Order Code RL34275
How Long Can the Defense Department Finance
FY2008 Operations in Advance of Supplemental
Appropriations?
December 6, 2007
Amy Belasco, Stephen Daggett, and Pat Towell
Specialists in Defense Policy and Budgets
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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How Long Can the Defense Department Finance
FY2008 Operations in Advance of Supplemental
Appropriations?
Summary
The Department of Defense is currently financing both day-to-day peacetime
activities and overseas military operations in Iraq and elsewhere with funds
appropriated in the regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-116. That
measure provides $460 billion for the Defense Department to cover the costs of
baseline, non-war-related programs in FY2008. The Administration has also
requested $189.3 billion in FY2008 supplemental appropriations for the Department
of Defense to cover war-related costs. Congress has approved $16.8 billion of that
amount, all for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The remainder
has been held up pending debate over Iraq policy.
For the present, action on supplemental funding appears to be at an impasse. On
November 14, the House approved a bill, H.R. 4156, to provide $50 billion in
supplemental appropriations as a temporary “bridge fund” to cover war costs for part
of the year, with a requirement that the President begin withdrawing troops from Iraq.
The Senate rejected cloture on a motion to bring the bill up for debate, however, and
the White House has threatened a veto. There has been no action in Congress to date
on a full-year supplemental.
In the absence of supplemental appropriations, the Defense Department has said
that money for Army operations will run out in mid-February and for the Marine
Corps in March, even after a transfer of $4.1 billion from other accounts to sustain
Army operations. On November 15, Secretary of Defense Gates announced plans to
"cease operations at all Army bases by mid-February next year." This would result,
he said, in furloughs of 100,000 civilian and another 100,000 contractor personnel.
CRS calculates that money in the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act, together
with planned transfers, will sustain Army and Marine Corps operations about as long
as the Defense Department projects. The Defense Department may be able to extend
operations further by transferring limited additional amounts to the Army and Marine
Corps and by slowing down spending as the Army proposed last April. These
measures would, however, reduce remaining financial flexibility and may disrupt
day-to-day operations. Even with these steps, money will run out within several
weeks of mid-February for the Army and the end of March for the Marine Corps.
The Defense Department may be able to sustain operations longer by invoking the
Feed and Forage Act or by using novel, unprecedented measures, such as assigning
the Navy and Air Force to pay costs of Army operations abroad. Such measures may
weaken congressional war powers and erode congressional controls on the use of
funds.
This report reviews the status of funding for military operations in advance of
FY2008 supplemental appropriations. It will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
How Long Regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Will Last . . . . . . . . . . 1
Effects of H.R. 4156, a $50 Billion “Bridge Fund” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Alternatives for Extending Operations Longer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Transfer Additional Funds to the Army and Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Slow the Pace of Army and Marine Corps Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Invoke the Feed and Forage Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Use Unprecedented Title 10 Authorities to Assign Support Operations to
Other Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Pros and Cons of Measures to Extend Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
List of Tables
Table 1. Uses of the Feed and Forage Act Since FY1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

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How Long Can the Defense Department
Finance FY2008 Operations in Advance of
Supplemental Appropriations?
The Department of Defense is currently financing both the day-to-day peacetime
operation of U.S. military forces and overseas military operations in Iraq and
elsewhere with funds appropriated in the regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations
Act, P.L. 110-116. That measure provides $460 billion for the Defense Department
to cover the costs of baseline, non-war-related programs in FY2008. The
Administration has also requested $189.3 billion in FY2008 supplemental
appropriations for the Department of Defense to cover war-related costs. Congress
has approved $16.8 billion of that amount, all for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles. The remainder has been held up pending debate over Iraq policy.
For the present, action on supplemental funding appears to be at an impasse. On
November 14, the House approved a bill, H.R. 4156, to provide $50 billion in
supplemental appropriations as a temporary “bridge fund” to cover war costs for part
of the year, with a requirement that the President begin withdrawing troops from Iraq.
The Senate rejected cloture on a motion to bring the bill up for debate, however, and
the White House has threatened a veto. There has been no action in Congress to date
on a full-year supplemental.
