Order Code RL33509
Lebanon
Updated November 23, 2007
Alfred B. Prados
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Lebanon
Summary
The United States and Lebanon continue to enjoy good relations. Prominent
current issues between the United States and Lebanon include progress toward a
Lebanon-Israel peace treaty, U.S. aid to Lebanon, and Lebanon’s capacity to stop
Hezbollah militia attacks on Israel. The United States supports Lebanon’s
independence and favored the end of Israeli and Syrian occupation of parts of
Lebanon. Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon on May 23, 2000, and Syria
completed withdrawing its forces on April 26, 2005. Regional tensions increased in
mid-2006, however, as clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza
territory spread to Lebanon. In July, Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel and
capture of two Israeli soldiers prompted large-scale Israeli bombing of Hezbollah
positions and Lebanese infrastructure. On August 11, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting and created an expanded
international peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Sectarian and political factionalism has
continued, however, with periodic escalation of tension (see below).
The assassination in February 2005 of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri sparked a political crisis, realignments in Lebanon’s domestic politics, and
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Since June 2005, an independent U.N.
commission has been investigating the circumstances of Hariri’s assassination, amid
allegations of Syrian involvement, directly or through pro-Syrian Lebanese officials.
On May 30, 2007, a divided U.N. Security Council voted to establish a special
tribunal outside Lebanon to try suspects in the Hariri case. Meanwhile, in late May
2007, frictions between the Lebanese Army and a splinter Palestinian faction known
as Fatah al-Islam, based in a refugee camp in northern Lebanon, led to an outbreak
of fighting and exacerbated already existing internal tensions. To help Prime
Minister Siniora deal with current challenges, the Bush Administration requested a
large increase in U.S. assistance, ultimately contained in H.R. 2206 (P.L. 110-28).
Meanwhile, a radical Palestinian group mounted further challenges to the government
of Prime Minister Siniora. On September 25, 2007, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed Resolution 548 which, among other things, pledges continued
support for the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese people.
The expiration of President Emile Lahoud’s term of office in November 2007
confronted the Lebanese with another difficult and likely divisive issue. Elections
to choose a successor to President Lahoud, whose term of office was scheduled to
expire on November 24, have been postponed five times as deputies seek to agree on
an acceptable successor. The latest postponement, until November 30, means that
Lebanon will be without a president from November 24 until at least November 23.
(See below for more discussion.) In the meantime, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed Resolution 548 which, among other things, pledges continued
support for the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese people on September 25,
2007, by 415 to 2 (Roll no. 899).
This report will be updated as significant changes occur in Lebanon or in U.S.-
Lebanese relations. Other CRS reports on Lebanon include CRS Report RL33933,
U.S. Foreign Aid to Lebanon: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
United States and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Lebanon: Demography and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Political Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Sectarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Political Structure and Power Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Civil War and Taif Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Political Upheaval of 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Assassination of Former Prime Minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Resolution 1595 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The First Mehlis Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Resolution 1636 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Mehlis Follow-On Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Resolutions 1644 and 1664 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Brammertz Progress Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Elections of 2005 and Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Deadlock and Partial Realignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
National Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Recent or Current Foreign Presence in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Shib’a Farms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Hezbollah-Israel Confrontation of 2006-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Resumption of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Diplomatic Endeavors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
After-Effects of the Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Further Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Resolution 1757 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Hezbollah Demonstrations and Their Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Seeking a Rapprochement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Palestinian and Palestinian-Associated Militia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Fatah al-Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Spring 2007 Developments and Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Constitutional Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Presidential Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
U.S. Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Parliamentary By-elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Implications of the Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Army Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
U.S.-Lebanese Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Recent and Current U.S. Assistance to Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
U.S. Reconstruction and Economic Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Military Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
List of Tables
Table 1. Lebanon Population and Religious Sects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. 2005 Parliament: Composition by Major Bloc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

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Lebanon
Most Recent Developments
Since the murder of the late Prime Minister Hariri, U.N. investigators have
sought to uncover the circumstances behind the atrocity and ascertain responsibility.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1595, adopted on April 7, 2005, established “an
international independent investigation commission (UNIIIC) based in Lebanon to
assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigations of the terrorist act. The
commission was initially headed by a German prosecutor, Detlev Mehlis, later by a
Belgian prosecutor, Serge Brammertz. The commission, whose mandate has been
repeatedly extended, has issued eight progress reports; so far these have been
inconclusive but the first two tended to implicate Syrian or pro-Syrian Lebanese
officials. The eighth report, submitted to the U.N. Security Council on July 12, 2007,
has reportedly identified persons who may have been involved in the Hariri
assassination. Brammertz, however, has not named any suspects.
Another major point of contention among Lebanese leaders is the establishment
of “a tribunal of an international character” to prosecute suspects in the murder of the
late Prime Minister Hariri. The proposed tribunal, called for in U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 1644 and 1664, has been resisted by pro-Syrian elements in
Lebanon, possibly because of concerns over the possibility that such a tribunal would
uncover a Syrian role in the murder. As noted above, six members or supporters of
Hezbollah resigned from the cabinet on November 11. Subsequently, on November
25, remaining members of the Lebanese cabinet approved the U.N. Security Council
proposal to establish the court, in the face of strong opposition from pro-Syrian
elements, who maintained that the truncated cabinet lacked a popular mandate to take
this step (see above).1 Also, governmental approval of the tribunal still requires the
approval of the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud, who has said the decision was
improper because of the resignation of the six ministers. Similarly, parliamentary
approval has proven difficult to obtain, despite the anti-Syrian majority in parliament,
where it is held up by the powerful Speaker, Nabih Berri, an ally of Hezbollah.2
Confronted with an impasse over the proposed tribunal, supporters of the
tribunal decided on a new approach that would circumvent the Lebanese
governmental machinery and enlist the international community. On April 4, 2007,
a U.N. spokesman announced that 70 members of the Lebanese parliament petitioned
1 The U.N. proposal for an international court is contained in U.N. Security Council
document S/2006/893, Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special
tribunal for Lebanon, November 15, 2006.
2 Anthony Shadid, “Crisis in Lebanon Reaches New Threshold,” The Washington Post,
November 26, 2006.

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CRS-2
the U.N. Secretary-General to act under the U.N. Charter and set up a special tribunal
to try suspects in the Hariri murder. On May 14, Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora
wrote to the Secretary-General, asking that the Security Council establish the court
as a matter of urgency. Subsequently, on May 30, 2007, a divided U.N. Security
Council voted by 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions (Russia, China, South Africa, Indonesia,
and Qatar) to adopt Resolution 1757, which establishes a tribunal outside of Lebanon
to prosecute persons responsible for the attack of February 14, 2005. The resolution
contains a detailed annex covering the establishment of the tribunal. The resolution
also provides that the provisions of the annex will “enter into force” on June 10, 2007
unless Lebanon ratifies the tribunal before that date.
The expiration of President Emile Lahoud’s term of office in November 2007
confronted the Lebanese with another difficult and likely divisive issue. By-
elections, held on August 5, 2007 to replace two anti-Syrian members of parliament
assassinated in November 2006 and June 2007, have been read by some
commentators as strengthening the position of pro-Syrian elements in the Lebanese
government, although others disagree. Elections to choose a successor to President
Lahoud, whose term of office was scheduled to expire on November 24, have been
postponed five times as deputies seek to agree on an acceptable successor. The latest
postponement, until November 30, means that Lebanon will be without a president
from November 24 until at least November 30. (See below for more discussion.) In
the meantime, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolution 548 which,
among other things, pledges continued support for the government of Lebanon and
the Lebanese people on September 25, 2007, by 415 to 2 (Roll no. 899).
United States and Lebanon
Overview
The United States and Lebanon have traditionally enjoyed good relations, rooted
in long-standing contacts and interaction beginning well before Lebanon’s emergence
as a modern state. Factors contributing to this relationship include a large Lebanese-
American community (a majority of Arab-Americans are of Lebanese origin); the
pro-Western orientation of many Lebanese, particularly during the Cold War; cultural
ties exemplified by the presence of U.S. universities in Lebanon; Lebanon’s position
as a partial buffer between Israel and its principal Arab adversary, namely Syria;
Lebanon’s democratic and partially Christian antecedents; and Lebanon’s historic
role as an interlocutor for the United States within the Arab world.
Two U.S. presidents have described Lebanon as of vital interest to the United
States, President Eisenhower in 1958 and President Reagan in 1983. (Public Papers
of the Presidents, 1958, pp. 550-551; Public Papers of the Presidents, 1983, vol. II,
p. 1501.) Both statements were made in the context of brief U.S. military
deployments to Lebanon to help Lebanese authorities counter rebellions supported
by radical Arab states with ties to the former Soviet Union. Some would agree that
a friendly and independent Lebanon in a strategic but unstable region is vital to U.S.
interests. But others might disagree, pointing to the absence of such tangible interests
as military bases, oil fields, international waterways, military or industrial strength,

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or major trading ties. In a broader sense, a ruinous 15-year civil war that created
turmoil in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 and that periodically threatened to spill
over into adjacent areas of the Middle East illustrated the dangers to U.S. interests
posed by instability in this small country.
Lebanon: Demography and Politics
Political Profile
Sectarianism. Lebanon, with a population of 3.8 million, has the most
religiously diverse society in the Middle East, comprising 17 recognized religious
sects. “Confessionalism,” or the distribution of governmental posts by religious sect,
is a long-standing feature of Lebanese political life, despite frequent calls to abolish
it. Because of political sensitivities related to power sharing among the various
communities, no census has been taken in Lebanon since 1932, when Lebanon was
under a French mandate. According to current estimates by the Central Intelligence
Agency as of 2005, Muslim groups comprise 59.7% of the population while Christian
groups comprise 39.0%, with another 1.3% of assorted religious affiliations. A more
detailed but less recent estimate by an expert on the geography and demography of
the Middle East gives the breakdown shown in Table 1.3
Table 1. Lebanon Population and Religious Sects
Sect
Number
Percent
Shi’ite Muslim
1,192,000
34%
Sunni Muslim
701,000
20%
Maronite Christiana
666,000
19%
Druzeb
280,000
8%
Greek Orthodox (Christian)c
210,000
6%
Armenian (Christian)d
210,000
6%
Greek Catholic (Christian)a
175,000
5%
Other
70,000
2%
Total (not exact, due to rounding)
3,506,000
100%
a. Affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church but retain their own rituals.
b. Grouped with Muslims; regarded by some as derived from Shi’ite Islam.
c. A senior Lebanese official stated that there are more Greek Orthodox
than Druze in Lebanon. Conversation, February 21, 2006.
d. Armenians are the only sizeable ethnic minority in Lebanon; other
Lebanese groups are all ethnic Arab.
3 Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns, Westview Press, 2000, p. 262. Reflecting 1999
figures, Held uses an estimated total Lebanese population of 3.506 million, to which he
applies the percentages in Table 1.

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CRS-4
Lebanese political parties have developed along religious, geographical, ethnic,
and ideological lines and are often associated with prestigious families. Christian
groups, especially Maronites, tend to be strong advocates of Lebanese independence
and opposed to Syrian and other external influences. Christian parties include the
Phalange led by the Gemayel family, and smaller parties led by the Chamoun,
Frangieh, and Iddi families. Sunni Muslim parties, historically more Arab nationalist
in orientation, include the Independent Nasirite group and a new group, the Futures
Party, that has coalesced around anti-Syrian supporters of the recently assassinated
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Shi’ite parties include the more moderate Amal under
Nabih Berri and the more radical Hezbollah (see below), former rivals but now at
least temporarily allied; Druze are largely associated with the Progressive Socialist
Party led by the leftist yet feudally based Jumblatt family, now somewhat tenuously
aligned with the Futures Party. A religiously mixed group, the Syrian National Social
Party (SNSP), favors a union of Syria, Lebanon, and possibly other nearby states.
Several of these parties and groupings formerly maintained militias, notably the
Lebanese Forces, which were affiliated with the Christian Phalange Party, and the
Shi’ite Muslim Hezbollah, which has both a political and a military wing. Most of
the militias were disbanded after the civil war, but Hezbollah’s militia continues to
function.
Political Structure and Power Sharing. Post-civil war Lebanon retains
the country’s unique political system, based on power sharing among the diverse
religious sectarian communities and political factions that comprise the modern
Lebanese state. Under the constitution of 1926, Lebanon is a republic with a
president elected by parliament for a non-renewable six-year term, a prime minister
and cabinet appointed by the president, and a parliament, elected by universal adult
suffrage for a four-year term. Composition of parliament varies in accordance with
electoral laws that are promulgated before each election; current membership is 128.
Unlike the President, the prime minister and cabinet must receive a vote of
confidence from parliament.
In 1943, when Lebanon became fully independent from France, leaders of the
principal religious communities adopted an unwritten agreement known as the
National Covenant, which provided that the President be a Maronite Christian, the
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite Muslim;
parliamentary seats were divided on the basis of six Christians to five Muslims.
Cabinet posts are generally distributed among the principal sectarian communities,
notably Maronites, Greek Orthodox, smaller Christian sects, Druze (a small sect
associated with Islam), Sunni Muslims, and Shi’ite Muslims.4 As time passed, the
1943 ratios, which had been based on the country’s sole census conducted in 1932,
became less reflective of Lebanese society as Muslims gradually came to outnumber
Christians, while within the Muslim community, Shi’ite Muslims came to outnumber
Sunni Muslims. Discontent over power sharing imbalances was a major factor in
inter-communal tensions and civil strife culminating in the 1975-1990 civil war.
4 The National Covenant (sometimes translated National Pact) addressed various foreign
policy issues as well. For discussion of this unwritten document, see Fahim Qubain, Crisis
in Lebanon, Washington, The Middle East Institute, 1961, pp. 17-18; Kamal S. Salibi, The
Modern History of Lebanon, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965, pp. 186-188.

