Order Code RL33498
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Updated October 18, 2007
K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Summary
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests.
U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan
stability; democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem
and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan
relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by
the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment
of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials
regularly praise Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although doubts exist about
Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base
for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan.
Since 2003, Pakistan’s army has conducted unprecedented and largely ineffectual
counterterrorism operations in the country’s western tribal areas. Islamabad later
shifted to a strategy of negotiation with the region’s pro-Taliban militants (combined
with longer-term economic and infrastructure development in the region), a tack that
elicited scepticism in Western capitals and that has failed in its central purposes.

Separatist violence in India’s Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state has
continued unabated since 1989, with some notable relative decline in recent years.
India blames Pakistan for the infiltration of Islamic militants into Indian Kashmir, a
charge Islamabad denies. The United States and India have received pledges from
Islamabad that all “cross-border terrorism” would cease and that any terrorist
facilities in Pakistani-controlled areas would be closed. The United States strongly
encourages maintenance of a bilateral cease-fire and continued, substantive dialogue
between Pakistan and India, which have fought three wars since 1947. A perceived
Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts
in South Asia. Attention to this issue intensified following nuclear tests by both
countries in 1998. More recently, the United States has been troubled by evidence
of the transfer of Pakistani nuclear technologies and materials to third parties,
including North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Such evidence became stark in 2004.
Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators have turned positive since 2001, with
some meaningful poverty reduction seen in this still poor country. President Bush
seeks to expand U.S.-Pakistan trade and investment relations. Democracy has fared
poorly in Pakistan; the country has endured direct military rule for more than half of
its existence. In 1999, the elected government was ousted in a coup led by Army
Chief General Pervez Musharraf, who later assumed the title of president. Supreme
Court-ordered elections seated a new civilian government in 2002 (Musharraf ally
and long-time finance minister Shaukat Aziz now serves as prime minister), but it
remains weak, and Musharraf has retained his position as army chief. The United
States urges restoration of full democracy, expecting Pakistan’s planned early 2008
elections to be free, fair, and transparent. Congress has annually granted one-year
presidential authority to waive coup-related aid sanctions. Pakistan is among the
world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid, obtaining about $4 billion in direct, overt U.S.
assistance for FY2002-FY2007, including more than $1.6 billion in security-related
aid. Pakistan also has since 2001 received more than $5 billion in reimbursements
for its logistical support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations.

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Contents
Key Current Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pakistan-Related Legislation and U.S.-Pakistan Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
President Musharraf’s Reelection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Musharraf-Bhutto Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Benazir Bhutto’s Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
National Election Schedule and Credibility Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Red Mosque Siege and Islamist Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Al Qaeda in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . 10
Setting and Regional Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Historical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Current U.S.-Pakistan Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Political Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Regional Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Pakistan-India Rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The “IPI” Pipeline Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The China Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Al Qaeda in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Infiltration Into Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Infiltration into Kashmir and India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Domestic Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Other Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Pakistan-India Tensions and the Kashmir Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Baluchistan Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Islamization, Anti-American Sentiment, and Madrassas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Democratization and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Democracy and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Human Rights Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Economic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Trade and Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
U.S. Aid and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Proliferation-Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Coup-Related Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9/11 Commission Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 110th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . 59

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List of Figures
Pakistan in Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 1. Map of Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
List of Tables
Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2008 . . . . . . . . 62

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Pakistan-U.S. Relations
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist
militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Current top-tier U.S. concerns
regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; and
domestic political stability and democratization. Pakistan remains a vital U.S. ally
in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. Yet the outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan
since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither neutralized anti-
Western militants and reduced religious extremism in that country, nor have they
contributed sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan. Many
observers thus urge a broad re-evaluation of such policies. This is especially so in
light of a months-old political crisis that has severely undermined the status of the
military-dominated government of President General Pervez Musharraf and a surge
in domestic Islamist militancy following the July denouement of a standoff involving
Islamabad’s Red Mosque complex. There are indications that anti-American
sentiments remain widespread in Pakistan, and that a significant segment of the
populace views U.S. support for the Musharraf government as being an impediment
to, rather than facilitator of, the process of democratization there. To date, the Bush
Administration publicly proclaims its ongoing strong support for Musharraf.
However, in 2007 the Administration has shown signs of a shift in its long-standing
policies toward Pakistan, in particular on the issues of democratization and on
Islamabad’s counterterrorism policies in western tribal areas.
Key Current Issues
Pakistan-Related Legislation and U.S.-Pakistan Diplomacy. On
August 3, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007
became P.L. 110-53. Section 2042 of the Act pertains specifically to U.S.-Pakistan
relations and includes a provision to end U.S. military assistance and arms sales
licensing to Pakistan in FY2008 unless the President determines that the Islamabad
government is fully committed to and making progress in efforts to halt terrorist
activity on Pakistani soil. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement calling
the section “disappointing” for Islamabad, saying its “unsubstantiated” allegations
about an Al Qaeda presence in Pakistan and conditionalities on military aid to
Pakistan “cast a shadow” on existing U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, creating linkages
that “did not serve the interest of bilateral cooperation in the past and can prove to
be detrimental in the future.” President Musharraf called the provisions “an irritant
in the bilateral relationship.”1 Other pending bills contain Pakistan-specific
provisions, including further possible conditions on U.S. aid (see “Selected Pakistan-
Related Legislation in the 110th Congress” section below). During an October 10
1 See [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/july/PR_199_07.htm]; “Musharraf
Dismayed at Pakistan Aid Condition,” Reuters, August 7, 2007.

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House Armed Services Committee hearing on Pakistan, a panel of four
nongovernmental experts urged Washington to increase its engagement with
Pakistan’s civilian political forces and use its influence to promote free and fair
elections there, while also counseling against the use of overt aid conditionality.2
On September 12, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte visited Islamabad
for the second round of the Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue, where he called for
peaceful democratic transition from military rule but refrained from any criticisms
of a recent political crackdown and the deportation of former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif. During their meeting, President Musharraf stressed the need for forward
movement on President George W. Bush’s Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
initiative and U.S. support for Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area
(FATA) development plan, as well as assistance for building the capacity of the
paramilitary Frontier Corps.3 On September 30, the United States and Pakistan inked
a new plan to provide $750 million in U.S. aid to the FATA over the next five years.
Political Crises. President General Musharraf has in mid-2007 faced the
worst political crisis since the October 1999 military coup. His array of woes
includes a spate of lethal attacks by Islamist militants and a deteriorating internal
security situation; a breakdown of truces made with pro-Taliban militants and a
resurgence of low-intensity warfare in the country’s tribal areas; an embarrassing July
reversal at the Supreme Court and a newly independent-minded judiciary; electoral
pressures due to upcoming constitutionally-mandated polls; simmering public anger;
and plummeting approval ratings. Among ordinary Pakistanis, criticism of the army
and its role in governance may be becoming more common.4 In September,
Musharraf promoted a close ally, Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, to lead the country’s
influential Inter-Services Intelligence agency. Taj will replace Lt. Gen. Ashfaq
Pervez Kiyani, a highly-regarded, pro-Western figure who has since been named as
the new Vice Chief of Army Staff. Kiyani would thus succeed Musharraf in the
powerful role of army chief should Musharraf resign from the post later this year as
he has vowed to do following reelection to the presidency. Since assuming his new
role, Kiyani has vowed press ahead with Pakistan army efforts to root out extremists
from the tribal areas.5
A judicial crisis began with President Musharraf’s summary March 9 dismissal
of the country’s Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, on charges of nepotism and
misconduct. Analysts widely believe the action was an attempt by Musharraf to
remove a potential impediment to his continued roles as president and army chief,
given Chaudhry’s recent rulings that exhibited independence and went contrary to
government expectations. The move triggered immediate outrage among Pakistani
2 “U.S. Urged to Change Tack in Pakistan as Ally Falters,” Reuters, October 10, 2007.
Hearing statements at [http://www.house.gov/hasc/calendar_past_hearings.shtml].
3 Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Official in Pakistan for Talks,” New York Times, September 12, 2007;
[http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Sep/PR_238_07.htm].
4 Carlotta Gall and Somini Sengupta, “Pakistanis Express Ire at Army and Musharraf,” New
York Times, August 9, 2007.
5 “No Let-Up in War on Terror: Kiyani,” News (Karachi), October 12, 2007.

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lawyers; ensuing street protests by both opposition activists grew in scale. On July
20, in what was widely seen as a major political defeat for Musharraf, Pakistan’s
Supreme Court unanimously cleared Chaudhry of any wrongdoing and reinstated him
to office. By providing an issue upon which anti-Musharraf sentiments could
coalesce, the imbroglio morphed into a full-fledged political crisis and the greatest
threat to Musharraf’s government since it was established.
In August, President Musharraf reportedly came close to declaring a state of
emergency, which would allow him to delay national elections for up to one year.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice telephoned Musharraf, by some accounts in a
successful effort to dissuade him from imposing a state of emergency.6 Musharraf’s
political supporters in the ruling faction of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q) are
overseen by the influential “Chaudhrys of Gujarat” — Shujaat Hussain is party
president and Pervaiz Elahi is Punjab’s Chief Minister. As Musharraf’s position has
weakened, PML-Q members have become increasingly concerned about their own
political fortunes. There have been signs that the PML-Q may fragment: several
high-profile parliamentary defections have taken place and some analysts believe the
party could “evaporate” upon Musharraf’s further loss of public support.7 A key
point of contention for the PML-Q is the opposition Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP)
demand that the president be stripped of his power to dissolve Parliament under
Article 58(2)b of the constitution. The government has rejected this demand.
Moreover, many of Musharraf’s supporters resist removal of the bar on prime
ministers serving a third term.8
August brought further indications that Pakistan’s Supreme Court would not be
subservient to military rule and could derail President Musharraf’s political plans.
Most significantly, on August 23 the court ruled that deposed Prime Minister Sharif
could return to Pakistan after seven years in exile. When, on September 10, Sharif
attempted to return to Lahore, the government immediately arrested him on
corruption charges, then deported him only hours later. Sharif immediately appealed
his deportation, which appeared to come in government defiance of the Supreme
Court, and he may attempt another return before year’s end. New York-based
Human Rights Watch criticized the government for “flouting international law,”
calling Sharif’s deportation “a direct affront to the Pakistani constitution.”9
However, the U.S. State Department called the development “a matter for the
Pakistanis to resolve,” a position echoed by the White House.10 For many in
6 Carlotta Gall and Salman Masood, “Facing a Furor, Pakistan Rejects Emergency Rule,”
New York Times, August 9, 2007.
7 Kim Barker, “Political Pitch: Time to Switch,” Chicago Tribune, September 7, 2007.
8 “Chaudhrys Upset Over Benazir-Musharraf Talks,” News (Karachi), August 29, 2007;
Sharif Khan and Rana Qaisar, “Musharraf-BB Talks Stall,” Daily Times (Lahore), August
31, 2007.
9 See [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/10/pakist16832.htm].
10 See [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/sep/91940.htm]; “White House Calls Sharif
Exile ‘Internal Matter,’” Agence France Presse, September 10, 2007.

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Pakistan, the government’s abrupt move was seen as evidence of weakness and
insecurity, and may have further damaged Musharraf’s standing.11
In late September, the Islamabad government arrested hundreds of opposition
political leaders and activists, many of them deputies of Nawaz Sharif, including
some sitting members of Parliament. A statement issued by the U.S. Embassy called
the development “extremely disturbing and confusing,” and Secretary of State Rice
later called the arrests “troubling.”12 On September 27, Pakistan’s Chief Justice
ordered the release of these political detainees, but Islamabad witnessed street
violence in the days immediately following the Supreme Court’s September 28
dismissal of petitions filed to oppose President Musharraf’s reelection plans when
hundreds of angry protestors clashed with riot police. One report claimed more than
100 journalists and lawyers sustained serious injuries in the melee and Pakistan’s
Chief Justice later ordered that Islamabad’s police chief and two other senior officials
be suspended for an alleged overreaction. Some analysts believe the government
crackdown on the political opposition undercuts Musharraf’s claims to be a pro-
democracy reformer.13 Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence officials reportedly are alarmed
by signs that political turmoil in Pakistan is leading the Musharraf government to
scale back its counterterrorism efforts in western tribal regions and that Musharraf
himself has become so politically weakened that the conditions allowing a resurgence
of religious militancy in Pakistan are likely to persist and perhaps worsen.14 (See also
“Democracy and Governance” section below.)
Moreover, the Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition, weakened
over a period of years by the increasingly divergent approaches taken by its two main
figures — Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed, a vehement critic of the
military-led government, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan chief Fazl ur-Rehman, who
largely has accommodated the Musharraf regime — may be near a split: on October
11 Mian Ridge, “Deporting Sharif May Weaken Pakistan’s President Musharraf,” Christian
Science Monitor, September 11, 2007. A public opinion survey conducted in early
September by the U.S.-based International Republican Institute found that Musharraf’s
approval rating had dropped to an all-time low of 21%, down from 63% only one year
earlier. Meanwhile, Sharif’s star rose at the time leading up to his aborted attempt at
returning to Pakistan: in the IRI survey he bested both Musharraf and Bhutto in the category
of “best leader for Pakistan,”with an outright majority of Punjabis assigning him that title.
The poll also found that economic issues are key for the great majority of respondents, and
that a majority disapprove of the performance of the current government and do not believe
i t shoul d be r eel ect ed (see [http://www.iri.org/ mena/ paki st an/ pdf s/
2007-10-11-pakistan-Index.pdf]).
12 See [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h07092402.html]; “Rice Says Arrests of
Pakistani Opposition Troubling,” Reuters, September 24, 2007.
13 “A Reign of Terror in Islamabad,” News (Karachi), September 30, 2007.”Crackdown
Hurts Pakistan Leader Image,” Associated Press, September 30, 2007.
14 Greg Miller, “Pakistan Backs Off Al Qaeda Pursuit,” Los Angeles Times, September 23,
2007; Carlotta Gall, “Political Paralysis Lets Pakistan Militants Thrive,” New York Times,
October 10, 2007.

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22, the JI and allied parties may ask Rehman to end his support for Musharraf or
leave the alliance.15
President Musharraf’s Reelection. On October 6, President Musharraf
won reelection when he captured 98% of the votes cast by Pakistan’s 1,170-member
Electoral College. About 57% of the total possible vote from the membership of all
national and provincial legislatures went to Musharraf; two-fifths of the body had
either resigned in protest (mostly members of the Islamist MMA coalition) or
abstained (members of the PPP). A White House spokesman congratulated
“important partner and ally” Pakistan for holding the election.16 Although the
exercise gave him a much-need boost, Musharraf’s political troubles are far from
ended, and many analysts see him relegated to a permanently diminished status.
Musharraf has vowed to resign his military commission following reelection, but he
will become even more politically vulnerable as a civilian president. At the same
time, the inability of political opposition forces to mount any meaningful agitation
against the election demonstrated their disunity and weakness.17
Controversy had arisen over Musharraf’s intention to seek reelection by the
current assemblies — which are considered more favorable to his continued rule than
assemblies elected in 2008 might be — as well as his intention to run while still
serving as army chief (2002 and 2005 rulings have allowed for his dual-role until
November 15). Opposition parties believe such moves to be unconstitutional and
they petitioned the Supreme Court to block this course. On October 5, that court
ruled the election could take place as scheduled but that official results would be
withheld until after the court rules on such legal challenges (the court resumed its
hearings on October 17). While few observers predict the court will void the result,
the ruling has to some degree left Musharraf in political limbo — he is not expected
to doff his army uniform until his reelection is confirmed. Some analysts fear that
a state of emergency would be declared were the court to rule against Musharraf.
Prior to the presidential election, one Islamabad-based non-profit group
concluded that “a majority of indicators tend to negatively affect the prospects of free
and fair presidential election,” noting that while a generally free media and newly
independent-minded Supreme Court represented hopeful signs, Musharraf’s
candidacy while in uniform, his government’s mass arrest of opposition leaders and
defiance of the apex court’s ruling on Nawaz Sharif, and the Election Commission’s
changing of election rules to benefit Musharraf all suggested a tainted process.18
15 Azaz Syed, “MMA on Verge of Spilt,” Daily Times (Lahore), October 14, 2007.
16 “US Cautiously Congratulates Pakistan After Vote,” Agence France Presse, October 6,
2007.
17 Laura King, “A New Term is Unlikely to End Musharraf’s Troubles,” Los Angeles Times,
October 5, 2007; Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Excluding the Military,” Daily Times (Lahore),
October 14, 2007.
18 Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, Election Monitor 1,
September 24, 2007, and Election Monitor 3, October 9, 2007.

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Musharraf-Bhutto Engagement. President Musharraf and former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto (leader of the PPP) reportedly have been negotiating a
power-sharing arrangement that would facilitate Musharraf’s continued national
political role while also allowing Bhutto to return to Pakistan from self-imposed exile
and potentially serve as prime minister a third time. The Bush Administration
reportedly is quietly encouraging such an arrangement as the best means of both
sustaining Musharraf’s role and of strengthening moderate political forces in
Islamabad.19 Already the Musharraf government appears to have benefitted through
the mere act of negotiating with Bhutto, as the process has driven a wedge between
the PPP and the rest of the country’s political opposition (Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N
faction and the Islamist MMA coalition both refuse to engage in such a dialogue).
In negotiations with the Musharraf government, Bhutto has focused on five key
points: 1) restoration of the 1973 Constitution minus the 17th Amendment (to restore
a “balance of power” established between the presidency and Parliament); 2)
establishment of an independent Election Commission; 3) release of all political
prisoners; 4) free, fair, and transparent elections with a level playing field for all
contenders; and 5) Musharraf’s resignation from the army. She also insists on the
repeal of a 2003 constitutional amendment banning twice-elected prime ministers
from serving again and the removal of all standing corruption charges against herself
and other ex-officials.20 Some analysts take a cynical view of Bhutto’s motives in
negotiating with Musharraf, believing her central goal is removal of standing
corruption cases against her.21 Bhutto insists that she has not sought a “power-
sharing” arrangement with Musharraf but has engaged his regime so as to facilitate
“an effective and peaceful transition to democracy.”22
According to one senior Pakistani political analyst, the credibility of the
Musharraf government has been so damaged in 2007 that a deal with the PPP is
unlikely to redeem it.23 A July report from a Brussels-based think-tank concluded
that President Musharraf has little choice but to continue his reliance on Islamist
parties for political support and it considers a Musharraf-PPP power-sharing
arrangement to be untenable given their mutual animosity and the increasing strength
of the country’s pro-democracy movement. It thus foresees either a peaceful and
orderly power transition through free and fair elections or violence and instability
through an effort by Musharraf and the army high command to cling to power.24 At
19 Mark Mazetti, “U.S. Prods Musharraf to Share Power,” New York Times, August 16,
2007.
20 “Bhutto Lays Down Pakistan Terms,” BBC News, July 30, 2007; Benazir Bhutto
(interview), “Transcript: CNN With Wolf Blitzer,” August 5, 2007; “PPP-Govt Deal
Focused on Four Points,” News (Karachi), August 24, 2007; Benazir Bhutto (interview),
“Transcript: PBS The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer,” August 21, 2007.
21 See, for example, Ijaz Hussain, “Deal-ing a Bad Hand,” Daily Times (Lahore), August 29,
2007.
22 Harlan Ullman, “Exclusive Bhutto Interview,” Washington Times, October 17, 2007.
23 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Table For Two?,” Daily Times (Lahore), July 29, 2007.
24 “Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report
(continued...)