How Long Regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Will Last
With enactment of supplemental appropriations in doubt, the immediate issue
has become how soon the Defense Department will have to rein in operations before
it runs out of money. At a press conference on November 15, Secretary of Defense
Gates warned that the Army would run out of money by the beginning of February,
and the Marine Corps some time in March, and he announced measures to limit
spending beginning almost immediately. “The least undesirable” option, he said,
would be to “cease operations at all Army bases by mid-February next year.” This
would result, he said, in furloughs of 100,000 civilian and another 100,000 contractor
personnel. Because some layoffs require 60 days advance notice, he said, the
Pentagon would have to begin sending notifications to personnel in December.1
In the same press conference, Secretary Gates said that the Defense Department
would take steps to extend Army and Marine Corps funding by “reprogramming” or
1 Department of Defense, "DoD News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Gates and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon Briefing Room,
Arlington, Va.," November 15, 2007 at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4089].

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CRS-2
“transferring” funds.2 On November 20, the Defense Department announced that it
was requesting approval from the congressional defense committees to transfer
$4.5 billion of funds from other accounts to the Army and to the Joint IED Defeat
Organization. The transfers, officials said, would extend Army operations for two
or three weeks.3
CRS calculations of the length of time the Army and Marine Corps can continue
to operate without additional funding are in line with Defense Department estimates.
At issue is how long money in Army and Marine Corps Operation and Maintenance
(O&M) accounts will last at projected obligation rates. The O&M accounts finance
a broad range of activities, including recruitment, training, transportation, clothing,
subsistence, fuel, facility operation and repair, and equipment maintenance. Funding
for Army and Marine Corps O&M supports both peacetime activities and war-related
operations.
For the first few months of the fiscal year, the Army appears to be planning
obligations of about $6.6 billion per month and the Marine Corps of about $800
million per month.4 The FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-116,
provides $27.4 billion in O&M for the Army and $4.8 billion for the Marine Corps.
At planned monthly obligation rates, therefore, the Army can operate with baseline
2 In general a “transfer” of funds is a shift of money from one appropriations account to
another. Because appropriations laws provide specific amounts for each account, a shift of
funds is permissible only to the extent Congress allows a transfer in statutory language. As
part of each appropriations bill, Congress usually specifies that a limited amount may be
transferred, subject to certain conditions. Section 8005 of the FY2008 Defense
Appropriations Act permits DOD to transfer up to $3.7 billion between accounts. This is
referred to as “General Transfer Authority” or “GTA.” In most agencies the term
“reprogramming” refers to shifts of funds within accounts, rather than a “transfer” between
accounts. The Defense Department, however, uses the term “reprogramming” to refer to all
shifts of funds, including those that involve a transfer between accounts. All transfers, along
with reprogramming actions over certain threshold amounts, also require advance approval
by the four congressional defense committees.
3 Department of Defense, “Reprogramming Action – Prior Approval,” Serial No. FY 08-02
PA, November 20, 2007. The proposal decreases Navy and Air Force personnel accounts
by $1.85 billion each, for a total of $3.7 billion, decreases cash balances in the Army
Working Capital Fund by $800 million, increases Army Operation and Maintenance funding
by $4,055.6 million, and increases the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund by
$444.4 million.
4 The Army budget reflects average funding of about $6.9 billion in O&M per month
through all of FY2008 to cover both peacetime and war-related operation, and the Marine
Corps budget an average of about $790 million per month. A rough way of estimating
monthly funding is to add the amount appropriated in the regular defense appropriations bill
to the amount requested for supplemental war-related activities, which equals the annual
total for O&M, and then to divide by twelve, which produces monthly average O&M
funding for each service. For Army O&M the calculation is $27.4 billion (FY2008 regular
appropriations) + $54.9 billion (amended FY2008 supplemental request) = $82.3 billion
(total annual O&M budget) ÷ 12 = $6.9 billion (average monthly Army O&M funding). For
the Marine Corps, the calculation is $4.8 billion (FY2008 regular appropriations) + $4.7
billion (amended FY2008 supplemental request) = $9.5 billion (total annual O&M budget)
÷ 12 = $0.8 billion (average monthly Marine Corps O&M funding).

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CRS-3
appropriations for about four months of the fiscal year (which began on in October
1, 2007) or until the beginning of February, and the Marine Corps can operate for
about six months, or until the end of March, consistent with Defense Department
estimates.
