Order Code RL33539
Intelligence Issues for Congress
Updated December 18, 2007
Richard A. Best Jr.
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Intelligence Issues for Congress
Summary
To address the challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 21st
century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve
coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In
December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-
458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with
substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also
established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial
challenges. The needs of intelligence “consumers” — ranging from the White House
to cabinet agencies to military commanders — must all be met, using the same
systems and personnel. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some
critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort
while some intelligence “targets” have been neglected.
The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the
organizational relationships will remain complex, especially for Defense Department
agencies. Members of Congress will be seeking to observe the extent to which
effective coordination is accomplished. FY2008 intelligence authorization
legislation (H.R. 2082/S. 1538) addresses some of these concerns.
International terrorism, a major threat facing the United States in the 21st
century, presents a difficult analytical challenge. Techniques for acquiring and
analyzing information on small groups of plotters differ significantly from those used
to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. U.S. intelligence efforts are
complicated by unfilled requirements for foreign language expertise. Whether all
terrorist surveillance efforts have been consistent with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) has been a matter of controversy. Changes to FISA
are included in H.R. 3773 and S. 2248. S. 2248 was debated by the Senate on
December 17, 2007 but further action was postponed until early 2008.
Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was inaccurate and Members
have criticized the performance of the Intelligence Community in regard to current
conditions in Iraq and other situations. Improved analysis, while difficult to mandate,
remains a key goal. Better human intelligence, it is argued, is also essential.
Intelligence support to military operations continues to be a major responsibility
of intelligence agencies. The use of precision guided munitions depends on accurate,
real-time targeting data; integrating intelligence data into military operations will
require changes in organizational relationships as well as acquiring necessary
technologies.
Counterterrorism requires the close coordination of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, but there remain many institutional and procedural issues that
complicate cooperation between the two sets of agencies. This report will be updated
as new information becomes available.

Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The “INTs”: Intelligence Disciplines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Integrating the “INTs” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Intelligence Budget Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The 9/11 Investigations and the Congressional Response . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Oversight issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Ongoing Congressional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Collection Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Analytical Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Intelligence Community and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
International Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intelligence Support to Military Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Issues In the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Quality of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Implementation of the Intelligence Reform Act (P.L. 108-458) . . . . . 16
ISR Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Terrorist Surveillance Program/NSA Electronic Surveillance/FISA . . 16
Role of the CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Role of the FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence . . . . . . . 19
Paramilitary Operations and Defense Humint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Regional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CIA and Allegations of Prisoner Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
109th Congress Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
110th Congress Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Intelligence Issues for Congress
Most Recent Developments
On October 3, 2007 the Senate passed its version of the FY2008 Intelligence
Authorization bill (H.R. 2082); the House had passed its version on May 11. The
conference report (H.Rept. 110-478) was filed on December 6; the House agreed to
it on December 13. The Administration has expressed strong opposition to
provisions requiring all executive branch agencies to use only interrogation
techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual.
The Protect America Act (P.L. 110-55), enacted on August 5, made a number
of significant changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) at the
request of the Administration, but the act is set to expire on February 1, 2008. On
November 15, the House passed H.R. 3773, the Responsible Electronic Surveillance
That is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective (RESTORE) Act of 2007. This
legislation would require a court order for the surveillance of a non-U.S. persons
located outside the United States. unless it were known that he or she would not be
communicating with U.S. persons.
On October 18, the Senate Intelligence Committee approved S. 2248, the FISA
Amendments Act of 2007, which would permit the Attorney General and Director
of National Intelligence jointly to authorize the targeting of persons reasonably
believed to be outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.
The Senate bill also provides some retroactive immunity for telecommunications
companies that assisted the government in counterterrorism surveillance efforts since
9/11 and have been the subject of lawsuits. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported
an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 2248 on November 16 that removed
the retroactive immunity provisions and made other changes to the Intelligence
Committee’s version. The Senate debated S. 2248 on December 17th, but postponed
further consideration until early 2008.
In accordance with P.L. 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, on October 30, the DNI announced that the aggregate
amount appropriated for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) for FY2007 was
$43.5 billion.

CRS-2
Background and Analysis
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, dramatically demonstrated the intelligence threats facing the United States in
the new century. In response, Congress has approved significantly larger intelligence
budgets and, in December 2004, passed the most extensive reorganization of the
Intelligence Community since the National Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter: the “Intelligence Reform
Act”) (P.L. 108-458) created a Director of National Intelligence (separate from the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) who will head the Intelligence
Community, serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President, and oversee
and direct the acquisition of major collections systems. As long urged by some
outside observers, one individual will now be able to concentrate on the Intelligence
Community as a whole and possess statutory authorities to establish priorities for
budgets, for directing collection by the whole range of technical systems and human
agents, and for the preparation of community-wide analytical products.
P.L. 108-458 was designed to address the findings of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, that there has
been inadequate coordination of the national intelligence effort and that the Intelligence
Community, as then-organized, could not serve as an agile information gathering
network in the struggle against international terrorists. The Commission released its
report in late July 2004 and Congress debated its recommendations through the following
months. A key issue was the extent of the authorities of the DNI, especially with regard
to budgeting for technical collection systems managed by Defense Department agencies.
In the end, many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission regarding intelligence
organization were adopted after a compromise provision was included that called for
implementing the act “in a manner that respects and does not abrogate” the statutory
authorities of department heads.
On April 21, 2005, the Senate confirmed the nominations of John D.
Negroponte, who had served as Ambassador to Iraq, as DNI and Lt. General Michael
V. Hayden, then Director of the National Security Agency, as Deputy DNI. (In May
2006 Hayden became Director of the CIA.) Members of Congress will seek to ensure
that the changes effected by P.L. 108-458 improve capabilities against terrorist
attacks and other threats to the national security. The legislation is complex and
many questions remain concerning implementation; much will depend upon
relationships established between the DNI, the separate intelligence agencies, and the
Secretary of Defense. On February 7, 2007, retired Navy Vice Admiral J. Michael
McConnell was confirmed by the Senate as Negroponte’s successor as DNI.

Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community (defined at 50 U.S.C.
401a(4)) consists of the following:
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (INR)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
National Security Agency (NSA)
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

CRS-3
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Army Intelligence
Navy Intelligence
Air Force Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Coast Guard (CG)
Treasury Department
Energy Department
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
Except for the CIA, intelligence offices or agencies are components of cabinet
departments with other roles and missions. The intelligence offices/agencies,
however, participate in Intelligence Community activities and serve to support the
other efforts of their departments.
The CIA remains the keystone of the Intelligence Community. It has all-source
analytical capabilities that cover the whole world outside U.S. borders. It produces
a range of studies that cover virtually any topic of interest to national security
policymakers. The CIA also collects intelligence with human sources and, on
occasion, undertakes covert actions at the direction of the President. (A covert action
is an activity or activities of the U.S. Government to influence political, economic,
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the U.S. role will not be
apparent or acknowledged publicly.)
Three major intelligence agencies in DOD — the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) — absorb the larger part of the national intelligence
budget. NSA is responsible for signals intelligence and has collection sites
throughout the world. The NRO develops and operates reconnaissance satellites.
The NGA prepares the geospatial data — ranging from maps and charts to
sophisticated computerized databases — necessary for targeting in an era dependent
upon precision guided weapons. In addition to these three agencies, the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible for defense attachés and for providing DOD
with a variety of intelligence products. Although the Intelligence Reform Act
provides extensive budgetary and management authorities over these agencies to the
DNI, it does not revoke the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense for these
agencies. There will be a need for close cooperation, but also an opportunity for
disagreements that could greatly complicate the intelligence effort.
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is one of the
smaller components of the Intelligence Community but is widely recognized for the
high quality of its analysis. INR is strictly an analytical agency; diplomatic reporting
from embassies, though highly useful to intelligence analysts, is not considered an
intelligence function (nor is it budgeted as one).
The key intelligence functions of the FBI relate to counterterrorism and
counterintelligence. The former mission has grown enormously in importance since
September 2001, many new analysts have been hired, and the FBI has been
reorganized in an attempt to ensure that intelligence functions are not subordinated
to traditional law enforcement efforts. Most importantly, law enforcement

CRS-4
information is now expected to be forwarded to other intelligence agencies for use
in all-source products.
The intelligence organizations of the four military services concentrate largely
on concerns related to their specific missions. Their analytical products, along with
those of DIA, supplement the work of CIA analysts and provide greater depth on key
technical issues.
The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) provided DHS responsibilities for
fusing law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the
homeland. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis in DHS participates in the inter-
agency counterterrorism efforts and, along with the FBI, has focused on ensuring that
state and local law enforcement officials receive information on terrorist threats from
national-level intelligence agencies.
The Coast Guard, now part of DHS, deals with information relating to maritime
security and homeland defense. The Energy Department analyzes foreign nuclear
weapons programs as well as nuclear nonproliferation and energy-security issues.
It also has a robust counterintelligence effort. The Treasury Department collects and
processes information that may affect U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. Treasury
also covers the terrorist financing issue.
The “INTs”: Intelligence Disciplines. The Intelligence Community has been
built around major agencies responsible for specific intelligence collection systems
known as disciplines. Three major intelligence disciplines or “INTs” — signals
intelligence (sigint), imagery intelligence (imint), and human intelligence (humint) —
provide the most important information for analysts and absorb the bulk of the
intelligence budget. Sigint collection is the responsibility of NSA at Fort Meade,
Maryland. Sigint operations are classified, but there is little doubt that the need for
intelligence on a growing variety of nations and groups that are increasingly using
sophisticated and rapidly changing encryption systems requires a far different sigint effort
than the one prevailing during the Cold War. Since the late 1990s a process of change
in NSA’s culture and methods of operations has been initiated, a change required by the
need to target terrorist groups and affected by the proliferation of communications
technologies and inexpensive encryption systems. Observers credit the then-Director of
NSA, Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, who became Director of the CIA in May 2006, with
launching a long-overdue reorganization of the Agency, and adapting it to changed
conditions. Part of his initiative has involved early retirements for some NSA personnel
and greater reliance on outsourcing many functions previously done by career personnel.
Some of the initiatives relating to acquisition did not, however, meet their objectives.
A second major intelligence discipline, imagery or imint, is also facing profound
changes. Imagery is collected in essentially three ways, satellites, manned aircraft,
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The satellite program that covered the Soviet
Union and acquired highly accurate intelligence concerning submarines, missiles,
bombers, and other military targets is perhaps the greatest achievement of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. Subsequent experience has demonstrated that there now
a greater number of collection targets than existed during the Cold War and that more
satellites are required, especially those that can be maneuvered to collect information
about a variety of targets. At the same time, the availability of high-quality

CRS-5
commercial satellite imagery and its widespread use by federal agencies has raised
questions about the extent to which coverage from the private sector can meet the
requirements of intelligence agencies. High altitude UAVs such as the Global Hawk
may also provide surveillance capabilities that overlap those of satellites.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was established in 1996
to manage imagery processing and dissemination previously undertaken by a number
of separate agencies. NIMA was renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) by the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136). The goal
of NGA is, according to the agency, to use imagery and other geospatial information
“to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically
referenced activities on the Earth.”
Intelligence from human contacts — humint — is the oldest intelligence
discipline and the one that is most often written about in the media. The CIA is the
primary collector of humint, but the Defense Department also has responsibilities
filled by defense attachés at embassies around the world and by other agents working
on behalf of theater commanders. Many observers have argued that inadequate
humint has been a systemic problem and contributed to the inability to gain prior
knowledge of the 9/11 plots. In part, these criticisms reflect the changing nature of
the international environment. During the Cold War, targets of U.S. humint
collection were government officials and military leaders. Intelligence agency
officials working under cover as diplomats could approach potential contacts at
receptions or in the context of routine embassy business. Today, however, the need
is to seek information from clandestine terrorist groups or narcotics traffickers who
do not appear at embassy social gatherings. Humint regarding such sources can be
especially important as there may be little evidence of activities or intentions that can
be gathered from imagery, and their communications may be carefully limited.
Contacts with individuals or groups who may have knowledge about terrorist
plots present many challenges. Placing U.S. intelligence officials in foreign countries
under “nonofficial cover” (NOC) in businesses or other private capacities is possible,
but it presents significant challenges to U.S. agencies. Administrative mechanisms
are vastly more complicated than they are for officials formally attached to an
embassy; special arrangements have to be made for pay, allowances, retirement, and
healthcare. The responsibilities of operatives under nonofficial cover to the parent
intelligence agency have to be reconciled with those to private employers, and there
is an unavoidable potential for many conflicts of interest or even corruption. Any
involvement with terrorist groups or smugglers has a potential for major
embarrassment to the U.S. government and, of course, physical danger to those
immediately involved.
Responding to allegations in the early-1990s that CIA agents may have been
involved too closely with narcotics smugglers and human rights violators in Central
America, the then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, established
guidelines in 1995 (which remain classified) to govern the recruitment of informants
with unsavory backgrounds. Although CIA officials maintain that no proposal for
contacts with persons having potentially valuable information was disapproved, there
was a widespread belief that the guidelines served to encourage a “risk averse”
atmosphere at a time when information on terrorist plans, from whatever source, was

