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Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
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Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and the
Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide
counterterrorism operations. The progress of mandated SOF growth, possible equipment and
logistical shortfalls, and SOF’s role in irregular warfare (IW) are potential policy issues for
congressional consideration. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 1
Command Structures ................................................................................................................. 1
Army Special Operations Forces............................................................................................... 1
Air Force Special Operations Forces ........................................................................................ 2
AFSOC Initiatives..................................................................................................................... 2
Naval Special Operations Forces .............................................................................................. 3
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) ................................................................. 3
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) ............................................................................. 3
Current Issues .................................................................................................................................. 4
SOF Ground Assaults into Pakistan and Syria .......................................................................... 4
Continued SOF Growth............................................................................................................. 4
Possible SOF Equipment and Logistics Shortages ................................................................... 5
SOF and Irregular Warfare (IW) ............................................................................................... 6
Issues for Congress.......................................................................................................................... 6
SOF Raids into Pakistan and Other Countries .......................................................................... 6
SOF Equipment and Logistics Shortages.................................................................................. 7
SOF and Irregular Warfare (IW) ............................................................................................... 7
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Author Contact Information ............................................................................................................ 7
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Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, elite military units with special training and
equipment that can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of
operations, many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy
specialized training. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) oversees the training,
doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. SOF units.
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In 1986, Congress expressed concern for the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning
and passed measures (P.L. 99-661) to strengthen its position. These actions included the
establishment of USSOCOM as a new unified command. USSOCOM is headquartered at
MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL. The Commander of USSOCOM is a four-star officer who
may be from any service. Commander, USSOCOM reports directly to the Secretary of Defense,
although an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC&IC) provides immediate civilian oversight over many
USSOCOM activities.
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U.S. Army SOF (ARSOF) include approximately 30,000 soldiers from the Active Army, National
Guard, and Army Reserve who are organized into Special Forces, Ranger, and special operations
aviation units, along with civil affairs units, psychological operations units, and special operations
support units. ARSOF Headquarters and other resources, such as the John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center and School, are located at Fort Bragg, NC. Five active Special Forces (SF)
Groups (Airborne) are stationed at Fort Bragg and at Fort Lewis, WA, Fort Campbell, KY, and
Fort Carson, CO. The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) currently stationed at Ft. Bragg will be
moving to Eglin Air Force Base, FL by September 2011 as mandated by the 2005 Base Closure
and Realignment Act.1 Special Forces soldiers—also known as the Green Berets—are trained in
various skills, including foreign languages, that allow teams to operate independently throughout
the world.
In FY2008, the Army began to increase the total number of Army Special Forces battalions from
15 to 20, with one battalion being allocated to each active Special Forces Group. In August 2008,
the Army stood up the first of these new battalions—the 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Groups
(Airborne)—at Fort Campbell, KY.2 Two Army National Guard SF groups are headquartered in
Utah and Alabama. An elite airborne light infantry unit specializing in direct action operations3,
1 Henry Cuningham, “Delays in 7th Group Move Could be Costly,” Fayetteville (NC) Observer, November 7, 2008.
2 Sean D. Naylor, “Special Forces Expands,” Army Times, August 11, 2008.
3 Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to
seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive
actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use
(continued...)
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the 75th Ranger Regiment, is headquartered at Fort Benning, GA, and consists of three battalions.
Army special operations aviation units, including the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
(Airborne) headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY, feature pilots trained to fly the most
sophisticated Army rotary-wing aircraft in the harshest environments, day or night, and in adverse
weather.
Some of the most frequently deployed SOF assets are civil affairs (CA) units, which provide
experts in every area of civil government to help administer civilian affairs in operational
theaters. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) is the only active CA unit, and plans call for
the brigade to expand from one to four battalions by 2009.4 All other CA units reside in the
Reserves and are affiliated with conventional Army units. Psychological operations units
disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass media. The active duty 4th
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Group (Airborne) is stationed at Fort Bragg, and two Army
Reserve PSYOPS groups work with conventional Army units.
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The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) includes about 13,000 active and reserve
personnel. AFSOC is headquartered at Hurlburt Field, FL, along with the 720th Special Tactics
Group, the 18th Flight Test Squadron, and the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School. The 16th
Special Operations Wing (SOW) relocated from Hurlburt Field to Cannon Air Force Base (AFB)
in 2007.5 AFSOC plans to activate the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field using elements of the 16th
SOW.6 The 352nd Special Operations Group is at RAF Mildenhall, England, and the 353rd Special
Operations Group, is at Kadena Air Base, Japan. Reserve AFSOC components include the 193rd
Special Operations Wing, Air National Guard, stationed at Harrisburg, PA, the 280th Combat
Communications Squadron, Air National Guard, stationed at Dothan, AL, and the 919th Special
Operations Wing, Air Force Reserve, stationed at Duke Field, FL. AFSOC’s three active-duty
flying units are composed of more than 100 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.
