

CRS Report for Congress

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

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Summary

For FY2008, Congress has fully funded the Bush Administration's requested \$95.2 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral, five-year program with planned U.S. contributions of some \$660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. GPOI's primary purpose is to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. GPOI also provides support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an Italian training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI is promoting the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and is encouraging an information exchange to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises in Africa. In June 2004, G8 leaders pledged to support the goals of the initiative.

GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997 to FY2005, the United States spent just over \$121 million on GPOI's predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (The term ACOTA is now used to refer to GPOI's training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten African nations were trained under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some \$33 million was provided from FY1998 to FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).

Within a year after GPOI was initiated in late 2004, the Administration began expanding the geographical scope of GPOI to selected countries in Central America, Europe, and Asia. In 2006 and 2007, the program was further expanded to countries in Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. GPOI now includes over 40 "partner" nations and organizations throughout the world, although the emphasis is still on Africa. According to figures provided by the State Department in January 2008, over 40,000 peacekeepers trainees and peacekeeper trainers were trained. Funds allocated to the GPOI program from FY2005 to FY2007 totaled, as of May 2007, some \$278 million.

Congress has tended to view the concept of the GPOI program favorably, but the 109th Congress balked at providing funding for a number of reasons: a lack of a strategic plan and evaluation program, perceived laxness in management, and a sense of a less than full commitment to the program by State Department, among others. The State Department has taken some steps to remedy these perceived shortcomings. While fully funding GPOI for FY2008, the first session of the 110th Congress has questioned whether the GPOI program is meeting its goals, and whether it is too Africa-centric.

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The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

Background

Through the FY2008 omnibus appropriations legislation (P.L. 110-161), Congress has fully funded the Bush Administration's request for \$95.2 million in FY2008 State Department funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).¹ The Administration launched the five-year \$660 million (in FY2005-FY2009 funds) initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of trained peacekeepers and "gendarmes" (police with military skills, a.k.a. constabulary police), as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them. While the United States has provided considerable support to implement several peace processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of budget accounts for well over a decade, it has provided relatively little funding to build up foreign military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.²

The United States previously provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EIPC have been subsumed under the GPOI budget line. ACOTA is still the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI, however, and is implemented by the State Department's Africa Bureau.

Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Policy, Plans, and Analysis (PM/PPA). (Information about GPOI is available at [<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoiteam/gpoi/index.htm>]). PM/PPA works closely with DOD offices to plan and carry out the program.

Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with the State Department for over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in SO/LIC's section on peacekeeping developed the plan as a means to expand and improve the ACOTA program — with more and better exercises and more equipment — as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other parts of the world.

¹ For details, see the section on Administration Funding Requests and Congressional Action, below.

² The term "peacekeeping" is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred to elsewhere as peace operations, stability operations, or stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations.

Policymakers hoped that the availability of peacekeeping training would encourage more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which potentially could serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.

The GPOI budget is part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping (PKO) account, also known as the “voluntary” Peacekeeping account, under the Military Assistance rubric. The PKO account funds activities carried out under Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).³ Section 551 authorizes the President to provide assistance for peacekeeping operations and other programs to further U.S. national security interests “on such terms and conditions as he may determine.” (This provides some flexibility to the President, but is not tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”)

GPOI Purposes and Activities

In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59th session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world “must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises.” In particular, he pointed to a need for “more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing.” A similar rationale prompted the Clinton Administration to formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current search for new strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.⁴

GPOI Goals and Needs

To accomplish these ends, GPOI, has three major goals:

- Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in peacekeeping skills by 2010. (The number is the total to be trained by all participating countries, according to a State Department official.)
- Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme (constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see section below); and

³ The State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the “voluntary” peacekeeping account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.N. assessed contributions are funded through the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA).

⁴ For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL32862, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities*, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.

- Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.

Through GPOI, the State Department also promotes the exchange of information among donors on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is accomplished through donors meetings which serve as a “clearinghouse” to facilitate coordination. The first of these State Department meetings was held in Washington, D.C. on October 7-8, 2004.⁵ The United Kingdom hosted a second meeting in February 2006, the Russian Federation hosted a third in June 2006, and Germany hosted a fourth in March 2007. All four of these meetings focused solely on Africa, according to a State Department official. The State Department is planning the first global clearinghouse for later this year (2007), which will include information exchanges on efforts to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide.

Demand for Peacekeepers. For many analysts, continued efforts to improve the peacekeeping skills of African and other military forces is an important step towards controlling devastating conflicts, particularly in Africa. In the mid-1990s, several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus on Africa.

As of the end of December 2004, shortly after GPOI first started up, almost 25,000 of the nearly 58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the military personnel — roughly 24,000 of 47,000 — in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.) Africa’s military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double that at the end of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African contributions to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in December 2000.