CRS-6
urgently sought. The FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 107-108) directed
the DCI to rescind and replace the guidelines, and July 2002 press reports indicated
that they had been replaced.
A major constraint on humint collection is the availability of personnel trained
in appropriate languages. Cold War efforts required a supply of linguists in a
relatively finite set of foreign languages, but the Intelligence Community now needs
experts in a wider range of more obscure languages and dialects. Various approaches
have been considered: use of civilian contract personnel, military reservists with
language qualifications, and substantial bonuses for agency personnel who maintain
their proficiency. The National Security Education Program, established in 1991,
provides for scholarships and career training for individuals in or planning to enter
careers in agencies dealing with national security issues.1

Other “INTs”. A fourth INT, measurement and signatures analysis — masint
— has received greater emphasis in recent years. A highly technical discipline,
masint involves the application of complicated analytical refinements to information
collected by sigint and imint sensors. It also includes spectral imaging by which the
identities and characteristics of objects can be identified on the basis of their
reflection and absorption of light. Masint is undertaken by DIA and other DOD
agencies. A key problem has been retaining personnel with expertise in masint
systems who are offered more remunerative positions in private industry.
Another category of information, open source information — osint (newspapers,
periodicals, pamphlets, books, radio, television, and Internet websites) — is
increasingly important given requirements for information about many regions and
topics (instead of the former concentration on political and military issues affecting
a few countries). At the same time, requirements for translation, dissemination, and
systematic analysis have increased, given the multitude of different areas and the
volume of materials. Many observers believe that intelligence agencies should be
more aggressive in using osint; some believe that the availability of osint may even
reduce the need for certain collection efforts. The availability of osint also raises
questions regarding the need for intelligence agencies to undertake collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information that could be directly obtained by user
agencies. Section 1052 of the Intelligence Reform Act expressed the sense of
Congress that there should be an open source intelligence center to coordinate the
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of open source intelligence to
other intelligence agencies. The DNI is to submit a report on the advisability of such
a center.
Integrating the “INTs”. The “INTs” have been the pillars of the Intelligence
Community’s organizational structure, but analysis of threats requires that data from
all the INTs be brought together and that analysts have ready access on a timely basis.
This has proved in the past to be a substantial challenge because of technical
problems associated with transmitting data and the need to maintain the security of
information acquired from highly sensitive sources. Some argue that intelligence
1 See CRS Report RL32557, Requirements for Linguists in Government Agencies, by Jeffrey
J. Kuenzi.

CRS-7
officials have tended to err on the side of maintaining the security of information
even at the cost of not sharing essential data with those having a need to know.
Section 1015 of the Intelligence Reform Act mandated the establishment of an
Intelligence Sharing Environment (ISE) to facilitate terrorism-related information.
A related problem has been barriers between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement information. These barriers derived from the different uses of
information collected by the two sets of agencies — foreign intelligence used for
policymaking and military operations and law enforcement information to be used
in judicial proceedings in the United States. A large part of the statutory basis for the
“wall” between law enforcement and intelligence information was removed with
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), which made it possible to
share law enforcement information with analysts in intelligence agencies, but long-
established practices have not been completely overcome. The Homeland Security
Act (P.L. 107-296) and the subsequent creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC) established offices charged with combining information from both
types of sources. Section 1021 of the Intelligence Reform Act made the new
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) operating under the DNI specifically
responsible for “analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by
the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism [except
purely domestic terrorism]....”
Intelligence Budget Process. For budgetary purposes, intelligence
spending is divided between the National Intelligence Program (NIP; formerly the
National Foreign Intelligence Program or NFIP) and the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP). The MIP was established in September 2005 and includes all
programs from the former Joint Military Intelligence Program, which encompassed
DOD-wide intelligence programs and most programs from the former Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) category, which encompassed
intelligence programs supporting the operating units of the armed services. The
Program Executive for the MIP is the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Only a small part of the intelligence budget is made public; the bulk of the $40
billion that media reporting associates with overall intelligence spending is “hidden”
within the DOD budget. Spending for most intelligence programs is described in
classified annexes to intelligence and national defense authorization and
appropriations legislation. (Members of Congress have access to these annexes, but
must make special arrangements to read them.)
For a number of years some Members have sought to make public total amounts
of intelligence and intelligence-related spending; floor amendments for that purpose
were defeated in both chambers during the 105th Congress. In response, however, to
a lawsuit filed under the Freedom of Information Act, DCI George Tenet stated on
October 15, 1997 that the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for FY1997 was $26.6 billion. He added that the
Administration would continue “to protect from disclosure any and all subsidiary
information concerning the intelligence budget.” In March 1998, DCI Tenet
announced that the FY1998 figure was $26.7 billion. Figures for FY1999 and
subsequent years have not been released and the executive branch has thus far
prevailed against legal efforts to force release of intelligence spending figures. On
May 23, 2000, the House voted 175-225 to defeat an amendment calling for annual

CRS-8
release of an unclassified statement on aggregate intelligence spending. During
consideration of intelligence reform legislation in 2004, the Senate at one point
approved a version of a bill which would require publication of the amount of the
NIP; the House version did not include a similar provision and, with the Senate
deferring to the House, the Intelligence Reform Act does not require making
intelligence spending amounts public. Provisions requiring public disclosure of the
aggregate amount of funds for the NIP are included in the Senate’s version of the
FY2008 authorization bill (S. 1538). Section 601 of P.L. 110-53, Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, requires that the DNI
publicly disclose the aggregate amount of funds appropriated for the NIP although
after FY2008 the President could waive or postpone the disclosure upon sending a
explanation to congressional oversight committees. However, during floor
consideration of the H.R. 3222, the FY2008 defense appropriations act, an
amendment was adopted that would preclude funds appropriated in the act from
being used to make public disclosure of NIP spending levels.
Jurisdiction over intelligence programs is somewhat different in the House and
the Senate. The Senate Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction only over the NIP but
not the MIP, whereas the House Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over both
sets of programs. The preponderance of intelligence spending is accomplished by
intelligence agencies within DOD and thus in both chambers the armed services
committees are involved in the oversight process. Other oversight committees are
responsible for intelligence agencies that are part of departments other than DOD.
Most appropriations for intelligence activities are included in national defense
appropriations acts, including funds for the CIA, DIA, NSA, the NRO, and NGA.
Other appropriations measures include funds for the intelligence offices of the State
Department, the FBI, and DHS. In the past, defense appropriations subcommittees
have funded the intelligence activities of CIA and the DOD agencies (although funds
for CIA have been included in defense appropriations acts, these monies are
transferred directly). The Senate voted in October 2004 to establish an
Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence, but this has not occurred and the
House has not taken similar action. On January 9, 2007, the House approved H.Res.
35 which establishes a select panel within the appropriations committee that includes
three members of the intelligence committee to review intelligence activities to
support the work of the appropriations committee.
Intelligence budgeting issues were at the center of the debate on intelligence
reform legislation in 2004. On one hand, there was determination to make the new
DNI responsible for developing and determining the annual National Intelligence
Program budget (which is separate from the MIP budgets that are prepared by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense). The goal was to ensure a unity of effort that
arguably has not previously existed and that may have complicated efforts to monitor
terrorist activities. On the other hand, the intelligence efforts within the National
Intelligence Program include those of major components of the Defense Department,
including NSA, the NRO, and NGA, that are closely related to other military
activities. Some Members thus argued that even the National Intelligence Program
should not be considered apart from the Defense budget. After considerable debate,
the final version of P.L. 108-458 provides broad budgetary authorities to the DNI, but
in Section 1018 requires the President to issue guidelines to ensure that the DNI

