Order Code RL32721
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectives on the
Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus
Developing Nations
Updated January 31, 2008
Larry Parker
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
John Blodgett
Deputy Assistant Director
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

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Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectives on the Top
20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations
Summary
Using the World Resources Institute (WRI) database on greenhouse gas
emissions and related data, this report examines two issues. The first issue is the
separate treatment of developed and developing nations under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol.
This distinction has been a pivotal issue affecting U.S. climate change policy. The
second issue is the continuing difficulty of the current approach designed to address
climate change through limiting greenhouse gas emissions to a specified percentage
of baseline emissions (typically 1990). The data permit examination of alternative
approaches, such as focusing on per capita emissions or the greenhouse gas emission
intensity (measured as emissions per unit of economic activity). Key findings
include:
! A few countries account for most greenhouse gas emissions: in
2000, the United States led by emitting 20% of the world total,
followed by China with 15%; no other country reached 6%; the top
nine emitters accounted for 60% of the 185 nations’ emissions.
! Land-use effects (e.g., deforestation) on emissions are negligible for
most nations, but they cause emissions to rise sharply for certain
developing nations, for example, Brazil and Indonesia.
! While oil- and gas-producing Gulf States have the highest per capita
greenhouse gas emissions, in general developed nations rank high in
per capita emissions (in 2000, Australia, the United States, and
Canada ranked 5, 7, and 9, respectively, in the world), while
developing nations tend to rank low (China, India, and Indonesia
ranked 99, 146, and 123, respectively).
! The greenhouse intensity of the economy — the metric by which the
Bush Administration is addressing climate change — varies
substantially among developed countries (the Ukraine emits 651
tons/million international $GDP, while France emits 94 tons/million
$GDP, with the United States at 196 tons/million $GDP; developing
nations show less variance unless land use is taken into account.
! The time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and for
taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential
impacts on individual nations, as a result of individual resource
endowments (e.g., coal versus natural gas and hydropower) and
stage of economic development (e.g., conversion of forest land to
agriculture occurring before or after the baseline).
Differentiating responsibilities between developed and developing nations —
as the UNFCCC does — fails to focus efforts on some of the largest emitters.
Moreover, many developed countries have not achieved stabilization of their
emissions despite the UNFCCC. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the
data, a flexible strategy that allows each country to play to its strengths may be
appropriate if diverse countries like the United States and China are ever to reach
agreement.

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Contents
A Look at the Historic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current (2000) and Baseline (1990) Emissions Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Longer-Term Historical Data (1950-2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Impact of Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Implications of Focusing on Emissions Levels for International Actions . . . 7
Alternative Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Per Capita Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Relative Ranking of 20 Top Emitters (Plus EU-25) of
Greenhouse Gases Based on 2000 Greenhouse Gas Emissions . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix B. Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for
20 Largest Emitters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix C. Additional Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related
Indicators for 20 Largest Emitters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Tables
Table 1. Shares of Global Emissions by the Industrialized (Annex I),
Developing (non-Annex I), and Top 20 Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

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Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectives
on the Top 20 Emitters and Developed
Versus Developing Nations
Climate change is a global issue1; however, greenhouse gas emissions data on
a global basis are incomplete. Some developing countries have no institutions for
monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and have never reported such emissions to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).2 In a
similar vein, data on individual greenhouse gases, sources, and land-use patterns vary
greatly in quality. Despite shortcomings in the data, the emerging picture of
emissions has implications for considering alternative policies for controlling
emissions. First, the picture outlines the estimated contributions of individual
countries. Second, evaluating those emissions in terms of socio-economic
characteristics (e.g., population and economic activity) provides insights on the
potentially divergent interests of differing groups of nations — especially concerning
developed nations versus developing ones.3
The World Resources Institute (WRI) has compiled greenhouse gas emissions
and related data from a variety of sources into a database that is available for
analysis.4 Covering 185 nations (plus a separate entry combining the members of the
European Union),5 the database includes total emissions, per capita emissions, and
1 This paper does not explore the underlying science of climate change nor the question of
whether action is justified. See CRS Report RL33849, Climate Change: Science and Policy
Implications, by Jane Leggett, for more information.
2 For the most recent developments on submissions to the UNFCCC by non-Annex 1
countries, see [http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/
items/653.php].
3 The UNFCCC divides nations into two groups, nations listed in Annex I (which under the
Kyoto Protocol would have specified reduction targets), encompassing “developed” nations
including Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; and non-Annex I nations (which do
not have specified reduction targets), including the rest of the world.
4 Called the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), the database uses a variety of data
sources to provide information on greenhouse gas emissions, sinks, and other relevant
indicators. Full documentation, along with caveats, is provided on the WRI website at
[http://cait.wri.org/].
5 Both the individual countries of the European Union and the European Community as an
entity are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Within the EU, the differing situations of each
constituent nation have resulted in differing emissions targets and policies for each country.
While this analysis focuses on the implications of individual nations’ situations, the EU
nations are authorized to meet their goals collectively.

