Order Code RL33498
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Updated January 11, 2008
K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Summary
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests.
U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan
stability; democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem
and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan
relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by
the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment
of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials
regularly praise Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although doubts exist about
Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base
for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s army has conducted unprecedented and largely ineffectual
counterterrorism operations in the country’s western tribal areas, where Al Qaeda
operatives and their allies are believed to enjoy “safehavens.”

A separatist insurgency in the divided Kashmir region has been underway since
1989. India has long blamed Pakistan for the infiltration of Islamic militants into its
Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state, a charge Islamabad denies. The United
States and India have received pledges from Islamabad that all “cross-border
terrorism” would cease and that any terrorist facilities in Pakistani-controlled areas
would be closed. The United States strongly encourages maintenance of a bilateral
cease-fire and continued, substantive dialogue between Pakistan and India, which
have fought three wars since 1947. A perceived Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has
been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Attention to this issue
intensified following nuclear tests by both countries in 1998. More recently, the
United States has been troubled by evidence of the transfer of Pakistani nuclear
technologies and materials to third parties, including North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
Such evidence became stark in 2004.
Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators have turned positive since 2001, with
some meaningful poverty reduction seen in this still poor country. President Bush
seeks to expand U.S.-Pakistan trade and investment relations. Democracy has fared
poorly in Pakistan; the country has endured direct military rule for more than half of
its existence. In 1999, the elected government was ousted in a coup led by then-
Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf, who later assumed the title of president.
Supreme Court-ordered elections seated a new civilian government in 2002, but it
remained weak, and Musharraf retained the position as army chief until his
November 2007 retirement. The United States urges restoration of civilian rule,
expecting Pakistan’s planned February 2008 elections to be free, fair, and transparent.
Such expectations became sharper after Musharraf’s November 2007 suspension of
the Constitution and imposition of emergency rule, and the December 2007
assassination of former Prime Minister and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto.
Congress has annually granted presidential authority to waive coup-related aid
sanctions. Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid, obtaining
more than $4 billion in direct, overt assistance since 2001, including about $1.7
billion in security-related aid. Pakistan also has received some $5.7 billion in
reimbursements for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts.

Contents
Key Current Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political Crises, State of Emergency, and Bhutto’s Assassination . . . . . . . . 2
Benazir Bhutto Assassinated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
State of Emergency Imposed, Then Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
National Election Calendar and Credibility Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Increasing Islamist Militancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Al Qaeda in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . 14
Setting and Regional Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Historical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S.-Pakistan Diplomatic Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Political Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Regional Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Pakistan-India Rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The “IPI” Pipeline Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The China Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Al Qaeda’s Resurgence in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Infiltration Into Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Infiltration into Kashmir and India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Domestic Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Other Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Pakistan-India Tensions and the Kashmir Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Baluchistan Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Islamization, Anti-American Sentiment, and Madrassas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Democratization and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Democracy and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Human Rights Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Economic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Trade and Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
U.S. Aid and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Coup-Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Proliferation-Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
9/11 Commission Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . 69

List of Figures
Pakistan in Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 1. Map of Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
List of Tables
Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Assistance and Military Reimbursements to
Pakistan, FY2001-FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Pakistan-U.S. Relations
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist
militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Current top-tier U.S. concerns
regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; and
domestic political stability and democratization. Pakistan remains a vital U.S. ally
in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. Yet the outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan
since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have seen a failure to
neutralize anti-Western militants and reduce religious extremism in that country, a
failure to contribute sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan, and
a failure to secure civilian governance and rule of law in Islamabad. Many observers
thus urge a broad re-evaluation of such policies.
A months-old political crisis and a November emergency proclamation severely
undermined the status of the military-dominated government of President Pervez
Musharraf, who resigned his position as Chief of Army Staff in November. A surge
in domestic Islamist militancy following the July denouement of a standoff involving
Islamabad’s Red Mosque complex has contributed to this dynamic. The December
assassination of former Prime Minster and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto,
who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October, plunged Pakistan
and the Musharraf government into further uncertainty. Many observers fear that
further spikes in violence could lead to another postponement of already-overdue
parliamentary elections, with some more cynical analysts (and opposition political
activists) believing Musharraf and his ruling party will seek such delays to preserve
their own power. Developments in Pakistan in 2007 have led many Washington-
based critics — both governmental and independent — to more forcefully question
the Bush Administration’s ongoing and largely uncritical support for President
Musharraf.
Moreover, there are indications that anti-American sentiments are widespread
in Pakistan, and that a significant segment of the populace views U.S. support for the
Musharraf government as being an impediment to, rather than facilitator of, the
process of democratization there. The Bush Administration continues to proclaim
its ongoing and strong support for Musharraf.1 However, in late 2007 the
Administration has shown signs of a shift in its long-standing policies toward
Pakistan, in particular on the issues of democratization and on Islamabad’s
counterterrorism policies in western tribal areas. Congress reportedly is considering
1 In a November 20, 2007, interview, President Bush offered strong support for President
Musharraf, saying Musharraf “hasn’t crossed the line” and “truly is somebody who believes
in democracy.” Some independent analysts, along with Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Senator Joe Biden, expressed incredulity at President Bush’s continuing personal
investment in the Pakistani leader (“Bush Gives Stronger Backing to Musharraf,”
W a s h i n g t o n P o s t , N o v e m b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 ; i n t e r vi e w t r a n s c r i p t a t
[http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Vote2008/story?id=3891196]).

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making adjustments to U.S. aid programs for Pakistan, including the possible
institution of new conditions on assistance and/or on major arms sales to Pakistan.
Key Current Issues
Political Crises, State of Emergency, and Bhutto’s
Assassination2

The year 2007 has seen Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political
crises culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minster and
leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-
imposed exile in October. Bhutto’s killing in an apparent gun and bomb attack (the
circumstances remain controversial) has been called a national tragedy for Pakistan
and did immense damage to already troubled efforts to democratize the country.
Bhutto was “chairperson for life” of what arguably is Pakistan’s most popular party,
the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which won the most total votes in the 2002
national election. In fact, Bhutto’s death appears to leave the United States even more
dependent on an increasingly embattled Musharraf as the only major pro-U.S. leader
in Pakistan.3 The assassination came just 12 days after Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf had lifted a six-week-old emergency order. The PPP named her young
son, Bilawal, and her husband, Asif Zardari, to succeed her as party leaders. Bhutto’s
long-time party deputy, Makhdoom Amin Fahim, is expected to be the put forward
as the PPP’s prime ministerial candidate. Following Bhutto’s death, President
Musharraf proclaimed in a nationally televised speech that Bhutto’s mission — “to
promote democracy and struggle against terrorism” — remains his mission, as well.4
Pakistan’s current political crisis is its worst since an October 1999 military
coup, when then-Army Chief General Musharraf overthrew the democratically-
elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The country now suffers from
considerable political uncertainty as the tenuous governance structure put in place by
Musharraf has come under strain. Popular opposition to military rule had been
growing steadily in Pakistan, especially following a series of political crises in 2007:
a bungled attempt by Musharraf to dismiss the country’s Chief Justice; Supreme
Court rulings which damaged Musharraf’s standing and credibility; constitutional
questions about the legality of Musharraf’s status as president; a return to Pakistan’s
political stage by two former Prime Ministers with considerable public support; and
the pressures of impending parliamentary elections. The catastrophic December
removal of Benazir Bhutto from Pakistan’s political equation dealt a serious blow
both to the cause of Pakistani democratization and to U.S. interests. Moreover, a
worsening security situation and increase in violent Islamist extremism is
contributing to even greater political instability.
2 See also CRS Report RL34240, Pakistan’s Political Crises.
3 “U.S. Strives to Keep Footing in Tangled Pakistan Situation,” Washington Post, December
30, 2007.
4 “President Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” January 2, 2008, at
[http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/SpeechAddressList.aspx].

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Many among the Pakistani public appear increasingly put off by a seemingly
arbitrary electoral process that preserves the power of a corrupt elite that
demonstrates little meaningful concern with the problems of ordinary citizens.
Moreover, there has been an accompanying and widespread dismay among Pakistanis
at the appearance of unabashed U.S. interference in their political system,
interference that from their perspective serves only to perpetuate the corruption.5
Musharraf’s “second coup” seemed to many observers a desperate power grab by a
badly discredited military ruler. One international human rights group issued a report
which argues that Musharraf’s central goal in declaring an emergency was to remove
the threat to his continued rule represented by the country’s judiciary. It criticized
the U.S. and other Western governments for “propping up” Musharraf with military
and financial assistance.6 There are fears that the move could, in fact, further
destabilize Pakistan and embolden Islamist militants, while further alienating
Pakistani civil society.
In December there was a sense among some in the U.S. government that
Pakistan was getting back on a path of democratization and stability, especially after
the December 15 lifting of the emergency.7 Such cautious optimism was swept away
by the Bhutto assassination.
Foreign Policy magazine offered a November 2007 exchange between two
senior Pakistan experts which captures the main arguments of those who believe the
United States must continue to support President Musharraf’s flawed leadership in
Islamabad so as to maintain “continuity in the face of political instability” there, and
those believe Musharraf has become a liability, one whose rejection by the United
States would signal to the Pakistani military that it must “start negotiating with the
country’s political parties and civil society instead of dictating to them.”8 This debate
has continued with even more vigor following Bhutto’s death.
Benazir Bhutto Assassinated. On December 27, former Prime Minister
and key opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in a gun and suicide bomb
attack following a political rally in the city of Rawalpindi. President Bush and the
State Department offered deep sympathy and sincere condolences, strongly
condemning the “cowardly” attack. The killing elicited widespread condemnation
from around the world. The next day, Bhutto’s body was interred in her ancestral
village in Sindh as the Pakistani government ordered a nearly total shutdown of
services in anticipation of spreading violence. Bhutto’s killing led to country-wide
rioting. Some 60 people were killed and the caretaker government called the damage
from ensuing violence “colossal,” saying “manufacturing, revenue, exports have all
5 “Pakistanis Crave Fresh Faces in Politics,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2007;
“Pakistanis Growing Frustrated With U.S.,” Washington Post, November 16, 2007.
6 Human Rights Watch, “Destroying Legality,” December 2007.
7 “US Breathes Easier Over Pakistan For Now,” Agence France Presse, December 6, 2007;
“US Recovers at Least Some Faith in Musharraf,” Agence France Presse, December 23,
2007.
8 See the exchange between Daniel Markey and Husain Haqqani at
[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4052].

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suffered badly.” Property damage and other losses have been estimated at more than
$1 billion. Whether deserving or not, Musharraf himself took the brunt of the blame
for ensuing instability.9 Bhutto’s killing also brought renewed attention to the ever-
present, if unlikely, danger that Pakistan could fracture along ethno-provincial lines,
especially with the widespread manifestation of anti-Punjabi sentiments among the
country’s Sindhis.10
The circumstances of Bhutto’s death remain controversial. Early reports about
the cause were conflicting: a government official claimed that neither bullets nor
shrapnel caused her death and that she was killed after her head hit a latch on the
vehicle’s sunroof. A more senior official later withdrew the claim, but the
government has continued to maintain that gunshots played no role. Emergency
room doctors who tried to revive Bhutto may have been pressured to conform to the
government’s accounts and later sought to distance themselves from such accounts,
calling for an autopsy.11 Video and photographs of the event appear to show a
gunman firing three shots at Bhutto from close range, closely followed by an
explosion which left more than 20 bystanders dead. In a blow to subsequent
investigations, city fire trucks used high-pressure hoses to clear the crime scene of
debris, likely destroying what could be vital forensic evidence.
Many observers have criticized the Musharraf government for providing
insufficient security for Bhutto. President Musharraf adamantly rejects suggestions
that he or any members of his government were complicit, claiming the security
provided to Bhutto was sufficient and that she had acted recklessly in the face of
known dangers.12 Yet with Pakistanis widely skeptical of their government’s
capacity and intention in launching a probe — and many holding the government
directly or indirectly responsible for Bhutto’s death — demands soon arose for an
international investigation into the assassination. Some called for a U.N. probe
modeled on that which investigated the 2005 assassination of Lebanon’s Prime
Minister; Bhutto’s widower and other PPP officials insist on this course. The
Islamabad government denied any need for U.N. involvement, a sentiment echoed
by Washington. In the absence of Security Council action or a Pakistan government
request, there are no signs that the U.N. will become involved. However, under
international diplomatic pressure, Musharraf agreed to consider foreign assistance in
the investigation and allowed a team from Britain’s Scotland Yard to take a
supporting role in the investigation. The U.S. government welcomed Musharraf’s
9 “Pakistan Suffers ‘Colossal’ Damage in Violence,” Reuters, December 31, 2007;
“Pakistani Blame Musharraf for Turmoil,” Associated Press, December 29, 2007; “Growing
Fury at Musharraf Deepens Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2007.
10 “Strains Intensify in Pakistan’s Ethnic Patchwork,” Washington Post, January 7, 2008;
“Bhutto Killing Roils Province, Spurring Calls to Quit Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal,
January 8, 2008.
11 “New Questions Arise in Killing of Ex-Premier,” New York Times, December 30, 2007.
12 “Musharraf Says Bhutto Took Excessive Risks,” New York Times, January 3, 2008.
Musharraf, in comments viewed as unseemly and unnecessary by some, told an American
television interviewer that, by lifting herself up and emerging from her vehicle’s sunroof,
Bhutto “alone” was to blame for her own killing (“Musharraf: Bhutto Knew of Risks”
(interview), CBS News, January 6, 2008).

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decision as a positive step and stands ready to provide its own assistance should
Pakistan request it.
Pakistani government officials quickly blamed pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda-linked
militant Baitullah Mehsud for Bhutto’s killing, claiming they had intercepted a
telephone conversation in which Mehsud took credit for the act. Through a
spokesman, Mehsud has denied any involvement in the killing. The U.S. government
has not taken a position on the identity of Bhutto’s killers, with some officials saying
Islamabad was too abrupt in blaming Mehsud. Still, some increasingly appear
confident that Mehsud was, in fact, complicit.13 Along with Al Qaeda itself, a
number of religious extremist groups indigenous to Pakistan are seen to have had a
motive for assassinating Bhutto and the means to do so. These include banned
terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, as well as Sunni
extremists in Lashkar-e-Jhangvi or Sipah-e-Sahaba (Bhutto had Shiite ancestry).
Conspiracy theories became rampant in Pakistan, with many versions implicating
government agencies as complicit.14
State of Emergency Imposed, Then Lifted. On November 3, 2007,
President Musharraf suspended the country’s constitution and assumed emergency
powers under a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) in his role as both president
and army chief. Musharraf justified the constitution’s suspension as necessary due
to the country’s rapidly deteriorating security circumstances and to the allegedly
negative role being played by the country’s judiciary. The ensuing PCO required,
inter alia, that the country’s judiciary take a new oath of office, and it barred the
judiciary from making any orders against the PCO or from taking any action against
the President, the Prime Minister, or anyone acting under their authority. It also
suspended a number of “Fundamental Rights” listed in Chapter One of the Pakistani
Constitution. These include freedom from unlawful arrest and detention, and
freedoms of movement, assembly, association, and speech.15 Seven Supreme Court
justices, including the Chief Justice, and scores of High Court judges refused to take
a new oath of office under the PCO and were summarily dismissed. The court has
since been reconstituted with justices appointed by Musharraf himself.
News of the emergency decree and PCO elicited immediate criticism from
Washington: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called the move a “highly
regrettable” step backward. In his first public comments on the issue, President
George W. Bush on November 5 said the United States expects elections in Pakistan
as soon as possible and that Musharraf should resign his military post. Two days
later, President Bush telephoned Musharraf for a “very frank discussion” on U.S.
desires that the Pakistani leader resign from the military and hold elections.
13 “U.S. Isn’t Ready to Accept Pakistan’s Initial Findings,” New York Times, January 2,
2008; “U.S.-Pakistan Divide Over Bhutto’s Death Widens,” Wall Street Journal, January
5, 2008.
14 See”Bhutto’s Long and Tangled List of Enemies,” Los Angeles Times, December 28,
2007; “Conspiracy Theories Thrive in Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2008.
15 Proclamation text at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Nov/emergency.htm];
PCO text at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Nov/order.htm]; Pakistani
Constitution at [http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/].

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Islamabad characterized President Bush as showing understanding of the “difficult
circumstances” being faced by Musharraf and of the Pakistani leader’s commitment
to “full democracy and civilian rule.”16 Several bills condemning the emergency
declaration were introduced in Congress (S.Res. 372, H.Res. 810, and H.Res. 823),
but none has moved out of committee to date.
The emergency declaration triggered an immediate and harsh crackdown on
Pakistan’s independent media outlets and wholesale arrests of opposition political
activists. Numerous private television and radio stations were blacked out in the
wake of Musharraf’s televised announcement and a new government order banned
any media reports that “defame or bring ridicule” to the government or military.
Moreover, several thousand opposition figures, human rights activists, and lawyers
were rounded up and detained in the days following the emergency proclamation.17
The U.S. government expressed “grave concern” at the crackdown, calling such
“extreme and unreasonable measures” contradictory to the goal of a fully democratic
Pakistan.18 Musharraf later had Pakistan’s 1952 Army Act amended to allow for
military trials of civilians, chilling human rights groups and potentially providing a
retroactive sanctioning of “disappearances” traced to the country’s security services
and criticized by the Supreme Court.19
On December 15, President Musharraf lifted the state of emergency in what he
claimed was a “complete restoration of the constitution.” In a speech to the Pakistani
nation, he again asserted that the emergency was declared as a last resort — “against
my own will” — in order to defeat a “conspiracy” to “derail the democratic process.”
Musharraf also took credit for laying “the foundation of real democracy.”20 Skeptics
identified little evidence that the lifting of the emergency would lead to meaningful
change, given what they see as repressive media curbs and a stacked judiciary.
Indications are that the Musharraf government has continued to clamp down on the
country’s media. One Pakistani analyst called Musharraf’s move a “public relations
exercise.”21 Human Rights Watch echoed the sentiments of many in calling the
“restoration of the constitution” a “sham” that would do little to restore genuine rule
1 6 S e e [ h t t p : / / w w w . s t a t e . g o v / s e c r e t a r y / r m / 2 0 0 7 / 1 1 / 9 4 5 8 6 . h t m ] ;
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071105-3.html]; “Bush Speaks to
M u s h a r r a f , U r g e s E l e c t i o n s , ” R e u t e r s , N o v e m b e r 7 , 2 0 0 7 ;
[http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Nov/PR_273_07.htm].
17 On November 6, 33 U.S. Senators signed a letter to President Musharraf urging him to
immediately release leading Pakistani lawyer and opposition political figure Aitzaz Ahsan
from prison. Ahsan subsequently was released, but remains under house arrest.
18 U.S. Embassy statement at [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h07110401.html].
19 “Pakistan: Rescind Decree Allowing Military Trials of Civilians,” Human Rights Watch
Press Release, November 14, 2007.
20 “Text of Pakistan President’s Speech on Lifting Emergency,” BBC Monitoring South Asia,
December 16, 2007.
21 “For Now, Musharraf Has Muzzled Legal Critics in Pakistan,” New York Times, January
5, 2008; “Pakistan’s Government Threatens Media,” Associated Press, December 19, 2007;
analyst quoted in “Analysts Doubt Change After Pakistan Emergency Ends,” Agence France
Presse
, December 13, 2007.

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of law unless “arbitrary” laws and amendments made after November 3 were
withdrawn.22 On the day before his action, Musharraf, acting under the PCO, issued
several decrees and made amendments the Pakistani Constitution, some of which
would ensure that his actions under emergency rule would not be challenged in court.
Background to the Emergency: Judicial Crisis. A judicial crisis began
with President Musharraf’s March 2007 dismissal of the country’s Chief Justice,
Iftikhar Chaudhry, on charges of nepotism and misconduct. Analysts widely believe
the action was an attempt by Musharraf to remove a potential impediment to his
reelection as president, given Chaudhry’s rulings that exhibited independence and
went contrary to government expectations. The move triggered immediate outrage
among Pakistani lawyers; ensuing street protests by opposition activists grew in
scale. By providing a platform upon which anti-Musharraf sentiments could
coalesce, the imbroglio morphed into a full-fledged political crisis.
The deposed Chief Justice became an overnight political celebrity, attracting
many thousands of supporters at several rallies. His May visit to Karachi led to
rioting after activists of a regional, government-allied party reportedly blocked his
exit from the airport. Ensuing street battles between pro-government cadres and
opposition activists killed dozens of people, most of them members of the PPP.
Many observers charged the government with complicity.23 In July, in what was
widely seen as a major political defeat for Musharraf, the Supreme Court
unanimously cleared Chaudhry of any wrongdoing and reinstated him to office.
August brought further indications the Supreme Court would not be subservient
to military rule and could derail President Musharraf’s political plans, in particular
with a ruling that former Prime Minister Sharif could return to Pakistan after seven
years in exile. When Sharif attempted a September 10 return, the government
immediately arrested him on corruption charges and deported him. Also in
September, the government arrested hundreds of opposition political leaders and
activists. A statement from the U.S. Embassy called the development “extremely
disturbing and confusing,” and Secretary Rice called the arrests “troubling.”24
President Musharraf Reelected as President, Resigns Army
Commission. President Musharraf won provisional reelection on October 6, 2007,
capturing 98% of the votes cast by Pakistan’s 1,170-member Electoral College.
About 57% of the total possible vote from the membership of all national and
provincial legislatures went to Musharraf; two-fifths of the body had either abstained
(members of the Bhutto-led PPP) or resigned in protest (mostly members of the
Islamist party coalition). Musharraf vowed to resign his military commission
22 See [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/14/pakist17562.htm].
23 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan called the riots “the result of a calculated
adventure hatched by the president and the MQM with the cooperation of the Sindh
government” (May 13, 2007, press release at [http://www.hrcp.cjb.net]; see also “Pakistan
on Brink of Disaster as Karachi Burns,” Telegraph (London), May 12, 2007, and “Clashes
in Pakistan Kill 28, Injure Scores as Unrest Escalates,” Washington Post, May 13, 2007).
24 See [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h07092402.html]; “Rice Says Arrests of
Pakistani Opposition Troubling,” Reuters, September 24, 2007.

