security Act of
1951.124 This act is “an act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy
and provide for the general welfare of the United States by furnishing [material]
assistance to friendly nations in the interest of international peace and security.”125
Specifically, the agreement references the “statement of purpose contained in
Section 2 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and reaffirms that....it [Germany] is
firmly committed to join in promoting international understanding and good will and
in maintaining world peace and to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon
to eliminate causes of international tension.”126 The statement of purpose in Section
2 of the act is
to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States
by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries
to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defense of the free
world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and
independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the
effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for
collective security.127
In 1955, the United States and Germany, both parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty, entered into an agreement on mutual defense assistance,128 obligating the
121 Id. at § 2342(b)(2).
122 [http://www.mfa.gov.af/Documents/ImportantDoc/US-Afghanistan%20Strategic%20P
artnership%20Declaration.pdf].
123 3 U.S.T. 4564; T.I.A.S. 2607; 181 U.N.T.S. 45. Exchange of letters at Bonn December
19 and 28, 1951.
124 P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373 (October 10, 1951).
125 Id.
126 3 U.S.T. 4564; T.I.A.S. 2607; 181 U.N.T.S. 45.
127 65 Stat. 373.
128 6 U.S.T. 5999; T.I.A.S. 3443; 240 U.N.T.S. 47. Signed at Bonn June 30, 1955. Entered
(continued...)

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United States to provide for “such equipment, materials, services, or other assistance
as may be agreed” to Germany.129 The agreement reflected the
desire to foster international peace and security through measures which further
the ability of nation dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations to participate effectively in arrangements for collective self-
defense in support of those purposes and principles, and conscious of the
determination to give their full cooperation to United Nations collective security
arrangements and measures and efforts to obtain agreement on universal
regulation of armaments under adequate guarantees against violation or evasion;
[and] considering the support which the Government of the United States of
America has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Security Act of
1954,130 which authorizes the furnishing of military assistance to certain
nations[.]131
Germany guarantees that it “will not use such assistance for any act inconsistent with
the strictly defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, without the prior
consent of the [United States], for any other purpose.132 The mutual defense
assistance agreement is the basis for numerous subsequent agreements between the
United States and Germany.133
In 1959, the counties entered into an agreement implementing the NATO SOFA
of 1953.134 The agreement provided additional supplemental agreements, beyond
those contained in the NATO SOFA, specific to the relationship between the United
States and Germany.
Japan. In 1954, the United States and Japan entered into a mutual defense
assistance agreement with annexes.135 The agreement was amended on April 18 and
June 23, 2006. The agreement references the Treaty of Peace signed between the
128 (...continued)
into force December 27, 1955.
129 Id.
130 P.L. 83-665, 68 Stat. 832 (August 26, 1954).
131 6 U.S.T. 5999; T.I.A.S. 3443; 240 U.N.T.S. 47.
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Mutual Defense Assistance: Disposition of Military Equipment and Materials.
6 U.S.T. 6005; T.I.A.S. 3444; 240 U.N.T.S. 69. Exchange of notes at Bonn June 30, 1955.
Entered into force December 27, 1955. Mutual Defense Assistance: Purchase of Certain
Military Equipment, Materials, and Services. 7 U.S.T. 2787; T.I.A.S. 3660; 278 U.N.T.S.
9. Exchange of notes at Washington October 8, 1956. Entered into force December 12,
1956. Defense: Training of German Army Personnel. 8 U.S.T. 149; T.I.A.S. 3753; 280
U.N.T.S. 63. Exchange of notes at Bonn December 12, 1956. Entered into force December
12, 1956.
134 14 U.S.T. 689; T.I.A.S. 5352; 490 U.N.T.S. 30. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.
Entered into force July 1, 1963.
135 5 U.S.T. 661; T.I.A.S. 2957; 232 U.N.T.S. 169. Signed at Tokyo March 8, 1954.
Entered into force May 1, 1954.