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CRS-2
greenhouse gas (or carbon) intensity,6 selected socio-economic indicators, and other
measures. Emissions data for all six greenhouse gases7 identified by the UNFCCC
are available for 1990, 1995, and 2000; data for carbon dioxide (CO ) are available
2
back to 1850 and up to 2004, but the effects of land use on CO are only available
2
from 1950.
This report uses the data compiled by WRI to examine a pivotal and long-
running issue surrounding U.S. climate change policy: the appropriate roles of
developed and developing countries in addressing climate change.
The UNFCCC states as its first principle in Article 3:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.8
The United States has struggled with the “common but differentiated responsibilities”
of developing countries and with the pledge for the developed countries to “take the
lead in combating climate change....” The resulting debate concerns what actions to
address greenhouse emissions should be “common” responsibilities (i.e., undertaken
by all nations) and what actions should be “differentiated” (i.e., undertaken only by
developed ones). Under the UNFCCC and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol, common
actions include the responsibility to monitor and report emissions; differentiated
actions include the commitment to reduce emissions to a 1990 baseline for
designated developed nations, listed on Annex I to the UNFCCC (and hence known
as Annex I nations).
Thus the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and much of the current debate about
actions to control greenhouse gas emissions focus on individual nations’ amounts of
emissions. As a result, primary attention falls on current greenhouse gas emissions,
past greenhouse gas emissions, and projected greenhouse gas emissions. In this
context, addressing global climate change has in effect meant reducing greenhouse
gas emissions — for Annex I countries. (A complicating factor is that land use
activities can affect net emissions, and the Kyoto Protocol provides methods for
taking land use effects into account.) For the UNFCCC, the differentiated control
action was for Annex I countries to take voluntary actions to ensure that their
greenhouse gas emissions in 2000 did not exceed 1990 levels.9 For the Kyoto
Protocol, the differentiated control action was for Annex I countries to control
emissions to individually specified percentages of baseline emissions, averaged over
6 Carbon intensity is the ratio of a country’s emissions to its gross domestic product (GDP),
measured in international dollars (purchasing power parity).
7 Carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride.
8 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 3.1.
9 The United States and many other countries failed to meet this voluntary goal. It was this
general failure that gave impetus to the Kyoto Protocol to mandate reductions.

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the period 2008-2012.10 Under both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, non-
Annex I nations would be exempt from these specified control requirements —
although they could voluntarily join in. This split in responsibilities — with the
consequent lack of greenhouse gas control requirements for major emitting non-
Annex I countries — played a key role in the United States’ refusal to agree to the
Kyoto Protocol.
Justifications for the differential treatment of the developed, Annex I nations
compared to the developing nations are both environmentally and economically
based.
! Environmentally, the Annex I nations account for about 72% of total
carbon dioxide emissions that accumulated in the atmosphere
between 1950 and 2000.11 Thus, to the extent cumulative CO may
2
be contributing to global warming, the Annex I nations bear the
preponderant responsibility.
! Economically, as the UNFCCC explicitly recognizes, the
development being pursued by the non-Annex I nations depends
importantly on expanded use of energy, including fossil fuels, which
are the main source of carbon dioxide, the dominant greenhouse gas.
From this perspective, a logic for the differing treatment of the two
groups is that the developed, Annex I countries can afford to control
emissions because they have achieved a relatively high standard of
living, while the developing nations have the right and should have
the opportunity to expand energy use as necessary for their economic
development.
This distinguishing of the responsibilities of the Annex I and non-Annex I nations
generates crucial and interrelated tensions:
! First, this approach means that Annex I nations pay an economic
price for addressing global climate change;
! Second, non-Annex I nations retain the opportunity to develop their
economies using least-cost energy regardless of greenhouse gas
emissions; this in turn means that from the perspective of the Annex
I nations, developing nations — which may be competing in certain
economic sectors — appear to be getting a free ride;
! And third, despite investments in controls and resulting tensions
between competing economies, actual global emissions will continue
to rise if the increase in emissions from non-Annex I nations exceeds
any decrease in emissions achieved by Annex I ones.
10 Generally the baseline was 1990; the individual Annex I commitments were negotiated, with the
U. S. commitment — if the United States had agreed to the Kyoto Protocol — being a 7% reduction.
11 Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 4.0 (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute,
2007).