CRS-8
following reelection, even knowing he would become even more politically
vulnerable as a civilian president. Controversy had arisen over Musharraf’s intention
to seek reelection by the current assemblies, as well as his candidacy while still
serving as army chief. Opposition parties called such moves unconstitutional and
they petitioned the Supreme Court to block this course.
On October 5, the court ruled the presidential election could take place as
scheduled but that official results would be withheld until after the court rules on
such legal challenges. While few observers predicted the court would void the result,
Musharraf was to some degree left in political limbo — he was not expected to doff
his army uniform until his reelection was confirmed. Some analysts feared that a
state of emergency would be declared were the court to rule against Musharraf. U.S.
and other Western officials, including Secretary Rice, urged Musharraf to refrain
from any such move. On November 19, the new Supreme Court (as reconstituted
under the PCO) struck down legal challenges to the validity of the reelection, thus
paving the way for Musharraf’s retirement from the army and swearing in for a
second term, which took place on November 29.
Musharraf-Bhutto Engagement. President Musharraf and former Prime
Minister Bhutto in 2007 had negotiations on a power-sharing arrangement that could
have facilitated Musharraf’s continued national political role while allowing Bhutto
to return to Pakistan from self-imposed exile, potentially to serve as prime minister
for a third time. The Bush Administration encouraged such an arrangement as the
best means of both sustaining Musharraf’s role and of strengthening moderate
political forces in Islamabad. Some analysts took a cynical view of Bhutto’s motives
in the negotiations, believing her central goal was personal power and removal of
standing corruption cases against her.25 Bhutto insisted that she engaged Musharraf
so as to facilitate “an effective and peaceful transition to democracy.”
On October 4, President Musharraf and Bhutto agreed to an accord that could
have paved the way for a power-sharing deal. The National Reconciliation
Ordinance (NRO) provides amnesty for all politicians who served in Pakistan
between 1988 and 1999 (officials said the amnesty would not apply to former Prime
Minister Sharif). In return, Bhutto reportedly agreed to (tacitly) accept Musharraf’s
reelection plans. Many Pakistanis were unhappy with news of the potential deal,
viewing it as a politically unprincipled arrangement between two opportunistic
figures. Following the imposition of emergency, Bhutto stated that she would not
meet or negotiate with Musharraf, effectively ending prospects for a deal.
25 Ijaz Hussain, “Deal-ing a Bad Hand” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), August 29, 2007;
“Bhutto’s Persona Raises Distrust, As Well As Hope,” New York Times, November 11,
2007; “Skepticism Tinges Support for Bhutto,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2007.
Bhutto’s own niece called the political posturing “sheer pantomime” (Fatima Bhutto, “Aunt
Benazir’s False Promises,” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2007). Other Bhutto
detractors emphasize that she was in power while the Pakistani government nurtured the
Afghan Taliban movement, that she did little to reduce the “cross-border” exfiltration of
Islamist militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir, that Pakistan was the site of numerous and
serious human rights violations under her government, and that the PPP has been run in a
nondemocratic fashion (see, for example, William Dalrymple, “Bhutto’s Deadly Legacy”
(op-ed), New York Times, January 4, 2008).

CRS-9
When asked whether the United States still favored a Musharraf-Bhutto power-
sharing agreement in the wake of the emergency decree and deteriorating relations
between the president and former prime minister, U.S. officials only reiterated a
belief that Pakistan’s moderate forces should work together to bring constitutional,
democratic rule. Yet reports continued to suggest that Washington was pushing for
such an accommodation even after Bhutto’s apparently full post-emergency embrace
of the opposition and perhaps even after her assassination.26 Until Bilawal Bhutto
Zardari completes studies at Oxford, Asif Zardari will run the party. Zardari is a
controversial figure in Pakistan: he has spent years in prison (without conviction) on
charges ranging from corruption to complicity in murder.27 His rise to leadership of
Pakistan’s largest opposition party could present difficulties for U.S. policy makers.
Bhutto’s long-time party deputy and recent National Assembly member Makhdoom
Amin Fahim is expected to be the put forward as the PPP’s prime ministerial
candidate. Fahim, who comes from a feudal Sindh background similar to that of
Bhutto, led the party competently in her absence, but does not possess national
standing and support anything close to that enjoyed by Bhutto herself.28
Benazir Bhutto’s Return. On October 18, Benazir Bhutto returned to
Pakistan after more than eight years of self-imposed exile and was welcomed by
hundreds of thousands of supporters. She proceeded to vigorously re-enter
Pakistan’s political stage with a major and polarizing effect. While Bhutto continued
to enjoy significant public support in the country, especially in rural Sindh, there
were signs that many PPP members were ambivalent about her return and worried
that her credibility as an opponent of military rule has been damaged through deal-
making with Musharraf. Only hours after Bhutto’s arrival in Karachi, two blasts near
her motorcade — likely perpetrated by at least one suicide attacker — left some 145
people dead, but Bhutto was unharmed. To date, police have made no breakthroughs
in the case, but there are signs (along with widely-held suspicions) that the
perpetrators are linked to Al Qaeda and other Islamist extremists in Pakistan.
Without offering evidence, Bhutto herself implicated elements of Pakistan’s own
security apparatus in the attack.
Nawaz Sharif’s Return. On November 25, former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif returned to Pakistan after seven years in exile, reportedly after Saudi King
Abdullah persuaded President Musharraf to allow the return (Sharif was deported
four hours after his September effort to return). Tens of thousands of supporters
cheered Sharif’s return to Lahore in his native Punjab province. The next day, Sharif
filed papers registering him as a candidate in the January 2008 elections (he is
constitutionally barred from serving a third term as Prime Minister) and threatened
to lead street protests if his demands for the lifting of emergency rule and
reinstatement of the Supreme court were not met.
26 “U.S. Trying to Revive Musharraf-Bhutto Deal,” Reuters, November 17, 2007; “US Still
Hopes Musharraf-Bhutto Deal Can Be Saved,” Jane’s Country Daily Risk Report, January
7, 2008.
27 See “House of Graft,” New York Times, January 9, 1998.
28 “PPP’s New Leader” (editorial), Dawn (Karachi), December 31, 2007; “Pakistan’s Zardari
Poses a Quandary for U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008; “U.S. Relying on Two
in People’s Party to Help Stabilize Pakistan,” Washington Post, January 6, 2008.

CRS-10
Because he has refused to engage in any negotiations with the Musharraf
government, Sharif has been able to seize a mantle as a opposition “purist,” and he
wields considerable political influence in the populous Punjab province. Sharif’s
electoral plans met a major obstacle when, on December 3, his nomination papers
were rejected, apparently making him ineligible to compete in the January 2008
elections because of criminal convictions related to his 1999 ouster from power (his
brother Shabaz, a former Punjab Chief Minister and political heavyweight in his own
right, saw his own nomination papers rejected days earlier, apparently due to pending
criminal charges against him). With Bhutto’s demise, Sharif has been able to step
up as the most visible opposition figure with national credentials. Even detractors
have acknowledged that Sharif has acted with uncharacteristic grace and dignity
following Bhutto’s killing. A conservative with long-held ties to Pakistan’s Islamist
political parties, Sharif is a bitter enemy of Musharraf and is viewed with
considerable skepticism by many in Washington, where there are concerns that a
resurgence of his party to national power could bring a diminishment of Pakistan’s
anti-extremism policies and be contrary to U.S. interests.29
National Election Calendar and Credibility Concerns. Pakistan’s
National Assembly ended its five-year term on November 15. This was the first time
in the country’s history that the body had completed a full term without interruption.
With Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s term also ending, President Musharraf
appointed his political ally and recent Chairman of the Senate, Mohammadmian
Soomro, to serve as caretaker Prime Minister during the election period. Benazir
Bhutto rejected the caretaker government and appeared have sought formation of a
“national unity government” that would oversee planned elections. Many analysts
view the caretaker cabinet as being stacked with partisan Musharraf supporters and
so further damaging to hopes for credible elections.30
There have been numerous reports of government efforts to “pre-rig” the polls.
Those who see a “stacked judiciary, cowed media, and toothless election
commission” have been pessimistic about the chances for a credible process.31
Bhutto herself reportedly was set to give visiting U.S. Members of Congress a 160-
page report detailing the Election Commission’s and major intelligence agency’s
29 “Now He’s the Only Opposition,” Los Angeles Times, January 4, 2008; “Former PM Now
Leads Pakistan Opposition,” Associated Press, January 1, 2008; “After Bhutto’s Death,
Sharif Steps Forward,” Washington Post, January 4, 2008; “In Void, West Warms to
Sharif,” Chicago Tribune, January 6, 2008.
30 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Divergent Paths” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), November 18,
2007; “Neutral Caretaker?” (editorial), News (Karachi), November 17, 2007; Pakistan
Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, Election Monitor 8, November 21,
2007.
31 “Elections That the West Hopes Will Stabilize Pakistan Flawed Before They Even
Begin,” Associated Press, December 14, 2007. See also “Most Want Musharraf to Quit,
Poll Shows,” New York Times, December 13, 2007; “Election Monitors Fear Rigging of
Pakistani Vote,” Reuters, December 13, 2007; Najam Sethi, “Don’t Rig the Elections” (op-
ed), Friday Times (Lahore), December 28, 2007.

CRS-11
alleged plans to illicitly manipulate the outcome.32 In January 2008, PPP officials
complained that the government was using the law and order situation following
Bhutto’s killing to harass and arrest thousands of party activists and sympathizers.33
Paris-based Reporters Without Borders warned in January 2008 that press censorship
and intimidation continue to severely hamper free media coverage of the election
campaign.34 Musharraf repeatedly has promised the elections will credible, and he
opines that opposition parties are claiming the polls will be rigged to justify their own
anticipated losses.35
Even before the emergency proclamation, some observers saw signs that the
government did not intend to conduct credible elections, most prominently
controversy surrounding the possible disenfranchisement of scores of millions of
Pakistanis from voter rolls and the apparent absence of an effective and neutral
Election Commission. More than $26 million in U.S. aid to Pakistan has been
devoted to bilateral and multilateral democracy-related programs there. Washington
also plans to sponsor election observation programs in support of parliamentary
elections. U.S. officials repeatedly have emphasized that the United States is neutral
with regard to the outcome of Pakistan’s such elections.
In November, Pakistan’s Chief Election Commissioner announced that national
polls would be held on January 8, 2007. About 13,500 candidates subsequently filed
papers to vie for Pakistan’s 272 National Assembly seats and 577 provincial
assembly constituencies. Opposition parties were placed in the difficult position of
choosing whether to participate in elections that may well be manipulated by the
incumbent government or to boycott the process in protest. Upon Bhutto’s
assassination, a nationwide debate was launched over the issue of postponing the
election date. Both Zardari, the new PPP leader, and Sharif demanded that the
election be held as scheduled. The Bush Administration appeared to support their
demands.36 Zardari’s calculation likely was rooted in expectations of a significant
sympathy vote for the PPP. The ruling PML-Q appeared to seek (and later welcome)
a decision to postpone the polls. Sharif, for his part, has maintained a hardline stand
against Musharraf’s continued rule, demanding that a broad-based national unity
government be put in place.37 Some analysts insist that an election boycott would
only serve the interests of the ruling PML-Q, and they urge full poll participation
while stressing the need to minimize any rigging or manipulation of the process.38
32 “Bhutto Had ‘Proof’ of State Rigging Poll,” Reuters, January 1, 2008.
33 “Arrests Put Pressure on Bhutto Party,” BBC News, January 9, 2008.
34 Reporters Without Borders, “Five Key Problems for Media Coverage of February’s
Legislative Elections,” January 9, 2008.
35 “Musharraf Promises ‘Fair’ Elections, to Lift Emergency Rule,” CNN.com, December 9,
2007.
36 “U.S. Presses Pakistan to Go Ahead With January 8 Vote,” Reuters, December 31, 2007.
37 Muhammed Nawaz Sharif, “The Future Pakistan Deserves” (op-ed), Washington Post,
January 1, 2008.
38 See, for example, Najam Sethi, “Rigging, Not Boycott, Core Issue” (op-ed), Friday Times
(continued...)

CRS-12
While conceding that the Pakistanis must determine whether or not to make
changes to the election schedule, a State Department spokesman offered that the best
way to honor Bhutto’s memory was for the democratic process to continue, and he
opined that polls should “by all means” go ahead as scheduled “if an election can be
held safely and smoothly on January 8.” When asked about the issue, Secretary Rice
said “it’s just very important that the democratic process go forward.”39 Some
analysts believe the U.S. government’s apparent push for January elections may have
been part of an eagerness to “graft legitimacy” onto Musharraf by anointing a
successor to Bhutto.40
The Election Commission’s January 2 decision to delay the polls until February
18 was met with vocal denouncement by the main opposition parties, who accuse the
government of fearing a major loss. The State Department welcomed the setting of
a firm date and urged Pakistani officials to use the interim period to ensure that an
independent media is able to operate and that all restrictions on political parties are
lifted.41 Musharraf, in a speech to the nation, defended the postponement as
necessary given the scale of destruction in Sindh. To his often-used phrase “free,
fair, and transparent elections” he added a fourth requirement: that the polls be
“peaceful.” Some observers have called the postponement unconstitutional.42
Opposition parties did not organize large-scale street protests against the decision,
but vow to do so if the slated polls are seen to lack credibility.
Increasing Islamist Militancy
Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society
throughout the post-2001 period and has become especially prevalent in 2007.43
Much of the militancy in western Pakistan appears to be fueled by people’s anger at
Islamabad’s perceived pro-American agenda, especially in the wake of Benazir
Bhutto’s return and subsequent assassination.44 A week-long July siege at
38 (...continued)
(Lahore), December 7, 2007.
39 See [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/dec/98143.htm] and [http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2007/12/98131.htm].
40 “Is Rice Rushing to Elections?,” Newsweek, December 28, 2007.
41 See [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/jan/98170.htm].
42 See “President Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” January 2, 2008, at
[http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/SpeechAddressList.aspx]; “Poll Delay Described
as Unconstitutional,” Dawn (Karachi), January 5, 2008. Under the country’s constitution,
parliamentary and provincial elections were required to take place by January 15, 2008, or
within 60 days of the November 15, 2007, end of the former bodies’ terms.
43 The Lahore-based Pak Institute for Peace Studies issued an annual report which counted
1,442 “terrorist attacks, incidents of political violence, and border clashes” in 2007. These
attacks, along with 61 military operations in western Pakistan, left 3,448 people dead (see
[http://pips.com.pk/san/pakistan/july7/AnnualReport.html]).
44 “Pakistani Militants Finding Targets Closer to Home,” New York Times, November 2,
(continued...)

CRS-13
Islamabad’s Red Mosque ended when Pakistani commandos stormed the complex
and, following a 20-hour battle, defeated the well-armed Islamist radicals therein.
Beginning in January and escalating steadily over the course of the year, an open
Islamist rebellion of sorts had been taking place in Pakistan’s relatively serene
capital. Radical Islamists at the Red Mosque and their followers in the attached
women’s Jamia Hafsa seminary had occupied illegally constructed religious
buildings, kidnaped and detained local police officers and alleged Chinese
prostitutes, battled security forces, and threatened to launch a violent anti-
government campaign unless Sharia (Islamic law) was instituted nationwide. Several
thousand people had been barricaded in the mosque complex, reportedly including
a small number of foreign militants. Some cynics in Pakistan suggested that the
government was complicit in allowing the standoff to fester, its alleged slow and
uncertain response being a purposeful effort to bolster its own standing as a bulwark
against spreading Islamist radicalism.
In the months since the Red Mosque raid, religious militants have perpetrated
more than three dozen suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan — most of them against
security personnel — taking some 700 lives. Moreover, upon reopening, the Red
Mosque has continued to be a gathering place for strongly anti-Musharraf and anti-
Western Islamist figures. By one account, the mosque is now “a memorial, a rallying
cry, and a propaganda tool” for radical religious groups, thus enlarging the pool of
potential terrorist recruits.45
More recently, Pakistan has faced a “neo-Taliban” insurgency in the scenic Swat
Valley just 100 miles northwest of the capital, where radical Islamic cleric Maulana
Fazlullah and up to 5,000 of his armed followers have sought to impose Sharia law.46
Fazlullah, also know as “Maulana Radio” for his fiery (and unlicensed) FM
broadcasts, may be seeking to set up his own parallel government in Swat like that
established by pro-Taliban militant leader Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan.
The ability of Fazlullah and his followers to impose their will on large swaths of
Pakistani territory with apparent impunity over a period of months was widely
viewed as evidence that the Islamabad government’s campaign against indigenous
extremists had faltered.
Pakistan in October deployed some 2,500 Frontier Corps soldiers to the Swat
Valley in an effort to counter the creeping “Talibanization” there. Ensuing battles
left scores of militants and soldiers dead. As fighters loyal to Fazlullah captured at
least three towns in early November, reportedly securing control of six of Swat’s
eight subregions, the army took charge of the counterinsurgency effort at the request
of the North West Frontier Province governor. Pakistan reportedly massed some
44 (...continued)
2007.
45 “Pakistan’s Embattled Mosque Reopens With Fresh Momentum,” Washington Post,
October 14, 2007. See also “Messages of Militancy Persist at Red Mosque,” Washington
Times
, December 21, 2007.
46 The Pakistani army estimates that only 500-700 militants are operating in the Swat region,
and it claims that these forces receive external assistance and that some are “foreign
elements.”

CRS-14
15,000 regular army troops and, by early December, most militant elements in the
Swat were reported to be in retreat. On December 15, the Pakistani government
claimed victory in its battle with Islamist militants in Swat, saying Fazlullah’s
loyalists had been routed. Pakistan army officials claim to have killed hundreds of
militants during the campaign, which is ongoing.47
Al Qaeda in Pakistan. U.S. officials increasingly are concerned that Al
Qaeda and other anti-Western terrorists remain active on Pakistani territory. Such
concern surged following the July release of an unclassified version of a new
National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland, which
concluded that Al Qaeda “has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland
attack capability, including a safehaven in the FATA, operational lieutenants, and its
top leadership.”48 In September, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden released an
audio tape in which he urged Muslims in Pakistan to rise up against President
Musharraf to avenge his “aid to America against the Muslims.”49 In December,
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, “Al Qaeda right now seems to have turned its
face toward Pakistan and attacks on the Pakistani government and Pakistan people.”
In what could be considered a telling slip, Musharraf claimed in January 2008 that
Pakistan had killed or neutralized 700 Al Qaeda “leaders.”50 The number of Al
Qaeda suspects reported killed or captured in Pakistan has remained essentially
unchanged since 2004. Some Pakistani and Western security officials see Islamabad
losing its war against religious militancy and Al Qaeda forces enjoying new areas in
which to operate, due in part to the Pakistan army’s poor counterinsurgency
capabilities and to the central government’s eroding legitimacy.51
Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency. An ongoing
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and its connection to developments in Pakistan
remain matters of serious concern, especially in light of signs that Al Qaeda terrorists
move with impunity on the Pakistani side of the rugged border. In July, pro-Taliban
militants in North Waziristan announced their withdrawal from a controversial
September 2006 truce made with the Islamabad government, claiming the accord had
been violated by army deployments and attacks on tribals. Simultaneously, U.S.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated that Washington had determined
President Musharraf’s policies in the region to be ineffective and he said the United
States was fully supporting new efforts to crack down on Pakistan’s pro-Taliban
militants. The U.S. commander of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Maj.
47 “Pakistan Claims Win in Crucial NW Valley,” Washington Post, December 15, 2007;
“Forces Launch New Offensive in Swat,” Dawn (Karachi), January 6, 2008.
48 See [http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf]. A Pakistan Foreign
Ministry statement criticized the document’s “unsubstantiated assertions.”
49 “Bin Laden, on Tape, Urges Pakistanis to Oust Musharraf,” New York Times, September
21, 2007.
50 “Musharraf: Bhutto Knew of Risks” (interview), CBS News, January 6, 2008.
51 “Gates: Pakistan an Al Qaeda Target,” Washington Post, December 22, 2007; “Pakistan
Seen Losing Fight Against Taliban and Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, October 3, 2007;
“Pakistan’s Army: Unprepared to Tackle Terrorism?,” Christian Science Monitor, October
22, 2007.

CRS-15
Gen. David Rodriguez, subsequently blamed a growing Al Qaeda presence in
Pakistan for a large increase in the number of foreign fighters infiltrating into
Afghanistan.52 With three-quarters of supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan going
either through or over Pakistan, Pentagon officials are said to be studying alternative
routes in case further political instability in Pakistan disrupts supply lines.53
It is possible that President Musharraf and the new army chief, Gen. Kayani,
will divide their responsibilities so that the former will retain political management
of the country while the latter oversees the military’s counterinsurgency efforts. This
might serve to make more effective Pakistan’s anti-extremism efforts over time (in
both their political and their militarized aspects). Musharraf adamantly insists that
he Pakistani military is unified in its fight against terrorism and extremism, even as
he concedes that “some elements” urge a “different solution” in Afghanistan, one
involving political dialogue with the Taliban.54
The Pakistan army has deployed some 100,000 regular and paramilitary troops
in western Pakistan in response to the surge in militancy there. Battles with pro-
Taliban militants are ongoing and became particularly fierce in North Waziristan in
October. The militants appear to be employing heavy weapons in more aggressive
tactics, making frontal attacks on army outposts instead of the hit-and-run skirmishes
of the past.55 The army also is suffering from a raft of recent suicide bomb attacks
and the kidnaping of hundreds of its soldiers.56 Such setbacks have damaged the
army’s morale, and also have caused some to question the organization’s loyalties
and capabilities.57
In other developments:
! On January 10, a suicide bomber killed at least 23 police officers
near the Lahore High Court building moments before a rally of
opposition lawyers was set to pass by.
52 “Pakistan Army Action Has Slight Effect: U.S. General,” Reuters, July 25, 2007.
53 “Pakistan Unrest Threatens Supply Lines,” Associated Press, November 14, 2007.
54 “Full Transcript Musharraf Interview,” ABC News (online), November 30, 2007.
55 “Battles Raging in Remotest Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2007.
56 In the most egregious example of the latter development, on August 30 some 250
Pakistani soldiers, including a colonel and 8 other officers, were taken prisoner when pro-
Taliban militants ambushed their convoy in South Waziristan. The troops apparently
offered no resistance before surrendering to Islamist extremists reportedly loyal to fugitive
commander Baitullah Mahsud. President Musharraf later criticized the troops for taking
insufficient precautionary measures. Only hours after Musharraf’s November 3 emergency
decree, the militants released 211 of the troops. Reports indicate that government
authorities had released 25 detained militants in exchange, including several men said to be
convicted aspiring suicide bombers.
57 “Kidnapings and Suicide Attacks Shake Morale of Pakistan’s Armed Force,” Times of
London
, September 20, 2007.

