Order Code RL34263
U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities:
Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik
December 3, 2007
Deborah D. Stine
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities:
Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik
Summary
The “space age” began on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union (USSR)
launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite. Some U.S. policymakers,
concerned about the USSR’s ability to launch a satellite, thought Sputnik might be
an indication that the United States was trailing behind the USSR in science and
technology. The Cold War also led some U.S. policymakers to perceive the Sputnik
launch as a possible precursor to nuclear attack. In response to this “Sputnik
moment,” the U.S. government undertook several policy actions, including the
establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), enhancement of
research funding, and reformation of science, technology, engineering and
mathematics (STEM) education policy.
Following the “Sputnik moment,” a set of fundamental factors gave
“importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology,”
according to an Eisenhower presidential committee. These four factors include the
compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence
in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and military systems; and scientific
observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the
Earth, solar system, and universe. They are still part of current policy discussions
and influence the nation’s civilian space policy priorities — both in terms of what
actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the appropriations each activity within
NASA receives. NASA has active programs that address all four factors, but many
believe that it is being asked to accomplish too much for the available resources.
Further, the United States faces a far different world today. No Sputnik
moment, Cold War, or space race exists to help policymakers clarify the goals of the
nation’s civilian space program. The Hubble telescope, Challenger and Columbia
space shuttle disasters, and Mars exploration rovers frame the experience of current
generations, in contrast to the Sputnik launch and the U.S. Moon landings that form
the experience of older generations. As a result, some experts have called for new
21st century space policy objectives and priorities to replace those developed 50 years
ago.
The authorization of NASA funding in the National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 2005 (P.L. 109-55) extends through FY2008. Congress may decide to maintain
or shift NASA’s priorities during the next reauthorization. For example, if Congress
believes that national prestige should be the highest priority, they may choose to
emphasize NASA’s human exploration activities, such as establishing a Moon base
and landing a human on Mars. If they consider scientific knowledge the highest
priority, unmanned missions and other science-related activities may be Congress’
major goal for NASA. If international relations are a high priority, Congress might
encourage other nations to become equal partners in NASA’s activities. If spinoff
effects, such as the creation of new jobs and markets and its effect on STEM
education are Congress’ priorities, then technological development, linking to the
needs of business and industry, and education may become NASA’s primary goals.
Contents
Sputnik and America’s “Sputnik Moment” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Why Was Sputnik So Influential? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Why Is Sputnik Important to Today’s Policies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
What Are the Activities of Other Nations and the Commercial Sector in
Space Exploration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
What Is the Nation’s Current Civilian Space Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Why Invest in Space Exploration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
What Is the Public’s Attitude Toward Space Exploration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
What Are the Nation’s Priorities for Civilian Space Exploration and Its
Implications for Future Space Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Figures
Figure 1. Sputnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. Timeline of Select Policy Events in the Year Following the
Sputnik Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 3. Global Space Economy Revenues, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. NASA Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix Table: Possible U.S. Civilian Space Policy Objectives:
Comparison of Selected Extracts from Historical and Current
Space Policy Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities:
Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik
Current U.S. space policy is based on a set of fundamental factors which,
according to an Eisenhower presidential committee, “give importance, urgency, and
inevitability to the advancement of space technology.”1 These factors were developed
fifty years ago as a direct result of the Soviet Union’s (USSR) launch of the first
artificial satellite, Sputnik. This launch began the “space age” and a “space race”
between the United States and USSR.
The four factors are the compelling need to explore and discover; national
defense; prestige and confidence in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and
military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our
knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system, and universe.2 They are still
part of current policy discussions and influence the nation’s civilian space policy
priorities — both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the
appropriations each activity within NASA receives.
NASA has active programs that address all four factors, but many believe that
it is being asked to accomplish too much for the available resources. An
understanding of how policy decisions made during the Sputnik era influence U.S.
space policy today may be useful as Congress considers changing that policy. The
response of Congress to the fundamental question, “Why go to space?,” may
influence NASA’s programs, such as its earth-observing satellites, human
exploration of the Moon and Mars, and robotic investigation of the solar system and
wider universe as well as its policies on related activities, including spinoff
technological development, science and mathematics education, international
relations, and commercial space transportation.
This report describes Sputnik and its influence on today’s U.S. civilian space
policy, the actions other nations and commercial organizations are taking in space
exploration, and why the nation invests in space exploration and the public’s attitude
toward it. The report concludes with a discussion of possible options for future U.S.
civilian space policy priorities and the implication of those priorities.
1 U.S. President (Dwight D. Eisenhower), President’s Science Advisory Committee,
Introduction to Outer Space, March 26, 1958. p. 1, at [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/
History/monograph10/doc6.pdf].
2 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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Sputnik and America’s “Sputnik Moment”
On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial
satellite. Sputnik (Russian for “traveling companion”) was the size of a basketball
and weighed 183 pounds (see Figure 1). Sputnik’s launch and orbit3 still influences
policy decisions 50 years later.
The USSR’s ability to launch a satellite ahead of the United States led to a
national concern that the United States was falling behind the USSR in its science
and technology capabilities and thus might be vulnerable to a nuclear missile attack.4
The resulting competition for scientific and technological superiority came to
represent a competition between capitalism and communism.
Figure 1. Sputnik
Source: NASA, at [http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/gallerysput.html].
Both the 85th Congress and President Eisenhower undertook an immediate set
of policy actions in response to the launch of Sputnik. Congress established the
Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics on February 6, 1958, and the
House Select Committee on Science and Astronautics on March 5, 1958 — the first
time since 1892 that both the House and Senate took action to create standing
committees on an entirely new subject. Each committee was chaired by the Majority
3 Sputnik 1 orbited the Earth every 96 minutes until it fell from orbit on January 4, 1958,
three months after its launch. Roger D. Launius, “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space
Age,” at [http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html].
4 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Center, “Sputnik and the Space Race,” at
[http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/dl/Sputnik/Sputnikdocuments.html].
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Leader. The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee was also active in analyzing the nation’s satellite and missile programs.5
Multiple congressional hearings were held in the three months following
Sputnik, and President Eisenhower addressed the nation to assure the public that the
United States was scientifically strong and able to compete in space. Within 10
months after Sputnik’s launch, the Eisenhower Administration and Congress took
actions that
! established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) through the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L.
85-568),6
! established the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) within the Department of Defense through DOD Directive
5105.15 and National Security - Military Installations and Facilities
(P.L. 85-325),7
! increased its appropriation for the National Science Foundation to
$134 million, nearly $100 million higher than the previous year,8 and
! reformed elementary, secondary, and postsecondary science and
mathematics education (including gifted education) and provided
incentives for American students to pursue science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics postsecondary degrees via fellowships
and loans through the National Defense Education Act (P.L.
85-864).9
5 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Toward the Endless
Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79, prepared for the
Committee by Ken Hechler, committee print, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Prt. 35-120,
(Washington: GPO, 1980), pp. 1-28.
6 P.L. 85-568, The National Aeronautics and Space Act (“Space Act”), July 29, 1958, at
[http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ogc/about/space_act1.html].