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least one senior Washington-based analyst is convinced that, even if an accord is
reached with Bhutto, Musharraf’s record suggests that he will continue to maintain
a tacit alliance with the country’s religious parties and will continue to use the
government’s security apparatus to constrain the activities of mainstream political
groups. Another predicts that Musharraf’s political survival depends on further
constraining his opponents’ political space and that Islamabad’s future regime is
likely to be even more autocratic.25
On October 4, President Musharraf and Bhutto agreed to an accord that would
pave the way for a power-sharing deal. The National Reconciliation Ordinance
(NRO) would provide amnesty for all politicians who served in Pakistan between
1988 and 1999, thus essentially clearing Bhutto of standing and potential corruption
charges. Officials said the amnesty would not apply to former Prime Minister Sharif.
In return, Bhutto reportedly agreed to withdraw her party’s petitions with the
Supreme Court that sought to block Musharraf’s reelection plans and to refrain from
a threatened mass parliamentary resignation of PPP members.26 Many Pakistanis
were unhappy with news of the deal. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan,
for example, opposes the NRO as “ill-conceived opportunism” and a measure
“designed to promote violent crime and corruption.” Another commentator
denounced the ordinance as “a devious deal between two power-hungry people” and
“a flagrant violation of principled politics.”27 The Supreme Court subsequently put
a spanner in Bhutto’s plans by ruling on October 12 that it would hear challenges to
the NRO, thus threatening a Musharraf-Bhutto deal by potentially reinstating
corruption charges against the former prime minister.
Meanwhile, Pakistanis appear increasingly put off by a seemingly arbitrary
electoral process that serves to preserve the power of a corrupt elite who are seen to
give little substantive attention to the problems of ordinary citizens.28 Moreover,
there has been considerable dismay among Pakistanis at the appearance of unabashed
U.S. interference in their political system, even to the extent of “bypassing the prime
minister and his cabinet to ensure smooth sailing” for Bhutto.29 One former State
Department official has contended that, through a deep U.S. involvement in efforts
to bring about a Musharraf-Bhutto understanding, “We have set ourselves up to be
blamed for all the shortcomings of Pakistan’s government — and have set the stage
24 (...continued)
No. 137, July 31, 2007, at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4969&l=1].
25 Teresita Schaffer, “Not the Same Pakistan,” CSIS Commentary, September 18, 2007;
William Milam, “Musharraf: A Transition Figure?,” Friday Times (Lahore), September 28,
2007.
26 “Pakistan’s Bhutto, Musharraf Agree on Accord,” Agence France Presse, October 4, 2007.
27 HRCP Press Release, October 10, 2007; Burhanuddin Hasan, “Death of Accountability,”
News (Karachi), October 11, 2007.
28 Sadaqat Jan, “Pakistanis Says They’re Cynical of Election Marred by Boycotts and Legal
Challenges,” Associated Press, October 6, 2007; Mark Sappenfield, “New Political Deal
Angers Pakistanis,” Christian Science Monitor, October 9, 2007.
29 “US Involved in Pak Politics to the Hilt,” News (Karachi), October 11, 2007.

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CRS-8
for a successor government to use anti-Americanism as a rallying cry ....”30 Whether
or not this comes to pass, it is far from clear if the two long-time antagonists will be
able to create an effective working relationship, and the central U.S. policy goal of
strengthening Islamabad’s role as an ally in counterterrorism efforts is unlikely to be
met in the short-term as Pakistan faces months of political uncertainty.31 (See also
“Democracy and Governance” section below.)
Benazir Bhutto’s Return. On October 18, former Prime Minister Bhutto
made good on her promise to return to Pakistan after more than eight years of self-
imposed exile and was welcomed in Karachi by up to one million supporters. (Hours
later, two bomb blasts near her motorcade — likely perpetrated by suicide attackers
— left at least 115 people dead, but Bhutto was unharmed.)32 While Bhutto
continues to enjoy significant public support in the country, especially in her home
region of rural Sindh, there are signs that many PPP members are ambivalent about
her return and worry that her credibility as an opponent of military rule has been
damaged through deal-making with Musharraf.33 Pakistani government officials have
warned that Bhutto could be subject to arrest if the Supreme Court upholds legal
challenges to the NRO. In the days leading up to her slated return, they repeatedly
urged her to postpone the date until after the Supreme Court had ruled on the legality
of both the president’s reelection and of the NRO. Bhutto claims that it is the PML-
Q leadership — and not President Musharraf — that was made anxious by her return
to the country. Bhutto is expected to run for a parliamentary seat in January and
potentially serve for a third time as prime minster.
National Election Schedule and Credibility Concerns. Pakistan’s next
parliamentary and provincial elections must take place by mid-February 2008, or
within 90 days of the mid-November 2007 end of the current bodies’ terms (Prime
Minister Shaukat Aziz has stated that the polls will take place during the first two
weeks of January 2008; after dissolution of the present assemblies, President
Musharraf reportedly plans to appoint a caretaker government to oversee elections).
Some observers see signs that the government does not intend to conduct credible
elections. Such signs prominently include controversy surrounding the possible
disenfranchisement of scores of millions of Pakistanis from voter rolls. In the words
of one commentator, “Preparing trustworthy voters’ lists was the first major test of
the current Election Commission’s ability to hold credible polls. The Commission
30 Statement of Ambassador Teresita Schaffer before the House Armed Services Committee,
October 10, 2007.
31 Peter Wonacott and Zahid Hussain, “For Pakistan, A Tenuous Accord,” Wall Street
Journal, October 5, 2007; Robin Wright and Griff Witte, “Pakistan Election Poses
Challenges for U.S.,” Washington Post, October 6, 2007.
32 Bhutto has alleged that some pro-jihadist retired Pakistani military officers have plotted
her assassination, and Baitullah Mehsud, a pro-Taliban militant commander in South
Waziristan, vowed to launch suicide attacks against her. The government deployed
thousands of security troops to safeguard her Karachi arrival (Zahid Hussain, “Triumph or
Tumult for Bhutto?,” Wall Street Journal Asia, October 18, 2007).
33 Kim Barker, “Exile Faces an Uneasy Welcome,” Chicago Tribune, October 15, 2007;
“Bhutto Returning Defiant But Compromised,” Associated Press, October 16, 2007.

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CRS-9
has clearly failed that test.”34 The U.S. government has provided millions of dollars
in democracy-related aid funds to Pakistan, much of these going toward a
Commission effort to computerize the country’s voter rolls. Washington also plans
to sponsor election observation programs in support of the parliamentary elections.
(See also “Democracy and Governance” section below.)
The Red Mosque Siege and Islamist Retaliation. On July 10, a week-
long siege at Islamabad’s Red Mosque ended when Pakistani commandos stormed
the complex and, following a 20-hour battle, defeated the well-armed Islamist
radicals therein. Beginning in January and escalating steadily over the course of the
year, an open Islamist rebellion of sorts had been taking place in Pakistan’s relatively
serene capital. Radical Islamists at the Red Mosque and their followers in the
attached women’s Jamia Hafsa seminary had occupied illegally constructed religious
buildings, kidnaped and detained local police officers and alleged Chinese
prostitutes, battled security forces, and threatened to launch a violent anti-
government campaign unless Sharia (Islamic law) was instituted nationwide. Several
thousand people had been barricaded in the mosque complex, reportedly including
a small number of foreign militants. Government efforts to negotiate with the
mosque’s clerics made no progress and were viewed by many Pakistanis as
appeasement of the Islamists. Some cynics in Pakistan suggested that the
government was complicit in allowing the standoff to fester, its alleged slow and
uncertain response being a purposeful effort to bolster its own standing as a bulwark
against spreading Islamist radicalism.
As street battles escalated, commandos laid siege to the mosque complex in
early July. On July 4, one of the two radical cleric leaders, Mohammed Abdul Aziz,
was captured as he tried to escape disguised as a woman. On July 10, with
negotiations appearing to fail conclusively, commandos launched a full-scale, pre-
dawn assault on the complex. The mosque’s remaining top cleric, Mohammed’s
younger brother Abdur Rashid Ghazi, was killed in the heavy fighting, which left
more than 100 people dead, including approximately 10 security troops, 60 militants,
and an unknown number of civilians, among them women and children.
The Red Mosque denouement elicited a rapid and fierce backlash among
Pakistani Islamists sympathetic to the radicals’ cause: up to 200 people, most of
them soldiers and police recruits, were killed in more than one dozen suicide
bombings in western Pakistan in the two weeks following the commando assault.
Sporadic and lethal militant attacks have continued. By one accounting, 396 people
have been killed in 36 suicide bombing incidents in Pakistan during the first nine
months of 2007, most of them soldiers and policemen, with the great majority of
deaths coming after the July 3 start of the Red Mosque siege. Another source claims
there have been more than 1,000 people killed in violence related to Islamist
militancy in Pakistan since the Red Mosque raid, including a reported 570 militants,
200 civilians, and 290 security personnel.35 Moreover, upon reopening, the Red
Mosque has continued to be a gathering place for strongly anti-Musharraf and anti-
34 Farahnaz Ispahani, “A Credible Election,” News (Karachi), August 20, 2007.
35 Amir Mir, “Who is the Enemy?,” Outlook (Delhi), October 1, 2007; “Violence Has
Pakistanis Debating US Tie,” Associated Press, October 10, 2007.

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CRS-10
Western Islamist figures. By one account, the mosque is now “a memorial, a rallying
cry, and a propaganda tool” for radical religious groups, thus enlarging the pool of
potential terrorist recruits.36
Al Qaeda in Pakistan. U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that Al
Qaeda and other anti-Western terrorists remain active on Pakistani territory. Such
concern surged following the July release of an unclassified version of a new
National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland, which
concluded that Al Qaeda “has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland
attack capability, including: a safehaven in the FATA, operational lieutenants, and
its top leadership.”37 Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Mahmoud Ali
Durrani, later claimed that U.S. intelligence reporting on Al Qaeda in Pakistan was
“absolutely incorrect” and that there were no Al Qaeda safehavens on Pakistani
territory.38 On September 20, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden released an audio
tape in which he urged Muslims in Pakistan to rise up against President Musharraf
to avenge his “aid to America against the Muslims” and the Pakistani army’s July
raid on Islamabad’s Red Mosque.39 As of mid-October 2007, Pakistani and Western
security officials reportedly see Islamabad losing its war against religious militancy
and Al Qaeda forces enjoying growing areas in which to operate, due in large part to
the Pakistan army’s poor counterinsurgency capabilities and the central government’s
steadily eroding legitimacy.40
Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency. An ongoing
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and its connection to developments in Pakistan
remain matters of serious concern, especially in light of signs that Al Qaeda terrorists
move with impunity on the Pakistani side of the rugged border. In July, pro-Taliban
militants in North Waziristan announced their withdrawal from a controversial
September 2006 truce made with the Islamabad government, claiming the accord had
been violated by army deployments and attacks on tribals. Simultaneously, U.S.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated that Washington had determined
President Musharraf’s policies in the region to be ineffective and he said the United
States was fully supporting new efforts to crack down on Pakistan’s pro-Taliban
militants. Later in July, the U.S. commander of counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, blamed a growing Al Qaeda presence in
36 Griff Witte, “Pakistan’s Embattled Mosque Reopens With Fresh Momentum,”
Washington Post, October 14, 2007.
37 See [http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf]. A Pakistan Foreign
Ministry statement criticized the document’s “unsubstantiated assertions.”
38 Michael Hirsh and Ron Moreau, “State of Anxiety,” Newsweek, August 27, 2007.
39 “Bin Laden, on Tape, Urges Pakistanis to Oust Musharraf,” New York Times, September
21, 2007.
40 Griff Witte, “Pakistan Seen Losing Fight Against Taliban and Al Qaeda,” Washington
Post, October 3, 2007.

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CRS-11
Pakistan for an estimated 50-60% increase in the number of foreign fighters
infiltrating into Afghanistan.41
According to a September 2007 U.N. report on the incidence of suicide bombing
in Afghanistan, “Pakistan remains an important source of human and material
assistance for the insurgency generally but suicide attacks in particular.” The report
found that nearly all suicide attackers in Afghanistan undergo some form of training
and preparation in Pakistani madrassas, and that more than 80% “pass through
recruitment, training facilities or safe houses in North or South Waziristan en route
to their targets inside Afghanistan.” Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry countered that the
“irresponsible” report was “based on sources known to be habitually critical of
Pakistan’s policies.”42
The Pakistan army now reportedly has deployed nearly 100,000 troops in
western Pakistan in response to the surge in militancy there. Battles with pro-Taliban
militants are ongoing and became particularly fierce in North Waziristan in mid-
October, when a days-long battle near the town of Mir Ali left a reported 250 people,
including 60 soldiers and up to 60 civilians, dead. An army spokesman claimed that
50 foreign fighters, mostly Uzbeks and Tajiks, were among those killed. The army
also is suffering from a raft of recent suicide bomb attacks and the kidnaping of
hundreds of its soldiers.43 Such setbacks have damaged the army’s morale, and also
have caused some to question the organization’s loyalties and capabilities.44
Meanwhile, Islamist militants from the tribal agencies are continuing to spread their
influence to Pakistan’s “settled areas,” including NWFP districts such as Malakand,
Dir, and Swat. The militants also appear to be employing heavy weapons in more
aggressive tactics, making frontal attacks on army outposts instead of the hit-and-run
skirmishes of the past.45
In other developments:
41 “Pakistan Army Action Has Slight Effect: U.S. General,” Reuters, July 25, 2007.
42 U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007),”
September 9, 2007; [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Sep/PR_240_07.htm].
43 In the most egregious example of the latter development, on August 30 some 250
Pakistani soldiers, including a colonel and 8 other officers, were taken prisoner when pro-
Taliban militants ambushed their convoy in South Waziristan. The troops apparently
offered no resistance before surrendering to Islamist extremists reportedly loyal to fugitive
commander Baitullah Mahsud, who is suspected of ordering numerous suicide bomb attacks
against military targets in recent months. The militants demanded that the military withdraw
from South Waziristan. President Musharraf later criticized the troops for taking
insufficient precautionary measures (Ismail Khan and Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani Militants
Hold Army Troops Hostage,” New York Times, September 4, 2007; Owen Bennett Jones,
“Musharraf Blames Captured Troops,” BBC News, October 12, 2007).
44 Jeremy Page and Zahid Hussain, “Kidnapings and Suicide Attacks Shake Morale of
Pakistan’s Armed Force,” Times of London, September 20, 2007.
45 Laura King, “Battles Raging in Remotest Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2007.

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! On October 18, two bomb blasts — likely perpetrated by suicide
attackers — left at least 115 people dead near the motorcade of
returning former Prime Minister Bhutto, who was unharmed
! Also on October 18, Pakistan and India held talks on
conventional confidence-building measures..
! On October 10, the House Armed Services Committee held a
hearing on Pakistan.
! On October 8, the main index of the Karachi Stock Exchange hit
a record high as analysts speculated that business interests favor
President Musharraf’s continued rule.
! October 1, a suicide bomber killed at least 15 people, including 4
police officers, at a police checkpost in Bannu, NWFP.
! On September 30, the United States and Pakistan inked a new plan
to provide $750 million in U.S. aid to the FATA over five years.
! On September 14, the U.S. Department of State’s International
Religious Freedom Report 2007 again found that the Islamabad
government imposes limits on the freedom of religion in Pakistan.
! On September 13, at least 15 Pakistani soldiers were killed in a
suicide bomb attack on an army building in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) outside Islamabad.
! On September 11, at least 16 people, including 2 policemen and
a soldier, were killed in a suicide bomb attack near a security
checkpost in Dera Ismail Khan in the NWFP.
! On September 4, at least 25 people were killed and another 70
injured in two suicide bomb attacks in Rawalpindi. Many of the
victims were employees of Pakistan’s security agencies.
! On September 1, seven people, including three paramilitary
soldiers, were killed in two suicide car bombings in the Bajaur
tribal agency.
! On August 31, two-day talks between Indian and Pakistani
officials seeking to resolve a water dispute over the Wullar
Barrage/Tubal navigation project ended in deadlock.
! On August 24, two suicide bomb attacks left six Pakistani
soldiers dead in North Waziristan. In response, Pakistani helicopter
gunships attacked suspected Islamist militant positions in the region,
reportedly killing up to 15.

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CRS-13
! On August 14, Pakistan celebrated its 60th independence day.
! On August 6, U.S. Trade Representative Schwab hosted
Commerce Minister Khan in Washington, where they reportedly
discussed proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, as well as
efforts to finalize a Bilateral Investment Treaty.
! On August 1, Pakistan and India ended two-day talks on
economic and commercial cooperation with agreements to
facilitate importation of cement from Pakistan and tea from India,
among others.
! On July 27, a suicide bomber killed at least 13 people, most of
them police, near Islamabad’s Red Mosque complex.
! On July 25, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing
on Pakistan.
! On July 19, three separate suicide bomb attacks killed at least 52
people. The worst attack involved the car bombing of a vehicle
carrying Chinese workers near Karachi. The Chinese were unhurt,
but 7 police escorts and 23 bystanders died.
Setting and Regional Relations
Historical Setting
The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War
and South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet
expansionism and Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat
from India prompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance
agreement in 1954. By 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by
joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the
Central Treaty Organization (or “Baghdad Pact”). As a result of these alliances,
Islamabad received nearly $2 billion in U.S. assistance from 1953 to 1961, one-
quarter of this in military aid, making Pakistan one of America’s most important
security assistance partners of the period. President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously
called Pakistan America’s “most allied ally in Asia.” Differing expectations of the
security relationship long bedeviled bilateral ties, however. During and immediately
after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military
assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship and
a perception among many in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally.
In the mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s efforts to respond to India’s
1974 underground nuclear test by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. U.S.
aid was suspended by President Carter in 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covert
construction of a uranium enrichment facility. However, following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan later that year, Pakistan again was viewed as a frontline ally

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CRS-14
in the effort to block Soviet
expansionism. In 1981, the Reagan
Pakistan in Brief
Administration offered Islamabad a
five-year, $3.2 billion aid package.
Population: 165 million; growth rate: 1.8%
(2007 est.)
Pakistan became a key transit
Area: 803,940 sq. km. (slightly less than twice
country for arms supplies to the
the size of California)
Afghan resistance, as well as home
Capital: Islamabad
for some three million Afghan
Head of Government: President and Chief of
refugees, most of whom have yet to
Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf
Ethnic Groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun,
return.
Baloch, Muhajir (immigrants from India at
the time of partition and their descendants)
Despite this renewal of U.S.
Languages: Punjabi 58%, Sindhi 12%, Pashtu
aid and close security ties, many in
8%, Urdu 8%; English widely used
Congress remained troubled by
Religions: Muslim 96% (Sunni 81%, Shia
15%), Christian, Hindu, and other 4%
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
Life Expectancy at Birth: female 65 years;
program. In 1985, Section 620E(e)
male 63 years (2007 est.)
(the Pressler amendment) was
Literacy: female 35%; male 62% (2004 est.)
added to the Foreign Assistance
Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $412
Act, requiring the President to
billion; per capita: $2,580; growth rate
6.2% (2006)
certify to Congress that Pakistan
Currency: Rupee (100 = $1.65)
does not possess a nuclear explosive
Inflation: 7.9% (2006)
device during the fiscal year for
Military Expenditures: $4.0 billion (3.6% of
which aid is to be provided. With
GDP; 2005)
the Soviet withdrawal from
U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $3.67 billion;
imports from U.S. $2 billion (2006)
Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; Departments of
activities again came under
Commerce and State; Government of Pakistan; Economist
Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; Military Balance
intensive U.S. scrutiny and, in 1990,
President George H.W. Bush again
suspended aid to Pakistan. Under
the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most bilateral economic and all military
aid ended, and deliveries of major military equipment ceased. In 1992, Congress
partially relaxed the scope of sanctions to allow for food assistance and continuing
support for nongovernmental organizations. Among the notable results of the aid
cutoff was the nondelivery of F-16 fighter aircraft purchased by Pakistan in 1989.
Nine years later, the United States agreed to compensate Pakistan with a $325 million
cash payment and $140 million in goods, including surplus wheat, but the episode
engendered lingering Pakistani resentments.
During the 1990s, with U.S. attention shifted away from the region, Islamabad
further consolidated its nuclear weapons capability, fanned the flames of a growing
separatist insurgency in neighboring Indian-controlled Kashmir, and nurtured the
Taliban movement in Afghanistan, where the radical Islamist group took control of
Kabul in 1996. After more than a decade of alienation, U.S. relations with Pakistan
were once again transformed in dramatic fashion, this time by the September 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a
pivotal ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. A small trickle of foreign assistance
to Pakistan again became a prodigious flow and, in a sign of renewed U.S.
recognition of the country’s importance, President George W. Bush designated
Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States in June 2004. One month
later, a Congressional Pakistan Caucus was formed to facilitate dialogue among

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CRS-15
Pakistani-Americans and their political representatives in Congress, and to improve
and strengthen bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States.
Current U.S.-Pakistan Engagement
U.S. engagement with Pakistan continues to be deep and multifaceted.
President Bush traveled to Pakistan in March 2006 for the first such presidential visit
in six years, and numerous high-level governmental meetings have ensued. During
the visit, President Bush and President Pervez Musharraf issued a Joint Statement on
the U.S.-Pakistan “strategic partnership” that calls for a “strategic dialogue” and
“significant expansion” of bilateral economic ties, including mutual trade and
investment, as well as initiatives in the areas of energy, peace and security, social
sector development, science and technology, democracy, and nonproliferation.46 In
the wake of that meeting, diplomatic engagements have continued apace. Over the
past year, visits to Islamabad have been made by Secretary of State Rice, Vice
President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Speaker of the House
Nancy Pelosi, and several top U.S. military commanders, among others. Pakistani
visitors to Washington in the past year have included President Musharraf, Foreign
Minister Kurshid Kasuri, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan, and the then-Chairman of
Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Ehsan ul-Haq. Among formal
sessions were a November 2006 meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Education Dialogue
hosted by Education Secretary Margaret Spellings in Washington; a February 2007
meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Committee on Science and Technology in
Washington; and a September meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in
Islamabad, where the U.S. delegation was led by Deputy Secretary of State
Negroponte.
Political Setting
Pakistan’s political history is a troubled one, marked by tripartite power
struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have
ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 60 years of existence, interspersed with
periods of generally weak civilian governance. From 1988 to 1999, Islamabad had
democratically elected governments, and the army appeared to have moved from its
traditional role of “kingmaker” to one of power broker. Benazir Bhutto (leader of the
Pakistan People’s Party) and Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Pakistan Muslim League)
each served twice as prime minister during this period. The Bhutto government was
dismissed on charges of corruption and nepotism in 1996 and Sharif won a landslide
victory in ensuing elections, which were judged generally free and fair by
international observers. Sharif moved quickly to bolster his powers by curtailing
those of the president and judiciary, and he emerged as one of Pakistan’s strongest-
ever elected leaders. Critics accused him of intimidating the opposition and the press.
In October 1999, in proximate response to Prime Minister Sharif’s attempt to
remove him, Chief of Army Staff General Musharraf overthrew the government,
dismissed the National Assembly, and appointed himself “chief executive.” In the
wake of this military overthrow of the elected government, Islamabad faced
46 See [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h06030404.html].

