Order Code RL31697
South Africa: Current Issues
and U.S. Relations
Updated January 31, 2008
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations
Summary
Over a decade after the South African majority gained its independence from
white minority rule under apartheid, a system of racial segregation, the Republic of
South Africa remains a regional superpower and is considered to be one of the United
States’ two strategic partners on the continent, along with Nigeria. With the largest
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the continent and a President eager to play an
active role in the promotion of regional peace and stability, South Africa is poised to
have a substantial impact on the economic and political future of Africa. President
Thabo Mbeki took a lead role in founding the African Union (AU), successor to the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD). South Africa, twice the size of Texas, has a population of
44 million, of which about 79% is African and 10% white, and a diverse economy.
The South African political system is regarded as stable, but it faces serious long-
term challenges arising from poverty, unemployment, and the AIDS epidemic.
The African National Congress (ANC), which led the struggle against apartheid,
continues to dominate the political scene, controlling the presidency, over two-thirds
of the National Assembly, all nine provinces, and five of the nation’s six largest
cities. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South
African Communist Party, key ANC partners, have been critical of the Mbeki
government, arguing that its policies have increased unemployment and failed to
respond adequately to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Jacob Zuma was recently elected as
head of the ANC, and is expected to be the party's candidate in the 2009 presidential
elections, although outstanding corruption charges could affect his candidacy.
South Africa has one of the largest HIV/AIDS populations in the world, with
between 5.3 and 6.2 million South Africans reportedly HIV positive. The Mbeki
government’s policy on HIV/AIDS has been controversial. The country has
weathered a series of corruption scandals, and continues to struggle with high crime
and unemployment rates. Nevertheless, South Africa is currently experiencing its
longest period of steady economic growth, and analysts expect the government’s
widely praised economic reform program to show substantial results.
U.S. relations with South Africa are cordial, and South Africa has benefitted
from export opportunities offered under the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA, P.L. 106-200). However, the U.S. and South African administrations have
expressed differences with respect to the situations in Zimbabwe, Iran, and Iraq, and
U.S. officials have articulated frustration with the South African government on
positions it has taken while serving on the United Nations Security Council.
This report will be updated as significant changes occur. Related CRS reports
include CRS Report RL33584, AIDS in Africa, by Nicolas Cook; CRS Report
RL32723, Zimbabwe, by Lauren Ploch; as well as CRS Report RL31772, U.S. Trade
and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and
Opportunity Act and Beyond and CRS Report RS21387, United States-Southern
African Customs Union (SACU) Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Background
and Potential Issues, by Danielle Langton.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Rise and Decline of the Democratic Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Strains in the ANC Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Succession Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Arms Deal and Other Corruption Scandals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
HIV/AIDS Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Land Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Diplomatic Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Prospects for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of South Africa’s Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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South Africa: Current Issues
and U.S. Relations
Background
The people of South Africa are highly diverse. Black Africans make up more
than three-quarters of the population, but come from several different ethnic
backgrounds. Most whites are Afrikaans speakers of Dutch, German, and French
Huguenot ancestry, but there is a substantial English-speaking white minority. The
remainder of the population are Asians, largely of Indian descent, and people of
mixed race, widely referred to as "Coloureds."
South Africa’s economy,
South Africa in Brief
the largest on the continent, is
diverse as well. South Africa
Population: 44 million
produces wine, wool, maize and
African, 79%; whites, 9.6%; mixed race, 9%;
other agricultural products for
Asian, 2.5%
export, although only about 12%
Population Growth Rate: -0.46%
of the country’s land is suitable
Approximate size: twice the size of Texas
for agriculture. Moreover,
Nominal GDP: $261 billion
South Africa is the world’s
GNI per capita (Atlas Method): $5390
Unemployment: 24.2%
leading producer of gold,
Life Expectancy: 42.45 years
platinum, and chromium. Major
Prevalence of HIV/AIDS: 16.2%
industrial sectors include
Literacy: 86.4%
a u t o m o b i l e a s s e m b l y ,
Religion: 80% Christian, 2% Muslim, 4% Other,
chemicals, textiles, foodstuffs,
15% None
and iron and steel production.
Language most often spoken at home:
South African cell phone
Zulu, 24%; Xhosa, 18%; Afrikaans, 13%;

companies and other firms are
Sepedi 9.4%, English 8.2%, Setswana 8.2%,
active throughout sub-Saharan
Sesotho 7.9%, Xitsonga 4.4%
Africa, and South African
Sources: World Bank, CIA World Factbook 2008,
Breweries, which renamed itself
UNAIDS.
SABMiller after acquiring
Miller Brewing, operates on a
global scale. The service sector
recently surpassed mineral and energy resources as South Africa's primary income
earner, according to the World Bank. The country’s stock exchange is among the 10
largest in the world, and South Africa is one of the few countries on the continent to
rank as an upper middle income country. Despite South Africa’s many economic
strengths, however, the country ranks third (behind Namibia and Brazil) as one of the
most unequal societies in the world in terms of income distribution. The majority of
black South Africans live in poverty, and South Africa’s cities are surrounded by vast
informal housing settlements known as “townships.”

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South Africa is an influential actor in the international relations of Africa. In
October 2006, South Africa was elected as one of the 10 non-permanent members of
the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council for a two-year term, and it is a member
of the U.N. Human Rights Council. Its voting record on both bodies has been
considered by some to be controversial. South Africa was a founding member of the
African Union (AU), successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and
President Thabo Mbeki served as the AU’s first chairperson.1 President Mbeki also
took a lead role in the development of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD), an African-designed plan for improved governance within Africa and
increased western aid, trade, and investment that was adopted by the AU as its
economic framework.2 South Africa has repeatedly put itself forward as a venue for
major international conferences, such as the World Summit on Sustainable
Development, which met in Johannesburg in August and September 2002, and the
World Conference on Racism in 2001. In 2010, it will host the soccer World Cup,
which is expected by some to have a significant impact on the country’s overall
economic growth and job creation.
Civil war, weak regimes, and general instability in the region have historically
had a significant impact on the country, and the country continues to face a large
influx of illegal immigrants. Government officials estimate that between three and
five million Zimbabweans currently reside illegally in South Africa.3 In order to
promote greater stability, President Mbeki and South African officials have played
prominent mediator roles in African conflicts, and South African troops actively
support peacekeeping missions throughout the continent. In December 2002, they
helped to persuade the parties to the prolonged conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) to sign a peace agreement following negotiations in South
Africa. Mbeki was less successful in mediating the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire.
Approximately 1,150 South African troops are currently participating as
peacekeepers in the U.N. Mission in the DRC (MONUC), and the country
contributed almost 900 soldiers to the U.N. Operation in Burundi (ONUB), where
former President Nelson Mandela played a leading role in brokering a peace
agreement. South African forces have also played a key role in the African Union
Mission in Darfur (known by the acronym of AMIS).4 In a move believed by many
to protest the Sudanese government’s policies toward Darfur, the Mbeki government
was instrumental in preventing Sudan from attaining the chairmanship of the African
Union in January 2006. It has, however, more recently protested the potential
1 See CRS Report RS21332, The African Union, by Nicolas Cook.
2 See CRS Report RS21353, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), by
Nicolas Cook.
3 “South Africa Struggling to Cope With Zimbabwean Refugees,” BBC Monitoring Africa,
London: July 24, 2006.
4 South Africa’s involvement in AMIS has not been without controversy. Some opposition
leaders have criticized Mbeki for not taking a more assertive role in the crisis, and some
South African troops threatened to pull out of AMIS in November 2006 over a pay dispute.
With the AMIS force expected to expand significantly under the"hybrid" U.N.-AU force
UNAMID, questions remain regarding South Africa’s contribution.