7 DARPA was originally called the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). It was
established by DOD Directive 5105.15 on February 7, 1958, and by Congress in P. L. 85-
325 on February 12, 1958. The name was changed from ARPA to DARPA by DoD
Directive on March 23, 1972. DARPA was redesignated ARPA by President Bill Clinton
in an Administration document on February 22, 1993. ARPA’s name was changed back to
DARPA by P.L. 104-106 on February 10, 1996. For more information about DARPA and
its history, see DARPA, “Defense Advanced Research Project Agency: Technology
Transition,” January 1997 at [http://www.darpa.mil/body/pdf/transition.pdf].
8 The appropriation for NSF continued to increase in future years. In 1968, it was almost
$500 million. National Science Foundation, An Overview of the First 50 years, at
[http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/overview-50.jsp].
9 P.L. 85-864, National Defense Education Act (NDEA), September 2, 1958.
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Figure 2 provides a timeline of the some of the major policy events in the year
following the Sputnik launch.
When people today speak of a “Sputnik moment,” they often refer to a rapid
national response that quickly mobilizes major policy change as opposed to a
response of inaction or incremental policy change. The term is also used to question
inaction — as in whether or not the nation is prepared to respond to a challenge
without an initiating Sputnik moment.
Figure 2. Timeline of Select Policy Events in the Year Following the
Sputnik Launch
Source: Association of American Universities, at [http://www.aau.edu/education/
Sputnik_Timeline_2007-09-20.pdf].
Notes: DARPA was also established by Congress in P.L. 85-325.
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Why Was Sputnik So Influential?
The Sputnik launch captured the public’s attention at a time of heightened U.S.
tension regarding the threat posed by the USSR and communism. Societal focus on
civil defense, including “duck and cover” drills and the establishment of some
personal bomb shelters, predisposed the nation towards identifying the potential
threat posed by the Sputnik launch.10 In this climate, many Americans became
concerned that if the USSR could launch a satellite into space, it could also launch
a nuclear missile capable of reaching the United States.11
The Sputnik launch was immediately viewed as a challenge to U.S. scientific
and technological prowess. The Soviet Union launched both Sputnik and Sputnik 2
before the United States was able to attempt a satellite launch.12 Additionally, the
Soviet launch was of a far heavier satellite than the U.S. had planned.13 The net
result of the Sputnik launch was called a “Pearl Harbor for American Science” — a
sign that the United States was falling behind the USSR in science and technology.14
The ensuing competition in scientific and technological skills came to represent a
competition to determine the political superiority of capitalism versus communism.
The Senate Majority Leader at the time, future President Lyndon B. Johnson,
illustrated the concern of many Americans in his own observations of the night sky:
“Now, somehow, in some new way, the sky seemed almost alien. I also remember
the profound shock of realizing that it might be possible for another nation to achieve
technological superiority over this great country of ours.”15
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Center, “Sputnik and the Space Race,” at
[http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/dl/Sputnik/Sputnikdocuments.html].
11 Council on Foreign Relations, Chronology of National Missile Defense Programs, June
1, 2002, at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/10443/].
12 The Project Vanguard booster tests on December 6, 1957 (rose 3 feet, caught fire) and
February 5, 1958 (rose 4 miles, exploded) were unsuccessful. A new effort, Project
Explorer led by Wernher von Braun, was initiated. Explorer 1 was successful, after two
aborted launches, on January 31, 1958. Roger D. Launius, “Sputnik and the Origins of the
Space Age,” at [http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html].
13 Sputnik 1 weighed 183 pounds. Sputnik 2 launched on November 3, 1957 weighed 1,120
pounds, carried a dog, and stayed in orbit for almost 200 days. The first satellite to be
launched in the American Project Vanguard was planned to be 3.5 pounds. Roger D.
L a u n i u s , “ S p u t n i k a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f t h e S p a c e A g e , ” a t
[http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html].
14 Davis, James C., The Human Story: Our History, From the Stone Age to Today (New
York: Harper Collins, 2004). According to Davis, the statement was made by a Japanese
newspaper shortly after the event. Others called it a “technological Pearl Harbor.”
15 Roger D. Launius, “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age,” at
[http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html].
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Why Is Sputnik Important to Today’s Policies?
The Sputnik launch prompted rapid development of new federal policies and
programs. In particular, federal investment in NASA is still influenced by the
Sputnik-era principles as illustrated in the Space Act, both in terms of what actions
NASA is authorized to undertake and the extent to which each activity is funded.
In 2005, NASA was reauthorized for FY2007 and FY2008.16 As Congress
considers future reauthorization of NASA and the agency’s 50th anniversary in 2008,
the status of the nation’s space policy, and the relative importance of the various
objectives underlying this policy may become topics of debate.
The United States faces a far different world today than 50 years ago. No
Sputnik moment, Cold War, or space race exists to help policymakers clarify the
goals of the nation’s civilian space program. The Hubble telescope, Challenger and
Columbia space shuttle disasters, and Mars exploration rovers frame the experience
of current generations, in contrast to the Sputnik launch and the U.S. Moon landings
that form the experience of older generations.
What Are the Activities of Other Nations and the
Commercial Sector in Space Exploration?
The United States faces a possible new set of competitors or collaborators in
civilian space exploration. China, India, Japan, Russia, and Europe are taking an
active role in space exploration as are commercial companies.17 Japan’s Moon
orbiter was launched on September 14, 2007, and arrived at the Moon on October 4,
2007, the 50th anniversary of Sputnik. China’s Moon orbiter was launched on
October 24, 2007 and entered lunar orbit on November 5, 2007. India and the United
States also plan to launch vehicles into the Moon’s orbit by the end of 2008. The
European Space Agency (ESA) is studying a Moon-lander mission, but its major
focus is on Mars. The United Kingdom and Germany are independently proposing
national Moon-orbiter projects, but their governments have not yet funded or
approved these activities.18
16 NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155).
17 Peter Spotts, “Many Contestants in Latest ‘Space Race’ to the Moon,” Christian Science
Monitor, October 1, 2007.
18 Frank Morring, Jr., Michael A. Taverna and Neelam Mathew, “Nations Looking For a
Piece of the Exploration Pie,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 30, 2007,
at [http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/
aw100107p2.xml&headline=Nations%20Looking%20For%20a%20Piece%20of%20the
%20Exploration%20Pie].
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China became the third country to send people into space, after the USSR19 and
the United States, completing two human spaceflight missions in 2003 and 2005.20
Press reports indicate that China plans a manned Moon landing leading up to
establishment of a Moon base after 2020,21 though some have questioned these
reports.22 NASA Administrator Michael Griffin contends that China is likely to be
the first country to land a human on the Moon since the last U.S. landing in 1972.23
China has also indicated plans for a joint mission with Russia to send a satellite to
orbit Mars in 2009.24
In the commercial sector, the X-Prize Foundation announced on September 13,
2007, the Google Lunar X Prize ($30 million) that invites private teams from around
the world to build a robotic rover capable of landing on the Moon.25 Virgin Galactic,
currently based in California with a spaceport under construction in New Mexico, has
plans for SpaceShipTwo, a six-passenger spaceliner with test flights scheduled for
2007 and suborbital passenger services to follow in 2008.26 In Europe,
EADS-Astrium is developing a four-person spacecraft to make suborbital trips with
possibly the first commercial flight in 2012.27 According to press reports, a number
19 Since the fall of the USSR, Russia is the only former-USSR country to conduct space
missions.
