Order Code RL34248
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons:
Proliferation and Security Issues
November 9, 2007
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin
Analysts in Nonproliferation
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

---

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues
Summary
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads.
Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its
weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan reportedly stores its
warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives,
and these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. Pakistan does not have
a stated nuclear policy, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is thought to be
primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Command and control structures have
been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export controls and
personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about
Pakistan’s top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan’s international proliferation network.
Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of
steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials
and improve its nuclear security. A number of important initiatives such as
strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international
nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent
years.
Current instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these
reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that
possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s
nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani
officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, it is
uncertain what impact continued instability in the country will have on these
safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan - U.S.
Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.

---

Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Delivery Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nuclear Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Proliferation Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pakistan’s Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

---

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation
and Security Issues
Background
The political instability and imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan on
November 3, 2007, has once again called attention to the issue of the security of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and how the world can be assured they remain in safe
hands during potential transitions of power. Some observers fear scenarios in which
Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets are given to or stolen by Al Qaeda sympathizers
or other terrorists, or a future government in nuclear Pakistan that might be hostile
to the United States.
Measures to improve the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been on-
going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since Pakistan and
India’s nuclear tests in 1998, increased attention has been given to reducing the risk
of nuclear war in South Asia. The two countries have most recently come to the
brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002 over Kashmir, and realizing the dangers,
have developed some nuclear risk reduction measures to prevent accidental war.1
Pakistan has also developed its command and control systems and improved security
of military and civilian nuclear facilities. After the 2004 revelations of an extensive
international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan, as
well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, the
Pakistani government has made additional efforts to improve export controls and
monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical
security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders.
Nuclear Weapons
Pakistan’s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss
of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that reportedly
triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret
nuclear weapons program. Defense against India is said to be the primary motivation
for Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Observers point to the peaceful nuclear explosion
by India in 1974 as the pivotal moment which gave urgency to the program.
Pakistan’s path to the bomb was through uranium enrichment technology, mastered
by the mid-1980s. Pakistan gained technology from many sources. This extensive
assistance is reported to have included, among other things, uranium enrichment
technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China, and
1 See CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan,
by Sharon Squassoni.

---

CRS-2
missile technology from China. In 1989, the United States learned that Pakistan had
assembled a nuclear warhead, which then led to a cut-off in military and financial aid
under the Pressler Amendment.2 When India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May
12, 1998, Pakistan’s government responded two weeks later on May 28 and May 30
with six tests at the Chagai Hills test site in western Pakistan. Test yields were about
10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis.3 The United States imposed
additional sanctions after the tests (these were lifted after the September 11th, 2001
attacks).
Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material (highly
enriched uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for about 60 nuclear weapons.4
Pakistan’s nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of highly
enriched uranium (HEU), approximately 15-20 kg per warhead.5 Pakistan reportedly
continues to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons at a rate of at least 100
kg per year.6
Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads since the 1990s and
continues to produce plutonium for weapons. Pakistan has received Chinese
assistance for its plutonium program. The 40-50 megawatt heavy water Khushab
plutonium production reactor has been operating since 1998. A second heavy water
reactor is being built at Khushab, which will at least double Pakistan’s plutonium
production capacity.7 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex also includes the 300-
megawatt reactor at Chasma, a reprocessing plant at Chasma, fuel fabrication plant,
tritium production facility, etc.8 The continued expansion of the complex and
production of weapons materials indicates plans to increase its nuclear weapons
2 The Pressler Amendment (August 1985) linked aid and military sales to two certification
conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid
‘will reduce significantly the risk’ that Pakistan will possess such a device. For background
summary of sanctions legislation, see CRS Report 98-486, Nuclear Sanctions: Section
102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan , by Jeanne
Grimmet and CRS Report RS22757, U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan, by Richard Grimmett.
3 Seismic data showed yields less than what was officially announced by Pakistan and India.
See Gregory van der Vink, Jeffrey Park, Richard Allen, Terry Wallace and Christel Hennet,
“False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty,” Arms Control
Today, May 1998 [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_05/vimy98.asp]
4 “Nuclear Notebook,” ibid.; Arms Control Association Fact Sheet,
[http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.asp]; “Global Fissile
Material Report 2007,” ibid.; SIPRI Yearbook 2007.
5 “Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan’s nuclear forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Vol. 63, No.3, May/June 2007.
6 “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” International Panel on Fissile Materials
[http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf]
7 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Commercial Satellite Imagery Suggests Pakistan is
Building a Second, Much Larger Plutonium Production Reactor: Is South Asia Headed for
a Dramatic Buildup in Nuclear Arsenals?” ISIS, 24 July 2006.
8 See chart of facilities in Pakistan chapter of Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam
Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

