Order Code RL32922
Meat and Poultry Inspection:
Background and Selected Issues
Updated February 7, 2008
Geoffrey S. Becker
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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Meat and Poultry Inspection:
Background and Selected Issues
Summary
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) must inspect most meat, poultry, and processed egg products for
safety, wholesomeness, and labeling. Federal inspectors or their state counterparts
are present at all times in virtually all slaughter plants and for at least part of each day
in establishments that further process meat and poultry products. Debate has ensued
for decades over whether this system, designed in the early 1900s, has kept pace with
changes in the food production and marketing industries. Current issues include:
Is enough being done to address longstanding concerns about naturally
occurring microbiological contamination? In 1996, FSIS added a sweeping new
system known as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) — essentially
plant-specific contamination prevention plans — on top of the traditional “sight-,
smell-, and touch-based” inspection system. However, large recalls due to pathogen
problems are still occurring. Proposals to delineate pathogen performance standards
and/or safe tolerance levels are part of H.R. 1148, S. 654, and H.R. 3624.
Should USDA have more authority to recall suspect meat and poultry products?
Recall provisions are in H.R. 1148/S. 654, H.R. 2108/S. 1274, and H.R. 3484. The
Senate but not the House-passed farm bill (H.R. 2419) would require USDA to
establish a notification system for companies to report potentially adulterated meat
and poultry.
Is legislation needed to improve the ability to trace animals, meat, and poultry
products? One bill (H.R. 1018) would prohibit a mandatory animal ID system;
another (H.R. 2301) would set up a producer-run program. S. 1292 and H.R. 3485
both would require more extensive farm-to-fork traceability systems.
Does FSIS have adequate funding and resources, and/or should industry pay
more for inspection? FSIS inspection is mainly funded through USDA’s annual
appropriation. Congress has denied successive Administrations’ proposals for new
user fees. Separately, Congress has delayed implementation of a controversial new
“risk based inspection system” (RBIS) aimed at shifting some existing FSIS
resources from processing plants and products that pose relatively lower safety risks
to others posing relatively higher risks. Division A of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161), delays the RBIS until USDA can address
any findings in a forthcoming Office of Inspector General report on it. On February
4, 2008, the FY2009 budget cycle began with submission of the President’s budget,
which includes a modest increase for FSIS.
Should state-inspected meat and poultry products be allowed in interstate
commerce? Both the House-passed and Senate-passed farm bills authorize state-
inspected shipments, but under divergent approaches. A final version of this
provision likely will be determined in a House-Senate conference on the farm bill in
early 2008.

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Contents
Background on the Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statutory Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Egg Products Inspection Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
System Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Plant Sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
HACCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Slaughter Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Processing Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pathogen Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Staffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
State Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Import Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Microbiological Contamination and HACCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Development of HACCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Pathogen Performance Standards and Salmonella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
E. coli O157:H7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Topps Recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
USDA Actions in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Listeria monocytogenes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
In Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Other Selected Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Recall and Enforcement Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Meat Traceability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Funding and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Risk-Based Inspection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
User Fee Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
State-Inspected Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Food Safety Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Horse Slaughter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
BSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
North American Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
BSE Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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Meat and Poultry Inspection:
Background and Selected Issues
Background on the Programs
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) is responsible for inspecting most meat, poultry, and processed egg
products for safety, wholesomeness, and proper labeling. Federal inspectors or their
state counterparts are present at all times in virtually all slaughter plants and for at
least part of each day in establishments that further process meat and poultry
products. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for ensuring the safety of virtually
all other human foods, including seafood, and for animal drugs and feed ingredients.1
Recently, the effectiveness of the FSIS inspection system has been compared
favorably (by some) to FDA’s, particularly with regard to its import safety program.
At the same time, large recalls of fresh and processed meat and poultry products,
often due to microbiological contamination, and illness outbreaks caused by such
products, continue to challenge the industry and government regulators. What if any
changes should Congress consider to improve safety oversight of meat and poultry
production?
Statutory Authorities
Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906. This law as amended (21 U.S.C.
601 et seq.) has long required USDA to inspect all cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses,
mules, and other equines brought into any plant to be slaughtered and processed into
products for human consumption. Since passage of the FY2006 USDA appropriation
(P.L. 109-97, Section 798), these types of animals are now called “amenable
species,” and the Secretary of Agriculture now has the discretion to add additional
species to the list (but has not yet done so).
Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957. This law as amended (21
U.S.C. 451 et seq.) makes poultry inspection mandatory for any domesticated birds
intended for use as human food. The current list of included species is chickens,
turkeys, ducks, geese, guineas, ratites (ostrich, emu, and rhea), and squabs (pigeons
up to one month old).
1 This report does not compare and contrast FSIS responsibilities with those of FDA, which
are separately authorized and operate under a considerably different regulatory framework.
These differences could have significance in the longstanding debate over the need, if any,
for reorganizing U.S. food safety authorities and programs. See CRS Report RS22600, The
Federal Food Safety System: A Primer, by Geoffrey S. Becker and Donna V. Porter.

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Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. Under this law as amended (7 U.S.C.
1621), FSIS also provides voluntary inspection for buffalo, antelope, reindeer, elk,
migratory waterfowl, game birds, and rabbits, which the industry can request on a
fee-for-service basis. These meat and poultry species (which are not specifically
covered by the mandatory inspection statutes) are regulated by FDA under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) if they are
not inspected under the voluntary FSIS program. FDA has jurisdiction over meat
products from such species in interstate commerce, even if they bear the USDA
inspection mark.
Egg Products Inspection Act. This law as amended (21 U.S.C. 1031 et
seq.) is the authority under which FSIS assures the safety of liquid, frozen, and dried
egg products, domestic and imported, and the safe disposition of damaged and dirty
eggs. FDA holds regulatory authority over shell eggs used in restaurants and sold in
stores.
USDA Meat Grading
USDA meat and poultry grading is distinct and separate from the FSIS safety
inspection program. Upon request, firms may request that inspectors from a
separate USDA agency, the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), grade their
products for quality attributes, but only after it has been cleared by FSIS for safety
and wholesomeness. Unlike safety inspection, which is mandatory and largely
covered by appropriated funds, grading services are voluntary and funded by
industry user fees.

Nationally uniform quality grades are used to convey, to buyers and sellers,
such traits as tenderness, flavor, and juiciness, and so forth. For example, AMS
now grades beef carcasses as prime, choice, select, standard and commercial,
utility, cutter, and canner; these grades are not usually visible on individual retail
cuts but can appear on the packages. Grades are also available for veal, lamb, and
poultry. Legislative authority for quality (and yield) grades comes through the
Agricultural Marketing Act (7 U.S.C. 1621).
System Basics
Coverage. FSIS’s legal inspection responsibilities begin when animals arrive
at slaughterhouses, and they generally end once products leave processing plants.
Certain custom slaughter and most retail store and restaurant activities are exempt
from federal inspection; however, they may be under state inspection.
Plant Sanitation. No meat or poultry establishment can slaughter or process
products for human consumption until FSIS approves in advance its plans and
specifications for the premises, equipment, and operating procedures. Once this
approval is granted and operations begin, the plant must continue to follow a detailed
set of rules that cover such things as proper lighting, ventilation, and water supply;
cleanliness of equipment and structural features; and employee sanitation procedures.