20 See CRS Report RS21641, China’s Space Program: An Overview, by Marcia S. Smith.
21 Agence France-Press, “China Aims for Lunar Base after 2020,” September 26, 2007, at
[http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070926/wl_asia_afp/spacechinamoon_070926154203].
Paul Maidmen, “China Shoots for the Moon,” Forbes, August 14, 2007, at
[http://www.forbes.com/opinions/2007/08/14/notn-china-aerospace-oped-cx_pm_0814no
tn.html].
22 Dwayne Day, “Exploding Moon Myths: Or Why There’s No Race to Our Nearest
Neighbor,” The Space Review, November 12, 2007, at [http://www.thespacereview.com/
article/999/1].
23 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, NASA Fiscal Year 2008
Budget Request, hearing, 110th Cong.,1st sess., March 15, 2007, H.Rept. 110-12,
(Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 48. Michael D. Griffin, “The Role of Space Exploration in
the Global Economy,” speech, September 17, 2007, p. 41 at
[http://www.nasa.gov/audience/formedia/speeches/mg_speech_collection_archive_1.html].
24 “China and Russia Join Hands to Explore Mars,” People’s Daily Online, May 30, 2007,
at [http://english.people.com.cn/200705/30/eng20070530_379330.html].
25 X-prize Foundation, “Google Sponsors Lunar X PRIZE to Create a Space Race for a New
Generation,” press release, September 13, 2007, at [http://www.xprize.org/lunar/
press-release/google-sponsors-lunar-x-prize-to-create-a-space-race-for-a-new-generation].
26 Virgin Galactic, Overview, at [http://www.virgingalactic.com/]. NASA has signed a
memorandum of understanding with Virgin Galactic to explore the potential for
collaborations on the development of space suits, heat shields for spaceships, hybrid rocket
motors, and hypersonic vehicles capable of traveling five or more times the speed of sound.
See NASA, “NASA, Virgin Galactic to Explore Future Cooperation,” press release,
February 21, 2007, at [http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/feb/
HQ_07049_Virgin_Galactic.html].
27 EADS-Astrium, “Astrium Rockets into Space Tourism,” press release, June 13, 2007, at
(continued...)
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of venture capitalists are also planning to build spaceships or develop private space
programs.28
If China is the first to land humans on the Moon and establish a Moon base in
the 21st century or the European Space Agency is the first to land humans on Mars,
will policymakers and the public view these activities as a loss in United States status
and leadership? If so, what are the policy implications? Would such activities
become this century’s “Sputnik moment” that would spur further investment in U.S.
space exploration activities? If not, how might this affect U.S. space policy
priorities?
What Is the Nation’s Current Civilian Space Policy?
On August 31, 2006, President Bush announced a new U.S. National Space
Policy.29 The space policy defined the key objectives of defense and civilian space
policy. The new space policy incorporated key elements of the Vision for Space
Exploration (“Vision”), often referred to as the Moon/Mars program, previously
announced on January 14, 2004.
In the Vision, President Bush announced new goals for NASA.30 The President
directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and
eventually sending them to Mars and “worlds beyond.”31 The President further
directed NASA to fulfill commitments made to the 13 countries that are its partners
in the International Space Station (ISS). In the 2005 NASA authorization act (P.L.
109-155), Congress directed NASA to establish a program to accomplish the goals
outlined in the Vision, which are that the United States
! Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program
to explore the solar system and beyond;
! Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a
human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for
human exploration of Mars and other destinations;
27 (...continued)
[http://www.astrium.eads.net/press-center/press-releases/astrium-rockets-into-space-touri
sm].
28 Jeremy Quittner (ed.), “I Need My Space,” Business Week, Winter 2007, at
[http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_09/b4023413.htm].
29 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, at
[http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf]. It replaced the
previous space policy that had been in place for 10 years.
30 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration
Program, Fact Sheet: A Renewed Spirit of Discovery, January 14, 2004, at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040114-1.html].
31 Twelve U.S. astronauts walked on the Moon between 1969 and 1972. No humans have
visited Mars.
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! Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures
both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for
human exploration; and
! Promote international and commercial participation in exploration
to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.32
More specifically, the Vision includes plans, via a strategy based on “long-term
affordability,” to
! return the Space Shuttle safely to flight (which has been
accomplished),
! complete the International Space Station (ISS) by 2010 but
discontinue its use by 2017,
! phase out the Space Shuttle when the ISS is complete by 2010,
! send a robotic orbiter and lander to the Moon,
! send a human expedition to the Moon (sometime between 2015-
2020),
! send a robotic mission to Mars in preparation for a future human
expedition, and
! conduct robotic exploration across the solar system.33
NASA is developing a new spacecraft called Orion (formerly the Crew
Exploration Vehicle) and a new launch vehicle for it called Ares I (formerly the Crew
Launch Vehicle). An Earth-orbit capability is planned by 2014 (although NASA now
considers early 2015 more likely) with the ability to take astronauts to and from the
Moon following no later than 2020.
The Vision has broad implications for NASA, especially since almost all the
funds to implement the initiative are expected to come from other NASA activities.
Among the issues Congress is debating are the balance between NASA’s exploration
activities and its other programs, such as science and aeronautics research; the impact
of the Vision on NASA’s workforce needs; whether the space shuttle program might
be ended in 2010; and if the United States might discontinue using the International
Space Station.34
32 U.S. President (G. W. Bush), “A Renewed Spirit of Discovery,” document, January 14,
2004, at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/space/renewed_spirit.html].
33 NASA, Vision for Space Exploration, February 2004, at [http://www.nasa.gov/
mission_pages/exploration/main/index.html].
34 CRS Report RS22625, National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Overview,
FY2008 Budget in Brief, and Key Issues for Congress, by Daniel Morgan and Carl E.
Behrens; CRS Report RL33568, The International Space Station and the Space Shuttle, by
Carl E. Behrens; and CRS Report RS21720, Space Exploration: Issues Concerning the
“Vision for Space Exploration,” by Marcia S. Smith.
