Order Code RS21968
Updated February 14, 2008
Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The current government is the product of a U.S.-supported election process
designed to produce a democracy, although many now believe it produced a sectarian
government incapable of reconciling Iraq’s communities. This sentiment has grown to
the point where some believe that the United States should seek a decentralized Iraq
with substantial autonomy for each community. However, the Administration says that,
partly as a result of the U.S. “troop surge,” it is now seeing some concrete signs of
political accommodation, most notably at local levels. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of formal occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to
an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly,
provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad), and
a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position on electoral
lists in order to ensure 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the
national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the
overall population), perceiving electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats
and very few provincial council seats. Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s
51-seat council. The faction of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr also mostly
boycotted the provincial elections because he was opposing the U.S.-led political process;
his supporters did not win many seats on the provincial councils of the mostly Shiite
south. After the elections, an interim national government was formed that U.S. officials
said was not sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, although it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker,
deputy president, deputy prime minister, defense minister, and five other ministers. The
presidency went to Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani and Da’wa
leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.

---

CRS-2
Permanent Constitution. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by
August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-
thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, the Assembly
appointed a 55-member drafting committee which included only two Sunni Arabs,
although 15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 more as advisors. In August
2005, the talks produced a draft that set a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a
referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designated
Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can contradict the “established”
provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 set a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowed
families to choose which courts to use for family issues such as divorce and inheritance
(Article 41); made only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and said that the
federal supreme court would include Islamic law experts and civil law judges and experts
(Article 89). These provisions concerned many women who fear that too much discretion
was given to males of their families, and many women say the provision is being misused
by Islamic extremists in southern Iraq and elsewhere to impose, including through
killings, restrictions against women. Article 126 made all orders of the U.S.-led
occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA), applicable until amended.
The major disputes were — and continue to be — centered on the draft’s allowing
two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and to allocate oil
revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces, which
would legitimize the fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the
TAL). Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
“current fields” in proportion to population, and gave “regions” a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunnis opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunni-
dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields might lie
in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
with its size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date).
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat it, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11) providing for
a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election
government took office (Article 137). The amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. However, in the referendum, the
Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.
Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” which meant that the constitution was
adopted (only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by a two-thirds majority).
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. As
shown in the table below, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the
1 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

---

CRS-3
UIA and the Kurds again dominated the elected COR, as they had in the January election.
The full term COR was inaugurated on March 16, but wrangling ensued and Kurdish and
other opposition caused the UIA to agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki,
as Prime Minister. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president,
and selected his two deputies — Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the Consensus Front. Another
Consensus Front figure, the hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council
party), was chosen COR speaker. Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 37-
member cabinet (including himself and two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006.
Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently
until June 8 because of infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; 19
Shiites; and 1 Christian. Four are women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks and Reconciliation
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-
28), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15 and September 15 — was required for the United
States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The president
indicated intent to use the waiver provision. The law mandated a separate assessment by
the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been
achieved, as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside
commission (headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results of the assessments, as well as
subsequent legislative actions and implementation, are shown in the chart below.
Many experts agree that Iraq’s major communities remain sharply divided over their
relative positions in the power structure, but the Administration sees signs of movement,
perhaps attributed to the success of the 2007 “troop surge” in reducing violence. The
February 13, 2008 passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of two significant
laws (amnesty law and provincial powers law, discussed below) and the 2008 national
budget, represented clear breakthroughs. The effect on reconciliation will depend on
implementation. The budget had been help up over Iraqi Arab assertions that the 17%
revenue allocation to the Kurdish region was too generous – a figure already agreed to
in previous budgets. The Kurds accepted a national census to determine long term
percentage allocations for the Kurds, and the budget apparently does not fund the Kurds’
peshmerga militia, who are now funded from the Kurds’ own regional funds. This
follows the January 12, 2008 passage of the De-Baathification reform law and the
January 22, 2008 adoption (not part of those named in P.L. 110-28 but cited by the Iraqi
themselves) of a law adopting a new national flag. Many Iraqi Arabs say the new flag was
adopted only because of Kurdish pressure and some factions refuse to fly it. These
recent steps, to some degree, represent achievement of the steps committed to by signed
by Hashimi, Maliki, Talabani, Abd al-Mahdi, and Kurdish regional president Masoud
Barzani in their August 26, 2007, “Unity Accord”.
Others signs point to a political stabilization of Prime Minister Maliki, who was
reeling in mid-2007 by the pullout of the cabinet of several major blocs, including the
Consensus Front, the Sadr faction, and the secular bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-
Allawi. Those withdrawals left the cabinet with about 16 vacant seats out of a 37 seat