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CRS-5
The Civil War and Taif Reforms. At stake in the civil war was control over
the political process in Lebanon, the status of Palestinian refugees and militia, and
the respective goals of Syria and Israel (see the section below on Foreign Presence
in Lebanon). From 1975 to 1990, the civil war killed, wounded, or disabled hundreds
of thousands and rendered comparable numbers homeless at one time or another
during the fighting. At one point, a terror bombing in October 1983 killed 241 U.S.
armed forces personnel, who were part of a short-lived multinational force attempting
to keep peace among Palestinian refugees and Lebanese factions. From 1987 until
July 1997, the United States banned travel to Lebanon because of the threat of
kidnaping and dangers from the ongoing civil war. Lebanon continues to rebuild in
the aftermath of the civil war.
The Lebanese parliament elected in 1972 remained in office for 20 years, since
it was impossible to elect a new parliament during the civil war. After a prolonged
political crisis near the end of the war, Lebanese parliamentary deputies met in 1989
in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the Arab League and adopted a revised
power sharing agreement. The so-called Taif Agreement raised the number of seats
in parliament from 99 to 108 (later changed to 128), replaced the former 6:5 ratio of
Christians to Muslims in parliament with an even ratio, provided for a proportional
distribution of seats among the various Christian and Muslim sub-sects, and left
appointment of the prime minister to parliament, subject to the president’s approval.
It also addressed the status of Syrian forces in Lebanon, as explained in a section
below. Parliamentary elections held in 1992, 1996, and 2000 resulted in pro-Syrian
majorities, given the presence and influence of Syrian forces in Lebanon ostensibly
as part of a peacekeeping force. Though supported by some Lebanese, including
many Shi’ite Muslims, the Syrian presence was increasingly resented by other
elements of the Lebanese population.
Political Upheaval of 2005
Assassination of Former Prime Minister. By 2004, tensions had
increased between the pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and the
independent Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a self-made billionaire who had
spearheaded the reconstruction of Lebanon after the civil war. Matters came to a
head when the Lebanese parliament, apparently under Syrian pressure, adopted a
Syrian-backed constitutional amendment extending President Lahoud’s tenure by an
additional three years. Hariri, who disagreed with the move, resigned in October
2004, and subsequently aligned himself with an anti-Syrian opposition coalition.
Hariri’s assassination in a car bombing on February 14, 2005, blamed by many on
Syrian agents, led to widespread protests by an anti-Syrian coalition comprising many
members of the Christian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim communities and counter-
demonstrations by pro-Syrian groups including Shi’ites who rallied behind the
Hezbollah and Amal parties. Outside Lebanon, the United States and France were
particularly vocal in their denunciation of the assassination and a possible Syrian role
in it.
Resolution 1595. A statement by the President of the U.N. Security Council
on February 25, although it did not mention Syria by name, condemned the
assassination and requested the Secretary General “to report urgently on the
circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act.” In accordance with this

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CRS-6
request, a U.N. fact-finding team visited Lebanon and concluded that “the Lebanese
investigation process suffers from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the
commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible conclusion.”
On April 7, as domestic and international outrage mounted, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1595, under which the council decided to “establish an
international independent investigation Commission (‘the Commission’ or UNIIIC)
based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all
aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors,
organizers and accomplices.” Heading the Commission was Detlev Mehlis,
described as “a 25-year veteran of the Berlin prosecutor’s office with a record of
solving high profile terror cases.”5 The resolution requested the Commission to
complete its work within three months from the date it commences operations,
authorized the Secretary General to extend the Commission’s mandate for another
period of up to three months, and requested an oral update every two months while
the Commission is functioning. The U.N. Secretary General informed members of
the Security Council that the Commission was fully operational as of June 16, 2005.
On September 8, 2005, the Commission requested a 40-day extension to complete
its work. Upon submission of the Commission’s initial report on October 19, the
Secretary General extended its mandate until December 15 to enable the Commission
to pursue further gaps it had identified (see “The Mehlis Commission,” below). On
August 30, a U.N. spokeswoman announced that three former heads of Lebanese
intelligence agencies and a former Lebanese member of parliament had been
identified as suspects in the assassination of Hariri. A subsequent press report
describes the suspects as Syrian proxies with close ties to President Lahoud.6
The First Mehlis Report. Tensions mounted as reports circulated that Syrian
and Lebanese officials would be implicated in the findings of the Mehlis
Commission. After encountering initial resistance from Syria, from September 20-
23, members of the commission visited Damascus, where they interviewed senior
Syrian military and security officials including the last two Syrian chiefs of
intelligence in Lebanon, who were widely regarded as the effective viceroys of
Lebanon during their respective tenures: Generals Rustom Ghazali and Ghazi
Kanaan. Kanaan, who was reassigned to Syria in 2002 and appointed minister of the
interior, apparently committed suicide in October 2005. Some observers speculate
that Kanaan was killed or forced to commit suicide by Syrian authorities because of
what he might reveal — or might have revealed — about Syrian involvement in the
Hariri assassination or that he chose to take his own life because he feared that he
would become the scapegoat for Syrian actions in Lebanon. In actuality, however,
Kanaan is not mentioned in the Commission’s report of October 19 (see below).
The 54-page report submitted by the Mehlis Commission represented four
months of research in which Commission members interviewed more than 400
5 Warren Hoge, “Bush Pushes U.N. to Move Swiftly on Syria Report,” New York Times,
October 22, 2005.
6 Hassan M. Fatah, “Lebanon’s President Facing Growing Pressure to Resign,” New York
Times, September 6, 2005. The press report lists the four as the current head of security, the
former head of security, a former military intelligence chief, and a former chief of police.

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CRS-7
persons and reviewed 60,000 documents, identified several suspects, and established
various leads. Two central conclusions reached by the Commission deal with the
question of culpability, although they do not constitute a conclusive finding:
It is the Commission’s view that the assassination on 14 February 2005 was
carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources
and capabilities.
...[T]here is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian
involvement in this terrorist act.... Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions
and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem,
it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination
plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.
The Commission report adds that the investigation is not complete and calls for
further investigation; states that Syrian authorities, including the foreign minister,
while extending limited cooperation, have provided some false or inaccurate
information; and calls on Syria to help clarify unresolved questions. Syrian officials,
including President Bashar al-Asad, have denied complicity in the Hariri
assassination and said the Mehlis report was biased. On October 29, President Asad
said Syria has set up a commission to investigate the assassination.7
Questions have been raised regarding the apparent exclusions in the report of
the names of suspects who had been identified in earlier drafts of the report. The
principal example appears in Paragraph 96 (page 29) of the report, in which a witness
told the Commission that in September 2004 “senior Lebanese and Syrian officials
decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri” and held several follow-up meetings in Syria to
plan the crime. An earlier version reportedly listed the names of five of the senior
officers, including President Asad’s brother Maher al-Asad and the President’s
brother-in-law Asif Shawkat, chief of military intelligence and widely considered the
second most powerful official in the regime. Some reporters questioned whether or
not the Commission chief Detlev Mehlis had come under pressure to make the report
less accusatory. At a news conference on October 21, both Mehlis and Secretary-
General Kofi Annan denied this; Mehlis went on to explain that he suppressed the
names of the officers when he found out that the Commission’s report was to be
made public, because he had only one anonymous source for the specific accusation.8
Maher al-Asad does not appear at all in the official copy of the report and Asif
Shawkat appears only once (paragraph 178) when Shawkat allegedly forced an
individual 45 days before the assassination to make a tape claiming responsibility for
the crime, purportedly in an effort to hide Syrian or Lebanese complicity.
Resolution 1636. On October 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1636, which requires Syria to cooperate “fully and
unconditionally” with the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of the late
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri or face unspecified “further action.” By
7 Warren Hoge and Steven R. Weisman, “U.N. Is Expected to Pass Measure Pressuring
Syria,” New York Times, October 31, 2005.
8 Warren Hoge, “Bush Pushes U.N. to Move Swiftly on Syria Report,” New York Times,
October 22, 2005.

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CRS-8
dropping a threat appearing in earlier drafts of specific economic sanctions, the
sponsors of the resolution were able to attract support from Russia and China while
leaving the door open to the imposition of sanctions at a later date. U.S. officials
noted that the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which
gives the Council power to impose penalties, including use of military force.9 After
temporizing, Syria acceded to a request by the Mehlis Commission to make five
Syrian officials available for questioning by the commission at U.N. offices in
Vienna, Austria. The Syrians, whose names were not announced, were reportedly
intelligence and security officials including the former Syrian intelligence chief in
Lebanon Rustom Ghazali; meetings took place from December 5 to 7. Meanwhile,
further violence took place in Lebanon, with several attacks directed against
Lebanese politicians and journalists opposed to the Syrian presence in Lebanon.
The Mehlis Follow-On Report. On December 12, the Mehlis commission
submitted a follow-on report which states that “[t]he Commission’s conclusions set
out in its previous report ... remain valid.” According to the follow-on report, the
Commission interviewed additional witnesses (for a total of 500 as of December 12),
identified 19 suspects (reportedly including the five Syrian officers interviewed in
Vienna), and reviewed additional documentation. Statements by two of the suspects
indicated that all Syrian intelligence documents concerning Lebanon had been
burned. Also, the head of a separate Syrian investigative commission informed the
Mehlis Commission that no material regarding the Hariri assassination had been
found in Syrian archives. The Mehlis follow-on report further expresses the view
that Hussam, the witness who recanted his statement, “is being manipulated by the
Syrian authorities.” Analysts are reportedly reviewing the material in an attempt to
find material relevant to planning for the assassination. The report stated that “[t]he
detailed information [from the additional statements and documents reviewed by the
commission] points directly at perpetrators, sponsors and organizers of an organized
operation aiming at killing Mr. Hariri, including the recruitment of special agents by
the Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services.” The report recommended that the
commission be extended by an additional six months.
Resolutions 1644 and 1664. On December 15, 2005, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1644, which extended the mandate of the Independent
Commission for six months until June 15, 2006, as recommended by the
Commission, and requested the Commission to report on its progress at three-month
intervals. The Council acknowledged a Lebanese request that suspects be tried by
“a tribunal of an international character” and asked the Secretary General to help the
Lebanese government identify the nature of such a tribunal (Paragraph 6). The
Council also requested the Secretary General to present recommendations to expand
the Commission’s mandate to include investigations of other attacks on Lebanese
figures (Paragraph 7). In a subsequent Resolution 1664 adopted on March 29, 2006,
the Council requested the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with the
government of Lebanon aimed at establishing the requested tribunal. (See The
Tribunal/Resolution 1757, below.) Meanwhile, Mehlis, who wanted to return to his
post in Germany, stepped down as Commission chairman in early January 2006 and
9 Warren Hoge, “U.N. Tells Syria to Stop Impeding Slaying Inquiry,” New York Times,
November 1, 2005.