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NASA states that its strategy is to “go as we can afford to pay,” with the pace
of the program set, in part, by the available funding.35 Affording such a program is
challenging, however, with a 2006 National Research Council report finding “NASA
is being asked to accomplish too much with too little.” The report recommended
that “both the executive and the legislative branches of the federal government need
to seriously examine the mismatch between the tasks assigned to NASA and the
resources that the agency has been provided to accomplish them and should identify
actions that will make the agency’s portfolio of responsibilities sustainable.”36
At a House Committee on Appropriations hearing, Dr. Michael Griffin, NASA’s
Administrator, acknowledged that funding is a challenge, stating
Many people are amazed by the things that NASA accomplishes but don’t realize
that our budget is only 0.6 percent of the entire federal budget of the United
States. As one of the most internationally recognized agencies in the government,
many people assume that NASA’s budget is much higher. In reality, we have to
make tough choices in the allocation of scarce resources. We just cannot do
everything that our many constituencies would like us to do. We need to set
carefully considered priorities of time, energy and resources, and for this we’re
guided by the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, our annual appropriations,
presidential policy, and the decadal surveys of the National Academy of
Sciences. 37
The House Committee on Appropriations also expressed concerns about these
issues, stating NASA “has too many responsibilities and not enough resources to
accomplish them all.”38 Similarly, the Senate Committee on Appropriations stated
NASA’s vision for space exploration maps out an aggressive role for the United
States in manned space exploration. However, the potential costs are substantial
and will likely be very difficult to maintain at the current estimated funding
levels. The Committee is concerned that NASA will neglect areas that only
tangentially benefit, or do not fit within, the exploration vision. The Committee
35 Testimony of Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics and Related Sciences, Budget Hearing, U.S. Senate,
F e b r u a r y 2 8 , 2 0 0 7 , a t [ h t t p : / / c o m m e r c e . s e n a t e . g o v / p u b l i c / _ f i l e s /
Testimony_MichaelDGriffin_NASA_FY2008PostureStatementFINAL22707.pdf].
36 National Research Council, Space Studies Board, An Assessment of Balance in NASA’s
Science Program, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 2 [http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=11644].
37 Testimony of Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, FY2008 Budget
Hearing, March 13, 2007, at [http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data
/docs/html/transcripts/congressional/110/congressionaltranscripts110-000002468892.ht
ml@committees&metapub=CQ-CONGTRANSCRIPTS].
38 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, report to accompany H.R. 3093,
110th Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 2007, H.Rept. 110-24, part 1 (Washington: GPO, 2007), p.
109.
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believes that NASA must work diligently to balance existing programs and
priorities with its plans for the future.39
Why Invest in Space Exploration?
The Appendix Table compares The National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958 as amended (“Space Act”),40 the oldest and most recent Presidential
commission reports (Killian41 and Aldridge42), the U.S. National Space Policy43
(“Space Policy”), and comments by members of Congress in the 110th Congress on
the issue of why the United States might explore space. The analyses identify the
following reasons why the United States might explore space:
! knowledge and understanding,
! discovery,
! economic growth — job creation and new markets,
! national prestige, and
! defense.
Some also include the following reasons:
39 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, report to accompany S. 1745, 110th
Cong., 1st sess., June 29, 2007, S.Rept. 110-24, part 1 (Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 101.
40 P.L. 85-568, The National Aeronautics and Space Act, July 29, 1958, at
[http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ogc/about/space_act1.html]. Since 1958, the objectives have
only had two modifications. The clause, “of the Earth and” was added to the first objective
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1985, P.L.
98-361, § I 10(b), 98 Stat. 422, 426 (July 16, 1984). Objective (9) was added by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, P.L.
100-685, § 214, 102 Stat. 4083, 4093 (November 17, 1988). Objective (9) states the
following: “The preservation of the United States’ preeminent position in aeronautics and
space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing
processes.”
41 During the Sputnik era, President Eisenhower’s Science Advisory Committee, chaired
by George Killian, (“Killian Commission”) responded to the fundamental question of why
the United States might undertake a national space program in its report Introduction to
Outer Space. (U.S. President (Dwight D. Eisenhower), President’s Science Advisory
Committee, Introduction to Outer Space, March 26, 1958. p. 2, at
[http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/monograph10/doc6.pdf]). The President’s
Science Advisory Committee is analogous to today’s President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (PCAST).
42 U.S. President (George W. Bush), President’s Commission on Implementation of United
States Space Exploration Policy, A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discovery, June 2004.
Available at [http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf]. The
commission report is named for its chair, Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr., and called the
“Aldridge Commission” report.
43 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, at
[http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf].
CRS-12
! international relations, and
! education and workforce development.
Although there is broad agreement on the reasons for space exploration, there
is a great deal of variation in the details. Among the chief differences in these
documents are the degree to which
! discovery is the major reason for space exploration as opposed to
meeting needs here on Earth;
! creation of jobs and new markets should be a major focus of NASA
activities as opposed to a side effect;
! science and mathematics education and workforce development
should be a goal of NASA in addition to other federal agencies; and
! relationships with other countries should be competitive or
cooperative regarding space exploration.
According to an analysis conducted by the Space Foundation, the global space
industry in 2005 generated $180 billion in revenues.44 (See Figure 3.) Comparing
the Aldridge Commission themes, the Space Policy goals, and the Space Act
objectives on the issue of the relationship of the space program to economic growth
provides some insights. While the Aldridge committee has a much broader view of
the industries related to space exploration, focusing on the potential role of space
exploration in job generation and new market development, the Space Act and Space
Policy focus on only one sector, the aeronautical and space vehicle industry.
44 Space Foundation, The Space Report: Guide to Global Space Activities, 2006, at
[http://www.thespacereport.org/]. For more on the space economy, see Michael D. Griffin,
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Space Economy, NASA
50th Anniversary Lecture Series, September 17, 2007, at [http://www.nasa.gov/audience
/formedia/speeches/mg_speech_collection_archive_1.html].
CRS-13
Figure 3. Global Space Economy Revenues, 2005
Source: Space Foundation, The Space Report: Guide to Global Space Activities, 2006, at
[http://www.thespacereport.org/].
The two Presidential commissions have two key differences. One is the first
theme outlined in the Sputnik-era Killian Committee report: “the compelling urge
of man to explore and discover.” This is quite different from the recent Aldridge
Commission report, which, although indicating exploration and discovery should be
among NASA goals, states that “exploration and discovery will perhaps not be
sufficient drivers to sustain what will be a long, and at times risky, journey.” The
implication is that, today, solely responding to the challenge of going to the Moon or
Mars is not sufficient to energize public support for space exploration.
The second key difference is the focus of the Aldridge Commission on
economic growth as a proposed space exploration theme. The Aldridge Commission
identifies the ability of investments in civilian space programs to generate new jobs
within current industries and spawn new markets. The contribution that federal space
investments make to the nation’s economy was not a key factor identified by the
Killian Committee.
