Order Code RS22707
Updated January 24, 2008
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
Vehicles: Background and Issues
for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
In late 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a major procurement
initiative to replace most uparmored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs) in Iraq with Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles by
FY2009. MRAPs have been described as providing twice as much protection against
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than uparmored HMMWVs. IEDs, at the height
of their use, were responsible for about 70% of U.S. casualties in Iraq.1 The DOD’s
accelerated MRAP program, decisions to decrease the number of MRAPs procured, and
MRAP’s performance in urban and counterinsurgency operations raise a number of
potential policy issues for congressional consideration. This report will be updated.
Background
MRAPs are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and international
companies that generally incorporate a “V”-shaped hull and armor plating designed to
provide protection against mines and IEDs. DOD is procuring three types of MRAPs.
These include Category I vehicles, weighing about 7 tons and capable of carrying 6
passengers; Category II vehicles, weighing about 19 tons and capable of carrying 10
passengers; and Category III vehicles, intended to be used primarily to clear mines and
IEDs, weighing about 22.5 tons and capable of carrying up to 12 passengers. The Army
and Marines have employed two versions of MRAPs (the Category III Buffalo and the
Category II Cougar, respectively) in limited numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003,
primarily for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. These
route clearance MRAPs quickly gained a reputation for providing superior protection for
their crews, and some suggested that MRAPs might be a better alternative for transporting
troops in combat than uparmored HMMWVs.
1 Tom Vanden Brook, “Troops in Iraq Get Safer Vehicle,” USA Today, May 10, 2007.

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DOD Accelerates the MRAP Program. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
directed that “the MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department
of Defense acquisition program.”2 The Secretary of Defense established the MRAP Task
Force to speed production and fielding of MRAPs and has assigned the Marines to
manage all MRAP procurement for DOD. The MRAP program was designated a “DX”
program, giving it priority for resources.3
The Evolving Requirement. The Buffalo MRAP was originally intended to be
fielded only to engineer units, with the Army planning to stand up three Route Clearance
Companies per year starting in FY2007, for a total of 12 companies.4 Marine Corps
leadership reportedly decided in February 2007 to replace all uparmored HMMWVs in
Iraq with MRAPs, whereas Army leadership would continue to rely on its uparmored
HMMWVs.5 In March 2007, the MRAP requirement for all services reportedly grew by
15% as the Navy, Air Force, and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) added
requirements for MRAPs that stood at 7,774 DOD-wide as of March 26, 2007.6 In May
2007, reportedly because of the requests from Army commanders in Iraq, Army leadership
reportedly began considering the possibility of replacing all uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq
with MRAPs, thereby increasing the Army’s total requirement to approximately 17,700
MRAP vehicles.7 On June 28, 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)8
reportedly endorsed a requirement to replace every HMMWV in with a MRAP,
potentially pushing the MRAP requirement to more than 23,000 vehicles.9 The JROC
capped overall MRAP procurement at 15,374 vehicles in September 2007 but suggested
that these numbers could change, based on the assessment of commanders.10
2 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “MRAP Acquisition,” May 2, 2007.
3 Jason Sherman, “Gates Establishes MRAP Task Force to Speed Up Production, Fielding,
InsideDefense.com, June 4, 2007, and Emelie Rutherford, “Gates Approves DX Rating for
MRAP,” InsideDefense.com, June 4, 2007.
4 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and Aviation Safety
Programs, February 1, 2006, p. 6.
5 David Wood, “Marines to Replace Humvees in Iraq,” Baltimore Sun, February 15, 2007.
6 Jason Sherman, “MRAP Requirement Rises 15 Percent as Navy, Air Force, SOCOM Weigh In,”
InsideDefense.com, March 26, 2007.
7 Jason Sherman, “Army Eying the Replacement of all Humvees in Iraq with MRAP Vehicles,”
Inside the Pentagon, May 3, 2007, and Letter from Acting Secretary of the Army Pete Geren to
the Secretary of Defense, MRAP Acquisition, May 13, 2007.
8 Chartered in 1984 ( 10 U.S.C. Sec 181), the JROC is tasked with examining potential joint
military requirements; identifying, evaluating, and selecting candidates for joint developmental
and acquisition programs; providing oversight of cross-service requirements and management
issues; and resolving service concerns that arise after the initiation of a joint program.
9 Jason Sherman, “Do the Marines Really Want 246,000 MRAPs? Not Exactly,” Inside
Defense.com, August 2, 2007.
10 JenDiMascio, “JROC Boosts MRAP Requirements; Congress Struggles to Arrange Funding,”
Defense Daily, Volume 235, Issue 56, September 20, 2007.