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countries in San Francisco, California in 1951.136 The Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949137 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951138 are also referenced in the
agreement as they provide for the furnishing of defense assistance by the United
States.139 The agreement provides that the United States and Japan “will make
available to the other and to such other governments as the two Governments
signatory to the present Agreement may in each case agree upon, such equipment,
materials, services, or other assistance as the Government furnishing such assistance
may authorize” subject to the conditions and provisions of the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and appropriation acts
which may affect the furnishing of assistance.140
The countries, in 1960, entered into the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security Between the United States of America and Japan.141 The treaty was
amended on December 26, 1990.142 Article III of the Treaty provides that the
countries, “individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous
and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their
constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.143 Article V provides
that the countries recognize “that an armed attack against either party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.”144 Under Article VI of the Treaty, the
United States is granted “the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and
areas in Japan” in order to contribute “to the security of Japan and maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East[.]”145 Article VI provides further that
the use of facilities and the status of U.S. armed forces will be governed under a
separate agreement.146
The countries, under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security Between the United States of America and Japan, entered into a SOFA in
136 3 U.S.T. 3169; T.I.A.S. 2490. Signed at San Francisco September, 8, 1951. Entered into
force April 28, 1952.
137 63 Stat. 714.
138 65 Stat. 373.
139 5 U.S.T. 661; T.I.A.S. 2957; 232 U.N.T.S. 169.
140 Id.
141 11 U.S.T. 1632; T.I.A.S. 4509; 373 U.N.T.S. 186. Signed at Washington January 19,
1960. Entered into force June 23, 1960.
142 T.I.A.S. 12335.
143 11 U.S.T. 1632; T.I.A.S. 4509; 373 U.N.T.S. 186.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.

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1960. 147 The SOFA addresses the use of facilities by the U.S. armed forces, as well
as the status of U.S. forces in Japan. The agreement has been modified at least four
times since the original agreement.148

South Korea. In 1948, the United States and South Korea entered into an
agreement related to the transfer of authority to the Government of South Korea and
the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces.149 Shortly after the initial agreement, the
United States and Korea entered into a second agreement concerning interim military
and security matters during a transitional period.150 This executive agreement was
between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, U.S.
Army Forces in Korea.151 The agreement calls for the “Commanding General, United
States Army Forces in Korea, pursuant to directives from his government and within
his capabilities” to “organize, train and equip the Security forces of the Republic of
Korea” with the obligation to train and equip ceasing “upon the completion of
withdrawal from Korea of forces under his command.”152 The agreement also
requires the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, to retain authority
to exercise over-all operational control of security forces of Korea until withdrawal,
as contemplated by Resolution No. II passed by the United Nations General
Assembly on November 14, 1948.153
Article III of the Agreement contains provisions related to the status of U.S.
forces during the transition period. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in
Korea, “shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over the personnel of his command, both
military and civilian, including their dependents, whose conduct as individuals shall
be in keeping with pertinent laws of the Republic of Korea.”154 The agreement
provides that any individuals under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General who
is apprehended by law enforcement agencies of South Korea shall be immediately
turned over to the custody and control of the Commanding General; individuals not
under jurisdiction of the Commanding General, but apprehended in acts detrimental
147 11 U.S.T. 1652; T.I.A.S. 4510; 373 U.N.T.S. 248. Signed at Washington January 19,
1960. Entered into force June 23, 1960.
148 Agreements concerning new special measures relating to Article XXIV (related to costs
of maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan and furnishment of of rights of way related to
facilities used by U.S. forces in Japan) of the agreement of January 19, 1960, have been
signed in 1991, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
149 Exchange of letters at Seoul August 9 and 11, 1948. Entered into force August 11, 1948.
150 62 Stat. 3817; T.I.A.S. 1918; 9 Bevans 477; 79 U.N.T.S. 57. Signed at Seoul August 24,
1948. Entered into force August 24, 1948.
151 Id.
152 62 Stat. 3818.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 3819.