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HACCP. Plants are required to have a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP) plan for their slaughter and/or processing operations. Essentially,
a plant must identify each point in the process where contamination could occur,
called a “critical control point,” have a plan to control it, and document and maintain
records. Under HACCP regulations, all operations must have site-specific standard
operating procedures (SOPs) for sanitation. USDA inspectors check records to verify
a plant’s compliance (see “Selected Issues” for more on HACCP).
Slaughter Inspection. FSIS inspects all meat and poultry animals to look
for signs of disease, contamination, and other abnormal conditions, both before and
after slaughter (“antemortem” and “postmortem,” respectively), on a continuous basis
— meaning that no animal may be slaughtered and dressed unless an inspector has
examined it. One or more federal inspectors are on the line during all hours the plant
is operating.
Processing Inspection. The inspection statutes appear to be silent on how
frequently USDA inspector must visit facilities that produce processed products like
hot dogs, lunch meat, prepared dinners, and soups. Under current policies,
processing plants visited once every day by an FSIS inspector are considered to be
under continuous inspection in keeping with the laws. Inspectors monitor operations,
check sanitary conditions, examine ingredient levels and packaging, review records,
verify HACCP processes, and conduct statistical sampling and testing of products
during their on-site visits.
Pathogen Testing. The HACCP rule also mandates two types of microbial
testing: for generic E. coli and for Salmonella. Levels of these two organisms are
indicators of conditions that either suppress or encourage the spread of such
potentially dangerous bacteria as Campylobacter and E. coli O157:H7, as well as
Salmonella itself. Test results (plants test for E. coli and FSIS for Salmonella) help
FSIS inspectors verify that plant sanitation procedures are working, and to identify
and assist plants whose process controls may be underperforming.
In the initial years of HACCP implementation, plants that failed three
consecutive Salmonella tests could have their USDA inspectors withdrawn. This
would effectively shut down the plant until the problem could be remedied. A
federal court ruling in 2000, upheld on appeal in 2001, made such enforcement
illegal. Nonetheless, FSIS inspectors still test samples for Salmonella and use the
results as one of a number of indicators of plant performance.2
Enforcement. FSIS has a range of enforcement tools to prevent adulterated
or mislabeled meat and poultry from reaching consumers. On a day-to-day basis, if
plant conditions or procedures are found to be unsanitary, an FSIS inspector can, by
refusing to perform inspection, temporarily halt the plant’s operation until the
problem is corrected. FSIS can condemn contaminated, adulterated, and misbranded
products, or parts of them, and detain them so they cannot progress down the
2 FSIS also samples meat tissues for drug and pesticide residues, but FDA and the FFDCA,
along with the Environmental Protection Agency and its statutes, are the guiding authorities
for such residues.

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marketing chain. FSIS does not have mandatory recall authority; if potentially
dangerous or mislabeled products do enter commerce, the agency relies on
establishments to voluntarily recall them.
Other tools include warning letters for minor violations; requests that companies
voluntarily recall a potentially unsafe product; a court-ordered product seizure if such
a request is denied; and referral to federal attorneys for criminal prosecution.
Prosecutions under certain conditions may lead to the withdrawal of federal
inspection from offending firms or individuals, which results in plant closure.
Funding. Federal appropriations pay for most, but not all, mandatory
inspection. In FY2008, FSIS received an annual appropriation of $930 million. In
addition, FSIS uses revenue from fees paid by the meat and poultry industries for
FSIS inspection that occurs beyond regularly scheduled shifts and on holidays, and
by private laboratories that apply for FSIS certification to perform official meat
testing and sampling. In FY2008, revenue from the fees was expected to amount to
approximately $141 million in additional program support, for a combined funding
level of more than $1 billion. Combined spending levels are estimated to increase
in FY2008 and FY2009, respectively.
Staffing. FSIS carries out its duties with about 9,400 total staff (full-time
equivalent). Approximately 7,800 of FSIS’s employees, roughly 1,000 of them
veterinarians, are in approximately 6,200 establishments and import inspection
facilities nationwide.
State Inspection. Twenty-seven states have their own meat and/or poultry
inspection programs covering approximately 2,000 small or very small
establishments. The states run the programs cooperatively with FSIS, which provides
up to 50% of the funds for operating them, comprising about $50 million of the total
FSIS budget annually (plus an additional $7.5 million in indirect costs for FSIS state-
related activities). A state program operating under a cooperative agreement with
FSIS must demonstrate that its system is equivalent to federal inspection. However,
state-inspected meat and poultry products are limited to intrastate commerce only.
In states that have discontinued their inspection systems for meat or poultry (or
both), FSIS has assumed responsibility for inspection at the formerly state-inspected
plants. However, actual inspection is performed by state personnel.
Import Inspection. FSIS conducts evaluations of foreign meat safety
programs and visits establishments to determine that they are providing a level of
safety equivalent to that of U.S. safeguards. No foreign plant can ship meat or
poultry to the United States unless its country has received such an FSIS
determination. Once they reach U.S. ports of entry, meat and poultry import
shipments must first clear Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspection to
assure that only shipments from countries free of certain animal and human disease
hazards are allowed entry. This function was transferred to DHS from USDA’s
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) when DHS was established by
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). After DHS inspection, imported

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meat and poultry shipments go to one of about 120 nearby FSIS inspection facilities
for final clearance into interstate commerce.3
Microbiological Contamination and HACCP
Large recent recalls of meat and poultry products, often due to microbiological
contamination, have brought closer attention to USDA’s and industry’s record in
detecting harmful pathogens and preventing them from reaching consumers and
making them sick. Although government officials assert that the number of both
recalls and illnesses has declined over the long term, developments in the last one to
two years have suggested mixed results in sustaining this overall decline.4
For example, the 20 recalls tied to E. Coli O157:H7 in 2007 were more than in
any year since the early 2000s. The largest in 2007 was of nearly 22 million pounds
of frozen ground beef products in September (see below). This recall and others have
caused some in Congress to question not only the effectiveness of USDA’s pathogen
prevention programs but also its recall policies.
Development of HACCP
In the early 1990s, following years of debate over how to respond to mounting
evidence that invisible, microbiological contamination on meat and poultry posed
greater public health risks than visible defects (the focus of traditional inspection
methods), FSIS began to add testing for pathogenic bacteria on various species and
products to its inspection system.
In 1995, under existing statutes, FSIS published a proposed rule to systematize
these program changes in a mandatory program called the Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) system. In this system, firms must analyze risks in
each phase of production, identifying and then monitoring “critical control points”
for preventing such hazards, with corrective actions taken when necessary. Record
keeping and verification are used to ensure that the system is working. FSIS
published the final rule on July 25, 1996, and since January 2000 all slaughter and
processing operations are required to have HACCP plans in place. HACCP is
intended to operate as an adjunct to the traditional methods of inspection, which still
are mandatory under the original statutes.5
3 As of late 2007, FSIS had determined the equivalency of meat or poultry programs in 38
countries. See also CRS Report RL34198, U.S. Food and Agricultural Imports: Safeguards
and Selected Issues, by Geoffrey S. Becker.
4 See for example Richard Raymond, Under Secretary of Food Safety, comments at an
October 23, 2007, news conference regarding recent USDA actions on E. coli O157:H7, at
[http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.retrieveconten
t/.c/6_2_1UH/.ce/7_2_5JM/.p/5_2_4TQ/.d/1/_th/J_2_9D/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?PC_7_2_
5JM_contentid=2007%2F10%2F0301.xml&PC_7_2_5JM_parentnav=TRANSCRIPTS_
SPEECHES&PC_7_2_5JM_navid=TRANSCRIPT#7_2_5JM]. More on recent data is
contained in the sections of this CRS report on selected pathogens.
5 The final rule appeared in 61 Federal Register 38805-38855.

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Scientific Advice on Performance Standards
National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods. The
committee, established in 1988 to provide scientific advice to the Secretaries of
Agriculture and of Health and Human Services on public health issues, concluded
in a report issued in October 2002 that “performance standards that meet the
principles as outlined in this document [i.e., standards that are based on
quantitative rather than qualitative data] are valuable and useful tools to define an
expected level of [pathogen] control in one or more steps in the process.” (The
report is at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPHS/nacmcf/rep_stand.htm].)

