Order Code RL31053
Kosovo and U.S. Policy:
Background and Current Issues
Updated December 17, 2007
Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Kosovo and U.S. Policy:
Background and Current Issues
Summary
Kosovo represents the last major unfinished business from the wars of Yugoslav
succession in the 1990s. In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies
attempted to put an end to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and
Yugoslav/Serb forces in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo province in southern Serbia. These
efforts culminated in a 78-day NATO bombing campaign (Operation Allied Force)
against Serbia from March until June 1999, when then-Yugoslav leader Slobodan
Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the province. Since then, Kosovo has
been governed by a combination of U.N. and local Kosovar interim governing
structures. Under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, the U.N.
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has retained ultimate political authority in the
province. A NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR, is charged with providing a
secure environment.
UNSC Resolution 1244 did not settle Kosovo’s disputed status, but called for
status to be considered at an undetermined time after an autonomous government was
in place. The ethnic Albanian majority wants full independence for Kosovo; Serbs
say Kosovo is and should remain an integral part of Serbia. In mid-2005, the U.N.
began a lengthy process to address Kosovo’s status. U.N. envoy and former Finnish
President Martti Ahtisaari proposed in early 2007 that Kosovo gain supervised
independence with extensive minority rights. The Ahtisaari proposal stalled in the
U.N. Security Council, with the United States and some European countries strongly
backing it, but with Russia opposed and threatening to wield its veto in the Security
Council. A troika of U.S., Russian, and EU negotiators agreed to launch four months
of new talks, but could report no breakthrough by its deadline of December 10, 2007.
Instead, the United States and many European countries are likely to consider
recognizing Kosovo’s independence sometime in 2008, while Russia remains
opposed.
The United States, in concert with European members of the international
contact group, has long taken a leading role in shaping international policy on
Kosovo. The United States has committed peacekeeping troops to KFOR since 1999
and has upheld an “in together, out together” policy with respect to keeping some
U.S. forces in Kosovo along with the European allies. U.S. officials have frequently
emphasized the desirability of a swift settlement to Kosovo’s status. During his visit
to Europe in mid-2007, President Bush expressed strong U.S. support for Kosovo’s
ultimate independence. In Congress, U.S. involvement in the 1999 Kosovo war was
controversial; after extensive debate, Congress neither explicitly approved nor
blocked U.S. participation in NATO air strikes against Serbia. In the 110th Congress,
some resolutions have been introduced favoring Kosovo’s independence. The 110th
Congress has also considered FY2007 supplemental and FY2008 budget requests
that include funds to support the outcome of the Kosovo status settlement. The
second session of the 110th Congress may review the status process early in the year.
For additional information, see CRS Report RS21721, Kosovo’s Future Status and
U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Introduction and Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Policy Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
War in Kosovo: February 1998-June 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Post-1999 Developments in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Kosovo’s Governing Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2007 Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
UNMIK and KFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
KFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Issue of Kosovo’s Future Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Getting to a Status Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
International Process on Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Vienna Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Ahtisaari Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.N. Security Council Deliberations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Contact Group Troika . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Kosovar Albanian and Serbian Perspectives on Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Future International Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Position on Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Congressional Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

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Kosovo and U.S. Policy:
Background and Current Issues
Introduction and Most Recent Developments
In advance of its December 10, 2007, deadline, a troika of international
negotiators representing the contact group submitted its final report to the United
Nations that confirmed its inability to reach an agreement between Belgrade and
Pristina on the final status of Kosovo. The U.N. Security Council is scheduled to
discuss the Kosovo situation on December 19. Barring further Security Council
activity, many observers expect Kosovo to declare independence sometime in early
2008 in a process closely coordinated with the international community. The
European Union is poised to take over from the United Nations leading international
civilian missions on the ground in Kosovo, while NATO is prepared to maintain
security through its Kosovo Force (KFOR). Serbia remains strongly opposed to
Kosovo’s independence and may consider a range of retaliatory measures. Many
observers fear the potential for a flare-up of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo.
Disagreement over Kosovo may also contribute to deteriorating relations between
Russia and the United States.
The troika report marked the end of a 120-day process that was launched after
a lengthy U.N.-led effort to address Kosovo’s future status reached an impasse at the
Security Council in July, mainly due to Russia’s strong opposition to proposals for
Kosovo’s supervised independence. After over a year of negotiations, U.N. envoy
and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari had presented to the Security Council
in March 2007 a comprehensive plan to move Kosovo toward independence under
international supervision, a recommendation rejected by Serbia. U.S. and other
European officials emphasize that international negotiations should not be extended
further beyond December, while Russia has proposed that talks continue until the
parties reach agreement.
The international impasse over Kosovo’s status has somewhat complicated
longstanding plans for new international missions in Kosovo. While Brussels would
have preferred a clear U.N. mandate for new missions, it has affirmed its pledge for
the EU to play a leading role in implementing a settlement and strengthening peace
and stability in Kosovo. Not all EU member states support independence for
Kosovo, although most have stated that they will recognize Kosovo’s independence.
The exact timing of a coordinated process of declaring Kosovo’s independence
is not yet clear. International officials have long stated that the status quo was not
sustainable in Kosovo. Many observers are concerned about increasing instability
on the ground in Kosovo and the ongoing risk of social unrest or inter-ethnic
violence. Kosovo held parliamentary and municipal elections on November 17, in

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which former opposition leader Hashim Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)
won a plurality. Most Kosovo Serbs boycotted the vote, including in municipalities
where they constitute a majority. Meanwhile, Serbia is set to hold new presidential
elections in late January-early February 2008.
U.S. Policy Overview
In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end
to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav forces in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region. They were outraged by Serb
security forces’ atrocities against ethnic Albanian civilians, and feared that the
conflict could drag in other countries and destabilize the region. These efforts
culminated in a 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia from March to June
1999. Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the
province in June 1999, clearing the way for the deployment of U.S. and other NATO
peacekeepers. While NATO’s action ended Milosevic’s depredations in Kosovo, it
left U.S. and other Western policymakers with many difficult issues, including
creating the conditions for the resumption of a normal life in Kosovo, setting up
autonomous governing structures, and beginning reconstruction of the war-torn
province. The thorny issue of Kosovo’s final status also loomed as critical
unfinished business, with important ramifications for stability in the entire western
Balkan region.
After several years, U.S. policymakers began to emphasize the need to resolve
unfinished business in the Balkans, especially with respect to a viable political
settlement for Kosovo. In 2006 and 2007, U.S. officials made repeated statements
against maintaining an unstable status quo and in favor of resolving Kosovo’s status
in order to achieve long-standing U.S. goals for a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
Most recently, President Bush and other top U.S. officials have publicly expressed
U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence (see “U.S. Policy” section, below).
Over the years, U.S. engagement in Kosovo has at times been controversial.
Proponents of U.S. engagement say that instability in Kosovo could have a negative
impact on the stability of the Balkans and therefore of Europe as a whole, which they
view as a vital interest of the United States. They believe instability in the region
could produce an environment favorable to organized crime and terrorism and
undermine U.S. goals of Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation. They say the
ongoing involvement of the United States is critical to ensuring this stability, because
of its resources and unrivaled political credibility in the region.
Increasingly, however, many observers emphasize that Europe has a larger stake
than the United States in stability in southeastern Europe, and that European nations
should lead international efforts in Kosovo. Some critics of U.S. engagement in the
Balkans say that the situation in Kosovo does not have as large an impact on vital
U.S. interests as other issues, particularly the war on terrorism in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the war in Iraq, as well as a
host of other foreign policy and national security challenges. Reflecting international
focus on the global anti-terrorism campaign and other priorities, there appears to be