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The intensity of these tensions that arise from focusing on emissions levels is
clear when one examines emissions data (see Appendices A, B, and C). To frame
this discussion, CRS focuses on the 20 individual nations that emitted the most
greenhouse gases in 2000.12 The top 20 were chosen because they represent about
three-quarters of the estimated greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2000 (latest
available data from CAIT for all six greenhouse gases). In addition, data for the 25-
member European Union are included, as the Kyoto Protocol allows the EU to
address its greenhouse gas emission obligations collectively. In 2000, the 25-nation
EU was the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, after the United States and
China.
A Look at the Historic Data
Current (2000) and Baseline (1990) Emissions Data. A compelling fact
to emerge from the database is that a few countries account for most of the emissions.
Appendices A, B, and C present data concerning the top 20 greenhouse gas-emitting
nations in 2000. They accounted for approximately 75% of global emissions.
Excluding land use data, the United States led in emitting greenhouse gases (1,876
million metric tons of carbon equivalent, MMTCE)13 at 20% of the total, followed
by China (1,355 MMTCE) at about 15%. No other country reached 6% of total
emissions (although the collective 25-member EU accounted for 14%); overall, only
nine countries emitted 2% or more. These top nine emitters accounted for 60% of
global emissions and the next 11 top emitters accounted for another 15% of
emissions.
Thus one implication of these data is that greenhouse gas control in the short
term depends mainly on the actions of a relatively few nations; if the top 20 emitters
(or even the top 10) all acted effectively, the actions of the remaining 160-plus
nations would be of little import, at least for years.
A second compelling fact about those top emitters is that they represent very
different types and situations.14 The top 20 nations include:
! Developed (Annex I) nations whose emissions grew between 1990
and 2000: the United States, Japan, Canada, Italy, Australia, and
Spain (ranked 1, 5, 8, 10, 15, and 19, respectively). These six
nations accounted for 30.6% of global greenhouse gas emissions in
2000.
12 For a more general discussion of the top 25 emitters, see Kevin Baumert and Jonathan
Pershing, Climate Data: Insights and Observations (Pew Center on Climate Change,
December 2004).
13 The UNFCCC provides a methodology for calculating the greenhouse gas contributions
of nations and converting them to equivalent units — Million Metric Tons of Carbon
Equivalents (MMTCE).
14 For a discussion of these situations, see CRS Report RL33970, Greenhouse Gas Emission
Drivers: Population, Economic Development and Growth, and Energy Use, by John
Blodgett and Larry Parker.

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! Developed (Annex I) nations whose emissions declined between
1990 and 2000, largely as a result of the collapse of the Eastern
European and USSR socialist economies during the decade: Russian
Federation, Germany,15 Ukraine, and Poland (ranked 3, 6, 16, and
20, respectively).16 These four nations accounted for 11.2% of
global greenhouse gas emissions in 2000.
! Developed (Annex I) nations with free-market economies whose
emissions declined between 1990 and 2000, largely because of a
combination of low population growth, modest economic growth,
and the displacement of high-emitting fuels (coal) with alternatives:
the United Kingdom and France (ranked 9 and 13, respectively).
These two nations accounted for 3.5% of global greenhouse gas
emissions in 2000.
! Developing (non-Annex I) nations, all of whose emissions rose
during the decade: China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea,
Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa (ranked 2, 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 17, and
18, respectively). These eight nations accounted for 30.1% of global
greenhouse gas emissions in 2000.
For the year 2000, then, 12 of the top 20 countries were Annex I countries,
including 7 of the top 10 emitters. In 2000, the Annex I countries accounted for
about 60% of the top-20 group’s greenhouse emissions, compared with 40% for the
developing, non-Annex I countries; in 1990, the relative shares were 68% and 32%,
respectively, so the developing countries have been increasing their share.
Highlighting the tension between Annex I and non-Annex I perspectives, the number-
one emitters of each group were the top two emitters overall: At the top was the
leading developed, free-market economy, the United States; in the number-two
position was the leading developing, non-Annex I country, China.17 Combined, these
two countries accounted for over one-third of total global emissions.
Longer-Term Historical Data (1950-2000). The impact of emissions on
climate change is believed to be cumulative over decades and even centuries. Thus
a longer-term examination of data provides an important perspective, and is one
reason for the differing treatments of the Annex I and non-Annex I nations. Available
data (see Appendices A, B, and C) give emissions estimates of energy-related CO2
emissions back to 1950.18 The period 1950-2000 represents the re-industrialization
15 Germany falls into this category as a result of its incorporation of East Germany. The pre-
merger West Germany was of course not a centrally planned economy.
16 The only change in the top 20 between 1990 and 2000 was the dropping out of
Kazakhstan, whose coal-based industries collapsed; it was replaced by Iran.
17 China is likely to pass the United States in greenhouse emissions in the near future — if
it hasn’t already done so. However, data are not available to verify current emissions.
18 As noted earlier, CAIT has data back to 1850; however, the earlier the data, the more
(continued...)