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CRS-16
considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related
U.S. sanctions under section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act
(Pakistan was already under nuclear-related U.S. sanctions). Musharraf later
assumed the title of president following a controversial April 2002 referendum.
National elections were held in October of that year, as ordered by the Supreme
Court. A new civilian government was seated — Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali was
replaced with Musharraf ally Shaukat Aziz in August 2005 — but it has remained
weak. In apparent contravention of democratic norms, Musharraf has continued to
hold the dual offices of president and army chief. Many figures across the spectrum
of Pakistani society welcomed Musharraf, or at least were willing to give him the
benefit of the doubt, as a potential reformer who would curtail both corruption and
the influence of religious extremists. Yet his domestic popularity has suffered
following indications that, as with Pakistan’s previous president-generals, expanding
his own power and that of the military would be his central goal.
Pakistan’s next parliamentary elections must take place by mid-February 2008,
or within 90 days of the mid-November 2007 end of the current body’s term.
President Bush has said that electoral process will be “an important test of Pakistan’s
commitment to democratic reform” and, during his 2006 visit to Islamabad, said
President Musharraf understands the elections “need to be open and honest.”47 In
October 2007, Secretary of State Rice repeated the admonition, saying the expected
parliamentary elections will be “a real test” of the Islamabad government’s
commitment to democratization and that the U.S. government is “pressing that case
very hard.”48 Musharraf himself stood for (and unofficially won) reelection as
president on October 6, 2007. Under the Pakistani system, the president is indirectly
elected by a 1,170-person electoral college comprised of the membership of all
national and provincial legislatures. Opposition parties have petitioned the Supreme
Court to annul the exercise: Under Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, Musharraf
ostensibly is barred from both seeking reelection and from simultaneously serving
as president and army chief.49 (See “Democracy and Governance” section below.
See also CRS Report RL32615, Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments.)
Regional Relations
Pakistan-India Rivalry. Three full-scale wars — in 1947-1948, 1965, and
1971 — and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual
border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. The
acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the
unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. Both
countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and
47 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-2.html] and
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-2.html].
48 Interview with the New York Post editorial board, October 1, 2007.
49 Article 63(1)(k) of Pakistan’s constitution bars any person from being elected to
Parliament within a two-year period of that person’s having been in other government
service (e.g., in the military). Article 41(2) states that eligibility for election as president
requires eligibility for election to Parliament. Article 43(1) bars the president from holding
“any office of profit in the service of Pakistan.”

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CRS-17
social development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both countries to
the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control (LOC) into
the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad [Free] Kashmir.
India blames Pakistan for supporting a violent separatist rebellion in the
Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley that has taken as many as 66,000 lives since
1989. Pakistan admits only to lending moral and political support to the rebels, and
it criticizes India for human rights abuses in “Indian-occupied Kashmir.”
India held Pakistan responsible for late 2001 terrorist attacks in Kashmir and on
the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi. The Indian response, a massive
military mobilization, was mirrored by Pakistan and within months some one million
heavily-armed soldiers were facing-off at the international frontier. During an
extremely tense 2002 another full-scale war seemed a real and even likely possibility,
and may have been averted only through international diplomatic efforts, including
multiple visits to the region by top U.S. officials. An April 2003 peace initiative
brought major improvement in the bilateral relationship, allowing for an October
cease-fire agreement initiated by Pakistan. The process led to a January 2004 summit
meeting in Islamabad and a joint agreement to re-engage a “Composite Dialogue” to
bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and
Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”50
During 2004, numerous mid-level meetings, normalized diplomatic relations,
and increased people-to-people contacts brought modest, but still meaningful
progress toward stable relations. Regular dialogue continued in 2005 and a third
round of Composite Dialogue talks was held in 2006. Numerous confidence-building
measures have been put in place, most notably travel and commerce across the
Kashmiri LOC for the first time in decades, and bilateral trade has increased. Yet
militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek
remain unresolved, and Pakistani officials regularly express unhappiness that more
substantive progress, especially on the “core issue” of Kashmir, is not occurring.
Following July 2006 terrorist bombings in Bombay, India, New Delhi postponed
planned foreign secretary-level talks, bringing into question the continued viability
of the already slow-moving process. However, after meeting on the sidelines of a
Nonaligned Movement summit in Cuba in September, President Musharraf and
Indian Prime Minister Singh announced a resumption of formal peace negotiations
and also approved implementation of a joint anti-terrorism mechanism. The
Composite Dialogue resumed in November after a four-month hiatus when Foreign
Secretary Khan paid a visit to New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart. No
progress was made on outstanding territorial disputes, and India is not known to have
presented evidence of Pakistani involvement in the 7/11 Bombay terrorist bombings,
but the two officials did give shape to the proposed joint anti-terrorism mechanism
and they agreed to continue the dialogue process in early 2007. A notable step came
in December 2006, when bilateral talks on the militarized Sir Creek dispute ended
with agreement to conduct a joint survey.
50 [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].

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CRS-18
In January 2007, Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri hosted his Indian
counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, in Islamabad for the first such visit in more than a
year. The two men reviewed past progress and planned for a fourth Composite
Dialogue round in March. On February 18, two bombs exploded on an Indian
segment of the Samjhauta [Friendship] Express train linking Delhi, India, with
Lahore, Pakistan. Resulting fires killed 68 people, most of them Pakistanis. Days
later, Kasuri traveled to New Delhi, where he and Mukherjee reaffirmed a bilateral
commitment to the peace process despite the apparent effort to subvert it. While
India refused a Pakistani request to undertake a joint investigation into that attack,
the two countries did sign an agreement to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.
The new joint Pakistan-India anti-terrorism mechanism met for the first time in
Islamabad in March 2007 and produced a joint statement in which both governments
agreed to use the forum for exchanging information about investigations of and/or
efforts to prevent terrorist acts on either side of the shared border, and to meet
quarterly while immediately conveying urgent information. Hopes that the
Samjhauta train bombing would provide a fitting “test case” apparently were dashed,
however, when India declined to share relevant investigative information with
Pakistan. Moreover, Indian officials were unhappy with Islamabad’s insistence that
the “freedom struggle” underway in Kashmir should not be treated as terrorism under
this framework. Still, the continuing engagement even after a major terrorist attack
was widely viewed as evidence that the bilateral peace process had gained a sturdy
momentum. A new rounds of dialogue was then launched in mid-March, when the
two foreign ministers met again in Islamabad. No new agreements were reached, but
both officials lauded improved bilateral relations and held “the most sustained and
intensive dialogue” ever on the Kashmir problem.51 Political turmoil and uncertainty
arose in Islamabad around that same time, however, and has since greatly slowed
progress in the Pakistan-India peace process.
The “IPI” Pipeline Project. Islamabad insists it is going forward with a
proposed joint pipeline project to deliver Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and possibly
on to India. In January 2007, officials from the three countries resolved a long-
running price-mechanism dispute, opening the way for further progress. In February,
the fourth meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Working Group on the Iran-Pakistan-
India (IPI) pipeline was held in Islamabad, where the two countries agreed to split
equally expected gas supplies. In June, Pakistani and Indian officials reportedly
reached an agreement in principle on transportation charges, and officials from all
three countries suggested a final deal was imminent. Prime Minister Aziz has
described the pipeline as being critical to Pakistan’s economic growth and political
stability. Doubts about financing the approximately $7 billion project combined with
concerns about security in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province have some analysts
skeptical about fruition. Some independent observers and Members of Congress
assert that completion of the pipeline would represent a major confidence-building
measure in the region and could bolster regional energy security while facilitating
friendlier Pakistan-India ties (see, for example, H.Res. 353 in the 109th Congress).
51 See Pakistan Foreign Ministry Press Release No. 81/2007 at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/-
Press_Releases/2007/March/PR_81_07.htm].

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CRS-19
As part of its efforts to isolate Iran economically, the Bush Administration
actively seeks to dissuade the Islamabad and New Delhi governments from
participation in this project, and a State Department official has suggested that
current U.S. law dictates American opposition: The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L.
107-24) requires the President to impose sanctions on foreign companies that make
an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector. The
109th Congress extended this provision in the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-
293). No firms have been sanctioned under this act to date. (See also CRS Report
RS20871, The Iran Sanctions Act.)
Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and
“strategic depth” with regard to India though friendly relations with neighboring
Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to President General Zia ul-Haq’s support for
Afghan mujahideen “freedom fighters” who were battling Soviet invaders during the
1980s and to Islamabad’s later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to
2001. British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting
the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893
“Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders,
who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.
Following Islamabad’s major September 2001 policy shift, President Musharraf
consistently has vowed full Pakistani support for the government of Afghan President
Hamid Karzai and he insists that Pakistan is playing a “totally neutral role” in
Afghanistan. Islamabad claims to have arrested more than 500 Taliban militants in
2006, remanding 400 of them to Afghan custody, and reportedly has provided $300
million in economic assistance to Kabul since 2001. Nevertheless, the two leaders
have continuously exchanged public accusations and recriminations about the
ongoing movement of Islamic militants in the border region, and U.S. officials have
issued increasingly strong claims about the problems posed by Taliban insurgents and
other militants who are widely believed to enjoy safehaven on the Pakistani side of
the Durand Line. Moreover, Pakistan is wary of signs that India is pursuing a policy
of “strategic encirclement,” taking note of New Delhi’s past support for Tajik and
Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post-2001
opening of numerous Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and
Afghanistan play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat Islamic
militancy. Continuing acrimony between Islamabad and Kabul is thus deleterious to
U.S. interests.
In August 2007, an unprecedented joint “jirga,” or tribal assembly, was held in
Kabul and included nearly 700 delegates from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
meeting was endorsed by the United States as a means of bringing stability to
Afghanistan. In the days immediately preceding the opening session, some 40 tribal
elders from North Waziristan announced they would not attend, saying the absence
of Taliban representatives rendered it pointless, and President Musharraf himself
later announced his withdrawal from participation. Analysts widely considered the
move a snub to both Afghan President Karzai and to the U.S. government, which
expressed dismay at the decision. Musharraf made a last-minute decision to attend
the final day’s session, where he offered a rare admission that support for militants
emanating from Pakistan has caused problems for Afghanistan, saying “There is no
doubt Afghan militants are supported from Pakistan soil. The problem that you have

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CRS-20
in your region is because support is provided from our side.” The jirga ended with
a declaration that included plans for dialogue with “the opposition,” i.e., the Taliban52
(see also “Infiltration into Afghanistan” section below).
The China Factor. Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and
mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Pakistan served as a link
between Beijing and Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world
for China during the 1980s. China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for
Pakistan began in the 1960s and included helping to build a number of arms factories
in Pakistan, as well as supplying complete weapons systems. After the 1990
imposition of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, the Islamabad-Beijing arms relationship
was further strengthened (see CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues). Indian leaders have
called the Islamabad-Beijing nuclear and missile “proliferation nexus” a cause of
serious concern in New Delhi, and U.S. officials remain seized of this potentially
destabilizing dynamic.
Analysts taking a realist, power political perspective view China as an external
balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad
allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful
India. Many observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key
aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of “encirclement” or constraint of India as a
means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s region-
wide influence.
In April 2005, the Chinese prime minister visited Islamabad, where Pakistan and
China signed 22 accords meant to boost bilateral cooperation. President Musharraf’s
five-day visit to Beijing in February 2006 saw bilateral discussions on
counterterrorism, trade, and technical assistance. Chinese President Hu’s November
2006 travel to Islamabad was the first such visit by a Chinese president in ten years;
another 18 new bilateral pacts were inked, including a bilateral Free Trade
Agreement and plans for joint development of airborne early warning radars.
Islamabad may seek future civil nuclear assistance from Beijing, including potential
provision of complete power reactors, especially in light of Washington’s categorical
refusal of Pakistan’s request for a civil nuclear cooperation similar to that being
planned between the United States and India.
In May 2007, Prime Minister Aziz visited Beijing, where Pakistan and China
signed 27 new agreements and memoranda of understanding to “re-energize”
bilateral cooperation in numerous areas, including defense, space technology, and
trade. No public mention was made regarding civil nuclear cooperation. The Chinese
government has assisted Pakistan in constructing a major new port at Gwadar, near
the border with Iran; Islamabad and Beijing aspire to make this port, officially
opened in March 2007, a major commercial outlet for Central Asian states. Some
52 “Pakistan Leader Snubs Afghan Meeting,” Reuters, August 8, 2007; Taimoor Shah and
Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Rebels Find Haven in Pakistan, Musharraf Says,” New York Times,
August 12, 2007. Declaration text at [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2007\
08\13\story_13-8-2007_pg7_48].

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CRS-21
Western and Indian analysts are concerned that the port may be used for military
purposes and could bolster China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Pakistan continues to view China as an “all-weather friend” and perhaps its most
important strategic ally.
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues
U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including
counterterrorism, nuclear weapons and missile proliferation, South Asian and Afghan
stability, democratization and human rights, trade and economic reform, and efforts
to counter narcotics trafficking. Relations have been affected by several key
developments, including proliferation- and democracy-related sanctions; a continuing
Pakistan-India nuclear standoff and conflict over Kashmir; and the September 2001
terrorist attacks against the United States. In the wake of those attacks, President
Musharraf — under intense U.S. diplomatic pressure — offered President Bush
Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Pakistan became
a vital ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. U.S. sanctions relating to
Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup quickly were waived and, in
October 2001, large tranches of U.S. aid began flowing into Pakistan. Direct
assistance programs include training and equipment for Pakistani security forces,
along with aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion, human rights
improvement, counternarcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade
preference benefits. The United States also supports grant, loan, and debt
rescheduling programs for Pakistan by the various major international financial
institutions. In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO
ally of the United States under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Revelations in 2004 that Pakistan has been a source of nuclear proliferation to North
Korea, Iran, and Libya complicated Pakistan-U.S. relations and attracted
congressional attention as a serious security issue.
Terrorism
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan
pledged and has provided major support for the U.S.-led global anti-terrorism
coalition. According to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has
afforded the United States unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S.
military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists,
tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and blocking terrorist
financing.53 Top U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistani anti-terrorism efforts. In
a landmark January 2002 speech, President Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan’s use
as a base for terrorism of any kind, and he banned numerous militant groups,
including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, both blamed for terrorist
violence in Kashmir and India, and both designated as terrorist organizations under
U.S. law. In the wake of the speech, thousands of Muslim extremists were detained,
53 See, for example, “Pakistan Key Partner in War on Terror, Defense Department Says,”
U.S. Department of State Washington File, March 6, 2006; “Pakistan ‘Indispensable’ in
Global Anti-Terrorism Fight,” U.S. Department of State Washington File, July 25, 2007.

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CRS-22
though most of these were later released. In the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law
enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist
Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters on Pakistani territory. Pakistani authorities claim to have captured at least
750 Al Qaeda suspects and remanded most of these to U.S. custody.54
Important Al Qaeda-related arrests in Pakistan have included Abu Zubaydah
(March 2002), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (September 2002), Khalid Sheik Mohammed
(March 2003), and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). Other allegedly senior Al Qaeda
figures were killed in gunbattles and missile attacks, including in several apparent
U.S.-directed attacks on Pakistani territory from aerial drones. Yet Al Qaeda
fugitives and their Taliban allies remain active in Pakistan, especially in the
mountainous tribal regions along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, numerous banned
indigenous groups continue to operate under new names: Lashkar-e-Taiba became
Jamaat al-Dawat (banned under U.S. law in April 2006); Jaish-e-Mohammed was re-
dubbed Khudam-ul Islam.
President Musharraf repeatedly has vowed to end the activities of religious
extremists in Pakistan and to permanently prevent banned groups from resurfacing
there. His policies likely spurred two lethal but failed attempts to assassinate him in
December 2003. At present, Islamabad declares a four-pronged strategy to counter
terrorism and religious extremism, containing military, political, administrative, and
development aspects. Nonetheless, some analysts have long called Musharraf’s
efforts cosmetic, ineffective, and the result of international pressure rather than a
genuine recognition of the threat posed. In recent years, some Pakistani nationals and
religious seminaries have been linked to Islamist terrorism plots in Western
countries, especially the United Kingdom. In a January 2007 review of global
threats, then-U.S. Director of Intelligence John Negroponte issued what may have
been the strongest relevant statements from a Bush Administration official to date,
telling a Senate panel that, “Pakistan is a frontline partner in the war on terror.
Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic extremism and the home for some
top terrorist leaders.” He identified Al Qaeda as posing the single greatest terrorist
threat to the United States and its interests, and warned that the organization’s “core
elements ... maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outward from
their leaders’ secure hideout in Pakistan” to affiliates on four continents.55
In February 2007, Vice President Cheney and the Deputy Director of the CIA,
Steve Kappes, made an unannounced four-hour visit to Islamabad, where they
reportedly warned President Musharraf that a Democratic-controlled Congress could
cut U.S. aid to Pakistan unless that country takes more aggressive action to hunt
down Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives on its soil.56 The unusually strong
admonition came after U.S. intelligence officials concluded that a “terrorist
54 “Al Qaeda Fugitive Detained by Pakistan,” USA Today, May 2, 2006.
55 Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007, at
[http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingId=2467].
56 David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Cheney Warns Pakistan to Act on Terrorism,” New
York Times, February 26, 2007.

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CRS-23
infrastructure” had been rebuilt in western Pakistan, that Islamabad’s
counterterrorism efforts had been feckless to date, and that the Bush Administration
was recognizing that current U.S. and Pakistani policies were not working. When
asked during a February Senate hearing about the possible source of a hypothetical
future Al Qaeda attack on the United States, the new Director of National
Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated his belief that such an attack “most likely
would be planned and come out of the [Al Qaeda] leadership in Pakistan.”57 The
State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, released in April 2007, said
“Pakistan executed effective counterterrorism cooperation and captured or killed
many terrorists” while also reiterating U.S. concerns that the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) is “a safe haven for Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
militants.”58 According to Under Secretary of State Burns in July 2007 testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
We know that the tribal areas of the mountainous border regions inside Pakistan
have never been within the effective control of any central government. We
know that the regions of North and South Waziristan have become safehavens
for violent extremist and terrorist activity.... [W]e would like to see a more
sustained and effective effort by the Pakistani government to defeat terrorist
forces on its soil.
Although the United States lauded Islamabad’s anti-terrorism financing efforts earlier
this decade, Under Secretary Burns also encouraged more energetic Pakistani action
in this area:
We want to see Pakistan use all tools at its disposal to choke the flow of funds
to terrorist groups. We are particularly concerned about terrorist groups
exploiting charitable donations, and by their tactic of re-forming under new
names to evade international prohibitions on donations to terrorist
organizations.... We urge Pakistan to pass an Anti-Money Laundering bill that
meets international standards, and to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit
within the State Bank of Pakistan.59
Pakistani officials are resentful of criticisms and doubts about their commitment to
the counterterrorist fight, and they aver that U.S. pressure on Pakistan to “do more”
could undermine President Musharraf and destabilize his government.60
Al Qaeda in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities reportedly have remanded to
U.S. custody roughly 500 wanted Al Qaeda fugitives to date, including some senior
57 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2007. A July 2007
National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat included the assessment that Al Qaeda
has “protected or regenerated” its capability to attack the United States, in part due to its
enjoying “safehaven” in Pakistan’s tribal areas (see [http://www.dni.gov/
press_releases/20070717_release.pdf]).
58 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82734.htm].
59 See [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/89418.htm].
60 David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Cheney Warns Pakistan to Act on Terrorism,” New
York Times, February 25, 2007; Shahzeb Jillani, “US May Be ‘Undermining’ Pakistan,”
BBC News, March 1, 2007; author interviews with Pakistani government officials.

