Order Code RS21968
Updated January 31, 2008
Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The current government is the product of a U.S.-supported election process
designed to produce a democracy, although many now believe it produced a sectarian
government incapable of reconciling Iraq’s communities. This sentiment has grown to
the point where some believe that the United States should seek a decentralized Iraq
with substantial autonomy for each community. However, the Administration says that,
partly as a result of the U.S. “troop surge,” it is now seeing some concrete signs of
political accommodation, most notably at local levels. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of formal occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to
an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly,
provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad), and
a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position on electoral
lists in order to ensure 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the
national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions.
In all 2005 votes, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling
centers were guarded primarily by Iraq’s security forces (ISF), with U.S. forces as backup.
Violence did not disrupt voting. As shown in the table at the end of this paper, the
January election was dominated by the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA),
consisting mainly of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
which in May 2007changed its named to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and
the Da’wa Party, as well as the Kurds, and a few secular parties. The two main Kurdish
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint list. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving

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electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats and very few provincial council
seats. Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s 51-seat council. The factions
formed an interim national government that U.S. officials said was not sufficiently
inclusive of Sunnis, although it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, deputy president, deputy
prime minister, defense minister, and five other ministers. The presidency went to PUK
leader Jalal Talabani and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum. The elected Assembly was to
draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005,
subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10,
2005, the Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee which included only two
Sunni Arabs, although 15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 more as
advisors. In August 2005, the talks produced a draft that set a December 31, 2007,
deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk will join the Kurdish region (Article
140); designated Islam “a main source” of legislation and said no law can contradict the
“established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 set a 25% electoral goal for women (Article
47); allowed families to choose which courts to use for family issues such as divorce and
inheritance (Article 41); made only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and said
that the federal supreme court would include Islamic law experts and civil law judges and
experts (Article 89). These provisions concerned many women who fear that too much
discretion was given to males of their families, and many women say the provision is
being misused by Islamic extremists in southern Iraq and elsewhere to impose, including
through killings, restrictions against women.
The major disputes were — and continue to be — centered on the draft’s allowing
two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and to allocate oil
revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces, which
would legitimize the fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the
TAL). Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
“current fields” in proportion to population, and gave “regions” a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunnis opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunni-
dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields might lie
in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
with its size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date).
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat it, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11) providing for
a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election
government took office (Article 137). The amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. However, in the referendum, the
Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.
Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” which meant that the constitution was
adopted (only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by a two-thirds majority).
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
1 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

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contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalitions. The
UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties
including Fadilah (Virtue). The major Sunni slate was a three-party “Iraq Consensus
Front” led by the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP), which had entered but then withdrew from the
January elections. Another major Sunni faction (National Iraqi Dialogue Front) ran
separately. The hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did not participate,
although it did not, as it had in January, call for a Sunni boycott. Violence was minor
because Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni inclusion, facilitated voting. Still,
voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the UIA and the Kurds
dominated the new COR, with nearly two-thirds of seats.
The COR was inaugurated on March 16, but quickly began wrangling over posts.
Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA to agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy, Nuri
Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue
as president, and selected his two deputies — ISCI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) and
Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. Another Front figure, the hardline
Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosen COR speaker.
Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 37-member cabinet (including himself and
two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and
National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of infighting. Of the
37 posts, there were 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; 19 Shiites; and 1 Christian. Four are women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve political
reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-
28), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related benchmarks — as assessed in
Administration reports due by July 15 and September 15 — was required for the United
States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The president
indicated intent to use the waiver provision to provide the aid. The law mandated a
separate assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the
benchmarks have been actually achieved, as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security
forces (ISF) by an outside commission (headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results of the
assessments, as well as subsequent actions, are shown in the chart below. Many experts
agree that there has not been substantial movement toward national political
reconciliation, but recent progress on some of the laws and on other issues – such as
November 2007 passage of a law to provide pensions to Saddam-era workers and the
January 2008 passage of the De-Baathification reform law – are cited by the
Administration as concrete signs of growing reconciliation. The COR also fulfilled a
related “benchmark” (not part of those named in P.L. 110-28 but cited by the Iraqi
themselves, by passing a law (January 22, 2008) adopting a new national flag, although
many Iraqi Arabs say the new flag was adopted only because of Kurdish pressure and
some factions refuse to fly it over buildings they control.