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Fewer MRAPs Required. On November 30, 2007, the Marines reduced its
MRAP requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles.11 The Marines cited six
factors in its decision:
! IED attacks were dramatically down over the preceding six months;
! the relatively heavy MRAP cannot operate or pursue the enemy off-road,
in confined areas, or across most bridges;
! reduced need to put Marines on high-threat roads through the use of
persistent surveillance and airlift of supplies;
! counterinsurgency focus requires Marines dismount and interact closely
with the local populace;
! MRAPs associated with surge forces were no longer needed; and
! MRAP sustainment numbers were lower because of fewer than expected
combat losses.
The Marines reduction in its MRAP requirement from 3,700 to 2,300 was anticipated to
result in a potential cost savings of approximately $1.7 billion in FY2008 and FY2009.
The Army is also expected to cut a number of MRAPs from its current 10,000-
vehicle requirement, but have not yet publically committed to a specific requirement.12
The Army also cited decreasing casualties and IED attacks over the previous six months,
as well as the need to dismount and interact with the populace, as factors in reducing its
original MRAP requirement.
MRAPs Deployed.13 According to U.S. defense officials, 2,225 MRAPs were in
service in Iraq and Afghanistan as of January 22, 2008, but only 45 of these were in
operation in Afghanistan. Reports maintain that the United States will ship an additional
500 MRAPs to Afghanistan in the near future to support the additional 3,200 U.S. troops
that will be deployed to the region in the next few months.
11 Information in this section is taken from a U.S. Marine Corps Information Paper, “Reduction
in the USMC Mrap Requirement” November 30, 2007.
12 Information in this section is from Tom Vanden Brook, “Army May Cut Armored Vehicles,”
USA Today, December 10, 2007 and Jim Garamone, “Army Looks at Long-Term Need for Mine-
Resistant Vehicles,” American Forces Press Service, December 12, 2007.
13 Information in this section is taken from Daphne Benoit, “US to Deploy 500 Mine Resistant
Vehicles to Afghanistan,” Agence France-Presse, January 19, 2008 and John K. Kruzel,
“Pentagon Officials Remain Confident in MRAPs Despite First Casualty,” American Forces
Press Service, January 22, 2008.

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Recent MRAP Contract Activity
MRAP Vehicle Orders Surpass 11,900.14 On December 18, 2007, DOD
reported that it had awarded four manufacturers a contract just under $2.66 billion for an
additional 3,126 MRAPs to be delivered by the end of July 2008. This award, combined
with previous contract awards, totals 11,941 MRAPs out of the current 15,374
requirement. The December 18, 2007, contracts include the following:
! Stewart and Stevenson Tactical Vehicle (Sealy, TX), a Division of Armor
Holdings that was recently acquired by BAE Land Systems, was awarded
a contract to produce 668 Category II MRAPs.
! BAE Land Systems and Armaments (Santa Clara, CA) was awarded a
contract for 600 additional Category II MRAPs, bringing its total to more
than 1,730 vehicles.
! Force Protection Industries, Inc. (Ladson, SC), was awarded a contract
for 178 Category I and 180 Category II MRAPS.
! International Military and Government LLC (Warrenville, IL) received
the largest single deliver order for 1,5000 Category I MRAPs.
MRAP II Contract.15 On July 31, 2007, the Marines issued a request for proposal
for the MRAP II Enhanced Vehicle Competition. The MRAP II is intended to better
address the threat of Explosively-Formed Penetrators (EFPs), a type of stand-off
improvised explosive device that employs a shaped charge against the sides of vehicles.16
In December 2007, MRAP program officials announced that only two companies — BAE
Systems and a team led by Ideal Innovations,17 a consultant based in Alexandria, Virginia
— were selected to provide six test vehicles each to be evaluated by DOD.18 Depending
on the results of testing, a production decision on MRAP II vehicles could be made from
the end of March to May 2008.19
14 Information in this section is from a U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release: “MRAP Vehicle Order Tops 11,900,” No.
1416-07, December 18, 2007.
15 Emelie Rutherford and Jason Sherman, “Solicitation Expected to be Released this Week for
MRAP II Competition,” InsideDefense.com, July 30, 2007, and Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Eyes
More than a Dozen New Potential Vendors for MRAP II,” InsideDefense.com, August 1, 2007.
16 Tom Vanden Brook, “MRAPs May Need Extra Armor Face EFPs,” USA Today, May 31, 2007
and “Add-On Armor Too Heavy for MRAPs,” USA Today, July 17, 2007.
17 The Ideal Innovations Team consists of Oskosh Truck from Oskosh, WI and Ceradyne from
Costa Mesa, CA.
18 Emelie Rutherford, “Two Companies Pass Muster in Testing for Next-Gen MRAP Vehicles,”
Inside the Navy, December 24, 2007.
19 Ibid.