CRS-16
! On January 9, a Pakistani official announced the December arrest of
a retired army major in connection with past and planned suicide
bomb attacks.
! On January 6, suspected Uzbek Islamist militants in South
Waziristan shot and killed eight tribal elders who were working
with a government-sponsored peace movement.
! On January 5, NWFP Governor Ali Mohammed Jan Orakzai
resigned his post, citing personal reasons. His replacement is
former Baluchistan governor Owais Ahmed Ghani, who has taken
stern action against Baloch separatist militants.
! On January 2, Pakistan’s Election Commission announced a
postponement of scheduled parliamentary polls to February 18.
! On December 26, Afghan President Karzai met with President
Musharraf in Islamabad.
! On December 21, a suicide bomb attack inside a crowded mosque
killed some 50 people in the NWFP. Former Interior Minister
Sherpao, believed to be a target for assassination, was unharmed.
! On December 6, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a
hearing on Pakistan.
! On November 22, the 53-member Commonwealth Ministerial
Action Group suspended Pakistan’s membership pending
restoration of democracy and rule of law there.
! On November 20, President Musharraf met with Saudi King
Abdullah in Riyadh, where the two men agreed on the need to
reinvigorate their counterterrorism efforts.
! On November 19, four days of fierce sectarian battles between
Sunnis and Shiites left at least 100 people dead in Parachinar in the
Kurram tribal agency.
! On November 10, Pakistan and Iran reportedly finalized a deal
to build a multi-billion-dollar pipeline that would deliver Iranian
natural gas to Pakistan and potentially on to India.
! On November 7, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a
hearing on Pakistan.
! On October 18, at least one suicide bomb attacker killed some
140 people near the motorcade of returning former Prime Minister
Bhutto, who was unharmed.
Setting and Regional Relations
Historical Setting
The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War
and South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet
expansionism and Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat
from India prompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance
agreement in 1954. By 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by
joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the
Central Treaty Organization (or “Baghdad Pact”). As a result of these alliances,

CRS-17
Islamabad received nearly $2
billion in U.S. assistance from
Pakistan in Brief
1953 to 1961, one-quarter of this in
Population: 165 million; growth rate: 1.8%
military aid, making Pakistan one
(2007 est.)
of America’s most important
Area: 803,940 sq. km. (slightly less than twice
security assistance partners of the
the size of California)
period. President Dwight D.
Capital: Islamabad
Head of Government: President and Chief of
Eisenhower famously called
Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf
Pakistan America’s “most allied
Ethnic Groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun,
ally in Asia.” Differing
Baloch, Muhajir (immigrants from India at
expectations of the security
the time of partition and their descendants)
relationship long bedeviled
Languages: Punjabi 58%, Sindhi 12%, Pashtu
8%, Urdu 8%; English widely used
bilateral ties, however. During and
Religions: Muslim 96% (Sunni 81%, Shia 15%),
i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e
Christian, Hindu, and other 4%
Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and
Life Expectancy at Birth: female 65 years; male
1971, the United States suspended
63 years (2007 est.)
military assistance to both sides,
Literacy: female 35%; male 62% (2004 est.)
Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $452
resulting in a cooling of the
billion; per capita: $2,750; growth rate
Pakistan-U.S. relationship and a
6.4% (2007 est.)
perception among many in Pakistan
Currency: Rupee (100 = $1.60)
that the United States was not a
Inflation: 7.6% (2007 est.)
Defense Budget: $4.14 billion (3.5% of G D P ;
reliable ally.
2006)
U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $3.9 billion; imports
In the mid-1970s, new strains
from U.S. $2 billion (2007 est.)
arose over Pakistan’s efforts to
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; Departments of
r e s p o n d t o In d i a’s 1 9 7 4
Commerce and State; Government of Pakistan; Economist
underground nuclear test by
Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; Military Balance
seeking its own nuclear weapons
capability. U.S. aid was suspended
by President Carter in 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covert construction of a
uranium enrichment facility. However, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
later that year, Pakistan again was viewed as a frontline ally in the effort to block
Soviet expansionism. In 1981, the Reagan Administration offered Islamabad a five-
year, $3.2 billion aid package. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms
supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as home for some three million Afghan
refugees, most of whom have yet to return.
Despite this renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in Congress
remained troubled by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. In 1985, Section 620E(e)
(the Pressler amendment) was added to the Foreign Assistance Act, requiring the
President to certify to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive
device during the fiscal year for which aid is to be provided. With the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear activities again came under
intensive U.S. scrutiny and, in 1990, President George H.W. Bush again suspended
aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most bilateral
economic and all military aid ended, and deliveries of major military equipment
ceased. In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of sanctions to allow for food
assistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations. Among the
notable results of the aid cutoff was the nondelivery of F-16 fighter aircraft purchased
by Pakistan in 1989. Nine years later, the United States agreed to compensate

CRS-18
Pakistan with a $325 million cash payment and $140 million in goods, including
surplus wheat, but the episode engendered lingering Pakistani resentments.
During the 1990s, with U.S. attention shifted away from the region, Islamabad
further consolidated its nuclear weapons capability, fanned the flames of a growing
separatist insurgency in neighboring Indian-controlled Kashmir, and nurtured the
Taliban movement in Afghanistan, where the radical Islamist group took control of
Kabul in 1996. After more than a decade of alienation, U.S. relations with Pakistan
were once again transformed in dramatic fashion, this time by the September 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a
pivotal ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. A small trickle of foreign assistance
to Pakistan again became a prodigious flow and, in a sign of renewed U.S.
recognition of the country’s importance, President George W. Bush designated
Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States in June 2004. One month
later, a Congressional Pakistan Caucus was formed to facilitate dialogue among
Pakistani-Americans and their political representatives in Congress, and to improve
and strengthen bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States.
U.S.-Pakistan Diplomatic Engagement
U.S. diplomatic engagement with Pakistan continues to be deep and
multifaceted. President Bush traveled to Pakistan in March 2006 for the first such
presidential visit in six years, and numerous high-level governmental meetings have
ensued. During the visit, President Bush and President Pervez Musharraf issued a
Joint Statement on the U.S.-Pakistan “strategic partnership” that calls for a “strategic
dialogue” and “significant expansion” of bilateral economic ties, including mutual
trade and investment, as well as initiatives in the areas of energy, peace and security,
social sector development, science and technology, democracy, and
nonproliferation.58 In the wake of that meeting, engagements have continued apace.
Over the past year, visits to Islamabad have been made by Secretary of State
Rice, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Speaker of
the House Nancy Pelosi, and several top U.S. military commanders, among others.
Pakistani visitors to Washington, DC, in the past year have included President
Musharraf, Foreign Minister Kurshid Kasuri, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan, and the
then-Chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Ehsan ul-Haq.
Among formal sessions were a February 2007 meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint
Committee on Science and Technology in Washington, and a September meeting of
the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in Islamabad, where the U.S. delegation was led
by Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.
Political Setting59
Pakistan’s political history is a troubled one, marked by tripartite power
struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have
58 See [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h06030404.html].
59 See also CRS Report RL32615, Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments.

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ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 60 years of existence, interspersed with
periods of generally weak civilian governance. From 1988 to 1999, Islamabad had
democratically elected governments, and the army appeared to have moved from its
traditional role of “kingmaker” to one of power broker. Benazir Bhutto (leader of the
Pakistan People’s Party) and Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Pakistan Muslim League)
each served twice as prime minister during this period. The Bhutto government was
dismissed on charges of corruption and nepotism in 1996 and Sharif won a landslide
victory in ensuing elections, which were judged generally free and fair by
international observers. Sharif moved quickly to bolster his powers by curtailing
those of the president and judiciary, and he emerged as one of Pakistan’s strongest-
ever elected leaders. Critics accused him of intimidating the opposition and the press.
Many observers hold Pakistan’s civilian political leaders at least as responsible as the
army for the anemic state of the country’s governance institutions.60

In October 1999, in proximate response to Prime Minister Sharif’s attempt to
remove him, Chief of Army Staff General Musharraf overthrew the government,
dismissed the National Assembly, and appointed himself “chief executive.” In the
wake of this military overthrow of the elected government, Islamabad faced
considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related
U.S. sanctions under section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act
(Pakistan was already under nuclear-related U.S. sanctions). Musharraf later
assumed the title of president following a controversial April 2002 referendum.
National elections were held in October of that year, as ordered by the Supreme
Court. A new civilian government was seated — Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali was
replaced with Musharraf ally Shaukat Aziz in August 2005 — but it has remained
weak. In apparent contravention of democratic norms, Musharraf has continued to
hold the dual offices of president and army chief. Many figures across the spectrum
of Pakistani society welcomed Musharraf, or at least were willing to give him the
benefit of the doubt, as a potential reformer who would curtail both corruption and
the influence of religious extremists. Yet his domestic popularity has suffered
following indications that, as with Pakistan’s previous president-generals, expanding
his own power and that of the military would be his central goal.
Pakistan’s next parliamentary elections are slated to take place on February 18,
2008. President Bush has said that electoral process will be “an important test of
Pakistan’s commitment to democratic reform” and, during his 2006 visit to
Islamabad, said President Musharraf understands the elections “need to be open and
honest.”61 In October 2007, Secretary of State Rice repeated the admonition, saying
the expected parliamentary elections will be “a real test” of the Islamabad
government’s commitment to democratization and that the U.S. government is
“pressing that case very hard.” The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Joe Biden, warned President Musharraf in December “there will
be consequences” if upcoming elections are not fair and open, saying U.S. aid levels
60 See, for example, “Ghosts That Haunt Pakistan,” New York Times, January 6, 2008.
61 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-2.html] and
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-2.html].

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could be decreased.62 Musharraf himself stood for (and controversially won)
reelection as president in October 2007. Under the Pakistani system, the president
is indirectly elected by a 1,170-person electoral college comprised of the membership
of all national and provincial legislatures.
In September, President Musharraf promoted Gen. Kayani, a highly-regarded,
pro-Western figure, to the position of Vice Chief of Army Staff. Kayani succeeded
Musharraf in the powerful role of army chief upon Musharraf’s late November
resignation from the army. In assuming his new role, Kayani vows to press ahead
with Pakistan army efforts to root out extremists from western Pakistan. The
constitutionally-designated successor to the office of the president is the chairman of
the Pakistani Senate. Kayani appears to have become a new locus of U.S. hopes for
Pakistani democratization, with U.S. officials reportedly seeing an opportunity for
him to oversee a peaceful transition to civilian rule while maintaining a disinterest
in pursuing his own political power.63
Regional Relations
Pakistan-India Rivalry. Three full-scale wars — in 1947-1948, 1965, and
1971 — and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual
border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. The
acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the
unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. Both
countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and
social development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both countries to
the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) into
the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad [Free] Kashmir.
India blames Pakistan for supporting a violent separatist rebellion in the
Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley that has taken as many as 66,000 lives since
1989. Pakistan admits only to lending moral and political support to the rebels, and
it criticizes India for human rights abuses in “Indian-occupied Kashmir.”
India held Pakistan responsible for late 2001 terrorist attacks in Kashmir and on
the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi. The Indian response, a massive
military mobilization, was mirrored by Pakistan and within months some one million
heavily-armed soldiers were facing-off at the international frontier. During an
extremely tense 2002 another full-scale war seemed a real and even likely possibility,
and may have been averted only through international diplomatic efforts, including
multiple visits to the region by top U.S. officials. An April 2003 peace initiative
brought major improvement in the bilateral relationship, allowing for an October
cease-fire agreement initiated by Pakistan. The process led to a January 2004 summit
meeting in Islamabad and a joint agreement to re-engage a “Composite Dialogue” to
62 Interview with the New York Post editorial board, October 1, 2007; “Biden Warns
Musharraf of Consequences for Poor Elections,” Associated Press, December 17, 2007.
63 “In Musharraf’s Shadow, a New Hope for Pakistan Arises,” New York Times, January 7,
2008.

CRS-21
bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and
Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”64
During 2004, numerous mid-level meetings, normalized diplomatic relations,
and increased people-to-people contacts brought modest, but still meaningful
progress toward stable relations. Regular dialogue continued in 2005 and a third
round of Composite Dialogue talks was held in 2006. Numerous confidence-building
measures have been put in place, most notably travel and commerce across the
Kashmiri LOC for the first time in decades, and bilateral trade has increased. Yet
militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek
remain unresolved, and Pakistani officials regularly express unhappiness that more
substantive progress, especially on the “core issue” of Kashmir, is not occurring.
Following July 2006 terrorist bombings in Bombay, India, New Delhi postponed
planned foreign secretary-level talks, bringing into question the continued viability
of the already slow-moving process. However, after meeting on the sidelines of a
Nonaligned Movement summit in Cuba in September, President Musharraf and
Indian Prime Minister Singh announced a resumption of formal peace negotiations
and also approved implementation of a joint anti-terrorism mechanism. The
Composite Dialogue resumed in November after a four-month hiatus when Foreign
Secretary Khan paid a visit to New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart. No
progress was made on outstanding territorial disputes, and India is not known to have
presented evidence of Pakistani involvement in the 7/11 Bombay terrorist bombings,
but the two officials did give shape to the proposed joint anti-terrorism mechanism
and they agreed to continue the dialogue process in early 2007. A notable step came
in December 2006, when bilateral talks on the militarized Sir Creek dispute ended
with agreement to conduct a joint survey.
In January 2007, Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri hosted his Indian
counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, in Islamabad for the first such visit in more than a
year. The two men reviewed past progress and planned for a fourth Composite
Dialogue round in March. On February 18, two bombs exploded on an Indian
segment of the Samjhauta [Friendship] Express train linking Delhi, India, with
Lahore, Pakistan. Resulting fires killed 68 people, most of them Pakistanis. Days
later, Kasuri traveled to New Delhi, where he and Mukherjee reaffirmed a bilateral
commitment to the peace process despite the apparent effort to subvert it. While
India refused a Pakistani request to undertake a joint investigation into that attack,
the two countries did sign an agreement to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.
The new joint Pakistan-India anti-terrorism mechanism met for the first time in
Islamabad in March 2007 and produced a joint statement in which both governments
agreed to use the forum for exchanging information about investigations of and/or
efforts to prevent terrorist acts on either side of the shared border, and to meet
quarterly while immediately conveying urgent information. Hopes that the
Samjhauta train bombing would provide a fitting “test case” apparently were dashed,
however, when India declined to share relevant investigative information with
Pakistan. Moreover, Indian officials were unhappy with Islamabad’s insistence that
64 [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].

CRS-22
the “freedom struggle” underway in Kashmir should not be treated as terrorism under
this framework. Still, the continuing engagement even after a major terrorist attack
was widely viewed as evidence that the bilateral peace process had gained a sturdy
momentum. A new round of dialogue was then launched in mid-March, when the
two foreign ministers met again in Islamabad. No new agreements were reached, but
both officials lauded improved bilateral relations and held “the most sustained and
intensive dialogue” ever on the Kashmir problem.65 Political turmoil and uncertainty
arose in Islamabad around that same time, however, and has since greatly slowed
progress in the Pakistan-India peace process.
A fourth round of bilateral talks on economic and commercial cooperation
ended in August 2007 with agreements to facilitate importation of cement from
Pakistan and tea from India, among others. Pakistani and Indian officials also held
technical-level talks on the modalities of cross-border movement, and separate talks
on the Tubal navigation project/Wullar barrage water dispute ended without progress.
In September, Pakistan issued a formal protest and expressed “deep concern” in
response to the Indian government’s announced intention to open the disputed
territory of the Siachen Glacier to tourism, saying the region was “illegally occupied”
by Indian troops in 1984 and its final status has yet to be determined due to an
“inflexible Indian attitude.”66 In a more positive sign, on October 1 trucks carrying
tomatoes from India to Pakistan crossed the international border for the first time in
60 years. Mid-October saw mid-level Pakistani and Indian officials meet to discuss
both conventional and nuclear confidence-building measures, but no new initiatives
were announced. Later in October, the countries held a second meeting of their Joint
Anti-Terrorism Mechanism in New Delhi, where the two sides shared new
information on terrorism and agreed to continue mutual investigatory cooperation.
The “IPI” Pipeline Project.67 Islamabad insists it is going forward with a
proposed joint pipeline project to deliver Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and possibly
on to India. In January 2007, officials from the three countries resolved a long-
running price-mechanism dispute, opening the way for further progress. In February,
the fourth meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Working Group on the Iran-Pakistan-
India (IPI) pipeline was held in Islamabad, where the two countries agreed to split
equally expected gas supplies. In June, Pakistani and Indian officials reportedly
reached an agreement in principle on transportation charges, and officials from all
three countries suggested a final deal was imminent. Former Prime Minister Aziz
described the pipeline as being critical to Pakistan’s economic growth and political
stability. Doubts about financing the approximately $7 billion project combined with
concerns about security in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province have some analysts
skeptical about fruition. Some independent observers and Members of Congress
assert that completion of the pipeline would represent a major confidence-building
measure in the region and could bolster regional energy security while facilitating
friendlier Pakistan-India ties (see, for example, H.Res. 353 in the 109th Congress).
65 See Pakistan Foreign Ministry Press Release No. 81/2007 at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/
Press_Releases/2007/March/PR_81_07.htm].
66 See [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Spokesperson/2007/Sep/Spokes_17_09_07.htm].
67 See also CRS Report RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act.

CRS-23
As part of its efforts to isolate Iran economically, the Bush Administration
actively seeks to dissuade the Islamabad and New Delhi governments from
participation in this project, and a State Department official has suggested that
current U.S. law dictates American opposition: The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L.
107-24) requires the President to impose sanctions on foreign companies that make
an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector. The
109th Congress extended this provision in the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-
293). No firms have been sanctioned under this act to date.
Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and
“strategic depth” with regard to India though friendly relations with neighboring
Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to President-General Zia ul-Haq’s support for
Afghan mujahideen “freedom fighters” who were battling Soviet invaders during the
1980s and to Islamabad’s later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to
2001. British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting
the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893
“Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders,
who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.
Following Islamabad’s major September 2001 policy shift, President Musharraf
consistently has vowed full Pakistani support for the government of Afghan President
Hamid Karzai and he insists that Pakistan is playing a “totally neutral role” in
Afghanistan. Islamabad claims to have arrested many hundreds of Taliban militants
and remanded most of them to Afghan custody, and it reportedly has provided $300
million in economic assistance to Kabul since 2001. Nevertheless, Musharraf and
Karzai have exchanged public accusations and recriminations about the ongoing
movement of Islamic militants in the border region, and U.S. officials have issued
increasingly strong claims about the problems posed by Taliban insurgents and other
militants who are widely believed to enjoy safehaven on the Pakistani side of the
Durand Line. Moreover, Pakistan is wary of signs that India is pursuing a policy of
“strategic encirclement,” taking note of New Delhi’s past support for Tajik and
Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post-2001
opening of numerous Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and
Afghanistan play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat Islamic
militancy. Continuing acrimony between Islamabad and Kabul is thus deleterious to
U.S. interests.
In August 2007, an unprecedented joint “jirga,” or tribal assembly, was held in
Kabul and included nearly 700 delegates from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
meeting was endorsed by the United States as a means of bringing stability to
Afghanistan. In the days immediately preceding the opening session, some 40 tribal
elders from North Waziristan announced they would not attend, saying the absence
of Taliban representatives rendered it pointless, and President Musharraf himself
later announced his withdrawal from participation. Analysts widely considered the
move a snub to both Afghan President Karzai and to the U.S. government, which
expressed dismay at the decision. Musharraf made a last-minute decision to attend
the final day’s session, where he offered a rare admission that support for militants
emanating from Pakistan has caused problems for Afghanistan, saying “There is no
doubt Afghan militants are supported from Pakistan soil. The problem that you have
in your region is because support is provided from our side.” The jirga ended with

CRS-24
a declaration that included plans for dialogue with “the opposition,” i.e., the
Taliban.68 In December 2007, Karzai met with President Musharraf in Islamabad for
a relatively cordial meeting after which the two men issued a joint statement
reaffirming their commitment to intensifying counterterrorism cooperation.69 (see
also “Infiltration into Afghanistan” section below).
The China Factor. Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and
mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Pakistan served as a link
between Beijing and Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world
for China during the 1980s. China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for
Pakistan began in the 1960s and included helping to build a number of arms factories
in Pakistan, as well as supplying complete weapons systems. After the 1990
imposition of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, the Islamabad-Beijing arms relationship
was further strengthened (see CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues
). Indian leaders have
called the Islamabad-Beijing nuclear and missile “proliferation nexus” a cause of
serious concern in New Delhi, and U.S. officials remain seized of this potentially
destabilizing dynamic.
Analysts taking a realist, power political perspective view China as an external
balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad
allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful
India. Many observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key
aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of “encirclement” or constraint of India as a
means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s region-
wide influence.
In April 2005, the Chinese prime minister visited Islamabad, where Pakistan and
China signed 22 accords meant to boost bilateral cooperation. President Musharraf’s
five-day visit to Beijing in February 2006 saw bilateral discussions on
counterterrorism, trade, and technical assistance. Chinese President Hu’s November
2006 travel to Islamabad was the first such visit by a Chinese president in ten years;
another 18 new bilateral pacts were inked, including a bilateral Free Trade
Agreement and plans for joint development of airborne early warning radars.
Islamabad may seek future civil nuclear assistance from Beijing, including potential
provision of complete power reactors, especially in light of Washington’s categorical
refusal of Pakistan’s request for a civil nuclear cooperation similar to that being
planned between the United States and India.
In May 2007, Prime Minister Aziz visited Beijing, where Pakistan and China
signed 27 new agreements and memoranda of understanding to “re-energize”
bilateral cooperation in numerous areas, including defense, space technology, and
trade. No public mention was made regarding civil nuclear cooperation. The Chinese
government has assisted Pakistan in constructing a major new port at Gwadar, near
68 “Pakistan Leader Snubs Afghan Meeting,” Reuters, August 8, 2007; “Afghan Rebels Find
Haven in Pakistan, Musharraf Says,” New York Times, August 12, 2007. Declaration text
at [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2007\08\13\story_13-8-2007_pg7_48].
69 See [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Dec/PR_306_07.htm].

CRS-25
the border with Iran; Islamabad and Beijing aspire to make this port, officially
opened in March 2007, a major commercial outlet for Central Asian states. Some
Western and Indian analysts are concerned that the port may be used for military
purposes and could bolster China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Pakistan continues to view China as an “all-weather friend” and perhaps its most
important strategic ally.
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues
U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including
counterterrorism, nuclear weapons and missile proliferation, South Asian and Afghan
stability, democratization and human rights, trade and economic reform, and efforts
to counter narcotics trafficking. Relations have been affected by several key
developments, including proliferation- and democracy-related sanctions; a continuing
Pakistan-India nuclear standoff and conflict over Kashmir; and the September 2001
terrorist attacks against the United States. In the wake of those attacks, President
Musharraf — under intense U.S. diplomatic pressure — offered President Bush
Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Pakistan became
a vital ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. U.S. sanctions relating to
Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup quickly were waived and, in
October 2001, large tranches of U.S. aid began flowing into Pakistan.
Direct U.S. assistance programs include training and equipment for Pakistani
security forces, along with aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion,
human rights improvement, counternarcotics, border security and law enforcement,
as well as trade preference benefits. The United States also supports grant, loan, and
debt rescheduling programs for Pakistan by the various major international financial
institutions. In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO
ally of the United States under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Revelations in 2004 that Pakistan has been a source of nuclear proliferation to North
Korea, Iran, and Libya complicated Pakistan-U.S. relations and attracted
congressional attention as a serious security issue.
Terrorism
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan
pledged and has provided major support for the U.S.-led global anti-terrorism
coalition. According to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has
afforded the United States unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S.
military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists,
tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and blocking terrorist
financing.70 Top U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistani anti-terrorism efforts. In
a landmark January 2002 speech, President Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan’s use
as a base for terrorism of any kind, and he banned numerous militant groups,
70 See, for example, “Pakistan Key Partner in War on Terror, Defense Department Says,”
U.S. Department of State Washington File, March 6, 2006; “Pakistan ‘Indispensable’ in
Global Anti-Terrorism Fight,” U.S. Department of State Washington File, July 25, 2007.

CRS-26
including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, both blamed for terrorist
violence in Kashmir and India, and both designated as terrorist organizations under
U.S. law. In the wake of the speech, thousands of Muslim extremists were detained,
though most of these were later released. In the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law
enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist
Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters on Pakistani territory. Pakistani authorities claim to have captured some 700
Al Qaeda suspects and remanded most of these to U.S. custody.71
Important Al Qaeda-related arrests in Pakistan have included Abu Zubaydah
(March 2002), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (September 2002), Khalid Sheik Mohammed
(March 2003), and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). Other allegedly senior Al Qaeda
figures were killed in gunbattles and missile attacks, including in several apparent
U.S.-directed attacks on Pakistani territory from aerial drones. Yet Al Qaeda
fugitives and their Taliban allies remain active in Pakistan, especially in the
mountainous tribal regions along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, numerous banned
indigenous groups continue to operate under new names: Lashkar-e-Taiba became
Jamaat al-Dawat (banned under U.S. law in April 2006); Jaish-e-Mohammed was re-
dubbed Khudam-ul Islam.
President Musharraf repeatedly has vowed to end the activities of religious
extremists in Pakistan and to permanently prevent banned groups from resurfacing
there. His policies likely spurred two lethal but failed attempts to assassinate him in
December 2003. At present, Islamabad declares a four-pronged strategy to counter
terrorism and religious extremism, containing military, political, administrative, and
development aspects. Nonetheless, some analysts have long called Musharraf’s
efforts cosmetic, ineffective, and the result of international pressure rather than a
genuine recognition of the threat posed. In recent years, some Pakistani nationals and
religious seminaries have been linked to Islamist terrorism plots in Western
countries, especially the United Kingdom.72
In a January 2007 review of global threats, then-U.S. Director of Intelligence
Negroponte issued what may have been the strongest relevant statements from a Bush
Administration official to date, telling a Senate panel that, “Pakistan is a frontline
partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic
extremism and the home for some top terrorist leaders.” He identified Al Qaeda as
posing the single greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its interests, and
warned that the organization’s “core elements ... maintain active connections and
relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hideout in Pakistan” to
affiliates on four continents.73
71 “Musharraf: Bhutto Knew of Risks” (interview), CBS News, January 6, 2008.
72 Some more cynical observers see a Pakistani connection to nearly all major jihadi terrorist
attacks worldwide; a few even find a connection to elements of Pakistan’s military
establishment in most jihadi terrorist attacks within Pakistan (see, for example, B. Raman,
“Al Qaeda in GHQ, Rawalpindi,” South Asia Analysis Group International Terrorism
Monitor
(New Delhi) Paper No. 2522, December 28, 2007).
73 Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007.