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AFSOC officials expect to have the first CV-22 tilt rotor squadron operational in early 2009. 7
This first AFSOC Osprey squadron will have six aircraft and nine crews. The Osprey will
eventually replace AFSOC’s MH-53 Pave Low helicopters, which were officially retired in 2008.
AFSOC is also accelerating efforts to replace the aging AC-130U gunship fleet with a lighter
version—perhaps a modified version of the C-27B Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA).8 AFSOC is said to
be working to increase the number of MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles
(...continued)
of force to achieve specific objectives.
4 Kevin Maurer, “Newly Formed 95th Civil Affairs Brigade Activates,” Fayetteville Times, August 18, 2006.
5 Michael Sirak, “Air Force Assigns Special Operations Wing to Cannon Air Force Base,” Defense Daily, June 22,
2006.
6 Ibid.
7 Nathan Hodge, “AFSOC to Stand Up First Osprey Unit in 2009,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 28, 2008, p. 10.
8 John Reed, “AFSOC Quickly Working to Field Next-Generation Light Gunship,” InsideDefense.com, June 27, 2008.
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(UAVs) it uses to support special operations missions by about two-thirds in the FY2010 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM).9
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The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is located in Coronado, CA. NSWC is organized
around eight SEAL Teams and two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams. Two of these eight
SEAL Teams are deployed at any given time, with each SEAL Team consisting of six SEAL
platoons each, consisting of two officers and 16 enlisted personnel. The major operational
components of NSWC include Naval Special Warfare Groups One and Three stationed in San
Diego, CA, and Naval Special Warfare Groups Two and Four in Norfolk, VA. These components
deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams worldwide to meet
the training, exercise, contingency and wartime requirements of theater commanders. NSWC has
approximately 5,400 total active-duty personnel—including 2,450 SEALs and 600 Special
Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCC)—as well as a 1,200-person reserve component of
approximately 325 SEALs, 125 SWCC and 775 support personnel. SEALs are considered the
best-trained combat swimmers in the world, and can be deployed covertly from submarines or
from sea-based aircraft.
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On November 1, 2005, DOD announced the creation of the Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC) as a component of USSOCOM. MARSOC consists of three subordinate units—the
Marine Special Operations Regiment, the Foreign Military Training Unit, and the Special
Operations Support Group—totaling approximately 2,600 Marines. MARSOC Headquarters, the
Foreign Military Training Unit, and the Special Operations Support Group are stationed at Camp
Lejeune, NC. The Marine Special Operations Regiment has its headquarters at Camp Lejeune and
has an element stationed at Camp Pendleton, CA. MARSOC has reportedly deployed Foreign
Military Training Teams to Africa and South America and two Marine Special Operations
Battalions have been activated—one on each coast.11
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According to DOD, the JSOC is “a joint headquarters designed to study special operations
requirements and techniques; ensure interoperability and equipment standardization; plan and
conduct joint special operations exercises and training; and develop joint special operations
tactics.”12 While not official acknowledged by DOD or USSOCOM, JSOC, which is
9 John Reed, “AFSOC Working to Increase Drone Fleet by Two-Thirds in POM-10 Build,” InsideDefense.com, July
18, 2008.
10 Information in this section is taken from DOD Press Release No. 1127-05, dated November 1, 2005, Subject:
Secretary of Defense Approves Marine Special Operations Command; Donna Miles, “Marine Corps to Join U.S.
Special Operations Command,” American Forces Press Service, November 1, 2005; and Christian Lowe, “U.S. Marine
Corps to Create Special Operations Unit,” Defense News, November 1, 2005.
11 Statement by General Bryan D. Brown, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, before the House
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, “Current Manning, Equipping, and Readiness
Challenges Facing Special Operations Forces,” January 31, 2007, p. 4.
12 USSOCOM website http://www.socom.mil/components/components.htm, accessed March 19, 2008.
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headquartered at Pope Air Force Base, NC, is widely believed to command and control what are
described as the military’s three special missions units—the Army’s Delta Force, the Navy’s
SEAL Team Six, a joint unit allegedly designed to conduct clandestine operations, as well as the
75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the Air Force’s 24th
Special Tactics Squadron.13 JSOC’s primary mission is believed to be identifying and destroying
terrorists and terror cells worldwide.