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CRS-6
of developed countries after World War II and the emergence of some major third-
world countries.
This longer-term view of emissions underscores the contribution of the Annex
I nations:
! Annex I countries’ share of energy-related emissions over the half-
century is over 70% of global emissions of carbon dioxide. The
energy and materials needed to power industrialization after World
War II put Russia ahead of China as the second-largest emitter over
the time period.
! The relative rankings of several developing countries, including
Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, and Iran, drop substantially using a
longer historical baseline for emissions: from the 2000 rank to the
1950-2000 cumulative rank, from 7th to 18th, 12th to 19th, 14th to 27th,
and 17th to 22rd, respectively.
Greenhouse gas emissions, particularly energy-related emissions, are closely tied
to industrialization. As “developed” is considered by many to be synonymous with
“industrialized,” it is not surprising that those countries entering the 1950-2000
period with an industrial base (even a war-damaged one) would have higher
cumulative emissions than those countries that only began to industrialize during this
period.
Impact of Land Use. Changes in land use can significantly affect net levels
of emissions. In general, deforestation increases CO emissions and afforestation
2
decreases them. However, data on land-use changes and their conversion into
equivalent units of greenhouse gas emissions are even more uncertain than the
emissions data. Therefore, this discussion (see Appendices A, B, and C) is at best
illustrative.
Unlike the cumulative energy-related emissions data, including land use in the
calculations focuses discussion on certain developing countries.
! Land-use practices in certain developing countries, notably Brazil
and Indonesia, are having the effect of substantially upping their
relative emissions ranks: The ranking of their cumulative net
emissions from 1950 to 2000 rise from 18th to 5th, and 27th to 4th,
respectively, when land use is taken into account.
! For Annex I nations and many non-Annex I nations, including land
use has relatively little effect on their emissions, and for many their
net emissions decline. Among the top 20 emitters in 2000, the
impact of accounting for land use on emissions is small for Western
European and North American nations, Russia, China, and India.
18 (...continued)
uncertain the quality; and land-use data are only available back to 1950.

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CRS-7
The United States’ relative rank (as number 1) does not change when
land use is taken into account, although its net emissions in 2000
drop by 110 MMTCE (nearly 6%).
What the land-use data reflect are the relatively stable land-use patterns of
countries where most land-clearing and agricultural development occurred before
1950. The Western developed nations and China and India, for example, have long-
established agricultural practices; in contrast, Brazil and Indonesia have over the past
few decades been clearing large regions of forest and jungle for timber and/or
conversion to agriculture, releasing greenhouse gases (or removing sinks). In terms
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, including land use in the equation for
controlling emissions disadvantages certain countries whose exploitation of resources
and development of agriculture are occurring at a particular moment in history.
Implications of Focusing on Emissions Levels
for International Actions
The data on greenhouse gas emissions highlight issues of both effectiveness and
fairness in the effort to address global climate change. Differentiating responsibilities
between Annex I and non-Annex I nations, as the UNFCCC has, does not focus
efforts on all of the largest emitters. As Table 1 shows, the emissions of all Annex
I nations currently account for just over half of 2000 emissions. Comparing 1990 to
2000 emissions, it is apparent that the share of emissions by non-Annex I nations has
been growing.
Moreover, contradictory issues of fairness arise. For Annex I countries, the
present scheme of controlling greenhouse gases requires them to bear essentially all
the direct economic costs. For non-Annex I countries, to the extent that development
is linked to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, imposing controls on them could
slow their development and hold down their standards of living vis-a-vis the
developed nations.
Finally, the focus on emissions levels at specific times (e.g., a baseline of 1990)
has differential and arbitrary impacts on individual nations.
! Looking at the industrialization process, to the extent that fossil fuel
use is a necessary ingredient of economic development, as
acknowledged by the UNFCCC, the emergence of the global climate
change issue at this time effectively determines the distinction
between the developed, Annex I nations and the developing, non-
Annex I nations. For Annex I nations, that energy exploitation has
been incorporated into their economies and is part of their baseline
for considering any controls on greenhouse gases. For developing,
non-Annex I nations, however, economic development will require
expanded energy use, of which fossil fuels can be the least costly.
Thus imposing limits on fossil energy use at this time could result in
developing countries being relegated to a lower standard of living
than those nations that developed earlier.

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Table 1. Shares of Global Emissions by the Industrialized
(Annex I), Developing (non-Annex I), and Top 20 Countries
Industrialized
Developing
(Annex I)
(non-Annex I)
Countries
Countries
Top 20
Indicator
n = 38a
n = 147
Nations
1990 GHG Emissions (excl. land use)
58.7%
40.1%
75.8%
2000 GHG Emissions (excl. land use)
51.5%
47.2%
75.4%
2000 GHG Emissions (with land use)
41.3%
57.6%
70.4%
Cumulative Energy-Related CO2
Emissions 1950-2000 (excl. land use)
71.6%
26.4%
80.6%
Cumulative Energy-Related CO2
Emissions (with land use)
51.5%
46.7%
73.9%
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 4.0 (Washington, DC: World Resources
Institute, 2007).
a. Counting the European Union countries individually, excluding the EU as a collective member.
! Similarly, certain land-use activities, such as clearing land for
agriculture and exploiting timber, affect net greenhouse gas
emissions. Nations that are currently exploiting their resource
endowments, such as Brazil and Indonesia, could find themselves
singled out as targets for controls. Yet developed nations, like the
United States and most European countries, which exploited such
resources in the past, have those greenhouse gas implications
embedded in their baselines.
! Also, the focus on 1990 as a baseline means that the Eastern
European and former Soviet Union nations have the advantage of
reductions in emissions from their subsequent economic
contractions, which will allow them room for growth. Likewise, the
discovery and exploitation of North Sea gas has allowed Great
Britain to back out coal and thereby reduce emissions since the
baseline.
In all these cases, the time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and
for taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential impacts on
individual nations, as a result of their individual resource endowments19 and stage of
economic development. The differential impacts give rise to perceived inequities.
Thus the effort to find a metric for addressing greenhouse gas emissions baselines
and targets that will be perceived as equitable is challenging.
19 E.g., the availability of natural gas and/or coal, and when each has been or is being
exploited; or the extent of deforestation and/or afforestation, and when either has occurred.

