Order Code RL32888
The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated October 11, 2007
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army’s multiyear, multibillion-
dollar program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts. It is to be the
Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14
manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and
information network. FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1
Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has
been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced
technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems
together so that FCS-equipped units can function as intended.
The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which
could significantly influence the program’s outcome. The Administration has
committed the United States to “the Long War,” a struggle that could last for decades
as the United States and its allies attempt to locate and destroy terrorist networks
worldwide. Some question if FCS, envisioned and designed prior to September 11,
2001 to combat conventional land forces, is relevant in this “Long War.” The FCS
program has achieved a number of programmatic milestones and is transitioning from
a purely conceptual program to one where prototypes of many of the 14 FCS systems
are under development. With a variety of estimates on the total cost of the FCS
program, questions have been raised about FCS affordability, and the Army cites
anticipated budgetary constraints for the recent restructuring of the program from 18
to 14 systems.
The FCS is experiencing a number of program development issues — with some
technologies advancing quicker than anticipated, others progressing along predicted
lines, while still others have experienced significant delays, often impacting other
FCS-related programs. The 110th Congress, in its appropriation, authorization, and
oversight roles may wish to review the FCS program in terms of its projected
capabilities and program costs. This report will be updated as the situation warrants.

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Contents
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
FCS Program Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The FCS Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Program Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FCS Program Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Program Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Program Schedule Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2007 FCS Program Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Program Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FCS Prototypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FCS Army Evaluation Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Selected Program Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Active Protective System (APS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FCS Program Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 1585, S. 1584) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Army’s Response to the HASC’s Proposed Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
FCS Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Potential Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
What are the Military Risks Resulting from FCS Restructuring? . . . . . . . . 13
Other Service Participation in the FCS Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FCS and Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix. FCS Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Manned Ground Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Mounted Combat System (MCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Medical Vehicle - Evacuation (MV-E) and
Medical Vehicle - Treatment (MV-T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Class I UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Class IV UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

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Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle
(MULE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Tactical UGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Urban UGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment
(SOSCOE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Battle Command (BC) Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Warfighter-Machine Interface Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Communications and Computer (CC) Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) Systems . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
FCS Program Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Background and Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army’s multiyear, multibillion-dollar
program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts. It is to be the Army’s
major research, development, and acquisition program for the foreseeable future and
is to consist of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive
communications and information network. FCS is intended to replace such current
systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The
FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture
due to the advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all
of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units can function as intended.
The Army’s success criteria for FCS is that it should be “as good as or better than”
the Army’s current force in terms of “lethality, survivability, responsiveness and
sustainability.”1
The primary issues presented to 110th Congress are the capabilities and
affordability of the FCS program, and the likelihood, given a myriad of factors, that
the Army will be able to field its first FCS-equipped brigade by 2014 and eventually
field up to 15 FCS-equipped brigades. Key oversight questions for consideration
include:
! What are the military risks resulting from the FCS program
restructuring?
! What is the potential for Navy, Marine, and Air Force participation
in the FCS program?
! Is the Army overstating FCS’s potential role in counterinsurgency
operations?
The 110th Congress’s decisions on these and other related issues could have
significant implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and
future congressional oversight activities. This report will address a variety of issues
including the program’s timeline, budget, and program systems issues and
subsystems, as well as current program developmental progress and challenges.
1 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report “Defense Acquisitions: Improved
Business Case is Needed for Future Combat System’s Successful Outcome,” GAO-06-367,
March 2006, p. 2.