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to the security of personnel or property under his jurisdiction, shall be turned over to
the custody and control of the government of South Korea.155
The countries, in 1950, entered into a mutual defense assistance agreement.156
The mutual defense agreement references the Military Defense Act of 1949, 157 which
provides for the furnishing of military assistance by the United States to South Korea.
The mutual defense assistance agreement provides that each country “will make or
continue to make available to the other, and to other Governments, such equipment,
materials, services, or other military assistance” in support of economic recovery that
is essential to international peace and security.158
The United States and South Korea entered into a mutual security agreement in
1952.159 The mutual security agreement references the Mutual Security Act of
1951,160 which provides for military, economic, and technical assistance in order to
strengthen the mutual security of the free world. The mutual security agreement
provides that South Korea agrees to promote international understanding and good
will and to take action, that is mutually agreed upon, to eliminate causes of
international tensions.161
In 1954 the countries entered into a mutual defense treaty.162 As part of the
treaty the countries agree to attempt to settle international disputes peacefully, consult
whenever the political independence or security of either party is threatened by
external armed attack, and that either party would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.163 Article IV of the treaty
grants the United States “the right to dispose....land, air and sea forces in and about
the territory” of South Korea.164 Pursuant to the treaty, specifically Article IV, the
countries entered into a SOFA with agreed minutes and an exchange of notes165 in
1966; it was subsequently amended January 18, 2001.

155 Id.
156 1 U.S.T. 137; T.I.A.S. 2019; 80 U.N.T.S. 205. Signed at Seoul January 26, 1950.
Entered into force January 26, 1950.
157 P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714 (October 6, 1949).
158 1 U.S.T. 137; T.I.A.S. 2019; 80 U.N.T.S. 205.
159 3 U.S.T. 4619; T.I.A.S. 2612; 179 U.N.T.S. 105. Exchange of notes at Pusan January 4
and 7, 1952. Entered into force January 7, 1952.
160 P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373 (October 10, 1951).
161 3 U.S.T. 4619; T.I.A.S. 2612; 179 U.N.T.S. 105.
162 5 U.S.T. 2368; T.I.A.S. 3097; 238 U.N.T.S. 199. Signed at Washington October 1, 1953.
Entered into force November 17, 1954.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 17 U.S.T. 1677; T.I.A.S. 6127; 674 U.N.T.S. 163. Signed at Seoul July 9, 1966. Entered
into force February 9, 1967.

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Philippines. In 1947 the United States and the Republic of the Philippines
entered into an agreement on military assistance.166 The agreement was for a term
of five years, starting July 4, 1946, and provided that the United States would furnish
military assistance to the Philippines for the training and development of armed
forces. The agreement further created an advisory group to provide advice and
assistance to the Philippines as had been authorized by the U.S. Congress.167 The
agreement was extended, and amended, for an additional five years in 1953.168
A mutual defense treaty was entered into by the United States and the
Philippines in 1951.169 The treaty publicly declares “their sense of unity and their
common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that
no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in
the Pacific Area[.]”170 The Treaty does not address or provide for a SOFA.
The countries entered into a mutual security agreement in 1952,171 as related to
the assurances required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The assurances required
under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 included a commitment to accounting
procedures for monies, equipment and materials furnished by the United States to the
Philippines.172
In 1993, the countries entered into a SOFA.173 The agreement was subsequently
extended on September 19, 1994, April 28, 1995, and November 29, December 1 and
8, 1995. The countries entered into an agreement regarding the treatment of U.S.
armed forces visiting the Philippines in 1998.174 This agreement was amended on
April 11 and 12, 2006. The distinction between this agreement and the SOFA
originally entered into in 1993 is that this agreement applies to U.S. armed forces
visiting, not stationed in the Philippines. The countries also entered into an
agreement regarding the treatment of Republic of Philippines personnel visiting the
United States.175
166 61 Stat. 3283; T.I.A.S. 1662. Signed at Manila March 21, 1947. Entered into force
March 21, 1947.
167 61 Stat. 3284.
168 4 U.S.T. 1682; T.I.A.S. 2834; 2163 U.N.T.S. 77. Exchange of notes at Manila June 26,
1953. Entered into force July 5, 1953.
169 3 U.S.T. 3947; T.I.A.S. 2529; 177 U.N.T.S. 133. Signed at Washington August 30, 1951.
Entered into force August 27, 1952.
170 Id.
171 3 U.S.T. 4644; T.I.A.S. 2617; 179 U.N.T.S. 193. Exchange of notes at Manila January
4 and 7, 1952. Entered into force January 7, 1952.
172 Id.
173 T.I.A.S. Exchange of notes at Manila April 2, June 11 and 21, 1993. Entered into force
June 21, 1993.
174 T.I.A.S. Signed at Manila February 10, 1998. Entered into force June 1, 1999.
175 T.I.A.S. Signed at Manila October 9, 1998. Entered into force June 1, 1999.