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In February 2007, Vice President Cheney and the Deputy Director of the CIA,
Steve Kappes, made an unannounced four-hour visit to Islamabad, where they
reportedly warned President Musharraf that a Democratic-controlled Congress could
cut U.S. aid to Pakistan unless that country takes more aggressive action to hunt
down Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives on its soil.74 The unusually strong
admonition came after U.S. intelligence officials concluded that a “terrorist
infrastructure” had been rebuilt in western Pakistan, that Islamabad’s
counterterrorism efforts had been feckless to date, and that the Bush Administration
was recognizing that current U.S. and Pakistani policies were not working.
When asked during a February Senate hearing about the possible source of a
hypothetical future Al Qaeda attack on the United States, the new Director of
National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated his belief that such an attack “most
likely would be planned and come out of the [Al Qaeda] leadership in Pakistan.”75
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, released in April 2007,
said “Pakistan executed effective counterterrorism cooperation and captured or killed
many terrorists” while also reiterating U.S. concerns that the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) is “a safe haven for Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
militants.”76 According to Under Secretary of State Burns in July 2007 testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
We know that the tribal areas of the mountainous border regions inside Pakistan
have never been within the effective control of any central government. We
know that the regions of North and South Waziristan have become safehavens
for violent extremist and terrorist activity.... [W]e would like to see a more
sustained and effective effort by the Pakistani government to defeat terrorist
forces on its soil.
Although the United States lauded Islamabad’s anti-terrorism financing efforts earlier
this decade, Under Secretary Burns also encouraged more energetic Pakistani action:
We want to see Pakistan use all tools at its disposal to choke the flow of funds
to terrorist groups. We are particularly concerned about terrorist groups
exploiting charitable donations, and by their tactic of re-forming under new
names to evade international prohibitions on donations to terrorist
organizations.... We urge Pakistan to pass an Anti-Money Laundering bill that
meets international standards, and to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit
within the State Bank of Pakistan.77
74 “Cheney Warns Pakistan to Act on Terrorism,” New York Times, February 26, 2007.
75 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2007. A July 2007
National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat included the assessment that Al Qaeda
has “protected or regenerated” its capability to attack the United States, in part due to its
enjoying “safehaven” in Pakistan’s tribal areas (see [http://www.dni.gov/
press_releases/20070717_release.pdf]).
76 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82734.htm].
77 See [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/89418.htm].

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Pakistani officials are resentful of criticisms and doubts about their commitment to
the counterterrorist fight, and they aver that U.S. pressure on Pakistan to “do more”
could undermine President Musharraf and destabilize his government.78
Al Qaeda’s Resurgence in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities reportedly have
remanded to U.S. custody roughly 500 wanted Al Qaeda fugitives to date, including
some senior alleged operatives. However, despite clear successes in disrupting Al
Qaeda and affiliated networks in Pakistan since 2001, there are increasing signs that
Al Qaeda is resurgent on Pakistani territory, with anti-U.S. terrorists appearing to
have benefitted from what some analysts call a Pakistani policy of appeasement in
western tribal areas near the Afghan border. By seeking accommodation with pro-
Taliban leaders in these areas, the Musharraf government may inadvertently have
allowed foreign (largely Arab) militants to obtain safe haven from which they can
plot and train for terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western targets. Moreover,
many observers warn that an American preoccupation with Iraq has contributed to
allowing Al Qaeda’s reemergence in Pakistan.79
Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenant, Egyptian Islamic radical
leader Ayman al-Zawahri, are believed by many to be hiding somewhere in
Pakistan’s western border region. Pakistani officials reject such suspicions and
generally insist there is no evidence to support them, but numerous U.S. officials
have suggested otherwise. While some 2006 reports placed the Al Qaeda founder in
the remote Dir Valley of northwestern Pakistan, the country’s prime minister said
those hunting Bin Laden had no clues as to his whereabouts, a claim bolstered by
Western press reports indicating that the U.S. and other special forces tasked with
finding Bin Laden had not received a credible lead in years.80 President Bush has
said he would order U.S. forces to enter Pakistan if he received good intelligence on
Osama Bin Laden’s location.81
Infiltration Into Afghanistan. Tensions between the Kabul and Islamabad
governments — which stretch back many decades — have at times reached alarming
levels in recent years, with top Afghan officials accusing Pakistan of manipulating
Islamic militancy in the region to destabilize Afghanistan. Likewise, U.S. military
commanders overseeing Operation Enduring Freedom have since 2003 complained
that renegade Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters remain able to attack coalition troops in
Afghanistan, then escape across the Pakistani frontier. They have expressed dismay
at the slow pace of progress in capturing wanted fugitives in Pakistan and urge
Islamabad to do more to secure its rugged western border area. U.S. government
78 “Cheney Warns Pakistan to Act on Terrorism,” New York Times, February 25, 2007; “US
May Be ‘Undermining’ Pakistan,” BBC News, March 1, 2007; author interviews with
Pakistani government officials.
79 See, for example, Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs, May 2007;
“Influx of Al Qaeda, Money Into Pakistan Is Seen,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2007.
80 See, for example,”The Ongoing Hunt for Osama bin Laden,” Newsweek, September 3,
2007.
81 “Bush Would Send Troops Inside Pakistan to Catch bin Laden,” CNN.com, September 20,
2006.

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officials have voiced similar worries, even expressing concern that elements of
Pakistan’s intelligence agency might be assisting members of the Taliban. In 2006,
the State Department’s top counterterrorism official told a Senate panel that elements
of Pakistan’s “local, tribal governments” are believed to be in collusion with the
Taliban and Al Qaeda, but that the United States had no “compelling evidence” that
Pakistan’s intelligence agency is assisting militants.82 Later that year, the
Commander of the U.S. European Command told the same Senate panel it was
“generally accepted” that the Taliban headquarters is somewhere in the vicinity of
Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s southwestern Baluchistan province.83
Pakistan Launches Internal Military Operations. During the autumn of
2003, in an unprecedented show of force, President Musharraf moved 25,000
Pakistani troops into the traditionally autonomous FATA on the Afghan frontier.
The first half of 2004 saw an escalation of Pakistani army operations, many in
coordination with U.S. and Afghan forces just across the international frontier. U.S.
forces have no official authorization to cross the border into Pakistan.84 The battles,
which continued sporadically throughout 2005 and again became fierce in the spring
of 2006, exacerbated volatile anti-Musharraf and anti-American sentiments held by
many Pakistani Pashtuns.85
82 Statement of Henry Crumpton before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 13,
2006. After conducting interviews with numerous active and retired Pakistan army and
intelligence officials, an American reporter concluded in 2007 that “many officers of
Pakistan’s covert security agencies remain emotionally committed to jihad and hostile to the
U.S. role in the region” (“Role of Pakistan’s ‘Captain’ Shows Enduring Taliban Ties,”
Newsday, October 14, 2007).
83 Statement of Gen. James Jones before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
September 21, 2006. See also “In the Land of the Taliban,” New York Times, October 22,
2006; “Next-Gen Taliban,” New York Times, January 6, 2008. The Pakistani Taliban differ
from their Afghan brethren in several respects, perhaps most significantly in a lack of
organization and cohesion, and they possess no unified leadership council. Moreover, the
Pakistani Taliban appear to have more limited objectives, in contrast with the Afghan
Taliban who are struggling to regain national power in Kabul. At the same time, however,
both groups pledge fealty to a single leader — Mullah Omar — and both share fundamental
policy objectives with regard to U.S. and other Western government roles in the region (see
“The Emergence of the Pakistani Taliban,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, January 1, 2008).
84 One U.S. press report claimed that Pentagon documents from 2004 gave U.S. special
forces in Afghanistan authority to enter Pakistani territory — even without prior notice to
Islamabad — while in “hot pursuit” of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters or to take direct action
against “the Big 3”: Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahri, or Mullah Omar. A Pakistani
military spokesman called the report “nonsense” and denied there was any such
arrangement. As the U.S. presidential campaign gained momentum in late 2007, some
candidates urged that U.S. forces should enter Pakistan to neutralize suspected Al Qaeda
assets there; President Musharraf responded by saying he would consider such unauthorized
crossing an invasion (“U.S. OK’d Troop Terror Hunts in Pakistan,” Associated Press,
August 23, 2007; “Musharraf on Bhutto and Taleban” (interview), Straits Times
(Singapore), January 11, 2008).
85 Pakistan is home to some 28 million Pashto-speaking people, most of them living near the
border with Afghanistan, which is home to another 13.5 million ethnic Pashtuns (also known
(continued...)

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Kabul’s October 2004 elections were held without major disturbances,
apparently in part due to Musharraf’s commitment to reducing infiltrations. Yet
concerns sharpened in 2005 and, by the middle of that year, Afghan leaders were
openly accusing Islamabad of actively supporting insurgents and providing their
leadership with safe haven. Islamabad adamantly denied the charges and sought to
reassure Kabul by dispatching additional troops to border areas, bringing the total to
80,000. Still, 2006 was the deadliest year to date for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and,
at year’s end, there were growing indications that Islamabad’s efforts to control the
tribal areas were meeting with little success.
President Musharraf’s “carrot and stick” approach of offering amnesty to those
militant tribals who “surrendered,” and using force against those who resisted, clearly
did not rid the region of indigenous Islamic militants or Al Qaeda operatives. Late
2005 and early 2006 missile attacks on suspected Al Qaeda targets — apparently
launched by U.S. aerial drones flying over Pakistani territory — hinted at more
aggressive U.S. tactics that could entail use of U.S. military assets in areas where the
Pakistanis are either unable or unwilling to strike. Yet the attacks, in particular a
January 2006 strike on Damadola in the Bajaur tribal agency that killed women and
children along with several alleged Al Qaeda suspects, spurred widespread
resentment and a perception that the country’s sovereignty was under threat.
Meanwhile, Pakistani troops operating in the region are hampered by limited
communications and other counterinsurgency capabilities, meaning their response to
provocations can be overly reliant on imprecise, mass firepower. This has
contributed to a significant number of civilian casualties. Simultaneously, tribal
leaders who cooperate with the federal government face dire threats from the
extremists — as many as 200 were the victims of targeted killings in 2005 and 2006
— and the militants have sought to deter such cooperation by periodically beheading
accused “U.S. spies.”
Islamabad Shifts Strategy. As military operations failed to subdue the
militants while causing much “collateral damage” and alienating local residents,
Islamabad in 2004 began shifting strategy and sought to arrange truces with Waziri
commanders, first at Shakai in South Waziristan in April 2004, then again in
February 2005. Officials in Islamabad recognized that the social fabric of the FATA
had changed following its role as a staging and recruiting area for the war against the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan during the 1980s: the traditional power base was eroded
as the influence of religious elements had greatly increased. President Musharraf
lambasts the creeping “Talibanization” of the tribal areas and has sought to
implement a new scheme, shifting over time from an almost wholly militarized
approach to one emphasizing negotiation and economic development in the FATA,
as well as (re-)elevating the role of tribal maliks who would work in closer
conjunction with federal political agents. The aim, then, became restoration of a kind
of enhanced status quo ante with a limited state writ (maliks would enjoy more pay
85 (...continued)
as Pakhtuns or Pathans). A hardy people with a proud martial history (they are
disproportionately represented in the Pakistani military), Pashtuns played an important role
in the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s.

CRS-31
and larger levies), and the reduction and ultimately full withdrawal of army troops.86
The U.S. government offered cautious initial support for the new strategy.87
Cease-Fire and North Waziristan Truce. In June 2006, militants in North
Waziristan announced a unilateral cease-fire to allow for creation of a tribal council
seeking resolution with government forces. The Islamabad government began
releasing detained Waziri tribesmen and withdrawing troops from selected
checkposts in a show of goodwill. Hundreds of Pashtun tribesmen and clerics later
held a tribal council with government officials, and the cease-fire was extended.
Then, on September 5, 2006, the Islamabad government and pro-Taliban militants
in Miramshah, North Waziristan, signed a truce to ensure “permanent peace” in the
region. A representative of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) governor
agreed on behalf of the government to end army operations against local tribesmen;
release all detainees; lift all public sanctions, pay compensation for property damage,
return confiscated vehicles and other goods; and remove all new army checkposts.
In turn, two representatives of the North Waziristan “local mujahideen students”
(trans. “Taliban”) agreed to end their attacks on government troops and officials; halt
the cross-border movement of insurgents to Afghanistan; and evict all foreigners who
did not agree to live in peace and honor the pact.88
News of the truce received lukewarm reception in Washington, where officials
took a “wait-and-see” approach to the development. Within weeks there was
growing concern among both U.S. government officials and independent analysts that
the truce represented a Pakistani “surrender” and had in effect created a sanctuary for
extremists, with the rate of Taliban activities in neighboring Afghanistan much
increased and the militants failing to uphold their commitments. Still, Islamabad
pressed ahead with a plan to extend a similar truce to the Bajaur tribal agency. Only
hours before such a deal was to be struck on October 30, 2006, 82 people were killed
in a dawn air attack on a madrassa in Chingai, Bajaur. The Pakistani military
claimed to have undertaken the attack after the school’s pro-Taliban leader continued
to train terrorists and shelter “unwanted foreigners,” yet many observers speculated
that the attack had in fact been carried out by U.S. Predator drones, perhaps after
intelligence reports placed fugitive Al Qaeda lieutenant al-Zawahri at the site. Nine
days later, after a local pro-Taliban militant leader vowed to retaliate against
Pakistani security forces, a suicide bomber killed 42 army recruits at a military
training camp at Dargai in the NWFP, not far from the sight of the Chingai attack.
The bombing was the most deadly attack on the Pakistani military in recent memory.
The FATA in 2007. Instability in the FATA only increased in 2007, with a
large trust deficit between government forces and tribal leaders, and a conclusion by
top U.S. officials that President Musharraf’s strategy of making truce deals with pro-
86 Author interview with a senior advisor to Prime Minister Aziz, Islamabad, September
2006; “President General Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” July 20, 2006, at
[http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/SpeechAddressList.aspx].
87 “White House Backing New Plan to Defuse Insurrection in Pakistan,” McClatchy , August
16, 2006.
88 A translated version of the pact is at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/
etc/nwdeal.html].

CRS-32
Taliban militants had failed. In January, the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, told a Senate panel that tribal leaders in
Waziristan had not abided by most terms of the September 2006 North Waziristan
agreement.89 In March, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman reported
to the same panel that there was “an almost immediate and steady increase of cross-
border infiltration and attacks” just after that agreement had been reached. Some
reports even describe anecdotes of the Pakistani military providing fire support for
Taliban units operating in Afghanistan.90 Combat between Pakistani troops and
militants in the two Waziristan agencies reportedly has killed roughly 1,000 Islamist
extremists (many of them foreigners), along with a similar number of Pakistani
soldiers and many hundreds of civilians.
In March 2007, battles erupted between tribal forces and Uzbek militants in
South Waziristan. Heavy arms — including mortars, large-caliber machineguns, and
rockets — were used by both sides, and some 300 people, most of them Uzbeks,
were reported killed. President Musharraf later acknowledged that the Pakistani
army had provided fire support for what essentially were pro-Taliban tribal forces.
The fighting was touted by Islamabad as a sign that its new strategy was paying
dividends. Yet such conflict may well have been more about long-brewing local
resentments toward Uzbeks, and there is further concern among skeptics that the
battles served to strengthen the “Pakistani Taliban” and helped to consolidate their
control in the tribal areas.91
By 2007, U.S. intelligence analysts had amassed considerable evidence
indicating that Islamabad’s truces with religious militants in the FATA had given
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other Islamist extremists space in which to rebuild their
networks. Faced with such evidence, President Musharraf refrained from any change
in strategy, saying he was “making adjustments” and would proceed cautiously. A
behind-the-scenes diplomatic effort to prod the Musharraf government on its
counterterrorism strategy was ramped up during the course of the year, but it may
have only been through more public and strongly-worded U.S. criticisms of Pakistan
in July that Islamabad was convinced to be more energetic in its militarized efforts.92
A spate of militant attacks on Pakistani military targets during that month —
apparently in retaliation for the government’s armed assault on Islamabad’s radical
Red Mosque — led Musharraf to further bolster the army’s presence in the region
and coincided with an announcement by North Waziristan tribal leaders that they
were withdrawing from the September 2006 truce agreement due to alleged
government violations. Top Bush Administration officials subsequently conceded
that the agreement had failed to produce the desired results for both Pakistan and the
United States, and they suggested the tack should be abandoned.93
89 Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007.
90 “U.S. Pays Pakistan to Fight Terror, But Patrols Ebb,” New York Times, May 20, 2007.
91 “Pakistan’s Unlikely Alliances Worry West,” Chicago Tribune, April 22, 2007; “The
Game Is Up for Uzbeks,” Dawn (Karachi), April 5, 2007.
92 “Tougher Stance on Pakistan Took Months,” Washington Post, August 5, 2007.
93 “U.S. Boosts Pressure on Musharraf Over Al Qaeda,” Reuters, July 18, 2007.

CRS-33
Meanwhile, it appears the “Pakistani Taliban” of North Waziristan has
succeeded in establishing a local administrative infrastructure much as was done in
South Waziristan following the April 2004 Shakai agreement. In the words of one
Washington-based expert,
“[W]e cannot ignore the fact that across much of Pakistan’s border with
Afghanistan, Islamabad has, for now, lost the battle to fight militancy and
terrorism.... [T]oday the Pakistan state has virtually ceded North and South
Waziristan to powerful radical forces. Justice, education, and social policies are
in the hands of the Pakistani militants who practice a strongly conservative form
of Islam.... By indulging and supporting extremists as a tool to retain and hold
influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan has introduced changes that undermined its
ability to maintain its writ within its own borders.”94
Reports also continue to indicate that the FATA increasingly provides a base for a
new generation of Islamist militants and is the site of numerous terrorist training
camps, some associated with Al Qaeda.95
Despite acknowledged setbacks, the Bush Administration claims to strongly
support President Musharraf’s efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to
include economic and social development, and governance reform in the region,
flowing in part from an acknowledgment that purely military solutions are unlikely
to succeed.96 Yet international donors and lending agencies appear hesitant to
finance projects in the region while the security situation remains tense, and some in
the U.S. government reportedly are wary of infusing development aid that could end
up in the hands of elements unfriendly to U.S. interests.97 Many analysts insist that
only by bringing the tribal areas under the full writ of the Pakistani state and
facilitating major economic development there can the FATA problem be resolved.98
Infiltration into Kashmir and India. Islamabad has been under continuous
U.S. and international pressure to terminate the infiltration of separatist militants
across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). Such pressure reportedly elicited a
94 Statement of Prof. Marvin Weinbaum before the House Armed Services Committee,
October 10, 2007.
95 See, for example, “Official Links German Terror Plot to Syrian Arms, Pakistani
Operatives,” Washington Post, September 26, 2007; “Terrorists in Training Head to
Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, October 14, 2007.
96 Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard
Boucher before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and
South Asia, “Regional Overview of South Asia,” March 7, 2007. Pakistani strategy as
conveyed by the country’s Ambassador to the United Nations in Munir Akram, “A United
Front Against the Taliban,” New York Times, April 4, 2007.
97 “Aid to Pakistan in Tribal Areas Raises Concerns,” New York Times, July 16, 2007.
98 Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,”
U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 176, October 2006; “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas:
Appeasing the Militants,” International Crisis Group Asia Report 125, December 11, 2006;
Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and Alexander Thier, “Troubles on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan Border,” U.S. Institute for Peace Briefing, December 2006.

CRS-34
January 2002 promise from President Musharraf to then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage that all such movements would cease. During a June 2002
visit to Islamabad, Deputy Secretary Armitage reportedly received another pledge
from the Pakistani president, this time an assurance that any existing terrorist camps
in Pakistani Kashmir would be closed. Musharraf has assured India that he will not
permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism, and he
insists that his government is doing everything possible to stop infiltration and shut
down militant base camps in Pakistani-controlled territory. Critics contend, however,
that Islamabad continues to actively support anti-India militants as a means both to
maintain strategically the domestic backing of Islamists who view the Kashmir issue
as fundamental to the Pakistani national idea, and to disrupt tactically the state
government in Indian Kashmir in seeking to erode New Delhi’s legitimacy there.
Positive indications growing from the latest Pakistan-India peace initiative
include a cease-fire at the LOC that has held since November 2003 and statements
from Indian officials indicating that rates of militant infiltration are down
significantly. However, Indian leaders periodically reiterate their complaints that
Islamabad has taken insufficient action to eradicate the remaining “infrastructure of
terrorism” on Pakistani-controlled territory. With indications that terrorism on Indian
soil beyond the Jammu and Kashmir state may have been linked to Pakistan-based
terrorist groups, Indian leaders repeat demands that Pakistan uphold its promises to
curtail the operations of Islamic militants and violent Kashmiri separatists originating
on Pakistani-controlled territory.
Following conflicting reports from Indian government officials about the
criminal investigation into July 2006 Bombay terrorist bombings, India’s prime
minister stated that India had “credible evidence” of Pakistani government complicity
in the plot. Islamabad rejected Indian accusations as “propaganda” designed “to
externalize an internal [Indian] malaise.”99 Several other terrorist attacks against
Indian targets outside of Kashmir have been linked to Pakistan-based groups,
including lethal assaults on civilians in Delhi and Bangalore in 2005, in Varanasi in
2006, and in Hyderabad in 2007. Indian security officials also routinely blame
Pakistan’s intelligence service for assisting the infiltration of Islamist militants into
India from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, as well as across the Kashmiri LOC.100
Domestic Terrorism. Pakistan is known to be a base for numerous
indigenous terrorist organizations, and the country continues to suffer from terrorism
at home. Until a March 2006 car bombing at the U.S. consulate in Karachi that left
one American diplomat dead, recent attacks on Western targets had been rare, but
2002 saw several acts of lethal anti-Western terrorism, including the kidnaping and
murder of reporter Daniel Pearl, a grenade attack on a Protestant church in Islamabad
that killed a U.S. Embassy employee, and two car bomb attacks, including one on the
same U.S. consulate, which killed a total of 29 people. These attacks, widely viewed
as expressions of militants’ anger with the Musharraf regime for its cooperation with
99 “We Have Credible Evidence: Manmohan,” Hindu (Madras), October 25, 2006; Pakistan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media Briefing, October 2, 2006.
100 According to India’s national security advisor, most terrorist activity in India has been
“generated from outside”(“MK Narayanan” (interview), India Abroad, September 21, 2007).