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a strong interest in “finishing the job,” including an eventual “exit strategy” for the
international civil and military administration of Kosovo. However, a residual
international civilian and military role, perhaps with a smaller or short-term U.S.
presence, is likely to stay on for some time after status is determined.
War in Kosovo:
February 1998-June 1999
Although the war in Kosovo had deep historical roots, its immediate causes can
be found in the decision of Milosevic regime in Serbia to eliminate the autonomy of
its Kosovo province in 1989. The regime committed widespread human rights abuses
in the following decade, at first meeting only non-violent resistance from the
province’s ethnic Albanian majority. However, in 1998 ethnic Albanian guerrillas
calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began attacks on Serbian
police and Yugoslav army troops. The Milosevic regime responded with increasingly
violent and indiscriminate repression. From February 1998 until March 1999, conflict
between the KLA and Serb forces (as well as armed Serb attacks on ethnic Albanian
civilians) drove more than 400,000 people from their homes and killed more than
2,500 people.
The United States and other
Kosovo at a Glance
Western countries used sanctions
and other forms of pressure to try
Area: 10,849 sq.km., or slightly smaller than
to persuade Milosevic to cease
Connecticut
repression and restore autonomy
to Kosovo, without success. The
Population: 1.956 million (1991 Yugoslav census)
increasing deterioration of the
situation on the ground led the
Ethnic Composition: 82.2% Albanian; 9.9%
international Contact Group
Serbian. Smaller groups include Muslims, Roma,
(United States, Britain, France,
Montenegrins, Turks, and others (1991 census).
Germany, Italy and Russia) to
agree on January 29, 1999 on a
draft peace plan for Kosovo. They invited the two sides to Rambouillet, near Paris,
to start peace talks based on the plan on February 6. As an inducement to the parties
to comply, on January 30 the North Atlantic Council agreed to authorize NATO
Secretary-General Javier Solana to launch NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia,
after consulting with NATO members, if the Serb side rejected the peace plan.
NATO said it was also studying efforts to curb the flow of arms to the rebels. The
draft peace plan called for three-year interim settlement that would provide greater
autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia, and the deployment of a NATO-led
international military force to help implement the agreement. On March 18, 1999,
the ethnic Albanian delegation to the peace talks signed the plan, but the Yugoslav
delegation rejected it.
NATO began air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24,
1999. Yugoslav forces moved rapidly to expel most of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians
from their homes, many of which were looted and burned. A December 1999 State
Department report estimated the total number of refugees and displaced persons at

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CRS-4
over 1.5 million, over 90% of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population. The report said
that Yugoslav forces killed about 10,000 ethnic Albanians, and abused, tortured and
raped others.1 After 78 days of increasingly intense air strikes that inflicted damage
on Yugoslavia’s infrastructure and its armed forces, President Milosevic agreed on
June 3 to a peace plan based on NATO demands and a proposal from the Group of
Eight countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia,
and Japan). It called for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; the
deployment of an international peacekeeping force with NATO at its core; and
international administration of Kosovo until elected interim institutions are set up,
under which Kosovo will enjoy wide-ranging autonomy within Yugoslavia.
Negotiations would be eventually opened on Kosovo’s final status.
On June 9, 1999, NATO and Yugoslav military officers concluded a Military
Technical Agreement governing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.
On June 10, the U.N. Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1244, based on
the international peace plan agreed to by Milosevic. KFOR began to enter Kosovo
on June 11. The Yugoslav pullout was completed on schedule on June 20. On June
20, the KLA and NATO signed a document on the demilitarization of the KLA.2
Within weeks of the pullout of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the
deployment of NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR, the overwhelming majority
of ethnic Albanian refugees returned to their homes. At the same time, more than
200,000 ethnic Serbs and other minorities living in Kosovo left the province,
according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. International officials
estimate the number of Serbs living in Kosovo at about 100,000. Serbs in the
northern part of the province are concentrated in or near the divided town of
Mitrovica. The rest are scattered in isolated enclaves in other parts of the province,
protected by KFOR troops. A key reason for the departures is violence and
intimidation by ethnic Albanians, although some departures have been voluntary.
Meanwhile, some 15,000 so-called “minority returns” — or returns of displaced
persons to their homes in which they constitute an ethnic minority — have been
reported over the last several years, although even this amount has been offset by
other minorities who have since left the province. Kosovo Serbs say that since the
pullout of Yugoslav forces, more than 1,100 were killed and over 1,000 are missing.
Hundreds of houses of Serb refugees have been looted and burned.
1 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting, U.S. Department of State, December 1999.
2 For historical background to the conflict in Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20213, Kosovo:
Historical Background to the Current Conflict, by Steven Woehrel. For chronologies of the
conflict in Kosovo, see CRS Report 98-752, Kosovo Conflict Chronology: January-August
1998, by Valerie Makino and Julie Kim; CRS Report RL30127, Kosovo Conflict
Chronology: September 1998-March 1999, by Julie Kim.

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Post-1999 Developments in Kosovo
Kosovo’s Governing Institutions
After June 1999, Kosovo was primarily administered by the U.N. Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK). According to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK
was tasked with gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to
democratically elected, interim autonomous government institutions, while retaining
an oversight role. In a final stage, UNMIK was to oversee the transfer of authority
from the interim autonomous institutions to permanent ones, after Kosovo’s final
status is determined.
Kosovo had little to no governing experience, especially after it lost autonomy
under the rule of Milosevic. Kosovo’s dominant political party had long been the
Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), formerly headed by Ibrahim Rugova, who had
led a shadow government during the Milosevic years. After the war, new parties
emerged from the Kosovo Liberation Army. The biggest of these was the
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), headed by Hashim Thaci. Another significant,
although smaller, ex-KLA group is the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led
by Ramush Haradinaj. The LDK initially lost some ground to the newer parties but
regained dominant support among the Kosovo Albanian population. Kosovo’s first
postwar electoral process, municipal elections held in October 2000, resulted in an
LDK victory with 58% of the vote province-wide. The PDK won 27.3% and the
AAK, 7.7%. Kosovo Serbs boycotted, charging that UNMIK and KFOR have been
ineffective in protecting them from ethnic Albanian violence.
In May 2001, UNMIK issued a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government in Kosovo. It called for the establishment of a 120-seat legislature,
which elects a President and a Prime Minister. Twenty seats were reserved for ethnic
minorities, including ten for Serbs, but Serbs were not granted veto power on laws
passed by the ethnic Albanian majority in the body. UNMIK retained oversight or
control of policy in many areas, including law enforcement, the judiciary, protecting
the rights of communities, monetary and budget policy, customs, state property and
enterprises, and external relations. UNMIK could invalidate legislation passed by the
parliament if in conflict with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. KFOR
remained in charge of Kosovo’s security. The Constitutional Framework did not
address the question of Kosovo’s final status.
The first postwar vote for Kosovo-wide institutions was held in November
2001. The moderate LDK won 47 seats in the new legislature. The PDK won 26
seats, and the AAK won 8 seats. Four small ethnic Albanian parties won one seat
each. The remaining 13 seats were won by parties representing the Bosniak, Turkish
and Roma communities. In contrast to their boycott of the 2000 local elections,
Kosovo Serbs turned out in substantial numbers to vote in the November 2001
legislative elections. A coalition of Serbian parties called Povratak, or Return, won
22 seats. Turnout in Serb-majority areas was about 47%, according to the OSCE,
while turnout in Serbia and Montenegro was about 57%. (This compared with a
turnout of about 67% in Albanian-majority areas.)

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After months of political wrangling, the Assembly chose a President and a
government in March 2002. LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova was elected as President.
Kosovo’s Prime Minister is Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK. The government consisted
of members of the LDK, PDK and AAK. One cabinet post was reserved for a
Kosovo Serb representative and another for a member of a non-Serb minority group.
The Kosovo Serbs initially refused to join the government, saying they wanted
greater representation, but finally agreed to do so in May 2002, after UNMIK agreed
to appoint a Kosovo Serb as an advisor on refugee returns.
Kosovo held its second local elections on October 2002. Turnout for the vote
was 54%, lower than in the previous two elections. Observers attributed the low
turnout to disillusionment with the performance of the government and political
parties in Kosovo. The LDK confirmed its status as the leading party in Kosovo, but
lost ground compared to previous elections. The LDK won 45% of the vote, the
PDK 29%, and the AAK 8.55%. Serb turnout was particularly low, at about 20%.
Almost no Serbs voted in the troubled northern town of Mitrovica, where local
authorities intimidated potential voters. Among those Serbs who did vote in the
elections, the moderate Povratak (Return) coalition did poorly, while hard-line parties
did well. These results may have reflected continuing Serb dissatisfaction with their
situation in Kosovo, and with the failure of Serb moderates to improve it.
In March 2004, accusations that local Serbs were responsible for the drowning
death of two ethnic Albanian boys near the divided city of Mitrovica erupted into
violent demonstrations and attacks on several ethnic Serb enclaves throughout the
province. Large crowds of ethnic Albanians came out in droves and set fire to Serb
homes, churches and property in several cities. U.N. and NATO personnel evacuated
some ethnic Serbs to protected enclaves but could not hold back the crowds or
counter the destruction. The two days of violence on March 17-18, 2004, constituted
the worst flare-up of inter-ethnic violence since the end of the 1999 Kosovo war.
According to UNMIK, the two-day period resulted in the death of 19 civilians,
injuries to more than 900 persons, including international peacekeepers, and the
displacement of over 4,000 persons, mainly Serbs, from their homes. In addition,
about 30 churches and monasteries, 800 houses, and 150 vehicles were destroyed or
seriously damaged. U.N. and other international officials assessed that the attacks
came about in part spontaneously, and in part as a result of an orchestrated campaign
by extremist forces. Some referred to the attacks as “ethnic cleansing.” The U.N.
estimated that tens of thousands of persons participated in dozens of violent incidents
in the two-day period.
Kosovo held new parliamentary elections on October 24, 2004. On the
Albanian side, the results were largely in line with previous votes. The LDK won
45.4% of the vote, and 47 seats in the 120 seat legislature. The PDK won 28.9% and
30 seats. The AAK won 8.4% of the vote and nine seats. A new ethnic Albanian
party, ORA, led by publisher Veton Surroi, won seven seats, while four other ethnic
Albanian parties split five seats. Turnout for the election was 53.57%. Very few
Kosovo Serbs voted in the elections, responding to a call by Serbian Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica to boycott the election in the wake of the March 2004 violence.
Two Serbian groups which did participate in the elections received the ten seats
reserved for the Serbian community in the legislature, but it was questionable