Institute of Medicine-NRC. A second review of microbiological
performance standards, Scientific Criteria to Ensure Safe Food, was released in
2003 by the Institute in collaboration with the National Research Council (NRC).
Among many recommendations, this report calls on Congress to “grant the
regulatory agencies clear authority to establish, implement, and enforce food safety
criteria, including performance standards, and the flexibility needed within the
administrative process to update these criteria.”

The Institute report also makes specific recommendations for FSIS to
improve meat and poultry safety, including (1) to conduct surveys to evaluate
changes over time in the microbiological status of certain components of processed
meats and poultry; (2) to expand E. coli O157:H7 testing, identify control points
for E. coli O157:H7 back to the farm level, and inform consumers that even
irradiated ground beef must be cooked to a temperature that kills the pathogen; and
(3) to greatly expand generic E. coli criteria, and Salmonella performance
standards, for beef trim intended for grinding. (This report may be accessed at
[http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10690.html].)
Pathogen Performance Standards and Salmonella
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has noted that
poultry is an important source of human Salmonella infections. It also occasionally
has been found in beef. CDC in 2007 had reported that overall, incidence of
Salmonella infections through all types of food has not decreased significantly.6
CDC also reported that Salmonella accounted for nearly 39% of human foodborne
illnesses in 2006, making it the most common foodborne pathogen.
The meat and poultry inspection statutes do not give USDA the authority to use
Salmonella standards as the basis for withdrawing inspection from a plant that has
not met them, a federal court ruled in 2000, and an appeals court upheld in 2001.
Subsequently, USDA has adopted the position that the court decision did not affect
the agency’s ability to use the standards as part of the verification of plants’
sanitation and HACCP plans.
6 CDC, “Preliminary FoodNet Data on the Incidence of Infection with Pathogens
Transmitted Commonly Through Food — 10 States, 2006,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report, April 13, 2007, available at [http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/].

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Nonetheless, the appeals court ruling supports arguments of those who say that
pathogen testing results should not be a basis for enforcement actions until scientists
can determine what constitutes an unsafe level of Salmonella in ground meat and a
number of other meat and poultry products. Consumer groups and other supporters
of mandatory testing and microbiological standards, as well as of increased
enforcement powers, have used the case to bolster their argument for amending the
meat and poultry inspection statutes to specify microbiological standards.
FSIS had reported its concern about “increases in Salmonella rates observed
over the past three years (2003-2005) among the three poultry product categories,
broiler carcasses, ground chicken, and ground turkey. Increases were observed for
all three classes in 2003 and 2005 and in each year for broiler carcasses.”7
To address the problem, in early 2006 the agency launched an initiative to
reduce the pathogen in raw meat and poultry products, including the concentration
of more inspection resources at establishments with higher levels, and quarterly
rather than annual reporting of Salmonella test results. Sampling frequency was to
be based on a combination of factors such as a plant’s regulatory history and its
incidence of the pathogen.8 A notice and request for comments on this initiative were
published in the February 27, 2006, Federal Register.
Salmonella testing results for 2006, posted on the agency’s website, offer a
mixed picture. On the one hand, the data indicate that the incidence of the bacterium
found in broiler chickens was down significantly from 2005 and at or near the lowest
levels found. On the other hand, the rate of positives in ground chicken climbed
substantially from 2005 to 2006, and the year-to-year changes for other tested
products and animals varied. The incidence of positive Salmonella tests on broilers
for the first three quarters of 2007 (the period available at the time of this CRS
update) was 8.5% (out of 7,711 samples), compared with 11.4% (out of 10,206
samples) for all four quarters of 2006. The Salmonella incidence for ground chicken
was 29% (out of 350 samples) for the first three quarters of 2007, compared with
45% (out of 222 samples) for all of 2007, according to FSIS.9
FSIS on January 28, 2008, issued a notice on new policies and procedures for
Salmonella sampling and testing. One change will be to post on its website,
beginning March 28, sample test results from establishments — beginning with
7 Report on FSIS testing results for Salmonella, posted with those for E. coli O157:H7 on
the Internet at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Microbiology/index.asp]. In July 2006 the
advocacy group Food & Water Watch released the names of 106 broiler plants in 27 states
and Puerto Rico that failed to reach federal Salmonella standards between 1998 and 2005.
8 Food Chemical News, July 3, 2006.
9 At [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Microbiology/index.asp] FSIS cautions that “the
restructuring of Salmonella set scheduling means that comparison of results from 2006
onwards to previous years will be inappropriate. Similarly, the changes to the verification
program will prevent valid comparisons of testing results over time (e.g., quarter-to-quarter
or year-to-year trends). For such comparisons, the results of upcoming nationwide baseline
studies can be used to provide valid estimates of the prevalence of certain pathogens of
public health concern and permit valid statistical comparisons to be made over time.”

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young chicken slaughter establishments — that have substandard or variable records
in meeting Salmonella performance standards. The agency stated that it was taking
this action in part because at least 90% of such establishments are not testing
consistently for low Salmonella rates. Another change is a new “Salmonella
Initiative Program,” under which poultry slaughter plants with relatively low
Salmonella testing rates could effectively increase line speeds — i.e., process their
chickens faster — in exchange for providing more microbial data to help study the
links between FSIS-regulated products and human illness. Another change is a
restructuring of how FSIS conducts verification sampling.10
E. coli O157:H7
CDC noted that “E. coli O157:H7 is one of hundreds of strains of the bacterium
Escherichia coli. Although most strains are harmless and live in the intestines of
healthy humans and animals, this strain produces a powerful toxin and can cause
severe illness. E. coli O157:H7 was first recognized as a cause of illness in 1982
during an outbreak of severe bloody diarrhea; the outbreak was traced to
contaminated hamburgers. Since then, most infections have come from eating
undercooked ground beef.” CDC also noted that “... people have also become ill
from eating contaminated bean sprouts or fresh leafy vegetables such as lettuce and
spinach. Person-to-person contact in families and child care centers is also a known
mode of transmission. In addition, infection can occur after drinking raw milk and
after swimming in or drinking sewage-contaminated water.”11
In October 1994, FSIS began testing samples of raw ground beef for E. coli
O157:H7 and declared that any such product found with this pathogen would be
considered adulterated — the first time a foodborne pathogen on raw product was
declared an adulterant under the meat inspection law. Industry groups immediately
asked a Texas federal court for a preliminary injunction to halt this effort, on the
grounds that it was not promulgated through appropriate rulemaking procedures, was
arbitrary and capricious, and exceeded USDA’s regulatory authority under law. In
December 1994, the court denied the groups’ request, and no appeal was filed,
leaving the program in place. FSIS has taken tens of thousands of samples since the
program began; to date, hundreds of samples have tested positive.
In September 2002, FSIS issued a press release stating that “[t]he scientific data
show that E. coli O157:H7 is more prevalent than previously estimated,” and in
October 2002 the agency published a notice requiring manufacturers of all raw beef
products (not just ground beef) to reassess their HACCP plans and add control points
for E. coli O157:H7 if the reassessment showed that the pathogen was a likely hazard
in the facility’s operations. FSIS inspectors are to verify that corrective steps have
been taken and conduct random testing of all beef processing plants, including all
grinders (some previously had been exempted). In addition, the agency announced
10 73 Federal Register pp. 4767-4774. Public comments were due by February 27, 2008.
11 Background information on this pathogen may be viewed at the following CDC website:
[http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacoli_g.htm#What%20is%20Es
cherichia%20coli%20O157:H7].