African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). (The first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and most recently the Côte d’Ivoire. The AU deployed its first peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All missions but Sudan eventually became U.N. operations.) Both organizations are trying to develop an African stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional organizations, by 2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and support the command structures and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.

⁵ The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous “clearinghouse” meetings in May and December 2004.

Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces. A second capability in short supply is the specialized units of police with military skills to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.⁶ Several countries have such forces (e.g., the Italian *carabinieri*, the French *gendarmarie*, and the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, among others). In the United States these are referred to as constabulary forces.

U.S. Peacekeeping Training and Assistance, Pre-GPOI, in Sub-Saharan Africa

From 1996 through 2004, the United States provided field and staff training to develop military capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor program, ACOTA. Early in FY2005, ACOTA was subsumed under GPOI. Under ACRI/ACOTA, the United States trained some 16,000 troops from 10 African nations:⁷ Benin, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal,⁸ and Uganda. (It also trained a small number of gendarmes who received the same training as the others.)

The United States also provided non-lethal equipment to the militaries that it trained. This included communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification equipment.

⁶ Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less heavily armed than soldiers. According to the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks include the regulation of peoples' movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions "to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes" and to "stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots or other mob-type action;" and the dispersal of "unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances." (*Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations*, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.) Constabulary forces often can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy as "formed units" (i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They also are often equipped with their own communication and logistical support. See CRS Report RL32321, *Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions*, by Nina M. Serafino.

⁷ ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-fire or peace accord. The more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided training in the skills needed for African troops to perform peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics. Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF, *Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa*. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2003, as posted online at [<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html>]. ACOTA also put greater emphasis on the "train the trainer" aspect. As of 2005, training packages included Command and Staff Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises, often computer-bases, of headquarters commanders and staff) and Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet.

⁸ Military personnel from two of these nations were trained only briefly under ACRI. Training for the Côte d'Ivoire was halted because of a military coup, and for Uganda, because of that country's involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw classroom training provided by private contractors. Because of the demand for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, private contractors also began to conduct field training. By the time GPOI was initiated, private contractors, many of whom reportedly were retired military personnel and reservists, conducted most of the training, while active duty military officers played a minimal role. This remains true today.

Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, totaled \$83.6 million during its six fiscal years (FY1997-FY2002). (Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.) ACOTA was funded at \$8 million in FY2003 and \$15 million in FY2004.

Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries was provided through the EIPC, a "train the trainer" program which began in FY1998 and was subsumed under the GPOI rubric. EIPC provided assistance to selected countries — some 31 as of early 2005 — by designing and implementing a comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training and education program to enhance a nation's institutional structure to train and deploy peacekeepers. EIPC funding, provided under the Foreign Military Financing Program, totaled about \$31.5 million through FY2004.

The Transition to GPOI Training and Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa

GPOI was designed as a program with worldwide reach, but its emphasis was always intended to remain on Africa. In FY2005, all but a few hundred peacekeeper trainees were from outside Africa, and thus far the great majority of trainees are Africans. (For a detailed account of the number of trainees from each country, see **Table 4** at the end of this report. This table provides the number of trainees trained using the funds from each fiscal year, not the number of trainees actually trained in that fiscal year. Because training is still being conducted with previous fiscal year funds, these numbers will change.) Training in Africa continues to be conducted under the ACOTA program, which is implemented by the State Department's Africa Bureau.

During FY2005, nearly 11,000 African troops were trained, using funds initially appropriated for ACOTA under the regular budget and additional funds appropriated for GPOI. (A total of 14,000 troops were expected to be trained with FY2005 funds; some FY2005-funded training is still pending.) This included the training of six battalions from Senegal that were subsequently deployed to specific peacekeeping missions⁹ and three battalions from Botswana that anticipated deployment. Training for a seventh Senegalese battalion began in FY2005 and continued training into FY2006. Other ACOTA partners whose troops were trained using FY2005 funds were Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Mozambique. Two new partners were trained using

⁹ The Senegalese have been trained to participate in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur.

FY2005 funds: Gabon and Nigeria; at least one other may have been trained with FY2005 funds.

Development of the “Beyond Africa” Program

The State Department initiated the “Beyond Africa” training and equipping program in mid-July 2005¹⁰ in order to extend GPOI training to three new regions: Latin America, Europe, and Asia. (As in Africa, some equipment is provided during training, but only that needed for the training itself. Trained troops are not provided with equipment needed for operations until they deploy.)

In Central America, GPOI funds have been used to train and equip soldiers from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as to upgrade an existing facility in order to establish a peacekeeping training center in Guatemala. The intention is to stand up a battalion of about 600 Central American troops, as part of the *Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas* (CFAC).

