Order Code RS22324
Updated January 17, 2008
Bosnia: Overview of Current Issues

Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Over 12 years since the Dayton accords ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian war,
Bosnia’s future is still in question. Nationwide elections in October 2006 brought to
power leaders with highly divergent positions on the country’s future governing
arrangements, and ushered in a prolonged period of political tensions. As a result, many
areas of Bosnia’s reform agenda stalled in 2007, although some signs of progress
became evident at the end of the year. Bosnia’s political situation has also been affected
by uncertainties surrounding Kosovo’s future status and the potential for regional
instability in early 2008. Bosnia has made slow and unsteady progress toward Euro-
Atlantic integration: it formally joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in
December 2006 and is close to securing a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the European Union (EU). In early 2007, the international community
postponed plans to close out its overseeing role in Bosnia, and may consider another
postponement in early 2008; a small EU military force contributes to a secure
environment. This report provides an overview of prominent current issues in Bosnia
that may be of interest to Members of the 110th Congress. It may be updated as events
warrant.
Introduction and U.S. Policy
The Dayton peace agreement,1 reached in November 1995 with U.S. leadership,
ended a brutal three and one-half year ethnic and territorial conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that erupted after the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia. The Dayton
agreement outlined a common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised of two entities,
the Bosniak (Muslim)-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS), under the
authority of an international representative and a NATO-led peacekeeping presence.
1 Full text of the Dayton accords can be found at [http://www.oscebih.org]. The constitution is
in Annex 4. The accords were signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, and are sometimes referred
to as the Dayton/Paris agreement.

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Central Bosnian governmental institutions include a three-member presidency, Prime
Minister and Council of Ministers, and bicameral state Parliament. Under the Dayton
constitution, central governing powers were kept weak, with many governing functions
remaining at the Federation and RS entity level, which have their own governments and
parliaments. Below the entity level are cantons and municipalities in the Federation and
municipalities only in the RS. At the international level, Dayton mandated an Office of
the High Representative (OHR) to oversee international activities in Bosnia and bear
authority to impose decisions and remove officials. As the security situation improved,
NATO gradually reduced its presence in Bosnia and turned over peacekeeping duties to
the European Union (EU) in December 2004.
Most observers agree that Dayton was a great achievement in that it ended the war
and laid the foundation for consolidating peace. However, many observers also believe
that the Dayton agreement, as a document derived from compromises and reflecting
wartime circumstances, cannot by itself insure Bosnia’s future as a functioning
democratic state.2 In particular, Bosnia’s multi-layered and ethnically-defined governing
structures have presented significant challenges to its efforts to integrate into the
European Union and NATO. Political differences among Bosnia’s leaders and vested
interests in the status quo continue to hinder efforts to strengthen Bosnia’s central
governing institutions and administrative capacity. The pull of Euro-Atlantic integration
has fostered a degree of cooperation on this front, but political consensus across ethnic
lines on key governing arrangements is still elusive.
Since early 2005, the Bush Administration has renewed emphasis on “unfinished
business” in the western Balkan region. A major thrust of U.S. policy has been to resolve
the unsettled status of Kosovo, a U.N.-run province of Serbia that seeks independence.
The United States has also sought to bolster Bosnia’s further development as a unified,
democratic, and stable state capable of integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. The
Administration has supported Bosnia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and has encouraged
Bosnia’s leaders to consolidate state structures and erase the major political divisions that
Dayton accommodated.3 Some Members of the 110th Congress retain an interest in
Bosnia’s progress since Dayton, its path toward NATO membership and EU integration,
as well as its record of cooperation on war crimes issues.