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CRS-9
guidelines for grinding plants advising them to increase the level of pathogen testing
by plant employees, and to avoid mixing products from different suppliers.12
FSIS reported that, of an average of nearly 10,000 ground beef samples tested
annually in 2004, 2005, and 2006, a total of 43 (less than 0.2%) tested positive for
E. coli O157:H7, part of a significant decline in the percentage of positive samples
since 2000, when it was 0.86%. FSIS asserted that the reduction reflected the success
of its HACCP-based and related regulatory policies. The April 13, 2007, CDC report
indicated that the incidence of all foodborne infections caused by E. coli O157:H7
had declined significantly from the 1996-1998 baseline, but then climbed in both
2005 and 2006. The CDC reported that it did not know the reasons for the increases,
but did point out that the 2006 outbreaks caused by contaminated spinach and lettuce
highlighted the need for more effective prevention. The frequency of E. coli O157:H7
in ground beef samples taken in 2005 and 2006 had remained about the same as in
2004, the CDC stated.13
During calendar 2006, FSIS announced eight recalls due to E. coli O157:H7
contamination, mostly of ground beef products, and none were related to human
illness. In 2005, the agency announced five recalls. In 2007 FSIS announced 20
recalls, totaling more than 33 million pounds, mostly ground beef products, due to
E. coli concerns. At least nine of the 2007 recalls were related to human illnesses
(the rest came about after routine testing). Although many of the recalls were
relatively small, a June recall involved nearly 6 million pounds of beef, and the
Topps recall, 21.7 million pounds.14
Topps Recall. On September 25, 2007, USDA announced that Topps Meat
Company, LLC, an Elizabeth, N.J., establishment, was voluntarily recalling
approximately 331,582 pounds of frozen ground beef products because they might
be contaminated with E. coli O157:H7. On September 29, the recall was expanded
to 21.7 million pounds, making it one of the largest in history. On October 6, USDA
notified the public that several more product labels (but no additional pounds of
products) were being added to the recall.

USDA officials said that this recall case was unusual in that it arose from a
patient-reported illness (forwarded on August 31, 2007) thought to be caused by E.
coli. The same day, according to USDA, a field investigator collected a sample of
leftover product from the patient’s freezer for testing, and the laboratory returned a
positive finding of E. coli O157:H7 from that sample on September 7. It took a
series of follow-up tests and meetings before USDA was ready to tie the illness —
and a number of other similar illnesses — to the Topps plant, with the recall
12 67 Federal Register 62325.
13 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 13, 2007. For more information on the
widely publicized outbreaks in 2006 that were linked to produce, e.g., spinach produced in
California, see archived CRS Report RL33722, Food Safety: Federal and State Response
to the Spinach E. Coli Outbreak, by Donna V. Porter.
14 Some information is from the October 23, 2007, Raymond press conference. Recall
updates are at the FSIS website: [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fsis_Recalls/index.asp]; a list
of both FSIS and FDA recalls is at [http://www.recalls.gov/food.html].

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CRS-10
announced on September 25. By October 6, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
had cited 32 illnesses that appeared to be related to the recall.
According to trade press reports, the initial (September 25) recall covered three
days of ground beef production (on June 22, July 12, and July 23, 2007). The
expansion to 21.7 million pounds covered one year of production (back to September
25, 2006), because the plant was carrying over each day’s production to the next,
rather than processing the ground meat in separate batches, which would create a
clean break in production, as industry experts have stressed should be done. In
addition, the plant had not followed its own HACCP plan, according to the reports.15
More specifically, for example, reports indicated that the plant appeared to be
grinding meat that did not carry the necessary documentation showing that it had
been tested by the supplier for contamination. At the same time, the USDA inspector
who visited the plant daily (but was not there continuously) reportedly did not
uncover the problem, either. The plant has since ceased operations.
By early November 2007, the Topps recall was linked to beef trim supplied by
an Alberta, Canada, packer, Ranchers Beef Ltd.,16 which had closed in August 2007.
On November 9, 2007, FSIS began to hold Canadian beef products at the border until
they could be tested for E. coli; by December 2007 it had eased this policy but
continued heightened testing of these products destined for ground beef.
USDA Actions in 2007. USDA stated that after it had identified by June
2007 an increased number of positive E. coli O157:H7 beef samples, along with a
larger number of recalls and illnesses linked to the pathogen than in recent years, it
increased the number of tests on ground beef by more than 75%. It also began or
accelerated implementation of several other E. coli prevention initiatives that had
been under development. Announced actions affecting federally inspected raw beef
plants include the following:17
! FSIS began in March 2007 to test beef trim (which is used in ground
beef), on assumptions that contamination of ground beef is related
to contaminated beef trim.
! FSIS notified beef companies that starting in November 2007 all
plants would have to verify that they are effectively controlling E.
coli O157:H7 during slaughter and processing; and it has provided
the industry with examples of controls that would meet the
minimum criteria for effectiveness.
! The agency directed its inspectors to use a new checklist to review
establishment control procedures to help the agency identify changes
in each one’s production controls and corrective action procedures.
15 See for example, Cattle Buyers Weekly, October 8, 2007; Feedstuffs, October 8, 2007.
16 Source: Cattle Buyers Weekly, various 2007 issues.
17 USDA, FSIS, “FSIS Takes Aggressive Actions To Combat E. Coli O157:H7,” October
23, 2007, at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/NR_102307_01/index.asp].

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CRS-11
! FSIS said it would begin testing other types of materials used in
ground beef in addition to beef trim, and require importing countries
to conduct equivalent sampling.
! FSIS will attempt, starting in January 2008, to better target its
routine E. coli testing, with more frequent sampling of larger plants,
and other adjustments based on checklist data.
! The agency stated that it would work to speed up recalls.
Listeria monocytogenes
In February 2001, FSIS published a proposed rule to set performance standards
that meat and poultry processing firms would have to meet to reduce the presence of
Listeria monocytogenes (Lm), a pathogen in ready-to-eat foods (e.g., cold cuts and
hot dogs). The proposal covered over 100 different types of dried, salt-cured,
fermented, and cooked or processed meat and poultry products. Lm causes an
estimated 2,500 illnesses and 499 deaths each year (from listeriosis), and has been
a major reason for meat and poultry product recalls.
The proposed regulations raised a controversy among affected constituencies.
The meat industry argued that the benefits to consumers would not outweigh the cost
to packers of additional testing. Representatives of food manufacturers criticized the
proposed regulations for covering some categories of foods too broadly and heavily,
while not covering some other high-risk foods at all (such as milk, which is under
FDA jurisdiction). Consumer groups said the proposed rule would not require
enough testing in small processing plants and that products not tested for Lm should
not be labeled “ready-to-eat” because they would still require cooking to be 100%
safe.
Interest in the Listeria issue had grown in 1998 and 1999, following reports of
foodborne illnesses and deaths linked to ready-to-eat meats produced by a Sara Lee
subsidiary.18 Interest increased significantly after October 2002, when Pilgrim’s
Pride Corporation recalled a record-breaking 27.5 million pounds of poultry lunch
meats for possible Lm contamination after a July 2002 outbreak of listeriosis in New
England. CDC confirmed 46 cases of the disease, with 7 deaths and 3 stillbirths or
miscarriages. The recall covered products made as early as May 2002, and officials
stated that very little of the meat was still available to be recovered.
In December 2002, FSIS issued a directive to inspection program personnel
giving new and specific instructions for monitoring processing plants that produce
hot dogs and deli meats.19 In June 2003, FSIS announced the publication of an
interim final rule to reduce Listeria in ready-to-eat meats. Rather than set
performance standards, as the February 2001 proposed rule would have, the new
regulation requires plants that process RTE foods to add control measures specific
to Listeria to their HACCP and sanitation plans, and to verify their effectiveness by
testing and disclosing the results to FSIS. The rule directs FSIS inspectors to conduct
18 Source: Food Chemical News, various issues.
19 The guidelines can be found on the FSIS website at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov].