In Europe, the first countries whose troops were offered training and other support under GPOI were Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Ukraine. Bosnia was provided information technology support for its training center and a U.S. instructor with FY2005 funds. Of these, only Bosnia appears to have received training thus far.

GPOI funds have also been used to provide pre-deployment equipment for the “South East Europe Brigade” (SEEBRIG), a multinational military organization with seven members: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Macedonia, Albania, Italy, and Greece.¹¹

In Asia, the first countries to be extended train-and-equip assistance and provided some logistical support were Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand (which was subsequently suspended because of a military coup). GPOI funds were also used to establish and install communications equipment in a Peace Support Operations Collaboration Center (PSOCC) in Mongolia.¹²

Further Development in Africa and “Beyond” During FY2006 and FY2007

GPOI expanded its reach considerably in the past two years. At least 16 new partner countries (i.e., countries eligible to receive bilateral GPOI support and

¹⁰ The Department of Defense transferred the \$80 million in P.L. 108-447 (Division J Section 117) supplemental appropriations to be used for GPOI programs in June 2005. Funds became available for obligation in mid-July, 15 days after the State Department notified Congress of its spending plans.

¹¹ Original plans were to provide pre-deployment training for troops participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, but were changed when it was determined there was not requirement for it.

¹² This project was part of plans for what was formerly referred to as the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN).

training) were been added through the use of FY2006 and FY2007 funds since GPOI's first year in FY2005. Others were under consideration, but CRS does not have current information on these. (Funds must be obligated in the year of their appropriation but are available for expenditure for five years after obligation and, therefore, may be spent in years subsequent to their appropriation. References to fiscal year are to the funding year.)

More than 40,000 peacekeeping troops, gendarmes, and trainers have been trained through December 31, 2007. (For details on the number of troops trained per country, see **Table 2** at the end of this report. Not all countries receive training and other support during every fiscal year.)

The breakdown of partner countries, by region, as of the date of this report, is as follows.

- GPOI's Africa ACOTA component consists of 20 partners: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Assistance continues to the African Union and ECOWAS.
- In the Western Hemisphere, GPOI supports four Central American countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Paraguay was added as a new partner in FY2006, but it is not clear from information available to CRS whether it has received support.
- Of the four Asian partners eligible for support as of FY2005 — Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand — Thailand was suspended because of a military coup in September 2006. Six new Asian partners were eligible to receive support beginning in FY2006: India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, although it is not clear whether Pakistan and Kazakhstan have received support. By December 2008, it appears that two new Asian partners were added (i.e., Cambodia and the Philippines). It is not clear that Tajikistan, which was under consideration, was added.
- Currently, GPOI has six partners in greater Europe (i.e, Europe and Eurasia): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Macedonia, SEEBRIG,¹³ and the Ukraine.
- GPOI's first Middle Eastern partner, Jordan, was added in FY2006.

¹³ SEEBRIG as an entity has not received the presidential determination necessary to receive direct GPOI support, but GPOI treats SEEBRIG as a partner by providing support for the organization through direct assistance to Romania, which hosted the SEEBRIG headquarters.

Foreign Response and Contributions

G8 leaders¹⁴ endorsed the GPOI goals (above) at their June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island, GA, adopting an “Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.”¹⁵ (This was actually the third G8 Action Plan concerning peacekeeping in Africa. In June 2002, the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada, adopted a broad Africa Action Plan that contained sections on conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. The more specific Joint Africa /G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations was developed over the next year and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-les-baines, France.¹⁶)

As indicated by the GPOI “clearinghouse” concept, several G8 countries already have significant programs in Africa. In addition to the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with African militaries. Germany and the UK provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004, and Germany is providing continuing assistance. The European Union and other countries, most prominently Canada, Italy, France and the Netherlands, have also assisted the Center. In addition to their training and equipment assistance to African peacekeeping troops and centers, Canada and the UK are also providing equipment to the peacekeeping training center in Guatemala. Australia and Singapore are providing instructors and training in the East Asia/Pacific Island region. The Administration is working with Japan to identify areas where it could contribute to GPOI goals.

Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU). In his September 2004 speech to the United Nations, President Bush referred to Italy as a joint sponsor of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea Island G8 peacekeeping action plan. Italy also had moved to establish a school for training gendarme forces even before the United States Congress had provided funding for U.S. support for the school. Italian *carabinieri*, who are widely viewed as a leading model and have played a prominent role in providing constabulary forces to peacekeeping and stabilization operations,¹⁷ established the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) as an international training center at Vicenza in March 2005.

