Order Code RL30613
North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?
Updated December 11, 2007
Larry Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Raphael Perl
Specialist in International Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?
Summary
The issue of North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting
countries has arisen twice in recent U.S.-North Korean diplomacy. In 2000, North
Korea demanded that the Clinton Administration remove North Korea from the
terrorism-support list before North Korea would send a high level envoy to
Washington and accept the Clinton Administration’s proposal to begin negotiations
with the United States over the North Korean missile program. In 2003, multilateral
negotiations involving six governments began over North Korea’s nuclear programs
in the wake of North Korea’s actions to terminate its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. In
the six party talks, North Korea demanded that in return for a North Korean “freeze”
of its plutonium nuclear program, the United States agree to a number of U.S.
concessions, including removing North Korea from the U.S. terrorism-support list.
In late 2006 and early 2007, the Bush Administration reportedly offered North
Korea removal from the U.S. terrorism list if North Korea agreed to end its nuclear
programs. U.S. and North Korean diplomats negotiated much of the Six Party
Nuclear Agreement, which was signed on February 13, 2007. That agreement
specified that the United States and North Korea would begin to negotiate a process
of removal of North Korea from the terrorism list. In August-September 2007,
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill apparently made promises to North
Korea’s chief negotiator to remove North Korea as part of the process to implement
Phase Two of the February 2007 nuclear agreement. They set a deadline of
December 31, 2007, for completion of Phase II. Phase II requires North Korea to
allow the “disablement” of its plutonium facilities at Yongbyon and to issue a
declaration of its nuclear programs. The Bush Administration increasingly took the
position that the issue of North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese citizens was not
linked to removing North Korea from the terrorism list, from the standpoint of U.S.
law or policy. The Japanese government objected to this position. The State
Department continued to declare that North Korea had not committed a terrorist act
since 1987, but contrary reports from reputable sources described recent North
Korean programs to provide arms and training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, two groups on the U.S. list of international terrorist
organizations.
If the Administration removes North Korea from the terrorism list, it is required
under law to notify Congress 45 days prior to removal. For Congress to prevent
removal, it would have to pass legislation (not resolutions) that would be subject to
a presidential veto. The Administration has stated that it will adhere to the
requirement of providing Congress with a 45-day notice.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S.-North Korean Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Three Stages in Diplomacy over the Terrorism List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Responses: The Clinton Administration in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration in 2003-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . 4
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration Moves Toward
Removal, October 2006-November 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Terrorist State Activity Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
State Sponsors/Supporters List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Nations Not Fully Cooperating Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Adding and Removing Countries on the List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Rationale and Background for DPRK Retention on the Two Lists . . . . . . . . . . . 13
North Korea Previously Cited for Possible Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Prospects for Removal Are Set Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Process for Removal Moves Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
New Reports of Support of Terrorist Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

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North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?
Background
U.S.-North Korean Negotiations
Three Stages in Diplomacy over the Terrorism List. The issue of North
Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism has been in U.S.-
North Korean diplomacy since 2000, but three stages are of particular importance:
the first in 2000 in Clinton Administration-North Korean negotiations; the second
during the 2003-2004 Six Party negotiations over the North Korean nuclear issue;
and the third in the diplomacy around the Six Party nuclear agreement of February
2007. Until 2000, the core element of U.S.-North Korean diplomacy was the Agreed
Framework, which Washington and Pyongyang signed in October 1994. It dealt
primarily with North Korea’s nuclear program, but U.S. obligations specified in the
Agreed Framework included economic and diplomatic measures. However, the issue
of removal of North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list was omitted from the
Agreement. The issue appears not to have been a major object of the negotiations in
1994.
In October 1999, the Clinton Administration unveiled the Perry Initiative toward
North Korea. Formulated under the direction of William Perry, former Secretary of
Defense, the Perry initiative primarily sought a new round of U.S.-North Korean
negotiations over North Korea’s missile program. The Perry Initiative report of
October 1999 stated that if North Korea agreed to a “verifiable cessation” of its
missile program, the United States would provide a series of economic and
diplomatic benefits to North Korea leading to normalization of U.S.-North Korean
relations.1
The Clinton Administration sought an early visit of a high level North Korean
official to Washington to obtain substantive negotiations.2 North Korea, however,
began to demand several pre-conditions for a high level visit. Beginning in February
2000, one of these was removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorism-
supporting countries. North Korea reportedly persisted in this demand well into the
summer of 2000 before finally relenting. The high level envoy visited Washington
in October 2000.
1 Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea. Report by Dr. William J. Perry,
Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State. October 12, 1999.
2 Pomfret, John. “North Korea Threatens To Skip Talks.” Washington Post. March 29,
2000. p. A20.