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CRS-12
random tests to verify establishments’ programs. Plants are subject to different
degrees of FSIS verification testing depending upon what type of control steps they
adopt in their HACCP and sanitation plans.20
On January 4, 2005, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) issued a report
sharply criticizing USDA’s Listeria rulemaking. CFA asserted that the Department
essentially adopted meat industry positions in weakening the final rule, such as by
deleting proposed plant testing requirements and by not explicitly requiring that
HACCP plans include Listeria controls. In 2003, Listeria illnesses increased by
22%, CFA contended, citing CDC data.21
USDA and meat industry officials countered that the number of product recalls
related to Listeria had declined from 40 in 2002 to 14 in 2003, that the rise in
Listeriosis cases was quite small in 2003 after four years of declines, and that the
interim rule provides more incentives for plants to improve safety. The CDC’s 2006
FoodNet reported that the incidence of foodborne illness caused by Listeria, which
had reached its lowest level in 2002 compared with a 1996-1998 baseline, has
climbed in the last several years.22
Large recalls of FSIS-regulated products continue. In 2005, the largest was a
December 2005 recall of 2.8 million pounds of various bologna, ham, and turkey
lunchmeat products by ConAgra. Another 28 Listeria-related recalls were announced
during 2005, involving approximately 649,000 pounds of processed meat and poultry
products, according to the agency’s website. The website had posted six Listeria
recalls in 2006 and another 11 in 2007, including, in January and February 2007, 2.8
million pounds of Oscar Mayer/Louis Rich chicken breast cuts and strips.23
In Congress
In recent years, bills have been offered to add language to the inspection laws
clarifying the Secretary’s authority to set enforceable performance standards. In the
110th Congress, for example, pending bills to establish a single food agency (H.R.
1148/S. 654) include provisions requiring the new agency to set such standards.
Another bill (H.R. 3624) would require FDA to set tolerance levels to limit the
quantity of contaminants, including harmful pathogens, in foods.
20 See the FSIS website for more details on the rule.
21 CFA website: [http://www.consumerfed.org/].
22 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 13, 2007.
23 FSIS recall website: [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/FSIS_Recalls/index.asp].

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CRS-13
Other Selected Issues
Recall and Enforcement Proposals
Currently, the Agriculture Secretary must go to the courts to obtain an order to
seize and detain suspected contaminated products if a firm refuses to issue a recall
voluntarily. The GAO has criticized agencies’ efforts to ensure that companies carry
out recalls quickly and efficiently, particularly of products that may carry severe risk
of illness. A 2004 GAO report concluded that the agencies do not know how well
companies are carrying out recalls and are ineffectively tracking them. As a result,
most recalled items are not recovered and thus may be consumed, GAO reported.24
At past hearings, consumer and food safety advocacy groups have testified in
favor of obtaining these new enforcement tools to improve food safety in general, and
to strengthen USDA’s enforcement of the new HACCP system in particular. These
groups have asserted that civil fines would serve as an effective deterrent and could
be imposed more quickly than criminal penalties or the withdrawal of inspection.
They also have argued that the authority to assess civil penalties would permit USDA
to take stronger — and more rapid — action against “bad actors,”or those processors
who persistently violate food safety standards. Food safety advocates argue that FSIS
should have the authority to mandate product recalls as a backup guarantee in case
voluntary recalls moved too slowly or were not comprehensive enough.
Meat and poultry industry trade associations have testified in opposition to
granting USDA new enforcement powers. Both producers and processors argue that
current authorities are sufficient and that only once has a plant refused to comply
with USDA’s recommendation to recall a suspected contaminated product. Industry
representatives have testified that USDA’s current authority to withdraw inspection,
thereby shutting down a plant, is a strong enough economic penalty to deter potential
violators and punish so-called bad actors. Furthermore, they say, new enforcement
powers would increase the potential for plants to suffer drastic financial losses from
suspected contamination incidents that could ultimately be proven false. Some
observers argue that much still needs to be done to educate consumers and
restaurateurs about safe meat and poultry handling and cooking practices.
In August 2004, the consumer group Center for Science in the Public Interest
(CSPI) began a national campaign to urge USDA to publicize the names of retail
outlets where recalled meat has been distributed, so that consumers can learn more
quickly whether they have purchased potentially contaminated products. USDA and
industry leaders have contended that distribution records are proprietary, and exempt
from provisions of the Federal Freedom of Information Act; such information, they
argue, should be limited mainly to public officials so that they can monitor recalls.
However, in the March 7, 2006, Federal Register, FSIS proposed posting on its
24 Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of
Potentially Unsafe Food, GAO-05-51. Also see CRS Report RL34313, The USDA’s
Authority to Recall Meat and Poultry Products, by Cynthia Brougher and Geoffrey S.
Becker.

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CRS-14
website the names of retailers who have products subject to a voluntary recall. A
final rule had not been issued as of early February 2008, but was expected soon.
In Congress. Bills to address meat and poultry recalls have been introduced
in the 110th Congress. Provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007 (H.R. 3580; P.L. 110-85) require the Secretary of HHS both to establish
a food registry for the reporting of food adulteration, and to encourage more
coordination and communication when recalls occur, but it applies to FDA-regulated
foods. However, the Senate-passed version of the farm bill includes a provision
(H.R. 2419, in Title XI) requiring reportable food registries for FSIS-regulated meat
and poultry products as well. The House version lacks this provision, so the final
language likely will be determined in a House-Senate conference committee in early
2008. H.R. 2108/S. 1274, H.R. 3484, H.R. 3610, H.R. 3624, S. 2081, and H.R.
1148/S. 654 are among other pending bills that contain various provisions for
mandatory recall authority and/or notification requirements when adulterated foods
are suspected to be in commerce.
Meat Traceability
Recalls imply the ability to quickly trace the movement of products. On
September 30, 2003, USDA’s OIG released an audit report on a 2002 meat recall by
Con Agra. The report recommends “that FSIS reassess its management control
process over ... recall operations ... by ensuring that ground beef is traceable from
manufacturing to point-of-sale and that adequate production records are maintained
to facilitate traceback.”
Some argue that improved traceability capabilities would have enabled USDA
to determine the whereabouts of all related cattle of potential interest in the three U.S.
case of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or “mad cow disease”). The
traceability issue has also been debated in connection with protecting against
agroterrorism; verifying the U.S. origin of live cattle and meat products for export;
and facilitating recalls to prevent or contain foodborne illness outbreaks, among other
things.
Supporters of animal ID and meat traceability point out that most major meat-
exporting countries already have domestic animal ID systems. The U.S. meat
industry argued in the past that such a system would not be based on sound science,
and would be technically unworkable. However, since the domestic BSE case, the
industry, USDA, and some Members of Congress have been actively pursuing
adoption of a national animal ID (but not meat traceability) system, focused on
animal disease control rather than food safety per se. Among other issues are cost,
need for a mandatory rather than voluntary system, potential producer liability, and
privacy of records.
In Congress. Animal ID proposals have emerged in the 110th Congress. For
example, H.R. 1018 would prohibit the establishment of a mandatory ID system.
H.R. 2301 would create a livestock identification board with members from industry