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CRS-9
was replaced by Serge Brammertz, a Belgian prosecutor serving with the
International Criminal Court.
Brammertz Progress Reports. On March 14, 2006, Brammertz released
his first progress report to the U.N. Security Council (the third progress report by the
Commission, counting the two released by Mehlis). The 25-page document,
described by one commentator as more conservative and less detailed than the Mehlis
reports (New York Times, March 15, 2006), stated that “[t]he individuals who
perpetrated this crime appear to be very ‘professional’ in their approach” and went
on to say that “[i]t must be assumed that at least some of those involved were likely
experienced in this type of terrorist activity” (Paragraph 33 of the Brammertz report).
Syrian spokesmen put a positive interpretation on the report, saying that it “was
realistic and has a lot of professionalism.” President Asad, who had temporized for
several months over the Commission’s demand for an interview, agreed to meet
Brammertz under a deal that will give the Commission access to individuals, sites,
and information, including the head of state (Paragraphs 91-95). Pursuant to these
understandings, news media reported that Brammertz met with the Syrian president
and vice president in Damascus on April 25; however, the news reports did not give
details on the course of the meetings. Earlier, U.S. State Department spokesman J.
Adam Ereli told a news briefing audience on March 15 that “we support the work of
Investigator Brammertz. He’s continuing the important and invaluable work of his
predecessor, Mr. Mehlis.”
Brammertz released his second progress report (the fourth progress report by the
Commission) to the U.N. Security Council on June 14, 2006. Like its predecessor,
the June 10 report did not name suspects; however, it described the crime as “a
targeted assassination.” Brammertz said the level of assistance provided by Syria to
the Commission during the reporting period “has generally been satisfactory,” with
that country responding to all requests in a timely manner. Brammertz welcomed and
endorsed the request of the Lebanese government for a one-year extension of the
Commission’s mandate. On June 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1686, which extended the Commission’s mandate until June 14, 2007 and
supported the extension of the Commission’s mandate to offer further technical
assistance to Lebanese investigation of other possibly related assassinations during
the last two years.
Brammertz completed his third progress report (the fifth progress report by the
Commission) on September 25, 2006. The 22-page report is largely technical in
nature and deals mainly with three main issues: continuing work related to the crime
scene; broadening knowledge and evidence of possible linkages; and developing new
projects and leads (Paragraph 9). In his report, Brammertz said that cooperation from
Syria “remained generally satisfactory” (Paragraphs 6 and 82) and noted that the
commission has received “ongoing strong support” from Lebanese authorities, even
during the July-August 2006 fighting described below (Paragraph 2).10
10 The report is U.N. Document S/2006/760, dated September 25, 2006. See also Warren
Hoge, “U.N. Inquiry Into Death of Lebanon’s Ex-Premier Focuses on Killers,” New York
Times, September 26, 2006.

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CRS-10
In his fourth progress report (sixth report by the Commission), submitted on
December 12, Brammertz stated that the investigation into the Hariri assassination
“is approaching a sensitive and complicated phase” that requires confidentiality in
order to create a secure environment in which witnesses and staff will be able to carry
out their functions (Paragraph 115). Without naming names, Brammertz added that
the investigation is bringing to light “significant links” between the Hariri case and
14 other cases involving attacks or assassinations (Paragraph 116) that have occurred
in Lebanon since October 2004. Again, the report noted that the “level of assistance
provided by the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period remains generally
satisfactory” (Paragraph 101).11
In his fifth progress report (seventh by the Commission), submitted on March
15, 2007, Brammertz noted in his summary that “the Commission has made progress
in collecting new evidence and in expanding the forms of evidence collected,” but
did not specifically identify a perpetrator. He pointed to close cooperation with
Lebanese authorities (Paragraphs 91-94), and said the cooperation with Syria
“remains generally satisfactory,” while commenting that responses by interviewees
“can be characterized as variable in quality on occasion.” (Paragraphs 95-98)
Brammertz recalled that in his previous report (December 12, 2006) he had noted
requests from information from ten unidentified other states were overdue, but added
that as of the current report, “almost ll outstanding matters were resolved.”
(Paragraphs 99-102) In his conclusion, Brammertz anticipated that the Commission
will need more time to complete its work and welcomed the request of the Lebanese
government on February 21 for an extension of the Commission’s mandate beyond
its current expiration date of June 15, 2007 (Paragraph 118; also in the U.N.
Secretary General’s forwarding letter).12 Pursuant to this recommendation, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1748 on March 27, 2007, which extended the
Commission’s mandate until June 15, 2008, and changed the frequency of the
Commission’s reports from three to four months. (See below.)
In his sixth progress report (eighth by the Commission), submitted on July 12,
2007, “the Commission has identified a number of persons of particular interest who
may have been involved in some aspects of the preparation or commission of the
crime or could have had prior knowledge that such a plan was under way.”
(Paragraph 55.) Brammertz, however, has not named any suspects so far.13
Elections of 2005 and Aftermath
As Syrian troops departed from Lebanon under U.S. and international pressure
(see below), the Lebanese prepared to hold parliamentary elections without Syrian
interference for the first time since 1972. Parliamentary elections, held in four phases
between May 29 and June 5, 2005, gave a majority (72 out of 128 seats) to a large,
anti-Syrian bloc known as the Bristol Gathering or the March 14 Movement, headed
by Saad Hariri, a son of the late prime minister. A second, largely Shi’ite and pro-
11 The report is U.N. Document S/2006/962, dated December 12, 2006.
12 This report is U.N. Document S/2007/150, dated March 15, 2007.
13 This report is U.N. Document S/2007/424, dated July 12, 2007.

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CRS-11
Syrian bloc grouping Hezbollah and the more moderate Amal organization won 33
seats. A third bloc, the Change and Reform Movement (also known as the Free
Patriotic Movement), consisted of largely Christian supporters of former dissident
armed forces chief of staff General Michel Awn,14 who returned to Lebanon from
exile in France in May 2005. Awn’s bloc, which adopted a somewhat equivocal
position regarding Syria, gained 21 seats. (See Table 2 below.) Despite Hariri’s
success, the electoral pattern resulted in a mixed government, which complicates its
abilities to adopt clear policy lines. Hariri associate Fouad Siniora became prime
minister and the 24-member cabinet contains 15 Hariri supporters; however, it also
contains five supporters of the Shi’ite bloc including for the first time in Lebanese
history two members of Hezbollah. Other key pro-Syrians remaining in the
government are President Lahoud and veteran parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri,
who heads the Amal organization (Hezbollah’s junior partner in the Shi’ite coalition)
and has held the speakership since 1992.
Siniora immediately faced difficulties in working with this mixed government.
First, pressure has mounted among anti-Syrian elements for the resignation of
President Lahoud with the identification of several of his close associates in the
Hariri assassination.15 Second, the role of the formerly exiled General Awn is
uncertain: though long an opponent of the Syrian role in Lebanon, Awn formed
tactical alliances with several pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians during the 2005
elections in an effort to defeat pro-Hariri candidates. On the other hand, Awn’s
grouping is not represented in the cabinet and Awn has said he will form the
backbone of an opposition to Siniora’s government. Some observers believe Awn,
a Maronite Christian, has his eye on the presidency. Third, the inclusion of
Hezbollah officials in the cabinet raised further problems; for example, the U.S. State
Department, while welcoming the Siniora cabinet, has said it will not deal with an
official of Hezbollah, which the U.S. government has listed as a foreign terrorist
organization. Fourth, a major stumbling block for the government is a U.N. demand
contained in Security Council Resolution 1559 that all militias be disbanded, which
in effect refers mainly to Hezbollah. This demand has proven difficult to implement
in view of Hezbollah’s strong bloc of supporters in parliament, its paramilitary
capabilities, its support from Syria and Iran, and a perception among some Lebanese
that Hezbollah has stood up to Israel in various clashes in southern Lebanon.
Deadlock and Partial Realignments. Disputes over Lahoud’s status and
Hezbollah disarmament led to a cabinet crisis and temporary boycott by Shi’ite
cabinet ministers in December 2005. The crisis was temporarily resolved when
14 General Awn (variant spelling: Aoun), a controversial former armed forces commander
and prime minister, rejected the Taif Agreement and eventually obtained political asylum
in France.
15 In early January an anti-Syrian Lebanese political figure described Lahoud’s extension
in office as “null and void.” On the other hand, Lahoud’s extension is not without
precedent. On two previous occasions, in 1949 and 1995, Lebanon has extended the term
of a president. Shi’ite cabinet ministers reportedly refused to attend a cabinet meeting
unless President Lahoud was present. Majdoline Hatoum, “Calls for Lahoud’s Resignation
Intensify,” The Daily Star (Beirut), January 4, 2006; Adnan al-Ghoul, “Hizbullah Takes
Gloves off in Row with Jumblatt,” The Daily Star (Beirut), January 16, 2006.

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Prime Minister Siniora stated on February 3, 2006, that “we have never called and
will never call the resistance [Hezbollah] by any other name” [thereby avoiding the
term “militia” in characterizing Hezbollah]. In the meantime, leaders of two major
parliamentary blocs with strongly differing views on Syria and other topics —
Hezbollah chief Hasan Nasrallah and Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel
Awn — held what some describe as a historic meeting in a Beirut church on February
6, 2006. At the meeting, the two adopted a “Paper of Understanding” that called for
finding ways to end rampant corruption; drafting a new election law; finding ways
to confront issues such as the demarcation of borders and establishment of diplomatic
relations with Syria; and disarming Hezbollah guerrillas and Palestinian factions.
The parties emphasized that they were not forming an alliance or seeking to terminate
other bilateral undertakings involving either of the two parties. Some parties,
however, have gone so far as to call the Awn-Nasrallah meeting a “coup,” saying that
a meeting between the two leaders who have wide followings in their respective
communities “will leave its impact on balances of power that have emerged since
Hariri’s assassination.”16
Table 2. 2005 Parliament: Composition by Major Bloc
Bloc
Leader(s)
Number
March 14 Movement
Saad Hariri
72*
Prime Minister: Fouad Siniora
Shi’ite Bloc (Hezbollah, Amal)
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah
33
Speaker: Nabih Berri
Free Patriotic Movement
General Michel Awn
21
Independents
N/A
2
*Assassination of two members of the Hariri bloc in November 2006 and June 2007 reduced
the bloc’s majority from 72 to 70 and temporarily reduced total membership in parliament
from 128 to 126; by-elections to fill these positions were held on August 5, 2007, but some
Lebanese figures do not accept their validity. Another assassination of a pro-Hariri member
of parliament on September 19 could further alter the political picture. Tally sheets of the
parliamentary breakdown differ slightly among commentators.
National Dialogue. On March 2, 2006, 14 Lebanese leaders representing
major sectarian communities and political groups convened a National Dialogue
conference to address key issues currently dividing Lebanon. The ground-breaking
conference, pushed by parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri and other Lebanese
politicians, agreed to address such issues as the status of President Lahoud, the
international investigation of the Hariri and other assassinations, arms maintained by
Hezbollah and Palestinians outside refugee camps, demarcation of the Syrian-
Lebanese border including the disputed Shib’a Farms area (see below), and
16 Hussein Dakroub, “Alliance Between Pro-and Anti-Syrian Leaders Seen as ‘Coup’ in
Lebanon’s Politics,” Associated Press, February 8, 2006.

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CRS-13
establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria (which has never
taken place). According to press reports, the conferees reached initial agreement on
March 13 to disarm Palestinians outside refugee camps and to work to establish
diplomatic relations with Syria; however, Syria resisted border demarcation or
establishment of diplomatic relations at this time; moreover, the parties were unable
so far to agree on the status of President Lahoud or disarmament of Hezbollah.
Further sessions have been held intermittently, but as of June 8, 2006 the parties had
agreed only on a “Code of Honor” pact stipulating that the various parties “respect
each other.” The National Dialogue briefly reconvened on June 29 but adjourned
until July 25, according to the Speaker of Parliament. (See below.)
Recent or Current Foreign Presence in Lebanon
Syria
Thirty-five thousand Syrian troops entered Lebanon in March 1976, in response
to then President Suleiman Frangieh’s appeal to protect the Christians from Muslim
and Palestinian militias; later, Syria switched its support away from the main
Christian factions. Between May 1988 and June 2001, Syrian forces occupied most
of west Beirut and much of eastern and northern Lebanon. Syrian forces did not
venture south of a “red line” running east and west across Lebanon near Rashayah,
inasmuch as territory south of the line was considered to fall within the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) operating area.
In October 1989, as part of the Taif agreements, Syria agreed to begin
discussions on possible Syrian troop redeployment from Beirut to the eastern Beqaa
Valley two years after political reforms were implemented and discuss further
withdrawals at that time. Then President Elias Hirawi signed the reforms in
September 1990. However, the withdrawal discussions, which according to most
interpretations of the Taif Agreement were to have started in September 1992, did not
take place, in part because the Lebanese government said it needed more time to
establish its authority over the country. Syrian officials maintained that they were
waiting for the Lebanese government to complete rebuilding the army and police
forces and assume security responsibilities in Lebanon before beginning the
withdrawal discussions. In the meantime, Syria and Lebanon signed a treaty of
brotherhood, cooperation, and coordination in May 1991, which called for creating
several joint committees to coordinate policies. Although Syrian troop strength in
Lebanon reportedly declined from 35,000-40,000 in the 1980s to approximately
14,000 by early 2005, Syria continued to exercise controlling influence over
Lebanon’s domestic politics and regional policies; moreover, its intelligence agents
were active in Lebanon. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 adopted on
September 2, 2004, called among other things upon “all remaining foreign forces to
withdraw from Lebanon.”
The Hariri assassination in February 2005 prompted strong international
pressure on the Syrian regime, particularly from the United States and France, to
withdraw its forces and intelligence apparatus from Lebanon in accordance with
Resolution 1559. On April 26, 2005, the Syrian foreign minister informed U.N.