Italy is providing not only the facility, but also most of the staff for the “train the trainer” program. As of mid-2006, some 145 carabinieri were attached to CoESPU,

¹⁴ G8 refers to the “Group of 8” major industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. G8 heads of state, plus representatives from the European Union, meet at annual summits.

¹⁵ Text available at [http://www.g8usa.gov/d_061004c.htm].

¹⁶ Texts available at [<http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf>] and [<http://www.g8.gc.ca/AFRIQUE-01june-en.asp>].

¹⁷ According to *Carabinieri* officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004, some 1,300 *carabinieri* were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania, and Palestine.

of which about 25 were instructors and training staff. At the same point, two U.S. military service members were attached to the center. One serves as the Deputy Director, although DOD's commitment to fill that slot extends only through 2010. CoESPU would like a commitment of five U.S. military service members, one as Deputy Director and others to assist with information, training, and studies and research efforts, including the development of doctrine. France and Russia will be providing instructions in 2007, according to a U.S. State Department official.

A U.S. contribution of \$10 million for the school's operation and training programs was transferred to Italy in late September 2005. (According to CoESPU officials, the U.S. contribution covers about one-third the cost of running the school.)¹⁸ CoESPU's goal, by 2010, is to train 3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza and an additional 4,000 in formed units in their home countries.

CoESPU offers high-level courses (for staff officers ranking from Lt. Colonels to Colonels and their civilian equivalents) consisting of four-and-a-half weeks of classes (approximately 150 classroom hours) in international organizations, international law (including international humanitarian law), military arts in peace support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed international environments with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and organization of police units for international peace support operations.

The Center also offers a course for junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (sergeant majors to captains) and their civilian equivalents. This course covers the materials taught in the high-level course with an emphasis on training in the more practical aspects, including checkpoint procedures, VIP security and escorts, high-risk arrests, border control, riot control, election security, and police self-defense techniques.

The first high-level class graduated 29 officers on December 7, 2005. The first class consisted of officers from Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal. A pilot course for the middle-management level began on January 13, 2006, and seven weeks later graduated about 100 officers. Students for this course were drawn from the same six countries as those at the first-high level course.

On April 19, 2007, CoESPU graduated its fifth high-level class and its sixth middle-management class. These classes were attended by officers from the same countries as the first courses, minus Morocco and with the addition of Nigeria, Serbia and the Ukraine.¹⁹ Many more countries have indicated that they would like to send students to the CoESPU courses.

CoESPU is also developing a lessons-learned and doctrine writing capability in order to serve as an interactive resource for SPUs. It intends to develop a coherent and comprehensive SPU doctrine to promote interoperability in the field, to ensure that

¹⁸ Author's interviews at CoESPU, June 2006.

¹⁹ Remarks by Consul for Political and Economic Affairs Andrea Brouillette-Rodriguez, Vicenza, April 19, 2007. United States Consulate General in Milan. Accessible at [http://www.milan.usconsulate.gov/news/NE_ENG_190407_CoESPU.htm].

doctrine is the basis of training standards and methods, and to respond to questions from SPU commanders in the field, as well as to support pre-mission and in-theater training exercises.

Administration Funding Requests and Congressional Action

FY2005-FY2007 GPOI Funding

FY2005. Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after the FY2005 budget request was submitted to Congress. To fund the initiative at approximately \$100 million in FY2005, the Administration proposed that 80% be DOD funds and the remaining 20% be ACOTA State Department funds. The Armed Services committees did not back GPOI because of concerns that its inclusion in the DOD budget would divert funds from U.S. troops. GPOI's strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign affairs authorizers and appropriators. At the end of 2004, Congress provided \$96.7 million for GPOI funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447), split about as the Administration had proposed, with almost 20% in the Department of State budget and the remaining 80% as a transfer from the DOD budget.²⁰

FY2006. The Bush Administration requested \$114.4 million for FY2006 GPOI funding. Congress did not earmark funding for GPOI (or for any other program in the PKO account) in the conference version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriation bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102, signed into law November 14, 2005), which funded the PKO account at \$175 million — \$20.8 million below the Administration's request of \$195.8 million. The State Department eventually allocated an estimated \$100.4 million for FY2006 GPOI, some \$14 million below the request.²¹

²⁰ Congress divided the FY2005 GPOI funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) as follows. Section 117 of Division J ("Other Matters") provided that "\$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense" to the Department of State Peacekeeping Operations account, where it was allocated to GPOI. The transfer authority was provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, except section 551 of Division D (the Foreign Operations appropriations section of the bill), i.e., the "Leahy Amendment" which prohibits the training of military units credibly accused of gross violations of human rights. State Department officials explain that the "notwithstanding" language was requested to provide an exemption from FAA Section 660, which limits U.S. assistance for the training of foreign police in order to allow funding for COESPU. Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447 contained \$20 million in State Department PKO funding for the ACOTA account and nearly \$1.8 million in EPIC Foreign Military Financing funding. Both accounts which are now subsumed under GPOI.