Effects of H.R. 4156, a $50 Billion “Bridge Fund”
The House-passed bridge fund, H.R. 4156, would provide $50 billion in
supplemental appropriations for FY2008. This is about one-fourth of the amount the
Administration has requested to cover DOD war costs for all of FY2008. Most of the
money in H.R. 4156, however, $37.5 billion, is for operation and maintenance, of
which $27.5 billion is for the Army and $2.4 billion is for the Marine Corps. The
Army O&M total is 50% of the $54.9 billion that the Administration requested in
FY2008 supplemental appropriations for Army operations abroad, and the Marine
Corps total is 52% of the $4.7 billion requested in FY2008 supplemental
appropriations for Marine Corps operations abroad. The additional money for the
Army would extend operations for about four months at the Army’s projected
monthly rate of obligations, or until about the end of May. The additional money for
the Marine Corps would extend operations for about three months at the projected
monthly rate of obligations, or until the end of June.
Alternatives for Extending Operations Longer
In the absence of a bridge fund, the Defense Department may be able to extend
Army and Marine Corps operations beyond February or March, either by adding
money from other sources to O&M accounts or by slowing the pace at which the
services are obligating funds. Barring extensive use of the Feed and Forage Act or
an unprecedented use of provisions of standing law that may allow other services to
pay for Army and Marine Corps operations (see below for a discussion) options
appear limited, and the services may be able to extend operations for an additional
month or two.
Alternatives for extending Army and Marine Corps operations include –
! Transfer limited additional amounts that may be available from cash
balances in working capital funds;
! Slow the pace of Army and Marine Corps obligations of funds, in
part by using means the Army considered in April 2007 and in part
by delaying depot maintenance funding;
! Invoke the Feed and Forage Act, which permits obligations of funds
in advance of appropriations, and for which there are extensive
precedents in the past 40 years; and finally,
! Consider using standing authorities for which there do not appear to
be precedents to limit Army and Marine Corps costs, such as the
authority in 10 USC 165 to assign support operations to other
services.
Each of these alternatives may extend operations for some time, but each has limits
and disadvantages as well.

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CRS-4
In the Army’s official view, moreover, all of these kinds of budget maneuvers
are detrimental. In a presentation at the Brookings Institution on December 4, Army
Chief of Staff George Casey complained about any kind of budgetary gamesmanship:
In general, as Chief of Staff of the Army, not having predictable, timely
funding makes it harder for me to do my job: to organize, train and equip
the Army. Every time you put something off or delay it or take some
measures to get another week's worth of funding for the operations and
maintenance account, it has second and third order effects that ricochet all
through the organization, that you don't find the results for two or three
months, and it just makes it harder.
The second thing is I think what's going on right now sends a terrible
signal to soldiers and families. We have nine brigades that are redeploying
from Iraq and Afghanistan right now after being gone for 15 months. They
started in September. They'll come in through January. The notion that
people are even discussing closing down or warm-basing their installations
just minimum essential tasks at a time when they're coming home from
being gone for 15 months is very difficult for them.5
Transfer Additional Funds to the Army and Marine Corps
The Defense Department may be able to transfer a limited amount of additional
money to extend Army and Marine Corps operations. DOD already plans, subject
to approval by the congressional defense committees, to transfer $3.7 billion of funds
from Air Force and Navy personnel accounts to the Army and to JIEDDO and to shift
$800 million of cash balances from working capital funds to the Army. The $3.7
billion transfer from the Air Force and the Navy exhausts the total amount of General
Transfer Authority provided by Section 8005 of the FY2008 Defense Appropriations
5 General George William Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army, "Maintaining Quality in
the Force: a Briefing by General George W. Casey, Jr.," Brookings Institution Transcript,
December 4, 2007, p. 33, on line at
[http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/1204_casey/20071204casey.pdf].
The military services have consistently been wary of budget maneuvers, including
Administration steps to use money from later in the year to finance operations at the start
of the year – a practice known as “cash flowing.” Disputes over the use of cash flowing for
the Iraq war began as early as January, 2004. The Administration decided not to request
FY2005 supplemental appropriations until after the start of calendar year 2005. When
senior service leaders expressed concern about that decision in congressional hearings, DOD
Comptroller Dov Zakheim called a press conference to defend the practice. See Department
of Defense, "Defense Department Special Briefing: Purpose Of Budget Supplementals,"
February 11, 2004, available on line at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2062]. Subsequently
Congress initiated the practice of providing part-of-the year bridge funding when it added
$25 billion in unrequested funds for war related expenses to the FY2005 Defense
Appropriations Act. Later, Congress provided an unrequested bridge fund of $50 billion in
FY2006. The Administration only began to request appropriations for a bridge fund in the
FY2007 budget.