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CRS-14
Secretary General Kofi Annan and the President of the U.N. Security Council that
Syrian forces had completed their withdrawal from Lebanon. In his first semi-annual
report on the implementation of Resolution 1559,17 the U.N. Secretary General stated
that as of April 26, however, he had not been able to verify full Syrian withdrawal;
consequently, he dispatched a U.N. team to verify whether there had been a full
Syrian withdrawal. On May 23, the U.N. Secretary General forwarded a report by
a team he had sent to Lebanon to verify Syrian withdrawal. The team “found no
Syrian military forces, assets or intelligence apparatus in Lebanese territory, with the
exception of one Syrian battalion” deployed near the disputed village of Deir Al-
Ashayr on the Lebanese-Syrian border. The team also concluded that “no Syrian
military intelligence personnel remain in Lebanon in known locations or in military
uniform” but added that it was “unable to conclude with certainty that all the
intelligence apparatus has been withdrawn.”18
On June 10, 2005, following reports of Syrian involvement in attacks on anti-
Syrian Lebanese officials and journalists, Secretary General Annan sent the
verification team back to Lebanon to see if Syrian intelligence agents were still in the
country. The team returned on July 11 and subsequently submitted a report to
Annan. In his second semi-annual report on implementation of Resolution 1559,
submitted on October 26, 2005, Annan reported that “[o]verall, the team corroborated
its earlier conclusion that there was no remaining visible or significant Syrian
intelligence presence or activity in Lebanon, though the distinctly close historical and
other ties between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon also had to be taken into
account when assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian intelligence in
Lebanon.” He acknowledged that there were some credible reports that Syrian
intelligence continued to influence events in Lebanon but said most of these reports
were exaggerated.
On the other hand, the Secretary General noted that other requirements of
Resolution 1559 remained to be implemented, particularly disbanding and disarming
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia (notably Hezbollah and several Palestinian
groups) and extension of Lebanese government control throughout all of the
country.19 The third semi-annual report on implementation of Resolution 1559,
submitted to the Security Council on April 19, 2006, recounted previously reported
threats by Syrian officials against Lebanese legislators if they did not vote for
extension of President Lahoud’s term. The report says that Syrian forces and
intelligence services have effectively left Lebanon, but some other U.N. demands
remain unmet, including disarmament of Hezbollah, demarcation of the border, and
establishment of diplomatic relations. The fourth and fifth semi-annual reports,
submitted on October 9, 2006 and May 7, 2007, respectively, repeat some of these
17 U.N. Security Council document S/2005/272, Paragraph 17.
18 Annex to U.N. Security Council document S/2005/331, Letter dated May 23, 2005, from
the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.
19 Text of report is attached to U.N. Security Council document S/2005/673, October 26,
2005.

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CRS-15
themes.20 For example, the fourth report notes that “[a]llegations have at times been
made, including by the Government of Lebanon, that there continues to be Syrian
intelligence activity in Lebanon.” The fifth semi-annual report quotes an allegation
that “forces directly affiliated with Syrian intelligence are bringing in new shipments
of weapons” to Lebanon. Both reports cite Syrian denials of these allegations. In an
interview with Lally Weymouth published in the May 1, 2006, edition of Newsweek,
Prime Minister Siniora said “Syria has its men and people in the country: supporters,
some politicians and quite a number of Syrian intelligence.” The sixth semi-annual
report, submitted on October 24, 2007, states that the government of Lebanon has
continued to make progress in extending its authority over Lebanese territory, but
faces challenges from radical organizations, including the fringe Palestinian group
Fatah al-Islam (see below), as well as from the political stalemate in Lebanon.21
Syria has long regarded Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence. Some
international observers have expressed concern that Syrian leaders might try to
circumvent the effect of the withdrawal by maintaining their influence through
contacts they have acquired over the years in the Lebanese bureaucracy and security
services.22 Attacks on and assassinations of some prominent Lebanese critics of
Syria in addition to Hariri have accentuated these fears. Another remaining question
concerns the ability of the Lebanese security forces to assume responsibility for
maintaining order in areas vacated by Syrian forces. Lebanon’s ground forces
number approximately 70,000 organized into 11 under strength brigades and a few
separate units and armed largely with obsolescent equipment, plus minuscule air and
naval forces, each consisting of about 1,000 personnel.23 In this connection a
Lebanese study group has prepared a report indicating despite Syria’s formal
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, Syria continues to occupy as much as180 square
miles of Lebanese territory (approximately 4.5% of the country). The drafters of the
report believe Syria maintains camps and smuggling routes through which they
infiltrate foreign fighters and weapons into Lebanon.24
Israel
In March 1978, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanese territory south of the
Litani River, to destroy Palestinian bases that Israel believed were the source of
attacks against Israelis. Israeli forces withdrew in June 1978, after the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was placed south of the Litani to serve
as a buffer between Israel and the Palestinians (U.N. Security Council Resolution
425, March 19, 1978). In June 1982, Israel mounted a more extensive invasion
20 U.N. Security Council documents S/2006/832, October 19, 2006 and S/2007/262, May 7,
2007.
21 U.N. Security Council document S/2007/629, October 24, 2007.
22 Robin Wright, “Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31,
2005. Syria also has potential built-in assets through the continued presence of President
Lahoud and parliamentary speaker Berri.
23 Recent estimates appear in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance, 2005-2006, London, pp. 197-198.
24 Barbara Slavin, “Syria lingers in Lebanon, report says,” USA Today, July 25, 2007.

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CRS-16
designed to root out armed Palestinian guerrillas from southern Lebanon, defeated
Syrian forces in central Lebanon, and advanced as far north as Beirut. As many as
20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese may have perished in the fighting. Israeli forces
completed a phased withdrawal in 1985, but maintained a 9-mile wide security zone
in southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000. About 1,000 members of the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) patrolled the zone, backed by a 2,000-3,000 Lebanese militia
called the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which was trained and equipped by Israel.
On its part, Israel continued its air and artillery retaliation against Palestinian and
Lebanese Shi’ite militia and Lebanese armed forces units that attacked IDF and SLA
positions.
In May 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak fulfilled a 1999 campaign
promise to withdraw Israeli forces from the security zone in southern Lebanon.
Barak had hoped to do this in conjunction with a Syrian withdrawal, but the
continued stalemate in Syrian-Israeli talks led Barak to decide to move unilaterally.
Some 500 Hezbollah militia moved into portions of the southern security zone
vacated by the IDF and SLA. Israel gave asylum to approximately 6,700 SLA
fighters and their families, while another 1,500 SLA were captured by Hezbollah and
turned over to the Lebanese Government to stand trial. Of the 6,700 exiles, many
emigrated to Australia, Canada, and Latin America; approximately 2,000 remained
in Israel as of mid-2005, where they were later granted the right to Israeli citizenship
but few applied.
The Shib’a Farms. Syria and the then pro-Syrian Lebanese government
asserted that the Israeli withdrawal was incomplete because it did not include a 10-
square-mile enclave known as the Shib’a Farms near the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian tri-
border area. Most third parties maintain that the Shib’a Farms is part of the Israeli-
occupied Syrian Golan Heights and is not part of the Lebanese territory from which
Israeli was required to withdraw under the 1978 U.N. Security Council Resolution
425 (see above). On June 16, 2000, the U.N. Secretary General informed the
Security Council that Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon in compliance with
Resolution 425.
Hezbollah, on its part, claimed credit for forcing Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon, thereby boosting its credentials within the Arab world. Since May 2000,
Israeli forces in the Shib’a Farms area have been the main focus of Hezbollah attacks.
Some analysts believe that Syria, the Lebanese government, and Hezbollah raised the
issue of this obscure enclave as a justification for continuing to put military pressure
on Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights in the aftermath of its withdrawal from
Lebanon.25 Syria denies this. Moreover, Lebanese politicians across the spectrum,
including those opposed to Syria, appear to agree that the Farms are Lebanese
territory; in his interview with Lally Weymouth, Prime Minister Siniora said the
“Sheba (variant spelling) Farms is Lebanese.” Commentators have speculated that
through its contacts with Hezbollah, Iran may seek to fill the vacuum left by Syria’s
withdrawal from Lebanon. Others doubt that Iran has the means to fill Syria’s former
25 Michael Slackman, “Shabaa [variant spelling] Farms at Center of Tension for Lebanon,
Syria and Israel,” Los Angeles Times, April 28, 2001.

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CRS-17
role in Lebanon, noting that unlike Syria, Iran does not have contiguous borders with
Lebanon.26
The Hezbollah-Israel Confrontation of 2006-2007
Resumption of Violence
As agreement on basic domestic and regional issues continued to elude the
Lebanese, the fragile consensus they had achieved in the year following the Hariri
assassination began to unravel. Tensions between Israel and the militant Palestinians
in the Gaza territory spread to Lebanon in mid-July 2006 as a cycle of violence began
between Israel and militants from the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim organization
Hezbollah. On July 12, possibly in a gesture of solidarity with the radical
Palestinian organization Hamas combating Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah units launched
attacks across Israel’s northern border, killing eight Israelis and seizing two Israeli
soldiers as hostages. Israel launched widespread air and artillery strikes on
Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and Lebanese infrastructure including Beirut
International Airport, vowing to continue the attacks until the Israeli hostages are
returned. Hezbollah has launched daily attacks on northern Israel with extended-
range rockets, penetrating as far as the northern Israeli port of Haifa, Israel’s third
largest city, and beyond, to which Israel has responded with air strikes. Military
commentators have said that Hezbollah has more than 12,000 largely unguided
Katyusha rockets, with ranges of 20-45 miles, but also some more advanced variants
of Iranian or Syrian manufacture. Though with limited accuracy, they can cover a
wide range of Israeli territory.
Initially, the Israelis used primarily airpower and artillery in their strikes against
Hezbollah; however, by mid- to late July, they had carried out some small ground
operations in southern Lebanon. On July 21, Israel began massing ground forces on
the Lebanese border, and the following day, the Israeli Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Lt. General Dan Halutz said “[w]e shall carry out limited ground operations as
necessary in order to strike at the terrorism which strikes at us.”27 By August 4,
Israeli forces in Lebanon reportedly numbered 10,000 and had positioned themselves
in or around more than a dozen villages and towns up to four miles inside Lebanon
in some locations. On August 9, the Israeli “inner cabinet” agreed to expand the
ground offensive in an effort to drive Hezbollah forces across the Litani River and
clear a buffer zone in southern Lebanon before international diplomacy might lead
to a cease-fire. According to press reports, the Israeli Prime Minister and the
26 Michael Slackman, “As Syria’s Iinfluence in Lebanon Wanes, Iran Moves In,” New York
Times, March 13, 2006.
27 Greg Myre and Jad Mouawad, “Israeli Buildup at Lebanese Line as Fight Rages,” New
York Times, July 22, 2006. On the other hand, unnamed Israeli officials were quoted as
saying that a larger invasion may not be needed to achieve Israel goals. Scott Wilson and
Anthony Shadid, “Israel Fights To Secure Key Region in Lebanon,” Washington Post, July
23, 2006.