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CRS-15
to oversee a national program.25 S. 1292 and H.R. 3485, separate bills, are broader
traceability proposals. S. 1292 would require the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish a traceability system for all stages of production, processing, and marketing
of meat and poultry, and would require animal producers and meat and poultry
processors to maintain records sufficient to enable the Secretary to trace a product
forward to the consumer or backward to where the animal originated. H.R. 3485
covers both FSIS and FDA-regulated food traceability.
Both the House and Senate committee reports to accompany USDA’s FY2008
appropriation (H.Rept. 110-258; S.Rept. 110-134) had questioned USDA’s progress
and direction in implementing a national animal identification system (NAIS). Over
several years through FY2007, about $117.8 million had gone into the development
of such a program. Despite this effort, “the direction of this system remains unclear,”
noted the report on the Senate appropriations bill, which would have designated
$17.4 million in additional funds for NAIS. The House committee report noted that
its version would have provided no new funding, and requested that USDA provide
“a complete and detailed strategic plan for the program, including tangible outcomes,
measurable goals, specific milestones, and necessary resources for the entire
program.” The final FY2008 appropriation for USDA — contained in Division A
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161) — provides $9.75
million to continue NAIS implementation. Appropriators stated that a USDA
business plan for the program, issued late in 2007, did not provide sufficient
information or justification to grant the entire $33.2 million requested for the year.
Elsewhere, a provision in Title X of the farm bill (H.R. 2419) approved in
December 2007 by the Senate would require USDA to issue regulations addressing
“the protection of trade secrets and other proprietary and/or confidential business
information that farmers and ranchers disclose in the course of participation” in an
ID system.
Funding and Resources
From time to time in the past, FSIS has had difficulty in sufficiently staffing its
service obligations to the meat and poultry industries. Usually a combination of
factors causes these shortages, including new technologies that increase plant
production speeds and volume, insufficient appropriated funds to hire additional
inspectors at times of unexpected increases in demand for inspections, and problems
in finding qualified people to work in dangerous or unpleasant environments or at
remote locations. These staffing problems were complicated somewhat by the
addition of HACCP requirements on top of the traditional inspection duties.
Risk-Based Inspection System. Congress in 2007 ordered a halt to
FSIS’s work on what the agency calls a more robust “risk-based inspection system”
(RBIS), which would enable the agency to rebalance existing inspection resources,
Administration officials contend.26 The objective of this initiative is “to improve
public health by placing greater inspection and verification emphasis on federally
25 See also CRS Report RS22653, Animal Identification: Overview and Issues, by Geoffrey
S. Becker.
26 See “In Congress” later in this section of the report.

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CRS-16
inspected meat and poultry establishments that pose greater risks. In a more robust
RBIS, each establishment’s risk could be categorized, and the type and intensity of
inspection could be based primarily on that risk.”27
More specifically, the initiative is to enable FSIS to shift some processing
inspection resources from lower-risk products and plants to relatively higher-risk
products (for example, ground poultry), and to plants with relatively poor safety
records. USDA in February 2007 had announced a timetable for introducing RBIS,
beginning in April 2007 at 30 locations representing about 254 processing (but not
yet slaughter) establishments. About a fourth of these plants would come under
closer scrutiny, about a fourth less scrutiny, and about half would receive
approximately the same level of attention as currently, a USDA official said. He
added that all plants will still be under “daily inspection,” and full-time employees
would not be reduced under RBIS.28
Public comments to FSIS on RBIS, and hearings by a House appropriations
subcommittee, indicated that many agree in concept with risk-based inspection, but
are concerned that the agency has provided too few specifics on how it would be
implemented, lacks the data it needs to implement it, and should consider doing it
through formal rulemaking. A few warned that it could undermine rather than
strengthen safety oversight, and wondered whether the agency has the statutory
authority to change inspection frequency.29
Several interest groups reiterated their concerns following the earlier, February
22, 2007, USDA announcement. The American Meat Institute, representing major
meat packers, said in a statement that it was concerned that the “hasty launch” of the
initiative could jeopardize consumer confidence in meat and poultry, and that details
of exactly how the program would work still are unclear. Several consumer groups
questioned the validity of the data that USDA is using to rank product risk and plant
performance FY2009.30
The Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit of
FSIS’s work on RBIS, issuing its report in December 2007. Among other findings,
27 “Measuring Establishment Risk Control for Risk-based Inspection,” paper for May 23-24,
2006, meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Meat and Poultry Inspection.
Information on the meeting (and on other committee meetings) is posted at
[http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/National_Advisory_Committee_on_
Meat_&_Poultry/index.asp].
28 Comments by Dr. Richard Raymond, USDA Under Secretary for Food Safety, February
22, 2007, press teleconference. The start of implementation appears to have been delayed;
in April FSIS was holding a series of public meetings on aspects of RBIS. For information
see [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Risk_Based_Inspection/index.asp].
29 Risk-based inspection comments posted by FSIS, Food Chemical News, November 27,
2006; also, Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 2007, hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd session.
30 Sources: various statements as reported in Food Chemical News, February 26, 2007, and
April 23, 2007.

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CRS-17
the OIG questioned whether the agency currently had the systems in place “to provide
reasonable assurance that risk can be timely or fully assessed, especially since FSIS
lacks current, comprehensive assessments of establishments’ food safety systems.”31
OIG reported that FSIS lacks adequate management control processes or an
integrated IT (computer) system to support a program, and the agency had not
resolved all of the prior recommendations that OIG said were most critical to
successful development or risk-based inspection. The OIG report offered 35 new
recommendations around such matters as improving the use of food safety
assessment-related data; determining how assessment results will be used to estimate
risk; and clarifying documentation and written procedures and guidance for all
stakeholders, among other things.32
In Congress. Representative DeLauro and several other lawmakers have
expressed their own concerns about RBIS, such as during testimony before her House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture by Dr. Raymond on March 29 and
April 19, 2007. A provision (§6102) in the fiscal 2007 Iraq War supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 110-28) prohibited USDA from implementing its risk-based
inspection system anywhere until the OIG evaluated the data supporting the system,
and the FSIS resolved any issues raised in the evaluation. Both the House and Senate
reports on USDA’s FY2008 appropriation also had expressed concern about RBIS.
The final FY2008 appropriation for USDA (P.L. 110-161, Division A) reiterates the
directive that the Department not implement RBIS until after the OIG reported its
evaluation to Congress and FSIS revolved any issues raised.
User Fee Proposals. To ease funding pressures, most administrations over
the past 20 years have proposed to charge the meat-packing industry new user fees
sufficient to cover the entire cost, or at least a portion, of federal inspection services.
(FSIS has been authorized since 1919 to charge user fees for holiday and overtime
inspections, and does so). The primary rationale for more extensive user fees has
been that resources would then be adequate to hire new inspectors as necessary.
USDA economists estimate that the cost passed on to consumers from such a fee
would be no more than one cent per pound. Meat industry and consumer groups
have consistently opposed increased fees, arguing that food safety is a public health
concern that merits taxpayer support.
As part of its FY2009 budget submitted to Congress in February 2008, the Bush
Administration again asked for new user fees. Its FY2009 proposal would raise $92
million by collecting licensing fees from meat and poultry establishments, and
another $4 million by charging plants that require additional inspections due to
31 USDA, OIG, Issues Impacting the Development of Risk-Based Inspection at Meat and
Poultry Processing Establishments (Report. No. 24601-07-Hy).
32 The OIG report was one of the items discussed at the February 5-6, 2008, meeting of the
National Advisory Committee on Meat and Poultry Inspection, along with FSIS technical
reports on poultry slaughter and on processing and slaughter. Meeting materials were
posted on the Internet at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Meetings_&_Events/
index.asp]; a copy of the January 2008 FSIS Risk Assessment for Guiding Public
Health-Based Poultry Slaughter Inspection was posted at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/
Poultry_Slaughter_Risk_Assess_Jan2008.pdf].