CRS-9
exercises the authorities provided by the statute “in a manner that respects and does
not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of” of the Office of
Management and Budget and Cabinet departments. Even when guidelines are
drafted, observers expect that implementing the complex and seemingly overlapping
budgetary provisions of the Intelligence Reform Act will depend on effective
working relationships between the Office of the DNI, DOD, and the President.
The 9/11 Investigations and the Congressional Response. In the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, there was extensive public discussion of whether
the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center represented an “intelligence
failure.” In response, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence undertook a joint investigation of the
September 11 attacks. (Earlier in July 17, 2002, the House Intelligence Committee
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security had undertaken an investigation
of ways to improve counterterrorism capabilities in the light of the September 2001
attacks.) Public hearings by the resulting “Joint Inquiry” began on September 18,
2002, beginning with testimony from representatives of families of those who died
in the attacks. Former policymakers and senior CIA and FBI officials also testified.
Eleanor Hill, the Inquiry Staff Director summarized the Inquiry’s findings: “ ... the
Intelligence Community did have general indications of a possible terrorist attack
against the United States or U.S. interests overseas in the spring and summer of 2001
and promulgated strategic warnings. However, it does not appear that the
Intelligence Community had information prior to September 11 that identified
precisely where, when and how the attacks were to be carried out.”
The two intelligence committees published the findings and conclusions of the
Joint Inquiry on December 11, 2002.2 The committees found that the Intelligence
Community had received, beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of
2001, “a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated
the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States.” Further findings dealt
with specific terrorists about whom some information had come to the attention of
U.S. officials prior to September 11 and with reports about possible employment of
civilian airliners to crash into major buildings. The Inquiry also made systemic
findings highlighting the Intelligence Community’s lack of preparedness to deal with
the challenges of global terrorism, inefficiencies in budgetary planning, the lack of
adequate numbers of linguists, a lack of human sources, and an unwillingness to
share information among agencies.
Separately, the two intelligence committees submitted recommendations for
strengthening intelligence capabilities. They urged the creation of a Cabinet-level
position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) separate from the position of
director of the CIA. The DNI would have greater budgetary and managerial authority
over intelligence agencies in the Defense Department than possessed by the DCI.
The committees also expressed great concern with the reorientation of the FBI to
counterterrorism and suggested consideration of the creation of a new domestic
surveillance agency similar to Britain’s MI5.
2 The full report was released some months later as H.Rept. 107-792/S.Rept. 107-351.

CRS-10
The Joint Inquiry was focused directly on the performance of intelligence
agencies, but there was widespread support among Members for a more extensive
review of the roles of other agencies. Provisions for establishing an independent
commission on the 2001 terrorist attacks were included in the FY2003 Intelligence
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-306). Former New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean
was named to serve as chairman, with former Representative Lee H. Hamilton
serving as vice chairman. Widely publicized hearings were held in spring 2004 with
Administration and outside witnesses providing different perspectives on the role of
intelligence agencies prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks. The Commission’s
Report was published in July 2004.
Although the 9/11 Commission surveyed the roles of a number of Federal and
local agencies, many of its principal recommendations concerned the perceived lack
of authorities of the DCI. The Commission recommended establishing a National
Intelligence Director (NID) to manage the National Intelligence Program and oversee
the agencies that contribute to it. The NID would annually submit a national
intelligence program budget and, when necessary, forward the names of nominees to
be heads of major intelligence agencies to the President. Lead responsibility for
conducting and executing paramilitary operations would be assigned to DOD and not
CIA. The Commission also recommended that Congress pass a separate annual
appropriations act for intelligence that would be made public. The NID would
execute the expenditure of appropriated funds and make transfers of funds or
personnel as appropriate. Proposing a significant change in congressional practice,
the Commission recommended a single intelligence committee in each house of
Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities.
On August 27, 2004, President Bush addressed key recommendations of the
9/11 Commission in signing several executive orders to reform intelligence. In
addition to establishing a National Counterterrorism Center, the orders provided new
authorities for the DCI until legislation was enacted to create a National Intelligence
Director. In addition, several legislative proposals were introduced to establish a
National Intelligence Director, separate from a CIA Director.3 The Senate passed S.
2845 on October 16, 2004; the House had passed H.R. 10 on October 8, 2004.
Efforts by the resulting conference committee to reach agreed-upon text focused on
the issue of the authorities of the proposed Director of National Intelligence in regard
to the budgets and operations of the major intelligence agencies in DOD, especially
NSA, NRO, and NGA.4 Conferees finally reached agreement in early December,
and the conference report on S. 2845 (H.Rept. 108-796) was approved by the House
3 See CRS Report RL32600, Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence
Reforms, Roberts Draft Bill, H.R. 4104, S. 190, S. 1520, S. 6, H.R. 4584, Current Law
, and
CRS Report RL32601, Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence
Reforms, S. 2845, S. 2774, H.R. 5024, Administration Proposal, H.R. 10, Current Law
, both
by Alfred Cumming.
4 See CRS Report RL32506, The Proposed Authorities of a National Intelligence Director:
Issues for Congress and Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law
,
by Alfred Cumming, and CRS Report RL32515, Intelligence Community Reorganization:
Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies
, by Richard A. Best, Jr.