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CRS-3
imposition of U.N. sanctions against Sudan as counterproductive.5 The country has
supported democratic advances elsewhere on the continent, most recently providing
millions of ballots for elections in the DRC. In March 2007, the heads of state of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) nominated President Mbeki to
serve as a mediator between the Zimbabwean government and the opposition in an
effort to resolve that country's political and economic crises (see Zimbabwe below).
Political Situation
The Republic of South Africa held its first universal suffrage elections in April
1994. The African National Congress (ANC), which had led the struggle against
white minority rule and the apartheid system of state-enforced racial segregation,
won control of the National Assembly. The Assembly chose as President Nelson
Mandela, the ANC leader who had been released from prison in 1990, after serving
27 years. His release followed years of secret contacts between the ANC and key
white business and political figures. These contacts had led both sides to conclude
that a settlement could be negotiated that would protect the interests of all South
Africans. The negotiations themselves encountered many difficulties, including
several outbreaks of violence that threatened to destroy the peace process. Finally,
however, in November 1993, all-party negotiations resulted in a final agreement on
a new constitution and free elections, held in 1994. South Africa’s second universal
suffrage elections were held in June 1999, and the ANC retained control of the
National Assembly. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, who had served in key ANC
posts overseas during the anti-apartheid struggle, was chosen by the Assembly to
succeed Mandela. Mbeki retained his position as President following the April 2004
parliamentary elections, in which the ANC won almost 70% of the votes.
South Africa’s politics continue to be dominated by the ANC, which has
enjoyed support among many black South Africans because of its role in
spearheading the long struggle against white minority rule. Until December 2007,
when he lost the party presidency to a rival, Thabo Mbeki served as president both
of the party and the country.6 He remains President of the country until the next
elections in 2009. The ANC holds a 73% majority of the seats in the 400-member
National Assembly, where the country’s legislative power principally resides, far
ahead of its nearest rival, the Democratic Alliance (DA), which has just over 12%.
The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), headed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has about 9%
of Assembly seats. Buthelezi, who has been active in South African politics for
decades, holds a Zulu chieftainship, and the party is largely Zulu in membership. The
IFP has experienced a steady decline in parliamentary seats since the 1994 election,
while the ANC and the DA have gained electoral support. Other parties represented
in parliament include the New National Party (NNP, see below), the United
Democratic Movement (UDM), the Independent Democrats (ID), and the African
5 "Sanctions Threat on Sudan Counterproductive: South Africa," Agence France Presse,
June 21, 2007.
6 Under the South African constitution, the President is elected by the National Assembly,
and consequently, the next President is likely to be chosen from the majority ANC party.

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CRS-4
Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). The ANC also holds majorities in all of South
Africa’s nine provincial assemblies. In addition to the National Assembly, there is
a higher legislative body, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), with limited
powers. The members of NCOP are chosen by the governments of the nine
provinces, all controlled by the ANC.
Rise and Decline of the Democratic Alliance
The second largest party in the National Assembly, the Democratic Alliance
(DA), was created in 2000 through a merger of the Democratic Party (DP) and the
New National Party (NNP), to challenge ANC dominance of the political system.
The merger surprised many analysts, since the NNP was directly descended from the
National Party, which had created apartheid and established the white minority
regime that ruled South Africa for more than 40 years. In contrast, the DP, though
also largely white, advocated a classical liberal platform and was heir to the
Progressive Party, which had strongly opposed apartheid and campaigned on human
rights issues. However, by allying, the two parties were able to ensure their control
of the legislature of Western Cape Province and of many local governments in the
province, including the government of Cape Town, in the 2000 local elections.7
DP leader Tony Leon, an articulate critic of the ANC with respect to the slow
pace of privatization, transparency, and other issues, became DA leader, with NNP
head Marthinus van Schalkwyk as his deputy. The alliance soon fragmented in a way
that has further enhanced the power of the ANC in South African politics. In
October 2001, van Schalkwyk announced that the NNP would leave the DA and
enter into a cooperative agreement with the ANC. The NNP leader explained that
the move would promote national unity and progress, while critics suggested that he
was primarily interested in securing government appointments for NNP leaders.8
Van Schalkwyk’s break with the DA precipitated a prolonged national debate
over “floor crossing” — that is, over whether elected NNP representatives in
assemblies at the local, provincial, and national levels should be permitted to cross
over from the DA to the new ANC/NNP alliance. Representatives at all levels in
South Africa are elected not as individuals but because their names appear on lists
selected by each party. The proportion of the vote received by a party in an election
determines how many of those on its list will be given seats. Many argue that floor
crossing in such a system thwarts the will of the voters, and it had not been permitted
in South Africa. However, in 2002 the Constitutional Court allowed floor crossing
at the local level, throwing control of Cape Town and a number of other towns to the
ANC and its NNP allies. The National Assembly passed legislation in 2003 allowing
MPs to change their party affiliation during two week “window periods.” As a result
of a September 2005 “window period,” the ANC gained 14 seats, including all seven
NNP parliamentarians and four DA MPs who complained of racism within the party.
7 Tom Lodge, “The Future of South Africa’s Party System,” Journal of Democracy, Vol 17,
No. 3, July 2006, p. 154.
8 In November 2002, Mbeki named two NNP figures to positions as deputy ministers in his
government. “Mbeki Gives Van Schalkwyk Space with New Positions,” Business Day,
November 5, 2002.

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Although the ANC controls the provincial government of Western Cape, the city
of Cape Town remains the last major urban opposition bastion. Following a close
win by the DA candidate Helen Zille in March 2006, the ANC began a controversial
bid to change the city’s government from a mayorally dominated system to one run
by a 10-member committee, which would have left the current mayor a de facto
figurehead. Subsequent criticism by the other parties appears to have persuaded the
ANC to drop its proposed restructuring plan. Zille replaced Tony Leon as head of
the party when he stepped down in May 2007.9
Strains in the ANC Alliance
The ANC has long worked in an interlocking tripartite alliance with the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African
Communist Party (SACP). Leaders of COSATU and the SACP sit on the National
Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, which is the party’s principal decision-
making body. However, there is an ongoing disagreement between the ANC and its
allies over the government’s economic reform programs. The government’s first
major economic strategy, known as Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
(GEAR), sought to spur economic growth by attracting foreign investment,
strengthening the private sector, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. COSATU
and the SACP have argued that this approach has failed to benefit South Africa’s
poor. They favor the creation of programs that would use state resources to create
jobs and a moratorium on privatization. In 2005 the general secretary of COSATU
announced in a union meeting, “We want the ANC to be maintained as an
organization primarily of the workers and the poor. We will never hand over this
weapon, built up with our blood, sweat, and tears, to the other side on a silver platter.
We will never let the ANC be privatized by the rich. It is a working class formation
and a leftwing liberation movement — it must remain ours.” President Mbeki, on the
other hand, has insisted that the ANC is a “broad church” capable of representing
socialists and nationalists and bridging class divisions.10
COSATU also has been highly critical of President Mbeki’s stance on the AIDS
epidemic and his approach toward the Zimbabwe situation (see below). In June 2007
the country's trade unions launched what is reported to have been the biggest strike
since the end of apartheid, costing the economy an estimated $418 million according
to some economists.11 The unions, who were demanding a 12% pay raise for public
servants, accepted the government's offer of a 7.5% raise after four weeks of protest.
In May 2006, COSATU had launched a smaller general strike to protest the loss of
100,000 jobs over the past three years, primarily from the textile and mining
industries. That strike followed a series of earlier ones held in 2005, and they have
been considered significant acts of defiance against the policies of the Mbeki
9 "South Africa: Balanced Opposition," Business Day, April 26, 2007.
10 “Mbeki, Nzimande Clash Over Splits in Alliance,” Business Day, October 9, 2006.
11 "S Africa Unions Call Off Strike," BBC, June 28, 2007.