CRS-35
the United States, were linked to Al Qaeda, as well as to indigenous militant groups,
by U.S. and Pakistani officials.
From 2003-2006, Pakistan’s most serious domestic terrorism was directed
against the country’s Shia minority and included suicide bomb attacks that killed
scores of people (nearly 60 Sunnis also were killed in a 2006 suicide bombing in
Karachi). Indications are that the indigenous Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) Sunni terrorist
group is responsible for the most deadly anti-Shia violence. Two attempts to kill
Musharraf in December 2003 and failed efforts to assassinate other top Pakistani
officials in mid-2004 were linked to the LJ and other Al Qaeda-allied groups, and
illuminated the grave and continuing danger presented by religious extremists.
Following a July 2006 suicide bombing in Karachi that killed a prominent Shiite
cleric, Musharraf renewed his pledge to crack down on religious extremists; hundreds
of Sunni clerics and activists were subsequently arrested for inciting violence against
Shiites through sermons and printed materials. However, serious sectarian and other
religiously-motivated violence flared anew in late 2006 and continued in 2007.
Bomb attacks, many of them by suicidal extremists motivated by sectarian hatreds,
killed scores of people; some reports link the upsurge in such attacks to growing
sectarian conflict in Iraq. Since the summer of 2007 and continuing to the time of
this writing, most suicide bomb attacks have been perpetrated against Pakistan’s
security apparatus in apparent retaliation for the army’s July raid on Islamabad’s
radical Red Mosque. By one accounting, Pakistan suffered 60 suicide bomb attacks
in 2007 costing 770 lives.
A leading pro-Taliban militant in the South Waziristan tribal agency, Baitullah
Mehsud, issued vows to avenge Pakistani military and paramilitary attacks in the
region in early 2007; he reportedly has been linked to at least four anti-government
suicide bombings in Pakistan and in 2007 emerged as a major challenge to
Islamabad’s writ in the tribal areas.101 Some analysts believe that, by redirecting
Pakistan’s internal security resources, an increase in such violence can ease pressure
on Al Qaeda and affiliated groups and so allow them to operate more freely there.
In June 2007, Pakistan’s National Security Council reportedly warned President
Musharraf that Islamist militancy was rapidly spreading beyond western tribal areas
and that a “policy of appeasement” had emboldened the Taliban. The Council was
said to have formulated new plans to address the issue, including the deployment of
pilotless reconnaissance drones, bolstering local law enforcement capabilities, and
shifting more paramilitary troops to the region from other parts of Pakistan.102
Other Security Issues
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation. U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation
accelerated rapidly after 2001, and President Bush formally designated Pakistan as
101 “Doubts Over Peace Deal,” BBC News, January 17, 2007; “Baitullah Linked to Suicide
Attacks, Says FIA Official,” Dawn (Karachi), March 21, 2007; “Taliban Commander
Emerges as Pakistan’s ‘Biggest Problem,’” Washington Post, January 10, 2008.
102 “Pakistani President Reviews Political, Economic, Anti-Terrorism Measures,” BBC
Monitoring South Asia
, June 4, 2007.

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a major non-NATO U.S. ally in June 2004. The close U.S.- Pakistan security ties of
the cold war era — which came to a near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff — have been
restored as a result of Pakistan’s role in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. In
2002, the United States began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to
refurbish at least part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft. In 2005, the
United States announced that it would resume sales of new F-16 fighters to Pakistan
after a 16-year hiatus. A revived high-level U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative
Group (DCG) — moribund since 1997 — again sits for high-level discussions on
military cooperation, security assistance, and anti-terrorism; its most recent session
came in May 2006. In 2003, a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission was
established to bring together military commanders for discussions on Afghan stability
and border security; a session held in Pakistan in January 2007 included
establishment of the first joint intelligence sharing center in Kabul to boost
cooperation against Taliban and other extremists. Officers from NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan have joined the body.
In response to ever-increasing rates of Islamist-related violence in Pakistan, the
Bush Administration reportedly is in 2008 considering giving a freer hand to the CIA
and Pentagon to conduct covert military operations in that country’s tribal areas.
Critics argue that U.S. military intervention is likely to be ineffective and perhaps
even counterproductive by alienating the Pakistani army and increasing local support
for the militants. Islamabad vigorously rejects any suggestions that foreign military
operations will be allowed on Pakistani territory.103
Defense Supplies. Major government-to-government arms sales and grants
to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful for counterterrorism operations,
along with a number of “big ticket” platforms more suited to conventional warfare.
In dollar value terms, the bulk of purchases are made with Pakistani national funds
— the Pentagon reports total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth
$863 million in FY2002-FY2005; in-process sales of F-16s and related equipment
raised the value to $3.5 billion in FY2006 alone. The United States also has provided
Pakistan with about $1.23 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) since 2001,
with a”base program” of $300 million per year since FY2005. These funds are used
to purchase U.S. military equipment. Pakistan also has been granted U.S. defense
supplies as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Major post-2001 defense supplies under
FMF include:
! eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and their refurbishment
(valued at $295 million);
! about 5,250 TOW anti-armor missiles ($186 million);
! more than 5,600 military radio sets ($163 million);
! six AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars ($100 million);
! six C-130E transport aircraft and their refurbishment ($76 million);
and
! 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters granted under EDA, then
refurbished ($48 million).
103 “U.S. Considers New Covert Push Within Pakistan,” New York Times, January 6, 2008;
“Pakistan Says Won’t Let Foreign Troops on Its Soil,” Reuters, January 7, 2008.

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Supplies paid for with a mix of Pakistani national funds and FMF include:
! up to 60 mid-life upgrade kits for F-16A/B combat aircraft (total
value of $891 million, with $108 million of this in FMF); and
! 115 M-109 self-propelled howitzers ($87 million, with $53 million
in FMF).
Notable items paid for entirely with Pakistani national funds include:
! 18 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 combat aircraft (with an option for 18
more) (valued at $1.43 billion);
! 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles ($629 million);
! 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($298 million);
! 600 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles ($95 million); and
! six Phalanx close-in naval guns ($80 million).104
The Pentagon is negotiating the possible transfer to Pakistan of three P-3B
aircraft as EDA grants that would be modified to carry the E-2C Hawkeye airborne
early warning suite in a deal worth up to $855 million. If implemented, FMF could
be used toward this purchase. Major EDA grants since 2001 also include four F-16A
combat aircraft (24 more such aircraft will be transferred to Pakistan as they become
excess to the U.S. Air Force). Under Coalition Support Funds (part of the Pentagon
budget), Pakistan also received 26 Bell 412 helicopters, along with related parts and
maintenance, valued at $235 million. The Department of Defense has characterized
F-16 fighters, P-3C patrol aircraft, and anti-armor missiles as having significant anti-
terrorism applications. The State Department claims that, since 2005, FMF funds
have been “solely for counterterrorism efforts, broadly defined.”105 These claims
elicit skepticism from some analysts.
Other security-related U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan are said to be aimed
especially at bolstering Islamabad’s counterterrorism and border security efforts, and
have included U.S.-funded road-building projects in the NWFP and FATA; and the
provision of night-vision equipment, communications gear, protective vests, and
transport helicopters and aircraft. The United States also has undertaken to train and
equip new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target
terrorist elements. Modest U.S.-funded military education and training programs
seek to enhance the professionalism of Pakistan’s military leaders, and develop
respect for rule of law, human rights, and democratic values.
Some reports indicate that U.S. military assistance to Pakistan has failed to
effectively bolster the paramilitary forces battling Islamist militants in western
Pakistan. Such forces are said to remain underfunded, poorly trained, and
104 Data reported by the U.S. Department of Defense. See also CRS Report RS22757, U.S.
Arms Sales to Pakistan
.
105 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/97946.htm].

CRS-38
“overwhelmingly outgunned.”106 As part of a five-year, $750 million FATA
development assistance plan for Pakistan, the Bush Administration has launched an
initiative to strengthen the capacity of the Frontier Corps (FC), an 80,000-man
paramilitary force overseen by the Pakistani Interior Ministry. The FC has primary
responsibility for border security in the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces. The
Pentagon in 2007 began using its funds to train and equip the FC, as well as to
increase the involvement of the U.S. Special Operations Command in assisting with
Pakistani counterterrorism efforts. One former Pakistani police official opines that,
without fundamental structural reforms, the prospects for meaningfully improving
Frontier Corps capabilities are dim. Among his recommended changes are the
appointment of more local tribesmen into command positions and a restoration of the
authority of local political agents.107 A potential effort to bolster the capabilities of
tribal leaders near the Afghan border would target that region’s Al Qaeda elements
and be similar to U.S. efforts in Iraq’s Anbar province. Employing this tack in
Pakistan presents new difficulties, however, including the fact that the “neo-Taliban”
is not alien to Pakistan’s western regions but is, in fact, comprised of the tribals’
ethnolinguistic brethren.108
U.S. security assistance to Pakistan’s civilian sector is aimed at strengthening
the country’s law enforcement capabilities through basic police training, provision
of advanced identification systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism
Special Investigation Group. U.S. efforts may be hindered by Pakistani shortcomings
that include poorly trained and poorly equipped personnel who generally are
underpaid by ineffectively coordinated and overburdened government agencies.109
Renewed F-16 Sales and Congressional Concerns.110 In June 2006,
the Pentagon notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan worth
up to $5.1 billion. The deal involves 18 newly-built advanced F-16 combat aircraft
(and an option for 18 more), along with related munitions and equipment, and would
represent the largest-ever weapons sale to Pakistan. Associated munitions for new
F-16s and for mid-life upgrades on others include 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles
and 700 BLU-109 bombs. Congressional concerns about the sale and displeasure at
the Bush Administration’s apparently improper notification procedures spurred a July
2006 hearing of the House International Relations Committee. During that session,
many Members worried that F-16s were better suited to fighting India than to
combating terrorists; some warned that U.S. military technology could be passed
from Pakistan to China. The State Department’s lead official on political-military
106 “U.S. Aid to Pakistan Misses Al Qaeda Target,” Los Angeles Times, November 5, 2007.
107 “Pentagon Draws Up Plans to Train, Expand Pakistani Frontier Corps,” Agence France
Presse
, November 19, 2007; Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Corps,”
Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, March 29, 2007.
108 “Pakistan Strife Threatens Anti-Insurgent Plan,” Washington Post, November 9, 2007;
“U.S. Hopes to Arm Pakistani Tribes Against Al Qaeda,” New York Times, November 19,
2007; Peter Brookes, “The Tribal Option” (op-ed), New York Post, November 20, 2007.
109 See, for example, Seth Jones, et al., “Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform?,” RAND
Corporation Monograph, January 7, ch. 6, 2007.
110 See also CRS Report RL33515, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia

CRS-39
relations sought to assure the committee that the sale would serve U.S. interests by
strengthening the defense capabilities of a key ally without disturbing the regional
balance of power and that all possible measures would be taken to prevent the
onward transfer of U.S. technologies. H.J.Res. 93, disapproving the proposed sale,
was introduced in the House, but died in committee.
Secretary of State Rice subsequently informed Congress that no F-16 combat
aircraft or related equipment would be delivered to Pakistan until Islamabad provided
written security assurances that U.S. technology will not be accessible by third
parties. Islamabad has denied that any “extraordinary” security requirements were
requested; however, congressional concerns appear to have been satisfactorily
addressed. After further negotiations on specifics, including a payment process that
will require a major outlay from the Pakistani treasury, the United States and
Pakistan signed a September 2006 letter of acceptance for the multi-billion dollar F-
16 deal. Since then, several major U.S. defense corporations have won contracts
worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply F-16 parts and munitions to Pakistan,
including a December 2007 award to Lockheed-Martin worth about $500 million.
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation.111 Many policy analysts
consider an apparent arms race between India and Pakistan to be among the most
likely potential causes of the future use of nuclear weapons by states. In May 1998,
India conducted unannounced nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed
moratorium on such testing. Despite U.S. and world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan
quickly followed. The tests created a global storm of criticism and represented a
serious setback to two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia.
Pakistan currently is believed to have enough fissile material, mainly enriched
uranium, for 55-90 nuclear weapons; India, with a program focused on plutonium,
may be capable of building a similar number. Both countries have aircraft capable
of delivering nuclear bombs (U.S.-supplied F-16 combat aircraft in Pakistan’s air
force reportedly have been refitted to carry nuclear bombs).112 Pakistan’s military has
inducted short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (allegedly acquired from China
and North Korea), while India possesses short- and intermediate-range missiles.
Both countries have tested cruise missiles with radar-evading capabilities. All
missiles are assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads over significant
distances. In 2000, Pakistan placed its nuclear forces under the control of a National
Command Authority led by the president. According to the director of the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan is building its stockpile of fission weapons
and is likely to continue work on advanced warhead and delivery systems.113
111 See also CRS Report RL32115, Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South
Asia
; and CRS Report RS21237, Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons.
112 “Pakistan Jets Said to be Nuclear-Capable,” Associated Press, July 25, 1989.
113 Statement of Lt. Gen. Michael Maples before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, January 11, 2007.

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The A.Q. Khan Nuclear Proliferation Network.114 Press reports in late
2002 suggested that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang’s covert nuclear weapons program
by providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and technologies
beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002. Islamabad rejected such
reports as “baseless,” and Secretary of State Powell was assured that no such
transfers were occurring. If such assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-
humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be suspended, although the President has the
authority to waive any sanctions that he determines would jeopardize U.S. national
security. In early 2003, the Administration determined that the relevant facts “do not
warrant imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws.” Press reports during
2003 suggested that both Iran and Libya benefitted from Pakistani nuclear assistance.
Islamabad denied any nuclear cooperation with Tehran or Tripoli, although it
conceded in December 2003 that certain senior scientists were under investigation
for possible “independent” proliferation activities.
The investigation led to the February 2004 “public humiliation” of metallurgist
Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program
and a national hero, when he confessed to involvement in an illicit nuclear smuggling
network. Khan and at least seven associates were said to have sold crucial nuclear
weapons technology and uranium-enrichment materials to North Korea, Iran, and
Libya. President Musharraf, citing Khan’s contributions to his nation, issued a
pardon that was later called conditional.115 The United States has been assured that
the Islamabad government had no knowledge of such activities and indicated that the
decision to pardon is an internal Pakistani matter. Some independent observers have
insisted that Khan’s activities were, in fact, well known to top Pakistani authorities
and that elements of the U.S. government turned a blind eye to the proliferation while
seeking Pakistan’s continued cooperation with other foreign policy efforts.
While President Musharraf did promise President Bush that all information
learned about Khan’s proliferation network would be shared, Pakistan has refused to
allow any direct access to Khan by U.S. or international investigators.116 In May
2006, days after releasing from detention nuclear scientist and suspected Khan
collaborator Mohammed Farooq, the Islamabad government declared the
investigation “closed.” Some in Congress remained skeptical, however, and a House
panel subsequently held a hearing at which three nongovernmental experts insisted
that U.S. and international investigators be given direct access to Khan, in particular
to learn more about assistance given to Iran’s nuclear program. No alleged Pakistani
participants, including Khan himself, have faced criminal charges in the case.
In May 2007, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies
released a report on the Khan network, finding that “at least some of Khan’s
114 See also CRS Report RL32745, Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
.
115 In May 2007, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States reportedly said that if Khan
had not been a national hero, “we would have strung him from the highest tree” (“A
‘Worrisome’ Time in Pakistan” [interview], USA Today, May 23, 2007).
116 At least one report indicates that U.S. investigators have, in fact, had direct access to
Khan (Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” New Yorker, April 17, 2006).

CRS-41
associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could, after a period
of lying low, resume their black-market business.”117 Shortly after, a House panel
held another hearing on the Khan network, at which several Members and
nongovernmental experts called for Pakistan to allow direct access to Khan for U.S.
investigators. In July, Islamabad reportedly eased house arrest restrictions on Khan,
although the Foreign Ministry denied any change in Khan’s status. Some observers
say Iran’s strides in uranium enrichment and the related international crisis are almost
wholly attributable to Khan’s past assistance to Tehran’s nuclear program.118
Major New Plutonium Facilities? Revelations in July 2006 that Pakistan
is in the midst of constructing a major heavy water nuclear reactor at the Khushab
complex brought a flurry of concern from analysts who foresee a regional
competition in fissile material production, perhaps including China. A subsequent
report identified a third plutonium production reactor at Khushab. Upon completion,
which could be several years away, two new reactors with combined 1,000-megawatt
capacity might boost Pakistan’s weapons-grade plutonium production capabilities to
more than 200 kilograms per year, or enough for up to 50 nuclear weapons.
Moreover, a January 2007 report warned that Pakistan may soon be reprocessing
weapons-grade plutonium at its Chashma facility, further adding to its potential
stockpile and aiding in the development of thermonuclear weapons.119 While
Islamabad does not comment directly on the constructions, government officials there
insist that Pakistan will continue to update and consolidate its nuclear program for
the purpose of minimum credible deterrence. The Bush Administration responded
to the 2006 revelations by claiming it had been aware of Pakistani plans and that it
discourages the use of the facilities for military purposes.120
Pakistan’s Nuclear Transparency and Security.121 During 2006,
Islamabad appeared to launch a public relations effort aimed at overcoming the
stigma caused by Khan’s proliferation activities. The effort included dispatching to
Washington the chief of the country’s Strategic Plans Division, Lt. Gen. Khalid
Kidwai, who attempted to make more transparent Pakistan’s nuclear command and
control structure, and who acknowledged that Pakistan’s past proliferation record had
been “poor and indefensible.”122 Many analysts now assert that meaningful efforts
have been made to improve the physical security of Pakistan’s strategic arsenal.
117 See [http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm].
118 Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, “Pakistan’s Dr. Doom” (op-ed), Los Angeles
Times
, December 2, 2007.
1 1 9 See David Albright and Paul Brannan, June 21, 2007, at
[http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/ThirdKhushabReactor.pdf]; and January
18, 2007, at [http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/chashma.pdf].
120 “U.S. Says It Knew Of Pakistani Reactor Plan,” Washington Post, July 25, 2006.
121 See also CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.
122 Speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, October
24, 2006.

CRS-42
Among the most urgent concerns of U.S. officials during Pakistan’s political
crisis has been the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials, which could
be degraded as instability persists. While the danger of Islamist extremist gaining
possession of a nuclear explosive device is considered remote, the risk of rogue
scientists or security officials seeking to sell nuclear materials and/or technology is
seen to be higher in a setting of deteriorating security conditions. Pentagon officials
backpedaled from early expressions of concern, saying they believe Pakistan’s
arsenal was “under the appropriate control.” The United States reportedly has spent
nearly $100 million since 2001 on a classified program to help secure Pakistan’s
strategic weapons. Islamabad emphatically rejected suggestions that the country’s
nuclear arsenal is anything but fully secure, calling the story “distorted.”123
Most analysts appear to have concluded that the security of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons and facilities are much improved in recent years. More worrisome, many
claim, is the possibility that Pakistan’s nuclear know-how or technologies could
remain prone to leakage.124 Even India’s national security advisor — a figure not
expected to downplay the dangers — has stated an opinion that Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal is “largely safe.”125 Still, in January 2008, IAEA Director-General
Mohammed ElBaradei expressed fear that continued “chaos” could lead to Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremist elements. As expected, the
Islamabad government angrily rejects such fears as unrealistic, but even some
Pakistani commentators aver that such warnings should not be dismissed.126
Pakistan reportedly has since 2005 been employing a multilayered system of
checks that most prominently includes a Personnel Reliability Program modeled after
that used by the United States. The program carefully vets and monitors potential
and serving employees at the country’s nuclear facilities with a particular emphasis
on religious sentiments. Other aspects include biometric scanners and what Pakistani
officials call their indigenously developed versions of Permissive Action Links
(PALs), sophisticated locks put on U.S. nuclear weapons to prevent their
unauthorized use. Reports of U.S. “war-gaming” scenarios to intervene in Pakistan
to secure the country’s nuclear weapons in a crisis suggest that U.S. options are
severely limited and that the cooperation of the Pakistani government and military
123 “Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal a U.S. Worry,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2007; “US
Says Not Concerned About Pakistani Nukes,” Reuters, November 14, 2007; “U.S. Secretly
Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, November 18, 2007; Pakistan
Foreign Ministry statements at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Spokesperson/2007/Nov/
Spokes_12_11_07.htm] and [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Nov/
PR_281_07.htm]. See also CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.
124 See, for example, Andrew Koch and Kristin Rayhack, “Political Fallout: The Threat to
Pakistan’s Nuclear Stability,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2008.
125 Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets — Myths Vs Reality” (op-ed), Tehran Times,
December 11, 2007; “Pakistan Nukes Safely Guarded: Narayanan,” Hindu (Chennai),
December 18, 2007.
126 “Pakistan Rejects IAEA Chief’s Concerns, United Press International, January 9, 2008;
“Why is the World Scared of Pakistan?” (editorial), Daily Times, January 10, 2008.

CRS-43
would be crucial to the success of such efforts. Such reports may themselves
antagonize Islamabad.127
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. The United States has long sought to halt or
limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In May 1998, following the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on all
non-humanitarian aid to both countries as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms
Export Control Act. However, Congress and the President acted almost immediately
to lift certain aid restrictions and, in October 2001, all remaining nuclear-related
sanctions on Pakistan (and India) were removed. Officially, the United States
continues to urge Pakistan and India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states and it offers no official recognition of their
nuclear weapons capabilities, which exist outside of the international
nonproliferation regime.
During the latter years of the Clinton Administration, the United States set forth
nonproliferation “benchmarks” for Pakistan and India, including halting further
nuclear testing and signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT); halting fissile material production and pursuing Fissile Material Control
Treaty negotiations; refraining from deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic
missiles; and restricting any and all exportation of nuclear materials or technologies.
The results of U.S. efforts were mixed, at best, and neither Pakistan nor India are
signatories to the CTBT or the NPT. The Bush Administration quickly set aside the
benchmark framework. Concerns about onward proliferation, fears that Pakistan
could become destabilized by the U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan,
and concern over the issue of political succession in Islamabad have heightened U.S.
attention to weapons proliferation in the region. Section 1601 of P.L. 107-228
outlined U.S. nonproliferation objectives for South Asia. Some Members of
Congress have identified “contradictions” in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward
South Asia, particularly as related to the Senate’s rejection of the CTBT and
indications that the United States seeks to build new nuclear weapons.
During a July 2007 policy review for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Under Secretary of State Burns said,
We welcome the action Pakistan has taken to bring its export controls in line
with international standards, including the recent establishment of a Strategic
Export Control Division within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to centralize
licensing and enforcement. Pakistan continues its cooperation with the United
States under the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program.
We welcome Pakistan’s participation in the Container Security Initiative and the
Secure Freight Initiative.... We are also pleased that, in early June, Pakistan
joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.... Additionally, the
U.S. Department of Energy is working with their counterparts in Pakistan on
radiation source security and is in the process of finalizing an agreement to
install radiation detection equipment at Pakistani ports and border crossings. We
hope Pakistan will continue to take steps to join additional international
127 “Inside Pakistan’s Drive to Guard It’s A-Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, November 29,
2007; “Calculating the Risks in Pakistan,” Washington Post, December 2, 2007.

