Order Code RL32686
Afghanistan:
Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Updated December 6, 2007
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Summary
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant negative
factors in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years.
Afghan, U.S., and coalition efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy
cultivation and to disrupt corruption and narco-terrorist linkages succeeded in
reducing opium poppy cultivation in some areas during 2004 and 2005. However,
escalating violence, particularly in Helmand, and widespread corruption fueled a
surge in cultivation in 2006 and 2007, pushing opium output to all-time highs.
Cultivation has decreased in north-central Afghanistan and skyrocketed in the
southwest. In spite of ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, the United States,
and their partners, Afghanistan is now the source of 93% of the world’s illicit opium.
Across Afghanistan, militia commanders, criminal organizations, and corrupt
officials have exploited narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and patronage,
which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country’s fragile internal
security and the legitimacy of its embryonic democratic government. U.N. officials
estimated that in-country illicit revenue from the 2006 opium poppy crop reached
over $3 billion, sustaining fears that Afghanistan’s economic recovery continues to
be underwritten by drug profits. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to
provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue
to operate in and around Afghanistan, including the resurgent remnants of the Taliban
and some Al Qaeda operatives. Although coalition forces may be less frequently
relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many
observers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and elected
Afghan officials may create new political obstacles to further progress.
President Bush personally stated in February 2007 that narcotics are “a direct
threat to a free future for Afghanistan” and warned that, “the Taliban uses drug
money to buy weapons ... and they pay Afghans to take up arms against the
government.” Afghan president Hamid Karzai has identified the opium economy as
“the single greatest challenge to the long- term security, development, and effective
governance of Afghanistan.” In August 2007, the Administration unveiled plans to
strengthen counternarcotics efforts through a renewed focus on promoting rural
development, coordinating counterinsurgency and counternarcotics, and building
political will. Members of the 110th Congress may be asked to consider options for
further strengthening counternarcotics efforts. The Administration has requested
$1.54 billion in regular and supplemental counternarcotics assistance and related
defense funding for Afghanistan and surrounding countries for FY2007 and FY2008.
In addition to describing the structure of the Afghan narcotics trade, this report
provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade’s participants,
explores narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and international policy responses
since late 2001. The report also considers current policy debates regarding the
counternarcotics roles of the U.S. military, poppy eradication, alternative livelihoods,
and funding issues for Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major
developments. For more information on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Production Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Historical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Taliban Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-Taliban Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Farmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Land Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Traffickers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Narcotics and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Consumption Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Trafficking to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Regional Security Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The International Policy Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Institutions and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Strengthening Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Public Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Judicial Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Alternative Livelihood Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Defining the Role of the U.S. Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Equipment and Weaponry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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Redefining Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Manual or Aerial Herbicide-based Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Reauthorization of Defense Counternarcotics Activities . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Counternarcotics Funding FY2007 and FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Cited Field Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
List of Figures
Figure 1. Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1980-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1986-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2006-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets by Province,
FY2005-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding and Requests for Afghanistan,
FY2007-FY2008 ($ million) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 5. Defense Department Planned Use of FY2008 Appropriated and
Supplemental Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 6. State Department/USAID Foreign Operations FY2008 Request by
Program Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 7. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source,
FY2002-FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 8. United Kingdom Counternarcotics Funding 2005-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Introduction
In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade,
U.N. officials estimate that a record opium poppy crop was produced in Afghanistan
during the 2006-2007 season that supplied 93% of the world’s illicit opium.1
Afghan, U.S., and international officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation and
drug trafficking constitute serious strategic threats to the security and stability of
Afghanistan and jeopardize the success of post-9/11 counterterrorism and
reconstruction efforts. In light of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the
United States make a long-term commitment to the security and stability of
Afghanistan, counternarcotics policy has emerged as a focal point of recurring debate
in the Bush Administration and in Congress concerning the United States’ strategic
objectives in Afghanistan and the global war against terrorism.
Concerns include the role of U.S. military personnel in counternarcotics
activities and strategies for continuing the simultaneous pursuit of counterterrorism
and counternarcotics goals, which may be complicated by practical necessities and
emerging political realities. Coalition forces pursuing regional security and
counterterrorism objectives may rely on the cooperation of commanders, tribal
leaders, and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade. Similarly,
U.S. officials and many observers believe that the introduction of a democratic
system of government to Afghanistan has been accompanied by the election and
appointment of narcotics-associated individuals to positions of public office.
Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending
a highly-profitable enterprise that has become deeply interwoven with the economic,
political, and social fabric of a war-torn country. Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities are engaged in a campaign to reverse an unprecedented upsurge of opium
poppy cultivation and heroin production: they continue to implement a multifaceted
counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns, judicial reform
measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, drug interdiction
operations, and more robust poppy eradication. The Bush Administration and
Congress continue to consider options for upgrading U.S. support for
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in order to meet the challenges posed by the
Afghan opium economy to the security of Afghanistan and the international
community. Questions regarding the likely effectiveness, resource requirements, and
implications of new counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan are likely to arise
during the first session of the 110th Congress as such options continue to be debated.
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/Government of Afghanistan
Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), Afghan Opium Survey 2007 - Executive Summary.

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Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Opium production has become an entrenched negative element of Afghanistan’s
fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years in spite of ongoing local,
regional, and international efforts to reverse its growth. At the time of Afghanistan’s
pro-Communist coup in 1978, narcotics experts estimated that Afghan farmers
produced 300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually, enough to satisfy most local and
regional demand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities whose
products were bound for Western Europe.2 Since the 1980s, a trend of increasing
opium poppy cultivation and opium production has unfolded during successive
periods of insurgency, civil war, fundamentalist government, and recently,
international engagement (Figures 1 and 2).
During the 2006-2007 poppy growing season, Afghanistan produced a world
record opium poppy crop that yielded 8,200 MT of illicit opium — an estimated 93%
of the world’s supply. This continued the significant reversal of the slight downward
trend in national poppy cultivation and opium output that occurred from 2004 to
2005. Afghan government and United Nations reporting finds that downward trends
continue in many northern provinces, while remote areas in eastern provinces and the
conflict-ridden southern provinces continue to provide growth opportunities for
traffickers and farmers. In relation to this trend, the United nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) concludes that “opium cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer
associated with poverty,” but rather, “is now closely linked to insurgency,” as the
Taliban have “started to extract from the drug economy resources for arms, logistics
and militia pay.”3
Narcotics experts describe Afghanistan’s opium economy as the backbone of
a multibillion dollar drug trade that stretches throughout Central and Southwest Asia
and supplies heroin to consumption markets in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and
the United States. Millions of Afghans remain involved with various aspects of the
opium trade, including farmers, laborers, traffickers, warlords, and government
officials. Some experts have warned that the consolidation of existing relationships
between these groups threatens to transform Afghanistan into a failed narco-state.
Current Production Statistics
According to the 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the UNODC
and the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN):
! Opium poppy cultivation took place in 21 Afghan provinces in
2006-2007 (see Figure 3). The land area under poppy cultivation
rose by 59% to 165,000 hectares in 2005-2006 (equal to 3.65% of
Afghanistan’s arable land). The increase was concentrated in
2 See Jonathan C. Randal, “Afghanistan’s Promised War on Opium,” Washington Post,
November 2, 1978, and Stuart Auerbach, “New Heroin Connection: Afghanistan and
Pakistan Supply West With Opium,” Washington Post, October 11, 1979.
3 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 - Executive Summary, pp. iv-v.

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CRS-3
conflict-ridden Helmand province, which produced over 69,000
hectares of poppy — 42% of the national total and an area greater
than or equivalent to the entire country’s poppy cultivation for most
of the 1980s and 1990s. The U.S. government estimates that
172,600 hectares were cultivated in 2006.
! The 2006-2007 opium poppy crop produced 8,200 MT of illicit
opium, a 34% increase from the prior season. Crop yields improved
15% due to better weather conditions. A range of accepted opium
to heroin conversion rates indicate that this year’s estimated opium
yield of 8,200 MT could produce 820 to 1160 MT of refined heroin.4
The U.S. government estimated that 5,644 MT of opium were
produced in 2005-2006.
! Approximately 509,000 Afghan families cultivated opium poppy in
2006-2007, a 64% increase from 2005 and equal to roughly 3.3
million people or 14.3% of the Afghan population. Over 500,000
laborers and an unknown number of traffickers, warlords, and
officials also participate.
! The estimated $1 billion farmgate value of Afghanistan’s 2006-2007
illicit opium harvest is equivalent in value to approximately 13% of
the country’s licit GDP. Trafficking proceeds may exceed $2 billion.
Many licit and emerging industries are financed or supported by
profits from narcotics trafficking.5
The 2007 UNODC/MCN report identifies insecurity and poor governance as the
major factors that fueled the large growth in poppy cultivation and opium production
during the 2005-2006 season. The report echoes previous assessments that
significant sustainable declines in opium poppy cultivation occurred in provinces and
districts that were economically integrated and politically stable and in those that
received alternative livelihood assistance and where effective eradication took place.
Other observers have pointed to the steady increase in opium production volume that
has occurred since late 2001 and argued that excess opium supply has reduced raw
opium price levels (Table 1) and may undercut price incentives for farmers to
cultivate poppy. Price levels have declined across Afghanistan as poppy cultivation
and opium production have increased since 2004.6
Note: The following figures display trends in poppy cultivation and opium
production in Afghanistan over the last 25-plusyears. The sharp declines in the 2000-
2001 growing season are related to the Taliban decision to ban opium poppy
cultivation. According to U.S. officials, opium trafficking continued unabated.
4 UNODC/Afghan Gov., Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, November 2004, pp. 105-7.
5 Edouard Martin and Steven Symansky, “Macroeconomic Impact of the Drug Economy and
Counter-Narcotics Efforts,” in Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd (eds.), Afghanistan’s
Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics
Policy, World Bank/UNODC, November 2006.
6 UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 - Executive Summary, September 2007.

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Figure 1. Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1980-2007
9000
8200
8000
7000
6100
6000
ons 5000
4600
T
4200 4100
tric 4000
3600
e
3300
3400
M
3100
2800 2700
3000
2300
2300 2200
2000 2000
2000
1600
1120 1200
875
1000
488
450
350
200
225
275
160
200
0
0
3
86
89
92
4
7
00
03
06
198 1981 1982 198 1984 1985 19
1987 1988 19
1990 1991 19
1993 199 1995 1996 199 1998 1999 20
2001 2002 20
2004 2005 20
2007
Year
Source: Graphic developed by CRS using UNODC/MCN data. One metric ton is equal to 2,200 pounds. U.S. government estimates placed 2006 opium production
at 5,644 metric tons. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under their control in 2001 but allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from
the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivation continued in areas under Northern Alliance control.

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Figure 2. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1986-2007
200000
193000
180000
165000
160000
140000
131000
120000
es
104000
ar 100000
91000
ct
e
82000
80000
H
80000
71000
74000
64000
58000
60000
51000
54000 57000 58000
49000
41000
40000
32000 34000
29000 25000
20000
8000
0
6
7
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 199
199
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Source: Graphic developed by CRS using UNODC/MCN data. One hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters. U.S. government estimates placed 2006 opium
cultivation at 172,600 hectares. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under their control in 2001, but allowed opium trafficking to continue and
profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivation continued in areas under Northern Alliance control.

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Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2006-2007
Source: Map from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 - Executive Summary.

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Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan
(regionally weighted fresh opium farmgatea price US$/kilogram)
2000
2001b
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Opium Price
$28
$301
$350
$283
$92
$102
$94
$86
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Surveys 2004-2007.
a. Farmgate price for fresh opium is the price paid to farmers for non-dried opium.
b. Dry opium prices skyrocketed to nearly $700/kg immediately following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and fell to $93/kg after U.S. airstrikes began.
Historical Development
During the more than two decades of occupation, foreign interference, and civil
war that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion, opium poppy cultivation and drug
trafficking served as central parts of Afghanistan’s war economy, providing revenue
to individuals and groups competing for power and an economic survival mechanism
to a growing segment of the impoverished population. In December 2001, Afghan
leaders participating in the Bonn conference that formed Afghanistan’s interim post-
Taliban government echoed pleas issued by their pro-Communist predecessors
decades earlier:7 They strongly urged that “the United Nations, the international
community, and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to
combat international terrorism, cultivation, and trafficking of illicit drugs and provide
Afghan farmers with financial, material and technical resources for alternative crop
production.”8 In spite of renewed efforts on the part of Afghan and international
authorities to combat opium poppy cultivation since the fall of the Taliban,
Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium.
Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy. Following the Soviet invasion
of 1979 and during the civil war that ensued in the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal, opium poppy cultivation expanded in parallel with the gradual collapse
of state authority across Afghanistan. As the country’s formal economy succumbed
to violence and disorder, opium became one of the few available commodities
capable of both storing economic value and generating revenue for local
administration and military supplies. Some anti-Soviet mujahideen commanders
encouraged and taxed opium poppy cultivation and drug shipments, and, in some
instances, participated in the narcotics trade directly as a means of both economic
survival and military financing.9 Elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
7 In 1978, pro-Communist Afghan officials reportedly requested “a lot of assistance from
abroad, especially economic help, to help replace farmers’ incomes derived from opium
poppy cultivation.” Randal, Washington Post, November 2, 1978.
8 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions [The Bonn Agreement], December 5, 2001.
9 See Arthur Bonner, “Afghan Rebel’s Victory Garden: Opium,” New York Times, June 18,
1986, and Mary Thornton, “Sales of Opium Reportedly Fund Afghan Rebels,” Washington
(continued...)