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CRS-6
government. Many analysts doubt that a COSATU/ANC split is imminent, but
affirm that the rift between the two organizations is deepening.12
The Succession Debate
As President Mbeki neared the end of his second term as president of the ANC,
there was considerable speculation on whom the party might choose for the position
at the ANC’s national congress in December 2007. Mbeki had suggested that he
would not run for a third term. His successor would be widely expected to succeed
him as President of the country following the national elections in May 2009.
Although the ANC’s party constitution allows for a competitive leadership race, no
party presidential candidacy had ever been contested. Mbeki's dismissal of Jacob
Zuma as the country's Deputy President in 2005 (see below) exposed divisions in the
party (Zuma remained deputy president of the party). He was widely considered to
be the likely successor to Mbeki prior to these scandals. Zuma, a populist who has
elicited strong support from both youth and labor groups, as well as from his Zulu
ethnic base, has been linked with a number of controversies, including a 2006 rape
allegation for which he was acquitted, and a high profile corruption case. Zuma
made his intention to vie for the party leadership post clear, and he was vocally
supported by leaders from COSATU and SACP, who claim he has been a victim of
political conspiracy. After months of speculation, Mbeki, rather than put his support
behind a chosen successor, chose to run for a third term as ANC president. Zuma
won a decisive victory over Mbeki in a secret ballot vote at the national congress,
suggesting that Mbeki has alienated many in the party.
Although he prevailed in the rape and initial corruption trials, Zuma still faces
legal challenges. In November 2007 the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned a
lower court decision that had made documents seized from Zuma and his lawyer
inadmissable in future proceedings. He is expected to go on trial again in August
2008 for racketeering, money laundering, fraud, and corruption. Should Zuma be
convicted, he would be ineligible to run in 2009.
The Arms Deal and Other Corruption Scandals
A $5.5 billion arms purchase announced by South Africa in 1999 continues to
pose political problems. Questions remain over the country’s need for aircraft,
submarines, and surface vessels which were to be acquired under the deal with five
European firms. More pressing are allegations of corruption associated with the
purchase. According to media reports, Tony Yengeni, the ANC’s former chief whip
in the National Assembly, was arrested in 2001 on charges of corruption, forgery, and
perjury in connection with a large discount he received for the purchase of a luxury
car, allegedly in return for assuring that the deal went ahead. He pled guilty to fraud
in exchange for acquittal on corruption charges. President Mbeki later fired his
Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, after a judge declared Zuma had a “generally corrupt”
relationship with his former financial advisor, Schabir Shaik, who was convicted of
fraud and corruption in connection with the arms deal. Zuma was indicted but
acquitted in September 2006, after prosecutors failed to build a case against him.
12 “ANC in Turmoil Over Issue of Mbeki’s Successor,” Irish Times, October 12, 2006.

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CRS-7
Shaik lost an appeal of his conviction in November 2006, when judges ruled that
evidence overwhelmingly supported the charge that payments totaling about
$165,000 made by Shaik to Zuma were bribes. Some observers suggest that this
ruling may persuade prosecutors to reopen the case again Zuma. Critics maintain that
a number of questions related to the arms deal remains unresolved, and some are
concerned that promised “offsets” — that is, investments by the arms suppliers in
South African industry — have not materialized.13
In the more recent “Travelgate” scandal, over twenty current and former
members of parliament, most from the ruling ANC party, have appeared in court
since 2005 on charges of corruption. Accused of abuse of official travel privileges,
the MPs reportedly stole some $3 million in government funds. According to
Transparency International, the prosecutions have shown that “the anti-corruption
bodies and judiciary have a fair degree of independence and are able to carry out their
functions without hinderance, even when high ranking members of the ANC were
involved.”14 “Travelgate” was followed by another reported scandal popularly
referred to as “Oilgate,” an allegedly corrupt oil deal between a state-owned oil
company and a black economic empowerment company (see below), in which public
funds were reportedly illegally diverted into an ANC party campaign fund. To add
to the controversy, one of the country’s leading newspapers, the Mail & Guardian,
was banned by the courts from publishing a report on the scandal. According to
media reports, the court ruling found that publishing the report would damage the oil
company’s right to privacy and was potentially defamatory.15 The gag order was
reportedly the first placed on the paper since apartheid, and was denounced as “an
extraordinarily dangerous precedent” to South Africa’s press freedom, by the press
watchdog group, the Media Institute for Southern Africa.
South Africans are now avidly following another potential scandal. South
Africa's chief prosecutor Vusi Pikoli, was suspended in September 2007 on charges
of prosecutorial excess by President Mbeki. Many suggest the subsequent arrest of
national police commissioner Jackie Selebi amid allegations of ties to organized
crime was directly linked to Pikoli's suspension.16 Pikoli had been preparing warrants
for Selebi's arrest when he was suspended. Selebi, a senior ANC member, is widely
considered to be a Mbeki supporter within the party, and some South Africans have
accused Mbeki of trying to prevent Selebi's arrest. These cases may indicate rising
tensions between the country's law enforcement agencies.
13 “The Arms Deal — The Shadows Lengthen,” Business Day, September 20, 2006;
“Comment and Analysis: The Sordid Truth Behind an Arms Deal: How a UK Company
Gains While South Africa’s Poor are Losing Out,” The Guardian (London), July 17, 2002.
14 Berlin-based Transparency International describes itself as a non-governmental
organization devoted to combating corruption. Transparency International, Global
Corruption Report 2006, Available at [http://www.transparency.org].
15 The Media Institute of Southern Africa, “Media Freedom Has ‘Suffered Major Blow,’”
May 28, 2005.
16 See, for example, "Lets All Arrest One Another," The Economist, January 17, 2008 and
"Party Power Struggle Enthralls South Africa," New York Times, October 12, 2007.

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HIV/AIDS Controversy
President Mbeki’s stance on HIV/AIDS has been a major political issue in South
Africa. According to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS),
an estimated 16.2% to 18.8% of South African adults, aged 15-49, were HIV positive
at the end of 2005.17 UNAIDS also reports that 1.2 million children currently living
in the country have been orphaned by the disease. A study by the South African
Department of Health concluded that 30.2% of pregnant women were HIV positive
in 2005.18 As these figures show, the situation is grave.
Critics maintain that President Mbeki’s ambiguous statements about the disease
and lack of leadership on the issue diverted attention and funding from the pandemic
at a critical time. In 2002, President Mbeki drew criticism from the media and others
for reportedly insisting that tuberculosis rather than AIDS was the leading cause of
death in South Africa, even though the country’s Medical Research Council had
reported in September 2001 that AIDS was the leading cause, accounting for 40% of
mortality among adults aged 15-49.19 In April 2000, President Mbeki wrote to then
President Clinton and other heads of state defending dissident scientists who
maintain that AIDS is not caused by the HIV virus. In March 2001, Mbeki rejected
appeals that the National Assembly declare the AIDS pandemic a national
emergency. The reasons for President Mbeki’s stance on AIDS have been difficult
to discern, particularly since he could likely have reaped great political advantage
from becoming a leader in fighting the epidemic. Some speculate he feared that
AIDS could undermine his vision of South Africa as a leader in an African
renaissance sparked by NEPAD and the new African Union. As a result, some
believe that he has tended to minimize the importance of the epidemic.
In recent years, under mounting domestic and international pressure, the Mbeki
government has gradually modified its stance on HIV/AIDS. In 2002 the government
announced that it would triple the national AIDS budget, end official opposition to
the provision of antiretrovirals for rape victims, and launch a program for universal
access to drugs to prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of HIV. In July
2002, a South African court ordered the government to begin providing the
antiretroviral (ARV) drug Nevirapine nationwide to reduce MTCT. The South
African Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) had launched the suit in 2001,
maintaining that MTCT prevention trials were inadequate and that 20,000 babies
17 UNAIDS, 2007 AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2007. In late 2007, UNAIDS
published revised global AIDS demographic data. For some countries, it also provided
information on national HIV prevalence rates derived from the most recent population-based
health survey in countries that have conducted them since 2002. In some cases, these rates
are lower than previous UNAIDS country estimates, which were published in May 2006
(UNAIDS, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic).
18 This figure was extrapolated from testing done on patients at antenatal clinics in the
National HIV and Syphilis Prevalence Study South Africa 2005, Department of Health of
South Africa, 2005.
19 “South Africa President Mbeki Criticizes U.N. AIDS Fund Grant,” Associated Press, July
25, 2002, and “Research Affirms Disease Is Nation’s Leading Cause of Death,” The
Washington Post, October 19, 2001.