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whether they genuinely represented Serbian sentiment in Kosovo. Ten other seats
were set aside for other ethnic communities in Kosovo.
On December 2, 2004, AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj was elected Prime
Minister of Kosovo by the new Kosovo parliament. He led a new government
composed of a coalition between the AAK and LDK. The PDK, a key part of the
previous government, went into opposition. Haradinaj’s nomination was
controversial, due to concerns of EU and other international officials that he could
be indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for war
crimes allegedly committed when he was a rebel leader.
On March 8, 2005, Prime Minister Haradinaj resigned, after The Hague tribunal
notified him and two of his associates that they had been indicted for crimes against
humanity and war crimes allegedly committed during the 1998-1999 conflict with
Serbian forces. Haradinaj and his co-indictees flew to The Hague to submit to
detention. Haradinaj was succeeded as Prime Minister by a political ally, Bajram
Kosumi. Haradinaj had won high marks from international officials for his energetic
efforts to implement the standards. In June 2005, Haradinaj was provisionally
released by the Tribunal in return for his pledge to return to The Hague for his trial.
Without re-claiming a formal leadership position, Haradinaj is still thought to
exercise substantial leadership in the AAK and in his home region. He recently
returned to The Hague to face trial beginning on March 5, 2007.
In mid-2005, the United Nations conducted a comprehensive review of the
situation in Kosovo as part of effort to determine whether to open a political process
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status (see section on status, below). The
review, conducted by U.N. envoy Kai Eide, included some praise for progress made
in the development of governing institutions (although without sufficient engagement
by the Kosovo Serbs) and landmark economic structures. At the same time, the
review reported that the economic situation in Kosovo remained bleak and that
respect for the rule of law was a serious problem. Prospects were poor for inter-
ethnic harmony and the return of significant numbers of displaced minorities.3
On January 21, 2006, Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova died after a long bout
with cancer. In February 2006, Fatmir Sejdiu, from Rugova’s LDK party, was
elected as President by the Kosovo parliament. Later in the year, Sejdiu ran again for
President of the LDK and won the internal party vote. In March 2006, Kosovo Prime
Minister Bajram Kosumi stepped down after criticism of his performance, even
within his own party. He was replaced by Agim Ceku, who was formerly head of the
KLA and head of the Kosovo Protection Corps. The new government pledged to
implement standards set by the international community for Kosovo.
In preparation for the U.N.-led negotiation process on status, leaders of political
parties both in government and in the opposition formed a Unity Team, led by
President Sejdiu, to present a common front in the talks. The Kosovo negotiation
team did not include minority representation from Kosovo Serbs, who have been
3 The text of Eide’s comprehensive review is in U.N. Security Council document
S/2005/635, October 7, 2005.

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CRS-8
included on the Serbian side. The Unity Team has stuck together despite periodic
tensions and inter-party rivalries. Since the death of Rugova, it has been hard to
point to a single Kosovar Albanian leader with comparably broad popular appeal or
stature. In particular, divisions plague the leading LDK party, and some of its
members recently broke away to form a new party headed by Nexhat Daci, former
speaker of the Kosovo assembly. In December 2006, President Sejdiu won a
contentious internal party vote to become LDK chairman.
With expectations high for imminent independence, local and international
observers have also warned of potential instability and mounting local frustration if
the status process is seriously thwarted or further delayed. On both the ethnic
Albanian and Serb minority side, the potential is high for unrest and instability.4
Some demonstrations have been held — by both Kosovar Albanian and Serbian
organizers — in response to the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo’s status. Groups outside
of the Unity Team, including the grass-roots organization “Self-Determination,” are
opposed to holding further talks on status with Serbia. There is also concern about
the re-emergence of armed groups on both sides and their potential to incite violence.
2007 Elections. Under the terms of the Ahtisaari plan (see below), new
general and local elections in Kosovo were to be held within nine months of a status
settlement. With the status process stalled, UNMIK called for both levels of
elections to be held on November 17, 2007. Over 40 political parties registered
under new election rules. Prime Minister Ceku opted out of seeking re-election.
In a process with low overall voter turnout but little unrest, the opposition PDK
won a plurality of the vote (34% by preliminary results). The LDK came in second
with 22%. PDK leader Hashim Thaci is expected to become the next Prime Minister,
likely in coalition with other parties, possibly including the LDK. Thaci began
coalition negotiations on December 11.
Kosovo Serb voters and the Kosovo Serb parties largely boycotted the
November vote, as called for by Belgrade. As a result, incumbent Kosovo Serb
parties were defeated in five majority Serb municipalities. Governance in these areas
is expected to be managed through careful coordination with international authorities.
The Thaci government will be challenged to meet elevated voter expectations
on achieving independence, but also on addressing urgent economic challenges such
as high levels of unemployment and poverty.5 In the interim, the current government
and parliament have been working with UNMIK to prepare for and implement
aspects of the Ahtisaari plan that do not prejudge status. Another key challenge will
be to engage the Kosovo Serb communities in governing institutions and decision-
making, especially with respect to implementing proposals on decentralization and
local self-government.
4 The U.N. Secretary-General has reported a “discernible underlying volatility in Kosovo.”
Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK, S/2007/582, September 28, 2007.
5 A November 2007 progress report by the European Commission corruption and public
administration in Kosovo. Report available at [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
key_documents/reports_nov_2007_en.htm].

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UNMIK and KFOR
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) has formed the basis of
the international role in Kosovo since the end of the war. The resolution authorized
the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo, led by NATO, under
a mission to ensure the withdrawal of Yugoslav armed forces from Kosovo, the
demilitarization of the KLA, and the maintenance of the cease-fire. Resolution 1244
gave the U.N. mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the chief role in administering Kosovo
on a provisional basis. UNMIK’s duties included performing basic civil
administration of the province; maintaining law and order, including setting up an
international police force and creating local police forces; supporting humanitarian
aid efforts; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes;
protecting human rights; supporting the reconstruction effort; preparing the way for
elections and the creation of self-government institutions; and facilitating a political
process to address Kosovo’s final status. Resolution 1244 provided for an interim
period of autonomy for Kosovo until negotiations on the final status of the province
take place. It expressed support for the FRY’s territorial integrity.
Bernard Kouchner of France served as the first Special Representative of the
U.N. Secretary-General (SRSG) to oversee UNMIK until January 2001. He was
replaced by Hans Haekkerup, Denmark’s Defense Minister, whose brief term in
Kosovo ended in December 2001. Michael Steiner, a German diplomat with
extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia, became the third SRSG in early 2002
and completed his term in July 2003. Finnish diplomat Harri Holkeri became the
fourth SRSG in August 2003. He stepped down in May 2004, citing health reasons,
although some observers speculated that his resignation was also spurred by
perceptions that his credibility, as well as that of UNMIK as a whole, had been
damaged by the March 2004 riots. Danish diplomat Soren Jessen-Petersen, who had
been the EU’s Special Representative in Macedonia, became the next SRSG in mid-
August. Upon his arrival, he outlined five mission priorities: improving security,
prioritizing the standards and accelerating their implementation, transferring more
authority to the PISG, protecting minorities, and improving the economy. In June
2006, Jessen-Petersen announced his early departure from UNMIK as of July.
Joachim Rücker of Germany succeeded Jessen-Petersen as SRSG in September 2006.
UNMIK initially had a four-pillar structure divided into humanitarian aid, civil
administration, democratic institution-building, and reconstruction. UNMIK phased
out the humanitarian aid pillar in mid-2000 and added a police and justice pillar in
2001. The United Nations has led the police and justice pillar as well as the one for
civil administration; the Organization for Security and Cooperation had led the
institution-building pillar; and the European Union the reconstruction pillar.
In April 2002, then UNMIK chief Steiner offered a “vision on how to finish our
job,” or an “exit strategy” for the international mission. He outlined a “standards
before status” approach that included a series of benchmarks for Kosovo’s
institutions and society that should be achieved before addressing Kosovo’s final
status. The benchmarks included the following:
! the existence of effective, representative and functioning institutions;
! rule of law;