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CRS-8
(ISI) agency and Afghan rebel commanders to which the ISI channeled U.S. funding
and weaponry are also alleged to have participated in the Afghan narcotics trade
during the Soviet occupation and its aftermath, including in the production and
trafficking of refined heroin to U.S. and European markets.10 After the withdrawal
of Soviet troops and a drop in U.S. and Soviet funding, opium poppy cultivation,
drug trafficking, and other criminal activities increasingly provided local leaders and
military commanders with a means of supporting their operations and establishing
political influence in the areas they controlled.
Taliban Era. The centralization of authority under the Taliban movement
during the mid-to-late 1990s further fueled Afghan opium poppy cultivation and
narcotic production, as Taliban officials coopted their military opponents with
promises of permissive cultivation policies and mirrored the practices of their
warlord predecessors by collecting tax revenue and profits on the growing output.11
In 1999, Afghanistan produced a peak of over 4500 MT of raw opium, which led to
growing international pressure from states whose populations were consuming the
end products of a seemingly endless supply of Afghan drugs. In response, the
Taliban announced a ban on opium poppy cultivation in late 2000, but allowed the
opiate trade to continue, fueling speculation that the decision was designed to
contribute to their marginalized government’s campaign for international legitimacy.
Under the ban, opium poppy cultivation was reduced dramatically and overall opium
output fell to 185 MT, mainly because of continued cultivation and production in
areas under the control of Northern Alliance forces. Individual Northern Alliance
commanders also taxed opium production and transportation within their zones of
control and continued producing opium and trafficking heroin following the Taliban
prohibition.12 Although U.S. and international officials initially applauded the
Taliban policy shift, many experts now believe that the ban was designed to increase
the market price for and potential revenue from stocks of Afghan opium maintained
by the Taliban and its powerful trafficking allies within the country.13
9 (...continued)
Post, December 17, 1983.
10 See James Rupert and Steve Coll, “U.S. Declines to Probe Afghan Drug Trade: Rebels,
Pakistani Officers Implicated,” Washington Post, May 13, 1990; Jim Lobe, “Drugs: U.S.
Looks Other Way In Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Inter Press Service, May 18, 1990; John
F. Burns, “U.S. Cuts Off Arms to Afghan Faction,” New York Times, November 19, 1989;
Kathy Evans, “Money is the Drug,” The Guardian (UK), November 11, 1989; and Lawrence
Lifschultz, “Bush, Drugs and Pakistan: Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,” The Nation,
November 14, 1988.
11 The Taliban government collected an agricultural tax (approximately 10%, paid in kind),
known as ushr, and a traditional Islamic tithe known as zakat (variable percentages). The
Taliban also taxed opium traders and transport syndicates involved in the transportation of
opiates. UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 92, 127-8.
12 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 92.
13 In December 2001, then Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs Rand Beers stated that the Taliban had not banned opium cultivation
“out of kindness, but because they wanted to regulate the market: They simply produced too
much opium.” Marc Kaufman, “Surge in Afghan Poppy Crop Is Forecast,” Washington Post,
(continued...)

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CRS-9
Post-Taliban Resurgence. Following 9/11, Afghan farmers anticipated the
fall of the Taliban government and resumed cultivating opium poppy as U.S.-led
military operations began in October 2001. International efforts to rebuild
Afghanistan’s devastated society began with the organization of an interim
administration at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, and Afghan leaders
committed their new government to combat the resurgence of opium poppy
cultivation and requested international counternarcotics assistance from the United
States, the United Kingdom and others.14 The United Kingdom was designated the
lead nation for international counternarcotics assistance and policy in Afghanistan.
On January 17, 2002, the Afghan Interim Administration issued a ban on opium
poppy cultivation that was enforced with a limited eradication campaign in April
2002. In spite of these efforts, the 2001-2002 opium poppy crop produced over 3400
MT of opium, reestablishing Afghanistan as the world’s leading producer of illicit
opium. Since 2002, further government bans and stronger interdiction and eradication
efforts failed to reverse an overall trend of increasing opium poppy cultivation and
opium output, although year-on-year reductions occurred from 2004 to 2005.
Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Farmers, laborers, landowners, and traffickers each play roles in Afghanistan’s
opium economy. Ongoing field research indicates that the motives and methods of
each group vary considerably based on their geographic location, their respective
economic circumstances, their relationships with ethnic groups and external parties,
and prevailing political conditions.15 Studies suggest that profit is not the universal
motivating factor fueling opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan: opium trade field
researcher David Mansfield argues that the “great diversity in the socio-economic
groups involved in opium poppy in Afghanistan and the assets at their disposal”
ensures that “there is great disparity in the revenues that they can accrue from its
cultivation.”16 Household debt and land access needs also motivate opium poppy
cultivation. Cultivation patterns and motives vary from district to district.
Farmers. Field studies have identified several structural barriers that limit the
profitability of opium poppy cultivation for the average Afghan farmer. Many
Afghan farming households cultivate opium poppy in order to improve their access
to land, water, agricultural supplies, and credit — inputs that remain in short supply
13 (...continued)
December 25, 2001. See Table 1 and UNODC, Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 57.
14 The Bonn Agreement, December 5, 2001.
15 Analysis in this report relating to the motives and methods of Afghan farmers, land
owners, and traffickers is based on the findings of the UNODC’s “Strategic Studies” series
on Afghanistan’s opium economy and a series of commissioned development reports by
David Mansfield, the Aga Khan Foundation, Frank Kenefick and Larry Morgan, Adam Pain,
and others. UNODC Strategic Studies reports are available at [http://www.unodc.org/
pakistan/en/publications.html]. Complete citations are provided in Appendix A.
16 David Mansfield, “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and
Reality,” International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and
Cooperation, August 2001.

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CRS-10
in many of the rural areas where opium poppy is grown. Experts have identified high
levels of household debt as a powerful structural determinant of the continuation of
opium poppy cultivation among some Afghan farmers. An opium-for-credit system,
known as salaam, allows farmers to secure loans to buy necessary supplies and
provisions if they agree in advance to sell future opium harvests at rates as low as
half their expected market value. Crop failures that occurred as a result of a severe
four-year nationwide drought (1998-2001) reportedly caused many farming
households to accumulate large amounts of debt in the form of salaam loans based
on future cultivation of opium poppy. In some cases, the introduction of strict poppy
cultivation bans and crop eradication policies by the Taliban in 2001 and the Afghan
Interim Authority in 2002 and 2003 increased the debt levels of many Afghan
farmers by destroying opium crops that served as collateral for salaam arrangements.
Although the Afghan government issued a decree banning opium-based loans
and credit in April 2002, the 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey reported that salaam
lending had continued. Increased debt has led some farmers to mortgage land and
to agree to cultivate opium poppy in the future through sharecropping arrangements.
Other landless farmers have reportedly been forced to accept the crop selection
choices of landowners who control their access to land and water and who favor
opium poppy over other traditional crops. According to experts, this combination of
drought-induced debt, predatory traditional lending systems, and the unintended side-
effects from government cultivation bans and eradication programs has fueled opium
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey warned
that in areas where farmers carry high salaam and other loan debt, significant
decreases in opium poppy cultivation and associated revenue may be “potentially
problematic” and could have created “severe financial pressure on to farmers to
resume opium production [in 2006] in order not to default.”
Land Owners. Afghan land owners are better positioned to profit from opium
poppy cultivation because of the labor intensive nature of the opium production
process. Land owners who control vital opium cultivation inputs like land, water, and
fertilizers enjoy an economic advantage in the opium production cycle, which places
heavy demands on Afghanistan’s rural agricultural labor market during annual opium
poppy planting, maintenance, and harvesting seasons. Wealthy land owners secure
the services of skilled itinerant laborers to assist in the complex opium harvesting
process, which improves their crop yields and profits. Itinerant laborers, in turn,
contribute to the spread of opium cultivation expertise around Afghanistan.17
Although opium prices have fallen since reaching a peak of $350/kg in 2002, farmers
have experienced greater profit loss than land owners.18 Land owners also have
benefitted from consolidation of property related to rising debt levels among Afghan
farmers. Land valuation based on potential opium yields also benefits land owners.
Traffickers. International market prices for heroin and intermediate opiates
such as morphine ensure that individuals and groups engaged in the shipment and
distribution of refined opium products earn substantially higher profits than those
17 See UNODC, “An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy Cultivation to
New Districts in Afghanistan,” June 1998.
18 UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003,” p. 8.

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involved with cultivating and producing raw opium gum.19 According to the
UNODC, “most of the opium produced in Afghanistan is converted to heroin within
the country.”20 Although opium refining facilities that produce morphine base and
heroin traditionally have been located in tribal areas along the Afghan border with
Pakistan, the growth and spread of opium cultivation in recent years has led to a
corresponding proliferation of opiate processing facilities. The large proportion of
heroin in the composition of drugs seized in countries neighboring Afghanistan
reflects this proliferation and suggests that the profitability of opiate trafficking for
Afghan groups has increased significantly in recent years.
Although Afghan individuals and groups play a significant role in trafficking
opiates within Afghanistan and into surrounding countries, relatively few Afghans
have been identified as participants in the international narcotics trafficking
operations that bring finished opiate products such as heroin to Middle Eastern,
European, or North American consumer markets.21 Ethnic and tribal relationships
facilitate the opium trade within Afghanistan, while relationships between ethnic
Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, and Baluchi Afghans and their counterparts in Central Asia,
Pakistan, and Iran provide a basis for the organization and networking needed to
deliver Aghan opiates to regional markets and into the hands of international
trafficking organizations.22 Some observers argue that trafficking profits are a source
of economic and political instability and that interdiction and prosecution should
precede eradication efforts so that increased post-eradication opium prices do not
enrich trafficking groups further. Multilateral intelligence gathering and interdiction
operations have been initiated since 2001 and are described in further detail below.
Narcotics and Security
Experts and officials have identified three areas of concern about the potential
impact of the Afghan narcotics trade on the security of Afghanistan, the United
States, and the international community. Each is first summarized, and then more
fully developed below.
! Prospects for State Failure. Afghan, U.S., and international
officials have identified several correlations between the narcotics
trade and negative political and economic trends that undermine
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, establish the rule of law, and restore
a functioning and licit economy. These trends include corruption
and the existence of independent armed groups opposed to the
19 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 129-40, 165-8.
20 UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 - Executive Summary.
21 “The involvement of Afghan groups/individuals is basically limited to the opium
production, the trade of opium within Afghanistan, the transformation of some of the opium
into morphine and heroin, and to some extent, the trafficking of opiates to neighboring
countries.” UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 64.
22 See Tamara Makarenko, “Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience of
Networks,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1, 2002.

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Afghan government’s reform and counternarcotics agendas. Similar
drug-related trends threaten countries neighboring Afghanistan.
Political observers have warned that figures involved with the drug
trade have been elected or appointed to public office and may
oppose or undermine current and future counternarcotics initiatives.
! “Narco-Terrorism.” Afghan and U.S. officials believe that Taliban
insurgents and regional groups associated with Al Qaeda continue
to profit from Afghanistan’s burgeoning narcotics trade. Officials
also suspect that drug profits provide some Al Qaeda operatives with
financial and logistical support. U.S. officials believe that financial
and logistical relationships between narcotics traffickers, terrorists,
and criminal groups pose threats to the security of Afghanistan and
the wider international community.
! Consumption and Public Health. World health officials believe
that Afghan narcotics pose social and public health risks for
populations in Afghanistan, its neighbors, Russia, Western Europe,
and, to a limited extent, the United States. Increased use of Afghan
opiates has been closely associated with increased addiction and
HIV infection levels in heroin consumption markets.
Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan
Afghan authorities and international observers have identified negative trends
associated with the narcotics trade as barriers to the reestablishment of security, the
rule of law, and a legitimate economy throughout Afghanistan — goals that U.S. and
Afghan authorities have characterized as essential for the country’s long term
stability. In a September 2004 report on Afghanistan’s economic development, the
World Bank described these related trends as “a vicious circle” (Figure 4) that
constitute “a grave danger” to the “entire state-building and reconstruction agenda.”23
Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence. Anecdotal reporting
suggests that armed and well-financed trafficking groups may be encouraging Afghan
farmers to violently resist expanded drug interdiction and crop eradication efforts.
Opium production remains a source of revenue and patronage for some armed groups
and militia leaders seeking to maintain their power and influence over areas of the
country at the expense of the extension of national government authority.24 Although
much of the outright conflict between regional and factional militias that motivated
opium cultivation in the past has ended, long-established political and commercial
networks linking armed groups, landowning elites, transportation guilds, and drug
syndicates continue to constitute the foundation of the opium economy.
23 Testimony of Robert B. Charles, then-Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, House International Relations Committee,
September 23, 2004.
24 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 69, and Report of the
Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International
Peace and Security, August 12, 2004.

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Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan
Source: World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing
Poverty, Country Economic Report No. 29551-AF September 9, 2004, p. 87.
Fears of widespread violence are based in large part on patterns of clashes
between Afghan farmers and counternarcotics authorities seeking to eradicate crops.
Recent clashes have involved eradication teams that include U.S. officials and
advisers.25 In May 2006, fighting between the security detail for a government
eradication force and farmers during the destruction of opium crops in the northern
province of Sar-e Pol led to the death of two farmers and the wounding of nine
Afghan police. Afghan soldiers and police also were killed during 2005 by attackers
firing on government eradication forces in Uruzgan and Kandahar. These clashes
and attacks follow a pattern evident in previous years, in which eradication teams
employed by provincial authorities faced demonstrations, small arms fire, and mined
poppy fields.26
Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy. According to the
U.S. State Department’s 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) on Afghanistan, “drug-related corruption remains a problem, being
particularly pervasive at provincial and district government levels.” Although the
2006 report warned that President Karzai’s “ability to move vigorously against
corruption... is severely constrained by the practical political considerations of a
nascent central government,” the 2007 report details a number of steps taken by the
central government to begin a comprehensive anti-corruption program. In the past,
25 Jon Lee Anderson, “The Taliban’s Opium War,” New Yorker, Vol. 83:19, July 9, 2007.
26 The Afghan government’s Central Eradication Force reportedly was “rocketed by furious
villagers” during a 2004 eradication mission in Wardak province outside of Kabul. Reuters,
Pressure on Karzai as Afghan Drug Problem Worsens, October 5, 2004.