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CRS-9
could be saved yearly by a nationwide program.20 At its December 2002 party
conference the ANC announced that it was “putting AIDS at the top of our
agenda.”21 The Department of Health in 2003 declared that the government would
provide free antiretroviral drugs, but after what observers considered a very slow
implementation of the policy, TAC threatened another lawsuit. Under pressure, the
government began providing treatment at five hospitals in 2004 and has gradually
expanded access to the program. Reports suggest that access to treatment is still
limited in South Africa — by the end of 2005 only an estimated 200,000 people in
the country were receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART), a significant increase from
previous years, but accounting for an estimated 21% of those in need, according to
the Kaiser Family Foundation.22
Despite this commitment by the government to providing ART, many critics
still did not consider the Mbeki administration to be serious about the epidemic. In
August 2006 the Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, drew international
criticism for a controversial display of traditional remedies such as garlic, lemons,
and beetroot, which she reportedly claimed provided an alternative defense to AIDS,
at the International AIDS Conference in Toronto. Stephen Lewis, the U.N. Special
Envoy to Africa on AIDS, proclaimed South Africa’s AIDS policies as “wrong,
immoral, and indefensible” and “worthy of a lunatic fringe” during the conference,
and 81 international scientists delivered a petition to Mbeki urging the health
minister’s dismissal.23 Many observers consider the Toronto Conference to have
prompted a key shift in the government’s position. Weeks after the conference,
Mbeki appointed his Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, as head of a new
national AIDS commission charged with halving the country’s infection rate by 2011.
The Deputy President has emphasized that the government now believes HIV causes
AIDS and has acknowledged “shortcomings” in the government’s response to the
epidemic. Tshabalala-Msimang’s previous role in leading the government’s response
to HIV appears to have been transferred to the Deputy President. The government
also appeared to be reaching out to the AIDS advocacy community, which responded
with cautious optimism. TAC, the most vocal critic of the government’s efforts, was
cited in November 2006 saying that there was now “a growing enthusiasm, across the
board, around the possibility of what we can do as a country in a united fashion” to
combat the disease.24 However, TAC has more recently questioned the government's
commitment to fighting the epidemic after the August 2007 firing of Tshabalala-
20 “AIDS Activists Sue South Africa,” Associated Press, August 21, 2001.
21 Reuters. President Mbeki was criticized by some, however, for not giving the AIDS
epidemic greater prominence in his address to the conference.
22 Kaiser Family Foundation, HIV/AIDS Policy Fact Sheet, August 2006.
23 The letter, titled “Expression of Concern by HIV Scientists,” can be found at
[http://www.aidstruth.org/letter-to-mbeki.php]. See also “Under Fire, South Africa Shakes
Up Its Strategy Against AIDS,” The New York Times, September 3, 2006, and “In South
Africa, a Dramatic Shift on AIDS; Treatment, Prevention Get New Emphasis as Deputy
President Takes Key Role,”The Washington Post, October 27, 2006.
24 “Under Fire, South Africa Shakes Up Its Strategy Against AIDS,” The New York Times,
September 3, 2006.

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CRS-10
Msimang's deputy, who has been outspoken about problems with the nation's health
services and critical of the Health Minister's controversial views on AIDS.
Land Reform
In order to address historic injustices, the South African government began a
land reform program in the late 1990s to restore land rights to those forcibly
dispossessed of their land under racially discriminatory apartheid legislation. The
government set a number of targets, including the settlement of all land claims25 by
the end of 2008 and the more ambitious transfer of 30% of agricultural lands owned
by whites in 1994 to African owners by 2014. While the government’s “willing
buyer, willing seller” land reform policies have reportedly met with little resistance
from white landowners, and the Land Affairs Department reports that 93% of all land
claims have been settled, critics charge that the transfers are going too slowly.
According to media reports, the government announced in August 2006 that
negotiations with white farmers over the price of land marked for restitution would
be limited to six months, after which expropriation could take place if no settlement
was reached.26 Two months later, two white-owned farms claimed by black South
Africans were marked for expropriation, a process through which the government
would seize the land and pay the owners a price set by independent assessors.27 This
ruling has been seen by some analysts as signaling a sense of urgency on the part of
the government to speed up reforms.
Statements from the Mbeki government also suggest that it may be considering
a change in policy. In a 2005 speech on the perceived slow pace of land transfers,
Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka said that South Africa might learn from
Zimbabwe’s land reform process, igniting considerable controversy. President Mbeki
dismissed critics of the speech, saying the Deputy President’s words were
misinterpreted and that Zimbabwe’s policies were only one among many the
government had studied. The media reported a similarly controversial discussion
document circulated at a Land Affairs Department workshop in August 2006
suggesting replacing the “willing buyer, willing seller” approach with a
“Zimbabwean model,” or forced-sale principle (Zimbabwe’s policy that preceded the
country’s land invasions). Under this proposed model, farmers who want to sell
their land must offer the government the right of first refusal. If they refused a
government offer, they could not sell the land on the open market. The discussion
paper was said to propose the expropriation of commercial agricultural land to meet
the government’s target of 30% redistribution. Government officials stressed that the
document was for internal discussion only and did not reflect official policy.28
25 Black citizens have filed 79,700 land claims since January 1999, according to a report by
Michael Wines, “South Africa to Seize Two White-Owned Farms,” New York Times,
October 10, 2006.
26 “ANC Gives Ultimatum to White Farmers,” The Daily Telegraph, August 14, 2006.
27 “South Africa to Seize Two White-Owned Farms, New York Times, October 10, 2006.
28 “‘Zimbabwe’ Land Option Mooted by Officials,” Business Day, October 16, 2006.

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CRS-11
In a 2004 survey of South Africans of all races, 72% of black respondents
agreed with the statement: “All the land whites own, they stole from blacks.”29
According to an independent South African think tank,
The most universal and immediate land need in South Africa is for ‘a place to
stay’ rather than ‘a place to farm’.... Even among employed agricultural workers,
land demand is modest. Among people living on the land without alternative
sources of income, however, aspirations for land or more land can reach high
levels, and become very intense. Although this is a minority group, it is large in
numerical terms, and hence constitutes a significant policy challenge.30
The targets for reform set by the ANC government have set public expectations high,
and some analysts suggest that the perceived pace of land reform could become a
major issue in the 2009 general elections.
Crime
As South Africa prepares to host hundreds of thousands of tourists during the
soccer World Cup in 2010, the government continues to battle perceptions that the
country is not safe for tourists because of its high crime rate. According to one
survey, one-third of potential tourists have been deterred from visiting South Africa
out of fear of becoming victim to a criminal act.31 South African Police statistics cite
19,202 murders between April 2006 and April 2007, a 2.4% rise from the previous
year. The number of bank robberies doubled, and carjackings increased by 6%.32
Some analysts attribute the high rate of crime to the country's high level of wealth
disparity, but also to shortcomings within the police force and in the lack of a
comprehensive government approach. South African officials have acknowledged
the problem. In February 2007, President Mbeki admitted crime had created a high
level of fear around the country, and the South African Safety and Security Minister
recently called the high number of cases of violent crime "disconcerting and
unacceptable."33 The government has announced plans to recruit 30,000 new police
officers before the games.
29 In a survey of 3500 respondents conducted by Markinor for Pierre du Toit, department
of political science, University of Stellenbosch, in February and March 2004, South
Africans were asked to respond to the statement: “All the land whites own, they stole from
the blacks.” and were asked to present their responses in a range, from “strongly agree” to
“strongly disagree”. Over 72% responded “strongly agree” or “agree.” Cited in “Land Issue
Illustrates Social Rift,” Business Day, 5 May 2004.
30 The Centre for Development and Enterprise, Land Reform in South Africa: a 21st Century
Perspective, Johannesburg: June 2005, p. 30.
31 "Crime 'Deters' SA 2010 Tourists," BBC, July 23, 2007.
32 "South Africa Reels at Serious Crime Rise," Financial Times, July 4, 2007.
33 "SA Violent Crime 'Unacceptable,'" BBC, July 3, 2007.