---

CRS-3
arsenal in the near future. Pakistan may be partially responding to India’s ambitious
plans to build a nuclear triad.9
Delivery Vehicles
Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft under
the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles under the Pakistan Army.
Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s purchased from the United
States, provided modifications are made. It is widely believed that Pakistan has made
modifications to the F-16s previously sold to them. Concerns have been raised about
the impact of these sales on the strategic balance in South Asia.10 The U.S.
government maintains that the sale of additional F-16s to Pakistan will not alter the
regional balance of power.11 The contract for provision of an additional 36 aircraft
was signed on September 30, 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for those
aircraft, and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan’s F-16A/B model
aircraft. Pakistan’s F-16 fleet will therefore be expanded, but it is unclear what
portion of the fleet will be capable of a nuclear mission. Mirage III and V aircraft
could also be used, although would have limited range. A-5’s may have been
modified to carry a nuclear payload.12
After India’s first test of its Prithvi ballistic missile in 1988, Pakistan jump-
started its own missile program. Three types of ballistic missiles are thought to be
nuclear-capable: the solid fuel Hatf-III (Ghaznavi) and Hatf-IV (Shaheen) with a
range of 100-290 and 200-650 km respectively; and the medium-range Hatf-V
(Ghauri) with a 1200 km range. The Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2) is under development.13
Reports also indicate that Pakistan may be developing a nuclear-capable cruise
missile, the Hatf-7 (Babur), with ground, sea and air-launched versions.
9 “India Working on Sea-based Nuclear Missiles,” Defense News, October 15, 2007.
[http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3079617&C=landwar]
10 CRS Report RL33515, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications, by
Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmett, and K. Alan Kronstadt; Zachary Ginsburg, “US
Renews Fighter Exports to Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, September 2007.
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/USPakistan.asp]
11 “Release of these systems would not significantly reduce India’s quantitative or
qualitative military advantage. Release of these modifications to Pakistan will neither affect
the regional balance of power nor introduce a new technology as this level of capability or
higher already exists in other countries in the region..” Defense Security and Cooperation
Agency news release, June 28, 2006. [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases
/36-b/2006/Pakistan_06-11.pdf]
12 CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and
Pakistan: Issues for Congress, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
13 Nuclear Notebook, ibid.; “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,” Arms Control Today
Fact Sheet [http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp] and Mahmud Ali Durrani,
“Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” Cooperative Monitoring
Center Occasional Paper 37, July 2004. [http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand2004-
3375p.pdf]