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CRS-10
! freedom of movement;
! sustainable returns and reintegration;
! development of a sound basis for a market economy;
! clarity of property rights;
! normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and
! reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line
with its mandate.6
The international community endorsed the “standards before status” approach.
However, even as UNMIK downsized and transferred a greater number of
administrative competencies to Kosovo’s self-governing institutions, it became clear
to most observers that UNMIK’s ability to “finish the job” would ultimately depend
on a resolution to the question of Kosovo’s final status. The standards before status
approach gained new impetus in late 2003 with the Contact Group initiative, with
U.N. Security Council approval, to elaborate on and “operationalize” the Standards
for Kosovo and review their implementation by mid-2005 with a view to considering
future status.7 In December 2003, UNMIK and the Kosovo provisional government
established five joint working groups on implementing the standards. The Kosovo
Serb community did not agree to participate in the working groups. Nevertheless, on
March 31, 2004, UNMIK chief Holkeri unveiled the Kosovo Standards
Implementation Plan (KSIP), a detailed road map for realizing the Kosovo Standards.
In a presidential statement, the U.N. Security Council strongly condemned the
March 2004 inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo and attacks on KFOR and U.N.
personnel. In view of the March events and the need to rebuild inter-ethnic
cooperation, the U.N. Security Council called for urgent steps on two of the
standards: sustainable returns and freedom of movement.8 In the aftermath of the
attacks, some Serbian and European officials called for changes to the U.N. mission’s
mandate in order to improve security conditions in Kosovo. Some major non-
governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, strongly criticized the performance of U.N. agencies and NATO
operations in Kosovo for failing to protect minority communities. Former U.N.
Secretary-General Annan commissioned a U.N. team headed by Kai Eide to review
the U.N. Mission. Among other things, the Eide report called for a range of policy
and institutional changes to provide greater clarity and focus to the U.N. mission and
future direction of the province. Eide also said that “serious exploratory discussions”
on future status should begin as early as 2004 and that final status negotiations should
take place by mid-2005, with the participation of the Kosovo government and
Belgrade. He called for the transfer of more powers from UNMIK to the Kosovo
government, with the aim of terminating the U.N. mission after final status
negotiations begin. He recommended that the European Union take over as lead
6 Address to the Security Council by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, April 24, 2002, UNMIK/PR/719; [http://www.un.org/ News/Press/
docs/2002/sc7375.doc.htm].
7 The published text of the standards can be found at [http://www.unmikonline.org/press/
2003/pressr/pr1078.pdf]. See also U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement,
S/PRST/2003/26, December 12, 2003.
8 U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2004/13, April 30, 2004.

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CRS-11
international agency in Kosovo. The Secretary-General endorsed some of Eide’s
recommendations, especially on the priority standards, but not all of them.
As the international status process progressed in 2006, UNMIK continued to
work with the PISG on implementing the standards. In June 2006, the contact group
presented to the PISG a list of 13 priority standards for immediate attention, with
most focused on minority rights. U.N. officials have since reported substantial
progress in implementing the 13 priority standards and a strengthening of Kosovo’s
institutions that has resulted from standards implementation.
The current U.N. mission in Kosovo was projected to terminate after the status
process is completed and with the passage of a new U.N. Security Council resolution.
There is virtually no interest among Kosovar Albanians in prolonging UNMIK’s
tenure, and UNMIK is frequently the target of popular protests. In his comprehensive
review of the standards in 2005, U.N. envoy Eide noted that the U.N.’s leverage in
Kosovo was already then in decline. Among other factors, UNMIK’s reputation has
suffered from numerous scandals and charges of corruption involving U.N. officials.
UNMIK’s reputation took another hit after international police applied deadly force
to Kosovar demonstrators in Pristina on February 10, 2007. Two individuals were
killed and several dozen wounded that day; UNMIK Chief Rücker subsequently
dismissed the U.N. police chief over the incident. One week later, a bomb explosion
hit several U.N. vehicles in Pristina.
Under the Ahtisaari plan, the post-status transition process of transferring
authority and further competencies from UNMIK to the Kosovo government is
outlined to last 120 days. Without a new U.N. resolution and with the possible
continuation of Resolution 1244, UNMIK’s close-out process is not clear. U.N.
officials have raised concerns about delays; U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
recently assessed that, if Kosovo’s status remains undefined, “there is a real risk that
the progress achieved by the United Nations and the Provisional Institutions in
Kosovo can begin to unravel.” Similarly, UNMIK Chief Joachim Rücker has stated
that further progress in Kosovo “depends on ensuring clarity on Kosovo’s status.”9
KFOR.10 KFOR’s mission, in accordance with UNSC 1244, is to monitor,
verify, and enforce the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement and the KLA
demilitarization agreement. KFOR is also charged with establishing and maintaining
a secure environment in Kosovo to facilitate the return of refugees, the delivery of
humanitarian aid, and the operation of the international civilian administration.
KFOR has actively supported UNMIK’s activities, including efforts to meet
benchmarks of progress and to transfer increased responsibilities, especially related
to law enforcement, to Kosovo’s interim civil authorities. Resolution 1244 includes
a provision that says KFOR is to oversee the return of “hundreds, not thousands” of
Yugoslav troops to Kosovo to liaise with the international presence, mark minefields,
provide a “presence” at Serb historical monuments and “key border crossings.” No
troops from Serbia and Montenegro have returned to Kosovo for these purposes,
9 Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo, September 28, 2007, and June 29, 2007; U.N. News press release, July 9, 2007.
10 For more information, refer to the KFOR website at [http://www.nato.int/kfor].

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CRS-12
although in March 2001, NATO approved the phased return of Serbia and
Montenegro forces to the formerly demilitarized buffer zone between Kosovo and the
rest of Serbia. NATO and U.N. officials have since determined that a return of
Serbian forces to Kosovo would have a destabilizing effect in the province.
In response to the sudden and widespread ethnic Albanian attacks on Serb
enclaves in March 2004, NATO swiftly made available an additional 3,000 NATO
reserve forces to the former KFOR Commander, Lt. General Holger Kammerhoff.
The performance of KFOR units during the violence varied widely. In the aftermath
of the March incidents, NATO conducted a “lessons learned” study to evaluate
KFOR’s performance and identify areas for improvement. The study’s
recommendations reportedly included the removal of national restrictions, or caveats,
on COMKFOR’s ability to deploy KFOR troops; improved training and equipment;
improved intelligence capabilities in order to anticipate events such as in March; and
measures to maximize KFOR force presence in patrols. KFOR also created a
Security Advisory Group with UNMIK and local Kosovar representatives to improve
communication and coordination on security matters.
NATO periodically reviews KFOR’s mission and considers plans to adjust force
structure, reduce force levels, and eventually to withdraw from Kosovo. From its
peak strength in 1999 of nearly 50,000, KFOR steadily reduced in size in the
following years. On the basis of its mid-2003 mission review and reflecting KFOR’s
assessment that the overall security situation remained stable, NATO agreed to
continue to “regionalize and rationalize” KFOR’s force structure and size, including
a reduction in strength to about 17,500. Since December 2003, however, NATO
members have agreed that a sizeable NATO presence in Kosovo remains necessary
and have maintained KFOR strength at about 16,000-17,000, with additional
reinforcements brought in as necessary. KFOR force strength has remained at
roughly this level ever since (around 16,000 in December 2007). The U.S. share of
KFOR remains below 15% of the total and currently numbers about 1,600 troops, or
roughly 10%. In 2005, the former NATO SACEUR, General Jones, proposed
adjustments to KFOR’s structure to improve mobility and flexibility. The
adjustments involved streamlining the force into a task force structure that provides
greater efficiency and eliminates the need for redundant support and logistics units.
Although KFOR has generally assessed a low threat environment in recent
years, it has also been preparing for possible security challenges as Kosovo’s future
status is deliberated. KFOR and UNMIK have reinforced their presence in northern
Kosovo to boost security in that volatile sector, which may become a focal point for
unrest as contingencies relating to independence, partition, or population transfer
unfold. KFOR also has at its disposal theater troops that can be called in for
reinforcement. In December 2007, NATO members reaffirmed the alliance’s
resoluteness to deter any renewal of violence by any parties in Kosovo.