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CRS-12
The Economy
South Africa won praise from international economists for its reform-oriented
macro-economic policy in the late-1990s, which, according to the U.S. Department
of Commerce, "demonstrated its commitment to open markets, privatization, and a
favorable investment climate, moving away from the former government’s strategy
of import substitution and industrial development that protected local industries with
high tariff barriers."34 The policy, known as the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, however, delivered mixed results — it engendered
macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline, and trade liberalization. However,
unemployment continued to rise, and income distribution did not show signs of
significant improvement. Nevertheless, the income of the average black household
almost doubled in the first decade after the end of apartheid, according to a South
African source.35
The rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 3% per year in
the first decade after apartheid and rose to an average of 5% in the past three years.
While these annual GDP growth rates represent an advance over economic
performance in the 1990s, much higher growth rates will be needed if South Africa
is to substantially increase employment among the black majority and reduce the
sharp inequalities in income distribution among the races. Although unemployment
has fallen slightly, from 26.5% in 2005 to 25.5% in 2006, and with 24.2% projected
for 2007, the rate remains far above the government’s target of 15%, and unofficial
estimates place the current rate much higher.36 The vast, poverty-stricken townships
surrounding South Africa’s cities remain a potential source of political instability.
In recent years periodic riots have erupted in several poor municipalities to protest
local government corruption and inadequate service delivery. Although turnout and
support for the ANC remained high nationally in the March 2006 municipal
elections, voters boycotted the polls in a number of townships in which the ANC had
formerly enjoyed strong support, and several hundred former ANC supporters stood
as independent candidates. Conditions in the townships have improved marginally
with the expanded availability of electricity and the provision of clean water taps.
However, popular resentment is reportedly deepening with respect to the widening
gap between the rich and poor. Much of this resentment is said to be directed toward
the wealthy black business elite that has emerged in recent years.37
34 U.S. Department of Commerce, South Africa Country Commercial Guide, Fiscal Year
2003, July 2002.
35 The average household income for blacks increased by 71% from 1996 to 2004, according
to the South African Institute for Race Relations’ South Africa Survey 2004/2005.
36 These figures are official rates given by the South African government and the
International Monetary Fund. The World Bank reports that unemployment, under its
broadest definition, including discouraged workers, may be as high as 37%, according to its
Country Brief, November 2006.
37 Rachel L. Swarns, “Rich, but Not Comfortable in South Africa’s Black Elite,” New York
Times, August 2, 2002.

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CRS-13
Many economists attribute South Africa’s economic difficulties, in part, to the
slow pace of privatization. Despite its commitment to privatization under GEAR, the
government remains heavily involved in transportation, communications, energy
production, and the defense sector, and after the 2004 elections expressed a desire to
restructure most remaining state-owned enterprises rather than expand privatization.
Delays are due partly to government concerns that privatization will boost
unemployment temporarily, fueling criticism from COSATU and the SACP.
Moreover, the government is trying to find ways to promote “black empowerment”
by assuring that a significant portion of the shares in privatized companies will be
acquired by black South Africans rather than by wealthy whites or foreign investors.
Another point of view, championed by COSATU and the SACP, is that job cutbacks
that often follow privatization are contributing to unemployment and the growing
income gap in South Africa. Some argue that the South African government should
be intervening in the economy to save jobs, and to create new jobs, perhaps through
a major public works program.
In 2005, the Mbeki government unveiled its new Accelerated and Shared
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), which is designed to raise the average
economic growth rate to 4.5% from 2004-2009 and to at least 6% from 2010-1014
through targeted interventions, including public investment in infrastructure. The
ASGISA plan also aims, through these economic growth policies, to cut
unemployment rates in half by 2014. Another economic program, the government’s
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) program, was initiated in 1994 and is
designed to address racial inequalities in the business sector. In 1994, blacks owned
less than 5% of the country’s private enterprises; today over 30 black-owned or
black-empowered companies (approximately 15%) are listed on the South African
stock exchange. This rise in black ownership is echoed by a significant increase in
the black middle class.38 Nevertheless, the lack of skilled labor may be hampering
the success of the program, as may complicated or unclear regulations. According to
a 2005 survey of domestic and foreign firms, “While supporting the need for
affirmative action, most foreign investors acknowledge that the lack of clarity
surrounding the application of Black Economic Empowerment has had a dampening
effect on their plans to further invest in South Africa.”39 In February 2007, the
government instituted the BEE Codes of Good Practice, which make both listed and
unlisted companies subject to empowerment requirements and targets, but offers
concessions to small businesses and foreign investors.40 The September 2007
announcement that Sasol, the country's oil Would transfer 10% of the company to
black owners to qualify under BEE rules
In the first decade of post-apartheid rule, analysts expressed concern over the
government’s ability to attract foreign investment at the levels needed to spur
38 See, for example, “South Africa’s Black Companies Forge Ahead,” Africa Business, April
2006; "How SA's Black Buying Power is Changing Society," African Business,
August/September 2006; and "The Rise of the Buppies," The Economist, November 1, 2007.
39 United States Department of Commerce, “Doing Business in South Africa: A Country
Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies,” 2006.
40 Multinational corporations can maintain 100% ownership provided they meet other BEE
criteria, including employment and procurement targets.

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CRS-14
growth. Sound macroeconomic policies, including reduced tariffs and export
subsidies, the loosening of exchange controls, improved enforcement of intellectual
property laws, and legislation designed to improve competition have been cited by
observers as responsible for the country’s current and expected economic growth.
A recent World Bank study found that South Africa is one of the top 30 easiest
countries in which to do business.41 Investors are, however, reportedly worried by
labor relations, high crime rates, and corruption. Political risks arising from regional
instability, particularly in neighboring Zimbabwe, are regarded as another deterrent
to investors, and South Africa’s own racial, class, and political divisions are seen as
sources of concern. Transparency International ranks South Africa 43 out of 158 in
its 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating that it is perceived as less corrupt
than other Sub-Saharan African countries (only Botswana ranked less corrupt than
South Africa), but more corrupt than many competitors for investment in other parts
of the world.42
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has predicted a positive outlook for the
South African economy but has highlighted the country’s executive “brain drain” as
“one of the weakest aspects of — and greatest threats to — South Africa’s recent
strong economic performance” and suggests it may affect the government’s ability
to reach its target 6% GDP growth.43 The EIU also suggests that the outcome of the
debate over the role of state assistance may have the greatest effect on the country’s
capability to meet ASGISA goals, and consequently, the question of presidential
succession within the ANC may have significant ramifications on those goals.
The country's continued economic growth may also be threatened by an
overstretched electricity network. In January 2008, South Africans experienced
severe electrical power cuts throughout the country. Early estimates indicate that the
cuts may have cost the economy millions.44 The country's crucial mining sector was
hit particularly hard, causing global gold and platinum prices to rise. Many mines
closed for several days as the power cuts threatened worker safety. Electricity from
South Africa was also temporarily cut to neighboring countries. The government has
announced it will begin rationing electricity and will accelerate plans to build new
power plants and rehabilitate old ones. Experts suggest the shortages may
nevertheless continue for several years.45
41 See the Doing Business section of the World Bank’s website at [http://www.world
bank.org].
42 Berlin-based Transparency International describes itself as a non-governmental
organization devoted to combating corruption. The index is based on the reported
perceptions of business people and country analysts. A country with the rank of 1 has the
least corruption.
43 The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report September 2006.
44 EIU, "South Africa: Power Down," January 31, 2008.
45 "South African Power Cuts Threaten Economic Growth; Jobs," VOA News, January 31,
2008.