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Act. Additional funds may be available for transfer, however, in cash balances of
working capital funds.
The transfer of excess cash balances in working capital funds is permitted by
Section 8008 of the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act.6 Working capital funds
are business-like activities of the Defense Department that are funded primarily
through revenues from sales to the military services. Some working capital fund
activities maintain inventories of products that they sell to the services. Others
provide industrial services, such as depot maintenance of equipment. The military
services use appropriated funds, mostly in the operation and maintenance accounts,
to make the purchases. Section 8008 allows the funds to maintain sufficient cash
balances to meet projected requirements for disbursements. Excess cash balances
may then be available for transfer to other accounts, including service operation and
maintenance accounts.
The amount of excess cash balances varies from fund to fund and from year to
year. So far, the Defense Department has tapped FY2008 excess cash balances twice.
The FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act used $628 million to offset Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Defense-Wide operation and maintenance accounts. And now the
Defense Department is using $800 million for the Army. So about $1.4 billion has
been used.
Pros and Cons. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has reported to congressional defense committees that DOD had as much
as $3.5 billion in excess cash balances in the working capital funds at the
start of FY2008.7 With $1.4 billion having been used, another $2 billion
or so may be available. To tap all of the remaining funds to finance Army
and Marine Corps O&M accounts would extend operations for a week or
two. It would also, however, further reduce DOD’s remaining financial
flexibility to respond to future developments, at least temporarily. DOD
has asked Congress to restore the $3.7 billion in transfers it requested on
November 20, and Congress has, in the past, agreed to forgive amounts
transferred because of delays in making supplemental appropriations.8
Slow the Pace of Army and Marine Corps Operations
To the extent that Army obligations of O&M funds can be reduced below about
$6.9 billion per month, and Marine Corps obligations below $790 million, the
services can operate longer with available funds. Last April, the Army planned a
series of increasingly restrictive limits on activities to be implemented if FY2007
6 Like Section 8005, Section 8008 is a recurring provision in annual defense appropriations
acts.
7 CRS calculation based on DOD data provided by GAO analyst by e-mail, November 30,
2007.
8 The Defense Department also opposed House and Senate use of excess cash balances in
the FY2008 defense appropriations bills – see Department of Defense, “Budget Appeal,
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill,” #RF-2, October 15, 2007. The appropriations
conference agreement rejected the appeal.

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CRS-6
supplemental appropriations were further delayed.9 The Army projected that these
measures could reduce obligations by as much as $3.6 billion over three months out
of FY2007 obligations of about $6 billion per month.10 The Army and Marine Corps
may also be able to defer some other funding by, for example, delaying orders for
depot maintenance of equipment, for which the Army plans average obligations of
about $400 million per month in FY2008 – i.e., about $1.6 billion over the first four
months of the year.
Pros and Cons. If implemented over the next four months, these
steps might reduce obligations by as much as $5 billion ($3.6 billion from
measures like those identified last April, plus $1.6 billion from deferring
depot maintenance), though less if they were pursued selectively. This is
enough for an additional three weeks or so of operations. Some of these
measures may be less disruptive to the day-to-day operations of the force
than others, particularly if undertaken on only a temporary basis. The
Army reportedly has a depot maintenance backlog of about 7 ½ months,
so there may be some room to defer new orders without disrupting depot
work flows.11 The measures that the Army planned in April, however,
included some steps that appeared likely to be quite disruptive to military
and civilian personnel, and to affect day to day facilities management and
equipment maintenance adversely. It is uncertain how reduced obligations
of funds would affect military readiness or how disruptive cuts would be
to facilities management, civilian and contractor employment, materiel
inventories, equipment orders to industry, DOD travel, or depot
maintenance workloads. Congress may wish to consider these matters
more fully through hearings and other means.
