Order Code RL33715
Covert Action: Legislative Background and
Possible Policy Questions
Updated January 28, 2008
Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible
Policy Questions
Summary
Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what
the Bush Administration terms the global war on terror. Some observers have
asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of
counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as “covert
actions,” and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the
congressional intelligence committees.
Defense officials assert that none of DOD’s current counter-terrorist intelligence
activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not
require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees.
Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only “clandestine activities.” Although the
term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as
constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute “passive”
intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is
“active,” in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or
diplomatic behavior of a target.
Some of DOD’s activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to
collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions;
to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local
militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own.
Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line
separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has
blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret
intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S.
Intelligence Community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and
responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities.
Some Pentagon officials have appeared to indicate that DOD’s activities should be
limited to clandestine or passive activities, pointing out that if such operations are
discovered or are inadvertently revealed, the U.S. government would be able to
preserve the option of acknowledging such activity, thus assuring the military
personnel who are involved some safeguards that are afforded under the Geneva
Conventions. Covert actions, by contrast, constitute activities in which the role of
the U.S. government is not intended to be apparent or to be acknowledged publicly.
Those who participate in such activities could jeopardize any rights they may have
under the Geneva Conventions, according to these officials.
This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and
associated questions to consider. This report will be updated as warranted.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Post 9/11 Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current Statute Governing Covert Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Exceptions Under the Statutory Definition of Covert Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Traditional Military Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Routine Support of Traditional Military Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Covert Action: Legislative Background and
Possible Policy Questions
Introduction
Some observers assert that since 9/11 the Pentagon has begun to conduct certain
types of counterterrorism intelligence activities that may meet the statutory definition
of a covert action. The Pentagon, while stating that it has attempted to improve the
quality of its intelligence program in the wake of 9/11, contends that it does not
conduct covert actions.
Congress in 1990 toughened procedures governing intelligence covert actions
in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair, after it was discovered that the Reagan
Administration had secretly sold arms to Iran, an avowed enemy that had it branded
as terrorist, and used the proceeds to fund the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance,
also referred to by some as “Contras.” In response, Congress adopted several
statutory changes, including enacting several restrictions on the conduct of covert
actions and establishing new procedures by which Congress is notified of covert
action programs. In an important change, Congress for the first time statutorily
defined covert action to mean “an activity or activities of the United States
Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where
it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly.”1
The 1991 statutory changes remain in effect today. This report examines the
legislative background surrounding covert action and poses several related policy
questions.
Background
In 1974, Congress asserted statutory control over covert actions in response to
revelations about covert military operations in Southeast Asia and other intelligence
activities. It approved the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 requiring that no appropriated funds could be expended by the CIA for covert
actions unless and until the President found that each such operation was important
to national security, and provided the appropriate committees of Congress with a
1 Sec. 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 413b].
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description and scope of each operation in a timely fashion.2 The phrase “timely
fashion” was not defined in statute.
In 1980, Congress endeavored to provide the two new congressional intelligence
committees with a more comprehensive statutory framework under which to conduct
oversight.3 As part of this effort, Congress repealed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
and replaced it with a statutory requirement that the executive branch limit its
reporting on covert actions to the two intelligence committees, and established
certain procedures for notifying Congress prior to the implementation of such
operations. Specifically, the statute stipulates that if the President determines it is
essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital
interests of the United States, the President may limit prior notice to the chairmen
and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the speaker and
minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate —
a formulation that has become known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice is
withheld, the President is required to inform the Committees in a “timely fashion”
and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.4
In 1984, in the wake of the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in support of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence signed an informal agreement — which became
known as the “Casey Accords” — with then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
William Casey establishing certain procedures that would govern the reporting of
covert actions to Congress. In 1986, the committee’s principals and the DCI signed
an addendum to the earlier agreement, stipulating that the Committee would receive
prior notice if “significant military equipment actually is to be supplied for the first
time in an ongoing operation ... even if there is no requirement for separate higher
authority or Presidential approval.” This agreement reportedly was reached several
months after President Reagan signed the January 17, 1986, Iran Finding which
authorized the secret transfer of certain missiles to Iran.5
Following the Iran-Contra revelations, President Ronald Reagan in 1987 issued
National Security Decision Directive 286 prohibiting retroactive findings and
requiring that findings be written. The executive branch, without congressional
consent, can revise or revoke such National Security Directives.