State Consolidation Efforts and the Post-2006 Election Situation
As noted above, the Bush Administration and the EU have sought to promote further
constitutional reform to improve the governing effectiveness of Bosnia’s political
institutions and overcome some of the dysfunctional aspects of the post-Dayton legacy.
Among other things, a stronger Bosnian state could contribute to greater self-sufficiency
in Bosnia’s peaceful and democratic development, an improved ability to address pressing
political and economic concerns including combating organized criminal and international
terrorist activity, and improved prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration. In March 2005,
2 For example, Lord Paddy Ashdown, the outgoing High Representative in Bosnia, called Dayton
“a superb agreement to end a war, but a very bad agreement to make a state.” “Farewell,
Sarajevo,” The Guardian (U.K.), Nov. 2, 2005.
3 See statement of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Nov. 8, 2005.

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the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission concluded that Bosnia’s current
constitutional arrangements were neither efficient nor rational, and that state-level
institutions needed to become far more effective for Bosnia to move closer to EU
integration.4
Several milestone political and economic reforms have been reached by Bosnia’s
state and entity institutions in recent years, often with extensive input from and pressure
by the international community. The Bosnian parties agreed in early 2005 to
comprehensive defense and security reforms on merging the formerly rival forces into an
integrated army controlled by the central government.5 Additional landmark agreements
on intelligence and information services, state prosecution offices and justice ministry,
and border and customs services, among others, further expanded central state
competencies and institutions. Bosnia’s economy has also achieved significant growth
in recent years, although unemployment still exceeded 40% in 2007.
At a Washington meeting in November 2005 to commemorate the 10th anniversary
of the Dayton accords, Bosnia’s leaders signed a “Commitment to Pursue Constitutional
Reform,” a document in which the leadership pledged to embark on a process of
constitutional reform to create stronger and more efficient democratic institutions. Such
reforms were envisioned to include creating a single presidency instead of the current tri-
partite presidency, strengthening the Prime Minister’s office, and strengthening the
Bosnian parliament. Negotiations on a reform package continued through early 2006, with
the intention to complete them in time for scheduled general elections in October. In
March 2006, seven Bosnian parties agreed to a package of constitutional reforms, and the
tri-partite Bosnian presidency likewise adopted it. Despite this broad consensus, the
measure failed in Bosnia’s lower house of parliament on April 24, missing the required
two-thirds majority by two votes. Some Bosnian Croat and opposition Muslim deputies
opposed the bill. U.S. and other international officials publicly decried the outcome as a
major setback to the state consolidation process. After the vote, several parties reiterated
their commitment to continue negotiations toward reaching a consensus on constitutional
reforms, which many recognize to be essential for eventual integration with the European
Union, although few believed this could be achieved before upcoming elections.
October 2006 Elections and Aftermath. On October 1, Bosnia held elections
for the three-member Bosnian presidency, the Bosnian parliamentary assembly, the
parliaments of the two entities, the RS presidency, and the Federation’s cantonal
assembly. Overall turnout was 55% and the conduct and administration of the electoral
process were generally praised.6 The election campaign featured heightened nationalist
rhetoric among parties still largely representing distinct ethnic groups. While the hold on
power of the wartime nationalist parties was weakened, the relatively hardline positions
of the nominally moderate victorious parties pointed to new challenges to building
national consensus across ethnic lines on key issues. For example, the Party for BiH
(headed by former Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic), has promoted the dismantling of the
4 Text of the report can be found at [http://www.venice.coe.int].
5 See “Defense Reform Fact Sheet,” NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, July 21, 2005, available at
[http://www.afsouth.nato.int].
6 These were the first elections since Dayton to be administered entirely by Bosnian authorities.