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The terrorism list issue receded until 2003 when a new round of U.S.-North
Korean diplomacy ensued. This round was precipitated by the Bush Administration’s
claim that North Korea admitted in October 2002 to U.S. diplomats that it was
operating a secret uranium enrichment program. The Administration declared the
secret program a violation of the Agreed Framework and began to end U.S.
obligations under the Agreed Framework. North Korea retaliated by reopening
nuclear facilities that had been frozen under the Agreed Framework, expelling
monitors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and withdrawing from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Multilateral negotiations began in April 2003
hosted by China and ultimately involving six governments (the United States, North
Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan). At six party talks in August 2003,
North Korea demanded that in return for North Korean concessions on the nuclear
issue, the United States agree to a number of U.S. concessions, including removing
North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries. North Korea made
its demand more specific in December 2003 when it issued a revised proposal
centered on a “freeze” of North Korea’s plutonium nuclear programs (but not the
uranium enrichment program). This proposal restated North Korean demands for
multiple concessions in return for a freeze. Removal from the terrorism support list
was near the top of the list.3 North Korea reiterated its demand at the six party
meetings in February and June 2004 in the context of its freeze proposal.
The third stage began after North Korea’s test of an atomic bomb in October
2006. Bilateral meetings between Assistant Secretary of State Christopher and North
Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan in November 2006 and January 2007
contained discussions of the terrorism list issue as the two diplomats laid the
groundwork for the nuclear agreement that the six parties announced on February 13,
2007. That agreement created a “working group” on North Korea-U.S. normalization
of relations. The agreement stated
The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving bilateral
issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The U.S. will begin the
process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism,
and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the
Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.
U.S. Responses: The Clinton Administration in 2000. The Clinton
Administration reportedly presented to North Korea in February 2000 four steps that
North Korea would have to take to be removed from the terrorism list: (1) issue a
written guarantee that it no longer is engaged in terrorism; (2) provide evidence that
it has not engaged in any terrorist act in the past six months; (3) join international
anti-terrorism agreements; and (4) address issues of past support of terrorism.4 In
consulting U.S. allies, South Korea stated that the United States need not consider
North Korean terrorism against South Korea in responding to North Korea’s demand
and that the Kim Dae-jung administration in Seoul favored removal of North Korea
3 North Korean Foreign Ministry statement on talks. Reuters News Agency, December 9,
2003.
4 Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong) report, February 8, 2000. Yonhap News Agency
(Seoul) report, February 8, 2000.

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CRS-3
from the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries.5 Japan, however, strongly urged
the Clinton Administration to make a redress of North Korean terrorist acts against
Japan conditions for removing North Korea from the list. Japan specifically cited
North Korea’s kidnapping of at least ten Japanese citizens and North Korea’s
harboring of Japanese Red Army terrorists since the 1970s.6 The U.S. State
Department had cited North Korea’s harboring of Japanese Red Army terrorists as
a reason for North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting states.
A State Department official stated on April 25, 2000, that the United States considers
“resolving this issue as an important step in addressing [U.S.] concerns about North
Korean support of terrorism.”7 Moreover, according to informed sources, U.S.
officials began to raise the kidnapping issue with the North Korea in negotiations
over the terrorism list.
Japan intensified diplomacy on the terrorism issue in September and October
2000 as the United States prepared to receive the high ranking North Korean official
and as Japan prepared for bilateral normalization talks with North Korea. Japan
urged the Clinton Administration to raise Japan’s concerns over terrorism in the high
level U.S.-North Korean exchanges of October 2000 and not to remove North Korea
from the terrorism list.8 The visit to Washington of North Korean military leader, Jo
Myong-rok on October 9-12, 2000, produced two general U.S.-North Korean
statements opposing terrorism. However, the State Department’s North Korea policy
coordinator, Wendy Sherman, said on October 12 that Secretary Albright’s planned
visit to Pyongyang did not mean that the Clinton Administration would remove North
Korea from the terrorism list. North Korea, she said, “knows what it needs to do.”9
The impact of Japan’s entreaties were demonstrated during Albright’s visit to
North Korea. In the first ever meeting between an American official and North
Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, Albright raised the issue of the kidnapped Japanese. She
reported to Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei that in her meetings with Kim
Jong-il, “I brought up the [abduction] issue time and again. I told him that this issue
was important not only to Japan but also to the United States as well.” Kono
reportedly expressed satisfaction, saying “She seems to have thought about Japan.”10
The Clinton Administration thus decided in late 2000 to give Japan’s concerns
over terrorism a higher priority in U.S. negotiations with North Korea over the U.S.
5 ROK to press US to remove DPRK from terrorism list. Korea Herald, internet version,
June 21, 2000.
6 U.S. to question DPRK on kidnappings of Japanese nationals. JIJI News Agency (Tokyo)
report, February 16, 2000.
7 U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing [by James P. Rubin], April 25, 2000. p. 8.
8 Varied Aspects of Japan-North Korean Relations. Mainichi Shimbun (Nikkei Telecom
Database version), October 28, 2000. Jiji Kokkoku Column. Asahi Shimbun (internet
version), October 8, 2000.
9 Carter, Tom. Clinton Plans First-ever Presidential Trip to North Korea. Washington
Times, October 13, 2000. p. A1.
10 Varied Aspects of Japan-North Korean Relations, Mainichi Shimbun, October 28, 2000.

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CRS-4
terrorism list. This, in effect, lowered the priority of South Korea’s position in U.S.
policy.
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration in 2003-2004. There were
at least three components to the Bush Administration’s policy regarding North
Korea’s inclusion on the terrorism-supporting list after the Agreed Framework
collapsed and the six party talks began in 2003. The first was the U.S. response to
North Korea’s demand at the six party talks for removal from the list. A second was
the raising by U.S. officials of the danger that North Korea would provide nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. The third was the
emphasis given to the Japanese kidnapping in State Department statements on North
Korea’s inclusion on the list of terrorism-supporting countries.
Until June 2004, the Bush Administration took the position that it would not
discuss issues in U.S.-North Korean relations, including the terrorism-support list,
until North Korea agreed to and took concrete steps to dismantle it nuclear programs.
In line with this stance, the Administration refused to submit any comprehensive U.S.
proposal at the six party talks. The Administration’s position changed in June 2004,
apparently because of pressure from U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, and
heightened criticism of the Administration’s position from China. At the six party
meeting in June 2004, the Administration proposed a detailed plan in which North
Korea would freeze its nuclear programs and submit to international verification
during a three-month preparatory period followed by a full dismantlement of all
nuclear programs. Once North Korea had met the requirements of the preparatory
period, the United States would begin negotiations with North Korea on other issues,
including the terrorism-support list.11
The Bush Administration has linked North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese
citizens to the six party talks and to the terrorism-support list. When the Bush
Administration took office in 2001, it assured Japan, including the families of
suspected kidnapping victims, that the United States would continue to raise the
kidnapping issue with North Korea and would not remove North Korea from the U.S.
list of terrorism-supporting countries.12 In the six party talks, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly stated several times to the North Korean delegates that
North Korea should settle the kidnapping issue with Japan.
In April 2004, the State Department emphasized the kidnapping of Japanese in
its justification for North Korean’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting
countries, as part of the Department’s annual report on international terrorism.13 The
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 described Kim Jong-il’s
admission of North Korean kidnapping during his meeting with Japanese Prime
Minister Koizumi in September 2002 and that Japan-North Korea negotiations over
11 See CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and
Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch.
12 National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnaped by North Korea. Report of
Mission to the U.S. from February 25 to March 3, 2001.
13 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. p. 92.