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Afghan counternarcotics officials have stated that “high government officials, police
commanders, governors are involved” in the drug trade and have identified “former
commanders and warlords who are still in power” serving as “district chiefs and local
police” as the main problem with regard to corruption.27
Government authorities and security forces in Afghanistan have accused each
other of involvement in opium production and trafficking, and militia commanders
have clashed over opium production and profits in various regions of the country,
threatening the country’s stability and the lives of civilians.28 Although most of
Afghanistan’s prominent political figures have publicly condemned the country’s
opium economy, some political figures and their powerful supporters are alleged to
have links with the trade or hold responsibility for areas of Afghanistan where opium
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking take place. Commanders under the control of
former cabinet members, former presidential candidates, and members of parliament
are alleged to participate in the opium trade.29
As the Afghan government develops stronger counternarcotics policies and
capabilities, groups that are involved with the opium trade may join others in seeking
to corrupt or subvert Afghanistan’s democratic process. With regard to the Afghan
parliament, some experts have argued that drug money may have financed the
campaigns of candidates, and at least one expert warned that “drug lords” were
candidates.30 High-level appointees also have been alleged to be involved in
narcotics trafficking. One frequently cited example is the former governor of
Helmand province, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, who was removed from office
after 9 metric tons of opium were found at his offices in June 2005.31 When asked
about the case later that year, President Karzai said, “We don’t need to have an
investigation on [Sher Mohammed]. We will remove him from his place and bring
him to do some other government work. Maybe he should become a senator or
something.”32 President Karzai appointed Akhundzada to Afghanistan’s House of
Elders (Senate equivalent) in December 2005. In June 2006, Akhundzada claimed
27 “Curbing Rampant Afghan Opium Trade Will Take Karzai Years,” Agence France-
Presse, December 5, 2004; and Pamela Constable, “A Poor Yield For Afghans’ War on
Drugs,” Washington Post, September 19, 2006.
28 See “7 Are Killed in a Clash of Afghan Militias,” New York Times, February 9, 2004.
29 See Victoria Burnett, “Outlook Uncertain: Can Afghanistan Take the Next Step to
Building a State?” Financial Times, August 19, 2004; Carol Harrington, “Ruthless Dostum
a Rival for Karzai,” Toronto Star, September 20, 2004; and Jurgen Dahlkamp, Susanne
Koelbl, and Georg Mascolo, (tr. Margot Bettauer Dembo), “Bundeswehr: Poppies, Rocks,
Shards of Trouble,” Der Spiegel [Germany], November 10, 2003.
30 Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,”
Boston Globe, October 20, 2004.
31 John Jennings, “Opium Crops Flourish in Afghanistan after U.S. Breaks Aid Promise,”
Reuters, July 4, 1991; Paul Watson, “Where Taliban Rules Again,” Los Angeles Times, June
24, 2006; and, DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy Statement Before the House Committee
on Armed Services, June 28, 2006.
32 Steve Kroft, “Afghanistan: Addicted to Heroin,” 60 Minutes (CBS), October 16, 2005.

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to have recruited several hundred armed tribesmen to combat the Taliban in Helmand
with financial support from the national government.33
Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery. Reports
continue to indicate that profits from Afghanistan’s opium trade may be
overwhelming efforts to reestablish a functioning, licit economy. According to the
UNODC/MCN 2006 opium survey, the value of the 2006 opium harvest, an
estimated $3 billion, was equal in value to 45% of the country’s licit GDP. The
World Bank reports that the opium economy has produced significant increases in
rural wages and income and remains a significant source of credit for low income
rural households. Opium profits fuel consumption of domestic products and support
imports of high value goods such as automobiles and appliances from abroad. Funds
from the drug trade are also a major source of investment for infrastructure
development projects, including major projects in “building construction, trade, and
transport.”34 In February 2005, the IMF warned that new counternarcotics efforts, if
successful, “could adversely affect GDP growth, the balance of payments, and
government revenue” by lowering drug income and weakening its support for
domestic consumption and taxed imports.35
Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism
Afghan, coalition, and U.S. officials believe that linkages between insurgents,
terrorists, and narcotics traffickers threaten the security of Afghanistan and the
international community. In addition to moving opiates, sophisticated drug
transportation and money laundering networks may also facilitate the movement of
wanted individuals and terrorist funds and support illicit trafficking in persons and
weapons. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2007 INCSR report, “Poppy
cultivation contributes to Taliban funding to include the taxing of poppy farmers by
the Taliban. In addition, some drug traffickers willingly finance insurgency activities
and provide money to buy weapons. Traffickers provide weapons, funding, and
personnel to the Taliban in exchange for the protection of drug trade routes, poppy
fields, and members of their organizations.” British officials refer to these
relationships as “alliances of convenience” based on the use of drug money to recruit
tribal “foot soldiers.”36 Table 2 describes linkages between groups involved in
terrorism and the drug trade as presented by State Department officials to Members
of Congress in 2004 and 2005.
33 Akhundzada: “I have raised 500 people and am working on their registration. The Finance
Ministry pays them $200 a month.” Simon Cameron-Moore, “Afghanistan Mulls Enlisting
Tribesmen Against Taliban,” Reuters, June 11, 2006.
34 World Bank, State Building..., p. 87.
35 International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 05/33 - Islamic State of
Afghanistan: 2004 Article IV Consultation and Second Review, February 2005.
36 United Kingdom Defense Secretary Des Browne, “Speech to the Royal United Services
Institute,” London, September 19, 2006.

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Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade
Are they telling farmers to grow
Afghan Extremists
Are they receiving money from the trade?
Do traffickers provide them with logistical support?
opium poppy?
Hizb-i Islami/ Gulbuddin
Almost Definitely: HIG commanders
Most Likely: HIG commanders involved in the drug
Probably: Afghan government
(HIG)a
involved in trafficking have led attacks on
trade may use those ties to facilitate weapons smuggling
officials say the Taliban encourage and
Coalition forces, and U.S. troops have raided
and money laundering.
in some instances force poppy
labs linked to the HIG.
cultivation. Existing State Department
estimates suggest other groups
Taliban
Almost Definitely: U.N. and Afghan
Most Likely: Major drug barons who supported the
interested in weakening the
officials report the group earns money from
Taliban when it was in power remain at large, and may
government in Kabul — like the HIG
trafficking and gets donations form drug
be moving people, equipment, and money on the
— may have followed suit.
lords.
group’s behalf.
Islamic Movement of
Probably: Uzbek officials have accused the
Probably: Members with drug ties may turn to
Possibly: No reports, and these groups
Uzbekistan (IMU)
group of involvement in the drug trade, and
traffickers for help crossing borders.
— as foreigners in Afghanistan —
its remnants in Afghanistan may turn to
may lack the moral and political
trafficking to raise funds.
authority needed to influence farmers’
planting decisions.
Al Qaedab
Possibly: Only scattered reports, but fighters
Probably: Traffickers stopped during December 2003
in Afghanistan may be engaged in low-level
in the Arabian Sea were linked to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda
— but still lucrative — drug deals.
may hire criminals in South Asia to transfer weapons,
explosives, money, and people through the region.
Source: Robert Charles, then-Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, April 1, 2004.
a. Hizb-i Islami’s leader — former anti-Soviet mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — is alleged to have been involved in the Afghan narcotics trade since the 1980s.
b. According to U.S. officials, senior Al Qaeda leaders considered and subsequently rejected the idea of becoming directly involved in managing and profiting from Afghan narcotics.
Ideological considerations and fear of increased vulnerability to intelligence and law enforcement reportedly were the predominant factors in their decision. Author interviews with
U.S. officials in Kabul, Afghanistan, January 2005.

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Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers. Afghan individuals serve as middlemen
between the groups described in Table 2 and narcotics producers and traffickers.
Press reports and U.S. officials have identified three prominent figures involved in
Afghanistan’s drug trade that reportedly have financed Taliban insurgents and some
low-level Al Qaeda operatives:
! Haji Bashir Noorzai is a former confidant of ousted Taliban leader
Mullah Omar who served as a military commander during the
Taliban era and was reportedly a “major financial supporter of the
Taliban.”37 In June 2004, the Bush Administration added Haji
Bashir Noorzai to the U.S. government’s drug kingpin list. In April
2005, Noorzai was arrested by DEA officials and charged with
conspiracy to import heroin into the United States over a 15-year
period. The indictment charges that Noorzai and his organization
“provided demolitions, weaponry, and manpower to the Taliban” in
return for “protection for its opium crops, heroin laboratories,
drug-transportation routes, and members and associates.”38
! Haji Baz Mohammed is an alleged drug organization leader from
the eastern province of Nangarhar who was transferred to the United
States in October 2005 to face charges of importing Afghan heroin
into the United States. According to his indictment, Mohammed’s
organization was “closely aligned with the Taliban” and “provided
financial support to the Taliban and other associated Islamic-
extremist organizations in Afghanistan” in return for protection.39
! Haji Juma Khan has been identified as an alleged drug lord and Al
Qaeda financier. In August 2004, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Robert
Charles told Time Magazine that Haji Juma Khan is “obviously very
tightly tied to the Taliban.” Afghan Counter Narcotics Directorate
chief Mirwais Yasini added that “there are central linkages among
Khan, Mullah Omar and [Osama] Bin Laden.”40
U.S. forces reportedly detained and released both Haji Juma Khan and Haji
Bashir Noorzai in late 2001 and early 2002. Press accounts state that Noorzai
voluntarily provided intelligence about his Taliban and Al Qaeda colleagues during
37 Liz Sly, “Opium Cash Fuels Terror, Experts Say,” Chicago Tribune, February 9, 2004;
John Fullerton, “Live and Let Live for Afghan Warlords, Drug Barons,” Reuters, February
5, 2002.
38 See U.S. v. Bashir Noorzai, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S1 05 Cr.
19, April 25, 2005.
39 See U.S. v. Baz Mohammed, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S14 03
Cr. 486 [DC], October 25, 2005.
40 Tim McGirk, “Terrorism’s Harvest,” Time Magazine [Asia], August 2, 2004.

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questioning at Kandahar’s airport prior to his release.41 DEA officials reportedly
were unable to question him at the time.42 Noorzai’s forces later surrendered a large
number of weapons to coalition and Afghan authorities and provided security for the
then-governor of Qandahar province Gul Agha Sherzai.43 Juma Khan remains at
large, and Defense Department officials indicate that U.S. military forces are not
directly pursuing major figures in the Afghan opium trade, although U.S., Afghan,
and coalition authorities continue to monitor and collect intelligence on their
activities and support Afghan authorities and their operations.44
Consumption Markets
Afghan opium presents significant public health and internal security challenges
to downstream markets where refined heroin and other opiates are consumed,
including the United States. Russia and Europe have been the main consumption
markets for Afghan opiates since the early 1990s, and estimates place Afghan opium
as the source of over 90% of the heroin that enters the United Kingdom and Western
Europe annually. Russian and European leaders have expressed concern over the
growth of Afghanistan’s opium trade as both a national security threat as well as a
threat to public health and safety.
Trafficking to the United States. Heroin originating in southwest Asia
(Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) “was the predominant form of heroin
available in the United States” from 1980 to 1987,45 and the DEA’s Heroin Signature
Program has indicated that southwest Asia-derived heroin currently constitutes up to
10% of the heroin available in the United States.46 Since the 1980s, several figures
involved in the Afghan drug trade have been convicted of trafficking illegal drugs,
including heroin, into the United States.47 Afghan and Pakistani nationals have been
indicted and convicted on heroin trafficking and money laundering charges in U.S.
courts as recently as April 2005. Since 2001, DEA and FBI investigators have
prosecuted several Afghan and Pakistani nationals in connection with heroin
41 Haji Bashir reportedly described his time with U.S. forces in the following terms: “I spent
my days and nights comfortably... I was like a guest, not a prisoner.” CBS Evening News,
“Newly Arrived US Army Soldiers Find it Difficult to Adjust...,” February 7, 2002.
42 Steve Inskeep, “Afghanistan’s Opium Trade,” National Public Radio, April 26, 2002.
43 See Mark Corcoran, “America’s Blind Eye,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
Foreign Correspondent, April 10, 2002.
44 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, November 12, 2004.
45 Drug Enforcement Agency, “The Availability of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United
States,” May 1996.
46 Drug Enforcement Agency, “Heroin Signature Program: 2002,” March 2004.
47 In 1985, the DEA developed evidence against a wealthy Afghan national alleged to have
been “involved in supplying Afghan rebels with weapons in exchange for heroin and
hashish, portions of which were eventually distributed in Western Europe and the United
States.” See Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control - Annual Report 1985,
December 19, 1986, p. 58; See U.S. v. Roeffen, et al. [U.S. District Court of New Jersey
(Trenton), 86-00013-01] and U.S. v. Wali [860 F.2d 588 (3d Cir.1988)].