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Background
FCS Program Origins
In October 1999, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki
introduced the Army’s transformation strategy which was intended to convert all of
the Army’s divisions (called Legacy Forces) into new organizations called the
Objective Force. General Shinseki’s intent was to make the Army lighter, more
modular, and — most importantly — more deployable. General Shinseki’s
deployment goals were to deploy a brigade2 in four days, a division in five days, and
five divisions in 30 days.3 As part of this transformation, the Army adopted the
Future Combat System (FCS) as a major acquisition program to equip the Objective
Force.4
This transformation, due to its complexity and uncertainty, was scheduled to
take place over the course of three decades, with the first FCS-equipped objective
force unit reportedly becoming operational in 2011 and the entire force transformed
by 2032.5 In order to mitigate the risk associated with the Objective Force and to
address the near-term need for more deployable and capable units, the Army’s
transformation plan called for the development of brigade-sized units called the
Interim Force in both the active Army and the Army National Guard. Some of these
seven brigade-sized units,6 known as both Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs)
or Stryker Brigade Combat Teams7 (SBCTs), have served in Iraq.8 The House
Appropriations Committee recommended $ 1.1 billion in the FY2008 Defense
Appropriations Act “to outfit a new eight Stryker Brigade to support the Army’s
evolution to a larger, more rapidly deployable force.”9
2 According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States
Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers and
a division consists of approximately 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers.
3 Frank Tiboni, “Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation,” Federal
Computer Week, February 9, 2004.
4 James Jay Carafano, “The Army Goes Rolling Along: New Service Transformation
Agenda Suggests Promise and Problems,” Heritage Foundation, February 23, 2004, p. 5.
5 Bruce R. Nardulli and Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army: Toward the Objective Force,”
in Hans Binnendijk, ed. Transforming America’s Military, (National Defense University
Press, 2002), p. 106.
6 The Army currently plans to field six active and one National Guard Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams.
7 The Stryker is the Army’s name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will
constitute most of the brigade’s combat and combat support vehicles.
8 Annex A (Modular Conversion) to Army Campaign Plan, Change 2, September 30, 2005,
p. A-1.
9 Committee on Appropriations, Summary: 2008 Defense Appropriations Full Committee
Markup, July 25, 2007, p. 2.

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CRS-3
General Shinseki’s vision for the FCS was that it would consist of smaller and
lighter ground and air vehicles — manned, unmanned, and robotic — and would
employ advanced offensive, defensive, and communications/information systems to
“outsmart and outmaneuver heavier enemy forces on the battlefield.”10 In order to
initiate the FCS program, General Shinseki turned to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), not only because of its proven ability to manage highly
conceptual and scientifically challenging projects, but also because he reportedly felt
that he would receive a great deal of opposition from senior Army leaders who
advocated heavier and more powerful vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the
M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. In May 2000, DARPA awarded four contracts
to four industry teams to develop FCS designs and in March 2002, the Army chose
Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to serve as the
lead systems integrators to oversee the development and eventual production of the
FCS’s 18 systems. On May 14, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board11 (DAB)
approved the FCS’s next acquisition phase and in August 2004 Boeing and SAIC
awarded contracts to 21 companies to design and build its various platforms and
hardware and software.
The FCS Program
Program Overview12
The Army describes FCS as a joint (involving the other services) networked
“system of systems.” FCS systems are to be connected by means of an advanced
network architecture that would permit connectivity with other services, situational
awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations that are currently
unachievable by Army combat forces. FCS is intended to network with existing
forces, systems currently in development, and systems that will be developed in the
future. The FCS is to be incorporated into the Army’s brigade-sized modular force
structure.
Structure. FCS units would include the following:
! Unattended ground sensors (UGS);
! Two classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs);
! Three classes of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs): the Armed
Robotic Vehicle - Assault (Light) (ARV-A-L), the Small Unmanned
10 The following description of the early stages of the FCS program is taken from Frank
Tiboni’s Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation.
11 The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the Defense Department’s senior-level forum
for advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) on critical decisions concerning DAB-managed programs and special interest
programs.
12 Information in this section is taken from the Army’s official FCS website
[http://www.army.mil/fcs/overview.html].