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CRS-15
U.S. Relations
U.S. policies toward South Africa and the anti-apartheid struggle were a
contentious issue from the 1960s through the 1980s, with many arguing that the
United States was doing too little to promote human rights and democratic rule.
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-440) over
President Reagan’s veto in order to affirm U.S. support for democratic change. The
legislation imposed a number of sanctions against South Africa. The Reagan
Administration, by contrast, had been pursuing a policy of “constructive
engagement” (i.e., dialogue) with the white South African regime, regarding this
approach as the most effective way of promoting change.
In the early 1990s, the United States assumed a lead role in supporting South
Africa’s transition to democracy. Policy makers at that time saw the South African
democratization process as a model for other African countries, and expected that the
country would soon become a stabilizing force as well as an engine for economic
growth throughout the sub-Saharan region. South Africa’s need to focus on domestic
economic and social problems meant that U.S. expectations for the country’s regional
role were perhaps not met in full in the first post-apartheid years. But South Africa’s
leadership in the launching of NEPAD; the deployment of South African
peacekeepers to Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sudan; and intensive South African
involvement in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have
highlighted South Africa’s capabilities as a regional actor. South Africa also assisted
U.S. efforts to resolve the Haiti crisis by providing an exile location for former
President Bertrand Aristide. Given South Africa’s role in conflict mediation and
resolution throughout the continent, the United States has worked to expand the
country’s peacekeeping abilities through the African Contingency Operations
Training Assistance (ACOTA) program.46
Since 1992, South Africa has been among the leading African recipients of U.S.
aid and is currently the largest recipient on the continent. U.S. assistance to South
Africa in FY2006 stood at an estimated $224 million, and $363 million was allocated
in FY2007. The Bush Administration requested $609 million for FY2008.47 In its
FY2008 congressional budget justification, the State Department reports that "the
U.S. Government's (USG) relationship with South Africa is transforming from that
of donor to one of strategic partnership," and accordingly, "activities in Peace and
Security will continue to increase in importance while development programs will
be phased out in the next couple of years." U.S. assistance will focus fighting
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, improving primary health care services, and assisting
the South African government to implement economic reforms and to improve its
regional peacekeeping capacity. USAID reports that the assistance program is
supporting efforts to promote sound governance, reduce unemployment and poverty,
46 For more information see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
47 On December 26, the President signed into law the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161), which included State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs appropriations for FY2008. Country-specific allocations have not yet been
released.

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CRS-16
increase access to shelter and basic municipal services, and improve the quality of
education. The program also aims at strengthening the health system, particularly
with respect to combating HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, according to USAID. The
United States is working with four countries, including South Africa, on the new $22
million Women’s Justice and Empowerment Initiative, which supports South
Africa’s Thuthuleza (the Xhosa word for comfort) centers dealing with victims of
violent sexual crimes. U.S. assistance also includes $900,000 to restart an
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in South Africa.
The United States provides significant assistance to South Africa’s fight against
HIV/AIDS through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),
having contributed an estimated $458.5 million since the program's inception in
FY2004. The FY2006 budget allocated $221 million for the program. The
Administration has requested $591.5 million for FY2008 through the Global
HIV/AIDS Initiative. As of March 2007, the PEPFAR program had provided ARV
therapy to an estimated 296,700 patients, transmission prevention treatment to over
1,584,000 pregnant HIV-infected women, and palliative and/or tuberculosis care for
514,000 South Africans. PEPFAR’s South Africa program also funds public
education efforts to promote abstinence, faithfulness, and healthy behavior to reduce
the risk of transmission among high-risk groups, and includes support to Takalani
Sesame, the South African version of Sesame Street.48
Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism
U.S. and South African law enforcement authorities have cooperated for several
years on terrorism investigations, including investigations into the possibility that
South Africa is being used as a haven for Islamic militants from outside the region.49
In 1999, South African authorities arrested Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian
later convicted in the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, and deported
him to the United States. Khalfan had reportedly sought to hide among Cape Town’s
Muslims after he fled Tanzania. More recently, one of the suspects of the July 2005
London bombings, Haroon Rashid Aswat, who was arrested in Zambia, was thought
to have spent time in South Africa. There is continuing concern, both in the United
States and South Africa, that other terrorists may seek to hide in South Africa, or
make use of its modern transportation and communications systems for transit,
smuggling, and money-laundering.50
The U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
includes several South African nationals in its Specially Designated Nationals List
(SDN), which sanctions individuals and groups believed to have links to terrorism.
48 Takalani Sesame, which features Kami, an HIV-positive character, drew criticism in the
United States from some lawmakers and religious groups who were concerned a similar
character would be age-inappropriate if introduced on U.S. television. See, for example,
“Politicians Keep HIV-Positive Muppet at Arm’s Length,” Knight Ridder Tribune News
Service, August 5, 2002.
49 “SA, US Work in Tandem to Find Terrorist Cells,” Business Day, December 11, 2002.
50 “Spreading Influence: In South Africa, Mounting Evidence of al Qaeda Links,” Wall
Street Journal, December 10, 2002.

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CRS-17
In a controversial move, the South African government recently used its position as
a member of the U.N. Security Council's Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions
Committee, also known as the 1276 Committee, to block United Nations travel and
financial sanctions on two of these individuals, Farhad Ahmed Dockrat and Dr.
Junaid Ismail Dockrat. The South African government has argued that it requires
more time to examine the evidence against the Dockrats before applying international
sanctions.
There is concern over the potential use of South African travel documents by
potential terrorists. At the time of his arrest, Aswat was carrying a South African
passport, and according to media reports, others with suspected ties to terrorism have
been apprehended at U.S. and British borders, as well as in Pakistan, with South
African travel documents.51 The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism has noted concern regarding fraudulent travel documents,
saying, “efforts to limit the accessibility of passports and identity documents to
potential terrorists are limited by resources and corruption in the Department of
Home Affairs.”52 Authentic South African passports were found during raids by
British police on suspected terror groups in London in 2004 and again in 2005.
South Africa’s intelligence minister reported in August 2005 that groups allegedly
linked to al-Qaeda had been discovered in southern Africa and that maritime targets
could be threatened. U.S. law enforcement agencies provide training to their South
African counterparts, supply needed equipment to the South Africa Police Service,
and share information.53
The South African government has expressed differences with the United States
in the latter's designation of Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations. In May
2007, prior to the Hamas military seizure of the Gaza Strip, the South African
Minister of Intelligence met with Hamas leader and then-Prime Minister of the
Palestinian Authority Ismail Haniyeh. According to some media reports, he
publically praised Hamas and invited Haniyeh to visit South Africa.
Diplomatic Differences
Despite the cordial relations that officially exist between South Africa and the
United States, some analysts suggest that diplomatic differences highlight what U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer has referred to as a
"rough patch" in U.S.-South African relations.54 As one U.S. official pointed out, the
country has had close ties with the Non-Aligned Movement countries, and has
exhibited “marked sympathy toward countries that exert their independence from the
51 “Arrests and Plots Give South Africans a New Program,” New York Times, August 9,
2004.
5 2 U.S. Department of State, 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism
[http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/].
53 “Law Enforcement,” available at the website of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria
[http://usembassy.state.gov/pretoria].
54 Janine Zacharia, "U.S. Finds an Antagonist in a Country on the Rise," International
Herald Tribune, June 27, 2007.