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trafficking and money laundering charges, including members of Pakistan’s Afridi
clan.48 Officials have indicated that some of the individuals involved in these recent
cases may have relationships with Taliban insurgents and members of Al Qaeda.49
Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have been captured trafficking large quantities
of heroin and hashish and attempting to trade drugs for Stinger missiles.50
Russia. Afghan opiates have been a concern for Russian leaders since the
1980s, when Afghan drug dealers targeted Soviet troops and many Russian soldiers
returned from service in Afghanistan addicted to heroin.51 More recently, the Russian
government has expressed deep concern about “narco-terrorist” linkages that are
alleged to exist between Chechen rebel groups, their Islamist extremist allies, and
Caucasian criminal groups that traffic and distribute heroin in Russia. Since 1993,
HIV infection and heroin addiction rates have skyrocketed in Russia, and these trends
have been linked to the influx and growing use of Afghan opiates. These concerns
make the Afghan narcotics trade an issue of priority interest to Russian decision
makers, and motivate attention and initiative on the part of Russian security services
in the region. In response, Russian counternarcotics officials have been deployed to
Kabul.
Western Europe. In Europe, press outlets and public officials in several
countries have devoted significant attention to Afghanistan’s opium trade since the
1990s. In the United Kingdom, where British officials estimate that 90-95% of the
heroin that enters the country annually is derived from Afghan opium, the public
places a high priority on combating the Afghan opiate trade. In October 2001, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair cited the Taliban regime’s tolerance for opium cultivation
and heroin production as one justification for the United Kingdom’s involvement in
the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. Some British citizens and officials
have criticized the Blair Administration’s counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and
argued that more should be done to stem the flow of Afghan opiates in the future.52
The United Kingdom has served as the lead nation for international counternarcotics
efforts in Afghanistan, and British government officials assist Afghan
counternarcotics authorities in intelligence gathering and targeting operations for
interdiction and eradication. British defense officials have deployed 5,700 British
troops to participate in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
many of whom are serving in the key southern opium-producing province of
48 U.S. v. Afridi, et. al., [U.S. District Court of Maryland, (Baltimore), AW-03-0211].
49 Testimony of DEA Administrator Karen Tandy before the House International Relations
Committee, February 12, 2004.
50 James W. Crawley, “U.S. Warships Pinching Persian Gulf Drug Trade,” San Diego
Union-Tribune, February 9, 2004, and Tony Perry, “2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al
Qaeda Ally,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2004.
51 Defense Department officials report that steps are taken to educate U.S. troops serving in
Afghanistan about the dangers of narcotics use and to monitor and prevent drug use.
Testimony of Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director of Strategic Plans (J-5), Before the House
International Relations Committee, September 23, 2004.
52 House of Commons (UK) - Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report, July 21, 2004.

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Helmand, where their mission includes efforts to support counternarcotics operations.
Regional Security Implications
Afghanistan’s opiate trade presents a range of policy challenges for
Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly for the Central Asian republics of the former
Soviet Union. As a security issue, regional governments face the challenge of
securing their borders and populations against the inflow of Afghan narcotics and
infiltration by armed trafficking and terrorist groups. Regional terrorist organizations
and international criminal syndicates that move Afghan opiates throughout the region
have been linked to insecurity, corruption, and violence in several countries.53 As a
public health issue, Afghan narcotics have contributed to a dramatic upsurge in opiate
use and addiction rates in countries neighboring Afghanistan, a factor that also has
been linked to dramatic increases in HIV infection rates in many of Afghanistan’s
neighbors. According to the UNODC, by 2001, “Afghan opiates represented: almost
100% of the illicit opiates consumed in ... Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the Russian
Federation.”54 With the exception of Turkey, intravenous use of Afghan opiates is
the dominant driver of growing HIV infection rates in each of these countries.55
These destabilizing factors could provide a powerful pretext for increased attention
to and possible intervention in Afghan affairs on the part of regional powers such as
Iran and Pakistan.
Central Asia.56 The emergence of the so-called “Northern Route” of opiate
trafficking through Central Asia and the Caucasus in the mid-1990s transformed the
region’s previously small and relatively self-contained opiate market into the center
of global opium and heroin trafficking. Ineffective border control, civil war, and
corruption facilitated this trend, and opiate trafficking and use in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan now pose significant security and public
health threats to those countries. U.S. officials have implicated the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan in the regional drug trade, as well as well-organized and heavily armed
criminal syndicates that threaten U.S. interests.
53 See Tamara Makarenko, “Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug Trade,” Harvard Asia
Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 3 (Summer 2002); and, Integrated Regional Information Networks
(IRIN) Report, “Central Asia: Regional Impact of the Afghan Heroin Trade,” U.N. Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), August 2004.
54 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 33, 35.
55 For more information, see the World Health Organization’s Epidemiological Fact Sheets
on HIV/AIDS at [http://www.who.int/GlobalAtlas/PDFFactory/HIV/index.asp], and Julie
Stachowiak and Chris Beyrer, “HIV Follows Heroin Trafficking Routes,” Open Society
Institute - Central Eurasia Project.
56 For more on Central Asian security and public health, including information on narcotics
trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism see CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s
Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol and CRS Report
RL30970, Health in Russia and Other Soviet Successor States: Context and Issues for
Congress, also by Jim Nichol.

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Tajikistan has emerged as the primary transit point for Afghan opiates entering
Central Asia and being trafficked beyond. From 1998 to 2003, Tajikistan’s Drug
Control Agency seized 30 MT of drugs and narcotics, including 16 MT of heroin.
U.N. authorities estimate that the European street value of the 5,600 kg of heroin
seized by Tajik authorities in 2003 was over $3 billion.57 The 201st Russian Army
Division stationed troops along the Afghan-Tajik border to disrupt the activities of
criminals, narcotics traffickers, and terrorist groups from 1993 through late 2004.
Tajik and Russian authorities completed efforts to replace these Russian military
forces with Tajik border security guards in August 2005. Russian counternarcotics
officials have reported increases in narcotics smuggling via the Tajik-Afghan border
following the replacement of the Russian border guards. Tajik officials deny the
claims and have announced large-scale seizures since the handover.58 In January
2005, Russian press sources reported that Russian border guards seized 2.5 MT of
heroin on the Tajik-Afghan border in 2004. A Russian-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization interdiction effort known as Channel-2005 seized close to 9 MT of
drugs in 2005, including over 200 kg of heroin.59
Pakistan. According to the State Department’s 2007 INCSR, Pakistan
“remains a significant transit country” for Afghan opiates, and Pakistani narcotics
traffickers “are an important source of financing to the poor farmers of Afghanistan.”
Trafficking groups routinely use western areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as staging
areas for the movement of opiates into and through Iran. Efforts to control the
narcotics trade in Pakistan have historically been complicated by the government’s
limited ability to assert authority over autonomous tribal zones, although recent
cooperative border security efforts with the United States have increased the presence
of government authorities in these regions and improved opium seizures by 61% in
2005. The Pakistani government’s efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation and
heroin production since 2001 have been moderately successful; however, drug usage
remains relatively high among some elements of Pakistani society. In March 2003,
former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain told a House International
Relations Committee panel that the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
agency in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 had been “substantial.”60 The 2006
INCSR stated that “as a matter of policy, neither the government of Pakistan nor any
of its senior officials encourages or facilitates” narcotics trafficking, although the
report also stated that corruption “is likely to be associated with the movement of
large quantities of narcotics and pre-cursor chemicals.”
57 IRIN Report, “Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide,” OCHA, September 13, 2004.
Available at [http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/opium/regTaj.asp].
58 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, “Russia,”
March 2006.
59 Moscow Interfax, “Russia Says Around 9 Tonnes of Afghan Drugs Seized in International
Operation,” November 13, 2005. FBIS Document CEP20051113029009.
60 Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain, “Transcript: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee,” Federal News Service, March
20, 2003. See also, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 120-2, and
Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 197-8.
See also Rubin, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and
the Middle East and Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 7, 1990.

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CRS-22
Iran. Narcotics trafficking and use continue to present serious security and
public health risks to Iran, which, according to the State Department, serves as the
transit route for 60% of the opiates smuggled from Afghanistan. According to the
2007 INCSR, Iran claims that over 3,500 Iranian security personnel have been killed
in clashes with heavily-armed narcotics trafficking groups over the last twenty years,
and 67% of HIV infections in Iran are related to intravenous drug use by some of the
country’s more than 3 million estimated opiate users. Iran’s interdiction efforts along
its eastern borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan are widely credited with forcing
opiate traffickers to establish and maintain the “Northern Route” through Central
Asia. According to the State Department, Iranian officials seized 199 MT of opiates
in the first seven months of 2005.
The 2007 INCSR cites “overwhelming evidence of Iran’s strong commitment”
to counternarcotics programs, including interdiction and demand reduction.
Although the absence of bilateral diplomatic relations prevents the United States
from directly supporting counternarcotics initiatives in Iran, the 2007 INSCR
indicated that the United States and Iran “have worked together productively” in the
U.N.’s multilateral “Six Plus Two” group. Shared interest in interdiction has led the
United Kingdom to support the Iranian government’s counternarcotics efforts since
1999 by providing millions of dollars in grants for security equipment purchases,
including bullet-proof vests for Iran’s border patrol guards.61
The International Policy Response
The Bonn Agreement that established the Afghan Interim Authority committed
Afghanistan’s new government to cooperation with the international community “in
the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime.”62 After taking office in early
2002, Hamid Karzai’s transitional administration took a series of steps to combat the
growth of the Afghan narcotics trade, including issuing a formal ban on opium
cultivation, outlining a national counternarcotics strategy, and establishing
institutions and forces tasked with eradicating poppy crops and interdicting drug
traffic. Karzai’s government places a high priority on creating alternative livelihoods
and sources of income for opium growing farmers. Many countries have contributed
funding, equipment, forces, and training to various counternarcotics programs in
Afghanistan, including crop eradication and judicial reform. The United States and
others work closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors in an effort to contain the flow of
narcotics and strengthen interdiction efforts.
The United Kingdom serves as the lead coalition nation for international
counternarcotics policy and assistance in Afghanistan and has announced plans to
spend $510 (£270 million) on counternarcotics from 2005 through 2008 (Table 6).63
61 Jason Barnes, “The Desert Village that Feeds UK’s Heroin Habit,” The Observer (UK),
December 12, 1999.
62 The Bonn Agreement, December 5, 2001.
63 Dr. Kim Howells, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister for the Middle East,
(continued...)

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CRS-23
Under British leadership, basic eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood
development measures began in the spring of 2002. The U.S. Department of State’s
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau administers U.S.
counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance programs in Afghanistan and
coordinates with the Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
Government of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
To date, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have engaged in some counternarcotics
activities based on limited rules of engagement. The role of the U.S. military in
counternarcotics expanded in 2005 to include police training and limited interdiction
mission support. British military units carry out interdiction missions in cooperation
with Afghan authorities on a bilateral basis that target drug production laboratories
and trafficking infrastructure. By mutual agreement, the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) does not engage directly in eradication or
interdiction operations, but may provide support by improving Afghan force
protection abilities and sharing intelligence. The United States also provides
counternarcotics assistance to other countries in the region.
The Bush Administration continues to implement a “five-pillar” inter-agency
initiative to reinvigorate U.S. support for the implementation of Afghanistan’s
national counternarcotics strategy. The initiative has been accompanied by a
substantial increase in spending on counternarcotics programs, with particular
emphasis on alternative livelihood development and greater U.S. support for crop
eradication efforts. Training of and equipment for Afghan counternarcotics forces
and prosecution teams also have figured prominently in the strategy.
In August 2007, the State Department released a new strategy document
outlining plans to improve the implementation of current counternarcotics efforts.64
According to the document, Administration officials will focus on strengthening rural
development efforts, coordinating counternarcotics and counterinsurgency
operations, and securing political support from Afghan and international counterparts
in order to improve performance. Each of these issues has proven to be a key sticking
point in counternarcotics efforts to date. In particular, the symbiotic relationship
between insecurity and narcotics production that has taken hold in provinces such as
Helmand may prove difficult to break. Most observers and officials expect that a
long-term, sustained international effort will be necessary to reduce the threat posed
by the opium trade to the security and stability of Afghanistan and the international
community.
63 (...continued)
“Afghanistan: Counter Narcotics,” House of Commons Hansard Ministerial Statements for
July 13, 2006, (Pt. 0134).
64 Detailed program information is included in the strategy document. Available at
[http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/90561.htm].

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CRS-24
Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces
Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements. Among the first acts of the
newly established Afghan Interim Authority created by the Bonn Agreement was the
issuance of a decree that banned the opium poppy cultivation, heroin production,
opiate trafficking, and drug use on January 17, 2002. On April 3, 2002, Afghan
authorities released a second decree that described the scope and goals of an
eradication program designed to destroy a portion of the opium poppy crop that had
been planted during late 2001. In order to prevent further cultivation during the
autumn 2002 planting season, the government issued a third, more specific decree in
September 2002 that spelled out plans for the enforcement of bans on opium
cultivation, production, trafficking, and abuse.
Religious and political leaders have also spoken out adamantly against
involvement in the drug trade. Islamic leaders from Afghanistan’s General Council
of Ulema issued a fatwa or religious ruling in August 2004 that declared poppy
cultivation to be contrary to Islamic sharia law.65 Following his election in October
2004, President Hamid Karzai has made a number of public statements characterizing
involvement in opium cultivation and trafficking as shameful and stating that
provincial and district leaders would be held accountable by the central government
for failure to combat drug activity in areas under their control.
Afghan authorities developed a national drug control strategy (NDCS) in 2003
in consultation with experts and officials from the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the UNODC.66 The strategy declared the Afghan government’s
commitment to reducing opium poppy cultivation by 70% by 2008 and to completely
eliminating poppy cultivation and drug trafficking by 2013. In 2005, the Afghan
government released an implementation plan for the strategy that outlines specific
initiatives planned in five policy areas, as well as for regional cooperation,
eradication, and public information campaigns.67 New implementation plans to
replace those outlined in the 2005 document remain under consideration. The
government also issued a new counternarcotics law to clarify administrative
authorities for counternarcotics policy and establishes clear procedures for
investigating and prosecuting major drug offenses.
In January 2006, the Afghan government released an update of the NDCS to
incorporate changes in the structure of the government and lessons learned from
previous counternarcotics efforts and interagency and inter-governmental initiatives.
68 Unlike the original NDCS, the latest version refrains from setting firm elimination
65 “Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy,” Associated Press, August
3, 2004.
66 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, National Drug Control Strategy, May 18, 2003.
67 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation
Plan, February 16, 2005.
68 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - Ministry of Counternarcotics, National Drug Control
Strategy: An Updated Five-Year Strategy for Tackling the Illicit Drug Problem, January
(continued...)