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CRS-5
the issue were continuing. Coffer Black, the State Department’s top counterterrorism
official, stated upon the release of the report that the kidnapping issue was a key
factor in the report’s designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.14
During this period, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice made public statements pledging to support Japan. At his
summit meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2003, President Bush stated:
“Abduction is an abominable act. The United States supports Japan completely until
we find out the whereabouts of each and every Japanese citizen who has been
abducted by North Korea.”15 Condoleezza Rice described the kidnapping issue as “a
priority also for the United States, that we abhor what the North Koreans have
done.”16 In April 2004, Vice President Cheney said in Tokyo that Americans shared
Japan’s “outrage” over North Korea’s kidnappings and that the Bush Administration
supported Japan’s demand for a “resolution of all the issues surrounding the criminal
abduction of your citizens by the regime in Pyongyang.”17
In mid-2002, Japan and North Korea went into secret negotiations regarding the
kidnapping issue. In September 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro flew to
Pyongyang where North Korean leader Kim Jong-il admitted that North Korea had
abducted 13 Japanese citizens; of these, he claimed that 8 had died and that 5 were
alive. The five subsequently went to Japan. In May 2004, Koizumi again traveled
to Pyongyang and secured the release of 6 children of the 5 Japanese. However, the
issue quickly reached an impasse. Japan harbored doubts about the truthfulness of
North Korea’s claim that 8 of the 13 kidnapped Japanese were dead and that the
remains of all 8 had been washed away by floods and were not available for
identification. In 2006, the Japanese government added 3 other missing Japanese
citizens to its list of Japanese kidnapped by North Korea. In Japan, publicized claims
also emerged that North Korea had kidnapped up to several hundred Japanese.
The Bush Administration supported Koizumi’s efforts but reportedly pressed
the Japanese government not to reciprocate with financial aid to North Korea before
the nuclear and missile issues with North Korea were resolved. The Administration
urged Koizumi prior to each visit to press North Korea for policy changes on the
nuclear issue. Japan reportedly complied with the U.S. urgings.18
14 Washington links N. Korea abductions of Japanese with terrorism, Yonhap News Agency,
April 30, 2004.
15 Growing US distrust of South Korea, Tokyo Sentaku, June 2003, p. 6-9.
16 Bush’s National Security Adviser Rice says DPRK abduction issue priority topic,
Mainichi Shimbun (internet version), May 31, 2003.
17 Bill Gertz, Cheney backs Koizumi on Iraq stance, Washington Times, April 13, 2004, p.
A3.
18 Japan, U.S. agree to put pressure on Pyongyang. Yonhap New Agency, May 1, 2004.
Japan PM says Bush supportive on North Korea trip. Reuters News Agency, September 12,
2002. Howard W. French, Japan-North Korea talks conclude with deep splits, New York
Times, October 31, 2002, p. A13. James Brooke, North Korea’s A-arms project jeopardizes
aid, Japan says, New York Times, October 22, 2002, p. A6.

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CRS-6
These urgings pointed up the overall importance of Japan to U.S. policy toward
North Korea and thus the broader influence of the kidnapping issue. As far back as
the Perry initiative in 1999-2000, U.S. officials acted on the assumption that any
settlement of the nuclear and missile issues with North Korea would require a major
Japanese financial contribution. As a participant in the six party talks, Japan was
viewed as crucial in any settlement of the nuclear or missile issues that involved
reciprocal economic or financial benefits to North Korea. As far back as the Perry
initiative in 1999-2000, U.S. officials acted on the assumption that any settlement of
the nuclear and missile issues with North Korea would require a major Japanese
financial contribution.19 Japan promised North Korea billions of dollars in aid as part
of a normalization of relations, but Japan specified that normalization depends on a
settlement of the nuclear, missile, and kidnapping issues.20
At the six party talks in June 2004, the Bush Administration put forth a detailed
settlement proposal under which North Korea would receive heavy oil in the initial
stage of a settlement process, financed by Japan and South Korea. The United States
also offered North Korea negotiations on resolving North Korea’s broader energy and
electricity needs, which also undoubtedly would require a substantial Japanese
financial input. On the other hand, the Bush Administration discussed with Japan the
imposition of economic sanctions on North Korea. Japan joined the Proliferation
Security Initiative in 2003, which President Bush proposed to stifle the proliferation
activities of states like North Korea. In 2006, Japan imposed strong economic
sanctions on North Korea when the United Nations Security Council approved
sanctions in response to North Korea’s missile tests of July 2006 and atomic bomb
test of October 2006.
U.S. Responses: The Bush Administration Moves Toward Removal,
October 2006-November 2007. Although the Bush Administration sought and
obtained U.N. Security Council sanctions after North Korea’s atomic bomb test in
October 2006, it changed its policy on the North Korean nuclear issue in more
fundamental ways — one of which was to bring the terrorism list issue more directly
into negotiations. The change was directed by Secretary of State Condaleeza Rice
and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill. There have been three fundamental
changes in Bush Administration policy since the North Korean nuclear test that have
implications for the terrorism list issue. Tactically, the Administration abandoned
its opposition to bilateral talks with North Korea and actively sought bilateral
meetings with Pyongyang. Moreover, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill
used these meetings, in late November 2006 and mid-January 2007, to negotiate
actively the details of the six party agreement that was announced on February 13,
2007.
The second change under the Rice-Hill strategy has been in the U.S. policy
objective toward North Korea’s nuclear programs and weapons. Dismantlement of
19 Niksch, Larry A., North Korea and Terrorism: The Yokita Megumi Factor. The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis. Spring 2002. pp. 14-16.
20 For Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent statement of these conditions, see Kim, Jack and
Kitano, Masayuki. Japan, S. Korea urge N. Korea to move on crisis. Reuters News Agency,
July 22, 2004.