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Reports maintain that in July 2008, President Bush secretly approved authorization for U.S. SOF
to carry out ground raids inside Pakistan without prior approval of the Pakistani government. On
September 3, 2008, more than two dozen SEALs were said to have conducted a raid near Angor
Adda in the South Waziristan Tribal Area, killing about two dozen insurgents suspected of having
conducted cross-border attacks against an American forward operating base in Afghanistan. This
was not believed to be the first such raid, with the SEALs and other JSOC forces having
conducted “two or three” similar raids in the past. Severe Pakistani political reaction to the
September 3 raid, in particular the threat to cut coalition supply lines transiting Pakistan, has
supposedly resulted in the decision to suspend future unapproved U.S. SOF raids into Pakistan.
On October 26, 2008, U.S. SOF, supported by helicopters, reportedly conducted a small cross-
border raid near the town of Abu Kamal, five miles inside the Syrian border. Both the Pakistan
and Syria raids were said to a result of those nation’s unwillingness to prevent cross-border
attacks against U.S. and allied forces, but critics of these operations contend that they are of
limited tactical benefit and only serve to further complicate already tenuous diplomatic efforts
with those nations and incite local civilians. In the case of Pakistan, where U.S. SOF is said to be
training Pakistani Frontier Corps paramilitary personnel,15 these raids could result in the
suspension of these activities, which are viewed by many as a long-term solution to deal with
Taliban and Al Queda forces operating in the border region.
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As mandated by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) SOF continues to expand. In
FY2009, USSOCOM hopes to grow by 1,536 military and civilian positions.17 By the end of
FY2009, USSOCOM hopes to grow to 55,890 civilian and military personnel, of which 43,745
will be active duty military, 4,310 Guard, 2,560 Reserves, and 5,275 government civilians. These
increases roughly translate into adding five additional Special Forces battalions, four additional
Ranger companies, 300 additional SEALs, 2,500 Marine Special Operations Forces, and
13 Sean D. Naylor, “JSOC to Become Three-Star Command,” Army Times, February 13, 2006.
14 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids In Pakistan,” New York Times,
September 11, 2008; Sean D. Naylor, “Spec Ops Raids Into Pakistan Halted,” Army Times, September 29, 2008; Sean
D. Naylor, “U.S. Stops Spec Ops Raids Into Pakistani Tribal Areas,” Army Times, October 6, 2008; and Albert Ali,
“Special Forces Launch Rare Attack Inside Syria,” Army Times, October 26, 2008.
15 Stephen Graham, “Elite GIs Training Pakistani Forces to Fight Taliban,” Arizona Republic, October 25, 2008.
16 Ibid.
17 USSOCOM FY2009 Budget Highlights, February 2008, p. 5.
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additional special operations aviators. This expansion is intended to relieve the global shortfall of
U.S. SOF, as about 80% of SOF are deployed to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
area of operations, which has resulted in a shortage of SOF in other regions.18 Another concern
impacting SOF expansion is that DOD reports that a “full one third of Special Forces soldiers are
eligible to retire.”19 The emphasis on USCENTCOM has resulted in a dilution of skill levels for
some SOF members who under normal circumstances could be assigned to other areas of the
world where they would be using and refining different languages, cultural skills, and operational
tactics. In addition, the high concentration of U.S. SOF in the USCENTCOM region has hindered
USSOCOM efforts to establish what it describes as a “global network of persistent presence
rather than an episodic presence.”
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One report suggests that while SOF expansion is proceeding as planned, equipment shortages
may have an operational impact on USSOCOM forces. One crucial shortage area is airlift—both
rotary and fixed wing. Analysts maintain that the SOF helicopter fleet has not increased in
proportion with the expansion of SOF units. As a result, SOF units in Iraq have relied heavily on
conventional Army aviation, which is said to provide two-thirds of SOF’s lift requirements. This
deficit could worsen as SOF takes on more missions world-wide and also if there is a significant
reduction of Army aviation in Iraq as there is not expected to be a corresponding SOF draw down.
Observers also note that SOF requires additional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. Portable radios and even small arms
are also reported equipment shortfalls for special operations units. A contributing factor is said to
be USSOCOM’s acquisition emphasis, which has focused instead on “big-ticket programs” such
as the SEAL delivery vehicle and large air platforms at the expense of smaller items of
equipment.
A related difficulty is a lack of SOF logistics capability and units needed to repair equipment and
sustain SOF operations. SOF support units have been characterized as not being “robust”
enough—lacking human intelligence analysts, cooks, mechanics, and other support specialists.