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CRS-18
West.”55 Some South African officials have expressed opposition to the Bush
Administration's proposal to locate a new U.S. combatant command, Africa
Command or AFRICOM, on the continent.56 In addition, South Africa has taken a
critical stance toward the war in Iraq, and former President Nelson Mandela has been
vocal in his opposition to what he views as U.S. unilateralism on Iraq. South Africa
also differs significantly with the United States on Iran. During an August 2006 visit
by the Iranian Foreign Minister to Pretoria, South Africa affirmed its support for
Iran’s “inalienable right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” at the same
time that the Mbeki government announced its intention to consider renewing its
uranium enrichment program.57 South Africa, which dismantled its own nuclear
weapons program after the fall of apartheid, insists that any enrichment program
would be strictly peaceful in nature.
The United Nations. South Africa's current role as a non-permanent member
of the U.N. Security Council has been controversial, and the South African
government has been criticized by the United States as well as by many human rights
activists for its lack of support for human rights issues raised before the Council.58
In January 2007, South Africa voted against a resolution on political prisoners in
Burma, arguing that alleged human rights abuses in sovereign countries are not
covered by the mandate of the Security Council as defined by the U.N. Charter. It
argued that because the abuses do not pose a direct threat to international peace and
security, they would be more appropriately addressed by the U.N. Human Rights
Council.59 In March 2007, while serving a one-month term as President of the
Security Council, South Africa reportedly blocked discussion of human rights abuses
in Zimbabwe.60 Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu said of the Burma vote,
in which China and Russia cast a double veto, "I am deeply disappointed by our vote.
It is a betrayal of our own noble past...The tyrannical military regime is gloating, and
we sided with them. If others had used the arguments we are using today when we
asked them for their support against apartheid, we might still have been unfree,"61
55 Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “U.S.-South
Africa Relations: The View from Washington,” Washington, D.C., September 14, 2006.
56 According to South African media reports, in July 2007, the U.S. Ambassador to South
Africa, Eric Bost, publicly expressed frustration that the country's defense minister would
not respond to requests for a meeting with General Kip Ward, recently nominated to be
commander of AFRICOM. For more information, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa
Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren
Ploch.
57 "South Africa’s Support for Iran’s Nuclear Program ‘Holds Firm’,” BBC Monitoring
Africa, September 1, 2006.
58 See, for example, Colum Lynch, "South Africa's U.N. Votes Disappoint Some,"
Washington Post, April 16, 2007; James Kirchick, "Why, the Beloved Country?," Los
Angeles Times, July 29, 2007.
59 U.N. document, S/2007/14, January 12, 2007.
60 "Britain Wants U.N. Security Council Attention on Zimbabwe," Voice of America, March
16, 2007.
61 "Desmond Tutu 'deeply disappointed with South Africa's vote against U.N Security
(continued...)

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CRS-19
Former DA leader Tony Leon expressed similar sentiments on his government's
alleged refusal to address the Zimbabwe situation, calling it "extraordinary irony" that
the ANC government would use the same argument used to block debate on the
abuses of the former apartheid regime in South Africa.62
South Africa and the United States also have differed on Middle East issues
addressed by the Security Council. In May, South Africa abstained from a U.S.-
sponsored resolution to establish an international tribunal to investigate political
killings in Lebanon, arguing that although it supported the establishment of a tribunal
with "Lebanese ownership," it was not appropriate for the Security Council to impose
a tribunal upon the country and "politicize international criminal law."63 The country
also has been vocal in its opposition to Security Council sanctions on both Sudan and
Iran, arguing that such sanctions would ultimately harden the target governments'
positions rather than reduce tensions. However, after efforts to modify resolution
language, South Africa ultimately did vote for sanctions against Iran in March 2007,
"to remind Iran of its responsibility towards the IAEA and the Nonproliferation
Treaty."64
Zimbabwe.65 Political and economic turmoil in neighboring Zimbabwe has
led to a massive exodus of Zimbabweans in search of work. Some sources estimate
that up to four million Zimbabweans (30% of the total population) are now living
outside the country. South African government sources report that they have seen a
sharp increase in border crossings since the Zimbabwean government implemented
price controls on basic commodities in June 2007; over 4,000 Zimbabweans a day
are now reportedly crossing the border into South Africa, both legally and illegally.
Zimbabwe's other neighbors, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique, also have seen
a significant rise in immigration. While many stay in these countries to look for
work or stay with relatives, others commute across the border daily to buy basic
staples that are now unavailable in their own country. Those who are caught by
South African police are sent back to Zimbabwe; the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) has reported that the number of Zimbabweans repatriated from its
facility in Beitbridge, South Africa increased from 40,000 in the last six months of
2006 to almost 118,000 in the first six months of 2007. One South African official
recently acknowledged that Zimbabwean migration has become "a serious
problem."66
61 (...continued)
Council resolution on Myanmar,"International Herald Tribune, January 21, 2007.
62 "South Africa Reportedly Blocking U.N. Debate on Zimbabwe Crisis," Business Day,
March 20, 2007.
63 China, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, and Quatar also abstained. U.N. document,
S/2007/315, May 30, 2007.
64 U.N. Document S/Res/1747, March 24, 2007. For South African government statements
on the vote, see "Iran Keeps Up Nuclear Consultation with SA," Business Day, July 9, 2007.
65 For more information on South Africa's policies on Zimbabwe, see CRS Report RL32723,
Zimbabwe: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch.
66 Comment by South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad in "South Africa: A Cold
(continued...)

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CRS-20
During his 2003 visit to Africa, President George W. Bush called President
Mbeki his “point man” on Zimbabwe.67 The United States has been outspoken in its
criticism of the policies of Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe with respect to
human rights, democracy, and land reform, and has imposed “targeted sanctions”
prohibiting travel to the United States by Zimbabwe leaders. President Mbeki, by
contrast, chose to deal with President Mugabe through “quiet diplomacy,” or
diplomatic engagement, and South African officials have called for western countries
to reconsider the penalties they have imposed on Zimbabwe.
In March 2007, Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders
appointed President Mbeki to mediate between the Zimbabwean government and the
opposition. In June 2007, South Africa initiated talks between the Mugabe
Administration, represented by the country's Ministers of Labor and Justice, and the
two MDC factions, represented by their respective Secretary-Generals, in Pretoria.
The negotiations have continued, and reports suggest that the parties have reached
agreement on several points. President Mugabe's proclamation in January 2008 that
national elections will be held on March 29, 2008, while opposition rallies in the
country continued to be suppressed by police, have angered the opposition and may
undermine the South Africa-sponsored dialogue.68
As Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, many observers consider South Africa
to be in a position to exert substantial leverage on its neighbor. At the same time,
South Africa must weigh the unintended effects of such leverage — state collapse
across its northern border could produce a sharp increase in illegal migration and
have a substantial impact on South Africa. In 2005, as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) threatened to expel Zimbabwe from the Fund for debt payment arrears,
the country requested a loan of up to $1 billion from South Africa for fuel, food, and
electricity, as well as to address the IMF payments. Amid rumors that the South
African government would make any potential loan conditional on economic and
political reforms, the loan negotiations stalled and Mugabe found another source
from which to repay the IMF dues.69
Following Zimbabwe’s 2005 parliamentary elections, which the British and
American governments termed “fundamentally flawed” and “seriously tainted,” the
head of South Africa’s parliamentary observer mission, Mbulelo Goniwe, chief whip
of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), was quoted saying that the
delegation had “unanimously agreed that the elections were credible, legitimate, free
and fair.”70 Leading the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
observer delegation, current South African Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka
congratulated Zimbabwe on “the holding of a peaceful, credible, well-managed and
66 (...continued)
Reception for Zimbabwean Migrants," IRIN, August 16, 2007.
67 Comments made by President Bush during press conference on July 9, 2003 in Pretoria
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030709.html].
68 "Opposition Cries Foul as Mugabe Sets March Elections," CNN, January 25, 2008.
69 “Zimbabwe Pays Part of IMF Debt,” The Washington Post, September 2, 2005.
70 “The Real Fraud in Zimbabwe,” The Washington Times, April 6, 2005.