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CRS-7
Pyongyang’s nuclear programs and weapons remains as the official Bush
Administration policy goal, but the February 2007 Six Party Agreement says little
about dismantlement. The two phases outlined in the agreement focus on freezing
North Korean nuclear facilities in the first phase, to be completed in 60 days, then
“disablement of all existing nuclear facilities” and disclosure by North Korea of “all
nuclear programs” in the second phase that has no time deadline.” The February
2007 agreement thus signals an apparent policy objective of containment of North
Korea’s nuclear programs and nuclear weapons development, limiting their size and
scope. The Bush Administration continues to cite full nuclear dismantlement as its
goal for 2008. However, in the limited number of months left of an actively
functioning Bush Administration (prior to the U.S. presidential election campaign
starting in September 2008), the most realistic prospect of success is negotiating and
implementing the two phases of this Six Party Agreement or at least a partial
implementation. The dismantlement issue likely will be left for the U.S.
Administration that comes into office in January 2009. Consequently, this scenario
appears to have influenced the Bush Administration to delink total dismantlement as
a primary condition for removal of North Korea from the terrorism list and to link
removal with lesser North Korean steps in the February 2007 agreement, particularly
“disablement” of the Yongbyon plutonium nuclear facilities and a declaration of its
nuclear programs.
Thus, the third change under the Rice-Hill strategy has been to link removal
from the terrorism exclusively to a successful North Korean implementation of its
obligations under Phase Two of the February 2007 nuclear agreement. Beginning
with the Hill-Kim Kye-gwan meeting of November 28-29, 2006, and especially in
their meeting in Berlin in January 2007, Hill reportedly said that the Bush
Administration would remove North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism if North Korea dismantled its nuclear programs.21 In the February 2007
agreement, the Administration agreed to begin the process of removing the DPRK
from the list.22
North Korea also may have increased the incentive for the Bush Administration
to strengthen this linkage. The South Korean newspaper, JongAng Ilbo, quoted “a
diplomatic source knowledgeable on the New York talks” between Hill and Kim
Kye-gwan on March 5-6, 2007, that Kim asserted that if the United States took steps
to normalize relations, North Korea could disable the Yongbyon nuclear installations
within a year (i.e., March 2008). Kim specifically mentioned as a key step the
removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.23 Kim repeated
this during the six party meeting in July 2007.
21 What ‘new ideas’ did Washington offer Pyongyang? Chosun Ilbo (Seoul, internet
version), December 4, 2006. U.S. offered to remove N Korea from terror list — South
Korea. Dow Jones International News, December 26, 2006. Arimoto Takashi, Six-party
talks: Japan, PRC concerned about US-DPRK pre-talk coordination becoming regularized,
suspect ‘secret deal’, Sankei Shimbun (internet version), August 14, 2007.
22 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm] at p. 147.
23 Yi Sang-il and Chin Se-ku. Yongbyon nuclear facility can be disabled within a year.
JongAng Ilbo (internet version), March 13, 2007.

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As the Bush Administration moved toward this exclusive linkage, it began to
separate the Japanese kidnapping issue from the terrorism-support list. During
Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the White House in May 2007, Secretary of
State Rice told him that the Bush Administration had no legal obligation to link the
kidnapping and terrorism list issues.24 State Department officials subsequently
emphasized this “no legal obligation” position but also that Hill had urged North
Korea to negotiate progress on the kidnapping issue with Japan.25 In a press
conference with foreign correspondents on August 30, 2007, President Bush evaded
a direct answer to a reporter’s question whether progress on the kidnapping issue was
a condition for North Korea’s removal; Bush instead repeated his concern over the
kidnappings and his feelings when he received the families of kidnapped Japanese
at the White House.26
In September 2007 meetings between Assistant Secretary of State Hill and
North Korean negotiator Kim Gye-gwan, they agreed to complete the implementation
of Phase Two of the February 2007 nuclear agreement by December 31, 2007,
including North Korea’s obligations to disable the Yongbyon installations and
declare its nuclear programs. Kim Gye-gwan and North Korea’s Foreign Ministry
asserted that Hill had stated that part of this implementation would be the removal
of North Korea from the terrorism list.27 Hill did not confirm this, but it has been
reported widely and believed by many observers that he made a specific commitment
to Kim Gye-gwan regarding the terrorism list.28
On October 3, 2007, the six parties issued a statement on the implementation
of Phase Two, which included a target deadline of December 31, 2007. The
statement implied a U.S. commitment to remove North Korea as part of the
implementation process. Referencing the U.S. commitments in the February 2007
nuclear agreement to begin the process of removing North Korea from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism and the Trading with the Enemy Act, the statement read that
“the United States will fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the
DPRK’s actions based on consensus reached at the meetings on the working group
on normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations.” Christopher Hill stated at an October 25
congressional hearing that fulfilling these commitments “will depend on the DPRK’s
fulfillment of its Second-Phase commitments on providing a complete and correct
24 Abductions by N.Korea not related to US terrorist list, Chosun Ilbo (internet version),
May 14, 2007.
25 Pyongyang fallout, The Wall Street Journal Asia, November 16, 2007, p. 12. Statement
by Tom Casey, State Department spokesman.
26 The White House, Roundtable Interview of the President by Foreign Print Media, August
30, 3007.
27 Choe Sang-hun and David E. Sanger, North Korea claims U.S. will remove sanctions,
International Herald Tribune, September 4, 2007, p. 5.
28 Japanese abductions unlikely to stop U.S. from removing N. Korea, Yonhap News
Agency, September 6, 2007. Ser Myo-ja, Kang Chan-ho, Cheong Yong-whan, North: US
ready to lift sanctions, adjust terror list, JoongAng Ilbo (internet version), September 3,
2007.