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Minister of Defense would decide when the new phase of the offensive was to begin
and might defer it briefly depending on further diplomatic developments.28
Diplomatic Endeavors
At the G-8 summit meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, attendees disagreed over
various aspects of the crisis; however, on July 16, they adopted a statement placing
blame for the immediate crisis on extremist forces of Hezbollah and the militant
Palestinian organization Hamas, but calling on Israel to exercise utmost restraint and
avoid casualties among civilians. U.S. officials have been reluctant to support a
cease-fire resolution without dealing with “root causes,” which they identify as the
actions of Hezbollah. On July 23, two veteran officials from Saudi Arabia, Foreign
Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former Saudi
Ambassador to the United States and presently chief of the Saudi National Security
Council, met with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to
propose a cease-fire that would postpone the question of disarming Hezbollah. The
U.S. leaders made no public commitment to back this plan; however, the two sides
reportedly discussed restoring sovereignty to Lebanon, strengthening the Lebanese
Armed Forces, and rebuilding the country.29
In late July and early August, diplomatic activity focused on the feasibility of
a cease-fire, with U.S. and Israeli officials arguing that conditions must first be in
place to assure that a cease-fire would be “sustainable” before formally establishing
one. While the issue was under discussion, the Council issued two statements,
deploring an Israeli attack on a U.N. observer post and on a building in the Lebanese
town of Qana where a number of civilians had sought shelter; also, it adopted
Resolution 1697, which extended by one month the mandate of the existing U.N.
Interim Force in Lebanon, pending study of options for further arrangements in
southern Lebanon. On August 5, 2006, the United States and France proposed that
the U.N. Security Council adopt a two-track process consisting of a joint resolution
aimed at an initial cease-fire in Lebanon, possibly followed by a second resolution
aimed at securing a more lasting peace.30
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. After extended discussion and
debate, the U.N. Security Council on August 11, 2006, unanimously adopted as
Resolution 1701 a revised U.S.-French resolution calling for a “full cessation of
hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all
attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations.”
Among the other terms of the resolution are expansion of the existing U.N. Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from 2,000 to a maximum of 15,000; deployment of
28 Steven Erlanger and Warren Hoge, “Israel Holds Off on Drive to the North,” New York
Times, August 11, 2006.
29 “In Battle To Remove Hezbollah, Both Israel, Lebanon Pay Price,” Wall Street Journal,
July 24, 2006.
30 Terms are listed in more detail in Washington Post, August 6, 2006. See Colum Lynch
and Robin Wright, “U.S., France Agree On Plan to Halt Lebanon Fighting.” (Sidebar,
“Main Points of the U.N. Draft Resolution.”)

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UNIFIL plus a 15,000-member Lebanese Army contingent31 to southern Lebanon to
monitor the cease-fire; withdrawal of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon “in parallel”
with the deployment of U.N. and Lebanese forces to the south; a ban on delivery of
weapons to “any entity or individual” in Lebanon, except the Lebanese Army. The
resolution requests the U.N. Secretary General to develop proposals within 30 days
for disarmament [of militias] delineation of Lebanon’s international borders
including the disputed Shib’a (Shebaa) Farms enclave. In preambular language, the
resolution also emphasizes the need to address the issue of prisoners on both sides.
The resolution also calls upon the international community to extend financial and
humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including facilitating the safe return
of displaced persons.
According to the U.N. Secretary-General, the “cessation of hostilities” called for
in Resolution 1701 went into effect on August 14, at 5:00 a.m. GMT. In his first
report to the Security Council on implementation of Resolution 1701, the Secretary
General noted the leaders of Lebanon and Israel had accepted the resolution and that
the parties were generally complying with the cessation of hostilities as of the writing
of his report,32 although some of the heaviest fighting in the conflict had taken place
during the 48 hours before the cessation of hostilities came into effect. Some other
terms of the resolution are being carried out. Lebanese Army contingents are
beginning to deploy to some areas of southern Lebanon, and the expanded U.N.
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is deploying to southern Lebanon. As of late
September, about 5,000 UNIFIL troops were in Lebanon, representing a moderate
increase in UNIFIL’s former strength of 2,000 but significantly short of the
maximum target figure of 15,000 cited in the resolution. In an interview in an Italian
newspaper in late December, the French commander of UNIFIL, General Alain
Pellegrini, said the expanded UNIFIL (sometimes called UNIFIL-2) had reached a
strength of 11,000, with 23 countries represented, and is set to reach 12,000.33 In his
parting report to the U.N. Security Council of December 11, 2006, then Secretary
General Kofi Annan pointed out two other positive aspects of the U.N. deployment:
a “crucial role” by UNIFIL in helping the Lebanese army ensure that southern
Lebanon is “free of armed personnel, assets and weapons”; and the establishment of
a UNIFIL Maritime Task Force to assist the small Lebanese navy in securing its
territorial waters.34
In a subsequent report on implementation of Resolution 1701 submitted on
March 14, 2007, the new U.N. Secretary-General Mr. Ban Yi-moon noted that the
31 The Lebanese Prime Minister offered to deploy 15,000 military personnel, and the
Lebanese offer is welcomed in the preambular portion of Resolution 1701.
32 U.N. Document S/2006/670, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of
resolution 1701 (2006) (For the period 11 to 17 August 2006). The Secretary General noted
that “[o]n 12 August, the Government of Lebanon announced its acceptance of resolution
1701 (2006). On 13 August, the Government of Israel announced that it would act
according to its obligations as outlined in the resolution.”
33 “Al-Qa’ida Is Threatening the Blue Helmets,” La Repubblica (Rome), December 17,
2006, p. 17.
34 U.N. Document S/2006/956, December 11, 2006, p. 9.

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second phase of UNIFIL deployment had been completed as of February 20, 2007,
bringing UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon to the following numbers: 12,431 total
military personnel from 29 contributing countries, including 10,479 ground troops
operating in an eastern and a western sector; in addition, UNIFIL naval personnel had
reached a total of 1,772. He added that the mission has continued to recruit civilian
staff, reaching a total of 473 by February 8, with an authorized strength of 1,078. On
February 2, 2007, the former UNIFIL commander Major General Pellegrini, a French
officer, was succeeded by Major General Claudio Graziano, from Italy.35 Further
increases as of June 19, 2007 brought UNIFIL to 11,113 ground troops and 2,000
serving in the maritime force, plus smaller headquarters and support elements.36
After-Effects of the Fighting
According to the U.N. Secretary General, the Israeli bombardments and ground
invasion into Lebanon killed an estimated 1,200 Lebanese, injured over 4,000, killed
four U.N. military observers, and created nearly a million internally displaced people.
Over 140 Israelis, including 43 civilians, were killed and over 100 injured, many by
Hezbollah attacks using rockets. The Secretary General notes continued violations
of the cessation of hostilities resolution on both sides, including reports of weapons
supply to Hezbollah and Israeli overflights of Lebanon.37
The 34-day military confrontation between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense
Force in July and August 2006 enhanced the prestige of Hezbollah at the expense of
the Lebanese government. Hezbollah’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah acquired a
folk-hero status as his organization was widely hailed both for its military prowess
in the conflict with Israel and for its perceived ability to initiate disaster relief
projects far more quickly and efficiently than the regular governmental organizations.
Even those Lebanese who might be inclined to criticize Hezbollah for precipitating
a crisis that devastated much of southern Lebanon have been muted, at least
temporarily, by Nasrallah’s soaring popularity and Hezbollah’s success in delivering
aid to large numbers of displaced persons and other homeless or destitute Lebanese.38
Similarly, he finds himself in a strong position to withstand pressures to disarm
Hezbollah. Syria too, as a major sponsor of Hezbollah, finds that it has more
maneuver room in dealing with Lebanese issues.
The inevitable comparisons being drawn between Hezbollah effectiveness and
Lebanese government ineptitude raise questions about the future of the Siniora
government and its ability to withstand domestic criticism over its leadership during
the current crisis. Although not all Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah, many
observers believe Sheikh Nasrallah is likely to be heeded to a greater degree in the
35 U.N. Document S/2007/147, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of
Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), March 14, 2007, p. 11.
36 U.N. Document S/2007/392, June 28, 2007, pp. 11-12.
37 U.N. Document S/2006/956, December 11, 2006, pp. 8-9.
38 Sharon Behn, ‘U.S., Hezbollah Vie to Rebuild for Lebanese; Hope To Win Public
Opinion,” Washington Times, August 18, 2006; Paul Richter, “Cease-Fire in the Middle
East,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2006.

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CRS-21
post conflict environment in Lebanon; he benefits from his ability to play multiple
roles including military leader, reconstruction czar, and political participant. Despite
his currently favorable image, however, Nasrallah seems reluctant to allow the
situation to escalate into a resumption of civil or border strife.
Further Tensions
As the autumn of 2006 wore on, Hezbollah began pressing for a larger role in
the Lebanese government headed by the anti-Syrian prime minister Siniora. A
“victory rally” staged by Hezbollah in late September was followed by increased
pressure for the replacement of the Siniora government with a “national unity”
government, more than one third of whose members would be members or supporters
of Hezbollah.39 In an interview on October 31, 2006, Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah warned that if a national unity government had not come into being by
mid-November, “[w]e will take all available democratic steps to achieve this goal,
including resigning from the government.” On November 11, the Hezbollah-led bloc
carried out this threat, and its ministers and supporters resigned from the cabinet, a
decision that cost the Siniora government crucial support within the Shiite
community.40
The proximate causes of the resignation of the six ministers were the breakdown
of national unity talks and the recommendation of the U.N. Security Council to
establish an international tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri murder case, a step
strongly opposed by Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian groups. On November 13,
following the resignations, a depleted Lebanese cabinet minus the Hezbollah
ministers approved a draft law establishing a tribunal.
The Tribunal. On November 25, 2006, remaining members of the Lebanese
cabinet approved the U.N. Security Council proposal to establish the court, in the
face of strong opposition from pro-Syrian elements, who maintained that the
truncated cabinet lacked a popular mandate to take this step (see above).41 Also,
governmental approval of the tribunal still requires the approval of the pro-Syrian
President Emile Lahoud, who has said the decision was improper because of the
resignation of the six ministers on November 11. Similarly, parliamentary approval
has proven difficult to obtain, despite the anti-Syrian majority in parliament, where
39 A minority of one third of the cabinet seats plus one additional seat would provide the
Hezbollah bloc with effective veto power of cabinet decisions; hence, the governing
coalition’s refusal to consider this demand. Michael Slackman, “Lebanon Talks Collapse
as Shiites Vacate Cabinet,” The New York Times, November 12, 2006.
40 “Hezbollah Quits Lebanese Cabinet,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2006. Five
ministers from Hezbollah and its ally Amal resigned, plus a Sunni Muslim minister opposed
to Siniora’s policies.
41 The U.N. proposal for international court is contained in U.N. Security Council document
S/2006/893, Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for
Lebanon, November 15, 2006.

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it is bottled up by the Speaker, Nabih Berri, an ally of Hezbollah.42 On January 17,
2007, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (who had replaced Kofi Annan)
expressed concern that Lebanon has not yet given final approval to creation of the
tribunal. The Hezbollah-led opposition reportedly has said that it accepts the
principal of the court but does not want it to become a vehicle for attacking Syria.
In a further development, on February 6 the U.N. Chief Legal Counsel signed the
agreement to establish the court, but Lebanese ratification remained blocked as
explained above.43
Resolution 1757. Confronted with this impasse, supporters of the tribunal
decided on a new approach that would circumvent the Lebanese governmental
machinery and enlist the international community. On April 4, 2007, a U.N.
spokesman announced that 70 members of the Lebanese parliament petitioned the
U.N. Secretary-General to act under the U.N. Charter and set up a special tribunal to
try suspects in the Hariri murder. On May 14, Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora
wrote to the Secretary-General, asking that the Security Council establish the court
as a matter of urgency. Subsequently, on May 30, 2007, a divided U.N. Security
Council voted by 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions (Russia, China, South Africa, Indonesia,
and Qatar) to adopt Resolution 1757, which establishes a tribunal outside of Lebanon
to prosecute persons responsible for the attack of February 14, 2005. The resolution
contains a detailed annex covering the establishment of the tribunal. The resolution
also provides that the provisions of the annex will “enter into force” on June 10, 2007
unless Lebanon ratifies the tribunal before that date.
Establishment of the tribunal is likely to prove divisive among Lebanese and
elsewhere in the region. Pro-Syrian elements have already criticized Resolution 1757
and Syria has threatened not to cooperate with the tribunal, while some third world
countries have expressed reservations. (Lebanese President Lahoud reportedly
expressed skepticism but said he would support the tribunal if it is “fair and
impartial.”44) Western countries including France and Germany (which currently
holds the European Union presidency) have praised this step; Egypt welcomed the
June 10 target date, which in effect gave the Lebanese parliament one last chance to
establish the tribunal itself. Opponents of the resolution objected on grounds that it
was passed under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which could include the use of
force, and that it represents interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs; the Russian
delegate commented that “never before has the Security Council ratified agreements
on behalf of a parliament of a foreign country.” Some observers say it may take a
year to set up the machinery of the tribunal. The U.N. Secretary General has said the
tribunal will not be established until the U.N. has $35 million to cover costs for the
first year and pledges of $85 million to cover the following two years; Lebanon is
42 Anthony Shadid, “Crisis in Lebanon Reaches New Threshold,” The Washington Post,
November 26, 2006.
43 Betsy Pisik, “U.N., Beirut agree about Hariri tribunal,” The Washington Times, February
7, 2007; Evelyn Leopold, “UN OK’s tribunal on Lebanese political killings,” Reuters,
February 6, 2007.
44 Scheherezade Farmamarzi, “Syria and Lebanese opposition criticize U.N. creation of
tribunal,” AP News Wires, May 31, 2007.