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Alternative Perspectives
The problems raised above prompt the question: What alternatives to controls
derived from historically based emissions levels are available? Alternative metrics
for taking into account greenhouse gas emissions and economic development include
per capita emissions and economic intensity of emissions.20
Per Capita Emissions. The socioeconomic differences between the
developed, Annex I nations and the developing nations lead to considerations about
emissions other than simply their absolute amounts. One alternative is to consider
per capita emissions: All else equal, populous nations would emit more greenhouse
gases than less populated ones. On this basis, the difference between developed,
Annex I countries and non-Annex I ones is apparent.
Appendix B shows that of the top 20 emitters, the highest ranked by per capita
greenhouse gas emissions21 are developed countries (Australia, United States, and
Canada, ranked 5, 7, and 9, respectively). Their per capita emissions (7.0, 6.6, and
6.1 tons per person, respectively) are double the emissions of the highest-ranked
developing country in the top 20 (South Korea, at 3.0), and six times that of China
(1.1). The rankings for the non-Annex I countries in the top 20 emitters range from
32 (South Korea) to 146 (India), with China ranked 99. In contrast, Annex I
countries range from 5 (Australia) to 47 (Italy), with the United States at 7. Reasons
the United States, Australia, and Canada are so high on this measure include their
dependence on energy-intensive transport to move people and goods around countries
of large size and relatively low population density, the use of coal for power
generation, and the energy requirements for resource extraction industries.
Thus, if one were considering how to control greenhouse gas emissions, one
way of trying to bridge the different interests of the developed, Annex I nations and
the developing ones would be to focus on per capita emissions as a way of giving
each nation an equitable share of energy use. For the United States compared to the
developing world, this metric could imply constraints, depending on the compliance
time frame and future technological advancements. Likewise, this approach could
permit most less-developed countries to increase their emissions to accommodate
expanding economies.
Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Economy. Another alternative for
evaluating a nation’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions is to consider how
efficiently that nation uses energy (and conducts other greenhouse gas-emitting
activities) in producing goods and services. This concept is captured by greenhouse
20 For other analyses bearing on this question, see CRS Report RL32762, Greenhouse Gases
and Economic Development: An Empirical Approach to Defining Goals, by John Blodgett
and Larry Parker; and CRS Report RL33970, Greenhouse Gas Emission Drivers:
Population, Economic Development and Growth, and Energy Use, by John Blodgett and
Larry Parker.
21 The top four by this measure are oil- and gas-producing Gulf States.

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gas intensity — or carbon intensity22 — measured as the amount of greenhouse gases
emitted per million dollars of gross domestic product, measured in international
dollars (parity purchasing power) (see Appendices A, B, and C). Carbon intensity
as a greenhouse gas indicator has been receiving considerable attention since
President Bush decided to use it as a benchmark for his voluntary climate change
program.23 Also, the World Resources Institute has advocated its use as an
appropriate index for developing, non-Annex I nations.24
A nation’s greenhouse gas intensity reflects both its resource endowment and
the energy-intensiveness of its economy. In terms of energy resources, countries with
rich resources in coal would tend to be higher emitters, while countries with rich
resources in hydropower or natural gas would tend to be lower emitters. In terms of
economic activity, countries with major heavy industry, major extractive industries,
and extensive transportation systems tend to be higher emitters, while countries
without these and/or dominated by service industries would tend to be lower emitters.
As noted in terms of emissions, taking into account land use sharply increases the
greenhouse gas intensity of Brazil and Indonesia.
These variables do not differentiate nations simply; overall, the top 20 emitters
(see Appendices A, B, and C) range widely in greenhouse gas intensity: from 651
tons per million international $GDP (Ukraine, which relies heavily on coal) to 94
tons/million international $GDP (France, which relies heavily on nuclear power for
generating electricity). These are both Annex I nations; non-Annex I nations have a
narrower range, from 183 tons/million international $GDP (Brazil) to 350
tons/million international $GDP (Iran). Taking into account land use, however,
jumps Brazil to 478 tons/million international $GDP (+ 161%) and Indonesia to
1,340 tons/million international $GDP (+ 509%); the next largest increase from land
use is Mexico at 18%.
As a metric for considering how to control greenhouse gas emissions, intensity
focuses attention on the efficient use of energy and on the use of alternatives to fossil
fuels. Thus, a greenhouse gas intensity metric would reward the use of renewables,
hydropower, and nuclear power in place of fossil fuels; and among fossil fuels it
would reward natural gas use and penalize coal use (with oil use falling in between).
For greenhouse gas intensity, the United States ranks number 96 in the world,
making this a more favorable metric than absolute emissions (the United States ranks
number 1 in the world) and per capita emissions (the United States ranks number 7).
22 While the term “greenhouse gas intensity” encompasses all six greenhouse gases, the
term “carbon intensity” is sometimes used identically and implicitly means “carbon
equivalents intensity” and other times is used more narrowly to refer only to carbon
emissions. The discussion in this analysis focuses on “greenhouse gas intensity,” unless
otherwise noted (e.g., in the discussion of cumulative emissions).
23 Papers outlining the Administration’s climate change initiative are available on the White
House website: [http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html].
24 See Kevin A. Baumert, Ruchi Bhandari, and Nancy Kete, What Might A Developing
Country Climate Commitment Look Like? World Resources Institute Climate Notes, May
1999.