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CRS-13
The Issue of Kosovo’s Future Status11
Getting to a Status Process
U.N. Resolution 1244 reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and did not prescribe or prejudge a permanent
political resolution to the issue of Kosovo’s status. It said that Kosovo’s status
should be determined by an unspecified “political process.” Ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo strongly favor independence of the province from Serbia and its international
recognition as a sovereign state as soon as possible. In the early years after 1999, the
United States and other Western countries, as well as Kosovo’s neighbors except
Albania, opposed independence for Kosovo. They expressed concern that an
independent Kosovo could destabilize the region by encouraging separatist ethnic
Albanian forces in Macedonia, as well as Serbia’s Presevo Valley, where many
ethnic Albanians live.
Instead of status, international policy on Kosovo centered around “standards,”
as outlined above, and officials emphasized a policy of”standards before status.”
Kosovar Albanians initially expressed irritation with the benchmarks concept, as they
believed this approach was designed to block their aspirations for independence
indefinitely. Moreover, they complained that the Constitutional Framework does not
give them enough authority to achieve the benchmarks, especially since UNMIK
retained “reserved competence” in the area of law and order. More recently,
however, Kosovar Albanian leaders have expressed greater support for the standards
process, especially as it became more directly linked to the prospect of achieving
status.
In November 2003, then-U.S. Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman
announced, with the support of the other members of the international Contact
Group, a formal review in mid-2005 on Kosovo’s progress toward meeting the
standards. If the Contact Group, the U.N. Security Council and other interested
parties judged that progress was “sufficient,” a process to determine the province’s
status could begin. UNMIK released a highly detailed “Standards Implementation
Plan” on March 31, 2004.
The violent events of March 2004 led some to question the accepted standards
policy, as well as prospects for the peaceful coexistence of Kosovo’s majority ethnic
Albanian and minority Serb populations. The Serbian government and parliament
developed a plan to decentralize Kosovo and give the Serb minority self-governing
autonomy. In July, a U.N. assessment team led by Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide
recommended that the lengthy list of standards be replaced with a “dynamic, priority-
based standards policy” to pave the way for status discussions and future European
integration.12 At the time, U.N. Secretary-General Annan and successive UNMIK
11 See also CRS Report RS21721, Kosovo’s Future Status and U.S. Policy, by Steven
Woehrel.
12 For text of the Eide report, see U.N. Security Council document S/2004/932, November
(continued...)

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CRS-14
chiefs defended the standards policy, while identifying urgent priority standards
relating to security and minority rights. They and other international officials noted
that standards implementation will remain important for Kosovo’s development even
after a status settlement is reached.
International Process on Status
In 2005, the international community established a “roadmap” toward Kosovo’s
future status. On May 27, 2005, the U.N. Security Council reviewed a quarterly
report on UNMIK by the U.N. Secretary-General. On the basis of this report, Annan
sanctioned the launch of the comprehensive review of the Kosovo standards for the
summer. In June 2005, he appointed Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide, who led an
earlier assessment of UNMIK, to lead the review. After several trips to the region,
Ambassador Eide submitted his comprehensive review to Annan. On October 24,
2005, the U.N. Security Council endorsed the recommendation of U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to launch a political process to determine Kosovo’s disputed
status. On November 1, Annan announced his intention to name former Finnish
President Martti Ahtisaari to be his U.N. Special Envoy to lead the international
process. Ahtisaari began his mission with visits to Kosovo and Serbia in late
November 2005. He said that he hoped that the two sides would agree to face-to-face
talks in early 2006. He stressed that there was no deadline set for the completion of
the negotiations.
Prior to the start of negotiations, the contact group agreed on several principles
to guide the status process. With respect to the status outcome, the contact group
stated that there should be no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition
of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country. It also
called for the settlement to ensure sustainable multi-ethnicity in Kosovo, effective
local self-government and multi-ethnic coexistence through the process of
decentralization, and safeguards for cultural and religious sites.13 The Contact Group
stressed that “all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement
in the course of 2006.”
The Vienna Talks. The status talks began in Vienna in February 2006. The
initial rounds of the negotiations dealt with so-called “technical issues” that were
meant to prepare the way for tackling the determination of future status. These
included protecting cultural and religious sites, financial issues such as deciding
Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s debts, and the decentralization of Kosovo’s government,
including redrawing the borders of Kosovo’s municipalities. Ahtisaari and his
deputies refrained from making specific proposals, instead permitting the Serbian and
Kosovar delegations to put forth and discuss their own views. The positions of the
12 (...continued)
30, 2004.
13 See “Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo,”
S/2005/709, November 10, 2005; and “Statement by the Contact Group on the future of
Kosovo,” January 31, 2006, website of the U.N. Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo
[http://www.unosek.org].

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CRS-15
two sides remained far apart on most issues, and little movement toward compromise
solutions was reported.
One of most important issue dealt with in Vienna was the decentralization of
Kosovo’s government, an issue that included possible solutions to the divided
northern city of Mitrovica, a key potential flashpoint. Serbs have proposed the
creation of a large number of Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo, based on
the Serb population of Kosovo before most Serbs fled the province in 1999 and on
the location of Serbian cultural and religious monuments. The Serbs also sought the
formal division of the northern city of Mitrovica (which is already de facto divided),
separating its Serb-majority part north of the Ibar River from the ethnic Albanian-
dominated southern part. These municipalities would be controlled by local Serb
authorities, with their own police, and would be closely linked with each other and
with Serbia. In contrast, the Kosovar Albanians offered to permit the creation of only
a handful of Serb municipalities, based on Kosovo’s current Serbian population, and
have demanded that Mitrovica be at least nominally united.14
On July 24, 2006, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim
Ceku met with their Serbian counterparts Boris Tadic and Vojislav Kostunica to
discuss the status issue, in the first direct meeting between the two sides at the
leadership. Both sides reiterated their long-stated views on status, and little progress
toward a compromise was reached. Ahtisaari called the positions of the two sides “as
far apart as possible.”
The Ahtisaari Proposal.15 U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was
expected to present his proposal for Kosovo’s status to the contact group and the
U.N. Security Council in late 2006. After leading technical talks and status
negotiations with the Kosovar Albanian and Serbian parties in Vienna since early
2006, Ahtisaari could report no major progress in reaching a negotiated settlement
on status but said he was still prepared to come forward with a status proposal. The
contact group and especially the United States had long emphasized a preference to
conclude the Kosovo status talks in 2006. On November 10, however, Ahtisaari
announced that he would postpone releasing his status proposal in order to avoid it
having an adverse influence on key early elections in Serbia. He stated that he would
present his proposal “without delay after the parliamentary elections in Serbia.”
Following the January 21 vote in Serbia, which produced inconclusive results,
Ahtisaari presented a Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement to
representatives of the contact group on January 26, in Vienna, and to the Serbian and
Kosovar Albanian parties on February 2. The United States, European Union,
NATO, and other organizations swiftly endorsed the proposal, although Russia called
for more time to consider it. After another brief delay, Ahtisaari opened further
consultations with the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian parties on February 21, in
Vienna. A final Vienna meeting with the leadership in March closed out the
consultation phase without coming closer to mutual agreement on Kosovo’s status.
14 Reuters news agency dispatch, May 4, 2006.
15 Text of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement appears as an
Addendum to U.N. Security Council document S/2007/168/Add.1, March 26, 2007.

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CRS-16
Ahtisaari has called his status proposal a “foundation for a democratic and
multi-ethnic Kosovo in which the rights and interests of all members of its
communities are firmly guaranteed and protected by institutions based on the rule of
law.”16 The final package aims to provide for a multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo that
is viable, sustainable, and stable. The plan’s general principles and twelve annexes
outline the broad governing authority and structure of the Kosovo government. New
general and municipal elections are to be held within nine months of the agreement
coming into force. Special representational and voting privileges in the government
and assembly would be granted to Kosovo’s minority communities.
The plan provides for extensive minority protections through stated rights,
structural safeguards in governance — especially through decentralization at the local
level — and through international supervisory authority. Serb municipalities in
Kosovo are to have extended responsibilities and authority over local affairs,
including the right to cooperate directly with and receive financial assistance from
Serbia. The currently divided northern city of Mitrovica would become two
municipalities under a joint board. The settlement proposal includes protection of
religious and cultural heritage sites and reaffirms the right of return for refugees and
displaced persons. The settlement calls for a revamped security sector under
significant local ownership but retaining some international oversight.
The terms of the Ahtisaari plan appear to constitute somewhat of a compromise
between the maximum positions of each side. The plan moves beyond the status quo
with its broad provisions for self-rule in Kosovo, including the right to enter into
international agreements and seek membership in international organizations, as well
as the right to create symbols of statehood such as a flag, national currency, and an
army. Although the terms of the comprehensive proposal do not use the term
“independence,” Ahtisaari separately specified his recommendation for independence
in his accompanying report to the Security Council on March 26. However, Kosovo’s
sovereignty would be constrained by supervisory international civilian and military
missions and by explicit power-sharing arrangements with minority communities.
Ahtisaari and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon presented the
comprehensive proposal on Kosovo to the U.N. Security Council on March 26. With
the proposal, Ahtisaari submitted a brief report on Kosovo’s future status that
outlined his conclusions that “the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to
be supervised for an initial period by the international community.”17 He expressed
regret that the parties were unable to reach a negotiated solution, but also discounted
any value to further negotiations.
U.N. Security Council Deliberations. The Security Council began private
consultations on the Ahtisaari proposal on April 3. It then agreed to send a fact-
finding mission to the region from April 24 to 29 to obtain first-hand information on
the situation in Kosovo from Serbia, the Kosovo government, Kosovo’s ethnic
16 South East Europe Newswire, January 24, 2007.
17 S/2007/168, March 26, 2007.