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CRS-9
declaration and disabling its nuclear facilities, as well as on satisfaction of legal
requirements ... set forth in U.S. law.”29
The Bush Administration appears to maintain this intention despite mounting
criticism from Japan and a reported warning from U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas
Schieffer that removal of North Korea without progress on the kidnapping issue
could damage the U.S.-Japan alliance.30 In contrast, the South Korean and Chinese
governments appeared to support the Administration’s planned removal of North
Korea.31
Terrorist State Activity Designations
In April 2007, the Department of State released its annual global terrorism
report to Congress, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006 [Country Reports, 2006].32
North Korea is prominently mentioned in the yearly report, which include data on
terrorist trends and activity worldwide and serves as the basis for the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism that are subject to U.S. sanctions. Emerging, or ongoing,
problem areas “areas of concern” are identified as well.
In addition to data on terrorist trends, groups, and activities worldwide, Country
Reports provide a description as to why countries are on the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism that are subject to U.S. sanctions. Thus, included in Country
Reports are detailed data on the five countries currently on the “terrorism list”: Cuba,
Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.33 U.S. Administration officials maintain that
29 Statement of Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State, before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global
Environment, and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, October 25,
2007.
30 Gilles Campion, Senior Japanese adviser to Fukuda warns US over taking DPRK off
terrorist list, Agence France Presse, October 25, 2007. Michael Green and James Przystup,
The abductee issue if a test of America’s strategic credibility, PacNet, November 15, 2007.
Michael Green was Director for East Asia with the National Security Council until January
2007. James Przystup is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University.
31 Chang Lu, How much of 13 February joint document of six-party talks has been put into
effect? Xinhua Domestic Service, July 16, 2007.
32 Country Reports (formerly Patterns of Global Terrorism; hereinafter, “Patterns”) is an
annual report to Congress required by Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a).
See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/].
33 The degree of support for, or involvement in, terrorist activities typically varies
dramatically from nation to nation. For 2005 and 2006, of the five on the U.S. terrorism list,
Iran continued to be characterized on one extreme of the spectrum of terrorist list states as
an active supporter of terrorism: a nation that uses terrorism as an instrument of policy or
warfare beyond its borders. Closer to the middle of the spectrum is Syria. Although not
formally detected in an active role since 1986, Country Reports asserts that the Assad
regime reportedly uses groups in Syria and Lebanon to export terror into Israel and allows
groups to train in territory under its control. On the less active end of the spectrum, one
(continued...)

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CRS-10
the practice of designating and reporting on the activities of the state sponsors of
terrorism list and concomitant sanctions policy has contributed significantly to a
reduction in the overt — and apparently overall — activity level of states supporting
terrorism in the past decade. Libya and Sudan are frequently cited as examples of
such success, but to date, not North Korea. North Korea is also included on a
concomitant list of states “not fully cooperating” with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
This list includes the five state sponsors of terrorism currently on the Department of
State’s list and Afghanistan.
State Sponsors/Supporters List
North Korea remains one of five countries currently on the list that the Secretary
of State maintains have “repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.”34 Data supporting this list are drawn from the intelligence community.
Listed countries are subject to severe U.S. export controls — particularly of dual-use
technology and selling them military equipment is prohibited.35 Providing foreign
aid under the Foreign Assistance Act is also prohibited. Section 6(j) of the 1979
Export Administration Act stipulates that a validated license shall be required for
export of controlled items and technology to any country on the list, and that the
Secretaries of Commerce and State must notify the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and
Foreign Relations at least 30 days before issuing any validated license for goods and
services that could significantly enhance a nation’s military capability or its ability
to support terrorism as required by this act.36 In addition, Section 509(a) of the 1986
33 (...continued)
might place countries such as Cuba or North Korea, which at the height of the Cold War
were more active, but in recent years have seemed to settle for a more passive role of
granting ongoing safe haven to previously admitted terrorists. Also at the less active end of
the spectrum, and arguably falling off it, is Sudan, which reportedly has stepped up counter-
terrorism cooperation with the United States. An area of concern for some observers is the
impact DPRK removal from the state sponsors list may have on prospects for Cuba’s
removal.
Note that Libya was certified by the Secretary of State as being eligible for removal
from the list on May 12, 2006. See Presidential Determination No. 2006-14, May 12, 2006,
which went into effect June 28, 2006 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/
20060515-5.html] with the end result of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism
being rescinded on June 30, 2006. Sanctions against Iraq pursuant to its inclusion on the
terrorism list were suspended on May 7, 2003 by Presidential Determination No. 2003-23
(Federal Register of May 16, 2003), Vol. 68, No. 95, p. 26459). Iraq was removed from the
list by a recision of determination on October 7, 2004 (Federal Register, October 20, 2004,
Vol. 69, No. 202, p. 61702).
34 See generally CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism, Threat, Policy, and
Response, by Raphael Perl.
35 See CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
36 The interpretation of these “significant dual use items,” especially when items such as
aircraft parts are involved, is often the subject of considerable discussion within the
(continued...)