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nonproliferation programs and regimes so it can finally move beyond the stigma
of the A.Q. Khan era.128
Pakistan-India Tensions and the Kashmir Issue. In the interests of
regional stability, the United States strongly encourages an ongoing Pakistan-India
peace initiative and remains concerned about the potential for long-standing
disagreements to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries.
Relations between Pakistan and India remain deadlocked on the issue of Kashmiri
sovereignty, and a separatist rebellion has been underway in the region since 1989.
Tensions were extremely high in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999, when an
incursion by Pakistani soldiers led to a bloody six-week-long battle. Throughout
2000 and 2001, cross-border firing and shelling caused scores of both military and
civilian deaths. A July 2001 Pakistan-India summit meeting failed to produce even
a joint statement, reportedly due to pressure from hardliners on both sides. Major
stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to
future talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism.”
The 2002 Crisis. Secretary of State Powell visited South Asia in mid-October
2001 in an effort to ease escalating tensions over Kashmir, but a bombing at the
Jammu and Kashmir state assembly building later that month was followed by a
December assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi (both incidents were
blamed on Pakistan-based terrorist groups). India mobilized some 700,000 troops
along the Pakistan-India frontier and threatened war unless Islamabad ended all
“cross-border infiltration” of Islamic militants. This action triggered a corresponding
Pakistani military mobilization. Under significant international diplomatic pressure
(and likely also the threat of India’s use of force), President Musharraf in January
2002 gave a landmark address in which he vowed to end the presence of terrorist
entities on Pakistani soil, and he outlawed five militant groups, including those most
often named in attacks in India: Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.129
Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into Indian-held Kashmir continued,
and a May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most
of them women and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the
brink of full-scale war, and caused Islamabad to recall army troops from patrol
operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Intensive international diplomatic
missions to South Asia reduced tensions during the summer of 2002 and appear to
have prevented the outbreak of war. Numerous top U.S. officials were involved in
the effort and strenuously urged the two countries to renew bilateral dialogue.130
The Most Recent Peace Process. Pakistan and India began full military
draw-downs in October 2002 and, after a cooling-off period, a “hand of friendship”
offer to Pakistan by the Indian prime minister in April 2003 led to the restoration of
full diplomatic relations. Yet surging separatist violence that summer contributed to
128 See [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/89418.htm].
129 Text at [http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesSpeeches/Addresses/
1020200475758AMword%20file.pdf]
130 See Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin
Peaks Crisis” at [http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/USCrisisManagement.pdf].

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an exchange of sharp rhetoric between Pakistani and Indian leaders at the United
Nations, casting doubt on the nascent peace effort. A new confidence-building
initiative got Pakistan and India back on a positive track, and a November 2003
cease-fire was initiated after a proposal by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah
Khan Jamali. President Musharraf subsequently suggested that Pakistan might be
willing to “set aside” its long-standing demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, a proposal
welcomed by the United States, but called a “disastrous shift” in policy by Pakistani
opposition parties.
Although militant infiltration did not end, New Delhi acknowledged that it was
significantly decreased and, combined with other confidence-building measures,
relations were sufficiently improved that the Indian prime minister attended a January
2004 summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in
Islamabad. There Pakistan and India issued a joint “Islamabad Declaration” calling
for a renewed “Composite Dialogue” to bring about “peaceful settlement of all
bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”131
A major confidence-building development came in April 2005, when a new bus
service was launched linking Muzaffarabad in Pakistani Kashmir and Srinagar in
Indian Kashmir, and a summit meeting produced an agreement to address the
Kashmir issue “in a forward looking manner for a final settlement.” Still, many
Kashmiris reject any settlement process that excludes them.
Even as the normalization of India-Pakistan relations moves forward — and
likely in reaction to their apparent marginalization in the face of this development —
separatist militants continue their attacks, and many observers in both India and the
United States believe support for Kashmiri militants remains Pakistani state policy.
Yet many indicators show positive long-term trends. Steadily reduced rates of
infiltration may be attributed to the endurance of the Pakistan-India dialogue.
Moreover, President Musharraf has made considerable efforts to exhibit flexibility,
including December 2006 statements that Pakistan is “against independence” for
Kashmir, and his offering of a four-point proposal that would lead to “self-
governance ... falling between autonomy and independence.”132 This was seen by
many analysts as being roughly in line with New Delhi’s Kashmir position. Indeed,
the Indian prime minister welcomed Musharraf’s proposals, saying they “contribute
to the ongoing thought process.” Prospects for a government-to-government
accommodation may thus be brighter than ever before. However, political and
security crises in Pakistan have slowed the process in 2007.
India has watched Pakistan’s late 2007 political and security turmoil with great
interest, but little public comment. A destabilized Pakistan represents a major
security concern for New Delhi, but at the same time history shows that as Pakistan’s
internal difficulties grow, Pakistani interference in Indian affairs tends to decrease.133
131 [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].
132 “Pakistani Says Concessions Could Produce Kashmir Pact,” New York Times, December
6, 2006.
133 “As Pakistan Boils, India Watches,” Chicago Tribune, December 30, 2007.

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Baluchistan Unrest. Pakistan’s vast southwestern Baluchistan province is
about the size of California and accounts for 44% of the country’s land area, but only
5% of its population. The U.S. military has made use of bases in the region to
support its operations in neighboring Afghanistan. The province is the proposed
setting for a pipeline that would deliver Iranian natural gas to both Pakistan and
India, a project which, if brought to fruition, could bring hundreds of millions of
dollars in annual transit fees to Islamabad’s national treasury. The United States
opposes this “IPI” pipeline project as part of its effort to isolate Iran internationally.
Security problems in Baluchistan reduce the appeal to investors of building a pipeline
across the province. The presence in Baluchistan of Jundallah, a trans-border
militant group that claims to fight on behalf of Baloch rights, has caused friction
between Islamabad and Tehran. More broadly, such problems raise serious questions
about Pakistan’s internal stability and national cohesion.
Over the decades of Pakistani independence, many of the ethnic Baloch and
some of the Pashtun tribes who inhabit this relatively poor and underdeveloped
province have engaged in armed conflict with federal government forces, variously
seeking more equitable returns on the region’s rich natural resources, greater
autonomy under the country’s federal system, or even outright independence and
formation of a Baloch state that might include ethnic brethren and some territories
in both Afghanistan and Iran. Non-Baloch (mostly Punjabis) have been seen to
benefit disproportionately from mineral and energy extraction projects, and
indigenous Baloch were given only a small role in the construction of a major new
port at Gwadar. Many Baloch thus complain of being a marginalized group in their
own homeland. Long-standing resentments sparked armed conflicts in 1948, 1958,
and 1973. The latter insurrection, which lasted four years, involved tens of thousands
of armed guerillas and brought much destruction to the province; it was put down
only after a major effort by the Pakistan Army, which made use of combat helicopters
provided by Iran. Some 8,000 rebels and Pakistani soldiers were killed.
The Current Conflict. Mid-2004 saw an increase in hit-and-run attacks on
army outposts and in the sabotage of oil and gas pipelines. The alleged rape of a
Baloch doctor by Pakistani soldiers in January 2005 sparked provincial anger and a
major spike in separatist violence over the course of the year. In December 2005,
rockets were fired at a Baluchistan army camp during a visit to the site by President
Musharraf. A Baloch separatist group claimed responsibility and the Pakistani
military began major offensive operations to destroy the militants’ camps. In the
midst of increasingly heavy fighting in January 2006, Musharraf openly accused India
of arming and financing militants fighting in Baluchistan. New Delhi categorically
rejected the allegations. U.N. and other international aid groups soon suspended their
operations in Baluchistan due to security concerns. Shortly after, Baloch militants
shot and killed three Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, causing disruption
in Islamabad-Beijing relations.
President Musharraf calls Baloch rebels “miscreants” and “terrorists;” the
Islamabad government officially banned the separatist Baluchistan Liberation Army
as a terrorist organization in April 2006 and at times suggests that Baloch militants
are religious extremists. Yet most rebel attacks are taken against military and
infrastructure targets, and — despite a government campaign to link the two
movements — Islam appears to play little or no role as a motive for Baloch

CRS-47
militancy.134 Islamabad has employed helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft in
its effort to defeat the rebel forces.
The Death of Nawab Bugti. Fighting waned in the middle of 2006, with
hundreds of rebels surrendering in return for amnesty. The main rebel tribal leader
and onetime Baluchistan chief minister, 79-year-old Nawab Akbar Bugti, had gone
into hiding and was believed cut off from his own forces. In August, Bugti was
located in a cave hideout and was killed by Pakistan army troops in a battle that left
dozens of soldiers and rebels dead. Recognizing Bugti’s popularity among wide
segments of the Baloch populace and of the potential for his killing to provide martyr
status, government officials denied the tribal leader had been targeted. Nevertheless,
news of his death spurred major unrest across the province and beyond, with
hundreds of arrests in the midst of large-scale street demonstrations. Bugti’s killing
was criticized across the spectrum of Pakistani politicians and analysts, with some
commentators calling it a Pakistani Army miscue of historic proportions.135 Days of
rioting included numerous deaths and injuries, but the more dire predictions of
spreading unrest and perhaps even the disintegration of Pakistan’s federal system did
not come to pass. By October 2006, Pakistan’s interior minister was claiming a
“normalization” and decrease in violence in Baluchistan, although a low-intensity
insurgency continues and the overarching problem remains unresolved.136
Narcotics.137 Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and
processed in Afghanistan then distributed worldwide by Pakistan-based traffickers.
The State Department indicates that Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control “remains
strong,” and the Islamabad government has made impressive strides in eradicating
indigenous opium poppy cultivation. However, opium production spiked in post-
Taliban Afghanistan, which is now said to supply 92% of the world’s heroin.138
Elements of Pakistan’s intelligence agency are suspected of past involvement in drug
trafficking; in March 2003, a former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan told a House panel
that their role in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 was “substantial.” Taliban
militants are reported to benefit significantly by taxing Afghan farmers and extorting
traffickers.139 Other reports indicate that profits from drug sales are financing the
activities of Islamic extremists in Pakistan and Kashmir.
U.S. counternarcotics programs aim to reduce the flow of opiates though
Pakistan, eliminate Pakistan as a source of such opiates, and reduce the demand for
illegal drugs within Pakistan. Islamabad’s own counternarcotics efforts are hampered
134 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,” Carnegie Paper No.
65, January 2006.
135 “Bugti’s Killing Is the Biggest Blunder Since Bhutto’s Execution” (editorial), Daily
Times
(Lahore), August 28, 2006.
136 See also “Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan,” International Crisis Group
Asia Briefing No. 69, October 22, 2007.
137 See also CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy.
138 United Nations, World Drug Report 2007.
139 “Taliban Reaping Opium Profits,” Associated Press, April 11, 2007.

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by lack of full government commitment, scarcity of funds, poor infrastructure, and
likely corruption. Since 2002, the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has supported Pakistan’s Border Security
Project by training border forces, providing vehicles and surveillance and
communications equipment, transferring helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to the
Interior Ministry’s Air Wing, and road-building in western tribal areas. Congress
funded such programs with roughly $50 million for FY2007.
Islamization, Anti-American Sentiment, and Madrassas
With some 160 million citizens, Pakistan is the world’s second-most populous
Muslim country, and the nation’s very foundation grew from a perceived need to
create a homeland for South Asian Muslims in the wake of decolonization.
However, religious-based political parties traditionally have fared poorly in national
elections. An unexpected outcome of the country’s 2002 polls saw the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA or United Action Front), a coalition of six Islamic parties, win
11% of the popular vote and 68 seats in the National Assembly — about one-fifth of
the total. It also gained control of the provincial assembly in the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) and leads a coalition in the Baluchistan assembly. These Pashtun-
majority western provinces border Afghanistan, where U.S.-led counterterrorism
operations are ongoing. In 2003, the NWFP provincial assembly passed a Shariat
(Islamic law) bill. In both 2005 and 2006, the same assembly passed a Hasba
(accountability) bill that many fear could create a parallel Islamic legal body.
Pakistan’s Supreme Court, responding to petitions by President Musharraf’s
government, rejected most of this legislation as unconstitutional, but in February
2007 it upheld most of a modified Hasba bill re-submitted by the NWFP assembly.
Such developments alarm Pakistan’s moderates and Musharraf has decried any
attempts to “Talibanize” regions of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Islamists are notable for expressions of anti-American sentiment, at
times calling for “jihad” against the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty they
believe alliance with Washington entails. Most analysts contend that two December
2003 attempts to assassinate President Musharraf were carried out by Islamist
militants angered by Pakistan’s post-September 2001 policy shift. The “Pakistani
Taliban” that has emerged in western tribal areas has sought to impose bans on
television and CD players, and has even instigated attacks on girls schools in an
effort to prevent female education. Some observers identify a causal link between
the poor state of Pakistan’s public education system and the persistence of
xenophobia and religious extremism in that country.
Anti-American sentiment is not limited to Islamic groups, however. Many
across the spectrum of Pakistani society express anger at U.S. global foreign policy,
in particular when such policy is perceived to be unfriendly or hostile to the Muslim
world (as in, for example, Palestine and Iraq).140 In 2004 testimony before a Senate
panel, a senior U.S. expert opined: “Pakistan is probably the most anti-American
country in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the
140 Author interviews in Islamabad, September 2006.

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liberals and Westernized elites on the other side.”141 In a 2005 American magazine
interview, President Musharraf conceded that “the man on the street [in Pakistan]
does not have a good opinion of the United States.” He added, by way of partial
explanation, that Pakistan had been “left high and dry” after serving as a strategic
U.S. ally during the 1980s Afghan war.142
A Pew poll taken shortly before the catastrophic October 2005 earthquake found
only 23% of Pakistanis expressing a favorable view of the United States, the lowest
percentage for any country surveyed. That percentage doubled to 46% in an
ACNielson poll taken after large-scale U.S. disaster relief efforts in earthquake-
affected areas, with the great majority of Pakistanis indicating that their perceptions
had been positively influenced by witnessing such efforts. However, a January 2006
missile attack on Pakistani homes near the Afghan border killed numerous civilians
and was blamed on U.S. forces, renewing animosity toward the United States among
segments of the Pakistani populace. An October 2006 missile attack in the same
border area ostensibly was launched by Pakistani forces, but widespread suspicions
of U.S. involvement further engendered anti-Americanism and concerns about
Pakistani sovereignty. A further noteworthy episode in 2006 saw Pakistani cities
hosting major public demonstrations against the publication in European newspapers
of cartoons deemed offensive to Muslims. These protests, which were violent at
times, included strong anti-U.S. and anti-Musharraf components, suggesting that
Islamist organizers used the issue to forward their own political ends. Subsequently,
a June 2006 Pew Center poll found only 27% of Pakistanis holding a favorable
opinion of the United States, and this dropped to 19% in a September 2007 survey
by the U.S.-based group Terror Free Tomorrow, suggesting that public diplomacy
gains following the 2005 earthquake had receded.
In January 2008, the University of Maryland-based Program on International
Policy Attitudes released a survey of public opinion in Pakistan. The findings
indicated that significant resentment toward and distrust of the United States persist
among notable segments of the Pakistani public:
! 64% of Pakistanis do not trust the United States to “do the right
thing in world affairs;”
! more than two-thirds believe the U.S. military presence in
Afghanistan is “a critical threat to Pakistan’s interests;”
! only 27% feel that Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation has benefitted
Pakistan; and
! 86% now believe that weakening and dividing the Muslim world is
a U.S. goal (70% believe this is “definitely” the case).143
141 Statement of Stephen Cohen before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 14,
2004. More than three years later, country expert Lisa Curtis warned a House panel about
“the increasingly shrill anti-Americanism that is gripping Pakistani civil society” (statement
before the House Armed Services Committee, October 10, 2007).
142 “10 Questions for Pervez Musharraf,” Time, October 3, 2005.
143 See [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_rpt.pdf].

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Meanwhile, an open Islamist rebellion of sorts took place in Pakistan’s relatively
serene capital in 2007, where from January to July radical leaders of the Red Mosque
and their followers in the attached Jamia Hafsa seminary occupied illegally
constructed religious buildings, kidnaped and detained local police officers, battled
security forces, and threatened to launch a violent anti-government campaign unless
Sharia (Islamic law) was instituted nationwide. Government security forces laid
siege to the compound and subsequently launched an armed assault on its
intransigent occupants. Later, in the autumn, Pakistan faced a “neo-Taliban”
insurgency in the scenic Swat Valley just 100 miles northwest of the capital, where
a radical Islamic cleric and up to 5,000 of his armed followers sought to impose
Sharia law. The episodes indicate that support for religious extremism is spreading
into previously unaffected areas of the country.
Pakistan’s Religious Schools (Madrassas).144 Afghanistan’s Taliban
movement itself began among students attending Pakistani religious schools
(madrassas). Among the more than 10,000 madrassas training some 1.5 million
children in Pakistan are a small percentage that have been implicated in teaching
militant anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Hindu, and even anti-Shia values. Former
Secretary of State Colin Powell once identified these as “programs that do nothing
but prepare youngsters to be fundamentalists and to be terrorists.”145 Contrary to
popularly held conceptions, however, research indicates that the great majority of
Pakistan’s violent Islamist extremists does not emerge from the country’s madrassas,
but rather from the dysfunctional public school system or even from private, English-
medium schools. One study found that only 17% of international terrorists sampled
had Islamic education backgrounds.146
Many of Pakistan’s madrassas are financed and operated by Pakistani Islamist
political parties such as the JUI-F (closely linked to the Taliban), as well as by
multiple unknown foreign entities, many in Saudi Arabia.147 As many as two-thirds
of the seminaries are run by the Deobandi sect, known in part for traditionally anti-
Shia sentiments and at times linked to the Sipah-e-Sahaba terrorist group. In its 2006
report on international religious freedom, the U.S. State Department said, “Some
unregistered and Deobandi-controlled madrassas in the FATA and northern
Baluchistan continued to teach extremism” and that schools run by the Jamaat al-
Dawat — considered to be a front organization of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Taiba
terrorist group — serve as recruitment centers for extremists. President Musharraf
144 See also CRS Report RS22009, Education Reform in Pakistan, and CRS Report
RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background.
145 Statement before the House Appropriations Committee, March 10, 2004.
146 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press,
2004). See also Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks (Columbia
University Press, 2004); Peter Bergen and Swati Pandney, “The Madrassa Myth,” New York
Times
, June 14, 2005.
147 P.W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad,”
Brookings Institution Analysis Paper 14, November 2001; Ali Riaz, “Global Jihad,
Sectarianism, and the Madrassahs in Pakistan,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Singapore, August 2005.

CRS-51
himself has acknowledged that a small number of seminaries were “harboring
terrorists” and he has asked religious leaders to help isolate these by openly
condemning them.148
International attention to Pakistan’s religious schools intensified during the
summer of 2005 after Pakistani officials acknowledged that suspects in July’s
London terrorist bombings visited Pakistan during the previous year and may have
spent time at a madrassa near Lahore. While President Musharraf has in the past
pledged to crack down on the more extremist madrassas in his country, there
continues to be little concrete evidence that he has done so, and even the president
himself has admitted that movement on this issue has been slow.149 Some observers
speculate that Musharraf’s reluctance to enforce reform efforts is rooted in his desire
to remain on good terms with Pakistan’s Islamist political parties, which are seen to
be an important part of his political base.150 When asked in late 2007 about progress
in reforming the country’s madrassa system, Musharraf made a rare admission of
“lack of achievement,” but went on to call the registration campaign and efforts to
mainstream the curriculum successful.151
The U.S. Congress has appropriated many millions of dollars to assist Pakistan
in efforts to reform its education system, including changes that would make
madrassa curriculum closer in substance to that provided in non-religious schools.
More than $200 million has been allocated for education-related aid programs since
2002. In November 2006, the U.S.-Pakistan Education dialogue was launched in
Washington to bolster further engagement.
Democratization and Human Rights
Democracy and Governance.152 The status and development of Pakistan’s
democratic institutions are key U.S. policy concerns, especially among those analysts
who view representative government in Islamabad as being a prerequisite for
reducing religious extremism and establishing a moderate Pakistani state. There had
been hopes that the October 2002 national elections would reverse Pakistan’s historic
trend toward unstable governance and military interference in democratic institutions.
Such hopes were eroded by ensuing developments, including President Musharraf’s
imposition of major constitutional changes and his retention of the position of army
chief. International and Pakistani human rights groups continue to issue reports
148 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71443.htm]; “Some Madrassas Bad:
Musharraf,” Daily Times (Lahore), September 8, 2004.
149 See “Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector,” International Crisis Group Report 84,
October 7, 2004; “Radical Teachings in Pakistan Schools,” Boston Globe, September 29,
2006. Author interviews with Pakistani government officials and scholars have tended to
confirm that movement on madrassa reform is slow, at best.
150 “At an Islamic School, Hints of Extremist Ties,” Washington Post, June 13, 2004; Vali
Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal 58, 2,
Spring 2004.
151 “Full Transcript Musharraf Interview,” ABC News (online), November 30, 2007.
152 See also CRS Report RL34240, Pakistan’s Political Crises.

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critical of Islamabad’s military-dominated government. In 2007, and for the eighth
straight year, the often-cited Freedom House rated Pakistan as “not free” in the areas
of political rights and civil liberties. While praising Pakistan’s electoral exercises as
moves in the right direction, the United States expresses concern that seemingly
nondemocratic developments may make the realization of true democracy in Pakistan
more elusive, and U.S. officials continue to press Pakistani leaders on this issue.
Pakistan’s Military-Dominated Government. General Musharraf’s
assumption of the presidency ostensibly was legitimized by a controversial April
2002 referendum marked by evidence of fraud.153 In August 2002, Musharraf
announced sweeping constitutional changes to bolster the president’s powers,
including provisions for presidential dissolution of the National Assembly. The
United States expressed concerns that the changes could make it more difficult to
build democratic institutions in Pakistan. The 2002 elections nominally fulfilled
Musharraf’s promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved in the wake
of his extra-constitutional seizure of power. The pro-military Pakistan Muslim
League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won a plurality of seats, while a coalition of
Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing.
The civilian government was hamstrung for more than a year by fractious debate
over the legitimacy of constitutional changes and by Musharraf’s continued status as
army chief and president. A surprise December 2003 agreement between Musharraf
and the MMA Islamist opposition ended the deadlock by bringing the constitutional
changes before Parliament and by eliciting a promise from Musharraf to resign his
military commission before 2005. Non-Islamist opposition parties unified under the
Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) accused the MMA of betrayal and
insisted that the new arrangement merely institutionalized military rule in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s nominally non-party 2005 municipal elections saw major gains for
candidates favored by the PML-Q and notable reversals for Islamists, but were also
marked by widespread accusations of rigging. The Bush Administration made no
public comment on reported irregularities.
Other apparent reversals for Pakistani democratization came in 2004, including
the sentencing of ARD leader and PML-N stalwart Javed Hashmi to 23 years in
prison for sedition, mutiny, and forgery (Hashmi was released in August 2007), and
the “forced” resignation of Prime Minister Jamali for what numerous analysts called
his insufficient deference to President Musharraf. Musharraf “shuffled” prime
ministers to seat his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz. Aziz is seen to be an
able financial manager and technocrat favored by the military, but he has no political
base in Pakistan. Moreover, in the final month of 2004 Musharraf chose to continue
his role as army chief beyond the stated deadline. One senior Pakistani scholar offers
a critical summary of the country’s political circumstances under President
Musharraf’s rule:
The current power structure, often described as the “Musharraf model of
governance,” is narrow and suffers from a crisis of legitimacy. Its major features
are: a concentration of power in the presidency, with backup from its
153 “Pakistan’s Musharraf Wins Landslide, Fraud Alleged,” Reuters, May 1, 2002.