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entity structure in favor of greater state centralization. Conversely, Milorad Dodik, the
leader of Alliance of Independent Social Democrats in the RS, has promoted greater
federalism, and has on occasion threatened to call for a referendum on independence for
the RS. Ethnic Croat parties are generally supportive of greater rights for the country’s
ethnic Croat community. After several months of negotiations, a new seven-party
coalition government was formed in February 2007, headed by Bosnia’s first ethnic Serb
Prime Minister, Nikola Spiric.
Bosnia’s new leading politicians retained much of their hardline and
uncompromising positions throughout 2007, contributing to a deteriorating political
environment, provoking intermittent policy crises, and inviting “utmost concern” at the
international level.7 Some speculated that the international High Representative would use
his authority to remove Silajdzic and Dodik from power. Bosnia Prime Minister Spiric
actually did resign late in the year in protest of the High Representative’s decision to
streamline central Bosnian decision-making processes, but was later reinstated.
Above all, the issue of police reform and restructuring took over as a proxy for the
earlier (and still ongoing) debate over constitutional reforms, and became tied up with
Bosnia’s efforts to secure an association agreement with the EU (see below). Police
reforms have been a particularly thorny area of security sector reform because they relate
to the power relationship between the entities and the central government. The governing
parties reached a major milestone in this area in October-November 2007 by agreeing on
a set of principles and action plan on police reforms that appeared to meet EU conditions
on police consolidation. Under these agreements, Bosnia is to have police forces that are
centrally funded, centrally managed, and not subject to political interference. Despite this
sign of compromise, Bosnia’s leaders will be challenged in 2008 to implement their
commitments on the police as well as search for areas of consensus in revived efforts to
achieve constitutional reforms.
Euro-Atlantic Integration
Along with the other western Balkan states, Bosnia and Herzegovina seeks eventual
full membership in the European Union and NATO. Both institutions have committed
to the region’s full integration, once various conditions have been met. For a variety of
reasons, Bosnia has encountered a greater degree of difficulty in meeting some of the
conditions compared to other western Balkan countries.
European Union. At its June 2003 Thessaloniki summit, the EU committed to
integrate all of the countries of the western Balkans and created new instruments to foster
closer ties to the EU, including the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the
first step toward eventual EU accession. Numerous hurdles slowed Bosnia’s progress in
negotiating and concluding a SAA, leaving Bosnia as potentially the only state in the
region without a formal relationship with the EU. Significant recent progress in defense
and security sector reforms, including the latest breakthrough commitments on police
reforms, paved the way for the EU to “initial” a SAA with Bosnia in December 2007.
The SAA is expected to be signed in early 2008 once a series of laws implementing the
police reforms are prepared.
7 Declaration by the Steering Board of the PIC, Oct. 31, 2007, S/2007/651 (Nov. 5, 2007).

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Beyond the defense and police reform issue, the EU has also prioritized the need for
further reforms in Bosnia’s public administration and public broadcasting. Bosnia’s level
of cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal has also been of concern. While
the RS has dramatically improved its cooperation with The Hague in recent years, the
ongoing ability of wartime Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to
elude capture has kept international attention on this issue.
NATO. For several years, Bosnia, along with Serbia and Montenegro, had been the
only former Yugoslav state that had not yet joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program. As noted above, Bosnia’s government agreed to sweeping defense reforms in
2004 and 2005 to unify the armed forces structure and command and to create a
professional military. In July 2006, Bosnia’s presidency decided to merge the armed
forces into a unified Bosnian army by the end of 2007. With these achievements on
transforming the armed forces, the only remaining hurdle to Bosnia’s PfP aspirations had
been the RS’ still incomplete cooperation with The Hague war crimes tribunal, especially
with regard to arresting fugitive war crimes suspects such as Radovan Karadzic. In a
somewhat unexpected development, NATO leaders at the November 2006 Riga summit
invited Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro to join PfP (without achieving full cooperation
with the war crimes tribunal), and all three states did so in December. A small, residual
NATO presence in Sarajevo has provided the Bosnian government with advice and
assistance on defense reform issues, and is also engaged in efforts to capture and detain
remaining war criminals.
International Role
The international community has long played a dominant role in postwar Bosnian
affairs. The international community’s role is currently in a state of transition, as
responsibility for governance and security shifts to Bosnian control. Both the Office of
the High Representative, which wielded extensive political authority for many years, and
the international security presence have evolved considerably since the end of the war.
Office of the High Representative (OHR). Successive High Representatives
have frequently exercised considerable executive power, under the so-called “Bonn
powers” authority, to break through political stalemates, push difficult reforms forward,
and even remove obstructionist leaders.8 An earlier High Representative, Lord Paddy
Ashdown, freely wielded his powers during his tenure, making binding decisions and
taking action against or removing officials thought to support Radovan Karadzic. While
an effective mechanism, the High Representative’s office came under increasing criticism
for allegedly stymieing Bosnia’s political development. Ashdown completed his term in
January 2006 and was succeeded by German politician Christian Schwartz-Schilling, who
emphasized a “hands off” approach. Schwartz-Schilling did not stay long in his post, and
was succeeded by Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajcak in July 2007. Lajcak became
embroiled in controversy following his decision in October to streamline decision-making
in Bosnia’s Council of Ministers in an effort to break the deadlock over difficult police
reforms. The measure briefly precipitated another political crisis with the RS that was
8 At its December 1997 conference in Bonn, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the
international oversight body for the OHR, extended the High Representative’s mandate to include
imposing laws and removing officials.