Defense Department officials have said that cuts such as those planned last
spring are not sufficient in the present circumstances because of greater
uncertainty about supplemental funding. In his November 20 press
briefing, DOD spokesman Geoff Morrell insisted that the issue was not
simply how to free up money to extend operations, but, rather, what steps
the Defense Department would have to take to shut down operations
almost completely in the absence of funding. “All that will happen on the
9 Army Memorandum, “Operation and Maintenance, Army Spending Restrictions Plan for
FY07,” April 14, 2007. The text of the Memorandum is available on line at
[http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0704armyspending.pdf]. See also, Army Press
Release”Funding Needs Prompt Army Spending Constraints,” April 16, 2007, at
[http://www.army.mil/-newsreleases/2007/04/16/2698-funding-needs-prompt-army-
spending-constraints/]. The Army Memorandum is also discussed in CRS Report RL33900,
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes,
by Stephen Daggett, Amy Belasco, Pat Towell, Susan B. Epstein, Connie Veillette, Curt
Tarnoff, Rhoda Margesson, and Bart Elias, updated July 2, 2007 – see subsection entitled
“Financing Army Operations Until Passage of the Supplemental.”
10 Army Budget Office, PowerPoint Slides entitled “Operation and Maintenance, Army
Spending Restrictions Will Extend Fund Availability” and “OMA FY07 Execution,” April
2007.
11 E-mail communication from GAO analyst, November 30, 2007.

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CRS-7
[military] bases,” he said, “is that the most basic security and safety
personnel – fire, police, and so forth – will be operating. Day care centers,
libraries, all of the additional benefits that are there for families living on
the base will cease to operate, because we will not have the funds to keep
them going.” The steps taken last spring, he explained, were designed to
extend operations on the assumption that Congress would provide
additional appropriations quite soon. Now, however, defense officials are
not coping with a delay in funding, but with a shut off of funds.12
Invoke the Feed and Forage Act
The Feed and Forage Act, 41 USC 11,13 is a long-standing law, with antecedents
from well before the Civil War,14 that gives the Defense Department authority to
finance some costs of military operations in advance of congressional appropriations.
In the past 40 years, the act has been used periodically to pay for unplanned military
contingencies and to sustain military operations when supplemental appropriations
have been delayed.
The Feed and Forage Act permits the Department of Defense to obligate funds
in advance of appropriations for “clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters,
transportation, or medical and hospital supplies.” Obligations may not, however,
“exceed the necessities of the current year.” These categories are broad enough to
encompass most activities financed in operation and maintenance accounts. The
“transportation” category, for example, has been interpreted to allow operation of
weapons engaged in combat, including aircraft carrying out bombing missions in
Southeast Asia, and funding of repairs of equipment, including purchases of spare
parts.15 The law does not, however, permit pay of uniformed personnel or purchases
of munitions or other weapons.
When queried about the use of the Feed and Forage Act, Pentagon spokesperson
Geoff Morrell all but dismissed its potential use except in extraordinary
circumstances –
“we have extraordinary measures that can be taken in the eventuality that
we find ourselves in a situation where we have no money – and no ability
12 Department of Defense, "DoD News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from
the Pentagon," November 20, 2007 at –
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4091].
13 It is also frequently cited as Revised Statute 3732. The “Feed and Forage Act” as codified
in 41 USC 11 is an express exception to the “Adequacy of Appropriations Act,” which states
that “No contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made, unless the same
is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment.”
14 Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985),
pp. 238-247. The author cites one precedent as early as 1799 – see p. 240.
15 CRS has prepared an extensive compilation of background material, much of it provided,
by the Department of Defense Comptroller, on uses of the Feed and Forage Act since 1960,
on its history, and on associated issues, including war powers. Congressional staff and
Members of Congress should contact Stephen Daggett at CRS for a copy.

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CRS-8
to move funds and we find ourselves with our men and women in uniform
in the theater potentially unfunded. But all that we would be able to do in
those circumstances is provide – is basically provide for their survival. It’s
a “Feed and Forage” provision. It dates back before the Civil War. And
it will allow us, really, just to provide for their feed and that’s it. So it’s
an extraordinarily desperate situation. We are not there yet. We are not
talking about invoking that yet.”16
The Feed and Forage Act has been used in the past in circumstances quite
similar to those today. It has been used, for instance, to sustain major military
operations, including combat operations in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and
transportation of personnel to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, when appropriated funds were not sufficient. Table 1 summarizes uses of the
Feed and Forage Act since 1960. As the table shows, when amounts are adjusted to
today’s prices, the Feed and Forage Act has been invoked to finance quite substantial
obligations of funds – in FY1968, for example, during the Vietnam War, when, in
FY2008 prices, $7.4 billion was used and in FY1991, for Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, when $2.6 billion was used.