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army/intelligence and bureaucratic affiliates; induction of retired and serving
military officers into important civilian institutions and thus an undermining of
the latter’s autonomy; co-option of a section of the political elite, who are given
a share of power and patronage in return for mobilizing civilian support, on
President Musharraf’s terms; a reluctant partnership with the Islamic parties,
especially the Muttahida Majis-i-Amal (MMA), and soft-peddling towards
Islamic groups; manipulation of the weak and divided political forces and
exclusion of dissident political leaders.154
Many analysts have opined that, despite being a self-professed “enlightened
moderate,” Musharraf has in practice strengthened the hand of Pakistan’s Islamist
extremist forces and that, while he “talks a good game about liberalizing Pakistani
society ... his choice of allies suggests he’s not serious.”155 In the meantime, the
Pakistan army has further entrenched itself in the country’s corporate sector,
generating billions of dollars in annual profits from businesses ranging from
construction to breakfast cereal. One estimate has this “milbus” (military business)
accounting for 6% of the country’s gross domestic product.156
Some analysts argue that much of the criticism leveled at Musharraf is unfair
and that he has been a relatively benign “military dictator.” Such analysts will, for
example, point out that Musharraf’s policies vis-a-vis India have allowed for a
reduction of bilateral tensions and an ongoing peace dialogue, that he appears to have
clamped down on Kashmiri militancy, and that he has not come under fire for
corruption, as did Bhutto and other leaders.157
In May 2007, a delegation from the Washington-based National Democratic
Institute issued a report on its visit to Pakistan, calling expected national elections
there “critical to the nation’s future;” warning that tainted elections could strengthen
the position of extremist elements or further consolidate the role of the military in
governance; urging President Musharraf to retire his military commission in the
interest of public confidence; and calling for a significantly strengthened Pakistan
Election Commission to ensure credible polls.158 An October follow-on report
lamented what it said was almost no progress on efforts to resolve problems noted
in May. Such problems include long-standing provincial vacancies on the Election
Commission; correction of suspect voter rolls; an absence of normal political activity
in the FATA; insufficient measures to protect women’s political rights; and a
perceived need for the issuance and publicizing of government orders to prevent
security forces such as the ISI from interfering in the political process.159 In an
indication that the Commission’s credibility remains in doubt, former Prime Minister
154 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Towards a Solution of the Present Crisis” (op-ed), Daily Times
(Lahore), June 17, 2007.
155 Peter Beinart, “How to Deal with Dictators” (op-ed), Time, July 26, 2007.
156 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Pluto Press, 2007).
157 Jonathan Power, “In Defense of Pakistan’s Military Dictator” (op-ed), Toronto Star,
January 6, 2008.
158 [http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2157_pk_pre_election_statement_051707.pdf].
159 See [http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2208_pakistan_peam_stamt_102107.pdf].

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Bhutto in June 2007 filed a petition with the Pakistani Supreme Court on the removal
of tens of millions of Pakistanis from election rolls, and the Hong Kong-based Asian
Human Rights Commission later claimed that the Commission was illegitimately
denying voting rights to 38 million people, most of them women.
The leadership of the country’s leading moderate, secular, and arguably most
popular party — the Pakistan People’s Party — seek greater U.S. support for
Pakistani democratization and warn that the space in which they are allowed to
operate is so narrow as to bring into question their continued viability as political
forces.160 They also identify a direct causal link between nondemocratic governance
and the persistence of religious militancy in Pakistan. In a December 2007 opinion
article, Benazir Bhutto argued that the all the countries of the world had a direct
interest in Pakistani democratization, reiterating her long-held view that dictatorship
had fueled extremism in her country and that credible elections there were a
necessary condition for the reduction of religion militancy. As for U.S. policy, she
opined that, “At the very least, America can and should prod Musharraf to give
Pakistanis an independent election commission, a neutral caretaker administration,
and an end to blatant vote manipulation.”161
Judicial/Political Crisis in 2007. On March 9, President Musharraf
summarily dismissed the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, Iftikhar
Chaudhry, on unspecified charges of misconduct and nepotism. Analysts widely
believe the dismissal was an attempt by Musharraf to remove a potential impediment
to his continued roles as president and army chief, given Chaudhry’s recent rulings
that exhibited independence and went contrary to government expectations. The
move triggered immediate outrage among numerous Pakistani lawyers and others
who claimed Musharraf had acted unconstitutionally. Several judges and a deputy
attorney general resigned in protest, ensuing street protests by lawyers grew in scale
and were joined by both secular and Islamist opposition activists. By providing an
issue upon which anti-Musharraf sentiments could coalesce, the imbroglio soon
morphed from a judicial crisis to a full-fledged political crisis and the greatest threat
to Musharraf’s government since it was established in 1999. Numerous analyses
concluded that the developments severely weakened Musharraf politically and could
threaten the viability of his continued rule.162
The U.S. State Department at first declared the issue to be a purely internal
matter and withheld further comment but, as a sense of crisis increased in Pakistan,
a Department spokesman called Chaudhry’s dismissal “a matter of deep concern”
that the U.S. government was “monitoring very closely,” and he called for the issue
to be handled in a transparent manner in accordance with Pakistani law. However,
in a statement that triggered concern among many Pakistanis and skeptical analysts
160 Author interviews with PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, Washington, DC, February 2006, and
PPP officials, Islamabad, January 2004 and September 2006.
161 Benazir Bhutto, “Why the World Needs Democracy in Pakistan,” Christian Science
Monitor
, December 10, 2007.
162 Teresita Schaffer, “Pakistan: Shrinking Control,” CSIS Commentary, May 18, 2007, is
representative.

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alike, the spokesman also claimed President Musharraf was “acting in the best
interest of Pakistan and the Pakistani people.”163
In refusing to be cowed by the Musharraf government and voluntarily resign his
post, the suspended Chief Justice became a popular figure in Pakistan. In May, tens
of thousands of supporters lined the streets as Chaudhry drove from Islamabad to
Lahore to address the High Court there (a normally 4-hour drive took more than 24
hours). Chaudhry later flew to Karachi but was blocked from leaving the city’s
airport, reportedly by activists of the regional, government-allied Muttahida Qaumi
Movement (MQM) party. Ensuing street battles between MQM cadres and
opposition activists left at least 40 people dead on May 12, most of them PPP
members. Reports had local police and security forces standing by without
intervening while the MQM attacked anti-Musharraf protesters, leading many
observers to charge the government with complicity in the bloody rioting.164 The
incidents did significant further damage to President Musharraf’s standing.
U.S. Policy. While the United States maintains a keen interest in Pakistani
democratization, the issue is widely seen as having become a secondary consideration
as counterterrorism concerns grew after 2001. As stated by Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asia Boucher in a December 2007 statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The United States wants to see Pakistan succeed in its transition to an elected
civilian-led democracy, to become a moderate, democratic, Muslim nation
committed to human rights and the rule of law. All of our assistance programs
are directed toward helping Pakistan achieve these goals. This is a long-term
undertaking that will require years to accomplish.165
Bush Administration officials repeatedly have emphasized that democratization is
key to the creation of a more moderate and prosperous Pakistan. However, numerous
critics of Administration policy assert that the Islamabad government has for more
than five years been given a “free pass” on the issue of representative government,
in part as a means of enlisting that country’s continued assistance in U.S.-led
counterterrorism efforts.166 At the same Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing
cited above, one former U.S. diplomat offered that, “Overall U.S. policy toward
163 See [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/mar/81762.htm] and [http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/mar/81838.htm].
164 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan called the riots “the result of a calculated
adventure hatched by the president and the MQM with the cooperation of the Sindh
government” (May 13, 2007, press release at [http://www.hrcp.cjb.net]; see also “Pakistan
on Brink of Disaster as Karachi Burns,” Telegraph (London), May 12, 2007, and “Clashes
in Pakistan Kill 28, Injure Scores as Unrest Escalates,” Washington Post, May 13, 2007).
165 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/96566.htm].
166 For example, two former senior Clinton Administration officials have criticized President
Bush for choosing to “back the dictator” rather than offer clear support for democracy and
rule of law in Pakistan. They contend that such a policy is damaging to U.S. interests in
South Asia and in the Muslim world (Sandy Berger and Bruce Riedel, “America’s Stark
Choice” (op-ed), International Herald Tribune, October 9, 2007).

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Pakistan until very recently gave no serious attention to encouraging democracy in
Pakistan.” Numerous other U.S. officials have opined that the Bush Administration’s
relatively meager attention to Pakistani democratization has been rooted in an
aversion to any moves that could alienate Musharraf and so reduce his cooperation
on counterterrorism.167 U.S. congressional committees have long expressed concern
with “the slow pace of the democratic development of Pakistan” (S.Rept. 109-96)
and “the lack of progress on improving democratic governance and rule of law” there
(H.Rept. 109-486).
Many commentators have criticized the Bush Administration’s perceived over-
emphasis on relations with Musharraf and the Pakistani military at the expense of
positive ties with the broader Pakistan society. In the representative commentary of
a former Pakistani diplomat,
The United States made a critical mistake in putting faith in one man — General
Pervez Musharraf — and one institution — the Pakistani military — as
instruments of the U.S. policy to eliminate terrorism and bring stability to the
Southwest and South Asia. A robust U.S. policy of engagement with Pakistan
that helps in building civilian institutions, including law enforcement capability,
and eventually results in reverting Pakistan’s military to its security functions
would be a more effective way of strengthening Pakistan and protecting United
States policy interests there.168
The U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006,
issued by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in March 2007, does
not use the word “democracy” or any of its derivatives in discussing Pakistan, but
does note that “restrictions on citizens’ right to change their government” represent
a “major problem.”169 In a June 2007 letter to Secretary of State Rice, several
Members of Congress decried the “spiral of civil unrest and harshly suppressed
protest in Pakistan” and asserted that U.S. and Pakistani national interests “are both
served by a speedy restoration of full democracy to Pakistan and the end to state-
sponsored intimidation — often violent — of Pakistani citizens protesting
government actions in a legal and peaceful manner.” Leading opposition political
figures in Islamabad have warned that unconditional U.S. support for Musharraf’s
military-dominated government could result in an anti-American backlash among
Pakistan’s moderate forces.170 Yet others opine that overt U.S. conditionality is
unlikely to be effective and may only foster anti-U.S. resentments in Pakistan.171 One
167 Amb. Teresita Schaffer, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
December 6, 2007; “Democracy Gets Small Portion of U.S. Aid,” Washington Post, January
6, 2008.
168 Statement of Husain Haqqani before the House Armed Services Committee, October 10,
2007.
169 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78874.htm].
170 Letter to Secretary of State Rice from Sen. Joe Biden, Rep. Tom Lantos, and Rep. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, June 1, 2007; “US Warned Over Backing for Musharraf,” Financial Times
(London), June 12, 2007.
171 See, for example, Lisa Curtis, “Bolstering Pakistan in its Fight Against Extremism,”
(continued...)

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analysis by a former Bush State Department official concluded that “the United
States should resist the urge to threaten [Musharraf] or demand a quick democratic
transition,” arguing that the Pakistani military must be pushed toward political reform
in ways that do not jeopardize its “core interests.”172
Human Rights Problems. The State Department’s most recent Country
Report on Human Rights Practices (issued March 2007) again determined that the
Pakistan government’s record on human rights “remained poor.” Along with
concerns about anti-democratic practices, the report lists extrajudicial killings,
torture, and abuse by security forces; “widespread” government and police
corruption; lack of judicial independence; political violence; terrorism; and
“extremely poor” prison conditions among the major problems. It further notes an
increase in restrictions on press freedoms and in reports of “disappearances” of
political activists. Improvement was noted, however, with government efforts to
crack down on human trafficking.173 The most recent State Department report on
trafficking in persons (issued in June 2007) again said, “Pakistan does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it
is making significant efforts to do so.”174
According to the Department of State, the Islamabad government is known to
limit freedoms of association, religion, and movement, and to imprison political
leaders. In June 2007, the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 110-197)
expressed concern about the Pakistani government’s apparent lack of respect for
human rights. Senate reports have expressed similar concerns. The Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan and international human rights groups periodically issue
reports critical of Pakistan’s lack of political freedoms, lawlessness in many areas
(especially the western tribal agencies), and of the country’s perceived abuses of the
rights of women and minorities.
Gender Discrimination. Discrimination against women is widespread in
Pakistan and traditional constraints — cultural, legal, and spousal — keep women
in a subordinate position in society. In 2005, Pakistani gang rape victim Mukhtaran
Mai — and Islamabad’s (mis)handling of her case — became emblematic of gender
discrimination problems in Pakistan. The Hudood Ordinance was promulgated
during the rule of President General Zia ul-Haq and is widely criticized for imposing
stringent punishments and restrictions under the guise of Islamic law. Among its
provisions, the ordinance criminalizes all extramarital sex and makes it extremely
difficult for women to prove allegations of rape (those women who make such
charges without the required evidence often are jailed as adulterers). In November
2006, the Hudood laws were amended in the Women’s Protection Bill. President
171 (...continued)
Heritage Foundation WebMemo 1554, July 13, 2007; Ashley Tellis, “Pakistan: Conflicted
Ally in the War on Terror,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief 56, December 2007.
172 Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 2007.
173 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78874.htm]. A Pakistan Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman claimed the report “lacks objectivity and contains inaccuracies.”
174 See [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/82806.htm].

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Musharraf supported the changes and the ruling PML-Q party joined with the
opposition PPP to overcome fierce resistance by Islamist parties. The step was
viewed as a landmark in efforts to create more a moderate Pakistani state. However,
with the February 2007 murder of a female provincial minister in Punjab by a radical
Islamist and threats being issued against girls’ schools and female health workers in
the NWFP, among other incidents, well-entrenched societal discrimination continues.
Religious Freedom. The State Department’s most recent International
Religious Freedom Report (released in September 2007) again found that in practice
the Islamabad government imposes limits on the freedom of religion in Pakistan:
The Government took some steps to improve its treatment of religious minorities
during the period covered by this report, but serious problems remained. Law
enforcement personnel abused religious minorities in custody. Security forces
and other government agencies did not adequately prevent or address societal
abuse against minorities. Discriminatory legislation and the Government’s failure
to take action against societal forces hostile to those who practice a different
faith fostered religious intolerance, acts of violence, and intimidation against
religious minorities. Specific laws that discriminate against religious minorities
include anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws that provide the death penalty for
defiling Islam or its prophets.175
The State Department has rejected repeated U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom recommendations that Pakistan be designated a “country of
particular concern.” The 2007 annual report from that Commission claims that,
“Sectarian and religiously motivated violence persists in Pakistan ... and the
government’s somewhat improved response to this problem continues to be
insufficient and not fully effective.”176
Press Freedom. Press freedom and the safety of journalists recently have
become major concerns in Pakistan, spurred especially by the June 2006 discovery
of the handcuffed body of Pakistani journalist Hayatullah Khan in a rural area of
North Waziristan. Khan, who had been missing for more than six months, was
abducted by unknown gunmen after he reported on an apparent U.S.-launched missile
attack in Pakistan’s tribal region. Khan’s family is among those who suspect the
involvement of Pakistani security forces; an official inquiry into the death was
launched. Other journalists have been detained and possibly tortured, including a
pair reportedly held incommunicado without charges for three months after they shot
footage of the Jacobabad airbase that was used by U.S. forces. Paris-based Reporters
Without Borders placed Pakistan 152nd out of 169 countries in its most recent annual
ranking of world press freedom.
Pakistani journalists have taken to the streets to protest perceived abuses and
they complain that the government seeks to intimidate those who would report the
facts of Pakistani counterterrorism operations. In May 2007, the New York-based
Committee to Protect Journalists placed Pakistan sixth in a list of the ten countries
175 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90233.htm].
176 See [http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/index.html].

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where press freedom had most deteriorated since 2002.177 In early June, in apparent
reaction to media coverage of rallies in support of Pakistan’s suspended Chief
Justice, the Musharraf government issued an ordinance allowing the Pakistan
Electronic Media Regulatory Agency to impose strict curbs on television and radio
station operations. Human Rights Watch later called the decree a “disgraceful assault
on media freedom.”178 Implementation of the ordinance subsequently was halted.
In September 2007, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad expressed concern about recent
incidents in which Pakistani journalists were subject to assaults and harassment.179
“Disappeared” Persons. According to the U.S. State Department, there was
an increase of politically motivated disappearances in Pakistan in 2006, with police
and security forces holding prisoners incommunicado and refusing to provide
information on their whereabouts, particularly in terrorism and national security
cases. In November 2006, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ordered the government to
disclose the whereabouts of 41 suspected security detainees who had “disappeared.”
Human rights groups claim to have recorded more than 400 cases of such secret
detentions since 2002.180 London-based Amnesty International has criticized
Islamabad for human rights abuses related to its cooperation with the U.S.-led “war
on terror,” including the arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture of
hundreds of people. In late 2007, Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies
reportedly released from detention nearly 100 terrorism suspects without charges.
No official explanation for the releases was offered and some analysts assert that the
primary motive was avoiding the embarrassment of having to reveal that the suspects
were being held “on flimsy evidence in [a] secret system.”181 Islamabad denies
involvement in extralegal detentions.
Economic Issues
Overview. Pakistan is a poor country, but the national economy has gathered
significant positive momentum in recent years, helped in large part by the
government’s pro-growth policies and by post-2001 infusions of foreign aid.
However, presently high rates of domestic inflation (near 8%) have many analysts
concerned about the country’s macroeconomic stability, and some observers warn
that the domestic capacity to sustain growth does not exist. According to the World
Bank, nominal GDP per capita in 2006 was only $771, but poverty rates have
dropped from 34% to 24% over the past five years. Severe human losses and
property damage from an October 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan have had
limited follow-on economic impact, given a large influx of foreign aid and the
stimulus provided by reconstruction efforts. Even as the bulk of criticism of
177 See [http://cpj.org/backsliders/index.html].
178 See [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/06/pakist16084.htm].
179 See [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h07092101.html].
180 “Pakistan: A Land of Systematic Disappearances,” Asian Center for Human Rights,
March 28, 2007; “Pakistani Wife Embodies Cause Of ‘Disappeared,’” New York Times, July
19, 2007.
181 “Picture of Secret Detentions Emerges in Pakistan,” New York Times, December 19,
2007.

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Musharraf focuses on the authoritarian aspects of his rule, many ordinary Pakistanis
are unhappy with his government’s economic policies, which are seen to benefit only
a fraction of the country’s people.182
Pakistan’s political crises in late 2007 have harmed what had been a generally
strong national economy. The country’s main stock market lost nearly 5% of its
value when trading opened on November 5 — the market’s worst-ever one-day
decline — and the country’s attractiveness for foreign investors almost certainly has
suffered with December’s instability. Following Bhutto’s killing, the market again
fell by nearly 5%. Credible estimates have some $1 billion in damage being caused
by rioting in the wake of Bhutto’s death.183
Still, the long-term economic outlook for Pakistan is much improved since
2001, even as it remains clouded in a country still dependent on foreign lending and
the importation of basic commodities. Substantial fiscal deficits and dependency on
external aid have been chronic (public and external debt equal nearly three-fifths of
GDP), counterbalancing a major overhaul of the tax collection system and what have
been major gains in the Karachi Stock Exchange, which nearly doubled in value as
the world’s best performer in 2002 and was up by 40% in 2007. Along with absolute
development gains in recent years, Pakistan’s relative standing has also improved:
The U.N. Development Program ranked Pakistan 136th out of 177 countries on its
2007/2008 human development index (between Laos and Bhutan), down from 134th
the previous year, but up from 144th in 2003.184
Pakistan’s real GDP grew by 7% in the fiscal year ending June 2007, driven by
booming manufacturing and service sectors. Overall growth was up from the
previous year and has averaged nearly 7% over the past five years. Output from both
the industrial and service sectors has grown substantially since 2002, but the
agricultural sector continues to lag considerably (in part due to droughts), slowing
overall growth. Agricultural labor accounts for nearly half of the country’s work
force, but only about one-fifth of national income and 2% of tax revenue. Expanding
textile production and the government’s pro-growth measures have most analysts
foreseeing solid expansion ahead, with predictions near 6% for the next two years.
More recently, a relatively small but rapidly growing entrepreneurial class has
brought a boom in the consumption of luxury goods.185
In June 2007, the Musharraf government unveiled a 1.6 trillion rupee ($26.5
billion) federal budget plan for FY2007-FY2008 calling for a 22% boost in public
development spending and a 10% jump in defense spending. This latter expenditure
combines with interest on public debt to consume two-thirds of total revenues, thus
182 “Hungry for More Than Change,” Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2007.
183 “Political Instability May Dampen Growth,” Nation (Lahore), November 19, 2007;
“Pakistan Stocks Tumble Amid Violence,” Associated Press, December 31, 2007; “Fear
Stalks Pakistani Business After Bhutto’s Murder,” Reuters, January 2, 2008.
184 See [http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008].
185 “Modern and Muslim: In Turbulent Pakistan, Start-Ups Drive a Boom,” Wall Street
Journal
, September 5, 2007.

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squeezing out development funds. Pakistan stabilized its external debt at about $33
billion by 2003, but this has risen above $40 billion in 2007. Still, such debt is less
than one-third of GDP today, down from more than one-half in 2000. The country’s
reported total liquid reserves reached $13.7 billion by May 2007, an all-time high and
a nearly five-fold increase since 1999. Foreign remittances have exceeded $4 billion
annually since 2003 (at around $5.5 billion in FY2006/2007), up from slightly more
than $1 billion in 2001. High oil prices and high food commodity prices have driven
inflationary pressures, resulting in year-on-year consumer rates above 6%. While
inflation is expected to ease somewhat in 2008, many analysts call rising prices the
single most important obstacle to future growth. Pakistan’s resources and
comparatively well-developed entrepreneurial skills may hold promise for more rapid
economic growth and development in coming years. This is particularly true for the
country’s textile industry, which accounts for two-thirds of all exports (and up to
90% of exports to the United States).
Analysts point to the pressing need to further broaden the country’s tax base in
order to provide increased revenue for investment in improved infrastructure, health,
and education, all prerequisites for economic development. Serious environmental
degradation also retards growth: a September 2007 World Bank report conservatively
estimated that at least 6% of Pakistan’s GDP is lost to illness and premature mortality
caused by air pollution (both outdoor and indoor); diseases caused by inadequate
water supplies, sanitation, and hygiene; and reduced agricultural productivity due to
soil degradation.186
Attempts at macroeconomic reform historically have floundered due to political
instability, but the Musharraf government has had notable successes in effecting such
reform. Rewards for participation in the post-September 2001 anti-terror coalition
eased somewhat Pakistan’s severe national debt situation, with many countries,
including the United States, boosting bilateral assistance efforts and large amounts
of external aid flowing into the country. According to the Asian Development
Bank’s Outlook 2007:
Buoyant growth, improved macroeconomic fundamentals, and strengthened
international credit ratings have been the economy’s hallmarks in recent years.
In FY2006, high oil prices, a weak agricultural performance, as well as the effect
of the October 2005 earthquake, trimmed the expansion, while strong demand-
side pressures have exposed macroeconomic stresses. The economy is expected
to pick up slightly in FY2007, reflecting some strengthening in agriculture and
manufacturing. Inflation is set to moderate, after a further tightening of
monetary policy, but still come in above the central bank’s target. Spurred by an
expansionary, pro-growth fiscal policy, the budget deficit will widen slightly, as
will the current account deficit. The medium-term outlook remains positive, but
macroeconomic stability has to be maintained and structural issues addressed.187
Trade and Investment. Pakistan’s primary exports are cotton, textiles and
apparel, rice, and leather products. The United States is by far Pakistan’s leading
186 See [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/
448813-1188777211460/pakceasummary.pdf].
187 See [http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2007/PAK.asp].