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CRS-24
alleged operatives. However, despite clear successes in disrupting Al Qaeda and
affiliated networks in Pakistan since 2001, there are increasing signs that anti-U.S.
terrorists have benefitted from what some analysts call a Pakistani policy of
appeasement in western tribal areas near the Afghan border. By seeking
accommodation with pro-Taliban leaders in these areas, the Musharraf government
appears to have inadvertently allowed foreign (largely Arab) militants to obtain safe
haven from which they can plot and train for terrorist attacks against U.S. and other
Western targets. Moreover, many observers warn that an American preoccupation
with Iraq has contributed to allowing Al Qaeda’s reemergence in Pakistan.61
Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenant, Egyptian Islamic radical
leader Ayman al-Zawahri, are believed by many to be hiding somewhere in
Pakistan’s western border region. Pakistani officials reject such suspicions and
generally insist there is no evidence to support them, but numerous U.S. officials
have suggested otherwise. While some 2006 reports placed the Al Qaeda founder in
the remote Dir Valley of northwestern Pakistan, the country’s prime minister said
those hunting Bin Laden had no clues as to his whereabouts, a claim bolstered by
Western press reports indicating that the U.S. and other special forces tasked with
finding Bin Laden had not received a credible lead in years.62 President Bush has
said he would order U.S. forces to enter Pakistan if he received good intelligence on
Osama Bin Laden’s location.63
Infiltration Into Afghanistan. Tensions between the Kabul and Islamabad
governments — which stretch back many decades — have at times reached alarming
levels in recent years, with top Afghan officials accusing Pakistan of manipulating
Islamic militancy in the region to destabilize Afghanistan. Likewise, U.S. military
commanders overseeing Operation Enduring Freedom have since 2003 complained
that renegade Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters remain able to attack coalition troops in
Afghanistan, then escape across the Pakistani frontier. They have expressed dismay
at the slow pace of progress in capturing wanted fugitives in Pakistan and urge
Islamabad to do more to secure its rugged western border area. U.S. government
officials have voiced similar worries, even expressing concern that elements of
Pakistan’s intelligence agency might be assisting members of the Taliban. In June
2006, the State Department’s top counterterrorism official told a Senate panel that
elements of Pakistan’s “local, tribal governments” are believed to be in collusion
with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but that the United States had no “compelling
evidence” that Pakistan’s intelligence agency is assisting militants.64 In September
61 See, for example, Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs, May 2007;
Greg Miller, “Influx of Al Qaeda, Money Into Pakistan Is Seen,” Los Angeles Times, May
20, 2007.
62 See, for example, Evan Thomas, “The Ongoing Hunt for Osama bin Laden,” Newsweek,
September 3, 2007.
63 “Bush Would Send Troops Inside Pakistan to Catch bin Laden,” CNN.com, September
20, 2006.
64 After conducting interviews with numerous active and retired Pakistan army and
intelligence officials, an American reporter concluded in late 2007 that “many officers of
(continued...)

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CRS-25
2006, the Commander of the U.S. European Command, General James Jones, told
the same Senate panel it was “generally accepted” that the Taliban headquarters is
somewhere in the vicinity of Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s southwestern
Baluchistan province.65
Pakistan Launches Internal Military Operations. During the autumn of
2003, in an unprecedented show of force, President Musharraf moved 25,000
Pakistani troops into the traditionally autonomous FATA on the Afghan frontier.
The first half of 2004 saw an escalation of Pakistani army operations, many in
coordination with U.S. and Afghan forces just across the international frontier (U.S.
forces have no official authorization to cross the border into Pakistan).66 The battles,
which continued sporadically throughout 2005 and again became fierce in the spring
of 2006, exacerbated volatile anti-Musharraf and anti-American sentiments held by
many Pakistani Pashtuns.67
Kabul’s October 2004 elections were held without major disturbances,
apparently in part due to Musharraf’s commitment to reducing infiltrations. Yet
concerns sharpened in 2005 and, by the middle of that year, Afghan leaders were
openly accusing Islamabad of actively supporting insurgents and providing their
leadership with safe haven. Islamabad adamantly denied the charges and sought to
reassure Kabul by dispatching additional troops to border areas, bringing the total to
80,000. Still, 2006 was the deadliest year to date for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and,
at year’s end, there were growing indications that Islamabad’s efforts to control the
tribal areas were meeting with little success.
President Musharraf’s “carrot and stick” approach of offering amnesty to those
militant tribals who “surrendered,” and using force against those who resisted, clearly
did not rid the region of indigenous Islamic militants or Al Qaeda operatives. Late
2005 and early 2006 missile attacks on suspected Al Qaeda targets — apparently
launched by U.S. aerial drones flying over Pakistani territory — hinted at more
aggressive U.S. tactics that could entail use of U.S. military assets in areas where the
64 (...continued)
Pakistan’s covert security agencies remain emotionally committed to jihad and hostile to the
U.S. role in the region” (James Rupert, “Role of Pakistan’s ‘Captain’ Shows Enduring
Taliban Ties,” Newsday, October 14, 2007).
65 See also Elizabeth Rubin, “In the Land of the Taliban,” New York Times, October 22,
2006.
66 One U.S. press report claimed that Pentagon documents from 2004 gave U.S. special
forces in Afghanistan authority to enter Pakistani territory — even without prior notice to
Islamabad — while in “hot pursuit” of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters or to take direct action
against “the Big 3”: Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahri, or Mullah Omar. A Pakistani
military spokesman called the report “nonsense” and denied there was any such arrangement
(“U.S. OK’d Troop Terror Hunts in Pakistan,” Associated Press, August 23, 2007).
67 Pakistan is home to some 28 million Pashto-speaking people, most of them living near the
border with Afghanistan, which is home to another 13.5 million ethnic Pashtuns (also known
as Pakhtuns or Pathans). A hardy people with a proud martial history (they are
disproportionately represented in the Pakistani military), Pashtuns played an important role
in the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s.

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CRS-26
Pakistanis are either unable or unwilling to strike. Yet the attacks, in particular a
January 13, 2006, strike on Damadola in the Bajaur tribal agency that killed women
and children along with several alleged Al Qaeda suspects, spurred widespread
resentment and a perception that the country’s sovereignty was under threat.
Meanwhile, Pakistani troops operating in the region are hampered by limited
communications and other counterinsurgency capabilities, meaning their response to
provocations can be overly reliant on imprecise, mass firepower. This has
contributed to a significant number of civilian casualties. Simultaneously, tribal
leaders who cooperate with the federal government face dire threats from the
extremists — as many as 200 were the victims of targeted killings in 2005 and 2006
— and the militants have sought to deter such cooperation by periodically beheading
accused “U.S. spies.”
Islamabad Shifts Strategy. As military operations failed to subdue the
militants while causing much “collateral damage” and alienating local residents,
Islamabad in 2004 began shifting strategy and sought to arrange truces with Waziri
commanders, first at Shakai in South Waziristan in April 2004, then again in
February 2005. Officials in Islamabad recognized that the social fabric of the FATA
had changed following its role as a staging and recruiting area for the war against the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan during the 1980s: the traditional power base was eroded
as the influence of religious elements had greatly increased. President Musharraf
lambasts the creeping “Talibanization” of the tribal areas and has sought to
implement a new scheme, shifting over time from an almost wholly militarized
approach to one emphasizing negotiation and economic development in the FATA,
as well as (re-)elevating the role of tribal maliks who would work in closer
conjunction with federal political agents. The aim, then, became restoration of a kind
of enhanced status quo ante with a limited state writ (maliks would enjoy more pay
and larger levies), and the reduction and ultimately full withdrawal of army troops.68
Some reports had the U.S. government initially offering cautious support for this new
political strategy.69
Cease-Fire and North Waziristan Truce. In June 2006, militants in North
Waziristan announced a unilateral 30-day cease-fire to allow for creation of a tribal
council seeking resolution with government forces. The Islamabad government
began releasing detained Waziri tribesmen and withdrawing troops from selected
checkposts in a show of goodwill. Hundreds of Pashtun tribesmen and clerics later
held a tribal council with government officials, and the cease-fire was extended for
another month. Throughout July and August, Pakistan reported arresting scores of
Taliban fighters and remanding many of these to Afghanistan. Then, on September
5, 2006, the Islamabad government and pro-Taliban militants in Miramshah, North
Waziristan, signed a truce to ensure “permanent peace” in the region. A
representative of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) governor agreed on
68 Author interview with a senior advisor to Prime Minister Aziz, Islamabad, September
2006; “President General Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” July 20, 2006, at
[http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/SpeechAddressList.aspx].
69 Jonathan Landay, “White House Backing New Plan to Defuse Insurrection in Pakistan,”
McClatchy Newspapers, August 16, 2006.

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CRS-27
behalf of the government to end army operations against local tribesmen; release all
detainees; lift all public sanctions, pay compensation for property damage, return
confiscated vehicles and other goods; and remove all new army checkposts. In turn,
two representatives of the North Waziristan “local mujahideen students” (trans.
“Taliban”) agreed to end their attacks on government troops and officials; halt the
cross-border movement of insurgents to Afghanistan; and evict all foreigners who did
not agree to live in peace and honor the pact.70
News of the truce received lukewarm reception in Washington, where officials
took a “wait-and-see” approach to the development. Within weeks there was
growing concern among both U.S. government officials and independent analysts that
the North Waziristan truce represented a Pakistani “surrender” and had in effect
created a sanctuary for extremists, with the rate of Taliban activities in neighboring
Afghanistan much increased and the militants failing to uphold their commitments.
Still, Islamabad pressed ahead with a plan to extend a similar truce to the Bajaur
tribal agency. Only hours before such a deal was to be struck on October 30, 2006,
82 people were killed in a dawn air attack on a madrassa in Chingai, Bajaur. The
Pakistani military claimed to have undertaken the attack after the school’s pro-
Taliban leader continued to train terrorists and shelter “unwanted foreigners,” yet
many observers speculated that the attack had in fact been carried out by U.S.
Predator drones, perhaps after intelligence reports placed fugitive Al Qaeda
lieutenant al-Zawahri at the site. Nine days later, after a local pro-Taliban militant
leader vowed to retaliate against Pakistani security forces, a suicide bomber killed 42
army recruits at a military training camp at Dargai in the NWFP, not far from the
sight of the Chingai attack. The bombing was the most deadly attack on the Pakistani
military in recent memory.
The FATA in 2007. Instability in the FATA has only increased in 2007, with
a large trust deficit between government forces and tribal leaders, and a conclusion
by top U.S. officials that President Musharraf’s strategy of making truce deals with
pro-Taliban militants has failed. In January, the director of the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, told a Senate panel that tribal leaders
in Waziristan had not abided by most terms of the September 2006 North Waziristan
agreement.71 In March, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman reported
to the same panel that there was “an almost immediate and steady increase of cross-
border infiltration and attacks” just after that agreement had been reached. Some
reports even describe anecdotes of the Pakistani military providing fire support for
Taliban units operating in Afghanistan.72 Combat between Pakistani troops and
militants in the two Waziristan agencies reportedly has killed roughly 1,000 Islamist
extremists (many of them foreigners), along with a similar number of Pakistani
soldiers and many hundreds of civilians.
70 A translated version of the pact is at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/
etc/nwdeal.html].
71 Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007, at
[http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingId=2467].
72 David Sanger and David Rhode, “U.S. Pays Pakistan to Fight Terror, But Patrols Ebb,”
New York Times, May 20, 2007.

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In late March 2007, battles erupted between tribal forces and Uzbek militants
in South Waziristan. Heavy arms — including mortars, large-caliber machineguns,
and rockets — were used by both sides, and some 300 people, most of them Uzbeks,
were reported killed. President Musharraf later acknowledged that the Pakistani
army had provided fire support for what essentially were pro-Taliban tribal forces.
The fighting was touted by Islamabad as a sign that its new strategy was paying
dividends. Yet such conflict may well have been more about long-brewing local
resentments toward Uzbeks, and there is further concern among skeptics that the
battles served to strengthen the “Pakistani Taliban” and helped to consolidate their
control in the tribal areas.73
By early 2007, U.S. intelligence analysts had amassed considerable evidence
indicating that Islamabad’s truces with religious militants in the FATA had given
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other Islamist extremists space in which to rebuild their
networks. Faced with such evidence, President Musharraf refrained from any change
in strategy, saying he was “making adjustments” and would proceed cautiously. A
behind-the-scenes diplomatic effort to prod the Musharraf government on its
counterterrorism strategy was ramped up during the course of the year, but it may
have only been through more public and strongly-worded U.S. criticisms of Pakistan
in July that Islamabad was convinced to be more energetic in its militarized efforts.74
A spate of militant attacks on Pakistani military targets during that month —
apparently in retaliation for the government’s armed assault on Islamabad’s radical
Red Mosque — led Musharraf to further bolster the army’s presence in the region
and coincided with an announcement by North Waziristan tribal leaders that they
were withdrawing from the September 2006 truce agreement due to alleged
government violations. Top Bush Administration officials subsequently conceded
that the agreement had failed to produce the desired results for both Pakistan and the
United States, and they suggested the tack should be abandoned.75 Still, Musharraf
reportedly intends to withdraw all regular army troops from the tribal areas by
January 2008, leaving security responsibilities in the hands of paramilitary forces.76
Meanwhile, it appears the “Pakistani Taliban” of North Waziristan has
succeeded in establishing a local administrative infrastructure much as was done in
South Waziristan following the April 2004 Shakai agreement.77 In the words of one
Washington-based expert,
73 Kim Barker, “Pakistan’s Unlikely Alliances Worry West,” Chicago Tribune, April 22,
2007; Ismail Khan, “The Game Is Up for Uzbeks,” Dawn (Karachi), April 5, 2007.
74 Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Tougher Stance on Pakistan Took Months,”
Washington Post, August 5, 2007.
75 Caren Bohan, “U.S. Boosts Pressure on Musharraf Over Al Qaeda,” Reuters, July 18,
2007.
76 “‘No Army in FATA After Jan 2008,’” Daily Times (Lahore), August 25, 2007.
77 See, for example, Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Venturing Into the Taleban’s Backyard,” BBC
News, October 11, 2007; Jason Burke, “The New Taliban,” Observer (London), October 14,
2007.

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“[W]e cannot ignore the fact that across much of Pakistan’s border with
Afghanistan, Islamabad has, for now, lost the battle to fight militancy and
terrorism.... [T]oday the Pakistan state has virtually ceded North and South
Waziristan to powerful radical forces. Justice, education, and social policies are
in the hands of the Pakistani militants who practice a strongly conservative form
of Islam.... By indulging and supporting extremists as a tool to retain and hold
influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan has introduced changes that undermined its
ability to maintain its writ within its own borders.”78
Reports also continue to indicate that the FATA increasingly provides a base for a
new generation of Islamist militants and is the site of numerous terrorist training
camps, some associated with Al Qaeda. In one recent example, according to German
government sources, numerous suspects in an alleged Frankfurt bombing plot
disrupted in September 2007 had received “terrorism training” at camps in
Waziristan and their “direct orders to act” came from Pakistan.79
Despite acknowledged setbacks, the Bush Administration claims to strongly
support President Musharraf’s efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to
include economic and social development, and governance reform in the region,
flowing in part from an acknowledgment that purely military solutions are unlikely
to succeed.80 Yet international donors and lending agencies appear hesitant to
finance projects in the region while the security situation remains tense, and some in
the U.S. government reportedly are wary of infusing development aid that could end
up in the hands of elements unfriendly to U.S. interests.81 Many analysts insist that
only by bringing the tribal areas under the full writ of the Pakistani state and
facilitating major economic development there can the FATA problem be resolved.82
Infiltration into Kashmir and India. Islamabad has been under continuous
U.S. and international pressure to terminate the infiltration of separatist militants
78 Statement of Prof. Marvin Weinbaum before the House Armed Services Committee,
October 10, 2007.
79 Spencer Hsu and Craig Whitlock, “Official Links German Terror Plot to Syrian Arms,
Pakistani Operatives,” Washington Post, September 26, 2007. See also Dirk Laabs and
Sebastian Rotella, “Terrorists in Training Head to Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, October
14, 2007.
80 Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard
Boucher before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and
South Asia, “Regional Overview of South Asia,” March 7, 2007, at
[http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/bou030707.htm]. Pakistani strategy as
conveyed by the country’s Ambassador to the United Nations in Munir Akram, “A United
Front Against the Taliban,” New York Times, April 4, 2007.
81 Jane Perlez, “Aid to Pakistan in Tribal Areas Raises Concerns,” New York Times, July 16,
2007.
82 See, for example, Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-
Afghanistan Stalemate,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 176, October 2006;
“Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” International Crisis Group Asia Report
125, December 11, 2006; Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and Alexander Thier,
“Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border,” U.S. Institute for Peace Briefing, December
2006.

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across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). Such pressure reportedly elicited a
January 2002 promise from President Musharraf to then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage that all such movements would cease. During a June 2002
visit to Islamabad, Deputy Secretary Armitage reportedly received another pledge
from the Pakistani president, this time an assurance that any existing terrorist camps
in Pakistani Kashmir would be closed. Musharraf has assured India that he will not
permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism, and he
insists that his government is doing everything possible to stop infiltration and shut
down militant base camps in Pakistani-controlled territory. Critics contend, however,
that Islamabad continues to actively support anti-India militants as a means both to
maintain strategically the domestic backing of Islamists who view the Kashmir issue
as fundamental to the Pakistani national idea, and to disrupt tactically the state
government in Indian Kashmir in seeking to erode New Delhi’s legitimacy there.
Positive indications growing from the latest Pakistan-India peace initiative
include a cease-fire at the LOC that has held since November 2003 and statements
from Indian officials indicating that rates of militant infiltration are down
significantly. However, Indian leaders periodically reiterate their complaints that
Islamabad has taken insufficient action to eradicate the remaining “infrastructure of
terrorism” on Pakistani-controlled territory. With indications that terrorism on Indian
soil beyond the Jammu and Kashmir state may have been linked to Pakistan-based
terrorist groups, Indian leaders repeat demands that Pakistan uphold its promises to
curtail the operations of Islamic militants and violent Kashmiri separatists originating
on Pakistani-controlled territory.
Following conflicting reports from Indian government officials about the
criminal investigation into July 2006 Bombay terrorist bombings, India’s prime
minister stated that India had “credible evidence” of Pakistani government complicity
in the plot. Islamabad rejected Indian accusations as “propaganda” designed “to
externalize an internal [Indian] malaise.”83 Several other terrorist attacks against
Indian targets outside of Kashmir have been linked to Pakistan-based groups,
including lethal assaults on civilians in Delhi and Bangalore in 2005, in Varanasi in
2006, and in Hyderabad in 2007. Indian security officials also routinely blame
Pakistan’s intelligence service for assisting the infiltration of Islamist militants into
India from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, as well as across the Kashmiri LOC.84
Domestic Terrorism. Pakistan is known to be a base for numerous
indigenous terrorist organizations, and the country continues to suffer from terrorism
at home, in particular that targeting the country’s Shia minority. Until a March 2006
car bombing at the U.S. consulate in Karachi that left one American diplomat dead,
recent attacks on Western targets had been rare, but 2002 saw several acts of lethal
anti-Western terrorism, including the kidnaping and murder of reporter Daniel Pearl,
a grenade attack on a Protestant church in Islamabad that killed a U.S. Embassy
employee, and two car bomb attacks, including one on the same U.S. consulate,
83 “We Have Credible Evidence: Manmohan,” Hindu (Madras), October 25, 2006; Pakistan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Media Briefing, October 2, 2006.
84 According to India’s national security advisor, most terrorist activity in India has been
“generated from outside”(“MK Narayanan” (interview), India Abroad, September 21, 2007).