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Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics
and Equipment Countermine and Transport Vehicle (MULE-T);
! Eight types of Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs);
! The Network; and
! The individual soldier and his personal equipment and weapons.
The FCS is to serve as the core building block of the Army’s Future Force. FCS-
equipped brigade combat teams (BCTs) are to consist of:
! Three FCS-equipped Combined Arms battalions (CABs);
! One Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon battalion;
! One Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
squadron;
! One Forward Support battalion (FSB);
! One Brigade Intelligence and Communications company (BICC);
and
! One Headquarters company.
For a more detailed description of FCS subsystems, see Appendix A.
Capabilities.13 According to the Army, the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
will be designed to be:
! Self- sufficient for 72 hours of high-intensity combat;
! Self- sufficient for seven days in a low to mid-intensity environment;
! Able to reduce the traditional logistics footprint for fuel, water,
ammunition, and repair parts by 30% to 70%;
! Sixty percent more strategically deployable than current heavy
BCTs; and
! Able to operate across larger areas with fewer soldiers.
FCS Program Timeline
FCS is currently moving towards the System of Systems Preliminary Design
Review (PDR) now scheduled for January 2009.14 The PDR is described as “a multi-
disciplined technical review to ensure that a system is ready to proceed into detailed
design and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, schedule, risk, and
other system restraints.”15 FCS program leadership maintains that the program is
now out of the conceptual phase and is focusing on designing, building, integrating,
and testing FCS subsystems.
13 Information in this section is taken from the 2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5,
2007, pp. 8-11, and FCS Brigade Combat Team 14+1+1 Systems Overview 14 March 2007,
at [http://www.army.mil/fcs/whitepaper/FCSwhitepaper07.pdf].
14 MG Charles A. Cartwright and Mr. Tony Melita, Future Combat Systems (Brigade
Combat Team) Defense Acquisition Board In-Process Review, June 13, 2007, p. 11.
15 “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms,” Defense Acquisition University,
Fort Belvoir, VA, 12th ed., July 2005, p. B-121.

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Program Schedule. At present, the FCS program is operating under the
schedule depicted below:
FCS Program Schedule16
Event
Date (FY)
Event description
Preliminary Design
2009
A technical review to evaluate the progress and
Review
technical adequacy of each major program item.
It also examines compatibility with performance
and engineering requirements.
Critical Design
2011
A technical review to determine if the detailed
Review
design satisfies performance and engineering
requirements. Also determines compatibility
between equipment, computers, and personnel.
Assesses producibility and program risk areas.
Design Readiness
2011
Evaluates design maturity, based on the number
Review
of successfully completed system and subsystem
design reviews.
Milestone C
2013
Milestone C approves the program’s entry into
the Production and Deployment (P&D) Phase.
The P&D Phase consists of two efforts — Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate
Production and Deployment (FRP&D). The
purpose of the P&D Phase is to achieve an
operational capability that satisfies the mission
need.
Initial Operational
2015
IOC is defined as the first attainment of the
Capability (IOC)
capability to employ the system as intended.
(Part of the P&D Phase).
Full Operational
2017
The full attainment of the capability to employ
Capability
the system, including a fully manned, equipped,
trained, and logistically supported force. (Part
of the P&D Phase).
Note: Event descriptions in this table are taken from the Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms
Glossary published by the Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, VA, 12th ed., July 2005.
Program Schedule Concerns. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has been a significant monitor of the FCS program since its inception. One
of GAO’s continuing program schedule concerns is that:
FCS design and production maturity are not likely to be demonstrated until
after the production decision is made. The critical design review will be held
much later on FCS than on other programs, and the Army will not be building
16 MG Charles A. Cartwright and Mr. Tony Melita, Future Combat Systems (Brigade
Combat Team) Defense Acquisition Board In-Process Review, June 13, 2007, p. 4.