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CRS-11
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act (P.L. 99-399) bars export of
munitions list items to countries on the terrorism list.
A restriction potentially related to North Korea is found in Section 1621 of the
International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118). Entitled “Opposition to
Assistance by International Financial Institutions to Terrorist States,” Section 1621
states: “The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive
director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the
United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of the respective institution
to or for a country for which the Secretary of State has made a determination under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.” In short, the United States must oppose financial assistance
from institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to any
state on the U.S. terrorism list. Given the influence of the United States in these
institutions, U.S. opposition would constitute in effect a veto against any proposals
for financial aid to North Korea. Section 1621, however, does not require the United
States to oppose North Korean membership in the IMF and World Bank. North
Korean membership is the near term goal of the South Korean government, which
views this as an initial step toward financial aid.
P.L. 109-58, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 prohibits the export, re-export,
transfer or retransfer of U.S. nuclear materials and technologies to any country
identified by the Secretary of State as a sponsor of terrorism. This provision, in
Section 632 of the Act, was authored specifically to foreclose the possibility of
civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and North Korea, either
directly or through third countries that have access to U.S. nuclear technology.37
Nations Not Fully Cooperating Category
The DPRK also remains on a list (required by P.L. 104-132), which prohibits,
absent a presidential waiver, the sale of arms to nations not fully cooperating with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.38
Adding and Removing Countries on the List
In late January each year, under the provisions of Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation
36 (...continued)
executive branch as well as the subject of informal consultations with Congress.
37 Letter from Representative Edward J. Markey to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
October 3, 2007. Representative Markey was a principle author of Section 632.
38 Periodically, discussions have been held under differing administrations to provide for
graduated sanctions within this category to make it a more effective tool, but no substantive
action, to date, has been taken on this issue. Note that P.L. 104-132 also requires the
withholding of foreign assistance to nations providing lethal military aid to countries on the
list of state sponsors.

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CRS-12
with the Secretary of State, provides Congress with a list of countries supporting
terrorism. Compilation of the list is the result of an ongoing process. Throughout
the year the Department of State gathers data on terrorist activity worldwide, and then
beginning about November, the list is formally reviewed. Each new determination
under Section 6(j) of the act must also be published in the Federal Register.
Congressional report language provides guidelines for designation. A House
Foreign Affairs Committee report approving the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export
Amendments Act of 1989 (H.Rept. 101-296) included as criteria (1) allowing
territory to be used as a sanctuary; (2) furnishing lethal substances to
individuals/groups with the likelihood that they will be used for terrorism; (3)
providing logistical support to terrorists/groups; (4) providing safe haven or
headquarters for terrorists/organizations; (5) planning, directing, training or assisting
in the execution of terrorist activities; (6) providing direct or indirect financial
support for terrorist activities; and (7) providing diplomatic facilities such as support
or documentation to aid or abet terrorist activities. A Senate report had similar
criteria (S.Rept. 101-173).
Paragraph 6(j)(4) of the Export Administration Act prohibits removing a country
from the list unless the President first submits a report to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, and Foreign Relations. When a government changes (i.e., a government is
significantly different from that in power at the time of the last determination), the
President’s report, submitted before the proposed rescission would take effect, must
certify that (1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of
the government of the country concerned (an actual change of government as a result
of an election, coup, or some other means); (2) the new government is not supporting
acts of international terrorism; and (3) the new government has provided assurances
that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
When the same government is in power, the current situation with North Korea,
the President’s report — submitted at least 45 days before the proposed rescission
would take effect — must justify the rescission and certify that (1) the government
concerned has not provided support for international terrorism during the preceding
six-month period; and (2) the government concerned has provided assurances that it
will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Congress can let the
President’s action take effect, or pass legislation to block it, the latter most likely
over the President’s veto. Since enactment of this procedure in 1989, the Bush
Administration has removed two countries from the list of state sponsors of terrorism
— Libya and Iraq. The Administration has stated that in the case of North Korea, it
will adhere to the legal requirement of providing Congress with a 45-day notice
before removal that would include the required certification.39
Congress has passed several resolutions on North Korean support for terrorism
since 2005. In January 2005, the entire Illinois delegation in Congress sent a letter
to North Korea’s United Nations Ambassador demanding information on the
39 Letter from Jeffrey T. Bergner, State Department, Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs to Representative Edward J. Markey, November 6, 2007.

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CRS-13
Reverend Kim Dong-shik, who was kidnapped by North Korean agents in China in
2000. The Illinois delegation stated that it would oppose removing North Korea from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism until his fate is resolved. H.R. 3650, a bill
introduced in the House of Representatives in September 2007 with 27 sponsors as
of December 10, 2007, would continue to designate North Korea as a state sponsor
of terrorism until North Korea met a number of conditions related to cessation of
nuclear and missile proliferation, arms and training to terrorist groups, the
counterfeiting of U.S. currency; and the release of kidnapped Japanese and Kim
Dong-shik and South Korean prisoners of war from the Korean War.
A complex challenge facing those charged with compiling and maintaining the
list is the degree to which diminution of hard evidence of a government’s active
involvement indicates a real change in behavior, particularly when a past history of
active support or use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy has been well
established. For example, Iraq, which was removed in 1982, was again placed on the
list in 1990, to be again removed in 2004. Some observers suggest that one reason
that countries have not been dropped from the list is the reluctance of the executive
branch to confront Congress on the issue.
Rationale and Background for
DPRK Retention on the Two Lists
North Korea was added to the “official” list of countries supporting terrorism
because of its implication in the bombing of a South Korean airliner on November
29, 1987, which killed 115 persons. According to the State Department, North Korea
has not been conclusively linked to any terrorist acts since 1987. A North Korean
spokesman in 1993 condemned all forms of terrorism, and said his country resolutely
opposed the encouragement and support of terrorism. A similar statement was made
in November 1995 and again in 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Country Reports, 2006, continues to contain language that could be used to
justify retention of the DPRK on the list of state supporters of terror:
... The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who
participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to
seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have
been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated
to Japan since 2002....”40
Using language similar to the 2006 Report, Country Reports, 2005, in a brief
two-paragraph section on North Korea states that:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have
sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in
1987.
40 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm] (p. 147 of the published version).