In 1988, acting on a recommendation made by the Congressional Iran-Contra
Committee, the Senate approved bipartisan legislation that would have required that
the President notify the congressional intelligence committees within 48 hours of the
2 P.L. 93-559 (1974). The “appropriate committees of Congress” was interpreted to include
the Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations (Senate) and Foreign Affairs
(House), and Appropriations of each House of Congress, a total of six committees.
3 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established in 1976. The House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was established in 1977.
4 P.L. 96-450 (1980).
5 W. Michael Reisman and James E. Baker, Regulating Covert Action, 1992, (Yale
University Press) pp. 131-132.
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implementation of a covert action if prior notice had not been provided. The House
did not vote on the measure.
Still concerned by the fall-out from the Iran-Contra affair, Congress in 1990
attempted to tighten its oversight of covert action. The Senate Intelligence
Committee approved a new set of statutory reporting requirements, citing the
ambiguous, confusing and incomplete congressional mandate governing covert
actions under the then-current law. After the bill was modified in conference,
Congress approved the changes.6
President George H.W. Bush, however, pocket-vetoed the 1990 legislation,
citing several concerns, including conference report language indicating
congressional intent that the intelligence committees be notified “within a few days”
when prior notice of a covert action was not provided, and that prior notice could
only be withheld in “exigent circumstances.”7 The legislation also contained
language stipulating that a U.S. government request of a foreign government or a
private citizen to conduct covert action would constitute a covert action.
In 1991, after asserting in new conference language its intent as to the meaning
of “timely fashion” and eliminating any reference to third-party covert action
requests, Congress approved and the President signed into law the new measures.8
President Bush noted in his signing statement his satisfaction that the revised
provision concerning “timely” notice to the Congress of covert actions incorporates
without substantive change the requirement found in existing law, and that any
reference to third-party requests had been eliminated. Those covert action provisions
remain in effect today.9
6 S. 2834
7 Memorandum of Disapproval issued by President George H.W. Bush, November 30, 1990.
8 P.L. 102-88. See covert action requirements in Sec. 503 of the National Security Act of
1947 [50 U.S.C. 413b].
9 Although the covert action statute has remained virtually unchanged, Congress has
addressed some related concerns. The FY2004 defense authorization law (P.L. 108-136)
included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on the Special
Operations Forces’ changing role in counterterrorism, and on the implications of those
changes, if any, on the Special Operations command. Also included was a provision
requiring that any Special Operations Command-led missions be authorized by the President
or the Secretary of Defense. In the 2004 intelligence authorization law, conferees reaffirmed
the “functional definition of covert action” and cited the “critical importance to the
requirements for covert action approval and notification” contained in the 1991 intelligence
authorization law. For a more detailed discussion of these and related issues, see Helen
Fessenden, CQ Weekly, “Intelligence: Hill’s Oversight Role At Risk, March 27, 2004, p.
734. In the FY2005 Defense Authorization Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary of
Defense to spend up to $25 million in each of the fiscal years, 2005 through 2007, to provide
support to “... foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting
or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to
combat terrorism.” Congress further required that the Secretary of Defense notify the
congressional defense committees “... expeditiously, and in any event in not less than 48
hours, of the use of such authority with respect to that operation....” Congress said that this
(continued...)
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Post 9/11 Concerns
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, concerns have surfaced with regard to the
Pentagon’s expanded intelligence counterterrorism efforts. Some lawmakers
reportedly have expressed concern that the Pentagon is creating a parallel intelligence
capability independent from the CIA or other American authorities, and one that
encroaches on the CIA’s realm.10 It has been suggested that the Pentagon has
adopted a broad definition of its current authority to conduct “traditional military
activities” and “prepare the battlefield.”11 Senior Defense Department officials
reportedly have responded that the Pentagon’s need for intelligence to support ground
troops after 9/11 requires a more extensive Pentagon intelligence operation, and they
suggest that any difference in DOD’s approach is due more to the amount of
intelligence gathering that is necessarily being carried out, rather than to any
difference in the activity it is conducting.12 These same officials, however, also
reportedly contend that American troops were now more likely to be working with
indigenous forces in countries like Iraq or Afghanistan to combat stateless terrorist
organizations and need as much flexibility as possible.13
Adding even more complexity to DOD and CIA mission differences, CIA
Director Michael Hayden reportedly has stated that it has become more difficult to
distinguish between traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by the military
and those by the CIA and that any problems resulting from overlapping missions will
be resolved case-by-case.14 More recently, General James R. Clapper, Jr., the
Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee that within the statutory context of the meaning of covert
action, “covert activities are normally not conducted ... by uniformed military
9 (...continued)
authority does not constitute the authority to conduct a covert action. See Section 1208, P.L.