²¹ The House FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057 (as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), H.Rept. 109-152, on June 24 and passed on June 28), contained \$96.4 million for GPOI. In its report, the HAC expressed its support for (continued...)

FY2007. For FY2007, the Administration requested \$102.6 million for GPOI funding. House and Senate action signaled some discontent with the program. The House was disinclined to provide full funding.²² Senate appropriators expressed discontent with State Department management of the program. They proposed that GPOI funding be transferred to a new FMF program and recommended that the COESPU program be either fully funded by other countries or be transferred to the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).²³

²¹ (...continued)

GPOI as a means for the United States to “reduce the emphasis on the use of military troops for these operations.” It explained that it had provided \$18 million less than the request because it did not expect that all \$63 million indicated for equipment and transportation outside of Africa could be obligated and spent in 2006. The Senate version of the bill (as reported June 30 and passed July 20), contained \$114.0 million for GPOI.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee version of the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600, S.Rept. 109-35, reported on March 10, 2005, and returned to the calendar on April 26) would authorize \$114.4 million for FY2006 and such sums as may be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI. The House version (H.R. 2601, H.Rept. 109-168, as reported by the House International Relations Committee on July 13, 2005 and passed on July 20) does not mention GPOI and does not detail accounts in such a way as to indicate whether GPOI is funded. There was no further action on the bill.

²² The House version of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (H.R. 5522, passed July 9, 2006), contained \$82 million for GPOI. This was \$20.6 million below the request and \$18.4 below the FY2006 level. No explanation was provided in the House Appropriations Committee’s explanatory report (H.Rept. 109-486) for the reduction. The report did state the committee’s expectation that the FY2008 budget request for GPOI “include a detailed summary of the achievements of GPOI to date and specific information linking the budget request to fiscal year 2008 performance objectives.” The committee also “strongly” encouraged the Secretary of State “to consider sending GPOI participants to common educational programs in the United States, including the Naval Postgraduate School.”

The Committee report also noted it did not authorize the use of GPOI funds notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), which is necessary to provide funds for CoESPU. Although the committee expressed support for COESPU, it stated that it expected that either other G8 nations support the program or that the Administration use funding from other accounts with the necessary authority, such as the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account.

²³ In the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) version of H.R. 5522, the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277), approved by SAC on June 29, 2006, funding for GPOI would be transferred from the PKO account to a new program under the Foreign Military Financing Program. S.Rept. 109-277 stated that the State Department “has failed to demonstrate a requisite level of commitment to the program, instead viewing funds provided for GPOI as a funding source for other activities.” [The State Department transferred \$57 million in GPOI funds to support urgent needs of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, according to a State Department official.] The report also scored the State Department for ignoring committee guidance on GPOI and for its inability “to articulate any plan for the use of fiscal year 2005 funding until calendar year 2006.” S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.

The SAC recommended that a Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund be created
(continued...)

The final continuing resolution²⁴ that funded most government operations and programs through FY2007, including GPOI, left the decision on the amount of GPOI funding for FY2007 largely to the State Department, albeit in the context of a reduced availability of funds.²⁵ The State Department estimate of FY2007 GPOI obligations is \$81 million (i.e., \$1 million less than provided for in the House-passed FY2007 Foreign Operations bill, H.R. 5522). (An earlier version of the Continuing Resolution had set the House-passed amount as the level for FY2007 GPOI funding.)

FY2008. In its February 2008 budget request, the Administration asked for \$92.5 million in GPOI funding. Congress fully funded the request in the omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764, Division J; P.L. 110-161, signed into law December 26, 2007). Although the Act does not specify funding for GPOI, the Joint Explanatory Statement on the final version of the omnibus appropriations bill specifies that the executive branch is to take into account House and Senate Committee report language on bills incorporated into the omnibus when implementing the legislation. The House Report (H.Rept. 110-197) accompanying the original State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill recommends full funding. In that report, the House Appropriations Committee stated its expectation that the FY2009 budget request for GPOI would “include a detailed summary of GPOI’s achievements to date and specific information linking the budget request to fiscal year 2009 performance objectives.”

In action on the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in Section 1204 of its version of the bill (S. 1547, reported June 5, 2007), calls for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study describing and assessing the activities and implementation of the GPOI program. This requirement was retained in the final bill (H.R. 4986, P.L. 110-181, signed into law January 28, 2008).