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III. Congressional Oversight
While it appears that a prospective U.S.-Iraqi security arrangement will impose
legal obligations upon the parties, it is not yet clear whether the agreement(s) will be
in the form of a treaty or executive agreement. Nonetheless, Congress has several
tools at its disposal to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, conclusion, and
implementation of any such agreement.
Notification
One manner in which Congress exercises oversight of international agreements
is via notification requirements. Obviously, in cases where an agreement requires
action from one or both Houses of Congress to take effect, notification is a requisite.
Before a treaty may become binding U.S. law, the President must submit it to the
Senate for its advice and consent. Likewise, the Executive needs to inform Congress
when he seeks to conclude an executive agreement that requires congressional
authorization and/or implementing legislation to become U.S. law, so that
appropriate legislation may be enacted.
While constitutional considerations necessitate congressional notification in
many circumstances, it has historically been more difficult for Congress to keep
informed regarding international agreements or pledges made by the Executive that
did not require additional legislative action to take effect — i.e., sole executive
agreements and executive agreements made pursuant to a treaty. Additionally, even
in cases where congressional action is necessary for an agreement to take effect, the
Executive has sometimes opted not to inform Congress about an agreement until it
has already been drafted and signed by the parties. In response to these concerns,
Congress has enacted legislation and the State Department has implemented
regulations to ensure that Congress is informed of the conclusion (and in some cases,
the negotiation) of legally binding international agreements.
Notification Pursuant to the Case-Zablocki Act. The Case-Zablocki Act
was enacted in 1972 in response to congressional concern that a number of secret
agreements had been entered by the Executive imposing significant commitments
upon the United States.176 It is the primary statutory mechanism used to ensure that
Congress is informed of international agreements entered by the United States.
Pursuant to the act, all executive agreements are required to be transmitted to
Congress within 60 days of their entry into force.177 If the President deems the
immediate public disclosure of an agreement to be prejudicial to national security,
the agreement may instead be transmitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The President is also required to
annually submit a report regarding international agreements that were transmitted
after the expiration of the 60-day period, describing the reasons for the delay.178
176 See H. REP. 92-1301, 92nd Cong. (1972).
177 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a).
178 Id. at §112b(b).

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Although the Case-Zablocki Act originally only imposed reporting requirements
with respect to executive agreements that had entered into force, the act was
amended in 2004 to ensure that Congress was regularly notified regarding the status
of proposed agreements, as well. The Secretary of State is required to annually
report to Congress a list of executive agreements that have not yet entered into force,
which (1) have not been published in the United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements compilation and (2) the United States has “signed,
proclaimed, or with reference to which any other final formality has been executed,
or that has been extended or otherwise modified, during the preceding calendar
year.”179
The Case-Zablocki Act does not define what sort of arrangements constitute
“international agreements” falling under its purview, though the legislative history
suggests that Congress “did not want to be inundated with trivia...[but wished] to
have transmitted all agreements of any significance.”180 In its implementing
regulations, the State Department has established criteria for determining whether an
arrangement constitutes a legally binding “international agreement” requiring
congressional notification. These include
! the identity of the parties, and whether they intended to create a
legally binding agreement;
! the significance of the agreed-upon arrangement, with “[m]inor or
trivial undertakings, even if couched in legal language and form,”
not considered to fall under the purview of the Case-Zablocki Act;
! the specificity of the arrangement;
! the necessity that the arrangement constitute an agreement by two or
more parties; and
! the form of the arrangement, to the extent that it helps to determine
whether the parties intended to enter a legally binding agreement.181
Notification Pursuant to Circular 175 Procedures. The State
Department’s Circular 175 procedure also contemplates that Congress will be
notified of developments in the negotiation of “significant” international agreements.
Specifically, Department regulations provide that
With the advice and assistance of the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs,
the appropriate congressional leaders and committees are advised of the intention
to negotiate significant new international agreements, consulted concerning such
agreements, and kept informed of developments affecting them, including
especially whether any legislation is considered necessary or desirable for the
implementation of the new treaty or agreement.182
179 Id. at § 112b(d).
180 H. REP. 92-1301, 92nd Cong. (1972).
181 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a).
182 11 F.A.M. § 725.1(5).