As a result of its focus on economic growth as a key theme of space exploration,
the Aldridge Commission recommended that “NASA’s relationship to the private
sector, its organizational structure, business culture, and management processes —
all largely inherited from the Apollo era — must be decisively transformed to
implement the new, multi-decadal space exploration vision.” Two of its specific
recommendations were that NASA recognize and implement a far larger private
industry presence in space operations, with the specific goal of allowing private
CRS-14
industry to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA, and that NASA’s
centers be reconfigured as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs) to enable innovation, work effectively with the private sector, and
stimulate economic development.45
FFRDCs are not-for-profit organizations which are financed on a sole-source
basis, exclusively or substantially by an agency of the federal government, and not
subject to Office of Personnel Management regulations. They operate as private
non-profit corporations, although they are subject to certain personnel and budgetary
controls imposed by Congress and/or their sponsoring agency. Each FFRDC is
administered by either an industrial firm, a university, or a nonprofit institution
through a contract with the sponsoring federal agency. FFRDC personnel are not
considered federal employees, but rather employees of the organization that manages
and operates the center.46
Table 1. NASA Centers
Center
Mission Area
Location
Ames Research Center
New Technology Research
Moffett Field, CA
Dryden Flight Research
Flight Research
Edwards, CA
Center
Glenn Research Center
Aeropropulsion and
Cleveland, OH
Communications Technologies
Goddard Space Flight
Earth, the Solar System, and
Greenbelt, MD
Center
Universe Observations
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Robotic Exploration of the Solar
Pasadena, CA
(FFRDC)
System
Johnson Space Center
Human Space Exploration
Clear Lake, TX, near
Houston, TX
Kennedy Space Center
Prepare and Launch Missions
Cape Canaveral, FL
Around the Earth and Beyond
Langley Research Center
Aviation and Space Research
Hampton, VA
Marshall Space Flight
Space Transportation and
Huntsville, AL
Center
Propulsion Technologies
Stennis Space Center
Rocket Propulsion Testing and
Hancock County,
Remote Sensing Technology
MS, near Slidell, LA
Source: NASA, [http://education.nasa.gov/about/nasacenters/index.html]
Note: FFRDC is a federally funded research and development center.
45 U.S. President (George W. Bush), President’s Commission on Implementation of United
States Space Exploration Policy, A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discovery, June 2004,
p. 7, at [http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf].
46 See CRS Report RS21542, Department of Homeland Security: Issues Concerning the
Establishment of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), by
Michael E. Davey.
CRS-15
NASA has not fully adopted the Aldridge Commission recommendations.
NASA has 10 centers (see Table 1).47 One, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), is
already an FFRDC and is managed by the California Institute of Technology. In
2005 testimony before Congress discussing the involvement of private industry in
NASA activities, NASA Administrator Griffin identified a need for continued federal
capabilities. In particular, on the issue of private entrepreneurs who believe that they
can launch vehicles and put payloads, including human beings, into space at a
fraction of what it costs NASA, Griffin stated, “while I am enlisting the
entrepreneurial community to step forward and help meet those requirements, we
cannot stop work on the, admittedly less efficient, government systems.... [T]hat just
doesn’t work.48 Similarly, when asked about whether or not NASA Centers would
be converted to FFRDCs, Administrator Griffin stated, “I do not fundamentally see
any gain to be achieved by having NASA convert federal centers to FFRDCs.”49
What Is the Public’s Attitude Toward Space
Exploration?
Some editorialists question whether investing in space exploration is relevant
today.50 Others question if NASA has the right priorities.51 Would the public care
if the country’s investment in space exploration ended? Does the public believe it
would be better to invest in social needs here on Earth rather than space exploration?
Does the public support the current prioritization of the nation’s space exploration
activities?
According to poll data, Americans do not rank space exploration as a high
priority for federal government spending. For example, in an April 10, 2007 Harris
poll, respondents were given a list of twelve federal government programs and asked
to pick two which should be cut “if spending had to be cut.” Space programs led the
list (51%), followed by welfare programs (28%), defense spending (28%), and farm
subsidies (24%).52 Space exploration was also near the bottom of a University of
47 For more information, see [http://education.nasa.gov/about/nasacenters/index.html].
48 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, Status of NASA’s Programs, H.Rept. 109-
31, 109th Cong., 1st session, November 2, 2005, p. 53 (Washington, GPO, 2005).
49 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, The Future of NASA, H.Rept. 109-19, 109th
Cong., 1st session, June 28, 2005, p. 48 (Washington, GPO, 2005).
50 See, for example, Anne Applebaum, “Mission to Nowhere,” Washington Post, January
7, 2004, p. A21.
51 See, for example, Gregg Easterbrook, “How NASA Screwed Up (And Four Ways to Fix
It),” Wired, May 22, 2007, at [http://www.wired.com/science/space/magazine/
15-06/ff_space_nasa]; The Economist, “Spacemen Are from Mars,” September 27, 2007,
at [http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9867224].
52 Harris Interactive, “Closing the Budget Deficit: U.S. Adults Strongly Resist Raising Any
Taxes Except “Sin Taxes” Or Cutting Major Programs,” press release, April 10, 2007, at
[http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=746]. The poll was of 2,223
(continued...)
CRS-16
Chicago National Opinion Research Center survey reported in January 2007 that
asked Americans about how they would prioritize federal spending.53
On the other hand, Americans are interested in space exploration. According to
a Zogby poll reported in May 2007, most Americans (66%) are interested in space
exploration with about half of those personally interested in commercial space travel
and tourism. About half (49%) gave NASA a positive job approval rating. Many of
those surveyed (45%) expressed concerns that the shuttle fleet is too old, too
expensive, and too frail to fly humans into space safely. NASA’s great
achievements, according to poll respondents, are the Apollo Moon missions (34%)
and the Hubble Space Telescope (18%).54
NASA’s Office of Strategic Communication funded several analyses of the
public’s attitude toward space exploration based on focus groups55 and a survey,56 the
results of which were presented in June 2007.57 According to an analysis conducted
for NASA, the focus group participants were ambivalent about going to the Moon
and Mars and wanted to know why these missions were important. Reasons such as
leadership, legacy, and public inspiration were found to be less persuasive, especially
for future Moon exploration, than NASA-influenced technologies. Most participants
agreed that partnership with other countries would be beneficial, but doubted whether
it can be achieved realistically.
52 (...continued)
adults surveyed online between March 6 and 14, 2007. This online survey is not based on
a probability sample and therefore no theoretical sampling error can be calculated.
53 University of Chicago, “Americans Want to Spend More on Education, Health,” press
release, January 10, 2007, at [http://www-news.uchicago.edu/releases/07/070110.gss.shtml].
The General Social Survey, supported by the National Science Foundation, has been
conducted since 1973, and is based on face-to-face interviews of randomly selected people
who represent a scientifically accurate cross section of Americans. For the 2006 survey,
2,992 people were interviewed and asked a wide variety of questions in addition to those
related to spending priorities.
54 Zogby, “Zogby Poll: Most Believe Humans Will Someday Colonize the Moon,” press
release, May 3, 2007, at [http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews2.dbm?ID=1296]. The
Zogby Interactive poll of 4,824 adults nationwide was conducted online from March 14-16,
2007, and carries a margin of error of ± 1.4 percentage points.
55 The focus groups were professionally moderated by Dr. Stephen Everett of the Everett
Group, Inc., in consultation with ViaNovo. The six focus groups were located in San
Diego, Kansas City, and Philadelphia.
56 The professionally conducted telephone survey was of 1,001 U.S. adults in February 2007.
The margin of error was ± 3.2%. The survey was conducted by Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar of
Dittmar Associates, in consultation with ViaNovo.