---

CRS-4
cabinet. As of late 2007, Maliki’s government has strengthened somewhat. Maliki
filled two vacancies (agriculture and health ministers) in October 2007 with independent
Shiites, replacing resigned Sadrists, although he failed in November 2007 to win COR
confirmation for new ministers of justice or communications. At the same time, Minister
of Planning Ali Baban broke with his Consensus Front bloc and rejoined the cabinet,
leaving the cabinet with 13 vacancies. As of February 2008, the Iraqi Islamic Party, the
main faction of the Consensus Front, reportedly is considering rejoining the cabinet. All
blocs, including the Consensus Front, have ended their 2007 boycotts of the COR.
Another positive development came in December 2007 with agreement by the Kurds to
delay the contentious, constitutionally mandated referendum on Kirkuk until June 2008;
it was to be held by December 31. On the other hand, demonstrating that new alliances
are forming across sectarian lines, 120 parliamentarians from Sadr’s faction, Allawi’s
faction, and part of the Da’wa Party members signed a statement on January 13, 2008,
opposing Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk and energy deals signed by the Kurds.
Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats after departure
of Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (29 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 29 seats; Da’wa Party (faction
140
128
of Nuri al-Maliki, and a competing faction - 25 seats; and independents - 30.
Sadr faction not formally in UIA for January 2005 election.
Kurdistan Alliance - joint list of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan
75
53
Democratic Party.
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
40
25
(2 members left the bloc in September 2007, leaving it with 23 seats)
Iraq Consensus Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi
—
44
Islamic Party (IIP) of Tariq al-Hashimi; National Dialogue Council of
Khalaf Ulayyan; and General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi.
Hardline Sunni group Muslim Scholars Association did not join slate but did
not call for election boycott, as it had in January vote.
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-
—
11
Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

---

CRS-5
Table 1. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
GAO
Sept. 14
Administration
Report
Administration
Subsequent Actions
Report
Report
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
satisfactory
unmet
satisfactory
No recent discernible progress. Deadlines for CRC
(CRC) and completing review
recommendations repeatedly extended, now to May 2008.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
unsatisfactory
unmet
satisfactory
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by
Baathification
143 in COR present. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking
Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three
party ranks would receive pensions instead. But, could allow for
judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing of about 7,000
ex-Baathists in post-Saddam security services, and bars ex-
Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
no passage of oil laws, but revenue being distributed equitably.
equitable distribution of resources
2008 budget adopted February 13, 2008 at least temporarily
maintains existing 17% revenue share for Kurdish region.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semi-
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
Regions law passed October 2006, but main blocs agreed to
autonomous regions
met
moratorium on implementation until April 2008.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish
satisfactory on
overall
satisfactory on (a)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted
a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial
(a) and
unmet; (a)
and (c).
February 13, 2008, and COR agreed to hold provincial elections
elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of
unsatisfactory
met
by October 1, 2008. Election law will need to be adopted first.
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial
on the others
Some of the nine Higher Election Commission (IHEC) members
elections
to be replaced due to “non-transparent” selection process, despite
passage of IHEC law in May 2007.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
conditions do
unmet
conditions do not
Crucial to Sunnis who are the overwhelming majority of detainees
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
not allow a
allow a rating
in Iraq, the law to amnesty 5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees held by
rating
Iraq passed on February 13, 2008. However, would not affect
25,000 detainees held by U.S, and, depending on implementation,
might not lead to freedom for other approximately 20,000
detainees held by Iraq.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
conditions do
unmet
conditions do not
No progress on disarmament program or related laws
disarmament
not allow rating
allow rating
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
satisfactory
met
met
No change
services committee to support U.S. Baghdad
“surge”

---

CRS-6
Benchmark
July 12
GAO
Sept. 14
Administration
Report
Administration
Subsequent Actions
Report
Report
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
No change
support U.S. surge
met
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
unsatisfactory
unmet
Mixed: satisfactory
No significant change
make decisions, without political intervention, to
to pursue extremists,
pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
b u t p o l i t i c a l
Shiite militias
i n t e r f e r e n c e
continues
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing
unsatisfactory
unmet
overall mixed.
No significant change.
even-handed enforcement of law
Satisfactory on Iraqi
military,
unsatisfactory on
police
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
No change. Mahdi Army at reduced level of activity due to
provide a safe haven for any outlaw, regardless of
met
Sadr six month suspension and reported decline in Iranian
sectarian affiliation
weapons shipments. Sadr might end suspension in later Feb.
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Overall mixed.
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating.
eliminating militia control of local security
Satisfactory on
80,000 Sunni “Concerned Local Citizens” and 15,000 tribal
(a) but
“Awakening” fighters combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
unsatisfactory
by Maliki government as potential Sunni militia forces. Only
on (b)
15% CLC’s have been allowed to join ISF.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
No change
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say
independently
ISF likely unable to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and
against external threats not until 2018-2020.
16. Ensuring protection of rights of minority parties
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
No change
in Iraqi parliament
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
About 4.5% of the $10 billion spent by August 2007, according
capital budget for reconstruction projects, on an
met
to Iraqi figures. $13 billion more in 2008 Iraqi budget adopted
equitable basis
on February 13, 2008.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities are not
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
No change
undermining or making false accusations against
ISF members

---