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CRS-11
Of the indicators examined here, the United States gets the most favorable results
from this one. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, the United States is relatively
inefficient with respect to intensity compared with Western European countries (the
EU-25 would rank 134 and Japan ranks 143. In addition, the United States is less
efficient than non-Annex I emitters South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico, but it is more
efficient than China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Iran.
Discussion
As stated above, the data on greenhouse gas emissions highlight issues of both
effectiveness and fairness with respect to current efforts to address global climate
change. Differentiating responsibilities between Annex I and non-Annex I countries
fails to focus efforts on all the largest emitters. In addition, contradictory issues of
fairness arise, as Annex I countries bear essentially all the direct economic costs of
reducing emissions, and non-Annex I countries are granted the right to increase
emissions to meet developmental needs. Finally, the focus on historical emissions
as a baseline for regulation has differential and arbitrary impacts on individual
nations.
The result of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol’s setting emissions targets for
only developed nations and focusing on returning their emissions to a specific
baseline is twofold: (1) the current regime has had little effect on global emissions,
and will have little effect in the near future; and (2) the largest emitters, the United
States and China, have not found it in their interests to join in the international effort
to a significant degree. Indeed, the United States has pulled completely out of the
Kyoto process. Proponents of the Kyoto Protocol assert that although it is only a first
step, it is one that must be taken.
This history of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol raises serious questions
about how to develop greenhouse gas targets, time frames, and implementation
strategies. With respect to targets, the UNFCCC recognized the right of developing
countries to develop and the responsibility of all countries to protect the global
climate. These goals of the UNFCCC suggest that if there is to be any permanent
response to climate change that involves controlling greenhouse gases, then a regime
that combines some measure reflecting the right of developing countries to develop,
such as per capita emissions, and some measure reflecting the need to be efficient,
such as carbon intensity, may be necessary to move the world toward a workable and
effective climate change framework.
As shown above, globally, a target focused on per capita emissions generally
rewards developing nations,25 providing them room for economic growth, with the
target’s balance between limiting emissions and permitting growth determining the
individual winners and losers. For example, based on Appendix B, a target of 3 tons
carbon per person would allow all the developing nations in the top 20 emitters
except South Korea growth room, while six developed nations (United States,
Russian Federation, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia) would have
25 An exception is several Gulf States that are high emitters due to exploitation of their oil
reserves.

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CRS-12
to make cuts. In contrast, a target focused on greenhouse gas intensity would have
more diverse implications for developing nations. Several major developing nations
produce considerably higher greenhouse gas emissions per million dollars of GDP
than some developed nations. For example, China’s carbon intensity is over twice
that of Japan’s (273 tons/million international $GDP versus 111). Thus a greenhouse
gas intensity goal could be a counterforce to the economic development process for
some countries, meaning that the winners and losers of a regime combining per
capita and carbon intensity measures could be highly dynamic and contentious.
Adding land-use implications would further complicate the regime, and selectively
affect certain nations, especially those just now at the point of exploiting forests
(notably Indonesia and Brazil).
For the United States, a regime containing some mix of per capita and
greenhouse gas intensity measures26 would likely imply a need to constrain emissions
over some time frame. The U.S. greenhouse gas intensity is declining, as is the case
with most nations, but the decrease currently does not completely offset increased
emissions resulting from the growth of population and of the economy. The extent
to which targets could translate into economic costs would depend on the other two
features of the regulatory scheme: (1) time frame (specifically, whether it would
accommodate technological advances in less-carbon-intensive technology or
accelerated commercialization of existing technologies such as nuclear power); (2)
implementation strategy (specifically, whether it encourages least-cost solutions and
development of advanced technologies).
With respect to time frame, the data indicate two things: (1) most countries that
achieved a significant reduction during the 1990s did so as a result of either an
economic downturn or a substantial realignment in energy policy; (2) many countries
have not been able to stabilize their emissions despite the UNFCCC, much less
reduce them. Using economic contraction as an emission reduction strategy can
scarcely be considered an option. Instead, the substantial development and/or
deployment of less-carbon-intensive technology, improved land-management
strategies, and other actions would be necessary to achieve stabilized emissions. As
noted above, greenhouse gas emissions are closely tied to industrialization — a
synonym for “developed.” With few exceptions, improvement in efficiency has been
gradual. A permanent transformation of the global economy necessary to ensure a
long-term stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions may involve a multi-stage, long-
term time frame.
The difficulty in implementing the UNFCCC suggests implementation and
compliance are still an open issue. The United States submitted climate action plans
during the 1990s indicating it would achieve the UNFCCC goal of returning
emissions to 1990 levels. It did not. There were no sanctions. Likewise, some
Kyoto signatories may not achieve their reduction targets in 2008-2012. The
sanctions are unclear. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the data, a
flexible strategy that permits each country to play to its strengths may make it easier
26 See CRS Report RL33970, Greenhouse Gas Emission Drivers: Population, Economic
Development and Growth, and Energy Use, by John Blodgett and Larry Parker.