²³ (...continued)

under FMF, the purpose of which would be “identical to GPOI, namely, to identify the critical shortfalls in the training, equipment, and capabilities of our allies to serve in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.” To decide on the allocation of funds, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military [Pol-Mil] Affairs would consult with commanders of the U.S. regional military commands (U.S., Pacific, Central, European, and Southern) to identify “the most critical training and equipment shortfalls of our peacekeeping partners and regional allies” in order to develop a three year plan and program to address those needs. S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.

²⁴ Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5, signed into law February 15, 2007. Amends P.L. 109-289, division B, as amended by P.L. 109-369 and P.L. 109-383.)

²⁵ Congress, in effect, reduced the amount of funding available for the GPOI program by funding the overall PKO budget at \$223.25 million, while earmarking \$50 million for peacekeeping operations in Sudan. Congress thus provided \$173.25 million for other (than Sudan peacekeeping) PKO programs in FY2007, i.e., \$27.25 million less than the Administration’s \$200.5 million PKO budget request and the same as the FY2006 PKO budget. State Department plans for FY2007 included spending for two new programs totaling some \$31 million, the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and Liberia, that were not included in the FY2006 budget.

In the SASC report accompanying the Senate version of the bill (S.Rept. 110-77), SASC stated that it wanted to “strengthen the likelihood that GPOI will be administered in such a fashion, and that there will be an expectation, if not a requirement, that GPOI training recipient countries contribute troops to U.N. missions in the near-term, and that GPOI will increase the number of peacekeepers who can remain ready via sustained training and equipping programs.” SASC expressed concern as to whether the readiness of GPOI-trained troops “is being monitored or maintained” and noted that program objectives calling for the establishment of an equipment depot for and of a multilateral transportation logistics support arrangement (TLSA) have not been fulfilled.²⁶ SASC also expressed concern that participation by other G-8 members has not met expectations. (See the Issues for Congress section, below, for further discussion of this and other matters addressed by this legislation.)

Among the points the SASC requested the GAO to address are: (1) the extent to which contributing and participating countries maintain records and databases; (2) the quality and sustainability of the training of individuals and units, (3) the extent to which those trained are equipped and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations, (4) participating countries capacity to mobilize those trained; (5) the extent to which trained individuals are deployed, and (6) the extent to which contractors are used and the quality of their results. The Committee also requested an assessment of whether GPOI is achieving its goals and recommendations as to whether a country’s participation in GPOI “should require reciprocal participation.” The report is to be submitted by March 1, 2008 to the Congressional defense and foreign affairs committees.

²⁶ According to a 2006 State Department document, GPOI provided peace operations equipment and logistics technical advisors to equipment depots in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (for the African Union) and in Freetown, Sierra Leone (for ECOWAS) and will establish “a substantial equipment cache in a location to be determined that maximizes the U.S.’ ability to deploy the equipment in response to a crisis anywhere in the world.” The document also stated that the United States would coordinate with Russia, the 2006 G8 President, and other G8 members, to formally establish the TLSA in 2006.” U.S. Department of State, Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Summary of GPOI Strategy for Fiscal Years 2005-2009*. September 4, 2006. pp 52-53.

Table 1. GPOI Allocations, FY2005-FY2008
(in \$ millions)

Category	FY2005 Actual ^a	FY2006 Estimates ^a	FY2007 Estimates ^a	FY2008 Request ^a
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)	28.92	35.00	40.39	40.26
Africa Regional HQ Support: African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	6.30	5.72	5.15	7.26
East Asia and the Pacific	7.74	11.0	6.55	6.00
Europe and Eurasia	5.05	6.00	4.0	5.20
Near East (i.e., Jordan)	0	0.65	1.3	1.60
South & Central Asia	0.93	5.00	7.36	12.83
Western Hemisphere	6.49	11.70	8.45	7.05
Deployment Equipment and Depots	20.69	19.52	3.79	6.00
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) ^a	15.00	0	0	4.00
Transportation and Logistics Support Arrangement	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.00
Program Management	0.55	1.80	0	1.0
Total	96.67	100.38	81.0	95.20

Source: Department of State, as of May 7, 2007.

Note: Some totals do not add due to rounding.

- a. As GPOI was not created until late 2004, FY2005 actuals include funds originally appropriated elsewhere: \$14.88 million in Peacekeeping Account (PKO) funds for ACOTA; \$1.79 million in Foreign Military Financing for Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC), and an \$80 million transfer from DOD.