---

CRS-4
A.Q. Khan, former head of Khan Research Laboratories, maintained that only
the medium-range Ghauri missiles would be usable in a nuclear exchange (given fall-
out effects for Pakistan of shorter-range missiles). Other observers view the 30 to 50
Hatf-II short-range (300km) missiles (modified Chinese M-11s) as potential delivery
vehicles for nuclear weapons. Ghauri missiles (1350 and 2300km), which reportedly
are based on the North Korean No-Dong and Taepo-Dong-1, are capable of reaching
New Delhi with large payloads.14 Pakistan continues to carry out ballistic missile
tests, but notifies India in advance in accordance with the bilateral missile pre-
notification pact of October 2005.15
Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan’s strategic doctrine is undeclared, and will probably remain so, but
prominent officials and analysts have offered insights concerning its basic tenets.16
They have indicated that Pakistan’s posture is designed to preserve territorial
integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter its main
rival’s conventional superiority. “Minimum credible nuclear deterrence” is the
guiding principle.17 Statements of high level officials point to four policy objectives
for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through
a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by
securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic
deterrence in South Asia.18
Pakistani officials state that they have already determined the arsenal size
needed for a minimum nuclear deterrent and they will not engage in an arms race
with India. Pakistan has also pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states,
but has not ruled out first-use against a nuclear-armed aggressor that attacks Pakistan
— for example, India. Analysts say this ambiguity serves to maintain deterrence
against India’s conventional superiority. Others argue that keeping the first-use
option against India allows Pakistan to conduct sub-conventional operations while
14 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002.
15 “Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pre-
Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles,” Full text on the Henry L. Stimson
Center website. [http://www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20060207949]
16 Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability,” Paper presented
to the Conference on Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, Nonproliferation Education Center,
Washington, DC, April 28, 2006 [http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType
=Single&PDFFile=20070121-Lavoy-PakistanNuclearPosture&PDFFolder=Essays]
17 For an in-depth discussion of minimum deterrence, see Naeem Salik, “Minimum
Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan,” Landau Network
Centro Volta South Asia Security Project Case Study, January 2006
[http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/South%20Asia%20Security%20Program_file%5CDoc
umenti%5CCase%20Studies%5CSalik%20-%20S.A.%20Case%20Study%202006.pdf]
18 Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,”
Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, July 2004.
[http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand2004-3375p.pdf]

---

CRS-5
effectively deterring India at the strategic level.19 Pakistan has reportedly addressed
issues of survivability through second strike capability, possible hard and deeply
buried storage and launch facilities, road-mobile missiles, air defenses around
strategic sites, and concealment measures.20
Command and Control
Pakistan’s command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized
and includes strict operational security. It has three components — the National
Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic
Forces Commands.21 The NCA was created in 2000 and for the first time the nuclear
program was under military control with oversight. The SPD acts as the secretariat
for the NCA and coordinates with the strategic forces commands. The Army, Air
Force, and Navy each have their respective strategic force command, but operational
control remain with the NCA. The authority to launch a nuclear strike requires
consensus within the NCA. The NCA Chairman, who is the President of Pakistan,
casts the final vote.22
Security Concerns
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are reportedly stored unassembled, with the fissile
core separated from the non-nuclear explosives. These components are stored
separately from delivery vehicles. However, a Department of Defense report says
that Pakistan can probably assemble the weapons fairly quickly.23 Nevertheless,
separate storage may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or
prevent theft of an assembled weapon.
As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after
9/11, President Musharaff reportedly ordered Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal be
redeployed to “at least six secret new locations.”24 This action came at a time of
uncertainly about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan
relations. In President Musharraf’s speech justifying his decision to assist the United
States against the Taliban, he cited protection of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets
19 Kanti Bajpai, “No First Use in the India-Pakistan Context,” Pugwash Workshop No. 279,
November 2002. [http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/bajpai.htm]
20 Lavoy, ibid.
21 Durrani, ibid.
22 See Lavoy, Slide 19, ibid. and Naeem Salik, “Changes within Pakistan’s Nuclear Security
Structure since 1998,” Presentation to the Partnership for Global Security Conference,
“Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” June 20, 2007.
[http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/Projects/Globalizing%20Threat%20Reduct
ion%20Project/index.asp]
23 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 28.
24 Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons - Musharraf Says
Arsenal Is Now Secure,” Washington Post, November 11, 2001.

