Order Code RS21968
Updated January 14, 2008
Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The current government is the product of a U.S.-supported election process
designed to produce a democracy, although many now believe it produced a sectarian
government incapable of reconciling Iraq’s communities. This sentiment has grown to
the point where some believe that the United States should seek a decentralized Iraq
with substantial autonomy for each community. The Administration says that, partly as
a result of the 2007 U.S. “troop surge,” it is seeing some political accommodation, most
notably at local levels. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005
After about one year of formal occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to
an appointed Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. A government and a constitution were
voted on thereafter, in line with a March 8, 2004, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
The first election (January 30, 2005) was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly,
provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad), and
a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation (closed list) — voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition
of parties, or individuals). A female candidate occupied every third position on electoral
lists in order to ensure 25% female membership. A total of 111 entities were on the
national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions.
In all 2005 votes, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders were closed, and polling
centers were guarded primarily by Iraq’s security forces (ISF), with U.S. forces as backup.
Violence did not disrupt voting. As shown in the table at the end of this paper, the
January election was dominated by the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA),
consisting mainly of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
which in May 2007changed its named to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and
the Da’wa Party, as well as the Kurds, and a few secular parties. The two main Kurdish
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint list. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving

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electoral defeat, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats and very few provincial council
seats. Sunnis won only one seat on Baghdad province’s 51-seat council. The factions
formed an interim national government that U.S. officials said was not sufficiently
inclusive of Sunnis, although it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, deputy president, deputy
prime minister, defense minister, and five other ministers. The presidency went to PUK
leader Jalal Talabani and Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.
Permanent Constitution and Referendum. The elected Assembly was to
draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005,
subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10,
2005, the Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee which included only two
Sunni Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, although 15 Sunnis were later added as
committee members (and 10 more as advisors). On August 28, the talks produced a draft
that set a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk will join
the Kurdish region (Article 140); designated Islam “a main source” of legislation and said
no law can contradict the “established” provisions of Islam (Article 2);1 set a 25%
electoral goal for women (Article 47); allowed families to choose which courts to use for
family issues such as divorce and inheritance (Article 41); made only primary education
mandatory (Article 34); and said that the federal supreme court would include Islamic law
experts and civil law judges and experts (Article 89). These provisions concerned many
women who fear that too much discretion was given to males of their families, and many
women say the provision is being misused by Islamic extremists in southern Iraq and
elsewhere to impose, including through killings, restrictions against women.
The major disputes were — and continue to be — centered on the draft’s allowing
two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions” and to allocate oil
revenues. Article 117 allowed each “region” to organize internal security forces, which
would legitimize the fielding of militias, including the Kurds’ peshmerga (allowed by the
TAL). Article 109 required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from
“current fields” in proportion to population, and gave “regions” a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Sunnis opposed the draft on these grounds; Sunni-
dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits, although some oil fields might lie
in Anbar Province. Article 62 established a “Federation Council,” a second chamber
with its size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (not passed to date).
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat it, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11) providing for
a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election
government took office (Article 137). The amendments would require a majority
Assembly vote of approval and, within another two months, would be put to a referendum
under the same rules as the October 15 referendum. However, in the referendum, the
Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.
Mostly Sunni Nineveh province voted 55% “no,” which meant that the constitution was
adopted (only two provinces, not three, voted “no” by a two-thirds majority).
December 15, 2005 Elections. In the December 15, 2005, elections for a four
year government, a formula was adopted to attract Sunni participation; each province
1 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html].

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contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR).
Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats
for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole
nation. 361 political “entities” registered, of which 19 were multi-party coalition slates.
The UIA slate formally included Sadr’s faction as well as other hard line Shiite parties
including Fadilah (Virtue). The major Sunni slate was a three-party “Iraq Consensus
Front” led by the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP), which had entered but then withdrew from the
January elections. Another major Sunni faction (Saleh al-Mutlak’s National Iraqi
Dialogue Front) ran separately. The hardline Muslim Scholars Association (MSA) did
not participate, although it did not, as it had in January, call for a Sunni boycott. Violence
was minor because Sunni insurgents, supporting greater Sunni inclusion, facilitated
voting. Still, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, not idea platforms, and
the UIA and the Kurds dominated the new COR, with nearly two-thirds of seats.
The COR was inaugurated on March 16, and was quickly engulfed in wrangling over
positions. Kurdish and other opposition caused the UIA to agree to Jafari’s Da’wa deputy,
Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to
continue as president, and selected his two deputies — ISCI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(incumbent) and Consensus Front/IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi. Another Front figure, the
hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), was chosen COR
speaker. Maliki won COR majority vote approval of a 37-member cabinet (including
himself and two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense,
Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 8 because of
infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; 19 Shiites; and 1 Christian.
Four are women.
Iraqi Performance on Benchmarks
In August 2006, the Administration and the Iraqi government agreed on a series of
“benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, would presumably achieve reconciliation
among the major communities. Under Section 1314 of the FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on eighteen political and security-related
benchmarks — as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15 and September 15
— is required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds
(ESF) to the Iraqi government. The president has indicated intent to use the waiver
provision to provide the aid. The law mandated a separate assessment by the GAO, by
September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been actually achieved,
as well as an assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by an outside commission
(headed by ret. Gen James Jones). Results of these assessments, as well as subsequent
actions, are shown in the chart below, but most experts seem to agree that there has not,
since the major mandated reports have been issued, been substantial movement toward
national political reconciliation. That assessment might change if the January 12, 2008,
de-Baathification law is implemented to better integrate disillusioned Sunnis into
government. Administration officials say that there is Sunni-Shiite “accommodation”
at the national level and some reconciliation at the local level. (The July and September
2007 benchmark reports are at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/],
[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071222t.pdf], and [http://media.csis.org/isf.pdf]. More
extensive analysis is in CRS Report RL31339.)