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export market, accounting for about one-quarter of the total. During 2007, total U.S.
imports from Pakistan were worth an estimated $3.9 billion (up about 5% over 2006).
Some 90% of this value came from purchases of textiles and apparel. U.S. exports
to Pakistan during 2007 were worth an estimated $2 billion (virtually unchanged
from 2006). Civilian aircraft and associated equipment accounted for about one-
quarter of this value; electricity generating machinery is another notable U.S.
export.188 Pakistan is the 54th largest export market for U.S. goods.
According to the 2007 National Trade Estimate of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR), Pakistan has made substantial progress in reducing import
tariff schedules, though a number of trade barriers remain. While estimated trade
losses due to copyright piracy in Pakistan were notably lower in 2005 and 2006, book
piracy accounted for about half of the 2006 losses and remains a serious concern.189
Pakistan also has been a world leader in the pirating of music CDs and has appeared
on the USTR’s “Special 301” Watch List for 17 consecutive years (in 2004,
continuing violations caused the USTR to move Pakistan to the Priority Watch List;
improved intellectual property rights protection saw it lowered back to the Watch
List in 2006).190 From the USTR report:
The government of Pakistan continued to take noticeable steps during 2006 to
improve copyright enforcement, especially with respect to optical disc piracy.
Nevertheless, Pakistan does not provide adequate protection of all intellectual
property. Book piracy, weak trademark enforcement, lack of data protection for
proprietary pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical test data, and problems
with Pakistan’s pharmaceutical patent protection remain serious barriers to trade
and investment.191
In April 2007, the USTR again named Pakistan to its Special 301 watch list, lauding
Islamabad for progress on intellectual property rights enforcement, but also
expressing ongoing concerns about Pakistan’s lack of effective protections in the
pharmaceutical sector.
According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance, total foreign direct investment in
Pakistan exceeded $7 billion for the year ending June 2007 — an unprecedented
amount doubling that of the previous year — but many investors remain wary of the
country’s uncertain political-security circumstances.192 About one-third of the
foreign investment value came from U.S.-based investors; much of the remainder
188 See [http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/index.html].
189 The International Intellectual Property Alliance, a coalition of U.S. copyright-based
industries, estimated U.S. losses of $100 million due to copyright piracy in Pakistan in 2006
(see [http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301PAKISTAN.pdf]).
190 See [http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/
2006_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file797_9198.pdf] and [http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/
asset_upload_file190_9339.pdf].
191 See [http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Trade_
Policy_Agenda/Section_Index.html]
192 “Pakistan Investors Wary of Political Instability,” Reuters, August 27, 2007.

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originates in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. Islamabad is eager to
finalize a pending Bilateral Investment Treaty and reach a Free Trade Agreement
with the United States, believing that its vital textile sector will be bolstered by duty-
free access to the U.S. market. The establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones that could facilitate development in Pakistan’s poor tribal regions, an initiative
of President Bush during his March 2006 visit to Pakistan, may be forwarded for
consideration by the 110th Congress.
The Heritage Foundation’s 2007 Index of Economic Freedom — which may
overemphasize the value of absolute growth and downplay broader quality-of-life
measurements — again rated Pakistan’s economy as being “mostly unfree” and
ranked it 89th out of 157 countries. The index identified restrictive trade policies, a
heavy fiscal burden, weak property ownership protections, and limited financial
freedoms.193 Corruption is another serious problem: in September 2007, Berlin-
based Transparency International placed Pakistan 138th out of 179 countries in its
annual ranking of world corruption levels.194
U.S. Aid and Congressional Action
U.S. Assistance. A total of about $16.5 billion in direct U.S. aid went to
Pakistan from 1947 through 2007, including some $4.5 billion for military programs.
Since the 2001 renewal of large U.S. assistance packages, Pakistan has received
nearly $10 billion, including some $2.4 billion for economic purposes and $1.7
billion for security-related purposes, along with about $5.7 billion in coalition
support reimbursements (see Table 1). As asserted by the Bush Administration,
current U.S. assistance to Pakistan
will maintain Pakistan’s support in the Global War on Terrorism and efforts to
build peaceful and positive relations with its neighbors, India and Afghanistan.
[It] also will encourage Pakistan’s participation in international efforts to
prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and support in the
development of a moderate, democratic, and civilian government which promotes
respect for human rights and participation of its citizens in government and
society.195
In June 2003, President Bush hosted President Musharraf at Camp David, Maryland,
where he vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid
package for Pakistan. Annual installments of $600 million each, split evenly
between military and economic aid, began in FY2005.196 When additional funds for
development assistance, law enforcement, earthquake relief, and other programs are
included, the non-food aid allocation for FY2006 was $788 million. An estimated
193 See [http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/country.cfm?id=Pakistan].
194 See [http://www.transparency.org].
195 U.S. Department of State FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations (Revised), May 2, 2007.
196 The Foreign Operations FY2005 Appropriations bill (P.L. 108-447) established a new
“base program” of $300 million for military assistance for Pakistan.

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total of $793 million was delivered in FY2007, the first year of the Administration’s
new plan to devote $750 million in U.S. development aid to Pakistan’s tribal areas
over a five-year period.
FATA Development Plan. The U.S.-assisted development initiative for the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, launched in 2003, seeks to improve the quality
of education, develop healthcare services, and increase opportunities for economic
growth and micro-enterprise specifically in Pakistan’s western tribal regions.197 One
senior USAID official estimated that, for FY2001-FY2007, about 6% of U.S.
economic aid to Pakistan has been allocated for projects in the FATA.198 There has
been considerable skepticism about the potential for the new policy of significantly
boosted funding to be effective. Corruption is endemic in the tribal region and
security circumstances are so poor that Western nongovernmental contractors find
it extremely difficult to operate there. Moreover, as much as half of the allocated
funds likely will be devoted to administrative costs.199
The related establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) that
could facilitate further development in the FATA, an initiative of President Bush
during his March 2006 visit to Pakistan, has run into obstacles in Congress and is yet
to be finalized. The ROZ program would provide duty-free access into the U.S.
market for certain goods produced in approved areas and potentially create significant
employment opportunities. While observers are widely approving of the ROZ plan
in principle, many question whether there currently are any products with meaningful
export value produced in the FATA. One senior analyst suggests that the need for
capital and infrastructural improvements outweighs the need for tariff reductions. A
Pakistani commentator has argued that an extremely poor law and order situation in
the region will preclude any meaningful investment or industrialization in the
foreseeable future.200
Economic Support Funds. The Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the
President to furnish assistance to countries and organizations in order to promote
economic or political stability. The Economic Support Funds (ESF) requested under
this authorization have represented a significant proportion of U.S. assistance to
Pakistan. Immediately following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, the 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P.L. 107-38) included
appropriation of $600 million in cash transfers for Pakistan under ESF. Congress
subsequently authorized Pakistan to use the FY2003 and FY2004 ESF allocations to
cancel about $1.5 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government.
197 See [http://www.usaid.gov/pk/mission/news/fata.htm].
198 Statement of Acting Deputy USAID Administrator James Kunder before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, December 6, 2007.
199 “Doubts Engulf an American Aid Plan for Pakistan,” New York Times, December 25,
2007.
200 Statement of Amb. Teresita Schaffer before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
December 6, 2007; Hamid Waleed, “Establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
Almost Impossible” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), January 13, 2007.

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Within the Administration’s FY2005-FY2009 assistance plan for Pakistan it
was agreed that $200 million of ESF each year (two-thirds of the category total)
would be delivered in the form of “budget support” — cash transfers meant to enable
the Islamabad government to spend additional resources on education, improving
macroeconomic performance, and the quality of and access to healthcare and
education. (In the Administration’s FY2008 request for foreign operations, Pakistan
was to be one of only three countries — along with Jordan and Lebanon — to receive
ESF in this form.) These funds were to be used for purposes spelled out in mutually
agreed “Shared Objectives” based on goals Pakistan set for itself in its Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, which is the reference widely used by the donor
community. While the State Department and USAID insisted that use of the funds
was carefully monitored, criticisms arose that poor oversight and the fungibility of
money could allow Pakistan’s military-dominated government to use them for
purposes other than those intended. In December 2007, the State Department
appeared to agree in announcing that budget support for Pakistan will henceforth be
“projectized to ensure the money is targeted at the most urgent priorities.”201
Coalition Support Funds. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to
reimburse Pakistan for its operational and logistical support of U.S.-led
counterterrorism operations. As of December 2007, a total of about $8 billion had
been appropriated or authorized for FY2002-FY2008 Defense Department spending
for coalition support payments to “Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating
nations.” Pentagon documents show that disbursements to Islamabad — at an
estimated $5.7 billion or an average of about $79 million per month — account for
the great majority of these funds. The amount is equal to more than one-quarter of
Pakistan’s total military expenditures. The Defense Department Appropriations Act,
2007 (P.L. 109-289) allowed up to $900 million in Pentagon funds be used for
FY2007 reimbursements. The Bush Administration requested another $1 billion in
emergency supplemental coalition support funds (CSF) for FY2007, however, the
supplemental bill signed into law (P.L. 110-28) allowed for only $200 million in new
CSF appropriations, bringing the FY2007 CSF authorization to $1.1 billion. The
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (H.R. 1585) would authorize up to
$1.2 billion more for such purposes.
The State Department claims that Pakistan’s requests for CSF reimbursements
are carefully vetted by several executive branch agencies and must be approved by
the Secretary of Defense. However, a large proportion of CSF funds may have been
lost to waste and mismanagement, given a dearth of adequate controls and oversight.
Senior Pentagon officials reportedly are taking steps to overhaul the process through
which reimbursements and other military aid is provided to Pakistan, perhaps
including linking payments to specific objectives.202
Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs. Numerous
commentators on U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan have recommended making
201 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/96566.htm].
202 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/96566.htm]; “U.S. Officials See Waste in
Billions Sent to Pakistan,” New York Times, December 24, 2007; “Pentagon Aims to
Reshape Pakistan Aid,” Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2007.

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adjustments to the proportion of funds devoted to military versus economic aid
and/or to the objectives of such programs. For most of the post-2001 period, funds
have been split roughly evenly between economic and security-related aid programs,
with the great bulk of the former going to a general economic (budget) support fund
and most of the latter financing “big ticket” defense articles such as airborne early
warning aircraft, and anti-ship and anti-armor missiles. Only about one-tenth of the
roughly $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has
been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs.203 Many
Pakistan-watchers argue that it could be useful to better target U.S. assistance
programs in such a way that they more effectively benefit the country’s citizens.
Some analysts call for improving America’s image in Pakistan by making U.S. aid
more visible to ordinary Pakistanis.204
One idea commonly floated by analysts is the “conditioning” of aid to Pakistan,
perhaps through the creation of “benchmarks.” For example, in 2003, a task force
of senior American South Asia watchers issued a report on U.S. policy in the region
which included a recommendation that the extent of U.S. support for Islamabad
should be linked to that government’s own performance in making Pakistan a more
“modern, progressive, and democratic state” as promised by President Musharraf in
January 2002. Specifically, the task force urged directing two-thirds of U.S. aid to
economic programs and one-third to security assistance, and conditioning increases
in aid amounts to progress in Pakistan’s reform agenda.205 A more recent perspective
is representative of ongoing concerns about the emphases of U.S. aid programs:
[T]he United States has given Musharraf considerable slack in meeting his
commitments to deal with domestic extremism or his promises to restore
authentic democracy. The U.S. partnership with Pakistan would probably be on
firmer footing through conditioned programs more dedicated to building the
country’s political and social institutions than rewarding its leadership.206
Some commentators emphasize that, to be truly effective, conditionality should be
applied by many donor countries rather than just the United States and should be
directed toward the Pakistani leadership — especially the military — to the exclusion
of the general populace.207 In the wake of political crises and deteriorating security
circumstances in Pakistan in late 2007, some senior Members of Congress have been
203 For an extensive review of the U.S. assistance strategy for Pakistan, see Craig Cohen, “A
Perilous Course,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2007.
204 See, for example, Lisa Curtis, “Denying Terrorists Safe Haven in Pakistan,” Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1981, October 26, 2006.
205 “New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan,”
Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations and the Asia Society, October 2003.
206 Marvin Weinbaum, “Afghanistan and Its Neighbors,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special
Report 162, June 2006.
207 See, for example, Frederic Grare, “Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007.

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more vocal in calling for conditions on further U.S. assistance in lieu of
improvements in these areas.208
Many analysts, however, including those making policy for the Bush
Administration, aver that conditioning U.S. aid to Pakistan has a past record of
failure and likely would be counterproductive by reinforcing Pakistani perceptions
of the United States as a fickle and unreliable partner. From this perspective, putting
additional pressure on an already besieged and weakened Musharraf government
might lead to significant political instability in Islamabad.209 One senior Washington-
based analyst who advocates against placing conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan
instead offers an admittedly modest and “not entirely satisfying” approach that would
modify current U.S. policy through more forceful private admonitions to Islamabad
to better focus its own counterterrorism efforts while also targeting Taliban
leadership, increased provision of U.S. counterinsurgency technologies and training
to Pakistani security forces, and the establishment of benchmarks for continued
provision of coalition support funding.210 Private admonitions are considered by
some analysts to be meaningless in the absence of public consequences, however.
For Pakistanis themselves, aid conditionality in U.S. congressional legislation
can raise unpleasant memories of 1985’s so-called Pressler Amendment, which led
to a near-total aid cutoff in 1990. Islamabad’s sensitivities are thus acute: in July
2007, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry said aid conditions legislated in the
Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53)
“cast a shadow” on existing U.S.-Pakistan cooperation and create linkages that “did
not serve the interest of bilateral cooperation in the past and can prove to be
detrimental in the future.”211 Late 2007 and early 2008 calls for further conditionality
from some in Congress led Islamabad to again warn that such moves could harm the
bilateral relationship and do damage to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, the State
Department reports being “comfortable” with congressional conditions and
“confident” that required reports can be issued.212
Coup-Related Legislation. Pakistan’s October 1999 military coup triggered
U.S. aid restrictions under Section 508 of the annual Foreign Assistance
appropriations act. Post-September 2001 circumstances saw Congress take action
on such restrictions. P.L. 107-57 (October 2001) waived coup-related sanctions on
Pakistan through FY2002 and granted presidential authority to waive them through
FY2003. A November 2003 emergency supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 108-
106) extended the President’s waiver authority through FY2004. The foreign
208 See, for example, “Senate Leader Wants Bush to Pressure Pakistan,” Reuters, January
10, 2008.
209 See, for example, Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, July
2007.
210 Ashley Tellis, “Pakistan: Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror,” Carnegie Endowment
Policy Brief 56, December 2007.
211 See [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/july/PR_199_07.htm].
212 “Pakistan Rejects Call for Conditions on U.S. Aid,” Reuters, January 11, 2008; State
Department claim at [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/97946.htm].

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operations FY2006 appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102) extended it through FY2006.
The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-
53) provided a two-year extension through FY2008. In issuing the waiver, the
President must certify for Congress that it “would facilitate the transition to
democratic rule in Pakistan” and “is important to United States efforts to respond to,
deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism.” President Bush has exercised this
waiver authority five times, most recently in July 2007.213
Proliferation-Related Legislation. Through a series of legislative
measures, Congress incrementally lifted sanctions on Pakistan resulting from its
nuclear weapons proliferation activities.214 After the September 2001 terrorist attacks
on the United States, policymakers searched for new means of providing assistance
to Pakistan. President Bush’s issuance of a final determination that month removed
remaining sanctions on Pakistan (and India) resulting from the 1998 nuclear tests,
finding that restrictions were not in U.S. national security interests. Some Members
of the 108th Congress urged reinstatement of proliferation-related sanctions in
response to evidence of Pakistani assistance to third-party nuclear weapons programs.
However, the Nuclear Black-Market Elimination Act (H.R. 4965) died in committee.
Legislation in the 109th Congress included the Pakistan Proliferation Accountability
Act of 2005 (H.R. 1553), which sought to prohibit the provision of military
equipment to Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan has verifiably
halted all proliferation activities and is fully sharing with the United States all
information relevant to the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. This bill also did not
emerge from committee.
In the 110th Congress, the House-passed version of the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1) included provisions to suspend
all arms sales licenses and deliveries to any “nuclear proliferation host country”
unless the President certifies that such a country is, inter alia, fully investigating and
taking actions to permanently halt illicit nuclear proliferation activities. Related
Senate-passed legislation (S. 4) contained no such language and the provisions did
not appear in the subsequent law (P.L. 110-53).
9/11 Commission Recommendations. The 9/11 Commission Report,
released in July 2004, identified the government of President Musharraf as the best
hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it recommended that the United
States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for
Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a
policy of “enlightened moderation.” In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
213 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070629-2.html].
214 The Agricultural Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-194) allowed U.S. wheat sales to
Pakistan after July 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (in P.L. 105-277)
authorized a one-year sanctions waiver exercised by President Clinton in November 1998.
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-79) gave the President
permanent authority to waive nuclear-test-related sanctions applied against Pakistan and
India after October 1999, when President Clinton waived economic sanctions on India
(Pakistan remained under sanctions as a result of the October 1999 coup). (See CRS Report
RS20995, India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne Rennack.)

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Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Congress broadly endorsed this
recommendation by calling for U.S. aid to Pakistan to be sustained at a minimum of
FY2005 levels and requiring the President to report to Congress a description of
long-term U.S. strategy to engage with and support Pakistan. A November 2005
follow-on report by Commissioners gave a “C” grade to U.S. efforts to support
Pakistan’s anti-extremism policies and warned that the country “remains a sanctuary
and training ground for terrorists.” In the 109th Congress, H.R. 5017 and S. 3456
sought to insure implementation of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The bills contained Pakistan-specific language, but neither emerged from committee.
A new Democratic majority took up the issue again in 2007. The premiere
House resolution of the 110th Congress, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1), was passed in January containing discussion
of U.S. policy toward Pakistan. The bill was passed by the Senate in July and
became P.L. 110-53 in August, including conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan for the
first time in the post-9/11 era (see below). The Bush Administration opposed the
language on the grounds that “conditionality” would be counterproductive to the goal
of closer U.S.-Pakistan relations.
Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 110th Congress
P.L. 110-53: The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of
2007 (became Public Law on August 3, 2007):
! Ends U.S. military assistance and arms sales licensing to Pakistan in
FY2008 unless the President reports to Congress that Islamabad is
“undertaking a comprehensive military, legal, economic, and
political campaign” to “eliminating from Pakistani territory any
organization such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, or any successor,
engaged in military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in Afghanistan,”
and “is currently making demonstrated, significant, and sustained
progress toward eliminating support or safe haven for terrorists.”
! Requires the President report to Congress a long-term U.S. strategy
for engaging Pakistan.
! Provides an extension of the President’s authority to waive coup-
related sanctions through FY2008.
P.L. 110-28: The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (became Public Law on May 27,
2007):
! Provides up to $200 million in further coalition support payments to
“Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations” in FY2007.
! Provides up to $60 million in counterdrug funds for Pakistan and
Afghanistan in FY2007.
! Allows that up to $110 million in Pentagon funds may be used for
Economic Support Funds (ESF) for development projects in
Pakistan’s tribal areas in FY2007.
! Withholds all FY2007 supplemental ESF for Pakistan until the
Secretary of State submits to Congress a report on the oversight

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mechanisms, performance benchmarks, and implementation
processes for such funds.
! Earmarks $5 million in FY2007 ESF for the Human Rights and
Democracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Department of State, for political party development and
election observation programs in Pakistan.
P.L. 110-161: The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (became Public Law on
December 26, 2007):
! Provides $250 million in FY2008 Foreign Military Financing for
Pakistani counterterrorism activities. Another $50 million will be
provided for such purposes after the Secretary of State reports to
Congress that Pakistan is “making concerted efforts” to combat both
Al Qaeda and Taliban forces on Pakistani territory and is
“implementing democratic reforms.”
H.R. 1585 (H.Rept 110-477): The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008
(presented to the President December 19, 2007):
! Would authorize up to $75 million in FY2008 Section 1206 funding
to enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of Pakistan’s
paramilitary Frontier Corp.
! Would authorize up to $1.2 billion in FY2008 Pentagon coalition
support reimbursements to “any key cooperating nation” in
connection with U.S. military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.
! Would withhold coalition support reimbursements to Pakistan unless
the Administration submits to Congress by March 31, 2008, a report
on enhancing security and stability along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border. The report must include “detailed description” of Pakistan’s
efforts to “eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other
violent extremists on the national territory of Pakistan” and to
“prevent the movement of such forces across the border of Pakistan
into Afghanistan ....”
! Would require the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress
itemized descriptions of coalition support reimbursements to
Pakistan for the period February 2008-September 2009.
H.R. 2446: The Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007 (passed by
the House on June 6, 2007; referred to Senate committee):
! Would require the President to report to Congress on
implementation of policies to encourage greater Pakistan-Arab
country reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and on Pakistan-
Afghanistan cooperation.
! Would authorize the President to appoint a new special envoy to
promote closer Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation.
! Would require the President to report to Congress on actions taken
by Pakistan to permit or impede transit of Indian reconstruction
materials to Afghanistan across Pakistani territory.

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Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Assistance and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2008
(rounded to the nearest millions of dollars)
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
Total
2007
2008
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
FY2002-FY2007
(est.)
(req.)
Economic Support Fundsa

615
188b
200b
298
297
284
1,880
443c
Other Development Aidd

50
50
75
50
141
118
484
58
Total Economic Aid

665
238
275
348
437
401
2,364
501
Foreign Military Financing

75
225
75
299
297
297
1,267
300
Other Security-Related Aide
4
102f
32
38
50
102
95
418
99
Total Security-Related Aid
4
177
257
112
349
399
392
1,685
399
Coalition Support Funds (CSF)g

1,169h
1,247
705
964
862
769i
5,716
j
Total Non-Food Aid Plus
4
2,010
1,741
1,093
1,661
1,698
1,562
9,765
900
Coalition Support Funds
Food Aidk
86
90
19
24
18
26

177

Grand Total
90
2,100
1,760
1,117
1,679
1,724
1,562
9,942
900
Sources: U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development. FY2007 figures are estimates; FY2008 figures are requested. Figures may
not add up due to rounding.
Notes:
a. From FY2005 onward, $200 million per year in ESF has been delivered in the form of “budget support” — cash transfers to Pakistan.
b. Congress authorized Pakistan to use the FY2003 ESF allocation to cancel $988 million and the FY2004 allocation to cancel $495 million in concessional debt to the U.S. government.
c. Includes a $60 million supplemental ESF request.
d. Includes Child Survival and Health; Development Assistance; Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance; and International Disaster and Famine Assistance.
e. Includes International Military Education and Training; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related; Pentagon
Section 1206 train and equip funds; and Pentagon counternarcotics funds.
f. Includes $73 million for border security projects that continued in FY2003.
g. CSF is Pentagon funding to reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S. military operations. It is not considered to be foreign assistance, although it is often portrayed as such.
h. Includes $220 million in Peacekeeping Operations Emergency Response Funds reported by the State Department.
i. Includes pending supplemental CSF payments of $200 million.
j. The Administration requested $1.7 billion in further CSF in FY2008. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (H.R. 1585) would authorize up to $1.2 billion for such
purposes.
k. P.L.480 Title I (loans), P.L.480 Title II (grants), Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations), and Food for Progress.


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Figure 1. Map of Pakistan