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CRS-17
minority communities, and representatives of the international community.18 Among
other things, mission representatives acknowledged that the status quo was not
sustainable in Kosovo.
Preliminary drafts on a new U.N. resolution to replace Resolution 1244 were
circulated in early May. According to U.S. officials, the new resolution was to lay
the groundwork for Kosovo’s independence and provide mandates for new
international missions in Kosovo under a Chapter VII authorization. Russia, in a
competing draft, called for further negotiations between the parties. A revised U.S.-
backed draft resolution circulated in late May to incorporate aspects addressing
Russian and Serbian concerns, but was also rejected by Russia.
Russia’s rejections of further draft revisions brought the Security Council
process to an impasse. Russian leaders made repeated statements opposing an
imposed settlement for Kosovo without Serbian agreement, favoring further
negotiations, and holding out the possibility of exercising a Russian veto in the
Security Council. In earlier statements, some Russian officials have also warned that
an outcome for Kosovo could serve as a precedent for other territorial disputes, such
as in the Caucasus. In contrast, U.N., U.S., and European officials contend that
Kosovo’s situation is unique and that a status outcome in Kosovo would not have any
relevance to other parts of the world.
Successive meetings at the highest levels among U.S. and European
governments did not yield any breakthrough on Kosovo, despite some expectations
of an agreement. At the G8 meeting in Germany, Russian officials stated openly that
Russia’s position remained “diametrically opposed” to that of other G8 members.
New French President Nicolas Sarkozy surprised other leaders with a proposal to
postpone the Kosovo status process by six months to allow for further talks, but to
set the Ahtisaari plan as a default solution. Elements of the Sarkozy initiative were
later adapted in a new U.N. draft resolution that would reportedly give the parties
four months to continue to negotiate. Serbian and Russian officials rejected the
outlines of this new plan and have argued that new talks should not have a pre-
determined outcome. And, no agreement was announced on Kosovo at an early July
summit meeting between Bush and Putin in Kennebunkport, Maine. U.S. and other
European Security Council members finally withdrew their latest iteration of a new
resolution on July 20 in recognition of the ongoing disagreement.
Contact Group Troika. On July 25, representatives of the contact group
agreed to embark on a new round of talks on the future of Kosovo, with the sanction
of U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and his instruction to report back to the
Security Council by December 10. Representing the contact group is a “troika” of
international negotiators: Wolfgang Ischinger of Germany, Frank Wisner of the
United States, and Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko of Russia. Diplomats stated that
all options were on the table and exhorted the Kosovar and Serbian parties to
approach the talks constructively. The contact group’s road map for Kosovo left
some matters open to speculation. For example, it was not clear whether the
18 See Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General,
S/2007/220, April 20, 2007.

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CRS-18
December 10 date for reporting back to the United Nations represented a final
deadline for all negotiations, or just a pause to take stock before continuing with
more talks. It was also left unclear what further action, if any, the U.N. Security
Council would consider.
The troika has hosted several rounds of talks, with the last talks held on
November 26-27, in Austria. The parties presented further detailed proposals — for
example, the Kosovar Albanians have put forward a treaty of cooperation between
Kosovo and Serbia, while the Serbian side promoted detailed arrangements for
Kosovo’s sustainable autonomy. However, their fundamentally opposing positions
on status have not changed. For its part, the troika put forward some of its own
proposals. It introduced a set of 14 principles that emphasize special future relations
between Belgrade and Pristina, their cooperation on issues of mutual concern, and
the prospect for eventual European integration for both Kosovo and Serbia. Later, the
troika floated a proposal for a cooperation agreement between Kosovo and Serbia
that would remain “status-neutral,” or allowing for cooperative relations underneath
ongoing disagreement over status.
Despite these efforts, the troika process could not achieve the purported goal of
reaching a mutually acceptable negotiated status settlement. In its final report, the
troika assessed that “the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status
of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental
question of sovereignty over Kosovo.” The troika reported some useful outcomes to
the process, including a pledge from the parties to refrain from actions that might
jeopardize the security situation in Kosovo, and extensive discussion about the
“European perspective” of both Kosovo and Serbia.19
The Security Council is scheduled to address the troika report and the situation
in Kosovo on December 19. Kosovo President Sejdiu will be allowed to address the
Council in closed session. Russia has called for status talks to continue, while the
United States and European members do not support any extension of the troika’s
mandate.
Next Steps. Barring further decisions in the U.N. Security Council, Kosovo’s
authorities are expected to prepare a declaration of independence in early 2008 as
part of a process closely coordinated with the international community. The exact
timing of this step remains uncertain; Pristina may be pressed to wait until Serbia
completes its direct presidential election (scheduled for January 20 and February 2).
The United States and a majority of EU member states are then likely to recognize
Kosovo’s independence. The United States and the EU hold firmly that Kosovo’s
situation is unique, while Russia claims that it will set a precedent for other disputed
independence claims, such as those in Eurasia. Most observers do not expect
European Union member states to achieve unanimity on the issue of recognizing
Kosovo’s independence, with Cyprus and possibly Romania, Slovakia, among others,
reluctant or opposed. Meanwhile, Serbia’s government has been preparing for a
range of possible measures to take in response to Kosovo’s claim of independence,
19 Full text of the troika report is available in the U.N. Secretary-General’s letter to the
President of the Security Council, S/2007/723, December 10, 2007.

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CRS-19
including economic sanctions against Kosovo and diplomatic responses to countries
that recognize Kosovo’s independence.
Kosovar Albanian and Serbian Perspectives on Status
The negotiation approach set out by Ahtisaari back in 2006, with its initial focus
on “technical aspects,” appeared to recognize the completely opposing positions of
the Albanian and Serbian parties on status itself. It is the position of virtually the
entire ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo that the independence of Kosovo is
non-negotiable. The opening of status talks in 2006 spurred some tensions within the
ethnic Albanian political community. There was jockeying for advantage among the
leading parties in Kosovo over the composition of the negotiating team for the talks,
perhaps signaling a struggle between the Liberal Democratic Party of Kosovo (LDK)
and the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and other
parties over who should get credit for what they see as Kosovo’s impending
independence. Despite these pressures, the Unity Team involved in status
negotiations managed to stick together. Groups outside of the established political
parties have mobilized some grass-roots support in opposition to any notion of
compromise or negotiation of independence. They have organized periodic rallies
against UNMIK and even Kosovar Albanian leaders.
Kosovo’s leaders insist that Kosovo achieve independence and are concerned
about repeated delays in the process as well as an unclear outcome. Many observers
have long feared that Kosovar frustrations could easily explode.20 A pro-
independence rally against perceived concessions to the Serbs in the Ahtisaari plan
turned into a violent clash with U.N. police, leaving two dead on February 10. The
Kosovar leadership accepted the Ahtisaari package and has denounced any violent
provocations by pro-independence citizens but continues to warn against further
delay in settling Kosovo’s status. Kosovo’s leaders appeared to be amenable to
international guidance on refraining from declaring unilateral independence while the
latest phase of talks were ongoing. Incoming PDK leadership of the next Kosovar
government combined with popular frustration, however, may increase pressure to
declare independence as soon as possible in early 2008.
The Serbian government and Kosovo’s Serbian community are strongly opposed
to Kosovo’s independence; this view is backed by virtually all political parties in
Serbia. From the perspective of Serbia’s governing parties, it has remained
politically expedient to prolong the Kosovo status process, with Russia’s ongoing
support, if that means not having to bear political responsibility in Serbia for “losing”
Kosovo. Serbian leaders encapsulated their broad position on status with the phrase
“more than autonomy, but less than independence” and floated varying
interpretations on “maximum” autonomy for Kosovo short of full independence.
Kosovo Serbs participated in the status talks as part of the Serbian delegation.
Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica has repeatedly insisted that independence for
Kosovo would violate Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and lead to greater
instability inside Kosovo and in the region. Serbia’s parliament and government
20 “Delay, Delay — Kosovo’s Future,” The Economist, December 9, 2006; “Kosovo Status:
Delay Is Risky,” International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 177, November 10, 2006.