108-375. The FY2008 Defense Authorization Act re-authorized the authority for support
of military operations to combat terrorism through FY2010. See H.R. 4986, Sec. 1202.
10 Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, “Clash Forseen Between CIA and Pentagon,” May 10,
2006, p 1. For a discussion of this and related issues, see Jennifer D. Kibbe, “Covert and
Action and the Pentagon,” Intelligence and National Security, February, 2007.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. The Department of Defense makes the following distinction between a clandestine
operation and a covert action: a clandestine operation is an operation sponsored or
conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or
concealment. Such an operation differs from a covert action in that emphasis is placed on
concealment of the operation rather than on the concealment of the identity of the sponsor.
According to DOD, in special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and
may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. See
“Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Publication
1-02, August 8, 2006.
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forces.”15 In written responses to questions posed by the Senate Armed Services
Committee in advance of the hearing, General Clapper asserted that it was his
understanding that “military forces are not conducting ‘covert action,’” but are
instead confining their actions to clandestine activities.16 Although testifying that the
term “clandestine activities” is not defined by statute, he characterized such activity
as consisting of those actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute
“passive” intelligence information gathering. By contrast, covert action, he
suggested, is “active,” in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic,
military, or diplomatic behavior of a target.17 In comments before the committee, he
further noted that clandestine activity can be conducted in support of a covert
activity.18 He also distinguished between a covert action, in which the government’s
participation is unacknowledged, and a clandestine activity, which although intended
to be secret, can be publicly acknowledged if it is discovered or inadvertently
revealed.19 Being able to publicly acknowledge such an activity provides the military
personnel who are involved certain protections under the Geneva Conventions,
according to General Clapper, who suggested that those who participate in covert
actions could jeopardize any rights they may have under the Geneva Conventions.
He recommended “that, to the maximum extent possible, there needs to be a line
drawn (between clandestine and covert activities) from an oversight perspective and
as well [sic] as a risk perspective.”20
Some observers suggest that Congress needs to increase its oversight of military
activities that some contend may not meet the definition of covert action, and may
therefore, be exempt from the degree of congressional oversight accorded to covert
actions. Others contend that increased oversight will hamper the military’s
effectiveness.21
15 See U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing transcript on Department of Defense
March 27, 2007.
16 See Advanced Questions for Lieutenant General James Clapper USAF (Ret.), Nominee
for the Position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, at [http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov], Hearings, March 27, 2007, Statement of James R. Clapper, Jr.
17 See U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing transcript on Department of Defense,
March 27, 2007, p. 23.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Helen Fessenden, CQ Weekly, “Intelligence: Hill’s Oversight Role At Risk,” March 27,
2004, p. 734.
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Current Statute Governing Covert Actions
The current statute with regard to covert action remains virtually unchanged
since it was signed into law in 1991.22 In essence it codified elements of the “Casey
Accords,” the President’s 1988 national security directive and various legislative
initiatives.
The legislation approved that year, according to the conferees,23 for the first time
imposed the following requirements pertaining to covert action:
! A finding must be in writing.
! A finding may not retroactively authorize covert activities which
have already occurred.
! The President must determine that the covert action is necessary to
support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States.
! A finding must specify all government agencies involved and
whether any third party will be involved.
! A finding may not authorize any action intended to influence United
States political processes, public opinion, policies or media.
! A finding may not authorize any action which violates the
Constitution of the United States or any statutes of the United States.
! Notification to the congressional leaders specified in the bill must be
followed by submission of the written finding to the chairmen of the
intelligence committees.
! The intelligence committees must be informed of significant changes
in covert actions.
! No funds may be spent by any department, agency or entity of the
executive branch on a covert action until there has been a signed,
written finding.
The term “covert action” was defined for the first time in statute to mean “... an
activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political,
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly....”24
22 Sec. 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 413b].
23 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. 1455, July 25, 1991.
24 Ibid.
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In 1991, Congressional conferees said this new definition was intended to clarify
understandings of intelligence activities requiring the President’s approval, not to
relax or go beyond previous understandings. Conferees also signaled their intent that
government activities aimed at misleading a potential adversary to the true nature of
U.S. military capabilities, intentions or operations, for example, would not be
included under the definition. And they stated that covert action does not apply to
acknowledged U.S. government activities which are intended to influence public
opinion or governmental attitudes in foreign countries. To mislead or to misrepresent
the true nature of an acknowledged U.S. activity does not make it a covert action,
according to the conferees.25
Exceptions Under the Statutory Definition of Covert
Action
In approving a statutory definition of covert action, Congress also statutorily
stipulated four categories of activities which would not constitute covert action.