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CRS-23
expected to fund 49% of the tribunal’s costs. The Netherlands reportedly agreed in
August 2007 to host the tribunal if those convicted served terms in another country.45

The Hezbollah Demonstrations and Their Aftermath. Meanwhile, a
new phase of the confrontation began in December with the beginning of massive
demonstrations led by Hezbollah with the avowed purpose of bringing down the
Siniora government. Since December 1, pro-Hezbollah crowds, estimated by some
at more than 100,000, have camped in front of the government building (the “Serail”)
where Prime Minister Siniora has remained with his supporters, who have organized
counter rallies to show solidarity with the government. Government supporters want
a presidential election to replace President Lahoud, while the Hezbollah supporters
want new parliamentary elections that they think would deprive the Prime Minister
of his majority and lead to a new government over which Hezbollah could exercise
a veto. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s unlikely ally retired General Awn is seeking the
presidency, a position reserved for the Maronite Christian community, to which Awn
belongs. The standoff continued for almost two months with little or no violence.46
The situation escalated on January 19, 2007, when the Hezbollah-led opposition
called for a general strike on January 23 in an effort to step up its campaign against
Prime Minister Siniora. Leaders of the 350,000-member labor federation called for
a parallel strike protesting Siniora’s planned tax increase. The strikes succeeded in
paralyzing much of Beirut and some other areas; initially peaceful, they quickly
turned violent causing three deaths and numerous injuries as protesters threw up road
blocks with burning tires and cars and clashed with government supporters, while
military, police, and firefighters tried to reopen roads. The unrest died down and a
tense calm returned to the city on January 24 as the opposition suspended the strike,
saying that it had served as a warning to the government. Pro-government groups,
on their part, warned of counter-protests if the opposition resumed their strike.
More violence marked the second anniversary of the late Prime Minister Hariri’s
assassination, when three Lebanese were killed and 23 wounded in the bombing of
two minibuses in Beirut. Commentators noted that this was the first time since the
1975-1990 civil war that such attacks were directed against ordinary Lebanese rather
than public figures and speculated that it was designed to scare people away from
attending the Hariri memorial service; however, many did attend.47 The Lebanese
Army, according to its commander General Michel Suleiman, is deployed throughout
Lebanon in an effort to keep the peace; General Suleiman added that “the army is
suffering from pressure” and “has been bearing above its load for months.” He went
45 “Hariri, Ban discuss ways to speed up international tribunal,” The Daily Star, October 9,
2007.
46 Anthony Shadid, “Lebanese Government Issues Own Warning,” The Washington Post,
December 14, 2006; Megan K. Stack, “The World; A key player in Lebanon shreds script,”
Los Angeles Times, December 20, 2006.
47 Anthony Shadid, “Anger and Homage, Side by Side Along Lebanon’s Divide,” The
Washington Post, February 15, 2007; Michael Slackman, “Rival Groups Kept Apart at
Hariri Memorial in Beirut,” The New York Times, February 15, 2007.

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CRS-24
on to say that the army “is ready to bear more on condition that officials and civilians
also bear their responsibilities in preventing security disturbances.”48
Seeking a Rapprochement. In the aftermath of the strikes and
demonstrations, there were some signs of forward movement in attempts by the
various parties to resolve the current political deadlock. On March 8, 2007, a series
of meetings began between two main rival leaders, Parliament Speaker Berri and
March 14 Movement leader (and son of the late prime minister) Saad Hariri. After
a follow-up meeting between the two politicians on March 16, Hariri told reporters
that the meetings would continued “until a settlement is reached.”49 The Berra-Hariri
meetings have been held against the backdrop of external diplomatic contacts aimed
at encouraging the Lebanese parties to find common ground; Saudi Arabia, for
example, has been active lately in seeking to settle growing religious sectarian crises.
Saudi Arabia hosted also hosted an Arab League summit conference on March 28-29,
2007. But unrest has continued in Lebanon Two assassinations of parliamentarians
(November 2006 and June 2007) reduced the Hariri bloc in parliament from 72 to 70
while decreasing overall membership from 128 to 126. By-elections to fill these two
positions were held on August 5, 2007, but some Lebanese figures do not accept their
validity. (See below.)
France on its part undertook a reconciliation mission on July 14-15, 2007, when
31 representatives of 14 Lebanese factions assembled in Paris for talks. Participants
were asked not to comment, but French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said
“[w]e achieved progress during the talks” and reportedly said there will be further
inter-communal talks. France has sent an envoy to Iran and there has been talk of
sending one to Syria as well, to pursue reconciliation efforts in Lebanon, with which
France has special ties.50
Palestinian and Palestinian-Associated Militia
On the heels of Lebanon’s internal rivalries, Palestinian militants in Lebanon —
relatively quiet during recent years — have mounted further challenges to the fragile
Lebanese government. Up to 400,000 Palestinians, mainly refugees, reside in
Lebanon, often in squalid camps. Most of them are denied Lebanese citizenship,
work permits, or other amenities. Discontented with their austere living conditions,
some are drawn to radical Palestinian organizations and militias.51 In the past,
Palestinian militias in Lebanon were secular and in some cases Marxist in outlook,
with little affinity for Islamic fundamentalism. More recently, however some
48 “Suleiman says army is trying to keep the peace,” The Daily Star (Beirut), January 27,
2007; Lebanese general says army under pressures,” Reuters, January 27, 2007.
49 Hassan M. Fattah, “2 Key Lebanese Leaders Meet,” The New York Times, March 9, 2007.
50 Rym Ghazal, “Lebanese factions agree to avoid “political violence’,” The Daily Star
(Beirut), July 16, 2007.
51 The U.S. State Department estimates Lebanon’s Palestinian population at 200,000 to
400,000. Extension of Lebanese citizenship to Palestinians is opposed by most Lebanese,
who fear that such a step would upset Lebanon’s delicate confessional balance. U.S.
Department of State, Background Note: Lebanon. August 2005.

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Palestinians in Lebanon have moved closer to the type of hard-line Sunni Muslim
fundamentalism espoused by Osama bin Laden and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Some have joined the insurgency in Iraq, while others have sought to turn Lebanon
into a recruiting ground for terrorist activities. Since early 2006, Lebanese authorities
have reportedly been concerned about two militias in southern Lebanon with reported
ties to bin Laden:
! Jund al-Sham (Army of Greater Syria), composed mainly of
Lebanese veterans of the 1980s war against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. It numbers less than 100.
! Asbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), composed mainly of
Palestinians and numbering 300-400.
One Lebanese military official expressed the belief that the two organizations were
largely the same and described them as “very dangerous men.”52 Subsequently,
during an interview with Reuters News Wire on September 22, 2006, then U.S.
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte expressed concern that Al Qaeda
may be seeking to extend its influence into the Levant area (basically, Lebanon and
Syria), despite religious differences between the Sunni Al Qaeda and the Shiite
Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Fatah al-Islam. A relatively obscure Palestinian-associated group known as
Fatah al-Islam has mounted a more serious challenge to the Lebanese government.
Numbering between 100 and 300, this group is variously described as having ties to
Al Qaeda or to Syrian intelligence; however, Syrian officials deny any links with it
and maintain that they have pursued Fatah al-Islam through Interpol and other
channels.53 Observers also differ on its composition, some calling it a Palestinian
organization and others saying its membership includes Syrians, Saudis, Jordanians,
and other Arab nationals. The organization is particularly strong among Palestinian
refugees residing in the Nahr al-Bared camp located near the northern Lebanese city
of Tripoli. Some observers believe Jund al-Sham has joined forces with Fatah al-
Islam in recent clashes discussed below. General Michel Suleiman calls the Fatah
al-Islam “a branch of the al-Qaida54 [variant spelling] organization.”
On May 20, 2007, Lebanese police conducted raids against suspected Fatah al-
Islam hideouts in Tripoli reportedly in pursuit of bank robbers. Fighting between
Fatah al-Islam and army and police units spread to the nearby Nahr al-Bared refugee
camp and were echoed in smaller clashes near the Ayn al-Helweh refugee camp in
southern Lebanon. Prohibited by a 1969 agreement from entering Palestinian camps,
the army besieged the camps and shelled militia positions in an effort to force the
militia out. Sporadic fighting continued for more than three months between the
52 Mitch Prothero, “A Wellspring of Anger,” U.S. News and World Report, June 26, 2006,
p. 34.
53 Liz Sly, “Lebanon’s stability under fire; Al Qaeda-linked group emerges as new threat,”
Chicago Tribune, May 22, 2007.
54 Hussein Dakroub, “Army commander: Militant group battling Lebanese troops in refugee
camp al-Qaida affiiliated,” Associated Press, August 13, 2007.

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Army and the Fatah al-Islam militia until September 3, when the Army announced
that it had taken control of the Nahr al-Bared camp. As of June 11, 2007, according
to a Lebanese Army spokesman, numbers of casualties had reached 58 soldiers, 41
militants, and 31 civilians. By the time the siege of Nahr al-Bared had ended,
Lebanese Army spokesmen said the Army had lost 163 soldiers, while between 400
and 500 had been wounded according to press accounts.55
Shakir al-Absi, the leader of Fatah al-Islam, reportedly killed in the late August
fighting, was described by U.S. officials as a well-known Palestinian-Jordanian
militant sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan for involvement in the 2002 murder
of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley. U.S. officials further describe his organization as
an offshoot of a Syria-backed secular Palestinian terrorist group called Fatah al-
Intifada. On August 9, 2007, U.S. Secretary of State Rice designated Fatah al-Islam
as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization, citing his role in the Foley
murder, the unprovoked attack on Lebanese security forces in May 2007, and use of
civilian camp-dwellers as human shields in the subsequent fighting between
Lebanese military and Fatah al-Islam forces. The designation, among other things,
cuts Fatah al-Islam off from the U.S. financial system and blocks any of its property
or interests in the United States. Meanwhile the U.S. Administration, already
supporting the Lebanese government and army against other internal challenges,
notably Hezbollah, responded with assistance to the Lebanese government including
humanitarian supplies, ammunition, and light weapons and equipment, some already
promised but with deliveries accelerated.
Spring 2007 Developments and Aftermath
Several developments marred the Middle East scene as political activity
intensified with the release of U.N. reports and preparations for a September
presidential election (see below). On June 24, unknown persons attacked a UNIFIL
position in southern Lebanon, killing six members of the peacekeeping force. No one
claimed responsibility and the UNIFIL commander vowed to continue their mission.
On June 29, in a step seen by some as designed to put further pressure on Syria,
President Bush issued a proclamation banning entry into the United States by Syrian
and Lebanese officials seen as threatening Lebanon’s democratically elected
government; the list specifically mentioned ten individuals including Assef Shawkat,
brother-in-law of President Asad and chief of intelligence. Two U.N. reports have
engendered further interest in Lebanon:
! The U.N. Secretary General’s report on implementation of
Resolution 1701, which notes continuing violations of the arms
embargo to militias. The Secretary General recommends
strengthening the Syrian-Lebanese border possibly with international
forces, a step opposed by Syria.56
55 Tom Perry, “Lebanon crushes militant group, but threat remains,” Reuters News Wire,
September 3, 2007.
56 U.N. Security Council document S/2007/392.