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CRS-25
targets or deadlines and identifies more general, overarching goals. The fundamental
objective, as outlined in the updated strategy, is “to secure a sustainable decrease in
cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs with a view to
complete and sustainable elimination.” Four priority areas outlined in the report
focus on the disruption of the drug trade (including high-level traffickers), the
strengthening and diversification of legal rural livelihoods, the reduction of the
demand for and consumption of illegal drugs, and the development of central and
provincial level counternarcotics institutions. Afghan authorities plan to complete
a full review of the NDCS in 2007 and release a new strategy sometime in 2008.
Institutions and Forces. In October 2002, then-Interim President Hamid
Karzai announced that the Afghan National Security Council would take
responsibility for counternarcotics policy and would oversee the creation and
activities of a new Counternarcotics Directorate (CND). The CND subsequently
established functional units to analyze data and coordinate action in five areas:
judicial reform, law enforcement, alternative livelihood development, demand
reduction, and public awareness. Following its establishment in late 2002, the CND
worked with other Afghan ministries, local leaders, and international authorities to
develop counternarcotics policies and coordinate the creation of counternarcotics
institutions and the training of effective personnel. The CND was transformed into
a new Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) in December 2004. Habibullah Qaderi
resigned as Afghanistan’s Minister for Counternarcotics in July 2007. Former deputy
minister General Khodaidad currently serves as acting minister. According to the
updated NDCS, the MCN will prepare quarterly and annual reports summarizing
interagency progress on implementing the strategy.
Counternarcotics enforcement activities have been directed from within the
Ministry of Interior since 2002. General Mohammed Daud was named Deputy
Ministry of Interior for Counternarcotics in December 2004. General Daud and his
staff work with U.S. and British officials in implementing the Afghan government’s
expanded counternarcotics enforcement plan. In November 2006, the World Bank
and UNODC warned that a lack of progress in reforming the Ministry of Interior in
relation to other ministries such as the Ministry of Defense has left Afghan police and
counternarcotics officials more vulnerable to corruption.69 Other relevant ministries
include the Ministries of Agriculture, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Justice,
National Defense, Education, Foreign Affairs, Provincial Administrations, Finance,
and Information.
The Ministry of Interior supervises of the following Afghan counternarcotics
and law enforcement entities:
! Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). The CNP-A
consists of investigative and enforcement divisions whose officers
work closely with U.S. and British counternarcotics authorities.
68 (...continued)
2006.
69 Buddenberg and Byrd (eds.), Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, World Bank/UNODC,
November 2006.

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CRS-26
CNP-A officers continue to receive U.S. training to support their
ability to plan and execute counternarcotics activities independently.
! National Interdiction Unit (NIU). The NIU was established as an
elite element of the CNP-A in October 2004 and continues to
conduct significant raids across Afghanistan. Approximately six 50-
member NIU teams have received U.S. training and over 125
officers now operate in cooperation with DEA Foreign Advisory
Support Teams (FAST teams, for more see below).
! Central Eradication Planning Cell (CPEC). The CPEC is a U.K.-
supported targeting and intelligence center that uses sophisticated
technology and surveying to target poppy crops and monitor the
success of eradication operations. The CPEC provides target data
for the Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF).
! Afghan Eradication Force (AEF). The U.S.-supported AEF
conducts ground-based eradication of poppy crops based on
targeting data provided by the Central Eradication Planning Cell
(CPEC). The force is made up of approximately 800 trained
eradicators and is supported by security personnel. Afghan and U.S.
officials prioritized so-called “governor led” eradication efforts
supported by Poppy Elimination Program supervision teams for
2006, after the AEF failed to meet its targets for 2005.
! Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF). The elite ASNF, or
“Force 333,” has received special training from the British military
and carries out interdiction missions against high value targets and
in remote areas. The U.S. military provides some intelligence and
airlift support for the ASNF. According to the Ministry of
Counternarcotics, the ASNF destroys approximately 150 MT of
opium annually and has raided over 190 drug laboratories.
! Border Police, National Police, and Highway Police.
Approximately 62,000 Afghan police have graduated from U.S.-
sponsored training facilities, including over 7,000 border police.
Elements of all three forces have received training, equipment, and
communications support from British, German, and U.S. authorities
to improve their counternarcotics enforcement capabilities. The
number of fully trained and equipped police cited by U.S. officials
in September 2006 was 42,000, including border police.
U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan
In spite of limited efforts on the part of Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities, the land area used for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and
Afghanistan’s corresponding opiate output has increased substantially from late 2001
through 2006. Although public awareness of government opium poppy cultivation
bans and laws outlawing participation in the narcotics trade is widespread, until
recently, counternarcotics enforcement activities have been hindered by the Afghan

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CRS-27
government’s tactical inability to carry out nationwide, effective eradication and
interdiction campaigns as well as a lack of adequate legal infrastructure to support
drug-related prosecutions. International development agencies have made positive,
but limited, efforts to address structural economic issues associated with rural
livelihoods and drug production, such as household debt and the destruction of local
agricultural market infrastructure. Such efforts were not centrally coordinated or
linked directly to counternarcotics goals and initiatives until late 2004: they remain
highly dependent on regional security conditions.
Substantial growth in opium poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking from
2001 through 2004 led U.S. officials, in consultation with their Afghan and coalition
partners, to develop a more comprehensive, complementary plan to support the
implementation of Afghanistan’s national counternarcotics strategy. The evolving
policy initiative currently being implemented by U.S. agencies consists of five key
elements, or pillars, that mirror Afghan initiatives and call for increased interagency
and international cooperation.70 The five pillars of the U.S. initiative are (1) public
information, (2) judicial reform, (3) alternative livelihood development, (4)
interdiction, and (5) eradication.
Strengthening Implementation. According to U.S. officials, new
initiatives to improve the results of existing counternarcotics policies will be
implemented over the coming 12 months.71 Highlights of the new plans include the
enlargement of existing financial and development rewards to poppy-free provinces
and the introduction of new development awards for provinces contributing to
significant interdiction or prosecutions. Eradication rewards on a per hectare basis
also are planned. Resources devoted to interdiction activities are to be doubled, and
airlift and intelligence operations in support of interdiction and eradication efforts are
to be expanded. The three strategic goals for the new initiatives are as follows:
! “dramatically increasing development assistance to incentivize licit
development while simultaneously amplifying the scope and
intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations;”
! “coordinating counternarcotics (CN) and counterinsurgency (COIN)
planning and operations in a manner not previously accomplished,
with a particular emphasis on integrating drug interdiction into the
counterinsurgency mission; and,”
70 David Shelby, “United States to Help Afghanistan Attack Narcotics Industry,”
Washington File, U.S. Department of State, November 17, 2004.
71 For detailed information see, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, August
2007, available at [http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/90561.htm]; Principle Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Schweich News
Briefing on the Counternarcotics Situation in Afghanistan, August 29, 2007; and
Ambassador William Wood’s Remarks at the Third Annual National Counter Narcotics
Conference, August 29, 2007.

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CRS-28
! “encouraging consistent, sustained political will for the
counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, our allies,
and international civilian and military organizations.”
Public Information. Afghan and U.S. authorities have initiated public
information campaigns to reach out to ordinary Afghans and raise public awareness
about the threat of narcotics and the danger of participation in the illegal drug trade.72
The efforts build on the Afghan government’s public awareness strategy, which
enlists local community and religious leaders to support the government’s
counternarcotics policies and encourages them to speak out in their communities
against drug use and involvement the opium trade. As noted above, Islamic leaders
from Afghanistan’s General Council of Ulema have supported this effort by publicly
condemning poppy cultivation and involvement in the drug trade.73
The UNODC/MCN 2005 Opium Survey found that farmers across Afghanistan
were well aware of the government’s ban on opium poppy cultivation and that many
farmers who declined to cultivate opium poppy did so because they feared
eradication or incarceration. An earlier survey also reported that farmers in provinces
where opium poppy cultivation was found to have increased believed that the
government could not or would not enforce the ban. The UNODC/MCN’s 2006 and
2007 surveys reported that Islamic prohibitions on involvement with narcotics also
was influential among Afghans, particularly those that had not yet been involved with
cultivation or trafficking.
The U.S. campaigns supplement existing public information efforts designed to
reduce demand for illegal drugs within Afghan society and spread awareness of the
Afghan government’s opium poppy cultivation bans and drug laws. The newly
launched strategic initiative will expanded U.S. officials’ participation in targeted
local outreach campaigns.
Judicial Reform. State Department (INL office) and Justice Department
personnel are undertaking judicial reform efforts to further enable Afghan authorities
to enforce counternarcotics laws and prosecute prominent individuals involved in
narcotics trafficking. A Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) has been developed and
granted jurisdiction over significant narcotics cases under presidential decree. The
CJTF features integrated teams of prosecutors and investigators that are being
specially trained to handle complex, high-profile cases. U.S. federal prosecutors
participate in CJTF training activities in Afghanistan, and the training program is set
to be expanded as part of the new strategy launched in August 2007. The CJTF
prepares cases for the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) under the jurisdiction of
fourteen specially trained judges. The U.S. Defense Department supported the
construction of a secure court facility and has contributed to the construction of a
maximum-security wing at the Pol-e Charki prison near Kabul to hold offenders
prosecuted by the Task Force.
72 Ibid.
73 “Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy,” Associated Press, August
3, 2004.

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Afghan and coalition officials are currently working to identify targets for
prosecution, although, according to U.S. officials, political concerns and security
considerations will play a role in the targeting of individuals. The April 2005 arrest
of Haji Bashir Noorzai by U.S. officials and the transfer of Haji Baz Mohammed
raised concern about the readiness and ability of Afghan authorities to investigate,
prosecute, and incarcerate drug suspects independently. According to an Afghan
Interior Ministry official, “Afghan police had no role in [Noorzai’s] arrest,” and
Afghan authorities were constrained because of “a lack of concrete evidence against
him.”74
With U.S. and coalition support, the government of Afghanistan drafted and
issued a new counternarcotics law in December 2005 that clarifies administrative
authorities for counternarcotics policy and establishes clear procedures for
investigating and prosecuting major drug offenses. The Afghan Parliament has
proposed amendments to the law that remain pending. U.S. officials have called on
the Afghan authorities “to start prosecuting corrupt officials” and “to start building
cases that will stand up in court” under the new law.75 Former Counternarcotics
Minister Habibullah Qaderi conceded in September 2006 that to date Afghan
authorities were “not going after the people who matter,” although some observers
expect that corrupt officials and higher level narcotics traffickers may be prosecuted
under the new law as planned anti-corruption initiatives move forward. President
Karzai has named a new Chief Justice for Afghanistan’s Supreme Court and a new
Attorney General, who, according to the State Department is “an anti-corruption
activist” and is “pursuing corruption investigations against politically sensitive
targets.”
Alternative Livelihood Development.76 In order to provide viable
economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation and drug production, U.S. officials
have developed a three-phased plan that directly links development initiatives to
overall counternarcotics efforts through a comprehensive program targeted to opium
producing areas. The first phase of the alternative livelihoods plan accelerated
existing agricultural development initiatives, including improvements to agricultural
market infrastructure, farmer education programs, and micro-credit lending systems
to support rural families. The new efforts build on existing USAID programs to
develop integrated systems of crop processing facilities, storage areas, roads, and
markets, and to restore wheat and other cereal crop production levels. Work began
on phase one projects in early 2005 and continued through 2006.
The second phase of the plan consists of an “immediate needs”/ “cash-for-work”
program that continues to sponsor labor-intensive work projects to provide non-
opium incomes to rural laborers and to rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure. The
74 Interior Ministry spokesman Lutfullah Mashal. “Afghan Drugs Kingpin Seized by US
was Untouchable in Afghanistan: Experts,” Agence France-Presse, April 27, 2005.
75 Thomas A. Schweich, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, quoted in Pamela Constable, “A Poor Yield For
Afghans’ War on Drugs,” Washington Post, September 19, 2006.
76 USAID information available online at [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/
countries/afghanistan/alt_live.html].

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program began in December 2004 and continued through 2007. USAID personnel
design “immediate needs” projects in consultation with local councils and tribal
leaders in districts where crop eradication has been planned or where farmers have
agreed to cease poppy cultivation.77 According to USAID, in main opium producing
provinces, USAID-sponsored alternative livelihood cash-for-work programs have
paid $19.6 million in salaries to 214,000 farmers who otherwise may have engaged
in or supported opium poppy cultivation. Over 6,200 km of irrigation canals,
drainage ditches, and traditional water transportation systems have been repaired and
cleaned in a number of provinces, improving irrigation and supporting high value
agriculture on an estimated 290,000 hectares of land. More than 650,000 farmers
have received seeds or fertilizer (or both) in conjunction with counternarcotics
information across Afghanistan since late 2005.78
The third, “comprehensive development” phase of the plan began in six key
poppy-producing provinces during 2005 and is scheduled to be implemented through
2009. Current and planned projects include long-term infrastructure development for
urban and rural areas, credit and financial services expansion, agricultural
diversification, and private investment support. The Afghan government requested
that USAID expand alternative livelihood programs into the provinces of Ghor, Dai
Kundi, Konar, Farah, and Uruzgan, and USAID personnel have consulted with
contractors and security officials and initiated preliminary projects in some of those
provinces.
Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets
by Province, FY2005-2007
($ millions)
2004 Province Share
Immediate
Comprehensive
Province
of Nationwide Poppy
Needs
Development
Cultivated Area
Nangarhar and Laghman
$18
$110
21.1%
Helmand and Kandahar
$19
$120
34.2%
Badakhshan and Takhar
$1.5
$60
8.6%
Source: USAID, Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 2, March 16 — 31, 2005.
Accountability standards have been built into the USAID alternative livelihood
programs, including seed and fertilizer distributions and cash-for-work programs.
Seed and fertilizer recipients, including government officials, are required to agree
77 USAID has established a “Good Performer’s Fund” to reward districts that end cultivation
with high visibility infrastructure development projects.
78 Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, September 12, 2006; USAID,
Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 13, August 2006; and, author consultation with
USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, January 2006.