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CRS-13
for diverse countries like the United States and China to reach some acceptable
agreement.
The extent of flexibility would depend on the balance between emission
reductions and economic cost designed into the targets, time frame, and
implementation strategy. Market-based mechanisms to reduce emissions focus on
specifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity), or compliance costs
(price), and allowing the marketplace to determine the economically efficient
solution for the other variable. For example, a tradeable permit program sets the
amount of emissions allowable under the program (i.e., the number of permits
available caps allowable emissions), while permitting the marketplace to determine
what each permit will be worth. Conversely, a carbon tax sets the maximum unit
(per ton of CO ) cost that one should pay for reducing emissions, while the
2
marketplace determines how much actually gets reduced.
Hence, a major implementation question is whether one is more concerned
about the possible economic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some
uncertainty about the amount of reduction received (i.e., carbon taxes), or one is more
concerned about achieving a specific emission reduction level with costs handled
efficiently, but not capped (i.e., tradeable permits). Of course, combinations of these
approaches are possible, depending on the flexibility desired.27 The data presented
here portray a very wide range of situations and conditions among the 20 top
countries that represent 75% of total emissions. Significant flexibility may not only
be desirable but necessary for them to reach any significant agreement.
27 See CRS Report RL33799, Global Climate Change: Design Approaches for a
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, by Larry Parker; CRS Report RL30024, U.S. Global
Climate Change Policy: Evolving Views on Cost, Competitiveness, and Comprehensiveness,
by Larry Parker and John Blodgett; and CRS Report RS21067, Global Climate Change:
Controlling CO2 Emissions — Cost-Limiting Safety Valves, by Larry Parker.

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CRS-14
Appendix A. Relative Ranking of 20 Top Emitters (Plus EU-25) of Greenhouse Gases
Based on 2000 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
1950-2000
1950-2000
2000
Cumulative
Cumulative
2000
1990
2000 Per
2000 GHG
Emissions w/
Energy CO
Energy CO
2
2
Country
Annex 1
Emissions
Emissions
Capita
Intensity
Land-use
Emissions
w/land-use
United States
Yes
1
1
7
96
1
1
1
China
No
2
2
99
68
2
3
2
European Union-25
Yesa
[3]b
[2]
[38]
[134]
[3]
[2]
[2]
Russian Federation
Yes
3
3
22
29
5
2
3
India
No
4
4
146
90
6
8
14
Japan
Yes
5
6
35
143
7
5
7
Germany
Yes
6
5
26
131
8
4
6
Brazil
No
7
9
87
101
4
18
5
Canada
Yes
8
10
9
84
10
10
9
United Kingdom
Yes
9
8
34
141
11
6
8
Italy
Yes
10
12
47
149
13
12
15
Mexico
No
11
14
80
114
12
14
16
Korea (South)
No
12
19
32
99
14
19
24

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CRS-15
1950-2000
1950-2000
2000
Cumulative
Cumulative
2000
1990
2000 Per
2000 GHG
Emissions w/
Energy CO
Energy CO
2
2
Country
Annex 1
Emissions
Emissions
Capita
Intensity
Land-use
Emissions
w/land-use
France
Yes
13
11
48
156
15
9
12
Indonesia
No
14
16
123
86
3
27
4
Australia
Yes
15
15
5
65
17
15
19
Ukraine
Yes
16
7
42
141
19
7
11
Iran
No
17
21
57
50
18
22
31
South Africa
No
18
17
45
66
20
13
20
Spain
Yes
19
20
46
138
24
17
25
Poland
Yes
20
13
44
74
25
11
14
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 4.0 (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2007).
a. European Union members, listed in Annex I, signed the Kyoto Protocol individually and, collectively, as the EU. The Protocol gave explicit authority to the original 15 member
European Union to meet its obligations collectively; the EU has in effect expanded that authority as it has incorporated new members.
b. The bracketed numbers would be the ranking of the EU; if the EU ranking were counted, equal and lower rankings would increase by one (e.g., Poland would rank 21st in 2000
emissions and 46th in 2000 per capita emissions, but remain at 90th in 2000 GHG intensity).