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As stated earlier, Bush Administration officials have stated that Administration “will
work closely with the appropriate committees of Congress to keep lawmakers
informed” about the prospective U.S.-Iraq agreement, and classified briefings on the
agreement have also begun.183
Annual Reporting of Security Arrangements Required by the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1991. In addition to the Case-Zablocki
Act, Congress has enacted legislation designed to ensure that it remains informed
about existing U.S. security arrangements. Section 1457 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510) requires the President to submit an
annual report to specified congressional committees regarding “United States security
arrangements with, and commitments to, other nations.”184 The report, produced in
classified and unclassified form, is to be submitted by February 1 each year to the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives.185 In addition to legally binding security
arrangements or commitments (e.g., mutual defense treaties and pre-positioning
agreements), the report must describe non-binding commitments, such as expressed
U.S. policy formulated by the executive branch. The report must also include, among
other things, “[a]n assessment of the need to continue, modify, or discontinue each
of those arrangements and commitments in view of the changing international
security situation.”186
Although reports were submitted to the appropriate committees pursuant to this
statutory requirement in 1991 and 1992, CRS has been unable to determine whether
any subsequent reports have been issued. In January 2008, CRS made an inquiry to
the document officers and clerks of several of the designated committees, but they
have been unable to find a record of any subsequent report being received. The
Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 (Sunset Act, P.L. 104-66)
terminated most reporting requirements existing prior to its enactment. The act
eliminated or modified several specific reporting requirements, and also generally
terminated any reporting requirement that had been listed in House Doc. 103-7,
unless such a requirement was specifically exempted. The reporting requirement
contained in § 1457 of the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act was neither
specifically terminated by the Sunset Act nor listed in House Doc. 103-7.
Accordingly, it does not appear that this requirement has been terminated.
Consultation
State Department regulations requiring consultation with Congress regarding
significant international agreements may provide a means for congressional oversight
as to the negotiation of a security arrangement with Iraq. One of the stated objectives
of the Circular 175 procedure is to ensure that “timely and appropriate consultation
183 Rice and Gates, supra note 9.
184 50 U.S.C. § 404c(a).
185 Id. at § 404c(c)-(d).
186 Id.

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is had with congressional leaders and committees on treaties and other international
agreements.”187 To that end, State Department regulations contemplate congressional
consultation regarding the conduct of negotiations to secure significant international
agreements.188 Although these regulations do not define what constitutes a
“significant” agreement, it seems reasonable to assume that the prospective U.S.-Iraqi
security arrangement would constitute such a compact, as the agreement would (at
least as envisioned in the U.S.-Iraqi Declaration of Principles) commit the United
States to provide security assurances to Iraq, arm and train Iraqi security forces, and
confront Al Qaeda and other terrorist entities within Iraqi territory.189 Such an
agreement appears to call for a more significant commitment of U.S. resources than
is required under most international agreements to which the United States is a party.
Circular 175 procedures may also provide for congressional consultation
concerning the form that a legally binding international agreement should take.
When there is question as to whether an international agreement should be concluded
as a treaty or an executive agreement, the matter is first brought to the attention of the
State Department’s Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs. If the Assistant Legal Adviser
for Treaty Affairs believes the issue to be “a serious one that may warrant formal
congressional consultation,”190 consultations are to be held with appropriate
congressional leaders and committees. State Department regulations specify that
“Every practicable effort will be made to identify such questions at the earliest
possible date so that consultations may be completed in sufficient time to avoid last
minute consideration.”191
Approval, Rejection, or Conditional Approval
of International Agreements
Perhaps the clearest example of congressional oversight in the agreement-
making context is through its consideration of treaties and congressional-executive
agreements. For a treaty to become binding U.S. law, it must first be approved by a
two-thirds majority in the Senate. The Senate may, in considering a treaty, condition
its consent on certain reservations, declarations and understandings concerning treaty
application. For example, it may make its acceptance contingent upon the treaty
being interpreted as requiring implementing legislation to take effect, or condition
approval on an amended version of the treaty being accepted by other treaty parties.
If accepted, these reservations, declarations, and understandings may limit and/or
define U.S. obligations under the treaty.
As previously discussed, a congressional-executive agreement requires
congressional authorization via a statute passed by both Houses of Congress. Here,
too, approval may be conditional. Congress may opt to authorize only certain types
187 11 F.A.M. § 722(4).
188 Id. at § 725.1(5).
189 Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
190 11 F.A.M. § 724.4(b)-(c).
191 Id. at § 724.4(b).