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Table 1. Assessments of the Benchmarks
Benchmark
July 12
GAO
Sept. 14 Administration
Administratio
Report
Report
Subsequent Actions
n Report
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee and
satisfactory
unmet
satisfactory
no progress
completing review
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
unsatisfactory
unmet
satisfactory
All 30 clauses of “Justice and Accountability Law” passed
Baathification
Jan. 12 unanimously by 143 in COR present. Effect on
overall reconciliation depends on implementation.
Allows about 30,000 lower ranking ex-Baathists to regain
their jobs; 3,500 Baathists (top three party ranks) would
not, but would receive pensions instead. Some Sunnis
believe new law will lead to judicial prosecution of all ex-
Baathists and to firing of about 7,000 ex-Baathists in post-
Saddam security services. Bars ex-Saddam security
personnel from regaining jobs.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
no passage, but revenue being distributed equitably
equitable distribution of resources
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semi-
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
Awaits implementation in April 2008
autonomous regions
met
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish
satisfactory on
overall
satisfactory on (a) and (c).
No passage of provincial powers law, but provincial
a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial
(a) and
unmet; (a)
governors pressing for passage.
elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of
unsatisfactory
met
provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial
on the others
elections
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
conditions do
unmet
conditions do not allow a
No amnesty law passed, but gov. announced Nov. 11
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
not allow a
rating
amnesty plan for some former insurgents. January 1,
rating
2008, cabinet submitted to COR draft law to amnesty
5,000 “non-terrorist” detainees held by Iraq, would not
affect 25,000 detainees held by U.S.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
conditions do
unmet
conditions do not allow
No progress; Sunni “militias” forming in cooperation
disarmament
not allow
rating
with U.S. forces
rating

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Benchmark
July 12
GAO
Sept. 14 Administration
Administratio
Report
Report
Subsequent Actions
n Report
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
satisfactory
met
met
No change
services committee to support U.S. Baghdad
“surge”
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
No change
support U.S. surge
met
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to
unsatisfactory
unmet
Mixed: satisfactory to pursue
No significant change.
make decisions, without political intervention, to
extremists, but political
pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
interference continues
Shiite militias
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing
unsatisfactory
unmet
overall mixed. Satisfactory
No significant change.
even-handed enforcement of law
on Iraqi military,
unsatisfactory on police
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
No change. Mahdi Army at reduced level of activity
provide a safe haven for any outlaw, regardless of
met
due to Sadr six month suspension and reported decline
sectarian affiliation
in Iranian weapons shipments
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Overall mixed.
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence continues to drop, but militias still
eliminating militia control of local security
Satisfactory on
operating. 70,000 Sunni “Concerned Local Citizens”
(a) but
fighting Al Qaeda, but still distrusted by Maliki
unsatisfactory
government as potential Sunni militia force. Only 15%
on (b)
have been allowed to join ISF.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
No change
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
Continuing but slow progress training ISF
independently
16. Ensuring protection of rights of minority parties
satisfactory
met
satisfactory
No change
in Iraqi parliament
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion for
satisfactory
partially
satisfactory
Additional $9 billion in yet-to-be passed 2008 Iraqi
reconstruction projects, on an equitable basis
met
budget
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities are not
unsatisfactory
unmet
unsatisfactory
No change
undermining or making false accusations against
ISF members

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Further Reconciliation Efforts. Amid press reports that U.S. efforts to
achieve reconciliation have been scaled back to passage of an Iraqi 2008 budget, renewal
of the U.N. mandate for U.S. forces (accomplished December 18, 2007), and passage of
a De-Baathification reform law (accomplished January 12, 2008) some question whether
a strong, cohesive central government can ever be established. Although U.S. support for
decentralizing Iraq into autonomous regions (expressed in a Senate amendment to H.R.
1585, FY2008 defense authorization act in September 2007) appears to be increasing,
Maliki is now widely assessed as having stabilized politically, helped by a decrease in
violence attributed to the U.S. “troop surge.” Deputy President Hashimi continues to
promote reconciliation, signing on to an August 26, 2007, “Unity Accord” — along with
Maliki, Talabani, deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi (ISCI) and Kurdish regional
president Masoud Barzani — to try to pass the de-Baathification law, hold early
provincial council elections, and release (mostly Sunni) detainees. All blocs, including
the Consensus Front, have ended their 2007 boycotts of the COR. Still, the number of
vacant cabinet posts is at least 12 out of 37 positions, reflecting the April 2007 withdrawal
of the Sadr faction, the Consensus Front, and the Allawi bloc from the cabinet. Maliki
filled two vacancies (agriculture and health ministers) in October 2007 with independent
Shiites, replacing resigned Sadrists, but failed in November 2007 to win COR
confirmation for new ministers of justice or communications. A relatively positive
development came in December 2007 with agreement by the Kurds to delay the
contentious, constitutionally mandated referendum on Kirkuk until June 2008; it was to
be held by December 31. On the other hand, 120 parliamentarians from Sadr’s faction,
Allawi’s faction, and part of the Da’wa Party members signed a statement on January 13,
2008, opposing Kurdish takeover of Kikuk and energy deals signed by the Kurds.
Table 2. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Slate/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
UIA (Shiite Islamist). Now 84 seats. ISCI- 29; Da’wa (two factions) - 25;
140
128
independents - 30. Sadr ( 29 seats) and Fadilah (15 seats) left bloc in 2007.
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP).
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote
40
25
(2 members left the bloc in September 2007, leaving it with 23 seats)
Iraq Consensus Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote
—
44
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote
—
11
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote
—
0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote
5
—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2
—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1
—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)
—
1
Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66%
(10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

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