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performance failures. These fees also were proposed, unsuccessfully, with the
Administration’s FY2008 budget.
In Congress. FSIS inspection costs are mainly funded through USDA’s
annual appropriation. For the current FY2008, the Senate-reported bill had
recommended $930.6 million for FSIS, or $38.5 million above the FY2007 level.
The House-passed bill and the final version (Division A of P.L. 110-161) provide
$930.1 million in appropriations for FSIS for FY2008, the same as the
Administration’s request. The congressional appropriation is to be supplemented in
FY2008 by an estimated $141 million in existing user fees.
The Administration’s FY2009 budget proposal recommends $952 million in
new appropriations for FSIS, to be supplemented by about $140 million in existing
user fees (i.e., not counting the proposed $96 million in new fees described above).
This would bring the FSIS program level to approximately $1.1 billion in FY2009.
Congress is expected to begin consideration of the next FSIS appropriation along
with that for other USDA activities, starting with hearings by spring 2008.
State-Inspected Products
As noted, current federal law prohibits state-inspected meat and poultry plants
from shipping their products across state lines, a ban that many states and small
plants want to overturn. Limiting state-inspected products to intrastate commerce is
unfair, these states and plants argue, because their programs must be, and are, “at
least equal” to the federal system. While state-inspected plants cannot ship interstate,
foreign plants operating under USDA-approved foreign programs, which must be
“equivalent” to the U.S. program, can export meat and poultry products into and sell
them anywhere in the United States.
Those who oppose allowing state-inspected products in interstate commerce
argue that state programs are not required to have the same level of safety oversight
as the federal, or even the foreign, plants. For example, foreign-processed products
are subject to U.S. import reinspection at ports of entry. The opponents of interstate
shipment note that a recent FSIS review, which had found all 28 state programs to
be at least equal to the U.S. program, was based largely on self-assessments.33
In Congress. In the 110th Congress, both the House and Senate versions of
H.R. 2419, the omnibus farm bill, would amend the FMIA and the PPIA to permit
interstate shipment of these products — but under divergent approaches. The House-
passed farm bill would replace the current federal-state cooperative inspection
programs with a new program that would enable meat and poultry that is not
federally inspected to be shipped across state lines, so long as the state programs
adopted standards identical to those of USDA along with any additional changes
USDA required. The proposed language is generally taken from pending H.R. 2315
(S. 1150 in the Senate). The farm bill provision further would enable many plants
currently under federal inspection to apply for state inspection and continue to ship
33 The FSIS Review of State Programs: Summary Report (January 2007) was accessed on
April 27, 2007, at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Review_of_State_Programs.pdf]. Since
that time, New Mexico has turned its inspection activities over to FSIS.

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CRS-19
interstate. Opponents of this change fear that many would seek to opt out of the
federal system if they believed that they could receive more lenient oversight by the
states — an assertion that state proponents dismiss.
“At Least Equal to” vs. “Equivalence”

According to FSIS, “at least equal to” means “that the food safety and other
consumer protection measures effected by a State program address the same issues
addressed by the Federal (FSIS) program, and the results of the State’s approach
are to be at least as effective as those of the Federal program. The State program
need not take exactly the same action as the Federal program” (FSIS Directive
5720.2, Revision 3, November 16, 2004).

“Equivalence” is a somewhat different concept. “Meat and poultry products
exported from another nation must meet all safety standards applied to foods
produced in the United States. However, under international law, food regulatory
systems in exporting countries may employ sanitary measures that differ from
those applied domestically by the importing country. The United States makes
determinations of equivalence by evaluating whether foreign food regulatory
systems attain the appropriate level of protection provided by our domestic system.
Thus, while foreign food regulatory systems need not be identical to the U.S.
system, they must employ equivalent sanitary measures that provide the same level
of protection against food hazards as is achieved domestically” (FSIS,
“Equivalence Process,” at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/
equivalence_process/index.asp]).
The Senate farm bill would supplement the current federal-state cooperative
inspection program with a new provision whereby state-inspected plants with 25 or
fewer employees could opt into a new program that subjects them to federally
directed but state-operated inspection, and thus could ship interstate. The Senate
version reportedly was developed as a compromise by those on both sides of the
issue. Nonetheless, some proponents of ending the current ban contend that the
Senate language is overly restrictive, while those who support the Senate version
contend that it provides appropriate safeguards. A House-Senate farm bill
conference committee likely will determine the final version.
Other pending bills that would authorize the shipment of state-inspected
products across state lines are H.R. 1760 and S. 1149; they also would set the federal
share of state inspection costs at no less than 50% and no more than 60%. A separate
measure, H.R. 2876, would authorize interstate shipment if the Secretary determines
that the state program is at least equal to the federal program. (For more a more
extensive discussion, see CRS Report RL34202, State Inspected Meat and Poultry:
Issues for Congress, by Geoffrey S. Becker.)
Food Safety Reorganization
U.S. food safety oversight, while concentrated in FSIS and FDA, is spread
among 15 agencies operating under a variety of statutes. This complex system is
supplemented by many state food safety programs. GAO, which has looked at the
matter several times, noted in one report that the federal food safety system “emerged

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piecemeal, over many decades, typically in response to particular health threats or
economic crises. The result is a fragmented legal and organizational structure that
gives responsibility for specific food commodities to different agencies and provides
them with significantly different authorities to enforce food safety laws.”34
In its January 2007 annual report, GAO newly designated food safety oversight
as one of 29 “high risk” federal program areas. The report, among other things,
recommended that “Congress consider a fundamental reexamination of the system
and other improvements to help ensure the rapid detection of and response to any
accidental or deliberate contamination of food before public health and safety is
compromised.”35 Besides GAO, the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Commission on the Public Service have studied the issue and recommended options
for change.36
In Congress. In the 110th Congress, “single food agency” bills were
introduced in February 2007, as H.R. 1148 by Representative DeLauro and S. 654 by
Senator Durbin. The measures would combine federal food safety programs,
including meat and poultry inspection, under a new, independent Food Safety
Administration, to be headed by an Administrator appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. The new Administrator would have to conduct a
comprehensive analysis of food safety hazards and adopt and implement a national
program that among other things requires registration of all domestic and foreign
food establishments doing business in the United States. The bills would require the
formulation of food safety performance standards, set out inspection procedures for
establishments, provide for research and education programs, and include
enforcement and penalty provisions.
The omnibus farm bill (H.R. 2419) that cleared the Senate includes a provision
establishing a bipartisan congressional food safety commission that is to study the
federal food safety system and recommend needed changes. Another provision in the
same measure requires the President to consider these changes and report to Congress
on legislation needed to effect them.
Interest in reorganizing the agencies and/or enhancing their resources and
authorities, particularly those of FDA, was the topic of numerous 2007 congressional
hearings, including hearings before Representative DeLauro’s House Appropriations
subcommittee and several subcommittees of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee. Panels on both sides of Congress have held hearings on the safety of
imported food products, including meat and poultry, where agency organization and
resources have been at issue as well.
34 Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries in Consolidating Their Food Safety Systems,
GAO-05-212, February 2005.
35 High Risk Series: An Update (GAO-07-310), January 2007.
36 See National Research Council, Institute of Medicine, Ensuring Safe Food From
Production to Consumption, Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 1998; and National
Commission on the Public Service, Urgent Business For America: Revitalizing the Federal
Government for the 21st Century, Washington, DC, 2003.