They are: (1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence,
traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain
the operational security of U.S. government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by U.S. government law
enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; (4) activities to provide
routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in the first three
categories) of other U.S. government agencies abroad.26
This report addresses the second category of activities — traditional military
activities and routine support to those activities.
Traditional Military Activities
Conferees stated:
It is the intent of the conferees that “traditional military activities” include
activities by military personnel under the direction and control of a United
States military commander (whether or not the U.S. sponsorship of such
activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and related to
hostilities which are either anticipated (meaning approval has been given
by the National Command Authorities for the activities and or operational
planning for hostilities) to involve U.S. military forces, or where such
hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing, and, where
the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be
acknowledged publicly. In this regard, the conferees intend to draw a line
between activities that are and are not under the direction and control of the
military commander. Activities that are not under the direction and control
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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of a military commander should not be considered as “traditional military
activities.”27
Routine Support of Traditional Military Activities
Conferees further stated that whether or not activities undertaken well in
advance of a possible or eventual U.S. military operation constitute “covert action”
will depend in most cases upon whether they constitute “routine support” and
referenced the report accompanying the Senate bill for an explanation of the term.28
The report accompanying the Senate bill29 states:
The committee considers as “routine support” unilateral U.S. activities to
provide or arrange for logistical or other support for U.S. military forces in
the event of a military operation that is to be publicly acknowledged.
Examples include caching communications equipment or weapons, the
lease or purchase from unwitting sources of residential or commercial
property to support an aspect of an operation, or obtaining currency or
documentation for possible operational uses, if the operation as a whole is
to be publicly acknowledged.
The report goes on to state:
The committee would regard as “other-than-routine” support activities
undertaken in another country which involve other than unilateral activities.
Examples of such activity include clandestine attempts to recruit or train
foreign nationals with access to the target country to support U.S. forces in
the event of a military operation; clandestine [efforts] to influence foreign
nationals of the target country concerned to take certain actions in the event
of a U.S. military operation; clandestine efforts to influence and effect [sic]
public opinion in the country concerned where U.S. sponsorship of such
efforts is concealed; and clandestine efforts to influence foreign officials
in third countries to take certain actions without the knowledge or approval
of their government in the event of a U.S. military operation.
As the congressional conferees declared in 1991, timing of such activities —
whether proximate to a military operation, or well in advance — does not define
“other-than-routine” support of military activities. Rather, whether such activities
constitute “other-than-routine” support, and thus constitute covert action, will
depend, in most cases, on whether such an activity is unilateral in nature, that is,
whether U.S. government personnel conduct the activity, or whether they enlist the
assistance of foreign nationals.
27 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. 1455, July 25, 1991.
28 Ibid.
29 S.Rept. 102-85, S. 1325, 102nd Congress, 1st Session (1991).
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Policy Issues
The lines defining mission and authorities with regard to covert action are less
than clear. The lack of clarity raises a number of policy questions for Congress,
including the following far from exclusive list.
How should Congress define its oversight role? Which committees should be
involved?
Can the U.S. military improve the effectiveness of its intelligence operations
without at some point enlisting the support of foreign nationals in such a way that
such activity could be viewed as “non-routine support” to traditional military
activities, that is, a covert action?
Is it appropriate to view U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the context of a global
battlefield and to view the military as having the authority to “prepare” that
battlefield, and can “anticipated” military action precede the onset of hostilities by
months or years?
Is it appropriate to view the military as being involved in “a war” against
terrorists, and thus its activities as constituting “traditional military activities” as it
wages that war?
By asserting that its activities do not constitute covert actions, is the Pentagon
trying to avoid the statutory requirements governing covert action, including a signed
presidential finding, congressional notification, and oversight by the congressional
intelligence committees? Or, as Pentagon officials suggest, is DOD, in the wake of
9/11, simply fulfilling a greater number of intelligence needs associated with
combating terrorism that are sanctioned in statute and do not fall under the statutory
definition of covert action?
Since 1991, when Congress last comprehensively addressed the issue of covert
action, has the environment in which the U.S. military operates changed sufficiently
to warrant a review of the statute that applies to covert actions?
In his 1991 signing statement, President George H.W. Bush argued that
Congress’s definition of “covert action” was unnecessary. He went on to state that
in determining whether particular military activities constitute covert actions, he
would continue to bear in mind the historic missions of the Armed Forces to protect
the United States and its interests, influence foreign capabilities and intentions, and
conduct activities preparatory to the execution of operations.