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quickly smoothed over with a negotiated agreement with all three ethnic community
parties on reformed voting rules in the central government and parliament. Lajcak did not
resort to taking action to remove politicians, as some thought he might.
In June 2006, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which oversees the OHR,
decided to “immediately begin preparations to close” (OHR) by June 30, 2007, in “the
interest of all for Bosnia to take full responsibility for its own affairs.”9 In its place, but
with a smaller presence and different mandate, the Office of the EU Special
Representative was to be enhanced but without the OHR’s Bonn powers (currently, the
High Representative is “double-hatted” as the EU’s Special Representative). Behind the
rationale of the planned OHR closure was the belief the EU accession process, with its
comprehensive and stringent political, economic, and legal requirements, could provide
sufficient impetus for Bosnia’s political leaders to carry out sustainable reforms. Critics
have been concerned that Bosnia’s prospects for EU membership remain distant and may
not provide enough of an incentive for competing political leaders to pursue reforms.
Perhaps in recognition of Bosnia’s stalled progress, the PIC decided in late February 2007
to extend the OHR until mid-2008, without reducing its powers. The PIC meeting on
February 26-27, 2008, may consider a further extension of the OHR mandate in view of
Bosnia’s political stalemate throughout much of 2007 as well as concerns about regional
instability arising from Kosovo’s possibly imminent independence. Several international
officials have criticized statements by Serbian and RS officials drawing parallels between
the status of Kosovo with that of the RS.
EUFOR/NATO. At the end of 2004, NATO concluded its SFOR mission in Bosnia
and turned over peacekeeping duties to a European Union military force, EUFOR, to
ensure continued compliance with Dayton and contribute to a secure environment in
Bosnia. Initially at a strength of over 6,000 multinational troops, EUFOR was
reconfigured in 2007 and reduced to about 2,500 troops. NATO maintains a small
headquarters presence in Sarajevo that provides assistance to the Bosnian government and
undertakes counter-terrorism and intelligence operations and missions to detain indicted
war criminals.10 On November 21, 2007, the U.N. Security Council extended the
authorization for the EU and NATO presence in Bosnia for another year (Resolution
1785).
The EU also took over the U.N. police monitoring and advisory mission in Bosnia
in 2003. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia currently comprises about 150
international police officers and its mandate runs through 2009 (as requested by the
Bosnian presidency). The mission of the EUPM is to assist Bosnia achieve a sustainable,
professional, and multi-ethnic police service. A major focus of EUPM activity has been
on combating organized crime and corruption.
9 Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board, June 23, 2006, available at [http://www.ohr.int].
10 For more information, see CRS Report RS21774, Bosnia and the European Union Military
Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping
, by Julie Kim.