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CRS-16
Appendix B. Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for 20 Largest Emitters
1990-2000
2000 Per Capita
2000
2000
2000
1990
Difference
GHG Emissions
Rank
Country
Annex 1
MMTCE
% of World
MMTCE
MMTCE
Difference %
(tons C/person)
1
United States
Yes
1,876
20.4%
1,631
245
13.1%
6.6
2
China
No
1,355
14.7%
1,029
326
24.1%
1.1
[3]
European Union-25
Yesa
1,294
14.1%
1,369
-75
-5.8%
2.9
3
Russian Federation
Yes
523
5.7%
780
-257
-49.1%
3.6
4
India
No
516
5.6%
366
150
29.1%
0.5
5
Japan
Yes
369
4.0%
328
41
11.1%
2.9
6
Germany
Yes
277
3.0%
332
-55
-19.9%
3.4
7
Brazil
No
232
2.5%
187
45
19.4%
1.3
8
Canada
Yes
187
2.0%
154
33
17.6%
6.1
9
United Kingdom
Yes
180
2.0%
198
-18
-10.0%
3.0
10
Italy
Yes
145
1.6%
132
13
9.0%
2.5
11
Mexico
No
144
1.6%
118
26
18.1%
1.5
12
Korea (South)
No
142
1.5%
79
63
44.4%
3.0
13
France
Yes
142
1.5%
150
-8
-5.6%
2.4

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CRS-17
1990-2000
2000 Per Capita
2000
2000
2000
1990
Difference
GHG Emissions
Rank
Country
Annex 1
MMTCE
% of World
MMTCE
MMTCE
Difference %
(tons C/person)
14
Indonesia
No
138
1.5%
97
41
29.7%
0.7
15
Australia
Yes
134
1.5%
111
23
17.2%
7.0
16
Ukraine
Yes
132
1.4%
253
-121
-91.7%
2.7
17
Iran
No
130
1.4%
79
51
39.2%
2.0
18
South Africa
No
114
1.2%
97
17
14.9%
2.6
19
Spain
Yes
104
1.1%
79
25
24.0%
2.6
20
Poland
Yes
102
1.1%
119
-17
-16.7%
2.6
Totalb
6,942
75.4%
6,319
623
9.0%
WORLD
9,201
8,335
866
9.4%
1.5
a. The Kyoto Agreement gave explicit authority to the original 15 member European Union to meet its obligations collectively; the EU has in effect expanded that authority as it has
incorporated new members. If the EU-25 were ranked in terms of its 2000 GHG emissions, it would place 3rd.
b. Total is of the 20 individual nations; it does not include the European Union.

---

CRS-18
Appendix C. Additional Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for 20
Largest Emitters
1950-2000
1950-2000
2000 GHG
Cumulative
Cumulative
Intensity with
2000 Emissions
Energy CO
Energy with
GDP
2000 GHG Intensity
Land-use
2
2000
with Land-use
Emissions
Land-use
(millions of
(tons/million
(tons/million
Rank
Country
(MMTCE)
(MMTCE)
(MMTCE)
international $)
intl. $GDP)
intl. $GDP)
1
United States
1,766
58,107
50,957
$9,587,197
196
184
2
China
1,342
19,587
30,206
$4,960,067
273
270
[3]
European Union-25a
1,288
48,018
48,190
$10,379,307
125
124
3
Russian Federation
538
21,048
24,716
$1,038,121
504
518
4
India
505
5,123
4,798
$2,453,549
210
206
5
Japan
370
10,193
11,559
$3,326,505
111
111
6
Germany
277
12,918
12,970
$2,094,828
132
132
7
Brazil
606
2,031
18,665
$1,269,311
183
478
8
Canada
204
4,757
6,175
$839,682
222
243
9
United Kingdom
179
8,122
8,116
$1,573,155
114
114
10
Italy
144
3,926
3,924
$1,441,942
101
100
11
Mexico
170
2,564
3,737
$886,227
162
192
12
Korea (South)
142
1,892
2,129
$760,234
186
187

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CRS-19
1950-2000
1950-2000
2000 GHG
Cumulative
Cumulative
Intensity with
2000 Emissions
Energy CO
Energy with
GDP
2000 GHG Intensity
Land-use
2
2000
with Land-use
Emissions
Land-use
(millions of
(tons/million
(tons/million
Rank
Country
(MMTCE)
(MMTCE)
(MMTCE)
international $)
intl. $GDP)
intl. $GDP)
13
France
140
5,100
5,115
$1,513,498
94
92
14
Indonesia
837
1,253
21,925
$624,627
220
1,340
15
Australia
135
2,508
2,868
$486,820
275
278
16
Ukraine
132
5,668
5,668
$202,048
651
651
17
Iran
132
1,627
1,782
$370,949
350
356
18
South Africa
114
2,784
2,798
$414,441
275
276
19
Spain
102
2,099
2,067
$881,471
118
116
20
Poland
101
4,336
4,350
$401,992
253
252
Totalb
7,936
175,643
224,525
$34,467,455
WORLD
11,280
217,820
303,825
$44,319,514
208
254
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 4.0 (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2007).
a. The Kyoto Agreement gave explicit authority to the original 15 member European Union to meet its obligations collectively; the EU has in effect expanded that authority as it
has incorporated new members. If the EU-25 were ranked in terms of its 2000 GHG emissions, it would place 3rd.
b. Total is of the 20 individual nations; it does not include the European Union.

---