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CRS-31
which killed a total of 29 people. These attacks, widely viewed as expressions of
militants’ anger with the Musharraf regime for its cooperation with the United States,
were linked to Al Qaeda, as well as to indigenous militant groups, by U.S. and
Pakistani officials.
From 2003 to the present, Pakistan’s most serious domestic terrorism has been
directed against the country’s Shia minority and included suicide bomb attacks that
killed scores of people in 2005 and 2006 (nearly 60 Sunnis also were killed in an
April 2006 suicide bombing in Karachi). Indications are that the indigenous Lashkar-
e-Jhangvi (LJ) Sunni terrorist group is responsible for the most deadly anti-Shia
violence. Two attempts to kill Musharraf in December 2003 and failed efforts to
assassinate other top Pakistani officials in mid-2004 were linked to the LJ and other
Al Qaeda-allied groups, and illuminated the grave and continuing danger presented
by religious extremists.
Following a July 2006 suicide bombing in Karachi that killed a prominent Shiite
cleric, Musharraf renewed his pledge to crack down on religious extremists; hundreds
of Sunni clerics and activists were subsequently arrested for inciting violence against
Shiites through sermons and printed materials. However, serious sectarian and other
religiously-motivated violence flared anew in late 2006 and continue in 2007. Bomb
attacks, many of them by suicidal extremists motivated by sectarian hatreds, killed
scores of people; some reports link the upsurge in such attacks to growing sectarian
conflict in Iraq. Since the summer of 2007 and continuing to the time of this writing,
most suicide bomb attacks have been perpetrated against Pakistan’s security
apparatus in apparent retaliation for the army’s July raid on Islamabad’s radical Red
Mosque. Among the spate of dozens of significant domestic terrorist attacks
(indiscriminate or those targeting civilians) suffered by Pakistan in 2007 were
! a January bomb blast in Peshawar that killed 15 people, most of
them policemen, including the city’s police chief, in a likely anti-
Shia attack;
! the February murder of six opposition People’s Party activists west
of Islamabad;
! a February suicide bombing in a Quetta courtroom that killed 16
people, including a judge;
! an April suicide bombing that killed at least 28 people and narrowly
missed Pakistan’s interior minister at a political rally in Peshawar;
! a May suicide bombing that killed up to 25 people at a Peshawar
restaurant said to be popular with Afghan refugees;
! at least 8 separate July suicide bomb attacks that left more than 100
people dead in the NWFP, the tribal agencies, and Islamabad;
! dual September suicide car bombings in Bajaur that left seven dead,
including three paramilitary soldiers;
! another dual September suicide bomb attack in Rawalpindi that
killed at least 25 people, many of them employees of Pakistan’s
security agencies;
! a September suicide bomb attack near a security checkpost in the
NWFP that killed at least 16 people;
! an October suicide bomb attack that killed at least 15 people,
including 4 police officers, at another security in the NWFP; and

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CRS-32
! another October bomb attack, this time on the motorcade of former
Prime Minister Bhutto as she returned to Karachi from self-imposed
exile, killed at least 115 people.
A leading pro-Taliban militant in the South Waziristan tribal agency, Baitullah
Mehsud, issued vows to avenge Pakistani military and paramilitary attacks in the
region in early 2007; he reportedly has been linked to at least four anti-government
suicide bombings in Pakistan.85 Some analysts believe that, by redirecting Pakistan’s
internal security resources, an increase in such violence can ease pressure on Al
Qaeda and affiliated groups and so allow them to operate more freely there. In June
2007, Pakistan’s National Security Council reportedly warned President Musharraf
that Islamist militancy was rapidly spreading beyond western tribal areas and that a
“policy of appeasement” had emboldened the Taliban. The Council was said to have
formulated new plans to address the issue, including the deployment of pilotless
reconnaissance drones, bolstering local law enforcement capabilities, and shifting
more paramilitary troops to the region from other parts of Pakistan.86
Other Security Issues
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation. U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation
accelerated rapidly after 2001, and President Bush formally designated Pakistan as
a major non-NATO U.S. ally in June 2004. The close U.S.- Pakistan security ties of
the cold war era — which came to a near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff — have been
restored as a result of Pakistan’s role in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. In
2002, the United States began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to
refurbish at least part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft. In 2005, the
United States announced that it would resume sales of new F-16 fighters to Pakistan
after a 16-year hiatus. A revived high-level U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative
Group (DCG) — moribund since 1997 — again sits for high-level discussions on
military cooperation, security assistance, and anti-terrorism; its most recent session
came in May 2006. In 2003, a U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission was
established to bring together military commanders for discussions on Afghan stability
and border security; a session held in Pakistan in January 2007 included
establishment of the first joint intelligence sharing center in Kabul to boost
cooperation against Taliban and other extremists. Officers from NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan have joined the body, which
met for the 22nd time in May 2007.87
Major government-to-government arms sales and grants since 2001 include 6
C-130 military transport aircraft; 6 AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars; air traffic control
systems; nearly 6,000 military radios; 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (with the
85 “Doubts Over Peace Deal,” BBC News, January 17, 2007; “Baitullah Linked to Suicide
Attacks, Says FIA Official,” Dawn (Karachi), March 21, 2007.
86 “Pakistani President Reviews Political, Economic, Anti-Terrorism Measures,” BBC
Monitoring South Asia, June 4, 2007.
87 “Tripartite Commission Addresses Border Issues,” International Security Assistance Force
Press Release, May 26, 2007.

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CRS-33
possibility of sales of another 90); 6 Phalanx guns (with upgrades on another 6); and
2,014 TOW anti-armor missiles. In 2004, the U.S. Navy agreed to grant 8 excess P-
3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft to Pakistan; plans for their major refurbishment and
service by U.S. firms could be worth $1 billion in coming years. Other pending sales
include up to 500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and 115 self-propelled howitzers.
Major Excess Defense Article grants have included 20 refurbished AH-1F Cobra
attack helicopters (with 20 more for parts) and 4 F-16A fighters (24 more such
fighters will be transferred to Pakistan as they become excess to the U.S. Air Force).
Further potential arms sales include costly plans to refurbish and modify three excess
P-3 aircraft with the E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning suite. The Department
of Defense has characterized F-16 fighters, P-3C patrol aircraft, and anti-armor
missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications, claims that elicit skepticism
from some analysts. The Pentagon reports total Foreign Military Sales agreements
with Pakistan worth $863 million in FY2002-FY2005. In-process sales of F-16s
raised the value to $3.5 billion in FY2006 alone.
Security-related U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan are said aimed especially
at bolstering Islamabad’s counterterrorism and border security efforts, and have
included U.S.-funded road-building projects in the NWFP and FATA; and the
provision of night-vision equipment, communications gear, protective vests, and
transport helicopters and aircraft. The United States also has undertaken to train and
equip new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target
terrorist elements. Modest U.S.-funded military education and training programs
seek to enhance the professionalism of Pakistan’s military leaders, and develop
respect for rule of law, human rights, and democratic values. U.S. security assistance
to Pakistan’s civilian sector is aimed at strengthening the country’s law enforcement
capabilities through basic police training, provision of advanced identification
systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group.
U.S. efforts reportedly are hindered by Pakistani shortcomings that include poorly
trained and poorly equipped personnel who generally are underpaid by ineffectively
coordinated and overburdened government agencies.88 (See also CRS Report
RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia.)
Renewed F-16 Sales and Congressional Concerns. In June 2006, the
Pentagon notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan worth up
to $5.1 billion. The deal involves 18 newly-built advanced F-16 combat aircraft (and
an option for 18 more), along with related munitions and equipment, and would
represent the largest-ever weapons sale to Pakistan. Associated munitions for new
F-16s and for mid-life upgrades on others will include 500 AMRAAM air-to-air
missiles and 700 BLU-109 bombs. Congressional concerns about the sale and
displeasure at the Bush Administration’s apparently improper notification procedures
spurred a July hearing of the House International Relations Committee. During that
session, many Members worried that F-16s were better suited to fighting India than
to combating terrorists; some warned that U.S. military technology could be passed
from Pakistan to China. The State Department’s lead official on political-military
88 See, for example, Seth Jones, et al., “Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform?,” RAND
Corporation Monograph, January 7, ch. 6, 2007, at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
2006/RAND_MG550.pdf].

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relations sought to assure the committee that the sale would serve U.S. interests by
strengthening the defense capabilities of a key ally without disturbing the regional
balance of power and that all possible measures would be taken to prevent the
onward transfer of U.S. technologies. H.J.Res. 93, disapproving the proposed sale,
was introduced in the House, but died in committee. (See also CRS Report
RL33515, Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications.)
Secretary of State Rice subsequently informed Congress that no F-16 combat
aircraft or related equipment would be delivered to Pakistan until Islamabad provided
written security assurances that U.S. technology will not be accessible by third
parties. Islamabad has denied that any “extraordinary” security requirements were
requested; however, congressional concerns appear to have been satisfactorily
addressed. After further negotiations on specifics, including a payment process that
will require a major outlay from the Pakistani treasury, the United States and
Pakistan in September signed a letter of acceptance for the multi-billion dollar F-16
deal. Since then, several major U.S. defense corporations have won contracts worth
hundreds of millions of dollars to supply F-16 parts and munitions to Pakistan.
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation. Many policy analysts
consider an apparent arms race between India and Pakistan to be among the most
likely potential causes of the future use of nuclear weapons by states. In May 1998,
India conducted unannounced nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed
moratorium on such testing. Despite U.S. and world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan
quickly followed. The tests created a global storm of criticism and represented a
serious setback to two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia.
Pakistan currently is believed to have enough fissile material, mainly enriched
uranium, for 55-90 nuclear weapons; India, with a program focused on plutonium,
may be capable of building a similar number. Both countries have aircraft capable
of delivering nuclear bombs (U.S.-supplied F-16 combat aircraft in Pakistan’s air
force reportedly have been refitted to carry nuclear bombs).89 Pakistan’s military has
inducted short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (allegedly acquired from China
and North Korea), while India possesses short- and intermediate-range missiles.
Both countries have tested cruise missiles with radar-evading capabilities. All
missiles are assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads over significant
distances. In 2000, Pakistan placed its nuclear forces under the control of a National
Command Authority led by the president. According to the director of the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan is building its stockpile of fission weapons
and is likely to continue work on advanced warhead and delivery systems.90 (See
also CRS Report RL32115, Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South
Asia; and CRS Report RS21237, Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons.)
The A.Q. Khan Nuclear Proliferation Network. Press reports in late 2002
suggested that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang’s covert nuclear weapons program by
providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and technologies
beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002. Islamabad rejected such
89 “Pakistan Jets Said to be Nuclear-Capable,” Associated Press, July 25, 1989.
90 Statement of Lt. Gen. Michael Maples before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, January 11, 2007, at [http://intelligence.senate.gov/070111/maples.pdf].

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reports as “baseless,” and Secretary of State Powell was assured that no such
transfers were occurring. If such assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-
humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be suspended, although the President has the
authority to waive any sanctions that he determines would jeopardize U.S. national
security. In early 2003, the Administration determined that the relevant facts “do not
warrant imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws.” Press reports during
2003 suggested that both Iran and Libya benefitted from Pakistani nuclear assistance.
Islamabad denied any nuclear cooperation with Tehran or Tripoli, although it
conceded in December 2003 that certain senior scientists were under investigation
for possible “independent” proliferation activities.
The investigation led to the February 2004 “public humiliation” of metallurgist
Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program
and a national hero, when he confessed to involvement in an illicit nuclear smuggling
network. Khan and at least seven associates were said to have sold crucial nuclear
weapons technology and uranium-enrichment materials to North Korea, Iran, and
Libya. President Musharraf, citing Khan’s contributions to his nation, issued a
pardon that was later called conditional.91 The United States has been assured that
the Islamabad government had no knowledge of such activities and indicated that the
decision to pardon is an internal Pakistani matter.
While President Musharraf did promise President Bush that all information
learned about Khan’s proliferation network would be shared, Pakistan has refused to
allow any direct access to Khan by U.S. or international investigators.92 In May
2006, days after releasing from detention nuclear scientist and suspected Khan
collaborator Mohammed Farooq, the Islamabad government declared the
investigation “closed.” Some in Congress remained skeptical, however, and a House
panel subsequently held a hearing at which three nongovernmental experts insisted
that U.S. and international investigators be given direct access to Khan, in particular
to learn more about assistance given to Iran’s nuclear program. No alleged Pakistani
participants, including Khan himself, have faced criminal charges in the case.
In May 2007, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies
released a report on the Khan network, finding that “at least some of Khan’s
associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could, after a period
of lying low, resume their black-market business.”93 Shortly after, a House panel
held another hearing on the Khan network, at which several Members and
nongovernmental experts called for Pakistan to allow direct access to Khan for U.S.
investigators. In July, Islamabad reportedly eased house arrest restrictions on Khan,
although the Foreign Ministry denied any change in Khan’s status. (See also CRS
Report RL32745, Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.)
91 In May 2007, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States reportedly said that if Khan had
not been a national hero, “we would have strung him from the highest tree” (“A
‘Worrisome’ Time in Pakistan” [interview], USA Today, May 23, 2007).
92 At least one report indicates that U.S. investigators have, in fact, had direct access to Khan
(Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” New Yorker, April 17, 2006).
93 See [http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm].

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Major New Plutonium Facilities? Revelations in July 2006 that Pakistan
is in the midst of constructing a major heavy water nuclear reactor at the Khushab
complex brought a flurry of concern from analysts who foresee a regional
competition in fissile material production, perhaps including China. A subsequent
report identified a third plutonium production reactor at Khushab. Upon completion,
which could be several years away, two new reactors with combined 1,000-megawatt
capacity might boost Pakistan’s weapons-grade plutonium production capabilities to
more than 200 kilograms per year, or enough for up to 50 nuclear weapons.
Moreover, a January 2007 report warned that Pakistan may soon be reprocessing
weapons-grade plutonium at its Chashma facility, further adding to its potential
stockpile and aiding in the development of thermonuclear weapons.94 While
Islamabad does not comment directly on the constructions, government officials there
insist that Pakistan will continue to update and consolidate its nuclear program for
the purpose of minimum credible deterrence. The Bush Administration responded
to the 2006 revelations by claiming it had been aware of Pakistani plans and that it
discourages the use of the facilities for military purposes.95
Pakistan’s New Nuclear Transparency. During 2006, Islamabad
appeared to launch a public relations effort aimed at overcoming the stigma caused
by Khan’s proliferation activities. The effort included dispatching to Washington the
chief of the country’s Strategic Plans Division, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who
attempted to make more transparent Pakistan’s nuclear command and control
structure, and who acknowledged that Pakistan’s past proliferation record had been
“poor and indefensible.”96 Many analysts now assert that meaningful efforts have
been made to improve the physical security of Pakistan’s strategic arsenal.
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. The United States has long sought to halt or
limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In May 1998, following the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on all
non-humanitarian aid to both countries as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms
Export Control Act. However, Congress and the President acted almost immediately
to lift certain aid restrictions and, in October 2001, all remaining nuclear-related
sanctions on Pakistan (and India) were removed. Officially, the United States
continues to urge Pakistan and India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states and it offers no official recognition of their
nuclear weapons capabilities, which exist outside of the international
nonproliferation regime.
During the latter years of the Clinton Administration, the United States set forth
nonproliferation “benchmarks” for Pakistan and India, including halting further
nuclear testing and signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
9 4 See Davi d Al br i ght and Paul Brannan, June 21, 2007, at
[http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/ThirdKhushabReactor.pdf]; and January
18, 2007, at [http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/chashma.pdf].
95 Joby Warrick, “U.S. Says It Knew Of Pakistani Reactor Plan,” Washington Post, July 25,
2006.
96 Speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, October 24,
2006.

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(CTBT); halting fissile material production and pursuing Fissile Material Control
Treaty negotiations; refraining from deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic
missiles; and restricting any and all exportation of nuclear materials or technologies.
The results of U.S. efforts were mixed, at best, and neither Pakistan nor India are
signatories to the CTBT or the NPT. The Bush Administration quickly set aside the
benchmark framework. Concerns about onward proliferation, fears that Pakistan
could become destabilized by the U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan,
and concern over the issue of political succession in Islamabad have heightened U.S.
attention to weapons proliferation in the region. Section 1601 of P.L. 107-228
outlined U.S. nonproliferation objectives for South Asia. Some Members of
Congress have identified “contradictions” in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward
South Asia, particularly as related to the Senate’s rejection of the CTBT and
indications that the United States seeks to build new nuclear weapons.
During a July 2007 policy review for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Under Secretary of State Burns said,
We welcome the action Pakistan has taken to bring its export controls in line
with international standards, including the recent establishment of a Strategic
Export Control Division within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to centralize
licensing and enforcement. Pakistan continues its cooperation with the United
States under the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program.
We welcome Pakistan’s participation in the Container Security Initiative and the
Secure Freight Initiative.... We are also pleased that, in early June, Pakistan
joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.... Additionally, the
U.S. Department of Energy is working with their counterparts in Pakistan on
radiation source security and is in the process of finalizing an agreement to
install radiation detection equipment at Pakistani ports and border crossings. We
hope Pakistan will continue to take steps to join additional international
nonproliferation programs and regimes so it can finally move beyond the stigma
of the A.Q. Khan era.97
Pakistan-India Tensions and the Kashmir Issue. In the interests of
regional stability, the United States strongly encourages an ongoing Pakistan-India
peace initiative and remains concerned about the potential for long-standing
disagreements to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries.
Relations between Pakistan and India remain deadlocked on the issue of Kashmiri
sovereignty, and a separatist rebellion has been underway in the region since 1989.
Tensions were extremely high in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999, when an
incursion by Pakistani soldiers led to a bloody six-week-long battle. Throughout
2000 and 2001, cross-border firing and shelling caused scores of both military and
civilian deaths. A July 2001 Pakistan-India summit meeting failed to produce even
a joint statement, reportedly due to pressure from hardliners on both sides. Major
stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to
future talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism.”
The 2002 Crisis. Secretary of State Powell visited South Asia in mid-October
2001 in an effort to ease escalating tensions over Kashmir, but a bombing at the
97 See [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/89418.htm].

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Jammu and Kashmir state assembly building later that month was followed by a
December assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi (both incidents were
blamed on Pakistan-based terrorist groups). India mobilized some 700,000 troops
along the Pakistan-India frontier and threatened war unless Islamabad ended all
“cross-border infiltration” of Islamic militants. This action triggered a corresponding
Pakistani military mobilization. Under significant international diplomatic pressure
(and likely also the threat of India’s use of force), President Musharraf in January
2002 gave a landmark address in which he vowed to end the presence of terrorist
entities on Pakistani soil, and he outlawed five militant groups, including those most
often named in attacks in India: Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.98
Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into Indian-held Kashmir continued,
and a May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most
of them women and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the
brink of full-scale war, and caused Islamabad to recall army troops from patrol
operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Intensive international diplomatic
missions to South Asia reduced tensions during the summer of 2002 and appear to
have prevented the outbreak of war. Numerous top U.S. officials were involved in
the effort and strenuously urged the two countries to renew bilateral dialogue.99
The Most Recent Peace Process. Pakistan and India began full military
draw-downs in October 2002 and, after a cooling-off period, a “hand of friendship”
offer to Pakistan by the Indian prime minister in April 2003 led to the restoration of
full diplomatic relations. Yet surging separatist violence that summer contributed to
an exchange of sharp rhetoric between Pakistani and Indian leaders at the United
Nations, casting doubt on the nascent peace effort. A new confidence-building
initiative got Pakistan and India back on a positive track, and a November 2003
cease-fire was initiated after a proposal by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah
Khan Jamali. President Musharraf subsequently suggested that Pakistan might be
willing to “set aside” its long-standing demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, a proposal
welcomed by the United States, but called a “disastrous shift” in policy by Pakistani
opposition parties.
Although militant infiltration did not end, New Delhi acknowledged that it was
significantly decreased and, combined with other confidence-building measures,
relations were sufficiently improved that the Indian prime minister attended a January
2004 summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in
Islamabad. There Pakistan and India issued a joint “Islamabad Declaration” calling
for a renewed “Composite Dialogue” to bring about “peaceful settlement of all
bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”100
A major confidence-building development came in April 2005, when a new bus
service was launched linking Muzaffarabad in Pakistani Kashmir and Srinagar in
98 Text at [http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesSpeeches/Addresses/
1020200475758AMword%20file.pdf]
99 See Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin
Peaks Crisis” at [http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/USCrisisManagement.pdf].
100 [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/jan/07.htm].