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CRS-20
rejected the Ahtisaari plan as a violation of Serbia’s sovereignty in early 2007. In
July 2007, the Serbian parliament passed a new resolution expressing opposition to
independence for Kosovo and authorizing the Serbian government to take measures
to protect Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo. Some government officials have
accused the United States and NATO of harboring designs on Kosovo’s territory and
have threatened unspecified diplomatic consequences, should the United States and
other countries recognize Kosovo’s independence. In talks under troika auspices,
Serbia presented more detailed proposals and models for maximum autonomy.
Belgrade also linked the Kosovo situation with Bosnia by supporting and promoting
Bosnian Serb claims for greater autonomy and possible moves toward secession.
Another aspect to Serbia’s stance on Kosovo is its internal political situation.
Officials argue that the loss of Kosovo will only strengthen the Serbian Radical Party,
currently the largest party in parliament and a contender to reach the presidency in
upcoming presidential elections. Although long at odds with each other, President
Tadic of the DS and Prime Minister Kostunica of the DSS have largely maintained
a unified front on Kosovo. After the January 2007 parliamentary elections, the two
parties achieved a hard-fought agreement on forming a new coalition government,
with Kostunica remaining Prime Minister. Kosovo will also likely factor into
Serbia’s upcoming presidential election, scheduled for January 20 and February 2.
Some observers have speculated that Serbia may seek to secure some form of
partition of Kosovo, with the Serb-controlled northern portions of Kosovo
proclaiming their own independence or appealing to become part of Serbia.21 To
date, the United States and other members of the contact group have explicitly ruled
out a formal partition of Kosovo as an acceptable status option and Serbia’s leaders
have not officially promoted this option. However, some observers are concerned that
Serbia might attempt to destabilize the situation on the ground in Kosovo in a way
that promotes partition. Belgrade had already discouraged the participation of
Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo central government and UNMIK, and called for a
Kosovo Serb boycott of the November elections. Some analysts fear that Serbia
could introduce more security forces into northern Kosovo, or encourage Serbs to
leave Kosovo in large numbers. KFOR’s reinforced presence in northern Kosovo
reflects international concern about the possibility of the north becoming a flashpoint
as the status process winds down.
Future International Missions
The international deadlock over Kosovo’s status has also complicated plans to
carry out new international missions to take over for the United Nations. In the early
planning stages for such missions, European officials repeatedly emphasized their
wish for the U.N. Security Council to provide the new missions with a clear
international mandate. However, in the likely absence of a new U.N. Security
Council resolution, international institutions have been considering ways to derive
an international legal basis for new missions in Kosovo. For example, Kosovo’s
21 Northern Kosovo is administratively tied to Serbia already through parallel institutions.
For example, see “Serbia Plays Kosovo Partition Card,” Balkan Insight [http://www.birn.
eu.com], April 19, 2007.

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CRS-21
government may invite the EU and NATO to deploy stabilization missions. In
addition, Resolution 1244 may be invoked to allow UNMIK to hand over
international civilian authority to a successor mission led by the EU, and to maintain
a NATO security presence in Kosovo. An EU Council meeting in December 2007
underlined the EU’s readiness to play a leading role in implementing a settlement in
Kosovo and in strengthening stability.
The Ahtisaari plan called for most governing powers to be held by Kosovar
authorities, but also envisaged an international civilian presence and an international
military presence. The civilian presence is to have two components: an International
Civilian Representative (ICR) and a civilian European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) Mission. The ICR will also serve as the EU Special Representative (EUSR)
to Kosovo and thus by definition be filled by an official from an EU member state.
The ICR will wield “final authority” over civilian aspects of the settlement. He will
be supported by an International Civilian Office (ICO), an international agency much
smaller in size than the UNMIK and including representatives from non-EU nations
such as a U.S. Deputy ICR. Informal estimates suggest that the size of the ICO may
equal around 70 to 100 personnel and is expected to be headed by Dutch diplomat
Pieter Feith.
The planned ESDP mission in Kosovo would be a non-military EU rule of law
mission involving training and developing police and judicial institutions. Plans for
the ESDP mission call for the deployment of up to 1,800 EU and other international
civilian personnel including police, judges, prosecutors, and customs police who will
report to the EUSR. The new Kosovo mission, led by former French General (and
former KFOR Commander) Yves de Kermabon, would be the EU’s largest civilian
ESDP operation to date. In addition to these missions on the ground, the EU plans
to lead international financial assistance to Kosovo following a status settlement.
The plan calls for NATO to maintain a presence in Kosovo to provide a safe and
secure environment after a status settlement. NATO members have expressed
readiness to assume responsibility for a new international military presence under the
Ahtisaari plan. At the NATO Riga summit in November 2006, alliance members
pledged to play a part in the implementation of the security provisions of a status
settlement. NATO foreign ministers, meeting on January 26, 2007, expressed strong
support for the Ahtisaari plan on Kosovo’s status. In December, NATO stated that
KFOR “shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1244, unless the Security Council decides otherwise.” NATO pledged to maintain
KFOR’s strength at “current levels and with no new caveats.”22 Most observers
believe that KFOR’s size and composition will not change much in the near-term
post-settlement environment. Longer-term, however, NATO may look to the EU to
take over military stabilization duties in Kosovo, as it did in Bosnia in 2004. In
addition, the United States may, within a year, seek to shift its troops from Kosovo
in order to meet demands for its troops in Afghanistan, or elsewhere.23
22 Final communiqué, North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting, December 7, 2007.
23 “U.S. pins Kosovo force on NATO’s Afghan commitment,” New York Times on the Web,
October 21, 2007.

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CRS-22
U.S. Policy
From the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s, the Clinton
Administration condemned Serbian human rights abuses and called for autonomy for
Kosovo within Yugoslavia, while opposing independence. The Clinton
Administration pushed for air strikes against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the
Rambouillet accords in March 1999, but refused to consider the use of ground troops
to eject Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. However, even before the air strikes, the
Clinton Administration said that U.S. troops would participate in a Kosovo
peacekeeping force if a peace agreement were reached. After the conflict, President
Clinton said that the U.S. and NATO troop commitment to Kosovo could be reduced
as local autonomous institutions took hold. He said that the United States and the
European Union must work together to rebuild Kosovo and the region, but that
“Europe must provide most of the resources.”24
During the 2000 presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, later appointed
National Security Advisor in President Bush’s first term, said that U.S. military
forces were overextended globally, and that peacekeeping responsibilities in the
Balkans should be taken over by U.S. allies in Europe. However, after taking office,
the Administration appeared to adopt a more cautious tone. In February 2001, former
Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the United States had a commitment to
peace in the Balkans and that NATO forces would have to remain in Bosnia and
Kosovo for “years.” He said the United States would review U.S. troop levels in
Bosnia and Kosovo with the objective of reducing them over time, but stressed that
the United States would act in consultation with its allies and was not “cutting and
running.” President Bush reiterated this position during a visit to Kosovo in July
2001, stating that U.S. and international forces “came in together” and would “go out
together,” under a common goal to “hasten the day” when peace in Kosovo would
be self-sustaining.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and subsequent
major military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced the Administration’s
desire to decrease the U.S. deployment in the Balkans. The number of troops in
KFOR has declined from about 38,000 in June 2002 to under 16,000 today, with the
U.S. contingent falling from 5,500 to 1,600, respectively. Although NATO
terminated its Stabilization Force in Bosnia and turned over peacekeeping duties to
the EU, no such transfer from NATO to the EU has been agreed to for Kosovo,
reflecting the more precarious security situation in Kosovo. According to the
Department of Defense Comptroller’s Office, DOD incremental costs for Kosovo
through FY2005 (estimated) were $9.1 billion. This figure included $1.89 billion for
the 1999 NATO air war, $7.0 billion for KFOR, and $141.6 million in refugee aid.25
24 See also CRS Report RL30374, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force,
by Paul E. Gallis, coordinator.
25 See CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S.
Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.