Because of these shortages, conventional Army units have been providing much of SOF’s
logistical support in Iraq, including running dining facilities, refueling vehicles, flying medical
evacuations, and guarding SOF bases. The concern is that in the case of Iraq, if there is a
significant draw down of conventional forces as anticipated, SOF operations might become
significantly constrained due to lack of organic logistical capabilities. The lack of SOF aviation,
intelligence, and logistics support is said to be a factor impacting a possible “surge” of SOF to
Afghanistan to target insurgents.21
18 Information in this section is from William H. McMichael, “Some Spec Ops Skills Being Lost, Official Says,” Army
Times, June 23, 2008.
19 Donna Miles, “Gates Gets Update on Army Special Ops Capabilities, Challenges,” Armed Forces Press Service,
October 24, 2008.
20 Grace V. Jean, “Equipment Shortages Undercut U.S. Special Operations Forces,” National Defense Magazine,
February 2009.
21 Peter Spiegel. “U.S. Considers Sending Special Ops to Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, October 26, 2008.
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Irregular Warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric
approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to
erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. DOD’s December 2008 directive on IW directs
the ASD/ SOLIC&IC to “serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for
IW and provide overall policy oversight within DOD.” Commander, USSOCOM was tasked to
assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by “coordinating the development of those aspects
of SOF doctrine relevant to IW.” USSOCOM was also directed to “lead the development of SOF-
IW-relevant training and education standards for units and individuals.” In addition, USSOCOM
was tasked to “develop SOF capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain
environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low-
visibility operations.”
With this emphasis on IW, some senior DOD officials have suggested that general-purpose forces
need to become “more SOF-like”in terms of responsiveness and the ability to adapt.23 DOD’s
ongoing Roles and Missions review reportedly will attempt to establish “the right division of
responsibilities for special operations troops and general-purpose forces across the spectrum of
irregular warfare, including for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense.”24 Within this
context, it is possible that general-purpose forces might be assigned a greater share of foreign
internal defense and training, advisory, and assistance missions, which have traditionally fallen to
SOF units. This shift in mission could have a number of operational implications for U.S. SOF
units.
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While SOF non-permissive raids into Pakistan and other countries are well within its capabilities,
such operations may not be in its best self-interest. These raids may in fact kill insurgents and
their leaders, disrupt their operations, and send the message that there is no sanctuary for them but
such raids might also make it more difficult for SOF to conduct “indirect operations.” SOF
indirect operations, such as training foreign militaries—like Pakistan’s Frontier Corps—have
proven successful in the Philippines and in Colombia, but are very dependent on “strong, long-
term ties to foreign militaries”25 and the host nation’s government. Given Pakistan’s reaction to
the September 2008 unsanctioned raid into South Waziristan, U.S. leaders may wish to consider
that further efforts could imperil long-term indirect SOF efforts to train Pakistani forces to assist
22 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is from DOD Directive Number 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare
(IW),” December 1, 2008.
23 Goeff Fein, “OEF, OIF Demonstrating U.S. Forces Will Need to be More SOF-Like,” InsideDefense.com, June 11,
2008.
24 Christopher J. Castelli “Pentagon Must Fix Shortfalls in Key Irregular Warfare Missions,” InsideDefense.com, May
22, 2008.
25 Peter Spiegel, “Indirect Approach is Favored in the War on Terror,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2008.
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in defeating insurgents in the tribal and border regions—a key operational requirement for
stability in Afghanistan.
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Reports of equipment and logistical shortages might merit further investigation. Given the fact
that USSOCOM’s budget has more than doubled since 2001, the issue is not likely a lack of funds
but instead an overemphasis on larger procurement items and expanding SOF “operators” at the
expense of soldier-specific items such as weapons and radios and the development of organic
logistics assets. Such an imbalance could result in the inability to fully equip newly manned SOF
units as well as employ them in operations. SOF’s reported dependency on significant support
from the conventional Army might make it extremely difficult for them to take on a greater role
in Iraq as conventional forces are redeployed or to “surge” in Afghanistan to support an
anticipated increased U.S. commitment.
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A shift in national defense strategy to IW could have a number of implications for U.S. SOF. One
is that more foreign internal defense and training, advisory, and assistance missions could be
transferred to general-purpose forces, which could potentially free up SOF units, that normally
would be assigned these missions, for other operations. The call for general-purpose forces to
become more “SOF-like” might facilitate IW operations and remove some of the operational
burden from SOF, but in order to achieve this “transformation” of general-purpose forces, SOF
resources and personnel would likely be dedicated to this effort, which could preclude their
availability for operational missions.
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Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
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