CRS-11
on December 7 and by the Senate on December 8. The President signed the
legislation on December 17, 2004, and it became P.L. 108-458.
The Intelligence Reform Act is wide-ranging (as noted below) and its
implementation will undoubtedly receive close oversight during the 110th Congress.
Some observers have suggested that modifications to the legislation may be needed;
others recommend that any difficulties be addressed by executive orders or
memoranda of understandings (MOUs).
Oversight issues. The 9/11 Commission concluded that congressional
oversight of intelligence activities was “dysfunctional.” A number of measures were
undertaken to address issues raised by the Commission, including the establishment
of oversight subcommittees on both committees.5 Proposals to establish one
committee with both appropriations and authorization responsibilities proved
unacceptable, but H.Res. 35, passed on January 9, 2007, established a panel within
the appropriations committee with additional staff to review intelligence activities.
Senate rules require that the Intelligence Committee include Members also serving
on the Appropriations Committee thus providing for a measure of coordination;
although S.Res. 445 in the 109th Congress envisioned an appropriations
subcommittee on intelligence, no such entity has been established.
The involvement of the Intelligence Community in homeland security efforts
that involve domestic law enforcement agencies has affected congressional oversight.
In the past the two intelligence committees and the appropriations committees were
almost the only points of contact between intelligence agencies and the Congress.
In the 109th Congress the Homeland Security Committees also undertook oversight
of some aspects of intelligence activities. Disagreements have arisen over the extent
to which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has oversight over
intelligence aspects of government-wide information sharing efforts6.
Ongoing Congressional Concerns
Collection Capabilities. Intelligence agencies collect vast quantities of
information on a daily, even an hourly basis. The ability to locate fixed installations
and moving targets has become an integral component of U.S. military capabilities.
On almost any subject, the Intelligence Community can provide a wealth of
knowledge within short time frames. Inevitably, there are “mysteries” that remain
unknowable — the effects of unforeseeable developments and the intentions of
foreign leaders. The emergence of the international terrorist threat has posed major
challenges to intelligence agencies largely designed to gather information about
nation states and their armed forces. Sophisticated terrorist groups in some cases
relay information only via agents in order to avoid having their communications
intercepted. Human collection has been widely perceived as inadequate, especially
in regard to terrorism; the Intelligence Reform Act stated the Sense of Congress that,
5 See CRS Report RL33742, 9/11 Commission Recommendations, by Richard F. Grimmett.
6 See Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing: the Federal Government
Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information
, GAO-06-385, March 2006, p. 30.

CRS-12
while humint officers have performed admirably and honorably, there must be an
increased emphasis on and greater resources applied to enhancing the depth and
breadth of human intelligence capabilities. In October 2005 the National Clandestine
Service was established at CIA to undertake humint operations by CIA and
coordinate humint efforts by other intelligence agencies.
There are also congressional concerns regarding major technical systems —
especially reconnaissance satellites. These programs have substantial budgetary
implications. Whereas the Intelligence Community was a major technological
innovator during the Cold War, today both intelligence agencies and their potential
targets make extensive use of commercial technologies, including sophisticated
encryption systems. Filtering out “chaff” from the ocean of data that can be collected
remains, however, a major challenge.
Analytical Quality. The ultimate goal of intelligence is accurate analysis.
Analysis is not, however, an exact science and there have been, and undoubtedly will
continue to be, failures by analysts to prepare accurate and timely assessments and
estimates. The performance of the Intelligence Community’s analytical offices
during the past decade is a matter of debate; some argue that overall the quality of
analysis has been high while others point to the failure to provide advance warning
of the 9/11 attacks and a flawed estimate of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction as
reflecting systemic problems. Congressional intelligence committees have for some
time noted weaknesses in analysis and lack of language skills, and a predominant
focus on current intelligence at the expense of strategic analysis.
Analytical shortcomings are not readily addressed by legislation, but Congress
has increased funding for analytical offices since 9/11 and the Intelligence Reform
Act of 2004 contains a number of provisions designed to improve analysis — an
institutionalized mechanism for alternate or “red team” analyses to be undertaken
(section 1017), the designation of an individual or entity to ensure that intelligence
products are timely, objective, and independent of political considerations (section
1019), and the designation of an official in the office of the DNI to whom analysts
can turn for counsel, arbitration on “real or perceived problems of analytical
tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity” (section 1020).
These efforts will, however, be affected by the long lead-times needed to
prepare and train analysts, especially in such fields as counterterrorism and
counterproliferation. Improving analysis depends, among other things, upon the
talents of analysts brought into government service, encouraging their contributions
and calculated risk-takings, and a willingness to tolerate the tentative nature of
analytical judgments. These factors are sometimes difficult to achieve in government
organizations. Another significant impediment to comprehensive analysis has been
a shortage of trained linguists especially in languages of current interest. As noted
above, the National Security Education Program and related efforts are designed to
meet this need, but most observers believe the need for linguists will remain a
pressing concern for some years.
An enduring concern is the existence of “stovepipes.” Agencies that obtain
highly sensitive information are reluctant to share it throughout the Intelligence
Community out of a determination to protect their sources. In addition, information

CRS-13
not available to analysts with relevant responsibilities is many times wasted. In
recent years there have been calls for greater sharing in order to improve the quality
of analysis, but it is expected that dealing with this complex dilemma will require
continuing attention by intelligence managers.
The Intelligence Community and Iraq. The Intelligence Community has
been widely criticized for its performance in regard to Iraq. The Baath regime in
Bagdad undeniably presented major challenges; it was almost impossible to penetrate
the inner reaches of Saddam Hussein’s government. U.S. intelligence agencies
supported the efforts of U.N. inspectors charged with determining Iraqi compliance
with U.N. resolutions requiring Iraq to end any programs for the acquisition or
deployment of weapons of mass destruction, but such efforts were frustrated by the
Iraqi government.
At Congress’s request, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) dealing with Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was prepared in September 2002, shortly
before crucial votes on the Iraqi situation. The NIE has been widely criticized for
inaccurately claiming the existence of actual WMDs and exaggerating the extent of
Iraqi WMD programs. The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that the NIE’s
major key judgments “either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying
intelligence reporting.” The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction severely criticized analysts
who misinterpreted the limited intelligence about Iraqi WMDs that was available and
failed to alert policymakers to the uncertainties in both evidence and analysis.
Other observers note, however, that the Intelligence Community based its
conclusions in significant part on Iraq’s previous use of WMD, its ongoing WMD
research programs, and its unwillingness to document the destruction of WMD stocks
in accordance with U.N. resolutions. These factors, which have never been disputed,
served as background to Administration decisions. Some observers argue, however,
that Administration officials misused intelligence in an effort to build support for a
military option.7
On February 11, 2004, President Bush by Executive Order 13328 created a
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons
of Mass Destruction. The Commission, co-chaired by former Senator Charles S.
Robb and retired Federal Judge Laurence H. Silverman, was asked to assess the
capabilities of the Intelligence Community to collect, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence regarding WMD and related 21st Century threats. It addition, the
Commission was asked to look specifically at intelligence regarding Iraqi WMD
prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom and to compare prewar assessments with the
findings of the Iraq Survey Group. The Commission issued its report on March 31,
2005.8 The report described in detail a number of analytical errors that resulted in
faulty pre-war judgments on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The Commission
recommended that the DNI take steps to forge an integrated Intelligence Community,
7 For additional background, see CRS Report RS21696, U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking:
The Iraq Experience
, by Richard A. Best Jr.
8 The report may be found at [http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html].