---

CRS-6
as one of the reasons for the dramatic policy shift.25 Pakistan’s leadership was
uncertain whether the U.S. would decide to conduct military strikes against
Pakistan’s nuclear assets if it did not do so. These events, in combination with the
2002 conflict with India at the Line of Control and revelations about the A.Q. Khan
proliferation network, inspired a variety of reforms to secure the nuclear complex.
Risk of nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999 Kargil crisis, when the
Pakistani military is believed to have begun preparing nuclear-tipped missiles. It
should be noted that even at high alert levels of 2001 and 2002, there were no reports
of Pakistan mating the warheads with delivery systems.26
In the fall of 2007, Pakistan faces another crucial moment in its history and
some observers have recently expressed concern about the security of Pakistan’s
arsenal if the current situation persists.27 Former Prime Minister and now opposition
leader Benazir Bhutto said in an interview on November 5, 2007, that while President
Musharraf says he is firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she is afraid this control
could weaken due to instability in the country.28 U.S. military officials have also
expressed concern about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.29 Experts worry
that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads
disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.30
Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to Congress on
November 7, 2007 expressed confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were not
at risk. He said he believes there is “plenty of succession planning that’s going on in
the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective
technical control.”31
The issue of U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of
control by the Pakistani government were famously addressed in Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice’s confirmation hearing in January 2005. In response to a question
by Senator Kerry asking what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if there
25 “Partial transcript of Pakistan President Musharraf’s televised speech asking the people
of Pakistan to support his course of action,” September 19, 2001.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/pakistantex
t_091901.html]
26 Lavoy,ibid. Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair
House,” Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series, 2002.
[http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/reidel.pdf]
27 “Opinions Mixed on Pakistani Nuclear Security,” Global Security Newswire, November
6, 2007. [http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/recent_stories.asp?category
=nuclear#6783E660]
28 Also see comments by David Albright in the same interview. “Pakistan in Crisis:
Interview with Benazir Bhutto,” CNN, November 5, 2007.
29 “Lieutenant General Carter Ham Holds a Defense Department Briefing,” CQ Transcripts,
November 7, 2007.
30 Also see comments by David Albright in “Pakistan in Crisis: Interview with Benazir
Bhutto,” CNN, November 5, 2007.
31 House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Democracy, Authoritarianism and
Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan, November 7, 2007.

---

CRS-7
was a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad, Secretary Rice answered, “We have noted
this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.”32
The United States reportedly offered Pakistan nuclear security assistance soon
after September 11th, 2001.33 U.S. assistance to Pakistan has included technical
measures that could help prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons
as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel
reliability.34 Press reports say that the United States provided Pakistan with
Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003.35 PALs require a code to be entered before
a weapon can be detonated. U.S. assistance must comply with nonproliferation
guidelines.
Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed that there has
been U.S. assistance in this area. In a recent interview, he said the US was unlikely
to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable
time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the
security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are
fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of
those.”36
Proliferation Threat37
Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could
obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan.38 Beginning
in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear
weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used
32 “The Nomination of Dr. Condoleeza Rice to be Secretary of State,” Hearings before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18 and 19, 2005. The concept of a
contingency plan to take over Pakistan’s nuclear assets was first somewhat sensationally
written about by Seymour Hersh, “Watching the Warheads,” The New Yorker, November
5, 2001.
33 Alex Wagner, “U.S. Offers Nuclear Security Assistance to Pakistan,” Arms Control
Today, December 2001. [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/paknucsecdec01.asp]
34 Joby Warrick, “U.S. Has Concerns Over Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” The
Washington Post, November 11, 2007.
35 Kaushik Kapisthalam, “Guarding Pakistan’s Nuclear Estate,” Asia Times, April 6, 2005.
[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD06Df04.html]; Robert Windrem, “Pakistan’s
Nuclear History Worries Insiders,” NBC News, November 6, 2007.
[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21660667/]
36 “A Conversation With Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage,” PBS: The
Charlie Rose Show, November 6, 2007.
37 This section was prepared by Paul Kerr.
38 For more information on Pakistani proliferation, see CRS Report RL32745, Pakistan’s
Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 0/11 Commission: U.S.
Policy Constraints and Options, by Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon
Squassoni. Also see CRS Report RL33498 Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