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of agreements, or may choose to approve only some provisions of a particular
agreement. In authorizing an agreement, Congress may impose additional statutory
requirements upon the Executive (e.g., reporting requirements). Congress may also
include a statutory deadline for its authorization of an agreement to begin or expire.
Because sole executive agreements do not require congressional authorization
to take effect, they need not be approved by Congress to become binding, at least as
a matter of international law. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, Congress may limit
a sole executive agreement through a subsequent legislative agreement or through the
conditioning of appropriations necessary for the agreement’s commitment to be
implemented.192
Implementation of an Agreement That Is Not Self-Executing
Congress may exercise oversight of international agreements via legislation
implementing the agreements’ requirements. Certain international treaties or
executive agreements are considered “self-executing,” meaning that they have the
force of law without the need for subsequent congressional action.193 However, many
other treaties and agreements are not considered self-executing, and are understood
to require implementing legislation to take effect, as enforcing U.S. agencies
otherwise lack authority to conduct the actions required to ensure compliance with
the international agreement.194
Treaties and executive agreements have, in part or in whole, been found to be
non-self-executing for at least three reasons: (1) implementing legislation is
constitutionally required; (2) the Senate, in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress,
by resolution, requires implementing legislation for the agreement to be given
force;195 or (3) the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective
as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation.196

Until implementing legislation is enacted, existing domestic law concerning a
matter covered by an international agreement that is not self-executing remains
192 See supra at 12-15. In the 110th Congress, legislation has been introduced that would
prohibit appropriations from being used to carry out any U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that
was not approved by the Senate as a treaty or authorized by legislation passed by both
Houses of Congress. See infra at 38-39.
193 For purposes of domestic law, a self-executing agreement may be superceded by either
a subsequently enacted statute or a new self-executing agreement. Whitney, 124 U.S. At
194
194 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, § 111(4)(a) & cmt. h.
195 For example, in the case of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), the Senate gave advice and consent subject
to a declaration that the treaty was not self-executing. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., October 27, 1990).
196 RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, § 111(4)(a) & n. 5-6.

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unchanged and is controlling law in the United States. However, when a treaty is
ratified or an executive agreement is entered, the United States acquires obligations
under international law and may be in default of those obligations unless
implementing legislation is enacted.197 Perhaps for this reason, Congress typically
appropriates funds necessary to carry out U.S. obligations under international
agreements.198
Although it is unclear what form the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement will take, it
is possible that at least some provisions will require implementing legislation. The
Department of Defense Appropriations Act FY2008 (P.L. 110-116), the Consolidated
Appropriations Act FY2008 (P.L. 110-161), and the National Defense Authorization
Act FY2008 (P.L. 110-181), for example, barred funds from being used to establish
permanent military bases in Iraq.199 The Consolidated Appropriations Act also
includes a measure intended to prevent the United States from entering an agreement
with Iraq that would make members of the U.S. Armed Forces subject to punishment
under Iraqi law.200
197 See id., § 111, cmt. h.
198 See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 166-170
(discussing congressional use of the appropriations power to influence the implementation
of international agreements by the United States).
199 In signing the National Defense Authorization Act FY2008 into law, President Bush
issued a statement that § 1222 of the act, which barred the funds the act made available from
being used to establish any permanent U.S. military installation in Iraq,
purport[s] to impose requirements that could inhibit the President’s ability to
carry out his constitutional obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, to protect national security, to supervise the executive branch, and to
execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The executive branch shall
construe [this provision] in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority
of the President.
President George W. Bush, Signing Statement for H.R. 4986, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, January 28, 2008, available at [http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-10.html]. In signing the Consolidated
Appropriations Act FY2008 into law, President Bush issued a more general statement that
provisions of the act would not be construed in a manner “inconsistent with [the
Executive’s] Constitutional responsibilities.” President George W. Bush, Signing Statement
for H.R. 2764, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 26,
2007, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071226-1.html].
Although a signing statement was issued by the President with respect to the interpretation
of specific provisions of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act FY2008, this
statement did not reference § 8113 of the act, which prohibits funds appropriated under any
congressional act from being used to construct permanent military bases in Iraq. President
George W. Bush, Signing Statement for H.R. 3222, the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2008, November 13, 2007, available at [http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071113-8.html]. For background on the legal implications of
presidential signing statements, see CRS Report RL33667, Presidential Signing Statements:
Constitutional and Institutional Implications, by T. J. Halstead.
200 Section 612, Division L of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-161) provides
that no funds made available under that division may be used to enter into “an agreement
with the Government of Iraq that would subject members of the Armed Forces of the United
(continued...)