CRS-14
that intelligence functions within the FBI be combined into a single National Security
Service, and urged that the DNI not focus on the preparation of the President’s Daily
Brief at the expense of the long-term needs of the Intelligence Community.
Despite the inadequate intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs, the success of the
military attack on the Iraqi regime launched in March 2003 by the United States, the
UK, and other countries was greatly assisted by intelligence. The extensive use of
precision-guided munitions that targeted key Iraqi military and command facilities
and limited civilian casualties was made possible by the real-time availability of
precise locating data. Observers have noted that operational shortcomings in
transmitting intelligence data that were frequent during the 1991 Persian Gulf War
were not observed in the Iraq campaign of 2003.
As the security situation in Iraq continues to be a matter of grave concern,
intelligence collection and analytical capabilities have been severely criticized. In
December 2006 the Iraq Study Group concluded that the “Defense Department and
the intelligence community have not invested sufficient people and resources to
understand the political and military threat to American men and women in the armed
forces.” The Group further maintained that intelligence agencies “are not doing
enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a national and
provincial level. The analytic community’s knowledge of the organization,
leadership, financing, and operations of militias, as well as their relationship to
government security forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.”9
International Terrorism. Although intelligence agencies were focused on
international terrorism from at least the mid-1980s, the events of September 11, 2001
made counterterrorism a primary mission of the Intelligence Community. In response
to a widespread perception that barriers that restricted the flow of information
between the CIA and the FBI, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-
56) which removed barriers on sharing foreign intelligence and law enforcement
information (including grand jury information). The PATRIOT Act was designed to
facilitate an all-source intelligence effort against terrorist groups that work both
inside and outside U.S. borders. Nevertheless, problems of coordination and
institutional rivalries persist. Moreover, some provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act
relating to the sharing of law enforcement and foreign intelligence information were
to have expired in early 2006, but new legislation (P.L. 109-177 and P.L. 109-178)
was enacted on March 9, 2006, that extended expiring provisions with
modifications.10
Legislation was also enacted to create a Department of Homeland Security that
would contain an analytical office responsible for integrating information from
foreign intelligence and law enforcement sources. In addition, the Administration
announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) in
January 2003 under the DCI. In accordance with EO13354 of August 27, 2004 and
9 U.S., Iraq Study Group, Report (Washington: Vintage Books, 2006), p. 94.
10 For further information, see CRS Report RS22412, USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Authorization Act of 2005: A Sketch
, by Brian T. Yeh and Charles Doyle.

CRS-15
the Intelligence Reform Act, TTIC has been transferred to the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
As an intelligence mission, counterterrorism has several unique characteristics.
Although it usually requires input from all the various intelligence disciplines, most
observers believe that it is especially dependent upon humint. Technical systems are
good at providing information about numbers of airplanes, ships, and tanks but the
most important information on small groups of terrorist plotters often is provided by
humint sources. Furthermore, the type of humint required for counterterrorism
depends on contacts with sources far removed from embassy gatherings and requires
expertise in languages that are possessed by few in this country. This is a distinct
difference from humint collection during the Cold War when Soviet diplomats and
military officers were often the principal targets.11
Intelligence Support to Military Forces. In 1997, the House intelligence
committee noted that “intelligence is now incorporated into the very fiber of tactical
military operational activities, whether forces are being utilized to conduct
humanitarian missions or are engaged in full-scale combat.” The Persian Gulf War
demonstrated the importance of intelligence from both tactical and national systems,
including satellites that had been previously directed almost entirely at Soviet
facilities. There were, nonetheless, numerous technical difficulties, especially in
transmitting data in usable formats and in a timely manner. Many of these issues
have since been addressed with congressional support and in Operation Iraqi
Freedom intelligence was an integral part of the operational campaign.
Issues In the 110th Congress
Observers expect that oversight of the implementation of the Intelligence
Reform Act will extend into the 110th Congress. Both chambers will address
authorization and appropriations legislation in accordance with procedures
established in the Intelligence Reform Act, undoubtedly taking into consideration the
diverse interpretations of different Members regarding the provisions. Congress is
also likely to monitor the evolving relationship between the DNI and the CIA
Director especially in regard to humint collection and covert operations as well to
CIA’s analytical efforts. The role of the Defense Department and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence are also likely to be a congressional concern.
Quality of Analysis. Evaluations of the Intelligence Community’s
performance in regard to Iraqi WMD undertaken by congressional committees and
by the Robb/Silverman Commission are likely to affect the influence of ongoing
assessments of Iranian and North Korean and potentially other nuclear programs.
Intelligence on WMD requires the collecting of data with highly sophisticated
technical systems and by human agents in areas where U.S. access is limited and
continuing analysis of complex and subtle indicators. As WMD proliferation will
11 See CRS Report RL31292, Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress, by
Richard A. Best, Jr. Foreign language issues are covered in CRS Report RL32557,
Requirement for Linguists in Government Agencies, by Jeffrey J. Kuenzi.

CRS-16
remain a major policy concern, the quality of supporting intelligence is likely to be
a focal point of congressional interest in the Intelligence Community.
Implementation of the Intelligence Reform Act (P.L. 108-458). The
legislation is expected to continue to have a major influence on the Intelligence
Community. The DNI will have authority to task intelligence collection and analysis
and manage national intelligence centers including the National Counterterrorism
Center, which encompasses TTIC, and the National Counter Proliferation Center
(and potentially additional centers). The DNI will have enhanced budgetary and
acquisition authorities over the entire national intelligence effort, although the exact
contours of the relationship with other government organizations, especially the
Defense Department, will be addressed in accordance with presidential guidelines.
The act has a number of provisions designed to ensure that intelligence analysis is not
politicized or biased and to protect civil liberties at a time when additional
counterterrorism measures are being undertaken. Intelligence agencies in the DOD
will remain in their existing chain of command and continue to be responsible for
providing support to combat commands.
The expansion of intelligence efforts, especially concentrated in
counterterrorism, has resulted in a severe shortage of trained analysts, especially
those with excellent foreign language talents. The problem is already acute in some
agencies and the likelihood of significant retirements in coming years will complicate
efforts to improve intelligence capabilities.
ISR Programs. Although major intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
programs are classified and discussed in the classified annexes of intelligence
authorization and defense appropriations acts, they include a substantial portion of
the overall intelligence budget. Satellites and NSA’s sigint efforts are likely to
continue to receive close scrutiny from Congress throughout the 110th Congress given
their technological complexity and high costs.12
Terrorist Surveillance Program/NSA Electronic Surveillance/FISA.
In December 2005 media accounts of electronic surveillance by NSA authorized
outside the parameters of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) led to
extensive criticism of the Administration. Although the technical details of the effort
remain classified, the Administration maintains that communications, which involve
a party reasonably considered to be a member of Al Qaeda, or affiliated with Al
Qaeda, and one party in the U.S., may be monitored on the basis of the President’s
constitutional authorities and the provisions of the Joint Resolution providing for
Authority for the Use of Force (P.L. 107-40) of September 18, 2001. The need for
speed and agility requires, the Administration further argues, an approach not
envisioned by the drafters of FISA. Others counter that FISA should have governed
such electronic surveillance. In early March 2006 agreement was reached with the
leadership of the two intelligence committees to establish procedures for enhanced
legislative oversight of the NSA effort, and legislative initiatives are under
12 For further information, see CRS Report RL32508, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Issues for Congress
, by Richard A. Best Jr.