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As lawmakers are asked to consider these or other proposals that would either
reorganize or consolidate the federal food safety organization, a range of policy
options are being debated, including whether the current regulatory approaches and
their authorizing statutes remain appropriate, particularly given the diversity of food
types, health risks, methods of production, and sources of supply; the continuously
evolving science on foodborne illness and how to prevent future outbreaks; the
impacts on industry competitiveness, particularly in a global economy; and funding
constraints.
Horse Slaughter
Nearly 105,000 horses were slaughtered in the United States in 2006 for human
food, mainly for European and Asian consumers. Such slaughter was conducted
under federal inspection at two foreign-owned plants in Texas and another foreign-
owned plant in Illinois. Debate has focused on the acceptability of using horses for
human food, and the costs of long-term care for such horses (or of disposing of their
carcasses) if they no longer went for human food.
Although legislation has been debated in Congress to curtail such slaughter (see
below), the plants’ activities have been constrained in 2007 by the courts and state
law. A federal lawsuit filed by the owners of the two Texas slaughter plants, Beltex
Corporation and Dallas Crown, Inc., sought to clarify that a Texas state law, first
passed in 1949 to prevent the use of horsemeat for human food, was not enforceable
and that they should not be prosecuted. The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas in Fort Worth had earlier agreed with the plants’ owners that the
law had been repealed, was preempted by the FMIA, and violated the dormant
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, on January 19, 2007, a panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected all three arguments in the
lower court’s ruling, declaring the Texas law to be in force and clearing the way for
the state attorney general to prosecute the plant owners if they continued to operate.
Elsewhere, the Illinois legislature passed a law banning horse slaughter for food. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by fall 2007 ruled against the argument
of the plant (owned by Cavel International) that the Illinois law violates the interstate
and foreign commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and it stopped slaughter.
In Congress. The 109th Congress had debated whether to ban horse slaughter
and (in the FY2006 appropriation) had banned the use of federal funds for ante-
mortem inspection of horses at meat processing plants. Although supporters of the
ban had hoped that the lack of federal funds for such inspection would force an end
to horse slaughter, the practice continued, with the three plants paying user fees for
the federal service (until legal and state-level developments challenged the plants; see
above). Also in the 109th Congress, the full House approved a bill (H.R. 503) to ban
horse slaughter, but no action occurred on a Senate version (S. 1915).
New bills in the 110th Congress to ban the movement or possession of horses for
slaughter include H.R. 503 and S. 311. The Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee approved S. 311 without amendments on April 25, 2007.37
37 See CRS Report RS21842, Horse Slaughter Prevention Bills and Issues, by Geoffrey S.
(continued...)

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Meanwhile, the omnibus appropriation for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161, in Division
A, Section 741) both continues the ban on using appropriated funds for inspecting
horses and also prohibits the USDA-FSIS rule that enables the collection of user fees
for such purposes.
BSE
North American Cases. As of late 2007, 15 cases of BSE had been reported
in North America, 12 of them in animals born in Canada, which reported its first
native case in May 2003 (one earlier case was imported from Great Britain). The
United States reported its first case in December 2003 (it was one of the Canadian-
born animals that had been imported into the United States). The United States also
found two more cases, the most recent in late February 2006 in a 10-year-old
Alabama beef cow.
In epidemiological investigations of the three U.S. cases, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) was unable to track down all related animals of interest, but
those that were located tested negative for the disease. Despite a beef recall, some
meat from the first U.S. BSE cow may have been consumed, USDA said, adding,
however, that the highest-risk tissues never entered the food supply. No materials
from the other two U.S. cows entered the food supply, USDA also said. In the recent
Alabama case, authorities were unable to determine the cow’s herd of origin.
Animal health officials initially indicated that all of the North American cases
were caused by the consumption of BSE-contaminated feed. However, USDA
reportedly now believes that the two native-born U.S. cattle had “atypical” BSE,
which differs from other cases. If these cases are determined to be “spontaneous,”
that may affect future control strategies.
BSE Safeguards.38 FSIS is one of the three federal agencies primarily
responsible for keeping BSE out of the food supply. The other two agencies involved
in BSE are USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), which
handles primarily the animal disease aspects, and FDA, which regulates feed
ingredients. After the first U.S. BSE case, FSIS published, as interim final rules in
the January 12, 2004, Federal Register, several actions to bolster U.S. BSE
protection systems, effective immediately:
! Downer (nonambulatory) cattle are no longer allowed into
inspected slaughter and processing facilities. (This interim
final rule was published in the July 13, 2007 Federal
Register.)
! Cattle selected for testing cannot be marked as “inspected and
passed” until confirmation is received that they have tested
negative for BSE.
37 (...continued)
Becker.
38 For additional details on the following discussion see CRS Report RL32199, Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or ‘Mad Cow Disease’): Current and Proposed
Safeguards, by Geoffrey S. Becker and Sarah A. Lister.

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! Specified risk materials (SRM), which include the skull, brain,
trigeminal ganglia, eyes, vertebral column, spinal column, and
dorsal root ganglia of cattle over 30 months of age, and the
small intestine of cattle of all ages, are now prohibited from
the human food supply.
! Slaughter facilities are required to develop and implement
procedures to remove, segregate, and dispose of SRM and
make information readily available for review by FSIS
inspection personnel.
! SRM from cattle 30 months or older cannot be in a product
labeled as “meat” if derived from advanced meat recovery
(AMR) technology, which USDA said would help ensure it
does not contain spinal tissue.
! Mechanically separated meat may not be used for human food.
! Air injection stunning is banned, to ensure that portions of the
animal brain are not dislocated into the carcass.
The FSIS actions, which remain in effect, were in addition to other BSE
regulatory safeguards that have been in place for several years. These include import
controls and ongoing BSE surveillance through carcass testing by APHIS, and
restrictions on the feeding of certain mammalian proteins to cattle by FDA (see box).
The FDA “Feed Ban”

The FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM), responsible for the safety
of animal feeds, began prohibiting the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for
ruminants in August 1997, a restriction commonly called the “feed ban.” This ban
did not prohibit the inclusion of potential bovine risk materials such as brain and
spinal cord in all animal feeds, but only those feeds intended for ruminants. FDA
required that feeds containing ruminant material be labeled with a prohibition
against feeding to ruminants, and that firms and farms effectively separate
prohibited and non-prohibited feeds in production, shipping and feeding. The ban
exempted certain bovine by-products, such as blood, milk, gelatin and restaurant
plate waste, on the premise that the exempted materials posed a minimal risk of
transmission. On October 6, 2005, FDA published a proposed rule banning some
SRM (mainly brains and spinal cords from cattle 30 months of age and older, and
from all cattle not passed for human food) from all animal feeds, including pet
food. The agency said its rule would remove those cattle parts responsible for 90%
of potential BSE infectivity. The public comment period on this rule ended on
December 20, 2005; a final rule had not been issued as of early February 2008.
Meanwhile, Canada finalized a similar but somewhat more extensive amendment
to its own feed rules in June 2006.
Additional USDA actions in the wake of the December 2003 BSE discovery
have included more attention to implementing a nationwide animal identification
program that would enable all cattle and other animal movements to be traced within
48 hours in cases of animal disease (see prior section on Meat Traceability); and an
intensive, one-time BSE testing program for higher-risk cattle (since completed).

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In Congress. Although BSE remains a priority for many Members of
Congress, much of the recent interest has focused on trade rather than food safety
concerns. Japan and Korea, once among the four leading markets for U.S. beef, did
not clear the way for the return of some U.S. beef products until late 2005 and 2006,
respectively. Exports to Japan are still well below previous levels, and Korean
inspection procedures kept that market largely closed to the United States through
much of 2007. Many Members of Congress have expressed increasing frustration
over the situation, particularly where countries like Japan and Korea are not viewed
as following international veterinary guidelines in assessing the safety of U.S. beef.
Legislation calling for sanctions against such countries has been offered in the past
and might re-emerge in the 110th Congress. U.S. access to Korea’s beef market has
become an issue in the debate over implementation of the U.S.-Korea free trade
agreement (FTA). A number of Members of Congress have signaled that their
support for legislation to implement the FTA is contingent on Korea fully opening
its market for U.S. beef.
Also of concern to many Members is USDA’s gradual reopening of the U.S.
border to more types Canadian cattle. Some Members are sympathetic to the
arguments of certain cattle organizations, primarily from the Upper Plains, that such
cattle continue to pose a BSE threat; resolutions of disapproval (H.J.Res. 55 and
S.J.Res. 20) of the most recent USDA rule to expand the types of eligible Canadian
imports have been introduced in both chambers. If passed, however, these resolutions
would have no force of law. (For background see CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow
Disease and U.S. Beef Trade, by Charles E. Hanrahan and Geoffrey S. Becker.)

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