FY2006 estimates include FY2006 actual allocations from FY2006 annual appropriations and FY2006 estimated allocations from FY2006 supplemental appropriations. Estimated allocations from supplemental funding totals \$57.0 million and will wholly fund Europe and Eurasia, Near East, South and Central Asia, and Western Hemisphere activities. Actual FY2006 allocations wholly fund Africa Regional support. Estimated supplemental increases for FY2006 allocations are: \$5.53 million for ACOTA over the \$29.47 million actual allocation; \$7 million for East Asia Pacific over the \$4 million actual allocation, \$15.53 million for deployment equipment and depots over the \$3.99 million actual allocation; and \$1.6 million for program management over the \$0.2 million actual allocation.

FY2007 Preliminary allocations were agreed upon by the GPOI Coordinating Committee on April 20, 2007. The FY2008 allocations may vary depending upon actual FY2008 appropriations. Of FY2005 COESPU funding, \$4.5 million remained to be obligated as of mid-May 2007.

Issues for the 110th Congress

Members of the 109th Congress tended to be supportive of the GPOI concept, but some expressed concerns over several shortcomings: a lack of a strategic plan and evaluation program, perceived laxness in program management leading to severe delays in planning and implementation, and a sense of a less than full commitment to the program by State Department, in particular. The State Department has taken steps to remedy these problems, producing a strategic plan (the executive summary of which is publically available),²⁷ facilitating procedures to speed planning and implementation, and implementing an evaluation program. It is not yet clear whether these steps will satisfy congressional critics who attempted through appropriations legislation to move the program elsewhere (as noted above). (The terms of the final continuing resolution, P.L. 110-5, left the program unchanged.)

Given the current congressional scrutiny of private contractors performing security functions and security force training in Iraq and elsewhere, some may eventually question the predominance of private contractors, and more recently other nations, in GPOI training, although Congress has not yet raised this as an issue.²⁸ (The FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181), cited above, does request GAO to describe the extent to which GPOI uses contractors and to assess “the quality and timeliness of the results achieved by the contractors, and whether the United States Government might have achieved similar or better results without contracting out functions.”

As of the beginning of the second session of the 110th Congress, two practical issues concerning GPOI seemed most salient. One is whether the ongoing evaluations of GPOI demonstrate that the program is meeting its goals and, if not, how to adjust the program to achieve them. A second is whether GPOI has become sufficiently global in its reach.

Are GPOI Training Efforts Having the Desired Effect? Members wonder whether the GPOI program is meeting its goal of providing well-trained peacekeepers for U.N. and other operations. There are four questions of particular concern: (1) Is GPOI meeting its target number of trainees? (2) Are those trained by GPOI to be trainers actually training other troops? (3) Are the soldiers (and police) trained under GPOI actually deployed to international peacekeeping operations? (4) Is the training provided sufficient to enable soldiers (or police in the case of COESPU training) to handle the necessary range of peacekeeping tasks effectively? These and

²⁷ U.S. Department of State. Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Summary of GPOI Strategy for Fiscal Years 2005-2006*. September 4, 2006.

²⁸ According to a conversation with a State Department official in May 2007: (1) ACOTA training is provided by Northrup Grummon Information Technology and MPRI; (2) A worldwide, five-year GPOI indefinite quantity contract for up to \$200 million, under which Northrup Grummond, MPRI, and Blackwater USA will provide services, was finalized recently; (3) Some GPOI training is also provided by the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Post-Graduate School; and (4) the United States has worked with Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay in providing training to Central Americans.

related concerns were among those raised by the Senate Armed Services Committee in the report accompanying its version of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1547, S.Rept. 110-77. See section on FY2008 Congressional Action above.

In an effort to measure results of its training, the State Department awarded in September 2005 a contract to DFI International to develop a system to evaluate GPOI and to monitor its results against that “metrics” system. Thus far, the DFI GPOI evaluation team has gathered figures that answer the first question with some confidence.

Figures on the numbers of troops trained compiled by the GPOI evaluation program indicate that it is possible that U.S.-funded GPOI training efforts may indeed reach the GPOI goal of 75,000 troops trained if funding continues at current levels through FY2009, as planned. GPOI evaluation data show just over 40,000 foreign troops trained to standard²⁹ through 2007 (i.e., through the third year of the program). The goal of 75,000 would indicate a pace of 17,500 soldiers trained per year through 2010, when the program is scheduled to end. The pace of training will have to speed up if the goal is to be met.

One area in which the numbers may fall short of some expectations is the proportion of peacekeeping trainers who are trained. GPOI was initially billed as a program with a significant “train-the-trainer” component, which implied a large number of trainers prepared to teach other soldiers to deploy on peacekeeping missions. Thus far, the available data show that trainers have comprised only 6.6% of those trained.