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! A further report by the Brammertz Commission, submitted in mid-
July, as noted above. In the summary to this report. Brammertz
comments that the Commission continues to receive generally
positive responses from Lebanon, Syria, and others to his requests
for assistance, but adds that the security environment in Lebanon has
deteriorated significantly during the period of this report, as
exemplified by an attack on a UNIFIL convoy in southern Lebanon
on June 24, 2007.
Constitutional Questions
Presidential Succession. A major political event confronting the Lebanese
is the expiration of President Lahoud’s term on November 24, 2007. So far, no
consensus has developed regarding a successor and most likely candidates carry
significant political baggage or are unacceptable to various segments of the body
politic on political or sectarian grounds. Furthermore, the National Covenant
provision requiring that the president be a Maronite Christian effectively limits the
field to a few prestigious families (Gemayel, Frangieh, Chamoun, Helou, Muawwad,
Harawi) or military leaders, some of whom are at odds with each other over factional
and family rivalries. In fact, the most contentious pre-election disputes seem to be
within the Christian community itself, some supporting the coalition headed by Prime
Minister Siniora and others supporting General Awn (see below). At present, the
following potential contenders appear among the more likely, but much will depend
on their ability to strike bargains to achieve a degree of consensus.
! Retired General Michel Awn (variant: Aoun). Until recently, the
only declared candidate for the presidency. A former armed forces
commander, he strongly opposed the Syrian military presence in
Lebanon and fled to France in 1990. However, on his return from
exile 15 years later, he shifted his position and negotiated a “paper
of understanding” with the pro-Syrian Hezbollah leader, with whom
he cooperates on major issues. Although a Maronite Christian and
hence eligible for the presidency, his association with Hezbollah
may make him unacceptable to parts of the Christian constituency.
On the other hand, some Christians look on him as a strong leader
who could protect their interests.
! General Michel Suleiman. The current armed forces commander,
General Suleiman has won the respect of many Lebanese for his
professional and apolitical stand during the tensions that have beset
Lebanon, particularly during fighting in Palestinian refugee camps
in mid-2007 (see below). As a career officer, he has not been a
major player in the Lebanese political scene; however, he has
reportedly indicated a willingness to head a transitional
government.57 Suleiman’s succession to the presidency would
57 Hani Bathish, “Lebanese Army commander willing to head interim government if MPs
fail to choose new president,” Daily Star (Beirut), August 14, 2007. One experienced
(continued...)

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require amending Article 49 of the constitution, which prescribes a
two-year interval between occupancy of a high level governmental
position (such as armed forces commander) and election to the
presidency. This has been done twice, on occasions when public
opinion favored a strong, apolitical leader.58
! President Emile Lahoud, who questions the legitimacy of Prime
Minister Siniora’s government, has spoken of establishing a
“parallel” government. As armed forces commander from 1989 to
1995, he was also highly regarded as a military professional who had
stayed out of politics during Lebanon’s civil war; however, after he
succeeded to the presidency in 1998, he came under increasing
criticism for adopting pro-Syrian positions. U.N. investigations
suggest a link between some of Lahoud’s key supporters and the
assassination of Hariri, who had opposed a three-year extension of
Lahoud’s presidency. Consequently, an effort by Lahoud to further
extend his tenure would encounter strong opposition from the Hariri
bloc in parliament and other anti-Syrian groups.
! There are other possibilities. Yet another prominent figure
mentioned as a potential successor to the presidency is former
President Amin Gemayel (served from 1982 to 1988), a Maronite
leader who is head of an important Christian-based party (the
Phalange) associated with the Hariri bloc. In recent years he has
taken a strongly anti-Syrian stand. Several other Maronite leaders
have associated with the Hariri bloc — deputies Butros Harb and
Robert Ghanem and former deputy Nassib Lahoud — have
announced their candidacies. The New York Times mentioned three
other possible candidates: banker Joseph Tarabay, legal expert
Chekib Kortbawi (former supporter of General Awn but respected
in several factions) and financial expert Damianus Kattar (also
widely respected).59
A vote to elect a new president, originally set for September 25, was postponed
until October 23, after members of parliament failed to agree on a consensus
candidate and opposition deputies (Hezbollah and its allies) boycotted the balloting.60
57 (...continued)
observer described the Lebanese army as “the only national institution left in the country”
and went on to say that the army has “credibility and respect in the country.” Hassan M.
Fatah, “Army Provides a Sense of Unity in Fractured Lebanon,” The New York Times, June
20, 2007
58 President Fouad Chehab in 1958; President Emile Lahoud in 1998.
59 “Lebanon’s Presidential Front-Runners,” The New York Times, November 16, 2007.
Former cabinet minister and financier Michel Edde, who represents a prominent Lebanese
family, has also been mentioned.
60 “Foreign pressures help entrench political impasse in Beirut,” The Daily Star, October 2,
(continued...)

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CRS-29
On October 22, the speaker of parliament announced a second postponement of the
election until November 10, allegedly to allow more time for consultations aimed at
reaching a consensus. However, on November 10, the speaker announced a third
postponement, until November 21, to allow rival political leaders another chance to
resolve the current political deadlock, as consultations continue among speaker Berri,
majority leader Sa’ad Hariri, and other senior politicians. Yet a fourth postponement,
until November 23, was announced on November 20. And on November 23, the
speaker announced a fifth postponement, until November 30, six days after President
Lahoud’s term expires.
The new date – six days after the expiration of President Lahoud’s term – means
that there is no agreement on a consensus president as Lahoud leaves his office and
Lebanon is likely to be without a president until at least November 30. The
constitution gives only limited guidance for such a contingency. Article 73 provides
that parliament should be convened between one and two months before the
expiration of an outgoing president’s term for the purpose of electing a successor.
Similarly, the constitution provides that if the presidency becomes vacant for any
reason, parliament convenes to elect a successor. It does not, however, directly
address the question of what happens if it proves impossible to convene parliament.
In practice, on at least two occasions when this situation has arisen, an outgoing
president has appointed a caretaker prime minister to exercise the powers of the
presidency until the prescribed electoral procedures could be implemented.
This happened most recently in 1988, when parliament was unable to meet to
elect a successor to outgoing President Amin Gemayel because of the then ongoing
civil war. Gemayel appointed the armed forces commander, General Awn, as
caretaker prime minister, but Awn was unacceptable to large segments of Lebanese
Muslims and some Christians, and for a year there were two parallel governments in
Lebanon. Ultimately an extraordinary session of parliament elected a new president
who succeeded in establishing control with Syrian support. Awn, anti-Syrian at the
time, fled to Paris. Inasmuch as Lebanon, though tense, is not presently wracked by
civil war, there is at least some possibility that parliamentarians may be able to
convene and agree upon a successor to Lahoud.
Still, present circumstances create an intricate set of possible outcomes and the
issue of choosing a successor president remains mired in constitutional questions.
Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote in
parliament to elect a new president on the first ballot but only requires a simple
majority on subsequent ballots. In the past, this provision has led to complications
and challenges. Further debate centers on requirements for a quorum for a
presidential election, with some constitutional scholars maintaining that attendance
by two-thirds of the members of parliament is needed before elections can be held
in the first place.61 Some observers believe that opponents of an election (a category
that appears to include pro-Syrian groups) are behind recent assassinations of anti-
60 (...continued)
2007.
61 For further analysis, see “Lebanese constitution said ‘vague’ on outgoing president’s last
10 days,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 15, 2007.

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CRS-30
Syrian Lebanese members of parliament in an effort to derail the elections or to shape
their outcome by undermining the dwindling majority that the pro-Hariri bloc still
enjoys in parliament.62
U.S. Views. U.S. officials have urged that the Lebanese presidential elections
take place promptly and without interference from neighboring states, notably Syria.
In an October 4 interview with the Arabic language television station Al Arabiya,
President Bush stated that “I have no specific candidate,” but went on to say that “I
have a deep desire to help the Lebanese democracy succeed.” He added that “I am
deeply concerned about foreign interference into the presidential election,” and
expressed concern over the murders in Beirut including that of the elder Hariri (and
thereby implying Bush Administration support for the Hariri bloc). Some Members
of Congress have supported the Siniora-Hariri coalition. On September 25, 2007, the
House of Representatives passed by a vote of 415-2 (Roll no. 899) H.Res. 548, which
among other things condemned attempts by Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian groups
to undermine the government of Lebanon, the assassination campaign targeting
members of parliament and public figures in favor of Lebanese independence; and
Syria and Iran for their roles in arming Lebanese militias. S.Res. 328, introduced in
the Senate on September 24, 2007, condemned the assassination of a pro-Hariri
deputy and asserted that the people of Lebanon should be permitted to choose their
next president free from foreign interference.
Parliamentary By-elections. By-elections held on August 5, 2007, to elect
replacements for the two parliamentary deputies assassinated in November 2006 and
June 2007 may affect both the balance of power in the Lebanese parliament and the
outcome of the presidential elections later in the year. The slain former members of
parliament were both members of the anti-Syrian March 14 bloc headed by deputy
Saad Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The winners of the by-elections,
however, included one member of the March 14 bloc but also a member of General
Awn’s group, which is loosely linked to the Hezbollah bloc. Consequently, Prime
Minister Siniora’s majority has slipped incrementally from 72 to 71, while General
Awn’s bloc has gained a seat (advancing from 21 to 22), thereby benefitting Awn’s
semi-ally Hezbollah. Moreover the seat gained by Awn’s bloc was at the expense of
former President Gemayel, who had contested one of the by-elections but lost his bid.
Some observers interpreted the election results as a victory for opponents of the
March 14 bloc, particularly inasmuch as it entailed the defeat of a potential
presidential candidate from the Hariri (March 14) bloc, but others thought the split
results represented a draw.63 Still others attribute the outcome to local issues,
including rivalries between Gemayel supporters and the small Armenian Christian
minority. The situation has been further complicated by the subsequent assassination
of another anti-Syrian deputy, Antoine Ghanem, a member of Amin Gemayel’s
Phalange Party, on September 19 and the possibility that his murder will further
affect power balances and the upcoming presidential election, as mentioned above.
62 Nadra Bakri and Hassan M. Fattah, “Car Bomb Near Beirut Kills Christian Lawmaker,”
The New York Times, September 20, 2007; Nada Bakri, “In Lebanon, Staying Alive in Order
to Preserve the Government,” The New York Times, September 21, 2007.
63 “Opposition wins seat in Lebanon,” The New York Times, August 6, 2007; Alia Ibrahim,
“In Lebanon Vote, Implications for the President,” The Washington Post, August 6, 2007.

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CRS-31
Implications of the Conflicts
Large-scale fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in mid-2006 and
accompanying destruction of large parts of Lebanon’s newly rebuilt infrastructure
complicates U.S. support for Lebanon’s reconstruction. Subsequent clashes between
radical Palestinian militia and the Lebanese Army exacerbated the situation. In a
broader sense, the conflict jeopardizes not only the long-term stability of Lebanon but
presents the Bush Administration with a basic dilemma. On one hand, the
Administration was sympathetic to Israeli military action against a terrorist
organization; President Bush has spoken in favor of Israel’s right of self-defense. On
the other hand, the fighting dealt a setback to Administration efforts to support the
rebuilding of democratic institutions in Lebanon. As one commentator put it, “the
two major agendas of his [Bush’s] presidency — anti-terrorism and the promotion
of democracy — are in danger of colliding with each other in Lebanon.”64 Mounting
tension between pro- and anti-U.S. factions in Lebanon during the fall of 2006 and
an impasse in attempts by Lebanese parties to reestablish a political dialogue threaten
the long-term viability of Lebanon’s political system.
If Lebanon disintegrates through a return to communal civil strife or becomes
closely aligned with a radicalized Syria or Iran, U.S. goals could be seriously
affected. The United States would lose a promising example of a modernizing
pluralist state moving toward a resumption of democratic life and economic reform
and quite possibly face a return to the chaos that prevailed in Lebanon during the 15-
year civil war. Such conditions would be likely to foster terrorism, unrest on Israel’s
border, and other forms of regional instability. Alternatively, the growth of Syrian
or Iranian influence or some combination of the two could strengthen regional voices
supporting extremist and likely anti-Western views associated with clerical regimes
(Iran), totalitarian models (Syria), or a militant stance toward Israel, quite possibly
resulting in some type of costly U.S. regional involvement to protect allies or
maintain stability.
Saudi Arabia, on its part, was close to the late Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri,
wants his killers brought to justice, and wants to see stability in Lebanon; moreover,
Saudi leaders are wary of Iranian influence in the region and are trying to position
Saudi Arabia as an Arab counterpoint to Iran. But Saudi efforts to mediate regional
rivalries have increased lately, as Saudi leaders seek to dampen tensions in the area
and as Saudi and Iranian officials have increased bilateral contacts over Lebanon in
recent months. Consequently, U.S. policy makers face a dilemma: they support
Saudi efforts to calm the situation in Lebanon but look with disfavor on any
expansion of Iranian influence in Lebanon.65
Army Perceptions. One byproduct of Lebanon’s extended governmental
crisis and the more recent siege of the radical Palestinian Fatah al-Islam has been an
enhancement of the Lebanese army’s standing in the eyes of a wide spectrum of
Lebanese citizens. During the demonstrations and counter-demonstrations led by
64 Michael Hirsh, “The Legacy On the Line,” Newsweek, July 24, 2006, p. 30.
65 Michael Slackman, “U.S. Ally and Foe Are Trying to Avert War in Lebanon,” The New
York Times, January 30, 2007.