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CRS-14
Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and
in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions
about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations
between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what
it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had
reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s
end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from
locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485
civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War. Four
Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement
in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in
2004.41
Perhaps most revealing of United States’ policy rationale for keeping nations
such as North Korea on the terrorism list is text contained in the “State Sponsors Of
Terror Overview” section of Country Reports, 2005, and partially reprinted in
Country Reports, 2006. Prominently mentioned are two factors: (1) maintaining ties
to terrorist groups and (2) “the capability to manufacture WMD and other
destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists.”
Libya and Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global
war on terror. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, however, continued to
maintain their ties to terrorist groups. Iran and Syria routinely provide unique
safe haven, substantial resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.
State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups.
Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty
obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan
and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also
have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies
that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist
that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups. [Emphasis and
italics added]42
North Korea Previously Cited for Possible Removal

In its “Introduction,” the Patterns 1999 report cites North Korea as a possible
candidate for removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Patterns 1999
report states:
The designation of state sponsors is not permanent, however. In fact, a primary
focus of U.S. counterterrorist policy is to move state sponsors off the list by
delineating clearly what steps these countries must take to end their support for
terrorism and by urging them to take these steps ...There have been some
encouraging signs recently suggesting that some countries are considering taking
41 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm], p. 175.
42 Country Reports, 2005, p. 171, at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm] and
Country Reports, 2006, p. 145, at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm]. The
italicized text appears identically in Country Reports for both 2005 and 2006.

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CRS-15
steps to distance themselves from terrorism. North Korea has made some
positive statements condemning terrorism in all its forms. We have outlined
clearly to the Government of North Korea the steps it must take to be removed
from the list, all of which are consistent with its stated policies.
The report states that “if a state sponsor meets the criteria for being dropped
from the terrorism list, it will be removed — notwithstanding other differences we
may have with a country’s other policies and actions.”
In June 15, 2000, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Michael Sheehan, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testified
that
We need to take into account all relevant considerations in connection with
moving states onto or off of the list, and we also need to explore whether it
would be appropriate in any cases to identify states as “not fully cooperating”
rather than as state sponsors of terrorism if doing so was warranted by the facts
and would advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives ... I have been considering
what intermediate steps could be taken to give state sponsors a clearer look at
how they might “graduate” off the list. It may be possible that in appropriate
cases state sponsors could step off the state sponsor list and be left only on the
“not fully cooperating” list, with an eye towards stepping off of that list when
they fully cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
Similarly, in July 12 testimony before the House International Relations
Committee, Ambassador Sheehan confirmed that his earlier statements were intended
as a clear signal to terrorist supporting countries that the United States would
consider taking them off the list if they take the necessary steps to cease their support
for terrorism.
Prospects for Removal Are Set Back
Patterns 2000, issued in 2001 under the new Bush Administration, changed the
tone. It does state that “the Department of State is engaged in ongoing discussion
with North Korea and Sudan with the object of getting those governments completely
out of the terrorism business and off the terrorism list.” It cites the North Korean
statement in the U.S.-North Korean joint statement of October 12, 2000, in which
“the DPRK reiterated its opposition to terrorism and agreed to support international
actions against such activity.” However, as stated previously, Patterns 2000 was
more specific in citing evidence of North Korean support of other terrorist groups,
particularly in the Philippines. The report also asserts that “the US has a long
memory and will not simply expunge a terrorist’s record because time has passed.”
Patterns 2001 and Patterns 2002, arguably, softened language to designed to
provide a rationale for retaining the DPRK on the terror list. For example, Patterns
2002, although noting that “Pyongyang continued to sell ballistic missile technology
to countries designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, including
Syria and Libya”, concluded with the statement that “North Korea is a party to six of

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CRS-16
the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.”43 Contrast
such language to Patterns 2003: “Although it is a party to six international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken any
substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat international terrorism. [italics
provided]”44
Patterns 2003, which covers the year North Korea was designated a member of
the “axis of evil” by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address, appears
to take a somewhat more confrontational position.45 The 2003 report begins with text
to the effect that the DPRK is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since
1987. The report notes, however, that North Korea continued to give sanctuary to
hijackers affiliated with the Japanese Red Army. Although Patterns 2003 arguably
indicates that North Korea’s support for international terrorism appears limited at
present, it offers no promising language to suggest that DPRK removal from the
terrorism list may occur anytime soon.
Country Reports, 2004, again offers no promising language to suggest that
DPRK removal from the terrorism list may occur anytime soon, but notes what can
be interpreted as progress in resolving the issue of kidnapped Japanese citizens.
Again restated is language to the effect that the DPRK is “not known” to have
sponsored any acts of terrorism since 1987. Pyongyang, however, is cited for lack
of “substantial steps” in co-operating in efforts to combat international terrorism,
although it has signed six international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have
sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in
1987.
At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in Pyongyang in September
2002, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il acknowledged the
involvement of DPRK “special institutions” in the kidnapping of Japanese
citizens and said that those responsible had already been punished. Pyongyang
in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of
43 Patterns 2002, p. 81. On the other hand, the section covering North Korea begins with text
characterizing the DPRK’s response to international efforts to combat terrorism as
“disappointing throughout 2002.”
44 Patterns 2003, p. 92.
45 See text in preceding paragraph regarding lack of international cooperation. Note that
arguably, a factor that may affect whether the DPRK is removed from the terrorism list is
whether any other nations — notably Libya and possibly Sudan — are removed first. In
the wake of one or two successful cases of removal, a political climate may well be created
that is less risk adverse to chancing removal of a third state. Conversely, removing the
DPRK from the list prior to removing other nations would arguably create a climate more
favorably disposed to removal of additional states as well. In the past, the list has been
subject to criticism that it is governed by political criteria not necessarily connected to a
nation’s level of support for terrorism. See CRS Report RL32417, The Department of States
Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Related Issues, by
Raphael Perl.