Table 1. Uses of the Feed and Forage Act Since FY1960
(amounts in millions of current year and constant FY2008 dollars)
Current
Constant
Fiscal
Year
FY2008
Year
Dollars
Dollars
1962
Berlin Airlift
53
441
1966
Southeast Asia
277
1,943
Southeast Asia: Late enactment of supplemental
1968
appropriations
1,136
7,427
Southeast Asia: Late enactment of supplemental
1969
appropriations
4
23
1972
Southeast Asia
137
700
Escalating foreign currency rates: Late enactment
1978
of supplemental appropriations
80
252
1980
Middle East oil crisis
664
1,719
1991
Gulf War
1,642
2,562
1994
Haiti
126
185
1996
Saudi Arabia Khobar Towers*
–
–
2001
Terrorist Attacks of 9/11/01*
–
–
Source: Current year dollars figures from Department of Defense Comptroller, constant dollar totals
calculated by CRS using deflators from Department of Defense Comptroller.
*Note: The act was invoked in 1996 following the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and in
2001 just after the attacks of 9/11, but no funds were used.
16 Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from
the Pentagon,” November 20, 2007 at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript]. aspx?transcriptid=4091.

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Pros and Cons. The Feed and Forage Act gives the Department
of Defense considerable flexibility to mobilize funding for military
operations in the event of unexpected developments. The potential use of
substantial amounts to carry on combat operations, particularly if Congress
has denied or refused to act on funding for a war, may be of concern to
Congress because of its implications for congressional war powers,
including the power of the purse. During the Vietnam war, use of the Feed
and Forage Act ignited a vigorous debate over war powers issues. In 1973
Senators Mathias and Church sponsored hearings on the law, and in 1974
and 1975, Senator Abourezk proposed repealing the act because, he
argued, it eroded congressional authority.17 Use of the Feed and Forage
Act under current circumstances may warrant similar concerns. Unless
Congress were to enact language restricting funding for Iraq “in this or any
other act,” use of funding under the Feed and Forage Act would not appear
to be subject to any limitations.
The act has other has limitations as well. Significantly, while the act
permits the Defense Department to obligate funds (i.e., sign contracts or
hire civilian personnel), in DOD’s interpretation, it does not permit actual
expenditures (i.e., outlays) of funds without congressional appropriations.18
This would require contractors to agree, likely with some compensation,
to contracts that might delay actual payments. In effect, the law allows the
Defense Department to obligate Congress to provide what are known as
“deficiency appropriations,” which were quite frequently enacted up until
the 1950s, but have not been used often since then. The enactment of
deficiency appropriations may, however, be delayed.
Use Unprecedented Title 10 Authorities to Assign Support
Operations to Other Services
While the use of the Feed and Forage Act has an extensive history, there are
some other authorities in standing law that might be used to extend Army and Marine
Corps operations, but for which CRS is not aware of any precedents. One such
provision is 10 USC 165. Title 10 U.S. Code is the standing law that establishes the
Department of Defense and includes most of the statutory language that governs its
organization and operations. Section 165 ( c) specifically permits the Secretary of
Defense to assign responsibility for administration and support of forces assigned to
17 John P. MacKenzie, “Pentagon Use of 1861 Law Scored,” Washington Post, September
30, 1973, p. 4. Remarks of Senator Abourezk, Congressional Record, June 5, 1975, pp.
S17367-17369. Remarks of Senator Abourezk, Congressional Record, June 3, 1974, pp.
S9417-S9422. Congressional concern about the act was piqued particularly when
then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird asserted in congressional testimony that the Defense
Department could use authority of the "deficiency authorization legislation," meaning the
Feed and Forage Act, to continue military operations in Southeast Asia in the absence of
appropriations for the war – see MacKenzie article.
18 See, Department of Defense Comptroller, “Budget Execution Flexibility, FY2007,” at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/execution/Final_Budget_Execution.pdf], p. 19.