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Indian Kashmir, and a summit meeting produced an agreement to address the
Kashmir issue “in a forward looking manner for a final settlement.” Still, many
Kashmiris reject any settlement process that excludes them.
Even as the normalization of India-Pakistan relations moves forward — and
likely in reaction to their apparent marginalization in the face of this development —
separatist militants continue their attacks, and many observers in both India and the
United States believe support for Kashmiri militants remains Pakistani state policy.
Yet many indicators show positive long-term trends. Steadily reduced rates of
infiltration may be attributed to the endurance of the Pakistan-India dialogue.
Moreover, President Musharraf has made considerable efforts to exhibit flexibility,
including December 2006 statements that Pakistan is “against independence” for
Kashmir, and his offering of a four-point proposal that would lead to “self-
governance ... falling between autonomy and independence.”101 This was seen by
many analysts as being roughly in line with New Delhi’s Kashmir position. Indeed,
the Indian prime minister welcomed Musharraf’s proposals, saying they “contribute
to the ongoing thought process.” Prospects for a government-to-government
accommodation may thus be brighter than ever before. However, political and
security crises in Pakistan have slowed the process in 2007.
Baluchistan Unrest. Pakistan’s vast southwestern Baluchistan province is
about the size of California and accounts for 44% of the country’s land area, but only
5% of its population. The U.S. military has made use of bases in the region to
support its operations in neighboring Afghanistan. The province is the proposed
setting for a pipeline that would deliver Iranian natural gas to both Pakistan and
India, a project which, if brought to fruition, could bring hundreds of millions of
dollars in annual transit fees to Islamabad’s national treasury. The United States
opposes this “IPI” pipeline project as part of its effort to isolate Iran internationally.
Security problems in Baluchistan reduce the appeal to investors of building a pipeline
across the province. The presence in Baluchistan of Jundallah, a trans-border
militant group that claims to fight on behalf of Baloch rights, has caused friction
between Islamabad and Tehran. More broadly, such problems raise serious questions
about Pakistan’s internal stability and national cohesion.
Over the decades of Pakistani independence, many of the ethnic Baloch and
some of the Pashtun tribes who inhabit this relatively poor and underdeveloped
province have engaged in armed conflict with federal government forces, variously
seeking more equitable returns on the region’s rich natural resources, greater
autonomy under the country’s federal system, or even outright independence and
formation of a Baloch state that might include ethnic brethren and some territories
in both Afghanistan and Iran. Non-Baloch (mostly Punjabis) have been seen to
benefit disproportionately from mineral and energy extraction projects, and
indigenous Baloch were given only a small role in the construction of a major new
port at Gwadar. Many Baloch thus complain of being a marginalized group in their
own homeland. Long-standing resentments led to armed conflicts in 1948, 1958, and
1973. The latter insurrection, which lasted four years, involved tens of thousands of
101 Somini Sengupta, “Pakistani Says Concessions Could Produce Kashmir Pact,” New York
Times, December 6, 2006.

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armed guerillas and brought much destruction to the province; it was put down only
after a major effort by the Pakistan Army, which made use of combat helicopters
provided by Iran. Some 8,000 rebels and Pakistani soldiers were killed.
The Current Conflict. Mid-2004 saw an increase in hit-and-run attacks on
army outposts and in the sabotage of oil and gas pipelines. The alleged rape of a
Baloch doctor by Pakistani soldiers in January 2005 sparked provincial anger and a
major spike in separatist violence over the course of the year. In December 2005,
rockets were fired at a Baluchistan army camp during a visit to the site by President
Musharraf. A Baloch separatist group claimed responsibility and the Pakistani
military began major offensive operations to destroy the militants’ camps. In the
midst of increasingly heavy fighting in January 2006, Musharraf openly accused India
of arming and financing militants fighting in Baluchistan. New Delhi categorically
rejected the allegations. U.N. and other international aid groups soon suspended their
operations in Baluchistan due to security concerns. Shortly after, Baloch militants
shot and killed three Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver, causing disruption
in Islamabad-Beijing relations.
President Musharraf calls Baloch rebels “miscreants” and “terrorists;” the
Islamabad government officially banned the separatist Baluchistan Liberation Army
as a terrorist organization in April 2006 and at times suggests that Baloch militants
are religious extremists. Yet most rebel attacks are taken against military and
infrastructure targets, and — despite a government campaign to link the two
movements — Islam appears to play little or no role as a motive for Baloch
militancy.102 Islamabad has employed helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft in
its effort to defeat the rebel forces.
The Death of Nawab Bugti. Fighting waned in the middle of 2006, with
hundreds of rebels surrendering in return for amnesty. The main rebel tribal leader
and onetime Baluchistan chief minister, 79-year-old Nawab Akbar Bugti, had gone
into hiding and was believed cut off from his own forces. In late August, Bugti was
located in a cave hideout and was killed by Pakistan army troops in a battle that left
dozens of soldiers and rebels dead. Recognizing Bugti’s popularity among wide
segments of the Baloch populace and of the potential for his killing to provide martyr
status, government officials denied the tribal leader had been targeted. Nevertheless,
news of his death spurred major unrest across the province and beyond, with
hundreds of people being arrested in the midst of large-scale street demonstrations.
Bugti’s killing was criticized across the spectrum of Pakistani politicians and
analysts, with some commentators calling it a Pakistani Army miscue of historic
proportions.103 Days of rioting included numerous deaths and injuries, but the more
dire predictions of spreading unrest and perhaps even the disintegration of Pakistan’s
federal system have not come to pass. By October 2006, Pakistan’s interior minister
was claiming a “normalization” and decrease in violence in Baluchistan, although a
low-intensity insurgency continues and the overarching problem remains unresolved.
102 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,” Carnegie Paper No.
65, January 2006, at [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP65.Grare.FINAL.pdf].
103 “Bugti’s Killing Is the Biggest Blunder Since Bhutto’s Execution,” Daily Times (Lahore),
August 28, 2006.

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Narcotics. Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and
processed in Afghanistan then distributed worldwide by Pakistan-based traffickers.
The State Department indicates that Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control “remains
strong,” and the Islamabad government has made impressive strides in eradicating
indigenous opium poppy cultivation. However, opium production spiked in post-
Taliban Afghanistan, which is now said to supply 92% of the world’s heroin.104
Elements of Pakistan’s intelligence agency are suspected of past involvement in drug
trafficking; in March 2003, a former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan told a House panel
that their role in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 was “substantial.” Taliban
militants are reported to benefit significantly by taxing Afghan farmers and extorting
traffickers.105 Other reports indicate that profits from drug sales are financing the
activities of Islamic extremists in Pakistan and Kashmir.
U.S. counternarcotics programs aim to reduce the flow of opiates though
Pakistan, eliminate Pakistan as a source of such opiates, and reduce the demand for
illegal drugs within Pakistan. Islamabad’s own counternarcotics efforts are hampered
by lack of full government commitment, scarcity of funds, poor infrastructure, and
likely corruption. Since 2002, the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has supported Pakistan’s Border Security
Project by training border forces, providing vehicles and surveillance and
communications equipment, transferring helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to the
Interior Ministry’s Air Wing, and road-building in western tribal areas. Congress
funded such programs with roughly $50 million for FY2007. (See also CRS Report
RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy.)
Islamization, Anti-American Sentiment, and Madrassas
With some 160 million citizens, Pakistan is the world’s second-most populous
Muslim country, and the nation’s very foundation grew from a perceived need to
create a homeland for South Asian Muslims in the wake of decolonization.
However, religious-based political parties traditionally have fared poorly in national
elections. An unexpected outcome of the country’s 2002 elections saw the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA or United Action Front), a coalition of six Islamic parties, win
11% of the popular vote and 68 seats in the National Assembly — about one-fifth of
the total. It also gained control of the provincial assembly in the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) and leads a coalition in the Baluchistan assembly. These Pashtun-
majority western provinces border Afghanistan, where U.S.-led counterterrorism
operations are ongoing. In 2003, the NWFP provincial assembly passed a Shariat
(Islamic law) bill. In both 2005 and 2006, the same assembly passed a Hasba
(accountability) bill that many fear could create a parallel Islamic legal body.
Pakistan’s Supreme Court, responding to petitions by President Musharraf’s
government, rejected most of this legislation as unconstitutional, but in February
2007 it upheld most of a modified Hasba bill re-submitted by the NWFP assembly.
Such developments alarm Pakistan’s moderates and Musharraf has decried any
attempts to “Talibanize” regions of Pakistan.
104 United Nations, World Drug Report 2007, at [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/
wdr07/WDR_2007_1.2_opium_heroin.pdf].
105 “Taliban Reaping Opium Profits,” Associated Press, April 11, 2007.

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Pakistan’s Islamists are notable for expressions of anti-American sentiment, at
times calling for “jihad” against the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty they
believe alliance with Washington entails. Most analysts contend that two December
2003 attempts to assassinate President Musharraf were carried out by Islamist
militants angered by Pakistan’s post-September 2001 policy shift. The “Pakistani
Taliban” that has emerged in western tribal areas has sought to impose bans on
television and CD players, and has even instigated attacks on girls schools in an
effort to prevent female education. Some observers identify a causal link between
the poor state of Pakistan’s public education system and the persistence of
xenophobia and religious extremism in that country.
Anti-American sentiment is not limited to Islamic groups, however. Many
across the spectrum of Pakistani society express anger at U.S. global foreign policy,
in particular when such policy is perceived to be unfriendly or hostile to the Muslim
world (as in, for example, Palestine and Iraq).106 In 2004 testimony before a Senate
panel, a senior U.S. expert opined: “Pakistan is probably the most anti-American
country in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the
liberals and Westernized elites on the other side.”107 In a 2005 American magazine
interview, President Musharraf conceded that “the man on the street [in Pakistan]
does not have a good opinion of the United States.” He added, by way of partial
explanation, that Pakistan had been “left high and dry” after serving as a strategic
U.S. ally during the 1980s Afghan war.108
A Pew poll taken shortly before the catastrophic October 2005 earthquake found
only 23% of Pakistanis expressing a favorable view of the United States, the lowest
percentage for any country surveyed. That percentage doubled to 46% in an
ACNielson poll taken after large-scale U.S. disaster relief efforts in earthquake-
affected areas, with the great majority of Pakistanis indicating that their perceptions
had been positively influenced by witnessing such efforts. However, a January 2006
missile attack on Pakistani homes near the Afghan border killed numerous civilians
and was blamed on U.S. forces, renewing animosity toward the United States among
segments of the Pakistani populace. An October 2006 missile attack in the same
border area ostensibly was launched by Pakistani forces, but widespread suspicions
of U.S. involvement further engendered anti-Americanism and concerns about
Pakistani sovereignty. A further noteworthy episode in 2006 saw Pakistani cities
hosting major public demonstrations against the publication in European newspapers
of cartoons deemed offensive to Muslims. These protests, which were violent at
times, included strong anti-U.S. and anti-Musharraf components, suggesting that
Islamist organizers used the issue to forward their own political ends. Subsequently,
a June 2006 Pew Center poll found only 27% of Pakistanis holding a favorable
opinion of the United States, and this dropped to 19% in a September 2007 survey
106 Author interviews in Islamabad, September 2006.
107 Statement of Stephen Cohen before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 14,
2004. More than three years later, country expert Lisa Curtis warned a House panel about
“the increasingly shrill anti-Americanism that is gripping Pakistani civil society” (statement
before the House Armed Services Committee, October 10, 2007).
108 “10 Questions for Pervez Musharraf,” Time, October 3, 2005.

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by the U.S.-based group Terror Free Tomorrow, suggesting that public diplomacy
gains following the 2005 earthquake had receded.
In April 2007, the University of Maryland-based Program on International
Policy Attitudes released a survey of public opinion in four Muslim countries. The
findings indicated that significant resentment toward and distrust of the United States
persist among notable segments of the Pakistani public:
! 67% of Pakistanis had an unfavorable view of the U.S. government;
! more than one-third approved of attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan (another third disapproved of such attacks);
! more than one-third thought the U.S. government and/or Israel were
behind the 9/11 attacks (only 2% held Al Qaeda responsible); and
! 27% reported having positive feelings toward Osama Bin Laden.109
Meanwhile, an open Islamist rebellion of sorts took place in Pakistan’s relatively
serene capital, where from January to July 2007 radical leaders of the Red Mosque
and their followers in the attached Jamia Hafsa seminary occupied illegally
constructed religious buildings, kidnaped and detained local police officers, battled
security forces, and threatened to launch a violent anti-government campaign unless
Sharia (Islamic law) was instituted nationwide. Government security forces laid
siege to the compound and subsequently launched an armed assault on its
intransigent occupants. The episode indicated that support for religious extremism
may be spreading into previously unaffected areas of the country.
Pakistan’s Religious Schools (Madrassas).110 Afghanistan’s Taliban
movement itself began among students attending Pakistani religious schools
(madrassas). Among the more than 10,000 madrassas training some 1.5 million
children in Pakistan are a small percentage that have been implicated in teaching
militant anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Hindu, and even anti-Shia values. Former
Secretary of State Colin Powell once identified these as “programs that do nothing
but prepare youngsters to be fundamentalists and to be terrorists.”111 Contrary to
popularly held conceptions, however, research indicates that the great majority of
Pakistan’s violent Islamist extremists does not emerge from the country’s madrassas,
but rather from the dysfunctional public school system or even from private, English-
medium schools. One study found that only 17% of international terrorists sampled
had Islamic education backgrounds.112
109 See [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf].
110 See also CRS Report RS22009, Education Reform in Pakistan, and CRS Report
RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background.
111 Statement before the House Appropriations Committee, March 10, 2004.
112 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press,
2004). See also Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks (Columbia
University Press, 2004); Peter Bergen and Swati Pandney, “The Madrassa Myth,” New York
Times, June 14, 2005.

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Many of Pakistan’s madrassas are financed and operated by Pakistani Islamist
political parties such as the JUI-F (closely linked to the Taliban), as well as by
multiple unknown foreign entities, many in Saudi Arabia.113 As many as two-thirds
of the seminaries are run by the Deobandi sect, known in part for traditionally anti-
Shia sentiments and at times linked to the Sipah-e-Sahaba terrorist group. In its 2006
report on international religious freedom, the U.S. State Department said, “Some
unregistered and Deobandi-controlled madrassas in the FATA and northern
Baluchistan continued to teach extremism” and that schools run by the Jamaat al-
Dawat — considered to be a front organization of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Taiba
terrorist group — serve as recruitment centers for extremists. President Musharraf
himself has acknowledged that a small number of seminaries were “harboring
terrorists” and he has asked religious leaders to help isolate these by openly
condemning them.114
International attention to Pakistan’s religious schools intensified during the
summer of 2005 after Pakistani officials acknowledged that suspects in July’s
London terrorist bombings visited Pakistan during the previous year and may have
spent time at a madrassa near Lahore. While President Musharraf has in the past
pledged to crack down on the more extremist madrassas in his country, there
continues to be little concrete evidence that he has done so, and even the president
himself has admitted that movement on this issue has been slow.115 Some observers
speculate that Musharraf’s reluctance to enforce reform efforts is rooted in his desire
to remain on good terms with Pakistan’s Islamist political parties, which are seen to
be an important part of his political base.116 The U.S. Congress has appropriated
many millions of dollars to assist Pakistan in efforts to reform its education system,
including changes that would make madrassa curriculum closer in substance to that
provided in non-religious schools. More than $200 million has been allocated for
such assistance since 2002. In November 2006, the U.S.-Pakistan Education
dialogue was launched in Washington to bolster further engagement.
Democratization and Human Rights
Democracy and Governance. The status and development of Pakistan’s
democratic institutions are key U.S. policy concerns, especially among those analysts
113 P.W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad,”
Brookings Institution Analysis Paper 14, November 2001; Ali Riaz, “Global Jihad,
Sectarianism, and the Madrassahs in Pakistan,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Singapore, August 2005.
114 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71443.htm]; “Some Madrassas Bad:
Musharraf,” Daily Times (Lahore), September 8, 2004.
115 See “Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector,” International Crisis Group Report 84,
October 7, 2004; Charles Sennott, “Radical Teachings in Pakistan Schools,” Boston Globe,
September 29, 2006. Author interviews with Pakistani government officials and scholars
have tended to confirm that movement on madrassa reform is slow, at best.
116 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “At an Islamic School, Hints of Extremist Ties,”
Washington Post, June 13, 2004; Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in
Pakistan,” Middle East Journal 58, 2, Spring 2004.

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who view representative government in Islamabad as being a prerequisite for
reducing religious extremism and establishing a moderate Pakistani state. There had
been hopes that the October 2002 national elections would reverse Pakistan’s historic
trend toward unstable governance and military interference in democratic institutions.
Such hopes were eroded by ensuing developments, including President Musharraf’s
imposition of major constitutional changes and his retention of the position of army
chief. International and Pakistani human rights groups continue to issue reports
critical of Islamabad’s military-dominated government. In 2007, and for the eighth
straight year, the often-cited Freedom House rated Pakistan as “not free” in the areas
of political rights and civil liberties. While praising Pakistan’s electoral exercises as
moves in the right direction, the United States expresses concern that seemingly
nondemocratic developments may make the realization of true democracy in Pakistan
more elusive, and U.S. officials continue to press Pakistani leaders on this issue.
Pakistan’s Military-Dominated Government. General Musharraf’s
assumption of the presidency ostensibly was legitimized by a controversial April
2002 referendum marked by evidence of fraud.117 In August 2002, Musharraf
announced sweeping constitutional changes to bolster the president’s powers,
including provisions for presidential dissolution of the National Assembly. The
United States expressed concerns that the changes could make it more difficult to
build democratic institutions in Pakistan. The 2002 elections nominally fulfilled
Musharraf’s promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved in the wake
of his extra-constitutional seizure of power. The pro-military Pakistan Muslim
League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won a plurality of seats, while a coalition of
Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing. The civilian government was
hamstrung for more than a year by fractious debate over the legitimacy of
constitutional changes and by Musharraf’s continued status as army chief and
president. A surprise December 2003 agreement between Musharraf and the MMA
Islamist opposition ended the deadlock by bringing the constitutional changes before
Parliament and by eliciting a promise from Musharraf to resign his military
commission before 2005. Non-Islamist opposition parties unified under the Alliance
for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) accused the MMA of betrayal and insisted
that the new arrangement merely institutionalized military rule in Pakistan.
Other apparent reversals for Pakistani democratization came in 2004, including
the sentencing of ARD leader Javed Hashmi to 23 years in prison for sedition,
mutiny, and forgery, and the “forced” resignation of Prime Minister Jamali for what
numerous analysts called his insufficient deference to President Musharraf.
Musharraf “shuffled” prime ministers to seat his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat
Aziz. Aziz is seen to be an able financial manager and technocrat favored by the
military, but he has no political base in Pakistan. Moreover, in the final month of
2004 Musharraf chose to continue his role as army chief beyond the stated deadline.
One senior Pakistani scholar offers a critical summary of the country’s political
circumstances under President Musharraf’s rule:
The current power structure, often described as the “Musharraf model of
governance,” is narrow and suffers from a crisis of legitimacy. Its major features
117 “Pakistan’s Musharraf Wins Landslide, Fraud Alleged,” Reuters, May 1, 2002.