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MRAP Allocation.20 DOD has reportedly allocated the 3,126 MRAPS ordered as
of December 18, 2007. The allocations are as follows:
! Army: 2,736.
! Marine Corps: 121.
! Navy: 181.
! Air Force: 88.
Given these allocation figures and the Marine’s reduced requirement of 2,300 MRAPs,
this allocation will almost satisfy Marine requirements. This allocation will also satisfy
the Navy’s total requirement for 544 MRAPs, and the Air Force would have 469 of the
697 MRAPs that it requires. Although SOCOM was not allocated any MRAPs in this
recent decision by DOD, it reportedly needs 24 MRAPs to meet its requirement. As
previously noted, Army requirements are still being examined by defense officials.
MRAP Concerns21
In addition to the aforementioned Marine Corps observation that the MRAP cannot
operate or pursue the enemy off-road, in confined areas, or across most bridges, there are
other concerns that have arisen from MRAP use in Iraq. According to reports, DOD’s
MRAP Acquisition Executive, John Young, stated that in certain terrain types, MRAPs
were not proving to be as effective and some units wanted to keep their uparmored
HMMWVs in lieu of MRAPs because of their superior speed and mobility. Service
chiefs have also continued to express their concerns that MRAPs are too large and too
heavy for expeditionary operations and can not be deployed by helicopter or by
amphibious ships.
Recent Congressional Action
PL 11-92, FY2008 Appropriations Continuing Resolution, appropriated $5.2 billion
for MRAP procurement, and PL-110-16, FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act,
appropriated an additional $11.6 billion for MRAP procurement. H.R. 4986, FY2008
Defense Authorizations Act, authorizes $ 17.6 billion for MRAP procurement and
associated MRAP transportation, contractor logistics, and research and development
costs.
Potential Issues for Congress
How Many MRAPs Does DOD Intend Procure? The Marines have reduced
its MRAP requirement by almost 38% and the Army is also expected to reduce its MRAP
requirement. While decreasing MRAP requirements based on the improving tactical
situation in Iraq and in anticipation of a reduction in troop levels can be considered
20 Jason Sherman, “DOD Refines Composition Allocation of MRAP Fleet,” InsideDefense.com,
January 22, 2008.
21 Jason Sherman, “At Wide-Ranging Hearing, Reports of MRAPs Hampering Mobility, Speed,”
InsideDefense.com, November 8, 2007 and Kimberly Johnson and Michael Hoffman, “Corps to
Slash Number of MRAPs it Will Buy,” Army Times, November 29, 2007.

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prudent management by DOD, at some point DOD will need to establish a firm
requirement for the total number of MRAPs to be procured. An additional concern is how
decreasing MRAP requirements will affect MRAP II procurement.
If Fewer MRAPs Are Required, How Will Remaining MRAP Funds Be
Used? According to one report, the Marines’ decision to reduce its MRAP requirement
by almost 38% will generate a cost savings of almost $1.7 billion.22 Another report,
anticipating that the Army will also reduce its MRAP requirement, suggests that leftover
funds could be used to address readiness shortfalls by repairing or replacing equipment
and adding new soldiers.23 Given the likelihood that MRAP requirements DOD-wide will
decrease from current funded levels, Congress and DOD might act to determine what the
overall cost savings will be and how to apply these funds within and perhaps outside of
DOD.
What Are DOD’s Long-Term Plans for MRAP? Senior Army officials have
stressed that MRAPs are only “an interim strategy” and that the Army was still “dedicated
to the future of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle — the HMMWV’s replacement.”24 Some
question DOD’s long-term plans for 15,000 plus MRAPs in the event of a significant
troop reduction in Iraq. Will MRAP production quotas be decreased in the event of large-
scale troop reductions? Will MRAPs be permanently integrated into force structures, or
will they be placed in a reduced readiness status after Iraq? It is also possible that
significant numbers of MRAPs could be transferred to Iraqi security forces. Given
questions about the MRAP’s future, Congress might require DOD to define its long-term
plans for the MRAP fleet.
How Will MRAP Acquisition Affect Other DOD Programs? Given MRAP’s
anticipated level of funding, the MRAP program is DOD’s third-largest acquisition
program, behind missile defense and the Joint Strike Fighter.25 There are concerns about
how MRAP procurement will affect the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV) program.
The Army-led joint program, which is expected to launch a 27-month development
competition in June 2008, could result in over 50,000 JTLVs being produced for the
Services starting as early as 2015.26 With war-related and equipment repair and
replacement costs continuing to grow at a substantial rate, there could be funding conflicts
between MRAP and other DOD programs as well.
22 Dana Hedgpeth, “Marines Reduce Vehicle Request,” Washington Post, December 1, 2007.
23 Richard Lardner, “Fewer MRAPs Could Mean More Readiness Funds,” Army Times,
December 12, 2007.
24 Fawzia Sheikh, “Industry Unclear About Army’s Pans for Joint-Service MRAP Program,”
InsideDefense.com, February 12, 2007.
25 DOD Transcript, DOD News Briefing with John Young, MRAP Task Force Chairman, July
18, 2007.
26 Jason Sherman, “Army Eyes Launch of JTLV Program in February, Contract Awards in June,
Inside Defense.com, January 11, 2008.

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