57 Robert Hopkins, “Strategic Communications Framework Implementation Plan,”
powerpoint presentation, NASA, Office of Strategic Communications, June 26, 2007, at
[http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=24646].
CRS-17
In addition, one of the analysis conducted for NASA found that most survey
respondents rated NASA-influenced technologies58 as somewhat or extremely
relevant to them. Over 52% of participants said such technologies were a “very
strong” reason to go to space. In contrast, the public’s response to a mission to send
humans to the Moon by the year 2020 was less strong with 15% of respondents very
excited and 31% somewhat excited. Results for a mission to send humans to the
Mars were similar to those for the Moon.
The public opinion analysis conducted for NASA found that there are
generational differences in regard to NASA’s proposed activities. For example,
NASA’s base support came from those who encompass “The Apollo Generation”
(45-64 year olds), the majority (79%) of whom support NASA’s new space
exploration mission, particularly the return to the Moon. By contrast, the majority
(64%) of those between 18-24 years of age are uninterested or neutral about a human
Moon mission. Those between 25 and 44 years of age are approximately evenly split
between those who are interested/excited and those who are either uninterested or
neutral. Those over 65 were more likely to be neutral or disinterested in a Moon
mission, with those over 75 years of age the least interested of all age groups.59
What Are the Nation’s Priorities for Civilian Space
Exploration and Its Implications for Future Space
Policy?
Current U.S. civilian space policy is based on a set of fundamental objectives
in the Space Act, based on policy discussions that occurred following the launch of
Sputnik over 50 years ago. Those objectives are still part of current policy
discussions and influence the nation’s civilian space policy priorities — both in terms
of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the degree of appropriations
58 An example of a NASA-influenced technology (commonly called “spinoff”) mentioned
in the survey that had significant results is a smoke alarm. According to NASA, in the
1970s NASA needed a smoke and fire detector with adjustable sensitivity for Skylab,
America’s first space station. Honeywell developed the device for NASA and then made
it available commercially so that consumers could avoid “nuisance” alarms while cooking.
Other devices in the survey were advanced breast cancer imaging, heart defibrillators,
weather satellites, remote-controlled robots, global positioning system, cordless tools,
satellite radio, and DirecTV. See [http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/] for more details on NASA’s
spinoffs. See a list of NASA’s top 20 spinoffs in the last five years at
[http://www.ipp.nasa.gov/spinoff_top_20a.pdf].
59 Ibid., p. 9. Robert Hopkins, “Strategic Communications Framework,”, powerpoint
presentation, NASA, Office of Communications Planning, February 2007, at
[http://images.spaceref.com/news/2007/feb07.stratcomm.pdf]. M. L. Dittmar, The Market
Study for Space Exploration, (Houston, TX: Dittmar Associates, Inc., 2004), pp. 26-29 (age
data) and pp. 8-11 (Executive Summary). M. L. Dittmar, “Engaging the 18-25 Generation:
Educational Outreach, Interactive Technologies, and Space”. Paper #2006-7303 in
Proceedings of AIAA Space 2006, September 19-21, (San Jose, California. Washington,
D . C . : A I A A , 2 0 0 6 ) . P a p e r a n d p r e s e n t a t i o n a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.dittmar-associates.com/Paper_Downloads.htm].
CRS-18
each activity within NASA receives. NASA has active programs that address all its
objectives, but many believe that it is being asked to accomplish too much for the
available resources.
NASA was last reauthorized in 2005 for FY2007 and FY2008.60 Thus, the
reauthorization of NASA for FY2009 and beyond, along with NASA’s upcoming 50th
anniversary in Fall 2008, may provide an opportunity for Congress to rethink the
nation’s space policy. Some analysts have called for new 21st century space policy
objectives and priorities to replace those developed 50 years ago.61
The goals of the nation’s investment in space exploration may be a key factor
in determining the focus of NASA’s activities and the degree of funding
appropriated for its programs. Congress and outside experts have concerns as to
whether the United States can afford to implement President Bush’s Vision for Space
Exploration without adversely influencing NASA’s other programs.62 Congress may
need to make challenging decisions to determine how to reap the most benefit from
the nation’s civilian space program investment. These decisions might answer
questions such as
! What are the priorities among the many reasons for U.S. space
exploration? For example, what might be the priority ranking
among the previously identified reasons as to why the United States
might explore space — knowledge and understanding, discovery,
economic growth, national prestige, defense, international relations,
and education and workforce development?
! What implications would this prioritization have for NASA’s current
and future budgets and the balance among its programs? For
example, what is the proper balance between human and robotic
space activities?
! What influence might the timing of other countries’ space
exploration activities have on U.S. policy? For example, what
60 P.L. 109-155, NASA Authorization Act of 2005, December 30, 2005.
61 See, for example, International Academy of Astronautics, “The Next Steps in Exploring
Deep Space,” June 9, 2004, at [http://iaaweb.org/iaa/Studies/nextsteps.pdf]; Roger A.
Pielke, “ NASA Needs a New Vision,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 7, 2007, p. E-5,
at [http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/10/07/edbjshsmh.dtl]; Donald
A. Beattie, “NASA’s troubled future,” The Space Report, September 4, 2007, at
[http://www.thespacereview.com/article/945/1]; USA Today, “3 Alternate Visions for
NASA’s Future,” April 11, 2005, at [http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/
2005-04-11-space-alternate-visions_x.htm].
62 See earlier discussion for Senate and House Committee on Appropriations report
language; also Lennard Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board, National Research Council and
Thomas M. Donahue Collegiate Professor of Space Science, University of Michigan, The
President’s Vision for Space Exploration: Perspectives from a Recent NRC Workshop on
National Space Policy, Testimony before the House Committee on Science, March 10, 2004,
at [http://science.house.gov/Commdocs/hearings/full04/mar10/fisk.pdf].
CRS-19
would be the impact of the United States, China, or another country,
or a commercial organization, establishing the first Moon base or
landing on Mars?
New objectives and priorities might help determine NASA’s goals. This, in
turn, might potentially help Congress determine the most appropriate balance of
funding available among NASA’s programs during its authorization and
appropriation process.
For example, if Congress believes that national prestige should be the highest
priority, they may choose to emphasize NASA’s human exploration activities, such
as establishing a Moon base and landing a human on Mars. If they consider scientific
knowledge the highest priority, Congress may emphasize unmanned missions and
other science-related activities as NASA’s major goal. If international relations are
a high priority, Congress might encourage other nations to become equal partners in
actions related to the International Space Station. If spinoff effects, including the
creation of new jobs and markets and its catalytic effect on math and science
education, are Congress’ priorities, then they may focus NASA’s activities on
technological development and linking to the needs of business and industry, and
expanding its role in science and mathematics education.
CRS-20
Appendix Table: Possible U.S. Civilian Space Policy Objectives: Comparison of Selected Extracts from Historical
and Current Space Policy Documents
G.W. Bush
Possible U.S.