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production-representative prototypes to test before production. The first
major test of the network and FCS together with a majority of prototypes will
not take place until 2012. Much of the testing up to the 2013 production
decision will involve simulations, technology demonstrations, experiments,
and single system testing.17
GAO suggests that because testing occurs so close to the production decision, that
problems identified during testing will need to be resolved during the production
phase, which historically is the most expensive phase in which to correct problems.18
2007 FCS Program Activities
FCS program officials contend that the program “is moving from the drawing
board to reality”with some prototype manned ground vehicles (MGVs) currently
being built.19 Selected FY2007 program activities are examined in the following
sections:
Program Restructuring. In early 2007 the Army citing “the effects of
budget reductions [by Congress] over the past three years, and the fiscal guidance for
future years [DOD],” reduced the scope and delayed the schedule of fielding the
FCS.20 The major element of this restructuring was eliminating Class II and III
UAVs (company and battalion-level UAVs, respectively) and deferring the Armed
Robotic Vehicle - Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition until the
Army builds its FY2010 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).21 The Army also
separated the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS) from the FCS program, but will
produce IMS under another program. This restructuring will reduce the FCS
program from 18 to 14 systems. In addition, the Army will slow the rate of FCS
procurement to the rate of one brigade per year starting in 2015, meaning that it will
take until 2030 to field all 15 FCS-equipped brigade combat teams — a five-year
delay to field the last FCS brigade. The Army has also reduced the number of FCS
technology “spin outs” to current forces from four to three — with the first spin out
planned for 2008. However, the Army will increase the number of brigades receiving
spin out technologies from three to six brigades.
The Army maintains that this restructuring will save the Army $3.4 billion over
the next six years, but will “put at risk our ability to reach the full tactical and
17 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the
Importance of Oversight,” GAO-07-672T, March 27, 2007.
18 Ibid.
19 Kris Osborn, “FCS: Fielding Coming Soon,” Army Times, April 2, 2007.
20 2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5, 2007, p 8.
21 Information in this section is from Ashley Roque, “Army Retools FCS to Address
Congressional, Service Budget Cuts,” Inside the Army, February 12, 2007.

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operational potential envisioned for FCS.”22 While the Army may believe that
reducing the cost of the FCS program by decreasing it from 18 to 14 systems will
make FCS less contentious in terms of overall cost, some suggest that while
“stretching out” the FCS program will likely decrease yearly FCS production costs,
it also means that the Army will need additional funds to keep FCS production lines
open longer.23
FCS Prototypes.24 The Army has reportedly begun building pre-production
prototypes for the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the Non-Line-of-Sight
Mortar (NLOS-M) — two of the eight planned FCS MGVs. Army officials maintain
that initial prototypes of the NLOS-M will be fielded to the Army Evaluation Task
Force (AETF) for evaluation in 2010 and that by 2010, the NLOS-C will begin to be
fielded to brigade combat teams (BCTs) in the field.
FCS Army Evaluation Task Force. In 2006 the Army announced that the
FCS Evaluation Brigade Combat Team (EBCT) would begin to form at Ft. Bliss, TX
in March 2007. This 3,500-soldier brigade was to have been built from the 1st
Armored Division, but in early 2007, because of additional requirements for troops
in Iraq, the Army decided instead to build the evaluation brigade on an ad-hoc basis.25
The Army has since renamed the EBCT the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF),
and has capped the unit at no more than 1,000 soldiers.26 The AETF is currently
undergoing small unit training, and it is anticipated that it will begin training in
September 2007 on some of the equipment the Army intends to “spin out” to current
forces in 2008.27 These technologies include FCS network kits for M-1 Abrams
tanks and M2A3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles that will allow the installation of
the current increment of the Systems of Systems Common Operating Environment
(SOSCOE) and a four channel version of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).28
The AETF is also scheduled to evaluate a variety of unattended sensors prior to the
2008 spin out. If these technologies are deemed successful, starting in 2010, six
brigade combat teams a year will begin receiving Spin Out One technologies. In July
22 2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5, 2007, p 9.
23 Ashley Roque, “Army Retools FCS to Address Congressional, Service Budget Cuts,”
Inside the Army, February 12, 2007.
24 “BAE Systems Unveils FCS Non-Line of Sight Mortar Firing Platform,” Defense Daily,
March 6, 2007; Kris Osborn, “Prototypes Being Built for FCS Cannon, Mortar,” Army
Times, March 10, 2007; and Kris Osborn, “FCS: Fielding Coming Soon,” Army Times, April
2, 2007.
25 From discussions with the Army Staff G-8 Office, January 12, 2007.
26 Scott Gourley, “U.S. Army Modifies FCS EBCT Structure,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
January 31, 2007. P. 31.
27 Ann Roosevelt, “FCS Team Shaping Up at Ft. Bliss, General Says,” Defense Daily, May
10, 2007.
28 Ann Roosevelt, “Army Building Task Force to Evaluate First FCS Equipment,” Defense
Daily, March 21, 2007.