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Continuing Oversight
After an international agreement has taken effect, Congress may still exercise
oversight over executive implementation. It may require the Executive to submit
information to Congress or congressional committees regarding U.S. implementation
of its international commitments. It may enact new legislation that modifies or
repudiates U.S. adherence or implementation of an international agreement. It may
limit or prohibit appropriations necessary for the Executive to implement the
provisions of the agreement, or condition such appropriations upon the Executive
implementing the agreement in a particular manner.
IV. Legislative Activity
Legislation has been introduced in the 110th Congress to ensure congressional
participation in the entering of any agreement emerging from the Declaration of
Principles between the United States and Iraq — including S. 2426, the
Congressional Oversight of Iraq Agreements Act of 2007, introduced by Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid on behalf of Senator Hillary Clinton on December 6,
2007; H.R. 4959, Iraq Strategic Agreement Review Act of 2008, introduced by
Representative Rosa DeLauro on January 15, 2008; and H.R. 5128, introduced by
Representative Barbara Lee on January 23, 2007.
All three bills would bar funds from being made available or appropriated to
implement certain types of formal agreements emerging from the U.S-Iraq
Declaration of Principles. S. 2426 would deny funds to implement any U.S.-Iraq
agreement involving “commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole,”
including a SOFA agreement, unless the agreement was approved by the Senate as
a treaty or by Congress through legislation. H.R. 4959, in contrast, would condition
appropriations to implement any agreement emerging from the Declaration of
Principles upon that agreement being approved as a treaty by the Senate, while H.R.
5128 would condition appropriations for the implementation of such an agreement
upon it being approved by an act of Congress.
H.R. 5128 also includes a provision stating that an agreement between the
United States and Iraq must be approved by an act of Congress in order to have legal
200 (...continued)
States to the jurisdiction of Iraq criminal courts or punishment under Iraq law.” While
Congress has occasionally barred funds from being used by the Executive to negotiate
international agreements, some have argued that this practice is unconstitutional, given the
President’s authority to “make” treaties and his significant authority in foreign affairs. See,
e.g., Charles J. Cooper et al., What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 165, 200 (1988) (section written by Sen. Orrin Hatch, arguing that Congress
may not deny funds from being used by the President to receive ambassadors, negotiate
treaties, and deliver foreign policy addresses); J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of
the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1211 (arguing the Congress may not use its appropriations
power to limit the President’s ability to negotiate international agreements).

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effect. This provision may raise serious legal concerns given the Constitution’s
specification that treaties approved by the Senate have status as the “Law of the
Land.” H.R. 4959 and S. 2426 include provisions expressing the sense of Congress
that a prospective U.S.-Iraq agreement should take a particular form in order to have
legal effect, but these provisions appear to raise less significant constitutional
concerns given their non-binding nature.
With respect to consultation, H.R. 4959 includes a provision requiring that
specified members of the executive branch consult with congressional committees
and leadership on any potential long-term security, economic, or political agreement
between the United States and Iraq. S. 2426 does not include a consultation
requirement, but instead requires the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State to
submit a report to Congress justifying any decision by the Executive not to consult
with Congress before concluding a security arrangement with Iraq in the form of a
sole executive agreement.

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