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CRS-23
From FY1999-FY2006, the United States obligated about $865 million in
bilateral aid to Kosovo.26 The Administration’s FY2007 request included $79
million for Kosovo. In preparation for anticipated final action on Kosovo’s status in
2007, the Administration has planned for increased aid allocations for Kosovo. In
February 2007, the Administration put forward a supplemental request for Global
War on Terrorism funding for FY2007, which included $279 million for Kosovo to
support the outcome of Kosovo’s status settlement. For FY2008, the Administration
requested $151.2 million for Kosovo.
Position on Status
The Bush Administration supported the “standards before status” policy favored
by UNMIK beginning in 2002. This approach called for the autonomous Kosovo
government to achieve a number of benchmarks (including progress toward creating
a functioning democratic government, free market economy, the rule of law and
respect for ethnic minorities) before the issue of Kosovo’s status is discussed. In
November 2003, the Bush Administration launched an initiative to give greater
impetus to the “standards before status” policy. Former Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs Marc Grossman, backed by other members of the Contact Group,
announced a “review date” strategy for the Kosovo standards that will lead to an
evaluation of the standards for Kosovo by mid-2005. Should Kosovo meet the
standards, he said that the international community would be prepared “to begin a
process to determine Kosovo’s future status.” He also said that “all options are on
the table,” but that the United States would not take a position on final status at this
time.27 On March 17, 2004, the State Department issued a statement strongly
deploring the incidents of serious violence in Kosovo and calling for the restoration
of calm and order and cooperation with international agencies. Since that event,
senior U.S. officials continued to emphasize the standards and review date strategy,
while giving particular emphasis to the priority standards relating to the treatment of
ethnic minorities in Kosovo.
In May 2005, the second Bush Administration announced a new phase in U.S.
policy in the Balkans. Emphasizing the need to “finish the work” in the region,
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns testified before
Congress that the status quo of Kosovo’s unresolved status was no longer sustainable
or desirable. He expressed U.S. support for the standards review timetable in 2005,
possibly leading to status negotiations later in the year. He said that a settlement
could be expected to be achieved by the end of 2006 and that the United States would
remain an active partner in Kosovo. In December 2005, the Administration named
Ambassador Frank Wisner to be the Special Representative of the Secretary of State
to the Kosovo status talks.
26 U.S. Agency for International Development, Overseas Loans and Grants, July 31, 1945-
September 30, 2001, p. 184; annual international affairs budget requests, U.S. Department
of State.
27 “UNMIK Press Conference,” November 5, 2003. Transcript available on the State
Department website in hypertext (html) at [http://www.state.gov/p/26032.htm] or in a
printer-friendly format (pdf) from the U.N. at [http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/
trans/tr051103.pdf].

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CRS-24
On February 2, 2007, the Administration expressed support for U.N. Envoy
Ahtisaari’s comprehensive proposal for a Kosovo status settlement. The State
Department called it “fair and balanced,” and a “blueprint for a stable, prosperous,
and multi-ethnic Kosovo.”28 U.S. officials urged the Serbian and Kosovar parties to
engage constructively with Ahtisaari during final consultations over the status
proposal, and endorsed the final version of the plan as presented to the Security
Council in March. They have also emphasized the need for international unity in
supporting a future status settlement; top U.S. officials have engaged their
counterparts, including those from Russia, on the Kosovo question.
At a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 17,
Undersecretary of State Burns expressed clear U.S. support for Kosovo’s
independence, calling it a “legitimate, fair, and lawful outcome.” He stated that the
United States fully supports Ahtisaari’s recommendations on a status settlement and
was working to achieve a timely and successful conclusion to the process. He
warned against delay in the interest of preventing further instability and tension.
Administration officials have also expressed the need to offer Serbia’s
democratic leadership a clear path toward Euro-Atlantic integration, including closer
association with NATO and the EU. In late 2006, the Administration supported
Serbia’s entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, long withheld over the
issue of Serbia’s cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal.
Following the G8 summit in Germany, President Bush made several statements
on Kosovo while visiting Italy and Albania in June. Stating that “the time is now,”
he pledged that the United States would work to get the process moving forward.
While acknowledging Russia’s disagreement with his position, Bush also stated
unequivocally that the end result of the status process should be independence for
Kosovo based on the Ahtisaari plan.29 Secretary of State Rice reiterated the
Administration’s support for achieving the goal of Kosovo’s independence in
meetings with the Kosovo Unity Team in Washington on July 23, while urging the
Kosovars to engage in new stage of the diplomatic process on status. In September,
Rice told the news media that the Administration was dedicated to achieving an end
result of independence.
U.S. officials have stated that the United States was prepared to recognize
Kosovo’s independence following passage of a new U.N. resolution. The
Administration strongly supported the troika process, although it does not support an
extension to this process beyond the December 10 deadline. Absent a new resolution
or a diplomatic breakthrough, the Administration is widely expected to support a
coordinated international effort to recognize a unilateral declaration of independence
by the Kosovar leadership sometime in early 2008.
28 Department of State press statement, February 2, 2007.
29 Press availability with Prime Minister of Albania, Office of the White House Press
Secretary, June 10, 2007.

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CRS-25
Congressional Response
In 1999, the 106th Congress debated whether U.S. and NATO air strikes in
Kosovo were in the U.S. national interest, and whether the President could undertake
them without congressional approval. In the end, Congress neither explicitly
approved nor blocked the air strikes, but appropriated funds for the air campaign and
the U.S. peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo after the fact. In 2000, some Members
unsuccessfully attempted to condition the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo on
Congressional approval and on the implementation of aid pledges made by European
countries. Many Members of Congress said that they expected U.S. allies in Europe
to contribute the lion’s share of aid to the region and expressed concern that
European countries were slow to implement their aid pledges. Congress moved to
limit U.S. aid to Kosovo to 15% of the total amount pledged by all countries.30
The 107th Congress focused on limiting the cost of the continuing U.S.
engagement in Kosovo. For example, the FY2002 foreign aid appropriations law
(P.L. 107-115) specified that aid to Kosovo “should not exceed 15 percent of the total
resources pledged by all donors for calendar year 2002 for assistance for Kosovo as
of March 31, 2002.” It also barred U.S. aid for “large scale physical infrastructure
reconstruction” in Kosovo.
Kosovo’s status has been another theme in legislation. In the 108th Congress,
several resolutions were introduced that advocate U.S. support for Kosovo’s
independence. In the first session, H.Res. 11 and H.Res. 28 were introduced,
expressing the sense of the House that the United States should declare support for
Kosovo’s independence. In the Senate, S.Res. 144 expressed the sense of the Senate
that the United States should support the right of the people of Kosovo to determine
their political future once “requisite progress” is made in achieving U.N. benchmarks
in developing democratic institutions and human rights protections.
In the wake of the March 2004 violence in Kosovo, several resolutions were
introduced to condemn the attacks, as well as subsequent attacks on Islamic sites in
Serbia. These included H.Res. 587, introduced by Representative Christopher Smith,
and H.Res. 596, introduced by Representative Burton. On April 8, the Senate agreed
by unanimous consent to S.Res. 326, introduced by Senator Voinovich. The
resolution, a slightly modified companion version of H.Res. 596, strongly
condemned the violence; recognized the commitment of Kosovo and Serbian leaders
to rebuild what had been destroyed and encourage the return of refugees; called on
leaders in Kosovo to renounce violence and build a multi-ethnic society based on the
standards for Kosovo; recommended the restructuring of UNMIK; and urged the
reinvigoration of dialogue between Kosovo and Belgrade. S.Res. 384, offered by
Senator Lugar on June 18, called on the United States to work with KFOR, UNMIK,
and the Kosovo and Serbian governments to implement the Standards for Kosovo.
The 109th Congress also considered legislation on Kosovo. On January 4, 2005,
Representative Lantos introduced H.Res. 24, which expressed the sense of the House
30 For detailed information on the activities of the 106th Congress, see CRS Report RL30729,
Kosovo and the 106th Congress, by Julie Kim.

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CRS-26
that the United States should support Kosovo’s independence. On October 7, 2005,
the Senate passed S.Res. 237, a resolution supporting efforts to “work toward an
agreement on the future status of Kosovo and a plan for transformation in Kosovo.”
It did not express support for any particular status option. The resolution passed
without amendment by unanimous consent. An identical House resolution was
introduced on December 17, 2005 (H.Res. 634).
At the start of the 110th Congress, Representative Lantos introduced H.Res. 36
on January 5, 2007, which calls on the United States to, among other things, support
Kosovo’s independence within its existing borders as a sovereign and democratic
state. It has been referred to the Subcommittee on Europe in the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs. Two identical bills, H.Res. 309 and S.Res. 135, have been
introduced expressing support for Kosovo’s independence. On May 24,
Representative Bean introduced H.Res. 445, which states that the United States
should refrain from any unilateral action, especially outside the United Nations,
toward Kosovo’s independence.
In a bill to provide emergency supplemental appropriations for FY2007 (H.R.
1591/S. 965), the House and Senate conference committee allotted $229 million out
of a requested $279 million for Kosovo. After H.R. 1591 was vetoed by the President
for provisions relating to Iraq, Congress approved another FY2007 supplemental
funding bill, which included $214 million in SEED funds for Kosovo and was signed
by the President on May 25 (H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28). In June, the House passed
H.R. 2764, providing FY2008 appropriations for the Department of State and foreign
operations; the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2764 on September 6. The
Administration’s FY2008 budget request included over $151 million in bilateral
assistance for Kosovo.

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CRS-27
Figure 1. Map of Kosovo
crsphpgw

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