CRS-17
consideration that would either modify FISA or establish new statutory authorities
for electronic surveillance.
Differing views of Members on the NSA effort were reflected in the House
Intelligence Committee’s 2006 report on FY2007 intelligence authorization
legislation (H.Rept. 109-411).13 In January 2007 the Administration agreed that any
electronic surveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance
Program (TSP) would be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. Further, the Administration indicated that it would
not re-authorize the TSP in the future. On May 1, 2007, the Senate Intelligence
Committee held an open hearing on the Administration’s proposal to revise FISA to
take account of changes in communications technologies since the 1970s, with
Members expressing differing views on the desirability of the legislation.14
According to media reports, a judge on the FISA Court at some point in 2007
ruled that the Federal Government had overstepped its authority by broad
surveillance of communications between two overseas locations that passed through
the United States. Although details of the effort remain classified, there appears to
have been wide agreement among Members that FISA needed to be amended to
permit surveillance of certain types of communications routing that did not exist
when FISA was first enacted.
The Protect America Act (P.L. 110-55), signed on August 5, 2007, after
extensive congressional debate, excludes from the definition of “electronic
surveillance” under FISA surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States. In addition, under certain circumstances, FISA, as
amended by this legislation, now permits the DNI and the Attorney General, for
periods up to one year, to authorize acquisition of foreign intelligence information
“concerning persons reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States,”
apparently including U.S. persons, and to direct a communications provider,
custodian, or other person with access to the communication immediately to provide
information, facilities, and assistance to accomplish the acquisition. Those receiving
such directives have the right to contest them in court. The DNI and the Attorney
General must certify, in part, that this acquisition does not constitute electronic
surveillance; and the Attorney General must submit the procedures by which this
determination is made to the FISA Court for review as to whether the Government
determination is clearly erroneous. On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General
must report to congressional oversight committees on instances of noncompliance
13 See also CRS Report RL33637, Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, as passed by
the House of Representatives
, and CRS Report RL33669, Terrorist Surveillance Act of
2006: S. 3931 and Title II of S. 3929, the Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution
Act of 2006
, both by Elizabeth B. Bazan.
14 See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the
Statutory Framework and U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and U.S. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review Decisions
by Elizabeth Bazan. See also by the
same author, CRS Memorandum, April 23, 2007, “Overview of ‘FISA Modernization
Provisions of the Proposed Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization.’”

CRS-18
with directives and numbers of certifications and directives issued during the
reporting period. P.L. 110-55 expires on February 1, 2008.15
The Protect America Act was strongly criticized by some Members; on
November 15, 2007, H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act (the Responsible Electronic
Surveillance that is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007) was passed by
the House to clarify that a court order is not required for the acquisition of the
contents of communications between two persons neither of whom is known to be
a U.S. person, and both of whom are reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States, regardless of whether the communications passed through the United
States or if the surveillance device was in the United States. Court orders would,
however, be required if the communications of a non-U.S. person reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States were targeted where the other parties
to the target’s communications are unknown. Some Members argue that this
provision would unnecessarily tie the hands of intelligence agencies and jeopardize
the counterterrorism effort. The RESTORE Act would also provide for increased
judicial oversight and would require quarterly implementation and compliance audits
by the Inspector General of the Justice Department, and add related congressional
reporting requirements.
The Senate Intelligence Committee reported its own version of a FISA
amendment on October 26. The Senate bill (S. 2248) contains provisions authorizing
the Attorney General and the DNI jointly to authorize targeting of persons reasonably
believed to be outside the U.S. to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods
up to one year. It also would provide some retroactive immunity to
telecommunications companies that have assisted in government’s counterterrorism
surveillance efforts since September 2001 and have subsequently been targeted by
lawsuits.
On November 16, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 2248 with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute. Like the Intelligence Committee version,
the Judiciary Committee substitute amendment would permit the Attorney General
and the DNI to authorize jointly the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States in order to acquire foreign intelligence information.
However, the Judiciary Committee version does not include retroactive immunity for
the telecommunications companies.
A central issue is the role of the Judicial Branch, and the FISA court in
particular, in approving and/or overseeing surveillance that does not target but may
involve individuals who are U.S. persons. Some argue that only the independent
judiciary can ensure that intelligence efforts do not become improperly or illegally
directed towards Americans. FISA currently permits electronic surveillance pursuant
to a FISA court order of U.S. persons who are foreign powers or agents of foreign
powers if other statutory criteria are met. In other situations, surveillance of U.S.
persons is the responsibility of law enforcement agencies that have demonstrated
15 For further background see CRS Report RL34143, P.L. 110-55, the Protect America Act
of 2007: Modifications of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
by Elizabeth Bazan.

CRS-19
probable cause that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed and that
have obtained a search warrant from the appropriate judge. Others argue, however,
that changes in technologies since FISA was enacted in 1978 have made case-by-case
judicial review of each international communication link that might involve a U.S.
person impractical and risky to national security. Details of this issue are complex
and, in many cases, classified. The Senate debated S. 2248 on December 17, 2007,
but postponed further consideration until early 2008.
Role of the CIA. Intelligence reform legislation enacted in 2004 may have a
significant effect on the work of the CIA. The CIA Director does not have the
Community-wide responsibilities that historically absorbed the attention of the DCI,
nor is he responsible for daily morning briefings in the White House. In his role as
National Humint Manager, the CIA Director oversees the National Clandestine
Service’s efforts humint collection by the CIA and coordinates humint efforts by
other agencies. The CIA also retains primary responsibilities for all-source analysis
on a vast array of international issues that are of concern to the U.S. Government.
Some observers suggest that the CIA has lost stature as a result of the Intelligence
Reform Act that placed the DNI between the head of the CIA and the President.
Other observers argue, however, that without the burden of interagency coordination,
the CIA Director will be better positioned to emphasize analytical and humint
activities. Congress has expressed concern about both humint and the conduct of
analysis on repeated occasions and may choose to oversee the CIA Director’s efforts
more closely.
Role of the FBI. In the wake of the September 2001 attacks, the FBI was
strongly criticized for failing to focus on the terrorist threat, for failing to collect and
strategically analyze intelligence, and for failing to share intelligence with other
intelligence agencies (as well as among various FBI components). Subsequently, FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller III introduced a number of reforms to create a better and
more professional intelligence effort in an agency that has always emphasized law
enforcement. Congress has expressed concern about the overall effectiveness of
these reforms and with the FBI’s widely criticized information technology acquisition
efforts.16
The Role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The
position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) was established by
the Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-314, sec. 901). The statute and
DOD directives gave the incumbent signification authorities for the direction and
control of intelligence agencies within DOD especially in regard to systems
acquisition. There are reports that DOD special forces have also been involved in
human intelligence collection efforts that are not effectively coordinated with CIA.
Some media commentators have pointed to potential conflicts between the office of
the USD(I) and the DNI’s office, but there is little official information available
publicly. The first USD(I), Stephen Cambone, resigned at the end of 2006; his
successor is retired Air Force Lt. General James Clapper who previously served as
16 For further information, see CRS Report RL33033, Intelligence Reform Implementation
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress
, by Alfred
Cumming and Todd Masse.