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in writing not to grow poppy in exchange for program support. Cash-for-work
program participants must make similar commitments, and program staff monitor
participant activities outside of the program to ensure compliance. According to
USAID, all alternative livelihood program assistance is 100% conditional on the
reduction of poppy cultivation within one year of the receipt of assistance.79 Positive
incentives also are provided via a multi-million dollar “Good Performers Fund,”
which is scheduled to be expanded as part of the new U.S. implementation plan
announced in August 2007. The United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development (DfID plans to contribute over $245 million (£130 million) to
development and alternative livelihood programs as part of the UK’s
counternarcotics program from 2005-2008.80
Interdiction. Reflecting on the absence of effective counternarcotics
institutions and authorities in post-Taliban Afghanistan, international authorities led
by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) established a series
of cooperative interdiction initiatives in countries neighboring Afghanistan beginning
in early 2002. The primary U.S.-led effort, known as “Operation Containment,” is
designed to “implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations of
their market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs,
precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency.”81 Operation Containment
has continued since early 2002 and currently involves “nineteen countries from
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Europe and Russia.”82 According to the DEA, Operation
Containment activities in FY2005 were responsible for the seizure of “11.5 metric
tons of heroin, 1.3 metric tons of morphine base, 43.9 metric tons of opium gum, 248
drug labs, and 146 investigations including efforts that led to the arrest of alleged
drug lords Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Baz Mohammed.83 A similar multinational
DEA-led effort named Operation Topaz has focused on interdicting acetic anhydride
— a primary heroin production precursor chemical — to Afghanistan.
According to U.S. officials, resources devoted to interdiction efforts will be
doubled over the period from September 2007 to September 2008. In addition to
ongoing international narcotics and precursor interdiction initiatives, U.S. officials
provide support to Afghan government interdiction efforts through intelligence
cooperation, training programs, equipment transfers, and joint operations. The DEA
has significantly expanded its presence in Afghanistan since January 2003, although
in the past DEA officials have cited restrictions on the capabilities and freedom of
movement of their staff in Afghanistan due to a general lack of security outside of
Kabul and difficulty in securing air mobility assets (see discussion of security and
79 Author consultation with USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, January 2006.
80 Dr. Kim Howells, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister for the Middle East,
“Afghanistan: Counter Narcotics,” House of Commons Hansard Ministerial Statements for
July 13, 2006, (Pt. 0134).
81 DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy, House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, February 26, 2004.
82 Ibid.
83 DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy Statement Before the House Committee on Armed
Services, June 28, 2006.

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mobility issues below). DEA Foreign Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) have
been deployed to Afghanistan “to provide guidance and conduct bilateral
investigations that will identify, target, and disrupt illicit drug trafficking
organizations.” The FAST teams receive Defense Department transportation and
construction support and are currently conducting operations and serving as mentors
to officers of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit. The DEA received new FY2006
funding to expand its operational presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia,
including support for FAST teams, Operation Containment activities, and new field
officers. In December 2006, House International Relations Committee Chairman
Henry Hyde announced a reported change in policy that will allow DEA agents to
accompany U.S. military forces on operational raids of narcotics-related sites in
Afghanistan.84
Current Defense Department directives state that U.S. military forces in
Afghanistan do not and will not directly target drug production facilities or pursue
drug traffickers as a distinct component of ongoing U.S. counternarcotics
initiatives.85 Current rules of engagement allow U.S. forces to seize and destroy
drugs and drug infrastructure discovered during the course of routine military
operations carried out in pursuit of conventional counterterrorism and stability
missions.86 U.S. forces continue to provide limited intelligence and air support to
Afghan and British forces during interdiction missions, including the destruction of
heroin laboratories and opiate storage warehouses. U.S. initiatives that supply
Afghan police with tents, boots, communication equipment, mobility support,
infrastructure improvements, and training are expected to continue. Defense
Department and military personnel plan to focus future efforts on further improving
Afghanistan’s border security and providing greater intelligence support to Afghan
law enforcement officials through joint military/DEA/Afghan “intelligence fusion
centers” located at U.S. facilities in Kabul and the Afghan Ministry of Interior.87
British forces currently contribute to a central targeting operation that identifies
opiate warehouses and processing facilities for destruction. British Customs and
Excise authorities also work with Afghan officials through mobile heroin detection
units in Kabul. British and other troops in the key opium-producing province of
Helmand province in southern Afghanistan are under the NATO-led support security
84 The Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration did not comment
publicly. “Hyde Praises Department of Defense Support for Drug Enforcement
Administration Efforts in Afghanistan,” House Committee on International Relations News
Advisory, Thursday, December 07, 2006.
85 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, November 12, 2004.
86 Testimony of Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Before House International Relations Committee,
February 12, 2004; and Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, November 12, 2004.
87 Statement of Lennard J. Wolfson, Assistant Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Committee on House Government Reform Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, May 10, 2005.

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and counternarcotics operations but do not have a role in directly targeting high-level
narcotic traffickers.88
Eradication. Some critics have cited growth in opium poppy cultivation
figures as evidence that manual eradication campaigns have failed thus far to serve
as a credible deterrent for Afghan farmers. Plans developed by the State Department,
in consultation with Afghan authorities, called for early and more robust opium
poppy eradication measures for the 2004-2005 growing season to provide a strong
deterrent to future cultivation. The Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF)
carried out limited operations with support from U.K. intelligence officers, U.S.
advisors, and international contractors in early 2005. Field reports indicated that
CPEF personnel met violent resistance from farmers in some instances and largely
failed to meet their eradication targets for the 2004-2005 season.89 State Department
officials identified the failure of 2004-2005 eradication activities as one factor behind
the surge in poppy cultivation that occurred during the 2005-2006 season, and made
similar judgments with regard to the 2006-2007 crop.
The centrally organized and executed eradication plan in 2004-2005 marked a
departure from previous eradication campaign strategies, which largely relied upon
governors and local authorities to target and destroy crops. Most governors pledged
to support President Karzai’s eradication initiatives in 2005, and U.S. officials report
that areas where governors and local leaders embraced and enforced the central
government’s eradication demands saw significant reductions in poppy cultivation.
In response to these trends, “poppy elimination programs” (PEPs) have been
established in select Afghan provinces as part of a change toward “governor-led” and
centrally monitored eradication. The PEPs consist of 7-member Afghan and
international teams that direct and monitor locally led and administered
counternarcotics activities, including public information campaigns eradication, and
will advise the central government on any needed intervention.
Central government and governor-led eradication efforts during the 2005-2006
season tripled the amount of eradicated poppy (15,713 hectares, roughly 10% of the
total national poppy crop). Expanded dual-track eradication further increased the
eradicated area in the 2006-2007 season (19,047 hectares, a 24% increase). U.S.
officials have stressed the importance of early season, locally executed eradication
in order to minimize violent farmer resistance and give Afghan farmers time to plant
licit replacement cash crops. A persistent problem remains the targeting of
eradication on the fields of non-influential and smaller scale landowners and farmers.
U.S. officials emphasized in August 2007 the need for non-negotiated, equitable
eradication to strengthen the effect of current efforts.
88 “Troops deployed as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
— including British forces deployed as part of the Helmand Task Force — are authorized
to provide support to Afghan counter-narcotics forces, including training, and they will help
the Afghans create a secure environment in which economic development and institutional
reform — both essential to the elimination of the opium industry — can take place.” Des
Browne, UK Secretary of State for Defense, House of Commons Hansard Record, Written
Answers to Questions, July 24, 2006.
89 Author conversation with DEA official, Washington, DC, May 2005.

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New methods and technologies for future eradication activities also are under
consideration, including the introduction of manual herbicide spraying to improve
eradication teams’ efficiency. In January 2007, President Karzai announced that any
herbicide-based eradication efforts would be delayed until 2008 at the earliest.
Coalition partners such as the United Kingdom have refused to provide security
support to eradication programs in the absence of more widespread economic
development and alternative livelihood assistance.
Issues for Congress
Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking may
jeopardize the success of international efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.
U.S. officials believe that efforts to reverse the related trends of opium cultivation,
drug trafficking, corruption, and insecurity must expand if broader strategic
objectives are to be achieved. A broad interagency initiative to assist Afghan
authorities in combating the narcotics trade has been developed, but officials argue
that the full effectiveness of new U.S. efforts will not be apparent until capacity
building efforts are complete and all elements of the strategy are advanced
simultaneously. Regional insecurity and corruption also present formidable
challenges.
Primary issues of interest to the Congress include program funding, the role of
the U.S. military, and the scope and nature of eradication and development assistance
initiatives. The 108th Congress addressed the issue of counternarcotics in
Afghanistan in intelligence reform proposals, and the 109th Congress considered new
counternarcotics policy proposals in relation to FY2006 and FY2007 appropriation
and authorization requests. During the term of the 110th Congress, the full
effectiveness of the U.S. five-pillar plan should become apparent — Administration
officials have argued that, to date, insecurity in key opium poppy producing areas,
delays in building and reforming Afghan institutions, and widespread local Afghan
corruption have prevented its full implementation. According to Administration
officials, the new U.S. implementation plan announced in August 2007 is designed
to capitalize on achievements to date and improve performance in weaker areas.
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle
As noted above, narcotics trafficking and political instability remain intimately
linked across Afghanistan. U.S. officials have identified narcotics trafficking as a
primary barrier to the establishment of security and consider insecurity to be a
primary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations. Critics of existing
counternarcotics efforts have argued that Afghan authorities and their international
partners remain reluctant to directly confront prominent individuals and groups
involved in the opium trade because of their fear that confrontation will lead to
internal security disruptions or armed conflict with drug-related groups. Afghan
authorities have expressed their belief that “the beneficiaries of the drugs trade will
resist attempts to destroy it,” and have argued that “the political risk of internal
instability caused by counternarcotics measures” must be balanced “with the

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requirement to project central authority nationally” for counternarcotics purposes.90
Conflict and regional security disruptions have accompanied efforts to expand crop
eradication programs and previous efforts to implement central government
counternarcotics policies.
U.S. officials have identified rural security and national rule of law as
prerequisites for effective counternarcotics policy implementation, while
simultaneously identifying narcotics as a primary threat to security and stability.91
Although an increasing number of Afghan police, security forces, and
counternarcotics authorities are being trained by U.S. and coalition officials, the size
and capability of Afghan forces may limit their power to effectively challenge
entrenched drug trafficking groups and regional militia in the short term. Specifically,
questions remain as to whether Afghan security and counternarcotics forces alone
will be able to establish the security conditions necessary for the more robust
eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs planned by U.S. and
Afghan officials. As of September 2007, new U.S. initiatives were planned to
strengthen Afghan force protection capabilities.
From a political perspective, U.S. officials maintain that parliamentary and
provincial elections contributed to the political legitimacy of the central government
and, by extension, its counternarcotics initiatives. However, the creation of sufficient
political and military stability for effective counternarcotics operations is likely to
remain a significant challenge. Local police and officials are considered to be the
best positioned to create conditions of security necessary for “full spectrum”
counternarcotics activity. They also are considered to be the most susceptible to
narcotics related corruption. The death of several local contractor employees working
on USAID alternative livelihood projects in May 2005 brought renewed urgency to
concerns about the provision of security as a prerequisite for non-enforcement related
counternarcotics programs.
Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics
In pursuing counterterrorism objectives, Afghan and coalition authorities also
must consider difficult political choices when confronting corrupt officials, militia
leaders, and narcotics traffickers. Regional and local militia commanders with
alleged links to the opium trade played significant roles in coalition efforts to
undermine the Taliban regime and capture Al Qaeda operatives, particularly in
southeastern Afghanistan. Since late 2001, some of these figures have been
incorporated into government and security structures, including positions of
90 National Drug Control Strategy, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, May 18, 2003.
91 “Poppy cultivation is likely to continue until responsible governmental authority is
established throughout the country and until rural poverty levels can be reduced via
provision of alternative livelihoods and increased rural incomes.... Drug processing and
trafficking can be expected to continue until security is established and drug law
enforcement capabilities can be increased. “ Department of State, INCSR, March 2005.

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responsibility for enforcing counternarcotics policies.92 According to Afghanistan
scholar Barnett Rubin, “the empowerment and enrichment of the warlords who allied
with the United States in the anti-Taliban efforts, and whose weapons and authority
now enabled them to tax and protect opium traffickers,” have provided the opium
trade “with powerful new protectors.”93
Pragmatic decisions taken since 2001 to prioritize counterterrorism operations
and current plans to enforce counternarcotics policies more strictly may conflict with
each other, forcing Afghan and coalition authorities to address seemingly difficult
contradictions. “Tactical” coalition allies in militia and other irregular forces with
ties to the drug trade may inhibit the ability of the central government to extend its
authority and enforce its counternarcotics policies. According to the 2007 UNODC
Afghanistan Opium Survey, “in the provinces bordering with Pakistan, tacit
acceptance of opium trafficking by foreign military forces as a way to extract
intelligence information and occasional military support in operations against the
Taliban and Al-Qaida undermines stabilization efforts.” At the same time, U.S. and
Afghan officials have been increasingly adamant is stating that the Taliban
resurgence that has unfolded since early 2006 has been supported in part by narcotics
proceeds.
These issues may weigh strongly in decision concerning the feasibility and
prospects for success of continuing counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations.
One senior Defense Department official has argued that U.S. counternarcotics
strategy in Afghanistan must recognize “the impact the drug trade has on our other
policy objectives, while complementing (and not competing with) our other efforts
in furtherance of those objectives.”94 Striking such a balance may continue to create
challenges for the United States and its allies.
Defining the Role of the U.S. Military
Some observers have argued that U.S., coalition, and NATO military forces
should play an active, direct role in targeting the leaders and infrastructure of the
opiate trade. Following the announcement of record poppy cultivation and opium
production in 2005-2006, UNODC Director Antonio Maria Costa called for direct
NATO military involvement in counternarcotics enforcement operations in
Afghanistan, which is precluded under the NATO agreement governing the
92 See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “U.S. Turns to Drug Baron to Rally Support,” Asia Times,
December 4, 2001; Charles Clover and Peronet Despeignes, “Murder Undermines Karzai
Government,” Financial Times, July 8, 2002; Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Backing Helps
Warlord Solidify Power,” Washington Post, February 18, 2002; Ron Moreau and Sami
Yousafzai, with Donatella Lorch, “Flowers of Destruction,” Newsweek, July 14, 2003;
Andrew North, “Warlord Tells Police Chief to Go,” BBC News, July 12, 2004; Steven
Graham, “Group: Warlords to Hinder Afghan Election,” Associated Press, September 28,
2004; and Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in
Afghanistan,” Boston Globe, October 20, 2004.
93 Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” October 7, 2004.
94 Testimony of Mary-Beth Long, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics before the House Committee on International Relations, March 17, 2005.