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CRS-21
transparent election. The people of Zimbabwe have expressed their will in an
impressively instructive manner that will go a long way in contributing to the
consolidation of democracy and political stability not only in Zimbabwe, but also in
the region as a whole.”71 Both statements received substantial criticism in the
international press.
Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policies have drawn criticism from within his country;
former President Mandela, Archbishop Tutu, former opposition leader Tony Leon,
and even the ANC’s ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),
have been vocal detractors. COSATU delegations have been forcibly expelled from
Zimbabwe twice, first in 2004 and more recently in late 2006, when COSATU
members traveled to Harare to express their support for Zimbabwean human rights
activists after incidents of alleged police violence. One COSATU leader remarked,
“we are not quiet diplomats,” and “we will not keep mum when freedom does not
lead to respect for workers and human rights.”72 When the Mbeki government issued
a terse initial statement following the March 11, 2007, arrest of opposition and civil
society activists, COSATU criticized the government for a “disgraceful” response,
“in the face of such massive attacks on democracy and human rights, especially
coming from those who owed so much to international solidarity when South
Africans were fighting for democracy and human rights against the apartheid
regime.”73
New ANC leader Jacob Zuma has referred to the Zimbabwean president as “a
monster,” but has defended Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy.74 Other ANC heavyweights
like Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale have criticized Mbeki’s policy. Sexwale
has said, “When a freedom fighter takes a wrong step, it is time for other freedom
fighters to stand up and say ‘we know you are a great man, but we cannot support
what you are doing.’”75 He has suggested that the Zimbabwean government may be
ignoring Mbeki's efforts, and that it may be time to "turn up the volume.76
Ramaphosa has expressed similar sentiments.
Trade
The United States and South Africa enjoy a strong trade relationship. The
United States leads the world in direct foreign investment in South Africa, with over
71 “Zimbabwe’s Enabler; South Africa Falls Short as Monitor of Democracy, The
Washington Post, April 4, 2005.
72 “We Are Not Quiet Diplomats,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), November 5,
2004.
73 “South Africa Ends ‘s ‘Silence’ on Zimbabwe, Urges Harare ‘to Respect Rule of Law,’”
BBC Monitoring Africa, March 14, 2007.
74 “I’m No Mugabe, but I Have Sympathy for What He Has Done,” The Sunday Telegraph
(London), November 26, 2006.
75 “Chorus of Disapproval Grows As Sexwale Speaks Out on Mugabe,” Zimbabwe
Independent, October 6, 2006.
76 "Zimbabwe 'Ignoring' SA Diplomacy," BBC, May 15, 2007.

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CRS-22
600 American companies active in the country.77 As Table 1 indicates, the United
States runs a deficit in its merchandise trade with South Africa. Nevertheless, South
Africa is the largest market for U.S. goods on the continent, with imports totaling
over $4 billion in 2006. Leading U.S. exports include transportation equipment,
chemicals, and electronic products, while leading imports include minerals and
metals, and transportation equipment.78 U.S. officials point out that South Africa
continues to enjoy major benefits from the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA, P.L. 106-200), enacted by Congress in May 2000, with nearly all of the
country’s exports qualifying for duty-free entry into the United States. Through
AGOA, South Africa exported $1.8 billion in such products as vehicles, chemicals,
minerals, metals, and agricultural, textile, and apparel products in 2006, making the
country the largest and most diversified supplier of non-fuel products under AGOA.
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with South Africa
($ billions)
2003
2004
2005
2006
Exports to South Africa
2.819
3.178
3.907
4.462
Imports from South Africa
4.624
5.945
5.886
7.501
Balance
-1.805
-2.766
-1.979
-3.039
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division
During a February 2002 visit to South Africa, U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick proposed the creation of the United States’ first free trade agreement (FTA)
with sub-Saharan Africa, linking the United States with South Africa and the other
members of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU): Botswana, Lesotho,
Swaziland, and Namibia. SACU is the United States’ second largest trading partner
in Africa behind petroleum-rich Nigeria. Reaction to the FTA proposal in the region
was reportedly positive, but there were concerns about the scope of the negotiations.
Some observers felt that U.S. proposals to include intellectual property, government
procurement, and services in the negotiations could have a negative impact on the
SACU countries, and that the United States was not sensitive to the differing levels
of development within SACU. Negotiations began in 2003 but were suspended in
April 2006, when U.S. and SACU officials agreed on a new work program that will
aim to address a broad range of trade and investment issues, and may contribute in
the long term toward a possible FTA. Analysts suggest that the momentum for SACU
negotiators to complete the FTA may have been lost, given that AGOA benefits were
extended through the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-274) until 2015.79
77 Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara 2006, 35th ed.
Routledge, London: 2005, p. 1098.
78 U.S. International Trade Commission.
79 For further information, see CRS Report RS21387, United States-Southern African
Customs Union (SACU) Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Background and Potential
Issues, by Danielle Langton.

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CRS-23
Prospects for the Future
Analysts seem generally confident that South Africa will remain politically
stable for some time to come. There are tensions in rural areas over land, since most
land remains in white hands,80 but South Africa seems far from a rural upheaval over
land, as has been the case in Zimbabwe. The government has undertaken a land
reform program which, though behind schedule, is transferring government-owned
land, disused land, and land purchased from willing sellers to African farmers.
The principal worry for some analysts is that South Africa will become a de
facto one-party state under the ANC, weakening checks and balances in the political
system. Should this happen, some fear that the regime could become increasingly
authoritarian and unresponsive to the needs of its citizens. ANC leaders reject this
view, arguing that their party is a national liberation movement committed to
transforming South Africa and fulfilling the aspirations of the poor.81 Others argue
that the power of the ruling party is limited by the country’s free and very active
press, an independent judiciary, and a bill of rights enshrined in the constitution. In
any event, President Mbeki and other ANC leaders want their country to be seen as
a leader in Africa, and as a spokesman for Africa and the developing countries
generally in world affairs. To play such roles, South Africa must continue to be
recognized as a successful democracy.
80 South African Institute of Race Relations, South Africa Survey, 2001/2002, Johannesburg:
2001, p. 12-14.
81 See, for example, President Mbeki’s December 16, 2002 address to the ANC national
conference [http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2002/tm1216.html].

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CRS-24
For most observers, the major uncertainties about South Africa’s future are
long-term rather than short-term. There is a risk, some believe, that in five or ten
years, or possibly longer, continuing inequities in the distribution of wealth, perhaps
combining with AIDS deaths on a large scale among the poor, will raise social
tensions to dangerous levels. From this perspective, South Africa’s long term
stability is linked to the success of the South African government and its partners in
fighting poverty and reducing the toll of the AIDS pandemic.
Figure 1. Map of South Africa’s Provinces
ZIMBABWE
South Africa -
MOZAMBIQUE
Provinces
NORTHERN
PROVINCE
BOTSWANA
MPUMA-
NAMIBIA
Pretoria
LANGA
NORTHWEST
GAUTENG
SWAZILAND
FREE
KWAZULU-
STATE
NATAL
LESOTHO
NORTHERN
CAPE
AT L A N T I C
EASTERN
O C E A N
CAPE
WESTERN
I N D I A N
CAPE
O C E A N
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (12/02 M.Chin)
Note: South Africa shaded; all unshaded areas are independent countries.

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