Eisenhower
G.W. Bush
Congressional Comments on
Space Act Objectives
Administration
Civilian Space
Administration
Administration
Civilian Space Policy
(July 1958, as
“Aldridge
Policy
“Killian Committee”
“Space Policy” Goals
Objective-Related Issues in the
amended)
Commission” Themes
Objectives
Factors (March 1958)
(2006)
110th Congress
(2004)
Knowledge and
“(1) The expansion of
“Fourth, space
“Exploring the Moon,
“Increase the benefits
“From 2010, for another 3 to 5
Understanding
human knowledge of
technology affords
Mars, and beyond is a
of civil exploration,
years, we will have no access in
the Earth and of
new opportunities for
great journey worthy
scientific discovery,
space. We are going to rely on
phenomena in the
scientific observation
of a great nation.
and environmental
the kindness of allies to go back.
atmosphere and
and experiment which
The impulse to explore
activities.”
We cannot lose time or ground.
space.”
will add to our
the unknown is a
Our national security and our
knowledge and
human imperative, and
national honor depend upon it.
understanding of the
a notable part of what
Also, this would have a
earth, the solar system,
animates us as
tremendous impact on the state
and the universe.”
a people. This
of science, which goes to major
endeavor presents an
efforts in terms of better
opportunity to inspire a
understanding our planet Earth,
new generation of
where we do suspect intelligent
American explorers,
life, and also the impact of
scientist,
climate changes.”a (Senator
entrepreneurs, and
Barbara Mikulski)
innovators.”
CRS-21
G.W. Bush
Possible U.S.
Eisenhower
G.W. Bush
Congressional Comments on
Space Act Objectives
Administration
Civilian Space
Administration
Administration
Civilian Space Policy
(July 1958, as
“Aldridge
Policy
“Killian Committee”
“Space Policy” Goals
Objective-Related Issues in the
amended)
Commission” Themes
Objectives
Factors (March 1958)
(2006)
110th Congress
(2004)
Discovery
“(2) The improvement
“The first of these
“Despite the spiritual,
“Implement and
“...[H]ere we are on the 50th
of the usefulness,
factors is the
emotional, and
sustain an innovative
anniversary of Sputnik and it is
performance, speed,
compelling urge of
intellectual appeal of a
human and robotic
another sputnik moment. When
safety, and efficiency
man to explore and to
journey to space —
exploration program
all of us in America were
of aeronautical and
discover, the thrust of
exploration and
with the objective of
shocked that Russia had put up
space vehicles.”
curiosity that leads
discovery will perhaps
extending human
the first spaceflight, we were left
men to try to go where
not be sufficient
presence across the
to say: Why weren’t we first?
“(3) The development
no one has gone
drivers to sustain what
solar system.”
Today, 50 years later, we are
and operation of
before. Most of the
will be a long, and at
looking at a 5-year gap from the
vehicles capable of
surface of the Earth
times risky, journey.
end of the space shuttle before
carrying instruments,
has now been explored
We must also
the crew-return vehicle will be
equipment, supplies,
and men now turn to
undertake this mission
on line to put American
and living organisms
the exploration of
for pragmatic, but no
astronauts back in space. That is
through space.”
outer space as their
less compelling
another Sputnik moment.
next objective.”
reasons, which have
Are we going to rely on Russia
everything to do with
after 2010 to put American
life here on Earth.”
astronauts in space? I hope not. I
hope America never loses its
commitment to be the first in
technology, in knowing what can
be done, in exploring issues we
haven’t even thought about
because we know how much that
exploration has already done for
our country.”b (Senator Kay
Bailey Hutchinson)
CRS-22
G.W. Bush
Possible U.S.
Eisenhower
G.W. Bush
Congressional Comments on
Space Act Objectives
Administration
Civilian Space
Administration
Administration
Civilian Space Policy
(July 1958, as
“Aldridge
Policy
“Killian Committee”
“Space Policy” Goals
Objective-Related Issues in the
amended)
Commission” Themes
Objectives
Factors (March 1958)
(2006)
110th Congress
(2004)
Economic
“(4) The establishment
Not discussed.
“Further space
“Enable a dynamic,
“NASA’s space and Earth
Growth — Job
of long-range studies
exploration will
globally competitive
science basic research activities,
Creation and
of the potential
generate new jobs
domestic commercial
along with microgravity
New Markets
benefits to be gained
within current
space sector in order to
research, are prime examples of
from, the opportunities
industries and will
promote innovation,
research investments that cannot
for, and the problems
likely spawn entire
strengthen U.S.
only advance our knowledge but
involved in the
new markets involving
leadership, and protect
benefit society.... [T]he
utilization of
leading-edge
national, homeland,
investments also play a critical
aeronautical and space
manufacturing and
and economic
role in educating the next
activities for peaceful
flight support
security.”
generation of scientists and
and scientific
services....As one
engineers. Aeronautics R&D, we
purposes.”
impressive labor leader
have discussed that at some great
testified to the
length, is another area where
Commission, ‘every
investments we make benefit our
dollar spent on space is
economy, our quality of life, and
a dollar spent here on
our national security.... Human
Earth.’ This focus is
space flight and exploration is
good for jobs, good for
another area that offers benefits
the economy, and good
ranging from the very important
for American
intangible inspiration it provides
families.”
to the public, to the advanced
technologies, and research results
that can come from those
initiatives”c (Congressman Mark
Udall)
CRS-23
G.W. Bush
Possible U.S.
Eisenhower
G.W. Bush
Congressional Comments on
Space Act Objectives
Administration
Civilian Space
Administration
Administration
Civilian Space Policy
(July 1958, as
“Aldridge
Policy
“Killian Committee”
“Space Policy” Goals
Objective-Related Issues in the
amended)
Commission” Themes
Objectives
Factors (March 1958)
(2006)
110th Congress
(2004)
National
“(5) The preservation
“Third, there is the
“Exploring the Moon,
“Strengthen the
“We are in a space race. While
Prestige
of the role of the
factor of national
Mars, and beyond is a
nation’s space
we are the current leader in
United States as a
prestige. To be strong
great journey worthy
leadership and ensure
space, there are many countries
leader in aeronautical
and bold in space
of a great nation. The
that space capabilities
that want to take our place and
and space science and
technology will
impulse to explore the
are available in time to
are aggressively moving forward
technology and in the
enhance the prestige of
unknown is a human
further U.S. national
to do so...[O]ur Nation’s space
application thereof to
the United States
imperative, and a
security, homeland
program benefits the lives of
the conduct of peaceful
among the peoples of
notable part of what
security, and foreign
every American. The work that
activities within and
the world and create
animates us as a
policy objectives.”
NASA does, from encouraging
outside the
added confidence in
people.”
students into science and
atmosphere.”
our scientific,
engineering careers, to
technological,
innovative technology advances,
“(9) The preservation
industrial, and military
improve our quality of life. The
of the United States’
strength.”
forward and innovative thinking
preeminent position in
at NASA helps to ensure our
aeronautics and space
Nation has the ability to
through research and
compete, and lead, in the global
technology
economy. We are committed to
development related to
keeping our leadership role in
associated
space. In order to do so, we must
manufacturing
make the right investments in
processes.”
space at the right times. That
time is now.”d (Senator Richard
Shelby)
CRS-24
G.W. Bush
Possible U.S.