---

CRS-8
a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to
uranium enrichment.39
Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to
former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States “received
fragmentary information from an intelligence service” that in 1998 Osama bin Laden
had “sent emissaries to establish contact” with the network.40
Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist
organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda
“had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of
nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a
nuclear explosion.”41 Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a
different organization than the Khan network.
The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although
most official reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably.
Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had
been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007 statement to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that “Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear
proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.”42
However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs
Nicholas Burns replied that:
I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding
based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been
fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m
not sure I could say that.
Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found
in a May 2007 report that “at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped
law enforcement attention and could … resume their black-market business.”43
39 Libya obtained uranium enrichment technology and nuclear weapons designs that could
support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea currently has a plutonium-based nuclear
weapons program, but it is unclear whether it also has a uranium-based one. Iran is
suspected of pursuing both plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs.
40 Tenet, George and Harlow, Bill, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA,
HarperCollins: New York, 2007. p. 261.
41 The report can be found at [http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html].
42 Unclassified Statement for the Record Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007.
43 Presentation given to Partnership for Global Security Worskhop “Building Confidence
in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” April 30, 2007.

---

CRS-9
Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns
acknowledged that the United States has not had “personal, consistent access” to
Khan, but added that he did not “have all the details of everything we’ve done.”
Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet been able to
interview Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has
responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative in its
investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.44
A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the
government considered the Khan investigation “closed.”
Pakistan’s Response
Undersecretary Burns testified in July that the Bush administration has “told the
Pakistani government that it is its responsibility … to make sure” that neither the
Khan network nor a “similar organization” resurfaces in the country. Since the
revelations about the Khan network, Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to
prevent nuclear proliferation. But whether and to what extent these efforts have been
successful is not yet clear.
Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent
further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials.45 For example,
Pakistan adopted new national export controls legislation in September 2004. This
legislation includes a requirement that the government issue control lists for “goods,
technologies, material, and equipment which may contribute to designing,
development, stockpiling, [and] use” of nuclear weapons and related delivery
systems. According to an April 2007 presentation by Air Commodore Khalid Banuri,
Director of Pakistan’s Arms Control and Disarmament Division,46 the lists, which
were issued in October 2005, include items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.47
The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and
end-user certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its
adoption, Pakistan has established a Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV)
and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for formulating rules
and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of officials
from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary.
44 Personal communication, November 9.
45 Details of Pakistan’s nuclear-related legislation can be found in the country’s reports to
the UN 1540 Committee. Both can be found at [http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540
/report.html#P].
46 Presentation given to Partnership for Global Security Worskhop “Building Confidence in
Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” April 30, 2007.
47 The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multilateral, voluntary group of nuclear supplier states
which have agreed to coordinate their exports of civilian nuclear technology and materials
in order to prevent importers from using them to produce nuclear weapons. Pakistan is not
a member.

---

CRS-10
Islamabad says that it has also taken several other steps to improve its nuclear
security. For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is
“implementing a National Security Action Plan with the [IAEA’s] assistance.” That
same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S. — and Russian-led Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
The United States has also provided relevant assistance to Pakistan. Burns
described several such efforts in his June testimony.48 And according to an October
U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Islamabad was during fiscal years
2003-2006 the second-largest recipient of bilateral U.S. assistance designed to
improve target countries’ export controls. Pakistan received such assistance from the
Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security.49
Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security
workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel
by, for example, making its security clearance procedures more stringent. However,
the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to control its
nuclear expertise.50
crsphpgw
48 Burns mentioned Pakistan’s participation in the Container Security Initiative and the
Secure Freight Initiative. Under these programs, “the United States and Pakistan worked
together to install screening and radiation detection equipment to scan U.S.-bound cargo.”
He also stated that the Department of Energy “is working with Pakistan on radiation source
security and is in the process of finalizing an agreement to install radiation detection
equipment at Pakistani ports and border crossings.”
49 GAO Report, Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better
Data on Proliferation Risks and Program Results, October 31, 2007.
50 Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security: Workshop Synopsis. April 30, 2007.

---