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are: a concentration of power in the presidency, with backup from its
army/intelligence and bureaucratic affiliates; induction of retired and serving
military officers into important civilian institutions and thus an undermining of
the latter’s autonomy; co-option of a section of the political elite, who are given
a share of power and patronage in return for mobilizing civilian support, on
President Musharraf’s terms; a reluctant partnership with the Islamic parties,
especially the Muttahida Majis-i-Amal (MMA), and soft-peddling towards
Islamic groups; manipulation of the weak and divided political forces and
exclusion of dissident political leaders.118
Many analysts have opined that, despite being a self-professed “enlightened
moderate,” President Musharraf has in practice strengthened the hand of Pakistan’s
Islamist extremist forces and that, while he “talks a good game about liberalizing
Pakistani society ... his choice of allies suggests he’s not serious.”119 In the
meantime, the Pakistan army has further entrenched itself in the country’s corporate
sector, generating billions of dollars in annual profits from businesses ranging from
construction to breakfast cereal. One estimate has this “milbus” (military business)
accounting for 6% of the country’s gross domestic product.120
The bulk of Pakistanis may usefully be categorized as falling into one of two
camps: “transformationists” who seek radical change to include the military’s rapid
and permanent withdrawal from governance, and “transitionists” who favor gradual
adjustments so as to avoid any backlash that could come from an army fearful of
“revolutionary” change. From this perspective, most Pakistanis are seen to hold a
transformationist bent.121 Yet it may be that the country’s political leadership —
ruling and opposition, alike — is unprepared to abrogate the military’s central role
in policy making.
In May 2007, a delegation from the Washington-based National Democratic
Institute issued a report on its visit to Pakistan, calling expected national elections
there “critical to the nation’s future;” warning that tainted elections could strengthen
the position of extremist elements or further consolidate the role of the military in
governance; urging President Musharraf to retire his military commission in the
interest of public confidence; and calling for a significantly strengthened Pakistan
Election Commission to ensure credible polls.122 In an indication that the
Commission’s credibility remains in doubt, former Prime Minister Bhutto in June
2007 filed a petition with the Pakistani Supreme Court on the removal of tens of
millions of Pakistanis from election rolls, and the Hong Kong-based Asian Human
Rights Commission later claimed that the Commission was illegitimately denying
voting rights to 38 million people, most of them women.
118 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Towards a Solution of the Present Crisis,” Daily Times (Lahore),
June 17, 2007.
119 Peter Beinart, “How to Deal with Dictators,” Time, July 26, 2007.
120 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Pluto Press, 2007).
121 “‘Transformation’ Versus ‘Transition’ in Pakistan,” Daily Times (Lahore), September
7, 2007.
122 [http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2157_pk_pre_election_statement_051707.pdf].

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The leadership of the country’s leading moderate, secular, and arguably most
popular party — the Pakistan People’s Party — seek greater U.S. support for
Pakistani democratization and warn that the space in which they are allowed to
operate is so narrow as to bring into question their continued viability as political
forces.123 They also identify a direct causal link between nondemocratic governance
and the persistence of religious militancy in Pakistan. According to former Prime
Minister Bhutto, “Political dictatorship and social hopelessness create the desperation
that fuels religious extremism .... Civil unrest is what the extremists want. Anarchy
and chaos suit them.” She asserts that elements of Pakistan’s security apparatus are
sympathetic to religious extremists and that these elements can only be neutralized
by being made answerable to an elected government.124
Many analysts consider a potential accommodation between President
Musharraf and former Prime Minister Bhutto to be the best option both for stabilizing
Islamabad’s political circumstances and for more effectively creating a moderate and
prosperous Pakistan (some reports have the U.S. government quietly encouraging
Musharraf to pursue this option).125 Such accommodation might include Musharraf
retiring from the military following his reelection as President and allowing Bhutto
to return to Pakistan and run for national office. Even as this arrangement may be in
process, it is highly unlikely to alter the army’s role as ultimate arbiter of the
country’s foreign and national security policies, but might create a transitional
alliance that would empower Pakistan’s more liberal and secular elements.
Judicial/Political Crisis in 2007. On March 9, President Musharraf
summarily dismissed the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, Iftikhar
Chaudhry, on unspecified charges of misconduct and nepotism. Analysts widely
believe the dismissal was an attempt by Musharraf to remove a potential impediment
to his continued roles as president and army chief, given Chaudhry’s recent rulings
that exhibited independence and went contrary to government expectations. The
move triggered immediate outrage among numerous Pakistani lawyers and others
who claimed Musharraf had acted unconstitutionally. Several judges and a deputy
attorney general resigned in protest, ensuing street protests by lawyers grew in scale
and were joined by both secular and Islamist opposition activists. By providing an
issue upon which anti-Musharraf sentiments could coalesce, the imbroglio soon
morphed from a judicial crisis to a full-fledged political crisis and the greatest threat
to Musharraf’s government since it was established in 1999. Numerous analyses
conclude that the developments have severely weakened Musharraf politically and
could threaten the viability of his continued rule.126
123 Author interviews with PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, Washington, DC, February 2006, and
PPP officials, Islamabad, January 2004 and September 2006.
124 Benazir Bhutto, “When I Return to Pakistan,” Washington Post, September 20, 2007.
125 See, for example, Najam Sethi, “Musharraf in the Middle,” Wall Street Journal Asia,
October 11, 2007.
126 Representative is Teresita Schaffer, “Pakistan: Shrinking Control,” CSIS Commentary,
May 18, 2007, at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070518_schaffer_commentary.pdf].

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The U.S. State Department at first declared the issue to be a purely internal
matter and withheld further comment but, as a sense of crisis increased in Pakistan,
a Department spokesman called Chaudhry’s dismissal “a matter of deep concern”
that the U.S. government was “monitoring very closely,” and he called for the issue
to be handled in a transparent manner in accordance with Pakistani law. However,
in a statement that triggered concern among many Pakistanis and skeptical analysts
alike, the spokesman also claimed President Musharraf was “acting in the best
interest of Pakistan and the Pakistani people.”127
In refusing to be cowed by the Musharraf government and voluntarily resign his
post, the suspended Chief Justice became a popular figure in Pakistan. In May, tens
of thousands of supporters lined the streets as Chaudhry drove from Islamabad to
Lahore to address the High Court there (a normally 4-hour drive took more than 24
hours). Chaudhry later flew to Karachi but was blocked from leaving the city’s
airport, reportedly by activists of the regional, government-allied Muttahida Qaumi
Movement (MQM) party. Ensuing street battles between MQM cadres and
opposition activists left at least 40 people dead on May 12, most of them PPP
members. Reports had local police and security forces standing by without
intervening while the MQM attacked anti-Musharraf protesters, leading many
observers to charge the government with complicity in the bloody rioting.128 The
incidents did significant further damage to President Musharraf’s standing.
U.S. Policy. While the United States maintains a keen interest in Pakistani
democratization, the issue is widely seen as having become a secondary consideration
as counterterrorism concerns grew after 2001. In response to an August 2007 query
about U.S. attention to Pakistan’s domestic politics, a State Department spokesman
said,
[T]he primary concern for the United States in Pakistan is that there be free,
credible, and transparent elections there and elections that allow the Pakistani
people to have a real and full choice among the legitimate political actors and
parties in that country.129
Bush Administration officials repeatedly have emphasized that democratization is
key to the creation of a more moderate and prosperous Pakistan. However, numerous
critics of Administration policy assert that the Islamabad government has for more
127 See [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/mar/81762.htm] and [http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/mar/81838.htm].
128 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan called the riots “the result of a calculated
adventure hatched by the president and the MQM with the cooperation of the Sindh
government” (May 13, 2007, press release at [http://www.hrcp.cjb.net]; see also Isambard
Wilkinson and Massoud Ansari, “Pakistan on Brink of Disaster as Karachi Burns,”
Telegraph (London), May 12, 2007 and Griff Witte, “Clashes in Pakistan Kill 28, Injure
Scores as Unrest Escalates,” Washington Post, May 13, 2007).
129 See [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/aug/91608.htm]. In June 2007, the same
spokesman said the U.S. government expects President Musharraf to “follow through on his
commitments” to retire his military commission (he later clarified that this was not a
“condition of the United States”).

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CRS-49
than five years been given a “free pass” on the issue of representative government,
in part as a means of enlisting that country’s continued assistance in U.S.-led
counterterrorism efforts.130 U.S. congressional committees have expressed concern
with “the slow pace of the democratic development of Pakistan” (S.Rept. 109-96)
and “the lack of progress on improving democratic governance and rule of law” there
(H.Rept. 109-486). Pakistan’s nominally non-party 2005 municipal elections saw
major gains for candidates favored by the PML-Q and notable reversals for Islamists,
but were also marked by widespread accusations of rigging. The Bush
Administration made no public comment on reported irregularities.
In early 2007, the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, repeated
for a Senate panel the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that
[D]emocracy has not been fully restored since the Army took power in 1999 ....
Musharraf continues to be criticized for remaining both the President and Chief
of Army Staff, but there are no political leaders inside the country able to
challenge his continued leadership. Musharraf’s secular opponents are in
disarray, and the main Islamic parties continue to suffer from internal divisions
and an inability to expand their support base.131
The U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006,
issued by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in March 2007, does
not use the word “democracy” or any of its derivatives in discussing Pakistan, but
does note that “restrictions on citizens’ right to change their government” represent
a “major problem.”132 In a June 2007 letter to Secretary of State Rice, several
Members of Congress decried the “spiral of civil unrest and harshly suppressed
protest in Pakistan” and asserted that U.S. and Pakistani national interests “are both
served by a speedy restoration of full democracy to Pakistan and the end to state-
sponsored intimidation — often violent — of Pakistani citizens protesting
government actions in a legal and peaceful manner.” A September 2007 letter to
Secretary Rice contained two Senators’ concerns about the political situation in
Pakistan and ongoing signs of nondemocratic developments. Leading opposition
political figures in Islamabad have warned that unconditional U.S. support for
Musharraf’s military-dominated government could result in an anti-American
backlash among Pakistan’s moderate forces.133 Yet others opine that overt U.S.
conditionality is unlikely to be effective and may only foster anti-U.S. resentments
130 For example, two former senior Clinton Administration officials have criticized President
Bush for choosing to “back the dictator” rather than offer clear support for democracy and
rule of law in Pakistan. They contend that such a policy is damaging to U.S. interests in
South Asia and in the Muslim world (Sandy Berger and Bruce Riedel, “America’s Stark
Choice,” International Herald Tribune, October 9, 2007).
131 [http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/February/McConnell%2002-27- 07.pdf].
132 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78874.htm].
133 Letter to Secretary of State Rice from Sen. Joe Biden, Rep. Tom Lantos, and Rep. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, June 1, 2007; Jo Johnson and Farhan Bokhari, “US Warned Over Backing
for Musharraf,” Financial Times (London), June 12, 2007.

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in Pakistan.134 One recent analysis by a former Bush State Department official
concludes that “the United States should resist the urge to threaten [Musharraf] or
demand a quick democratic transition,” arguing that the Pakistani military must be
pushed toward political reform in ways that do not jeopardize its “core interests.”135
(See also CRS Report RL32615, Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments.)
Human Rights Problems. The State Department’s most recent Country
Report on Human Rights Practices (issued March 2007) again determined that the
Pakistan government’s record on human rights “remained poor.” Along with
concerns about anti-democratic practices, the report lists extrajudicial killings,
torture, and abuse by security forces; “widespread” government and police
corruption; lack of judicial independence; political violence; terrorism; and
“extremely poor” prison conditions among the major problems. It further notes an
increase in restrictions on press freedoms and in reports of “disappearances” of
political activists. Improvement was noted, however, with government efforts to
crack down on human trafficking.136 The most recent State Department report on
trafficking in persons (issued in June 2007) again said, “Pakistan does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it
is making significant efforts to do so.”137
According to the Department of State, the Islamabad government is known to
limit freedoms of association, religion, and movement, and to imprison political
leaders. In June 2007, the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 110-197)
expressed concern about the Pakistani government’s apparent lack of respect for
human rights. Senate reports have expressed similar concerns. The Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan and international human rights groups periodically issue
reports critical of Pakistan’s lack of political freedoms, lawlessness in many areas
(especially the western tribal agencies), and of the country’s perceived abuses of the
rights of women and minorities.
Gender Discrimination. Discrimination against women is widespread in
Pakistan and traditional constraints — cultural, legal, and spousal — keep women
in a subordinate position in society. In 2005, Pakistani gang rape victim Mukhtaran
Mai — and Islamabad’s (mis)handling of her case — became emblematic of gender
discrimination problems in Pakistan. The Hudood Ordinance was promulgated
during the rule of President General Zia ul-Haq and is widely criticized for imposing
stringent punishments and restrictions under the guise of Islamic law. Among its
provisions, the ordinance criminalizes all extramarital sex and makes it extremely
134 Lisa Curtis, “Bolstering Pakistan in its Fight Against Extremism,” Heritage Foundation
WebMemo 1554, July 13, 2007, at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/
wm1554.cfm] is representative.
135 Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 2007, at
[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86407/daniel-markey/a-false-choice-in-p
akistan.html].
136 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78874.htm]. A Pakistan Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman claimed the report “lacks objectivity and contains inaccuracies.”
137 See [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/82806.htm].

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difficult for women to prove allegations of rape (those women who make such
charges without the required evidence often are jailed as adulterers). In November
2006, the Hudood laws were amended in the Women’s Protection Bill. President
Musharraf supported the changes and the ruling PML-Q party joined with the
opposition PPP to overcome fierce resistance by Islamist parties. The step was
viewed as a landmark in efforts to create more a moderate Pakistani state. However,
with the February 2007 murder of a female provincial minister in Punjab by a radical
Islamist and threats being issued against girls’ schools and female health workers in
the NWFP, among other incidents, well-entrenched societal discrimination continues.
Religious Freedom. The State Department’s most recent International
Religious Freedom Report (released in September 2007) again found that in practice
the Islamabad government imposes limits on the freedom of religion in Pakistan:
The Government took some steps to improve its treatment of religious minorities
during the period covered by this report, but serious problems remained. Law
enforcement personnel abused religious minorities in custody. Security forces
and other government agencies did not adequately prevent or address societal
abuse against minorities. Discriminatory legislation and the Government’s failure
to take action against societal forces hostile to those who practice a different
faith fostered religious intolerance, acts of violence, and intimidation against
religious minorities. Specific laws that discriminate against religious minorities
include anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws that provide the death penalty for
defiling Islam or its prophets.138
The State Department has rejected repeated U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom recommendations that Pakistan be designated a “country of
particular concern.” The 2007 annual report from that Commission claims that,
“Sectarian and religiously motivated violence persists in Pakistan ... and the
government’s somewhat improved response to this problem continues to be
insufficient and not fully effective.”139
Press Freedom. Press freedom and the safety of journalists recently have
become major concerns in Pakistan, spurred especially by the June 2006 discovery
of the handcuffed body of Pakistani journalist Hayatullah Khan in a rural area of
North Waziristan. Khan, who had been missing for more than six months, was
abducted by unknown gunmen after he reported on an apparent U.S.-launched missile
attack in Pakistan’s tribal region. Khan’s family is among those who suspect the
involvement of Pakistani security forces; an official inquiry into the death was
launched. Other journalists have been detained and possibly tortured, including a
pair reportedly held incommunicado without charges for three months after they shot
footage of the Jacobabad airbase that was used by U.S. forces. Paris-based Reporters
Without Borders placed Pakistan 152nd out of 169 countries in its most recent annual
ranking of world press freedom.
Pakistani journalists have taken to the streets to protest perceived abuses and
they complain that the government seeks to intimidate those who would report the
138 See [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90233.htm].
139 See [http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/index.html].

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facts of Pakistani counterterrorism operations. In May 2007, the New York-based
Committee to Protect Journalists placed Pakistan sixth in a list of the ten countries
where press freedom had most deteriorated since 2002.140 In early June, in apparent
reaction to media coverage of rallies in support of Pakistan’s suspended Chief
Justice, the Musharraf government issued an ordinance allowing the Pakistan
Electronic Media Regulatory Agency to impose strict curbs on television and radio
station operations. Human Rights Watch later called the decree a “disgraceful assault
on media freedom.”141 Implementation of the ordinance subsequently was halted.
In September 2007, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad expressed concern about recent
incidents in which Pakistani journalists were subject to assaults and harassment.142
“Disappeared” Persons. According to the U.S. State Department, there was
an increase of politically motivated disappearances in Pakistan in 2006, with police
and security forces holding prisoners incommunicado and refusing to provide
information on their whereabouts, particularly in terrorism and national security
cases. In November 2006, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ordered the government to
disclose the whereabouts of 41 suspected security detainees who have “disappeared.”
Human rights groups claim to have recorded more than 400 cases of such secret
detentions since 2002.143 London-based Amnesty International has criticized
Islamabad for human rights abuses related to its cooperation with the U.S.-led “war
on terror,” including the arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture of
hundreds of people. In 2005, New York-based Human Rights Watch released a list
of 26 “ghost detainees” thought to be in U.S. custody, at least 16 of whom were
arrested in Pakistan. The families of missing persons have increased their efforts to
pressure the government on this issue.
Economic Issues
Overview. Pakistan is a poor country, but the national economy has gathered
significant positive momentum in recent years, helped in large part by the
government’s pro-growth policies and by post-2001 infusions of foreign aid.
However, presently high rates of domestic inflation (near 8%) have many analysts
concerned about the country’s macroeconomic stability, and some observers warn
that the domestic capacity to sustain growth does not exist. According to the World
Bank, nominal GDP per capita in 2006 was only $771, but poverty rates have
dropped from 34% to 24% over the past five years. Severe human losses and
property damage from an October 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan have had
limited follow-on economic impact, given a large influx of foreign aid and the
stimulus provided by reconstruction efforts. The long-term economic outlook for
Pakistan is much improved since 2001, even as it remains clouded in a country still
dependent on foreign lending and the importation of basic commodities. Substantial
140 See [http://cpj.org/backsliders/index.html].
141 See [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/06/pakist16084.htm].
142 See [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h07092101.html].
143 “Pakistan: A Land of Systematic Disappearances,” Asian Center for Human Rights,
March 28, 2007; Jane Perlez, “Pakistani Wife Embodies Cause Of ‘Disappeared,’” New
York Times, July 19, 2007.

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fiscal deficits and dependency on external aid have been chronic (public and external
debt equal more than 80% of GDP), and counterbalance a major overhaul of the tax
collection system and what have been major gains in the Karachi Stock Exchange,
which nearly doubled in value as the world’s best performer in 2002 and is up by
47% in 2007. Along with absolute development gains in recent years, Pakistan’s
relative standing has also improved: The U.N. Development Program ranked
Pakistan 134th out of 177 countries (between Laos and Bhutan) on its 2006 human
development index, up from 144th in 2003.144
Pakistan’s real GDP grew by 7% in the fiscal year ending June 2007, driven by
booming manufacturing and service sectors. Overall growth was up from the
previous year and has averaged nearly 7% over the past five years. Output from both
the industrial and service sectors has grown substantially since 2002, but the
agricultural sector continues to lag considerably (in part due to droughts), slowing
overall growth. Agricultural labor accounts for nearly half of the country’s work
force, but only about one-fifth of national income and 2% of tax revenue. Expanding
textile production and the government’s pro-growth measures have most analysts
foreseeing solid expansion ahead, with predictions at or near 6% for the next two
years. More recently, a relatively small but rapidly growing entrepreneurial class has
brought a boom in the consumption of luxury goods.145
In June 2007, the Musharraf government unveiled a 1.6 trillion rupee ($26.5
billion) federal budget plan for FY2007-FY2008 calling for a 22% boost in public
development spending and a 10% jump in defense spending. This latter expenditure
combines with interest on public debt to consume two-thirds of total revenues, thus
squeezing out development funds. Pakistan stabilized its external debt at about $33
billion by 2003, but this rose to nearly $39 billion in 2005 and remains near that
amount to date. Still, such debt is less than one-third of GDP today, down from more
than one-half in 2000. The country’s reported total liquid reserves reached $13.7
billion by May 2007, an all-time high and a nearly five-fold increase since 1999.
Foreign remittances have exceeded $4 billion annually since 2003 (at around $5.5
billion in FY2006-2007), up from slightly more than $1 billion in 2001. High oil
prices have driven inflationary pressures, resulting in a year-on-year consumer rate
of 6.4% in July 2007. While inflation is expected to ease later in 2007, many
analysts call rising prices the single most important obstacle to future growth.
Pakistan’s resources and comparatively well-developed entrepreneurial skills may
hold promise for more rapid economic growth and development in coming years.
This is particularly true for the country’s textile industry, which accounts for two-
thirds of all exports (and up to 90% of exports to the United States).
Analysts point to the pressing need to further broaden the country’s tax base in
order to provide increased revenue for investment in improved infrastructure, health,
and education, all prerequisites for economic development. Serious environmental
degradation also retards growth: a September 2007 World Bank report conservatively
estimated that at least 6% of Pakistan’s GDP is lost to illness and premature mortality
144 See [http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf].
145 Peter Wonacott, “Modern and Muslim: In Turbulent Pakistan, Start-Ups Drive a Boom,”
Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2007.