Has GPOI Become Sufficiently Global? As GPOI advances into its third year of operation, some Members question whether it has obtained the commitment and participation from other countries that was originally anticipated. The SASC report referred to above (S.Rept. 110-77, accompanying S. 1547) raises this concern: “Participation among the G-8 members is uneven,” it states, “and there appears to be no effort to solicit partnership with non-G-8 countries such as India, which has rich peacekeeping experience...” (Although India has recently become a GPOI “partner,” that term is used by GPOI to mean countries that receive training and support, rather than those that provide it, which seems to be the sense intended here.) The SASC report suggests that the State Department’s division of labor on GPOI may contribute to the problem: “One possible challenge to obtaining greater contributions or participation in GPOI may be the fact that at the Department of State, GPOI appears to be mainly administered by the Africa Bureau, rather than the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.” SASC provisions, as incorporated in the FY2008 omnibus appropriations bill (P.L. 110-181, discussed above), call for a GAO study to describe the President’s efforts to solicit contributions for and participation in GPOI, as well as the activities conducted by each member state of the G-8, by non-G-8 member nations, and by organizations and institutions. They also call for GAO to examine whether the State Department and the Defense Department “should concentrate administration [of GPOI] in one office or bureau, and if so, which one....”

²⁹ The standard is mastery of at least 80% of the coursework and an attendance record of 80% or better.

Whether GPOI is too Africa-centric may also be a concern regarding the relative proportion of troops trained from Africa vs. the rest of the world. Although GPOI was always intended to focus more on Africa than on the rest of the world, some members may regard the results thus far as too weighted towards that continent. Table 4, below, shows that of the 40,133 troops trained with GPOI funds as of December 31, 2007, some 38,465 or 96%, were from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-December 31, 2007
(#s trained to standard)

Region/Country/ Organization	Total # Peacekeepers Trained	Total # Peacekeeper Trainers Trained	Total #
Sub-Saharan Africa			
Benin	2,150	94	2,244
Botswana	118	47	165
Burkina Faso	1,671	110	1,781
Burundi	1,473	0	1,473
Cameroon	12	0	12
ECOWAS	219	2	221
Gabon	1,238	155	1,393
Ghana	2,900	87	2,987
Kenya	39	5	44
Malawi	1,048	25	1,073
Mali	867	130	997
Mozambique	868	161	1,029
Namibia	815	67	882
Niger	701	91	792
Nigeria	4,479	432	4,911
Rwanda	8,037	325	8,362
Senegal	6,746	412	7,158
South Africa	162	81	243
Tanzania	55	12	67
Uganda	1,852	103	1,955
Zambia	563	113	676
<i>Sub-Total Africa</i>	<i>36,013</i>	<i>2,452</i>	<i>38,465</i>
Asia/South Asia/Pacific Islands/Middle East			
Brunei	1	0	1

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Region/Country/ Organization	Total # Peacekeepers Trained	Total # Peacekeeper Trainers Trained	Total #
Bangladesh	59	24	83
Cambodia	45	2	47
Fiji (Khaan Quest participant, see notes)	44	3	47
India	47	0	47
Indonesia	91	9	100
Jordan	1	0	1
Laos	1	0	1
Malaysia	15	10	25
Mongolia	405	55	460
Nepal	2	2	4
Philippines (Khaan Quest participant, see notes)	5	0	5
Singapore	7	1	8
Sri Lanka	48	4	52
Thailand — Suspended	242	36	278
Tonga (Khaan Quest participant, see notes)	81	4	85
<i>Subtotal Asia/Central Asia/South Asia/the pacific</i>	<i>1,094</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>1,244</i>
Greater Europe (Europe and Eurasia)			
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	0	1
Western Hemisphere			
El Salvador	15	4	19
Guatemala	292	10	302
Honduras	61	18	79
Nicaragua	20	3	23
<i>Subtotal Western Hemisphere</i>	<i>388</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>321</i>
Total	37,496	2,637	40,133

Sources: Compiled from information provided by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 2008.

Notes: This table does not include soldiers trained by GPOI-trained trainers. The standard used by evaluators for inclusion was mastery of at least 80% of the coursework and an 80% or better attendance record. NA = Not Available.

This table includes three countries that are not GPOI partners but were provided support because they participated in the GPOI-funded August 2006 Khaan Quest multilateral peacekeeping training exercise in Mongolia on the invitation of the Mongolian government. It also includes Cameroon, which is not a GPOI partner (i.e., eligible to receive bilateral assistance). It is listed here as receiving training because it sends students to the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU).

Peacekeepers = # soldiers (and occasionally gendarmes) trained in peacekeeping skills in GPOI courses in order to deploy to peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeper Trainers = # soldiers trained to train other military personnel in peacekeeping skills for deployment to peacekeeping operations (i.e., soldiers trained under the “train-the-trainer” program).