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CRS-32
pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian factions starting in late 2006, the army carefully avoided
taking sides, while keeping the two groups apart. The army’s subsequent clashes
with radical Palestinian groups exposed certain weaknesses on the part of the poorly
equipped army units in their efforts to expel the Fatah al-Islam groups from the
refugee camps; however, observers say that most Lebanese regardless of their
affiliation have perceived the army as defending the country against foreign elements
such as Palestinians and pro-Palestinian fighters. One experienced observer
described the Lebanese army as “the only national institution left in the country” and
went on to say that the army has “credibility and respect in the country.”66
U.S.-Lebanese Relations
U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon
The United States has enjoyed good diplomatic relations with Lebanon and has
supported its political independence. During the 1975-1990 civil war, the United
States expressed concern over the violence and destruction taking place there;
provided emergency economic aid, military training, and limited amounts of military
equipment; and briefly deployed military forces to Lebanon in the early 1980s, as
noted earlier. The United States supported and participated in various efforts to bring
about a cease-fire during the civil war and subsequent efforts to quiet unrest in
southern Lebanon along the Lebanese-Israeli border. In 1996 the United States
helped negotiate an agreement between Hezbollah and Israel to avoid targeting
civilians and is a member of a five-party force monitoring this agreement. The
United States endorsed the U.N. Secretary General’s findings in May 2000 that Israel
had completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
The U.S. Administration reacted strongly to the assassination of the late Prime
Minister Hariri in February 2005, criticized the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and
demanded withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The United States welcomed
the formation of a new Lebanese government following the withdrawal of Syrian
forces. After a meeting with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora on July 22,
2005, Dr. Rice said, “I think that you cannot find a partner more supportive of
Lebanon than the United States.” On January 23, 2007, after the Hezbollah strike
began, U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns called on Arabs and Europeans
to throw their support behind Prime Minister Siniora against those who would try to
destabilize his regime.
Role of Congress
Congress has shown considerable interest in Lebanon over the years and has
periodically addressed Lebanese issues in legislation. Reasons for this interest
include a large expatriate Lebanese community in the United States; the western
orientation of many Lebanese, especially among Christians; and Lebanon’s key role
66 Hassan M. Fattah, “Army Provides a Sense of Unity in Fractured Lebanon,” The New
York Times, June 20, 2007.

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CRS-33
as a buffer between Syria and Israel. Congress is concerned over radical tendencies
on the part of Syria and has frequently criticized Syrian efforts to exert influence in
Lebanon, especially when such influence appears to threaten the security of Israel.
Like the Administration, Congress widely condemned the assassination of the late
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. During the 34-day Israel-Hezbollah fighting in mid-
2006, both houses voiced support for Israel and for the efforts of the President to
bring about an end to hostilities. The continued efforts of Hezbollah and its allies to
increase their influence in Lebanon could affect future congressional attitudes toward
Lebanon, especially if a new or modified Lebanese regime appeared to threaten
Israel. On the other hand, some Members of Congress seem disposed to support
Lebanon’s ability to maintain internal and regional stability through additional
economic support funds and a resumption of foreign military aid to the Lebanese
Armed Forces. On September 25, 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
Resolution 548 introduced by Representative Gary Ackerman, which, among other
things, pledges continued support for the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese
people, by 415 to 2 (Roll no. 899).
Recent and Current U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
In December 1996, the United States organized a Friends of Lebanon
conference, which resulted in a U.S. commitment of $60 million in U.S. aid to
Lebanon over a five-year period beginning in FY1997 and ending in FY2001 (i.e.,
$12 million per year mainly in Economic Support Funds (ESF)). Congress increased
this amount to $15 million in FY2000 and $35 million in FY2001, reportedly to help
Lebanon adjust to new conditions following Israel’s withdrawal and cope with
continuing economic strains. U.S. economic aid to Lebanon has hovered around $35
million in subsequent years, rising to $42 million in FY2006.
The Bush Administration initially requested $41.2 million in aid for Lebanon
in FY2007, including $35.5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), $4.8 million
in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $935 thousand in International Military
Education and Training (IMET). Since the Hezbollah-Israel fighting in mid-2006,
however, the United States and its allies have been vying with Iran and Hezbollah in
an effort to win “hearts and minds” of Lebanese citizens who have suffered from the
war’s devastation. Both the U.S. Administration and Hezbollah have promised or
provided significant relief and reconstruction packages.
For FY2007, President Bush requested $770 million in supplemental aid from
Congress for Lebanon. H.R. 1591, the House-passed FY2007 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations bill, would have fully funded the Administration’s
request for aid to Lebanon; however, it would have required the Administration to
certify to Congress that before the aid is disbursed, the Lebanese government and the
Administration had fulfilled certain conditions placed on assistance. A Senate-
approved supplemental bill, S. 965, would also have fully funded the President’s
request but would have required the Secretary of State to certify that U.S. military
assistance to Lebanon is not provided to U.S.-designated foreign terrorist groups.
Conference report H.Rept. 110-107 was filed on April 24, 2007, and agreed to by the
House by 218-208, 2 voting present, Roll. no. 265 on April 25. The conference
report in Section 1803(c) retained the provision in the Senate bill to ensure that no
military assistance goes to terrorist groups. The Senate accepted the conference

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CRS-34
report on April 26, 2007, by 51 to 46 with three not voting (Record Vote No. 147).
However, President Bush vetoed the bill on May 1, because it contained a time table
for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and the House failed to override the veto by
222 to 203 (Roll no. 276).
Subsequently, the President did sign a new supplemental appropriations bill,
H.R. 2206, on May 25, 2007 as P.L. 110-28. Like H.R. 1591, H.R. 2206 fully funded
the President’s requested supplemental aid to Lebanon but did not include a time
table for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Section 3802(d) of H.R. 2206 requires the
Secretary of State to submit to the congressional appropriations committees within
45 days a report on Lebanese actions to implement Section 14 of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1701. (See above.) Section 14 of the resolution calls upon the
Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and prevent the entry of unauthorized
arms or related material. (For more information, see CRS Report RL33933, U.S.
Foreign Aid to Lebanon: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp.)
U.S. Reconstruction and Economic Assistance. The battle for political
primacy in Lebanon waged by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s March 14 government
coalition and its U.S., European, and Saudi supporters against Hezbollah, their
sympathizers, and their foreign patrons in Syria and Iran is being fought on a number
of different fronts, including in the economic arena. The summer 2006 war and the
opposition’s campaign to obstruct the government have placed enormous financial
strains on the Lebanese economy, and Prime Minister Siniora has called on the
international community to provide financial backing to his fragile government.
The United States has committed several hundred million dollars to Lebanon’s
rebuilding efforts. President Bush announced on August 21, 2006, that the United
States would provide an immediate $230 million to Lebanon (an additional $175
million on top of an earlier pledge of $55 million) during a conference in Stockholm
designed to raise funds for Lebanese reconstruction. At a January 2007 donors’
conference in France, dubbed “Paris III,” Secretary of State Rice pledged an
additional $250 million in cash transfers directly to the Lebanese government. This
U.S. economic aid was requested in the FY2007 supplemental request under ESF
assistance and may be tied to certain benchmarks that the Siniora government would
be required to meet. To assuage donors’ fears that foreign assistance would be
mismanaged, Prime Minister Siniora has developed an economic reform plan
designed to lower Lebanon’s crippling $41 billion public debt (which costs nearly $3
billion a year in interest payments or nearly 40% of the national budget), decrease
public subsidies, privatize the electricity and telecommunications sectors, and
increase the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 10% to 12%. The opposition has
countered with a populist campaign to thwart these reforms, accusing Siniora of
adopting Western-backed liberalization schemes that hurt Lebanese workers. One
opposition slogan found in Beirut reads “‘No to the government of VAT’ and ‘No to
the government of seafront properties.’”67
Military Assistance. For the first time since 1984, the Administration
requested Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Lebanon in the FY2006
67 “People’s Revolt in Lebanon,” The Nation, January 8, 2007.

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CRS-35
foreign affairs budget. Originally, it sought approximately $1.0 million in FMF for
FY2006 and $4.8 million for FY2007 to help modernize the small and poorly
equipped Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) following Syria’s withdrawal of its 15,000-
person occupation force in 2005. However, the summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war
spurred Western donors to increase their assistance to the LAF. Drawing from
multiple budget accounts, the Administration ultimately reprogrammed an estimated
$42 million to provide spare parts, technical training, and new equipment to the LAF,
including 25 five-ton trucks and 285 Humvees to enhance the LAF’s border patrol
operations.68
The Administration’s FY2007 emergency supplemental request includes $220
million in FMF for Lebanon, a significant increase from previous levels. U.S.
military assistance may be used for expanded personnel training by private U.S.
contractors or the provision of spare parts and ammunition for Lebanese forces.
According to the U.S. State Department, U.S. security assistance would “promote
Lebanese control over southern Lebanon and Palestinian refugee camps to prevent
them from being used as bases to attack Israel. The U.S. government’s active
military-to-military programs enhance the professionalism of the Lebanese Armed
Forces, reinforcing the concept of Lebanese civilian control. To foster peace and
security, the United States intends to build upon welcome and unprecedented
Lebanese calls to control the influx of weapons.”69 The Administration also has
requested $60 million in Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related
Programs (NADR) funds primarily to train and equip Lebanon’s Internal Security
Forces (ISF).70 For more background on aid to Lebanon, see CRS Report RL32260,
U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends,
and the FY2007 Request; CRS Report RL33933, U.S. Foreign Aid to Lebanon:
Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
(millions of dollars)
Military
Economic Aid
Food Aid
Aid
I.M.E.T.
Year
Total
(Grants)
(Grants)
(Loans)
(Grants)
1946 - 1980
332.7
120.2a
86.2b
123.3c
3.0
1981
24.3
4.0
0
20.0
0.3
68 According to the U.S. State Department, the $42 million in FY2006 military assistance
to Lebanon was re-programmed from several accounts, including $10 million from
Department of Defense Section 1206 funds, $2.7 million from FMF, $28 million from the
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, and $1.2 million from ESF and INCLE.
69 See, FY2008 International Affairs (Function 150) Congressional Budget Justification,
U.S. Department of State, February 16, 2007.
70 According to H.R. 1591, the House Appropriations Committee’s FY2007 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations bill, the $60 million in NADR funds is to be used for
“non-lethal assistance” for Lebanon, of which $36,500,000 is for training of the Internal
Security Forces; $19,500,000 is for equipment including individual supplies for 9,000 new
recruits, 300 unarmored SUVs, computers, and radio gear; and $4,000,000 is to refurbish
35 police stations, 4 police academies, and a command and control center.

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CRS-36
Military
Economic Aid
Food Aid
Aid
I.M.E.T.
Year
Total
(Grants)
(Grants)
(Loans)
(Grants)
1982
21.8
9.0
2.2
10.0
0.6
1983
153.9
52.2
0
100.0
1.7
1984
44.0
28.1
0.3
15.0
0.6
1985
21.1
19.9
0.5
0
0.7
1986
17.6
16.0
1.1
0
0.5
1987
23.0
12.8
9.7
0
0.5
1988
12.3
5.1
6.8
0
0.4
1989
15.5
2.8
12.3
0
0.4
1990
19.4
8.3
10.7
0
0.4
1991
19.2
9.3
9.9
0
0
1992
16.4
9.2
7.2
0
0
1993
14.4
10.3
3.5
0
0.6
1994
2.0
1.7
0
0
0.3
1995
16.0
15.6d
0
0
0.4
1996
2.5
2.0
0
0
0.5
1997
12.8
12.3
0
0
0.5
1998
12.6
12.0
0
0
0.6
1999
12.6
12.0
0
0
0.6
2000
15.6
15.0
0
0
0.6
2001
35.4
34.9
0
0
0.5
2002
35.6
35.0
0
0
0.6
2003
35.5
34.8
0
0
0.7
2004
35.9
35.2
0
0
0.7
2005
35.9
35.2
0
0
0.7
2006e
41.7
40.0e
0
1.0
0.7
2007f
41.2
35.5
0
4.8
.9
2007 (supplem.)g
520.0
300.0
0
220.0
0
2008 (request)h
53.2
42.1
0
9.6
1.5
Totals
1,644.1
970.5
150.4
503.7
19.5
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants.
I.M.E.T. = International Military Education and Training
a. Of the $120.2 million total, $19 million was loans.
b. Of the $86.2 million total, $28.5 million was loans.
c. Of the $123.3 million total, $109.5 was loans and $13.8 million was grants.
d. Includes about $6 million from 1994.
e. Administration requested $35 million in ESF, increased to $40 million by P.L. 109-102
f. Plus additional relief/reconstruction funds and military financing; sources of funding not yet clear.
g. In addition, the supplement contains approximately $65 million in several accounts other than ESF
and FMF, including peacekeeping.
h. Does not include some small categories of aid such as de-mining

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