CRS-20
director of both NGA and DIA. In May 2007 the USD(I) was also designated
Director of Defense Intelligence and will also serve on the DNI’s executive
committee.
Paramilitary Operations and Defense Humint. In the Afghan campaign
and in Iraq the CIA conducted paramilitary operations separate from or alongside
Special Forces from the Defense Department. Some observers, and the 9/11
Commission, have recommended that DOD assume responsibility for all such efforts
to avoid duplication of effort. In addition, there had been media reports that CIA and
DOD efforts in Afghanistan were not well coordinated. DCI Goss testified in
February 2005, however, that a joint review by CIA and DOD had reaffirmed the
need for separate efforts. Observers note that CIA can hire paramilitary operators (in
many instances retired military personnel) for specific missions of a limited duration;
in addition, some missions may be more appropriate for nonuniformed personnel.17
Some observers have expressed concern that expanded efforts by DOD
intelligence personnel to collect humint overseas may interfere with ongoing efforts
of CIA humint collectors.18 Intelligence officials have maintained in congressional
testimony that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort and that careful
coordination is undertaken during the planning and implementing of such
operations.19 The determination to ensure that such coordination is effective was
further reflected in the designation of the DCIA as head of the National Clandestine
Service.
Regional Concerns. Despite the urgency of the counterterrorism mission,
the Intelligence Community is responsible for supporting traditional national security
concerns, including developments in China, North Korea, Iran, and South America.
In February 2006 testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, DNI
Negroponte provided a summary of the Intelligence Community’s assessments of
threats, challenges, and opportunities throughout the world. A similar review was
provided by DNI Negroponte on January 11, 2007.
CIA and Allegations of Prisoner Abuse. Media accounts of abuse of
prisoners in Iraq by CIA officials have led to calls for a congressional investigation.
Some have also raised broader concerns about the role of intelligence agencies in
holding and transporting prisoners.20 The conference version of the FY2008
17 See CRS Report RS22017, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary
Operations: Issues for Congress
, by Richard A. Best, Jr. and Andrew Feickert; also CRS
Report RL33715, Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,
by Alfred Cumming.
18 See Barton Gellman, “Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld’s Domain,” Washington Post,
January 23, 2005, p. A1.
19 See the testimony of General Bryan Brown, Commander, Special Operations Command,
to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, April 22, 2005.
20 See CRS Report RL32567, Lawfulness of Interrogation Techniques under the Geneva
(continued...)

CRS-21
Intelligence Authorization bill (sec. 327) included provisions requiring all executive
branch agencies, including the CIA, to use only interrogation techniques authorized
by the Army Field Manual. The Administration indicated strong opposition to this
provision.
109th Congress Legislation
H.R. 2475 (Hoekstra)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2006; introduced May 19, 2005; reported
June 2, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-101); passed House June 21, 2005.
H.R. 5020 (Hoekstra)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2007; introduced March 28, 2006;
reported April 6, 2006 (H.Rept. 109-411); passed House April 26, 2006.
S. 1803 (Roberts)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2006; introduced and reported by the
Select Committee on Intelligence, September 29, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-142); reported
by the Armed Services Committee, October 27, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-173).
S. 3237 (Roberts)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2007; introduced and reported by the
Select Committee on Intelligence, May 25, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-259); reported by the
Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-265).
110th Congress Legislation
S. 372 (Rockefeller)
Intelligence Authorization Act for 2007. Introduced and reported by the Select
Committee on Intelligence, January 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-2). Debated April 16-17,
2007.
S. 1538 (Rockefeller)
Intelligence Authorization Act for 2008. Introduced and reported by Select
Committee on Intelligence, May 31, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-75). Reported by Armed
Services Committee, June 26, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-92). Floor consideration, October
3, 2007; incorporated into H.R. 2082 as an amendment.
H.R. 1196 (Reyes)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2007. Introduced and referred to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 27, 2007.
H.R. 2082 (Reyes)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2008. Introduced and referred to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, May 1, 2007 (H.Rept. 110-131).
20 (...continued)
Convention, and CRS Report RL33643, Undisclosed U.S. Detention Sites Overseas:
Background and Legal Issues
, both by Jennifer K. Elsea.

CRS-22
Reported, May 2, 2007; debated May 10-11, 2007; approved May 11, 2007.
Conference report (H.Rept. 110-478) filed December 6. House approved conference
report, December 13, 2007.
For Additional Reading
U.S. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States,
March 31, 2005.
U.S. Congress. Committee of Conference Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005: Conference Report. December 7, 2004. 108th Congress, 2nd session
(H.Rept. 108-798).
——. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. December 7,
2004. 108th Congress, 2nd session. (H.Rept. 108-796).
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001.
December 2002. 107th Congress, 2nd session (H.Rept. 107-
792). [Also, S.Rept. 107-351]
——. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. June 21, 2004. 108th
Congress, 2nd session (H.Rept. 108-558).
——. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. June 2, 2005. 109th
Congress, 1st session (H.Rept. 109-101).
——. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. April 6, 2006. 109th
Congress, 2nd session (H.Rept. 109-411).
——. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. May 7, 2007. 110th
Congress, 1st session (H.Rept. 110-131).
------. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Conference Report.
December 6, 2007, 110th Congress, 1st session (H.Rept. 110-478).
——. Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Counterterrorism
Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11. July 2002.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Report of the Select
Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq
. July 9, 2004. 108th Congress, 2d session.
(S.Rept. 108-301).

CRS-23
——. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. September 29, 2005.
109th Congress, 1st session. (S.Rept. 109-142).
——. To authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005 for Intelligence and
Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System
. May 5, 2004. 108th Congress, 2nd session
(S.Rept. 108-258).
——. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. January 24, 2007. 110th
Congress, 1st session. (S.Rept. 110-2).
——. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. May 31, 2007. 110th
Congress, 1st session. (S.Rept. 110-75).
U.S. Department of Justice, Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs, A
Review of FBI Security Programs, March 2002.
U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11
Commission Report, July 2004.