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International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Although U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) officials have indicated that “the DoD counter-narcotics program in
Afghanistan is a key element of our campaign against terrorism,”95 military officials
have resisted the establishment of a direct counternarcotics enforcement role for U.S.
forces. Former NATO Commander U.S. General James Jones supported the idea that
counternarcotics enforcement is “not a military mission,” stating that “having NATO
troops out there burning crops, for example, is not going to significantly contribute
to the war on drugs.”96
Other opponents of a direct enforcement role for U.S., coalition, or NATO
forces claim that such a role may alienate forces from the Afghan population,
jeopardize ongoing counterterrorism missions that require Afghan intelligence
support, and divert military resources from direct counter-insurgent and
counterterrorism operations. The House report on the FY2007 Defense authorization
bill argued that the Department of Defense “must not take on roles in which other
countries or other agencies of the U.S. Government have core capabilities” with
regard to counternarcotics in Afghanistan. According to the Department of Defense,
U.S. military forces currently are authorized to seize narcotics and related supplies
encountered during the course of normal stability and counterterrorism operations.
Similarly, at present, NATO forces provide support for Afghan and coalition
counternarcotics initiatives but refrain from direct involvement with enforcement.
Equipment and Weaponry. Current U.S. policy calls for an expanded role
for U.S. military forces in training, equipping, and providing intelligence and airlift
support for Afghan counternarcotics teams, but stops short of elevating narcotics
targets to a direct priority for U.S. combat teams. Section 1021 of the Defense
Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-136) added Afghanistan to the list of
countries eligible for transfers of non-lethal Defense Department counternarcotics
equipment authorized under Section 1033 of the Defense Authorization Act for
FY1998 (P.L. 105-85). The FY2005 and FY2006 supplemental appropriations acts
(P.L. 109-13 and P.L. 109-234) further authorized the provision of individual and
crew-served weapons, ammunition, vehicles, aircraft, and detection, interception,
monitoring and testing equipment to Afghan counternarcotics forces. To date,
.50-caliber machine guns have been provided along with night vision equipment and
a range of other supplies. Afghan counternarcotics forces have requested further
weaponry in response to attacks by well armed and supplied trafficking groups. The
FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) reauthorized provision of .50-
caliber and lighter crew-served weaponry and ammunition through FY2008.
95 “U.S. CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the political and
economic reconstruction of Afghanistan... Local terrorist and criminal leaders have a vested
interest in using the profits from narcotics to oppose the central government and undermine
the security and stability of Afghanistan.” Major Gen. John Sattler, USMC, Dir. of
Operations-US CENTCOM before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, April 21, 2004.
96 Lolita C. Baldor, “NATO to Provide More Afghanistan Troops,” Associated Press,
September 20, 2006.

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The conference report (H.Rept. 109-360) on the Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) did not include a provision that was included in the Senate
version of the bill (S. 1042, Section 1033) that would have authorized the Defense
Department to provide a range of technical and operational support to Afghan
counternarcotics authorities under Section 1004 of the Defense Authorization Act for
FY1991 (P.L. 101- 510). The Senate version would have authorized “the use of U.S.
bases of operation or training facilities to facilitate the conduct of counterdrug
activities in Afghanistan” in response to the Defense Department’s request “to
provide assistance in all aspects of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including
detection, interdiction, and related criminal justice activities.”97 This would have
included transportation of personnel and supplies, maintenance and repair of
equipment, the establishment and operation of bases and training facilities, and
training for Afghan law enforcement personnel.
Mobility. Options for improving the mobility and reach of Afghan forces and
U.S. advisors also have been considered and addressed since 2004. In response to
calls for greater airlift support, Defense Department officials agreed in March 2005
to provide limited airlift assistance (four operations per month) to U.S. and Afghan
interdiction teams using U.S. Blackhawk and Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters.
Successful interdiction operations in remote areas have been carried out on this basis
since mid-March 2005, and further helicopter leasing and pilot training arrangements
have been made that will supply a total of 8 MI-17 helicopters to Afghan forces by
the end of 2006. Training efforts for MI-17 pilots and crew are ongoing at Ft. Bliss
in Texas. The Department of Defense prioritizes counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations when considering requests for U.S. military airlift
assistance by other entities.98 The State Department operates ten Huey-II helicopters
that provide medical evacuation, re-supply, transportation, reconnaissance, command
and control, and security for Afghan counternarcotics operations. A fixed-wing
aircraft and two further helicopters also provide higher altitude and higher capacity
airlift support. For other FY2007 equipment, weaponry, and mobility considerations,
see below.
Redefining Eradication
Proponents of swift, widespread eradication argued that destroying a large
portion of the 2004-2005 opium poppy crop was necessary in order to establish a
credible deterrent before opium production in Afghanistan reaches an irreversible
level. Critics of widespread, near-term eradication argued that eradication in the
absence of existing alternative livelihood options for Afghan farmers would
contribute to the likelihood that farmers would continue to cultivate opium poppy in
97 S.Rept. 109-69.
98 Prior to 2006, Defense Department airlift support to DEA and Afghan authorities was
minimal. From January to June 2006, the Defense Department supported 12 of 17 airlift
missions requested by DEA. As mentioned above, in December 2006, the Department of
Defense reportedly agreed to allow DEA agents to ride along on select missions to narcotics
relevant locations. Sources: Author consultation with Defense Department officials,
September 2006; and, House Committee on International Relations.

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the future by deepening opium based debt and driving up opium prices.99 U.S. and
Afghan authorities maintain that the Central Poppy Eradication Force and governor-
led eradication programs were effective in deterring and reducing some opium poppy
cultivation in 2005. However, given recurrent clashes between eradication forces and
farmers and accounts of selective, politicized eradication efforts by local authorities,
some observers and officials have expressed concern about the safety and
effectiveness of current ground-based eradication efforts.
During the 2006 season, “poppy elimination program” teams were partially
introduced to key opium poppy growing provinces to monitor and direct early season,
locally-executed eradication activities. This strategy was designed to minimize
violent farmer resistance to central government forces and give farming families time
to plant replacement cash crops. Eradication increased three-fold from 2004-2005 to
2005-2006, but results varied drastically based on location and local political and
security conditions. In many areas, small farms have been targeted for eradication
by local authorities rather than larger plantations associated with influential or
wealthy individuals. In August 2007, U.S. officials identified non-negotiated, large-
scale eradication operations as a goal and cited the need for better force protection
capabilities and political will on the part of the Afghan government.
Manual or Aerial Herbicide-based Eradication. Policy makers are likely
to engage in further debate concerning options for using herbicides for manual or
aerial poppy eradication and their possible risks and rewards. Afghan and U.S.
authorities discussed the introduction of aerial herbicide-based eradication to
Afghanistan in late 2004, but decided against initiating a program in early 2005 due
to financial, logistical, and political considerations. Afghan President Hamid Karzai
has expressed his categorical opposition to the use of aerial eradication, citing public
health and environmental safety concerns.100 The updated 2006 Afghan national drug
control strategy also states that “The Government has also decided that eradication
must only be delivered by manual or mechanical ground based means.”101 U.S.
officials have argued for more widespread and non-negotiated eradication operations
and have stated that while herbicides may be efficient and safe, U.S. officials will
follow the decisions of Afghan officials concerning their potential use.
Proponents of aerial eradication argue that the large amount of rural land under
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and poor road infrastructure makes ground-based
eradication inefficient, subjects eradication teams to unnecessary security threats, and
raises associated costs. Critics of aerial eradication argue that the mixed-crop
cultivation patterns common throughout Afghanistan will expose legitimate food
99 A September 2004 British government report argues that “if not targeted properly,
eradication can have the reverse effect and encourage farmers to cultivate more poppy to pay
off increased debts.” Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs (UK) to the Seventh Report from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee, September 2004.
100 Office of the Spokesperson to the President — Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan,
“About the Commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to the Fight Against Narcotics
and Concerns About the Aerial Spraying of Poppy Fields.”
101 Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics, Updated NDCS, January 2006, p. 21.

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crops to damage and warn that aerial spraying may produce widespread, possibly
violent resistance by villagers with vivid memories of centrally directed Soviet
military campaigns to destroy food crops and agricultural infrastructure. The Senate
report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 1268) specified that
“none of the funds recommended by the Committee may be available for aerial
eradication programs within Afghanistan absent a formal request by the President of
Afghanistan seeking such support.” Manual herbicide spraying by Afghan eradication
teams may be under consideration for future introduction as a means of improving
efficiency.
Herbicide-based eradication, whether aerial or manual, remains politically
sensitive. Reports of unauthorized aerial spraying in eastern Nangarhar province in
mid-November 2004 angered Afghan officials and led to an investigation by the
Afghan Ministries of Agriculture and Health of claims that crops had been sprayed
with herbicides by unidentified aircraft. The government investigation reportedly
revealed that unidentified chemicals were present in soil samples, that non-narcotic
crops had been destroyed, and that an increase in related illnesses in local villages
had occurred. Afghan officials cited U.S. control of Afghan airspace in their
subsequent demands for an explanation. U.S. and British officials have denied
involvement in the spraying and assured Afghan authorities that they support
President Karzai’s position.102 In early December 2004, then-U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad suggested that “some drug-associated people” may
have sprayed the crops “in order to create the sort of distrust and problem between
Afghanistan and some of its allies.”103 Observers noted that the vocal negative
reaction of the Afghan population and government to an alleged isolated spraying
incident illustrates the type of popular opposition that may accompany any future
herbicide spraying eradication program. In January 2007, President Karzai announced
that any herbicide-based eradication efforts would be delayed until 2008 at the
earliest, and presidential spokesmen repeated their criticism of herbicides in
September.
Afghan government officials would have to approve any future herbicide
spraying operations undertaken by U.S. or Afghan personnel in Afghanistan. Any
future aerial eradication in Afghanistan also would require significant funding and
the introduction of airframes and military support aircraft that exceed current U.S.
capabilities in the region. Herbicide-based eradication programs, if employed in the
future, could feature the use of the glyphosate compound currently approved for use
in Colombia. The use of mycoherbicides, or fungal herbicides, also has been
discussed. Opium poppy-specific mycoherbicide has been developed with U.N.,
U.K., and U.S. support at the Institute of Genetics and Experimental Biology, a
102 See David Brunnstrom, “Afghans Committed to Drug War But Against Spraying,”
Reuters, November 19, 2004; and Stephen Graham, “Afghan Government Concerned at
Spraying of Opium Crops by Mystery Aircraft,” Associated Press, November 30, 2004.
103 Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Poppy Farmers Say Mystery Spraying Killed Crops,” New York
Times, December 5, 2004, and “U.S. Says Drug Lords May Have Sprayed Afghan Opium,”
Reuters, December 2, 2004.

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former Soviet biological warfare facility in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.104 Mycoherbicide
tests continue, including efforts by USDA’s Agricultural Research Service , although
USDA officials and others have expressed various concerns about the use of
mycoherbicides for counternarcotics purposes.105
Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding
Several legislative initiatives in the 108th and 109th Congresses sought to address
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation on expanding the U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan’s security and stability, including U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Section
7104 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458) stated the sense of Congress that “the President should make the substantial
reduction of illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in the
Global War on Terrorism” and called on the Administration to provide a secure
environment for counternarcotics personnel and to specifically target narcotics
operations that support terrorism. The act also required the submission of an
interagency report that described current progress toward the reduction of poppy
cultivation and heroin production in Afghanistan and provided detail on the extent
to which drug profits support terrorist groups and anti-government elements in and
around Afghanistan. The report was completed in October 2005.106
Reauthorization of Defense Counternarcotics Activities. To date,
Department of Defense authorizations for counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan
have been provided via reference to Section 1033 of the Defense Authorization Act
for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85, as amended) and Section 1004 of the Defense
Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510, as amended). Both acts have been
amended on a semi-annual basis to extend existing authorizations into subsequent
fiscal years, and, as written, require reauthorization to extend beyond the end of
FY2006. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act(P.L. 109-364) restated the existing
authorizations and reauthorized the Secretary of Defense to provide non-lethal
counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan and a number of its neighbors (and other
countries) through FY2008. The act also allows the transfer of crew-served weapons
of .50-caliber or less to Afghan counternarcotics forces. The act also requires annual
reporting on overseas counterdrug activities, and Section 1025 required the Secretary
of Defense to submit an interagency-coordinated report by December 31, 2006,
updating “the interagency counter-narcotics implementation plan for Afghanistan and
104 See Nicholas Rufford, “Secret Bio-weapon Can Wipe Out Afghan Heroin,” Sunday Times
(London), May 26, 2002; Antony Barnett, “UK in Secret Biological War on Drugs,”
Observer (London), September 17, 2000; Juanita Darling, “Fungi May Be the Newest
Recruits in War on Drugs Colombia,” Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2000.
105 According to a USDA official, “The Department of Agriculture, as an agency, is opposed
to the idea [of using mycoherbicides in Afghanistan]: The science is far from complete;
There are real environmental and possible human health negative implications; There are
very real image problems ... the use of any agent like this would be portrayed as biological
warfare.” USDA response to CRS inquiry, October 19, 2004.
106 Report on Counter Drug Efforts in Afghanistan — October 18, 2005, as required by Sec.
7104, Section 207 (b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 (P.L.
108-458); House Committee on International Relations, Ex. Comm. 4575.