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combatant commands (including the Central Command responsible for operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan), to other components of the Defense Department. The term
“components” includes the active duty element of each military service, as well as
each of the reserve elements, as well as defense agencies. The full text of the
provision reads –
( c) Assignment of Responsibility to Other Components of DOD.— After
consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary
of Defense may assign the responsibility (or any part of the responsibility)
for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant
commands to other components of the Department of Defense (including
Defense Agencies and combatant commands). A component assigned such
a responsibility shall discharge that responsibility subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the
authority of commanders of the combatant commands under section 164
( c) of this title.
Pros and Cons. On its face, 10 USC 165 ( c) would appear to
allow the Defense Department considerable latitude to assign management
and budget responsibility to the Air Force and Navy for such support
activities as food and housing services handled by civilian contractors
under what are know as LOGCAP contracts, for which $6.2 billion is
requested in FY2008; contracts for linguists, for which $1.1 billion is
requested; subsistence for DOD civilians and contractors, for which $675
million is requested; or other war support activities. The Secretary also has
authority to detail civilian personnel from one service to another as part of
his general responsibility for managing the Department, so Army personnel
currently managing these contracts could be detailed to another service to
ensure continuity.19 Since Air Force and Navy O&M budgets are less
limited than Army and Marine Corps budgets, this would further extend
the amount of time the Army and Marine Corps could operate without
FY2008 supplemental funding. The FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act
provides $32.2 billion for Air Force O&M and $33.1 billion for Navy
O&M. If the Air Force and Navy were each assigned responsibility for $5
billion of activities currently handled by the Army, it would extend Army
operations by a month-and-a-half, while funding for Air Force and Navy
operations would be reduced by about two months.
Since the use of this provision is unprecedented, it is not known whether
a shift of responsibilities could quickly and efficiently be implemented.
Use of this authority might also be a matter of considerable concern to
Congress, since it would appear to undermine congressional limitations on
the use of funds. If the Navy can support Army operations with large
amounts of money, then the integrity of the account structure into which
Congress appropriates money is clearly at issue.
19 See Title 5, Section 3341 and Title 10, Sec. 113 (d).

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CRS-11
Pros and Cons of Measures to Extend Operations
The Defense Department has warned that money available to sustain Army and
Marine Corps operations will run out in February or March, and CRS calculations are
consistent with this projection. The Defense Department may be able to extend
military operations further by transferring limited additional amounts to the Army
and Marine Corps and by slowing down operations, but each alternative has some
disadvantages.
! Excess cash balances remaining in working capital funds might be
as high as $2 billion. Tapping these funds would, however, reduce
DOD’s remaining flexibility to respond to unexpected
developments.
! The Army projected that measures it planned to slow down
operations last April might, at the upper limit, avoid $3.6 billion or
so of obligations over three months. Some of these measures,
however, may disrupt day-to-day Army operations.
! Deferring new orders for depot maintenance might reduce planned
obligations by $400 million or so per month, or about $1.6 billion
over four months. CRS cannot, however, assess how this would
affect depot work planning.
Taken together, all of these measures might temporarily reduce or offset Army
and Marine Corps funding requirements by as much as $2 billion (use remaining
excess cash balances in working capital funds) + $3.6 billion (slow operations) +
$1.6 billion (defer new depot maintenance orders) = $7.2 billion, or about one
month's worth of funding at current obligation rates.
A potentially more significant source of funds may be to invoke the Feed and
Forage Act. In the past, it has been used to finance as much as $7.4 billion of
war-related operations in today's prices. That amount would finance Army and
Marine Corps operations for about another month. Operations might be sustained
longer if larger amounts were used. There may be some problems negotiating
contracts, however. And use of the Feed and Forage Act raises significant war
powers issues. For Congress to recommend use of the Feed and Forage Act appears
particularly ironic – it is, in a sense, to write the script for the Executive Branch to
evade legislative restrictions on the use of funds to carry on the war in Iraq.
The potential for DOD to use unprecedented measures, such as the flexibility
given to the Secretary of Defense to reassign responsibility for support activities to
other services, is particularly hard to assess. It might be difficult to administer, or it
might involve only paper changes that could be implemented quickly. It would
appear, however, to undermine congressional controls on the use of funds

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