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Some question whether a strong, cohesive central government can ever be
established. Although U.S. support for decentralizing Iraq into autonomous regions
(expressed in a Senate amendment to H.R. 4986, P.L. 110-181. FY2008 defense
authorization act) appears to be increasing, Maliki is now widely assessed as having
stabilized politically, helped by a decrease in violence attributed to the U.S. “troop surge.”
Deputy President Hashimi continues to promote reconciliation, signing on to an August
26, 2007, “Unity Accord” — along with Maliki, Talabani, deputy President Adel Abd al-
Mahdi (ISCI) and Kurdish regional president Masoud Barzani — to try to pass the de-
Baathification law, hold early provincial council elections, and release (mostly Sunni)
detainees. All blocs, including the Consensus Front, have ended their 2007 boycotts of
the COR. Still, the number of vacant cabinet posts is at least 12 out of 37 positions,
reflecting the April 2007 withdrawal of the Sadr faction, the Consensus Front, and the
Allawi bloc from the cabinet. Maliki filled two vacancies (agriculture and health
ministers) in October 2007 with independent Shiites, replacing resigned Sadrists, but
failed in November 2007 to win COR confirmation for new ministers of justice or
communications. The Iraqi Islamic Party, the main faction of the Consensus Front,
reportedly is considering rejoining the cabinet. A relatively positive development came
in December 2007 with agreement by the Kurds to delay the contentious, constitutionally
mandated referendum on Kirkuk until June 2008; it was to be held by December 31. On
the other hand, demonstrating that new alliances are forming across sectarian lines, 120
parliamentarians from Sadr’s faction, Allawi’s faction, and part of the Da’wa Party
members signed a statement on January 13, 2008, opposing Kurdish takeover of Kikuk
and energy deals signed by the Kurds.
Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Slate/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
UIA (Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats. ISCI- 29; Da’wa (two factions) - 25;
140
128
independents - 30. Sadr ( 29 seats) and Fadilah (15 seats) left bloc in 2007.
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP).
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
40
25
(2 members left the bloc in September 2007, leaving it with 23 seats)
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
—
44
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
—
11
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

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Table 1. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
GAO
Sept. 14
Administration
Report
Administration
Subsequent Actions
Report
Report
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee and
satisfactory
unmet
satisfactory
no progress
completing review
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
unsatisfactory
unmet
satisfactory
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12 unanimously by
Baathification
143 in COR present. Effect on overall reconciliation depends on
implementation. Allows about 30,000 lower ranking ex-Baathists
to regain their jobs; 3,500 Baathists (top three party ranks) would
not, but would receive pensions instead. But, the law could allow
for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and to firing of about
7,000 ex-Baathists in post-Saddam security services, and bars ex-
Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
no passage, but revenue being distributed equitably
equitable distribution of resources
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semi-
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
Regions law passed October 2006, but main blocs agreed to
autonomous regions
met
moratorium on implementation until April 2008.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish
satisfactory on
overall
satisfactory on (a)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments had two
a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial
(a) and
unmet; (a)
and (c).
readings but was sent back in December 2007 to the presidency
elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of
unsatisfactory
met
council for revisions. Several provincial governors pressing for
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial
on the others
passage.
elections
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
conditions do
unmet
conditions do not
January 1, 2008, cabinet submitted to COR draft law to amnesty
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
not allow a
allow a rating
5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees held by Iraq, would not affect
rating
25,000 detainees held by U.S. Draft had first reading in COR
on January 21.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
conditions do
unmet
conditions do not
No progress on disarmament program or related laws
disarmament
not allow rating
allow rating
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
satisfactory
met
met
No change
services committee to support U.S. Baghdad
“surge”

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Benchmark
July 12
GAO
Sept. 14
Administration
Report
Administration
Subsequent Actions
Report
Report
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
No change
support U.S. surge
met
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
unsatisfactory
unmet
Mixed: satisfactory
No significant change
make decisions, without political intervention, to
to pursue extremists,
pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
b u t p o l i t i c a l
Shiite militias
i n t e r f e r e n c e
continues
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing
unsatisfactory
unmet
overall mixed.
No significant change.
even-handed enforcement of law
Satisfactory on Iraqi
military,
unsatisfactory on
police
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
No change. Mahdi Army at reduced level of activity due to
provide a safe haven for any outlaw, regardless of
met
Sadr six month suspension and reported decline in Iranian
sectarian affiliation
weapons shipments. Sadr might not extend suspension.
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Overall mixed.
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still operating.
eliminating militia control of local security
Satisfactory on
70,000 Sunni “Concerned Local Citizens” and 15,000 tribal
(a) but
“Awakening” fighters combatting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted
unsatisfactory
by Maliki government as potential Sunni militia forces. Only
on (b)
15% of these Sunni fighters have been allowed to join ISF.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
No change
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
Continuing but slow progress training ISF. U.S. officials say s
independently
ISF likely unable to secure Iraq internally until 2012; and
against external threats not until 2018-2020.
16. Ensuring protection of rights of minority parties
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
No change
in Iraqi parliament
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
About 4.5% of the $10 billion spent by August 2007, according
capital budget for reconstruction projects, on an
met
to Iraqi figures. $13 billion more in 2008 Iraqi budget now
equitable basis
debated.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities are not
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
No change
undermining or making false accusations against
ISF members

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