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the South and Central Asian regions, including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, India, and China.”
Counternarcotics Funding FY2007 and FY2008. Funding for U.S.
counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan consists of program administration costs
and financial and material assistance to Afghan counternarcotics authorities. On
September 7, 2006, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Defense appropriations
bill for FY2007 (S.Amdt. 4897 to H.R. 5631), which would make available up to an
additional $700 million for Defense Department interdiction and counter-narcotics
activities “to combat the growth of poppies in Afghanistan, to eliminate the
production and trade of opium and heroin, and to prevent terrorists from using the
proceeds for terrorist activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.” The conference
report on H.R. 5631 (H.Rept.109-676) did not contain this provision but provides
$100 million to “expedite” the Defense Department’s non-construction related
counternarcotics efforts in FY2007. The conference report requires the Department
of Defense to submit “a detailed execution plan” on the use of the $100 million to the
congressional defense committees prior to obligating any of the funds. The
conference report also required the Department of Defense to submit an interagency
report on the Administration’s plan to address drug production, drug smuggling, and
narco-terrorism financing in the Central Asian region to the congressional
appropriations committees no later than March 1, 2007.
The House version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R.
5522) would have limited the obligation of Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance
to Afghanistan to $225 million until the Secretary of State certified to the
Appropriations committees that the Afghan government “at both the national and
local level” was fully cooperating with U.S.-funded poppy eradication and drug
interdiction efforts. The Senate version of the FY2007 foreign operations bill did not
contain this provision. An identical certification condition was included in the 2006
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) that provided waiver authority
to the President if he deems it necessary to preserve the vital national security
interests of the United States. The Administration waived its certification
requirement for FY2006 ESF appropriations for Afghanistan on May 22, 2006.107
FY2007 regular Foreign Operations funding for Afghanistan programs is
provided under the terms of a continuing appropriations resolution (H.R. 5631/P.L.
109-289 Division B, as amended by H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5 on February 15, 2007),
which sets funding levels for major Foreign Operations aid accounts. Country
allocations based on those levels were released in June 2007 (see Table 4 below)..
The Senate and House-approved conference report on H.R. 1591 (H.Rept.110-
107), the FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations act, directs $465 million
in funding for counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan and surrounding countries.
President Bush vetoed H.R. 1591 on May 1, 2007. However, the subsequently
107 U.S. Department of State Public Notice 5486, “Determination To Waive the Certification
Requirement that the Government of Afghanistan Is Cooperating Fully with U.S.-Funded
Poppy Eradication and Interdiction Efforts in Afghanistan,” May 22, 2006. Federal
Register, Volume 71, Number 153, August 9, 2006.

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CRS-43
adopted supplemental (H.R. 2206/P.L.110-28) contains general provisions that
incorporate the text of the conference report (H.Rept.110-107). Section 1306 of the
act limits the amount of counternarcotics support that may be provided to
Afghanistan and Pakistan to $60 million in addition to funds already appropriated.
The act also requires the DEA Administrator to submit a report by July 31, 2007 that
includes a plan to target and arrest Afghan drug kingpins in Helmand and Kandahar
provinces.
The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 2764, the FY2008
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations bill on June 18,
2007. The committee report (H.Rept. 110-197) would limit the obligation of FY2008
ESF assistance to Afghanistan to $300 million until the Secretary of State certifies
to the Appropriations committees that the Afghan government “at both the national
and local level” is fully cooperating with U.S.-funded poppy eradication and drug
interdiction efforts. The report provides for a presidential waiver of this provision,
subject to a reporting requirement.
Other key provisions in the House version of H.R. 2764 include a requirement
that no funds “shall be made available for eradication programs through the spraying
of herbicides,” and direction to the Secretary of State to initiate a pilot crop
substitution program in “an area in which poppy production is prevalent.” The
Administration also would be required to report on “the use of aerial assets to include
fixed and rotary wing aircraft in coordination with and in support of Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) counternarcotics operations,” and “the
extradition status of Afghan drug kingpins and narco terrorists, the destruction of
Afghan heroin laboratories, local Afghan prosecutions of heroin-related crimes, and
illegal border crossings by foreign nationals from Pakistan into Afghanistan.”
The Senate-approved version of H.R. 2764 (S.Rept. 110-28, passed September
6, 2007) did not contain these or other provisions specifically related to
counternarcotics in Afghanistan.
See the tables below for more detail on Foreign Operations and Defense funding
requests for FY2007 and FY2008.
Table 4 displays the core counternarcotics funding requests for Afghanistan for
the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense for FY2007-FY2008.
Table 5 describes the Administration’s planned use for requested supplemental
counternarcotics funding for the Department of Defense for FY2008.
Table 6 displays the State Department/USAID Foreign Operations FY2008
request by program element.
Table 7 displays the funding appropriated for U.S. counternarcotics activities
in Afghanistan and related regional programs from FY2002 through FY2006.
Table 8 describes the United Kingdom’s spending on counternarcotics
programs in Afghanistan for 2005-2006.

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CRS-44
Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding and Requests for Afghanistan, FY2007-FY2008 ($ million)
FY2008 Defense
FY2007 Supplemental
FY2008
FY2008
Agency
Appropriation
FY2007a
P.L. 110-28
Request
Supplemental Request
P.L.110-116
State/USAID
$318.74
$210.70c
$326.90
-
$16.00d
Defense Department
$119.69b
$254.67
$27.69
$24.05e
$263.51f
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Requests, FY2007 and FY2008, available at [http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/]; U.S.
Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, FY2008 Program and Budget Guide - South Asia, available at
[http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/93286.htm]; U.S. Department of Defense - Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), FY2007 and FY2008 Justification Materials,
available at [http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/index.html; and, Office of the Secretary of Defense communication to CRS, December 4, 2007.
a. FY2007 regular State/USAID funding for Afghanistan is provided under the terms of a continuing appropriations resolution (H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289 Division B, as amended by
H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5 on February 15, 2007), which sets funding levels for major Foreign Operations aid accounts. Total account allocations based on those levels were released
in June 2007. The FY2007 column above shows the sum of the agreed allocation for the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account and the original
narcotics-related Economic Support Funding (ESF) request for Afghanistan.
b. Includes $100 million in Title IX funds provided by the conference report on H.R. 5631 (H.Rept.109-676) to “expedite” the Defense Department’s non-construction related
counternarcotics efforts in FY2007. The conference report requires the Department of Defense to submit “a detailed execution plan” on the use of the $100 million to the
congressional defense committees prior to obligating any of the funds.
c. Includes $155 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for rural development, $47 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds, and $8.7
million for special USAID operating expenses in Afghanistan.
d. Includes $16 million in supplemental funds requested for special USAID operating expenses in Afghanistan.
e. Includes $4.65 million in appropriated funds planned for use in Turkmenistan, Krygyzstan, and Tajikistan.
f. Includes $94.8 million in supplemental funds requested for use in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.

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Table 5. Defense Department Planned Use of FY2008 Appropriated and Supplemental Funds
($ million)
FY2008 Defense Appropriation
FY2008 Supplemental
Proposed Purpose
P.L.110-116
Request
National Interdiction Unit (NIU), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) Support
$6.296
$97.775
Intelligence Fusion Center
$5.100
$2.175
Counternarcotics Border Police Support
-
$17.546
Intelligence and Technology Efforts [inspection, imagery, technology support]
-
$51.200
Other Program Support
$8.000
-
Other Nation Support [CENTCOM AOR]
$5.466a
$94.818b
Total
$24.862
$263.514
Source: U.S. Department of Defense - Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), FY2007 and FY2008 Justification Materials. Drug Interdiction and Counter Drug
Activities, Defense FY2007 and FY2008 Emergency Supplemental Requests - CN Supp OP-5, available at [http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy08GWOT.html]; and,
Office of the Secretary of Defense communication to CRS, December 4, 2007.
a. Includes appropriated funds planned for use in Turkmenistan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan, and “other countries” in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
b. Includes supplemental funds requested for use in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.

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CRS-46
Table 6. State Department/USAID Foreign Operations FY2008
Request by Program Element
($ million)
Program Element
Request
Eradication
$190.30
Alternative Development and Alternative Livelihoods
$118.61
Interdiction
$13.00
Drug Demand Reduction
$3.00
Program Support (Narcotics)
$1.99
Total
$326.90

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations
Request, FY2008, available at [http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/].

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CRS-47
Table 7. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source, FY2002-FY2006
($ million)
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Approp.
P.L.
Approp.
P.L.
Approp.
P.L.
P.L.
Approp.
Approp.
P.L. 109-
P.L. 109-13
Funds
107-206
Funds
108-11
Funds
108-106
107-38
Funds
Funds
234
Dept. of State
$3.00a
$60.00
$3.00a
$25.00 -
$170.00b
$50.00c
$89.28
$260.00
$232.65
-
Dept. of Defense
-
-
-
-
-
$73.00
-
$15.40
$242.00
$27.80h
$141.87g
DEAd
($0.58)
-
($2.92)
-
-
($3.96)
-
($7.67)
$7.65
$17.60e $9.20
USAIDf -
$9.99
$14.29
-
$53.55
-
-
$95.69
$248.50
$90.50
-
Annual Total
$73.57
$45.21
$350.51
$966.19
$519.62
Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development - Budget Justifications to the Congress, Department of State - Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Office
of the Secretary of Defense - Defense Budget Materials, Office of Management and Budget, and Legislative Information System.
a. $3 million funding for Southwest Asia Initiative counternarcotics programs in Pakistan partially designed to restrict the flow of Afghan opiates.
b. Of the $170 million in supplemental funds, $110 million was channeled toward police training and judicial reform programs.
c. Reprogrammed funds appropriated as part of $40 billion Emergency Response Fund established in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.
d. On May 8, 2002, Congress approved a reprogramming of 17 positions and $15,125,000 in Violent Crime Reduction Program prior year funds to support the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s ‘Operation Containment,’ which targets heroin trafficking in Southwest Asia. The figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect annual expenditure of the
reprogrammed obligated funds. (DEA response to CRS request, October 2004.)
e. FY2006 funds include $7.72 million for Operation Containment, $4.3 million to support Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) teams, and $5.58 million for DEA offices in Kabul
and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. New funds were not appropriated for the creation of a DEA office in Dubai, United Arab Emirates authorized in H.Rept. 109-272.
f. USAID figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect funds applied to USAID’s “Agriculture” and “Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” programs (Program #306-001).
g. Reflects supplemental funds earmarked for use in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, and Tajikistan.
h. Author consultations with Defense Department officials and appropriations committee staff, June 2005 and September 2006. Appropriated fund totals reflect funds requested and
obligated to continue programs in the entire U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, including countries along the Arabian Sea littoral, the Horn of Africa,
and Central Asia.

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Table 8. United Kingdom Counternarcotics Funding 2005-2006
Pillar/Program Area
$ million
£ million
Public Awareness
$1.225
£0.649
Demand Reduction
$2.100
£1.112
Law Enforcement
$39.251
£20.787
Criminal Justice
$2.100
£1.112
Institution Building
$9.775
£5.177
Alternative Livelihoods
$70.847
£37.520
International and Regional Cooperation
$3.788
£2.006
Counternarcotics Trust Fund Contribution
$16.994
£9.000
Law and Order Trust Fund Contribution
$2.832
£1.500
Strategy, Research, and Reviews
$5.608
£2.970
Total
$154.520
£81.833
Source: Dr. Kim Howells, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister for the
Middle East, “Afghanistan: Counter Narcotics,” House of Commons Hansard
Ministerial Statements for July 13, 2006 (Pt. 0134).

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Appendix A
Cited Field Surveys
Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd (eds.), Afghanistan’s Drug Industry:
Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics
Policy, World Bank/UNODC, November 2006.
Jonathan Goodhand, “From Holy War to Opium War: A Case Study of the Opium
Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan,” Peacebuilding and Complex
Emergencies Working Paper Series, No. 5, University of Manchester, 1999.
Frank Kenefick, and Larry Morgan, “Opium in Afghanistan: People and Poppies —
The Good Evil,” Chemonics International Inc. for USAID, February 5, 2004.
David Mansfield, “Coping Strategies, Accumulated Wealth and Shifting Markets:
The Story of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Badakhshan 2000-2003,” Agha
Khan Development Network, January 2004.
——, “Alternative Development in Afghanistan: The Failure of Quid Pro Quo,”
International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug
Control and Development Cooperation, January 2002.
——, “Exploring the ‘Shades of Grey’: An Assessment of the Factors. Influencing
Decisions to Cultivate Opium Poppy in 2005/06, Report for the Afghan
Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit of the Government of the United Kingdom,
December 2005.
David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Opium Poppy Eradication: How to Raise Risk
When There is Nothing to Lose?” Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit,
August 2006.
Adam Pain, “The Impact of the Opium Poppy Economy on Household Livelihoods:
Evidence from the Wakhan Corridor and Khustak Valley in Badakhshan,”
Aga Kahn Development Network, Badakhshan Programme, January 2004.
UNODC, Strategic Study Series #1-6, June 1998-June 2000.

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