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CRS-17
eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the
fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan
and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as
the remains of two Japanese abductees whom the North had reported as having
died in North Korea. Subsequent DNA testing in Japan indicated that the remains
were not those of Megumi Yokota or Kaoru Matsuki, as Pyongyang had claimed,
and the issue remained contentious at year’s end. Four Japanese Red Army
members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in
1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.
Although it is a party to six international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to
combat international terrorism.46
Process for Removal Moves Forward
In a dramatic shift in U.S. position regarding DPRK removal from the terrorist
list, Country Reports, 2006, clearly states that the United States has agreed to begin
the process of removing the DPRK from the list of state supporters of terror:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have
sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in
1987. The DPRK continued to harbor four Japanese Red Army members who
participated in a jet hijacking in 1970. The Japanese government continued to
seek a full accounting of the fate of the 12 Japanese nationals believed to have
been abducted by DPRK state entities; five such abductees have been repatriated
to Japan since 2002. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions Agreement, the
United States agreed to “begin the process of removing the designation of
the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism.” [Emphasis added]47
The Country Reports, 2006, reflected the new Rice-Hill strategy of linking
removal of North Korea to fulfillment of the February 2007 nuclear agreement.
While it mentions the Japanese kidnapping issue, there is less discussion of it than
in prior reports. Moreover, it did not describe progress or a settlement of the
kidnapping issue as a condition for North Korea’s removal.
New Reports of Support of Terrorist Groups
The State Department’s long-standing claim that North Korea “was not known
to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987” was particularly important in 2007
in view of the clear goal of the Rice-Hill strategy to remove North Korea from the list
of state sponsors of terrorism. However, questions about the credibility of the claim
are relevant in view of the appearance of reports from reputable sources that North
Korea has provided arms and possibly training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the
46 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c14813.htm], p. 90 of the full pdf file, or the “North
Korea” section at the end of Chapter 5 — Country Reports B.
47 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm] (p. 147 of the published version).

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CRS-18
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers are two of the most
active terrorist groups on the U.S. list of international terrorist groups.
In September 2006, Paris Intelligence Online, a French internet publication
specializing in political and economic intelligence, published details of an extensive
program by North Korea to provide arms and training to Hezbollah.48 It described
Iran as the facilitator of the North Korea-Hezbollah relationship. The program, it
said, began in the late 1980s with visits by top Hezbollah cadre to North Korea.
These visits involved training courses of several months run by the North Koreans.
After 2000, the program expanded with the dispatch of North Korean trainers to
Lebanon where they instructed Hezbollah cadre in the development of extensive
underground facilities for storing arms, food, and medical installations. This,
according to the report, significantly improved Hezbollah’s ability to fight the Israelis
during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.
Further indications of the North Korea-Hezbollah relationship appeared in the
South Korean newspaper, JoongAng Ilbo, in November 2007. The author of this
report was Professor Moon Chung-in, a professor at South Korea’s Yonsei
University.49 Professor Moon is an expert on Korean security issues and is a close
adviser to the South Korean government of President Roh Moo-hyun. This advisory
role has given him access to the U.S. government and other foreign governments. He
is well-known to American experts on Korean issues. Professor Moon cited Mossad,
the Israeli government’s main intelligence agency, as the source of an assessment that
“vital missile components” of Hezbollah missiles fired into Israel during the 2006
war came from North Korea. The missiles with North Korean components were
assembled in Iran and were transported to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria.
According to Professor Moon, the Mossad “partially blames North Korea” for the
effectiveness of Hezbollah’s missile strikes into Israel.
Reports of North Korean arms shipments to the Tamil Tigers appeared in the
Japanese newspaper, Sankei Shimbun, in September 2007.50 Two reports described
several North Korean attempts in late 2006 through the spring of 2007 to smuggle
conventional arms, including machine guns, automatic rifles, and anti-tank rocket
launchers, to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan navy intercepted and
attacked several North Korean ships carrying the arms. It sunk two of the vessels,
captured several North Korean crewmen, and seized some of the North Korean arms.
The Sri Lankan government filed an official protest with the North Korean
government. U.S. intelligence agencies, using spy satellites, may have conveyed
information about the North Korean ships to the Sri Lankan government, according
to the reports.
48 Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerrilla Force, Paris Intelligence Online, September 7,
2006. The publication is put out by the French Indigo Publications press group.
49 Moon Chung-in, The Syrian nuke connection, JoongAng Ilbo (internet version),
November 26, 2007.
50 Kubota Ruriko, DPRK plotted to export weapons to terrorist organ, Sankei Shimbun
(internet version), September 26, 2007. Kubota, Ruriko, Busting of DPRK arms smuggling
part of US psychological war aiming at weakening dictatorial regime, economic damage,
Sankei Shimbun (internet version), September 26, 2007.

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CRS-19
Policy Options
At this juncture in time, depending on North Korean actions yet to be
determined, Administration policymakers face a number of policy options, including
(1) downgrading the DPRK to the “not fully cooperating” category; (2) removing the
DPRK from both the “state sponsors” list and “not fully cooperating” lists, including
it instead in an informal “countries of concern” warning category; (3) relaxing further
sanctions against North Korea that can be done by presidential waiver; and (4) doing
nothing and retaining North Korea on both the “state sponsors” list and “not fully
cooperating” list.
If the Bush Administration continues to link removal of North Korea strictly
with progress on the nuclear issue, options 1 and 2 would fulfill the Administration’s
policy aim of prioritizing the nuclear issue in relations with North Korea. However,
delinking the Japanese kidnapping issue and not addressing the reports of North
Korean military support of Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers could damage the
integrity of the list of state sponsors of terrorism, damage U.S. relations with Japan,
and limit the ability of the United States to deal with what appears to have been into
2007 a rising level of North Korean support for international terrorist groups.

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