Eisenhower
G.W. Bush
Congressional Comments on
Space Act Objectives
Administration
Civilian Space
Administration
Administration
Civilian Space Policy
(July 1958, as
“Aldridge
Policy
“Killian Committee”
“Space Policy” Goals
Objective-Related Issues in the
amended)
Commission” Themes
Objectives
Factors (March 1958)
(2006)
110th Congress
(2004)
Defense
“(6) The making
“Second, there is the
“Much of the United
“Enable unhindered
“There is a strong, symbiotic
available to agencies
defense objective for
States’ current military
U.S. operations in and
relationship between space
directly concerned
the development of
strength and economic
through space to
research and national security.
with national defense
space technology. We
security rests on our
defend our interests
For example, by using
of discoveries that
wish to be sure that
technological
there.”
space-based navigation systems,
have military value or
space is not used to
leadership. Our
we can guide a missile to within
significance, and the
endanger our security.
technological and
“Enable a robust
meters of its intended target. This
furnishing by such
If space is to be used
industrial base must
science and technology
not only allows our military to
agencies, to the
for military purposes,
constantly be renewed.
base supporting
more effectively hit a target, it
civilian agency
we must be prepared to
Therefore, the United
national security,
also saves civilian lives and
established to direct
use space to defend
States must continue to
homeland security, and
limits collateral damage. The
and control
ourselves.”
lead, especially in
civil space activities.”
Chinese are gaining ground in
nonmilitary
those industries that
technological areas. For example,
aeronautical and space
require, and therefore
China recently surpassed the U.S.
activities, of
build, technology
as the world’s largest exporter of
information as to
skills.”
information-technology products
discoveries which have
(and the U.S. has become a net
value or significance to
importer of those products). The
that agency.”
Chinese are now turning their
attention to space technology —
and they are determined to use it
as a means of strengthening their
military. We cannot allow other
countries to acquire new
weapons technologies while
America does not keep up.”e
(Senator Bill Nelson)
CRS-25
G.W. Bush
Possible U.S.
Eisenhower
G.W. Bush
Congressional Comments on
Space Act Objectives
Administration
Civilian Space
Administration
Administration
Civilian Space Policy
(July 1958, as
“Aldridge
Policy
“Killian Committee”
“Space Policy” Goals
Objective-Related Issues in the
amended)
Commission” Themes
Objectives
Factors (March 1958)
(2006)
110th Congress
(2004)
International
“(7) Cooperation by
Not discussed.
“Although the era of
“Encourage
“NASA has a successful history
Relations
the United States with
Sputnik has given way
international
of international cooperation in
other nations and
to an age of
cooperation with
science and involves non-U.S.
groups of nations in
international
foreign nations and/or
partners on some two-thirds of its
work done pursuant to
cooperation in space, it
consortia on space
science missions, and also
this act and in the
remains a competitive
activities that are of
provides instruments, science
peaceful application of
frontier...Other
mutual benefit and that
support, and other in-kind
the results thereof.”
nations, against whom
further the peaceful
contributions to non-U.S.-led
we compete for jobs in
exploration and use of
space and Earth science
the global economy,
space, as well as to
missions. Successful cooperative
are also intent on
advance national
missions can increase the
exploring space. If not
security, homeland
scientific content of a mission
us, someone else will
security, and foreign
and build mutually beneficial
lead in the exploration,
policy objectives.”
relationships. At the same time,
utilization, and
cooperation can lead to delays
ultimately, the
and added mission costs. Among
commercialization of
the factors that have made
space, as we sit idly
international cooperative
by.”
missions harder in recent years is
ITAR” (International Traffic in
Arms Regulations).f (House
Committee on Science and
Technology)
CRS-26
G.W. Bush
Possible U.S.
Eisenhower
G.W. Bush
Congressional Comments on
Space Act Objectives
Administration
Civilian Space
Administration
Administration
Civilian Space Policy
(July 1958, as
“Aldridge
Policy
“Killian Committee”
“Space Policy” Goals
Objective-Related Issues in the
amended)
Commission” Themes
Objectives
Factors (March 1958)
(2006)
110th Congress
(2004)
Education and
“(8) The most effective
Not discussed.
“Long-term
Not discussed.
“Madam President, we are
Workforce
utilization of the
competitiveness
observing the 50th anniversary of
Development
scientific and
requires a skilled
the launch of Sputnik, the first
engineering resources
workforce. The space
artificial satellite that was
of the United States,
exploration vision can
launched by humans...we
with close cooperation
be a catalyst for a
suddenly became shocked at the
among all interested
much-needed
fact that we were falling behind
agencies of the United
renaissance in math
in math, in science and
States in order to avoid
and science education
technology, and that, lo and
unnecessary
in the United States.”
behold, with the symbolic value
duplication of effort,
of the Soviet Union — at that
facilities, and
point our mortal enemy in the
equipment.”
Cold War — having achieved
that first. Now, there is a lesson
in what I have just discussed
about our history in space that
would teach us not to repeat that
now. What is that lesson? First of
all, one of the great lessons of
that era is the fact that we got
excited about science and
technology and mathematics and
engineering and space flight. We
produced a generation of
exceptionally talented and
educated young people who were
told to go to their limit.”g
(Senator Bill Nelson)
CRS-27
Sources: “Space Act”: P.L. 85-568, The National Aeronautics and Space Act, July 29, 1958. This analysis focuses on the objectives section. “Killian Committee”: U.S. President
(Dwight D. Eisenhower), President’s Science Advisory Committee, Introduction to Outer Space, March 26, 1958. p. 2. Available at
[http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/monograph10/doc6.pdf]. “Aldridge Commission”: U.S. President (George W. Bush), President’s Commission on Implementation of United
States Space Exploration Policy, A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discovery, June 2004, p. 11. Excerpts are from the section entitled “Why Go?”. Available at
[http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf]. “Space Policy”: U.S. President (G.W. Bush), U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, at
[http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf]. Excerpts are from section 3, “United States Space Policy Goals.”
Notes: Excerpts are selected to reflect the general tone of text and are not necessarily the only language discussing these issues. The words in italics in the “Space Act” column show
the changes made to the objectives since 1958.
a. Senator Barbara Mikulski, “Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record,
October 16, 2007, p. S12904.
b. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, “Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional
Record, October 4, 2007, p. S12724.
c. Congressman Mark Udall, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, NASA’s Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request,
opening statement, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 15, 2007, H.Rept. 110-12 (Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 17.
d. Senator Richard Shelby, “Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record,
October 16, 2007, p. S12905.
e. Senator Bill Nelson, “Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, October
4, 2007, p. S12726.
f. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, NASA’s Space Science Programs: Review of Fiscal Year 2008
Budget Request and Issues, 110th Cong., 1st sess., May 2, 2007, H.Rept. 110-24 (Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 6.
g. Senator Bill Nelson, “Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, October
4, 2007, p. S12726.