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caused by air pollution (both outdoor and indoor); diseases caused by inadequate
water supplies, sanitation, and hygiene; and reduced agricultural productivity due to
soil degradation.146
Attempts at macroeconomic reform historically have floundered due to political
instability, but the Musharraf government has had notable successes in effecting such
reform. Rewards for participation in the post-September 2001 anti-terror coalition
eased somewhat Pakistan’s severe national debt situation, with many countries,
including the United States, boosting bilateral assistance efforts and large amounts
of external aid flowing into the country. According to the Asian Development
Bank’s Outlook 2007:
Buoyant growth, improved macroeconomic fundamentals, and strengthened
international credit ratings have been the economy’s hallmarks in recent years.
In FY2006, high oil prices, a weak agricultural performance, as well as the effect
of the October 2005 earthquake, trimmed the expansion, while strong demand-
side pressures have exposed macroeconomic stresses. The economy is expected
to pick up slightly in FY2007, reflecting some strengthening in agriculture and
manufacturing. Inflation is set to moderate, after a further tightening of
monetary policy, but still come in above the central bank’s target. Spurred by an
expansionary, pro-growth fiscal policy, the budget deficit will widen slightly, as
will the current account deficit. The medium-term outlook remains positive, but
macroeconomic stability has to be maintained and structural issues addressed.147
Trade and Investment. Pakistan’s primary exports are cotton, textiles and
apparel, rice, and leather products. The United States is by far Pakistan’s leading
export market, accounting for about one-quarter of the total. During 2006, total U.S.
imports from Pakistan were worth nearly $3.7 billion (up 13% over 2005). Almost
90% of this value came from purchases of textiles and apparel. U.S. exports to
Pakistan during 2006 were worth about $2 billion (up 60% over 2005). Civilian
aircraft and associated equipment accounted for about 42% of this value; electricity
generating machinery and textile fibers were other notable U.S. exports (2005 figures
had been depressed as a result of completed delivery of aircraft in 2004).148 Pakistan
is the 54th largest export market for U.S. goods. According to the 2007 National
Trade Estimate of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Pakistan has made
substantial progress in reducing import tariff schedules, though a number of trade
barriers remain. While estimated trade losses due to copyright piracy in Pakistan
were notably lower in 2005 and 2006, book piracy accounted for about half of the
2006 losses and remains a serious concern.149 Pakistan also has been a world leader
in the pirating of music CDs and has appeared on the USTR’s “Special 301” Watch
List for 17 consecutive years (in 2004, continuing violations caused the USTR to
146 See [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/
448813-1188777211460/pakceasummary.pdf
147 See [http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2007/PAK.asp].
148 See [http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/index.html].
149 The International Intellectual Property Alliance, a coalition of U.S. copyright-based
industries, estimated U.S. losses of $100 million due to copyright piracy in Pakistan in 2006
(see [http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301PAKISTAN.pdf]).

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move Pakistan to the Priority Watch List; improved intellectual property rights
protection saw it lowered back to the Watch List in 2006).150 From the USTR report:
The government of Pakistan continued to take noticeable steps during 2006 to
improve copyright enforcement, especially with respect to optical disc piracy.
Nevertheless, Pakistan does not provide adequate protection of all intellectual
property. Book piracy, weak trademark enforcement, lack of data protection for
proprietary pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical test data, and problems
with Pakistan’s pharmaceutical patent protection remain serious barriers to trade
and investment.151
In April 2007, the USTR again named Pakistan to its Special 301 watch list, lauding
Islamabad for progress on intellectual property rights enforcement, but also
expressing ongoing concerns about Pakistan’s lack of effective protections in the
pharmaceutical sector.
According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance, total foreign direct investment in
Pakistan exceeded $7 billion for the year ending June 2007 — an unprecedented
amount doubling that of the previous year — but many investors remain wary of the
country’s uncertain political-security circumstances.152 About one-third of the
foreign investment value came from U.S.-based investors; much of the remainder
originates in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. Islamabad is eager to
finalize a pending Bilateral Investment Treaty and reach a Free Trade Agreement
with the United States, believing that its vital textile sector will be bolstered by duty-
free access to the U.S. market. The establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones that could facilitate development in Pakistan’s poor tribal regions, an initiative
of President Bush during his March 2006 visit to Pakistan, may be forwarded for
consideration by the 110th Congress. The Heritage Foundation’s 2007 Index of
Economic Freedom — which may overemphasize the value of absolute growth and
downplay broader quality-of-life measurements — again rated Pakistan’s economy
as being “mostly unfree” and ranked it 89th out of 157 countries. The index identified
restrictive trade policies, a heavy fiscal burden, weak property ownership protections,
and limited financial freedoms.153 Corruption is another serious problem: in
September 2007, Berlin-based Transparency International placed Pakistan 138th out
of 179 countries in its annual ranking of world corruption levels.154
150 See [http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/
2006_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file797_9198.pdf] and [http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/
asset_upload_file190_9339.pdf].
151 See [http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Trade_
Policy_Agenda/Section_Index.html]
152 Faisal Aziz, “Pakistan Investors Wary of Political Instability,” Reuters, August 27, 2007.
153 See [http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/country.cfm?id=Pakistan].
154 See [http://www.transparency.org].

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U.S. Aid and Congressional Action
U.S. Assistance. A total of about $15 billion in direct U.S. aid went to
Pakistan from 1947 through 2006, including more than $4 billion in military
assistance. In June 2003, President Bush hosted President Musharraf at Camp David,
Maryland, where he vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, $3
billion aid package for Pakistan. Annual installments of $600 million each, split
evenly between military and economic aid, began in FY2005.155 When additional
funds for development assistance, law enforcement, earthquake relief, and other
programs are included, the non-food aid allocation for FY2006 was $788 million (see
Table 1). An estimated total of $779 million is to be delivered in FY2007, the first
year of the Administration’s new plan to devote $750 million in U.S. development
aid to Pakistan’s tribal areas over a five-year period.
Congress also has authorized the spending of billions of dollars to reimburse
Pakistan for its operational and logistical support of U.S.-led counterterrorism
operations. As of October 2007, a total of nearly $7 billion had been appropriated
for FY2002-FY2007 Defense Department spending for coalition support payments
to “Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations.” Pentagon documents show
that disbursements to Islamabad — at more than $5 billion or an average of about
$82 million per month — account for the great majority of these funds. The amount
is equal to more than one-quarter of Pakistan’s total military expenditures. The
Defense Department Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-289) allowed up to $900
million in Pentagon funds be used for FY2007 reimbursements. The Bush
Administration requested another $1 billion in emergency supplemental coalition
support funds (CSF) for FY2007, however, the supplemental bill signed into law
(P.L. 110-28) allowed for only $200 million in new CSF appropriations, bringing the
FY2007 CSF authorization to $1.1 billion. The Administration has requested another
$1.7 billion in coalition support for FY2008.
Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs. Numerous
commentators on U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan have recommended making
adjustments to the proportion of funds devoted to military versus economic aid
and/or to the objectives of such programs. For most of the post-2001 period, funds
have been split roughly evenly between economic and security-related aid programs,
with the great bulk of the former going to a general economic (budget) support fund
and most of the latter financing “big ticket” defense articles such as airborne early
warning aircraft, and anti-ship and anti-armor missiles. Only about one-tenth of the
roughly $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has
been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs.156 It may be
useful to better target U.S. assistance programs in such a way that they more
effectively benefit the country’s citizens. Some analysts call for improving
155 The Foreign Operations FY2005 Appropriations bill (P.L. 108-447) established a new
“base program” of $300 million for military assistance for Pakistan.
156 For an extensive review of the U.S. assistance strategy for Pakistan, see Craig Cohen, “A
Perilous Course,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2007, at
[http://www.csis.org/images/stories/pcr/070727_pakistan.pdf].

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America’s image in Pakistan by making U.S. aid more visible to ordinary
Pakistanis.157
One idea commonly floated by analysts is the “conditioning” of aid to Pakistan,
perhaps through the creation of “benchmarks.” For example, in 2003, a task force
of senior American South Asia watchers issued a report on U.S. policy in the region
which included a recommendation that the extent of U.S. support for Islamabad
should be linked to that government’s own performance in making Pakistan a more
“modern, progressive, and democratic state” as promised by President Musharraf in
January 2002. Specifically, the task force urged directing two-thirds of U.S. aid to
economic programs and one-third to security assistance, and conditioning increases
in aid amounts to progress in Pakistan’s reform agenda.158 A more recent perspective
is representative of ongoing concerns about the emphases of U.S. aid programs:
[T]he United States has given Musharraf considerable slack in meeting his
commitments to deal with domestic extremism or his promises to restore
authentic democracy. The U.S. partnership with Pakistan would probably be on
firmer footing through conditioned programs more dedicated to building the
country’s political and social institutions than rewarding its leadership.159
Some commentators emphasize that, to be truly effective, conditionality should be
applied by many donor countries rather than just the United States and should be
directed toward the Pakistani leadership — especially the military — to the exclusion
of the general populace.160 Many commentators have criticized the Bush
Administration’s perceived over-emphasis on relations with Musharraf and the
Pakistani military at the expense of positive ties with the broader Pakistan society.
In the representative commentary of a former Pakistani diplomat,
The United States made a critical mistake in putting faith in one man — General
Pervez Musharraf — and one institution — the Pakistani military — as
instruments of the U.S. policy to eliminate terrorism and bring stability to the
Southwest and South Asia. A robust U.S. policy of engagement with Pakistan
that helps in building civilian institutions, including law enforcement capability,
and eventually results in reverting Pakistan’s military to its security functions
157 See, for example, Lisa Curtis, “Denying Terrorists Safe Haven in Pakistan,” Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1981, October 26, 2006, at [http://www.heritage.org/
Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/bg_1981.pdf].
158 “New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan,”
Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations and the Asia Society, October 2003, at [http://www.asiasociety.org/
policy_business/india-southasia10-30-03.pdf].
159 Marvin Weinbaum, “Afghanistan and Its Neighbors,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special
Report 162, June 2006, p. 18, at [http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr162.pdf].
160 See, for example, Frederic Grare, “Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007, at [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
files/grare_pakistan_final.pdf].

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CRS-58
would be a more effective way of strengthening Pakistan and protecting United
States policy interests there.161
Many analysts, however, including those making policy for the Bush
Administration, aver that conditioning U.S. aid to Pakistan has a past record of
failure and likely would be counterproductive by reinforcing Pakistani perceptions
of the United States as a fickle and unreliable partner. From this perspective, putting
additional pressure on an already besieged and weakened Musharraf government
might lead to significant political instability in Islamabad.162 For Pakistanis
themselves, aid conditionality in U.S. congressional legislation can raise unpleasant
memories of 1985’s so-called Pressler Amendment, which led to a near-total aid
cutoff in 1990. Islamabad’s sensitivities are thus acute: in July 2007, the Pakistan
Foreign Ministry said aid conditions legislated in the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) “cast a shadow” on
existing U.S.-Pakistan cooperation and create linkages that “did not serve the interest
of bilateral cooperation in the past and can prove to be detrimental in the future.”163
Proliferation-Related Legislation. Through a series of legislative
measures, Congress incrementally lifted sanctions on Pakistan resulting from its
nuclear weapons proliferation activities.164 After the September 2001 terrorist attacks
on the United States, policymakers searched for new means of providing assistance
to Pakistan. President Bush’s issuance of a final determination that month removed
remaining sanctions on Pakistan (and India) resulting from the 1998 nuclear tests,
finding that restrictions were not in U.S. national security interests. Some Members
of the 108th Congress urged reinstatement of proliferation-related sanctions in
response to evidence of Pakistani assistance to third-party nuclear weapons programs.
However, the Nuclear Black-Market Elimination Act (H.R. 4965) died in committee.
Legislation in the 109th Congress included the Pakistan Proliferation Accountability
Act of 2005 (H.R. 1553), which sought to prohibit the provision of military
equipment to Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan has verifiably
halted all proliferation activities and is fully sharing with the United States all
information relevant to the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. This bill also did not
emerge from committee.
161 Statement of Husain Haqqani before the House Armed Services Committee, October 10,
2007.
162 See, for example, Daniel Markey, “A False Choice in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, July
2007, at [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86407/daniel-markey/
a-false-choice-in-pakistan.html].
163 See [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/july/PR_199_07.htm].
164 The Agricultural Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-194) allowed U.S. wheat sales to
Pakistan after July 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (in P.L. 105-277)
authorized a one-year sanctions waiver exercised by President Clinton in November 1998.
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-79) gave the President
permanent authority to waive nuclear-test-related sanctions applied against Pakistan and
India after October 1999, when President Clinton waived economic sanctions on India
(Pakistan remained under sanctions as a result of the October 1999 coup). (See CRS Report
RS20995, India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne Rennack.)

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CRS-59
In the 110th Congress, the House-passed version of the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1) included provisions to suspend
all arms sales licenses and deliveries to any “nuclear proliferation host country”
unless the President certifies that such a country is, inter alia, fully investigating and
taking actions to permanently halt illicit nuclear proliferation activities. Related
Senate-passed legislation (S. 4) contained no such language and the provisions did
not appear in the subsequent law (P.L. 110-53).
Coup-Related Legislation. Pakistan’s October 1999 military coup triggered
U.S. aid restrictions under Section 508 of the annual Foreign Assistance
appropriations act. Post-September 2001 circumstances saw Congress take action
on such restrictions. P.L. 107-57 (October 2001) waived coup-related sanctions on
Pakistan through FY2002 and granted presidential authority to waive them through
FY2003. A November 2003 emergency supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 108-
106) extended the President’s waiver authority through FY2004. The foreign
operations FY2006 appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102) extended it through FY2006.
The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-
53) provided a two-year extension through FY2008. President Bush has exercised
this waiver authority annually.
9/11 Commission Recommendations. The 9/11 Commission Report,
released in July 2004, identified the government of President Musharraf as the best
hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it recommended that the United
States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for
Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a
policy of “enlightened moderation.” In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Congress broadly endorsed this
recommendation by calling for U.S. aid to Pakistan to be sustained at a minimum of
FY2005 levels and requiring the President to report to Congress a description of
long-term U.S. strategy to engage with and support Pakistan. A November 2005
follow-on report by Commissioners gave a “C” grade to U.S. efforts to support
Pakistan’s anti-extremism policies and warned that the country “remains a sanctuary
and training ground for terrorists.” In the 109th Congress, H.R. 5017 and S. 3456
sought to insure implementation of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The bills contained Pakistan-specific language, but neither emerged from committee.
A new Democratic majority took up the issue again in 2007. The premiere
House resolution of the 110th Congress, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1), was passed in January containing discussion
of U.S. policy toward Pakistan. The bill was passed by the Senate in July and
became P.L. 110-53 in August, including conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan for the
first time in the post-9/11 era (see below). The Bush Administration opposed the
language on the grounds that “conditionality” would be counterproductive to the goal
of closer U.S.-Pakistan relations.
Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 110th Congress
P.L. 110-53: The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of
2007 (became Public Law on August 3, 2007):

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CRS-60
! Ends U.S. military assistance and arms sales licensing to Pakistan in
FY2008 unless the President reports to Congress a determination
that Islamabad is “undertaking a comprehensive military, legal,
economic, and political campaign” to “eliminating from Pakistani
territory any organization such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, or any
successor, engaged in military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in
Afghanistan,” and “is currently making demonstrated, significant,
and sustained progress toward eliminating support or safe haven for
terrorists.”
! Requires the President report to Congress a long-term U.S. strategy
for engaging Pakistan.
! States a U.S. policy to increase in U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan
“as the Government of Pakistan demonstrates a clear commitment
to building a moderate, democratic state.”
! Provides an extension of the President’s authority to waive coup-
related sanctions through FY2008.
P.L. 110-28: The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (became Public Law on May 27,
2007):
! Provides up to $200 million in further coalition support payments to
“Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations” in FY2007.
! Provides up to $60 million in counterdrug funds for Pakistan and
Afghanistan in FY2007.
! Allows that up to $110 million in Pentagon funds may be used for
Economic Support Funds (ESF) for development projects in
Pakistan’s tribal areas in FY2007.
! Withholds all FY2007 supplemental ESF for Pakistan until the
Secretary of State submits to Congress a report on the oversight
mechanisms, performance benchmarks, and implementation
processes for such funds.
! Earmarks $5 million in FY2007 ESF for the Human Rights and
Democracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Department of State, for political party development and
election observation programs in Pakistan.
H.R. 1585 (Senate version): The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008
(passed by the Senate on October 1, 2007; in conference at the time of writing):
! Would withhold FY2008 and FY2009 coalition support
reimbursements to Pakistan unless the President certifies to
Congress that Pakistan is “making substantial and sustained efforts
to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other violent
extremists in areas under its sovereign control....”
! Would require the President to report to Congress a description of
a long-term U.S. strategy for engaging with Islamabad on the
problems of cross-border infiltration of “violent extremist forces”
into Afghanistan and safe havens enjoyed by such forces in Pakistan.

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CRS-61
H.R. 2764: The Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2008 (passed by the House on June 22, 2007, and by the
Senate on September 6, 2007; in conference at the time of writing):
! Would appropriate $300 million in FY2008 Foreign Military
Financing for Pakistan unless the Secretary of State reports to
Congress that Pakistan is not “making effective and consistent
efforts” to combat both Al Qaeda and Taliban forces on Pakistani
territory and/or is not “implementing democratic reforms.” Upon
such a report, relevant funds may be transferred to Economic
Support.
H.R. 1585 (House version): The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008
(passed by the House on May 17, 2007; in conference at the time of writing):
! Would expand programs to build the capacity of Pakistan’s
counterterrorism security forces.
H.R. 2446: The Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007 (passed by
the House on June 6, 2007; referred to Senate committee):
! Would require the President to report to Congress on
implementation of policies to encourage greater Pakistan-Arab
country reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and on Pakistan-
Afghanistan cooperation.
! Would authorize the President to appoint a new special envoy to
promote closer Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation.
! Would require the President to report to Congress on actions taken
by Pakistan to permit or impede transit of Indian reconstruction
materials to Afghanistan across Pakistani territory.
S.Res. 99 (introduced on March 7, 2007):
! Would express the sense of the Senate that U.S. military assistance
to Pakistan should be guided by demonstrable progress by the
government of Pakistan in achieving certain objectives related to
counterterrorism and democratic reforms.

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CRS-62
Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2008
(rounded to the nearest millions of dollars)
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
Total
2007
2008
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
FY2002-FY2007
(est.)
(req.)
Economic Support Funds
—
625
188a
200a
298
297
284
1,890
383
Other Development Aidb
—
40
50
75
50
120
118
453
58
Total Economic Aid
—
665
238
275
348
416
401
2,343
441
Foreign Military Financing
—
75
225
75
299
297
297
1,267
300
Other Security-Related Aidc
4
102d
32
38
50
75
81
377
99
Total Security-Related Aid
4
177
257
112
349
372
378
1,644
399
Coalition Support Funds (CSF)
—
1,169e
1,247
705
964
845
996f
5,926f
g
Total Non-Food Aid Plus
4
2,010
1,741
1,093
1,661
1,633
1,775
9,913
840
Coalition Support Funds
Food Aidh
86
90
19
24
18
26
—
177
—
Grand Total
90
2,100
1,760
1,117
1,679
1,659
1,775
10,090
840
Sources: U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development. FY2007 figures are estimates; FY2008 figures are requested.
Figures may not add up due to rounding.
a. Congress authorized Pakistan to use the FY2003 ESF allocation to cancel $988 million and the FY2004 allocation to cancel $495 million in concessional debt to the U.S. government.
b. Includes Child Survival and Health; Development Assistance; Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance; and International Disaster and Famine Assistance.
c. Includes International Military Education and Training; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related; and
Pentagon counternarcotics funding begun in FY2005 and totaling an estimated $45 million in FY2007 and a requested $54.7 million for FY2008.
d. Includes $73 million for border security projects that continued in FY2003.
e. Includes $220 million in Peacekeeping Operations Emergency Response Funds reported by the State Department.
f. Congress authorized $1.1 billion in FY2007 CSF funds for “Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations.” CSF reimbursements to Pakistan averaged $83 million per month
for the first four months of FY2007. The FY2007 estimate is a CRS extrapolation based on that average and in line with Pentagon projections.
g. The Administration has requested $1.7 billion in further CSF in FY2008.
h. P.L.480 Title I (loans), P.L.480 Title II (grants), Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations), and Food for Progress.
Food aid totals do not include freight costs.

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CRS-63
Figure 1. Map of Pakistan

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