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2008, the Army reportedly plans to begin what it calls a Limited User Test, where the
AETF will use several dozen of the FCS-networked vehicles in mock combat.29
Selected Program Issues
The FCS program is composed of myriads of core and associated programs,
each progressing in its own unique manner. Some programs are exceeding or
meeting expectation, while others are experiencing difficulties. Some of the more
notable ongoing programs are examined in the following sections.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS radios are software-defined
radios that are to be used to provide voice, video, and data communications to FCS
ground and aerial vehicles. One of the primary benefits of JTRS is that it is intended
to operate on multiple radio frequencies, permitting it to talk to certain non-JTRS
radios that are expected to stay in the Army’s inventory. JTRS is a joint program and
therefore not considered part of the FCS program by the Army, but it is to form the
“backbone” of the FCS Network and therefore of critical importance to the program’s
success.
GAO reports that the 2006 JTRS program restructuring “appears to put the
program in a better position to succeed, by emphasizing an incremental, more
moderate risk approach to developing and fielding capabilities.”30 While the
restructuring of the estimated $37 billion program is viewed as a positive
development, GAO notes that the program still faces a number of long term technical
challenges in terms of interoperability, meeting size, weight, and power constraints,
and meeting information assurance requirements.31
JTRS has recently conducted a number of tests and program reviews that have
been described by some as “successful” and “on cost, and on schedule.”32 In
particular, the JTRS Ground Mounted Radio (GMR), which will be mounted in FCS
MGVs, has reportedly had a number of successful field tests, and the JTRS
Handheld, Manpack, Small (HMS) has had a number of successful technology
demonstrations and has undergone a design review. The JTRS Airborne, Maritime,
and Fixed radio program (AMF) also reportedly conducted a successful design
review, and a contract for low-rate initial production for these radios is due to be
issued late in 2007.
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T). WIN-T is described
as the Army’s “communications network of the future consisting of a three-tiered
29 Kris Osborn, “Vehicle Will Put FCS to Test in July 2008,” Army Times, March 12, 2007,
p. 18.
30 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program
Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-09-955, September 2006, p. 4.
31 Ibid.,p. 1.
32 Marina Malenic, “Joint Tactical Radio System Tests and Reviews Continue,” Inside the
Army, February 26, 2007 and Ann Roosevelt, “Boeing JTRS GMR Program on Cost, On
Schedule, Officials Says,” Defense Daily, March 13, 2007.

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CRS-9
architecture of orbital, airborne, and ground links that will provide connectivity to a
dispersed and highly mobile force.”33 WIN-T, reportedly now expected to cost
approximately $16.4 billion, is intended to permit the Army to communicate and
transfer large amounts of data on the move.34
Program delays in WIN-T program compelled the Army to extend an interim
program — the Joint Network Node (JNN) — which employed off-the-shelf
networking technology to provide improved communications and data transfer
capabilities to the Army in Iraq. Although JNN does provide many of the capabilities
that WIN-T hopes to eventually embody, JNN does not provide a mobile networking
capability. There has been a great deal of concern expressed about the redundancy
between the WIN-T and JNN programs, as well as their respective costs.35
Nunn-McCurdy Breach and Merger with JNN.36 On March 5, 2007, the
Secretary of the Army notified Congress that the WIN-T program had exceeded its
approved program baseline by more than 25%.37 Both the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees have recommended in their markups of the FY2008 Defense
Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585, S. 1584) that the Army combine the WIN-T and JNN
programs.38 In response to the Nunn-McCurdy breach and congressional language,
DOD decided in June 2007 to restructure the WIN-T program and merge it with the
JNN program.39 The Army tentatively plans on fielding WIN-T in four increments,
with each increment having increasing capability.
Active Protective System (APS). In March 2006, a contract potentially
worth $70 million was awarded to Raytheon to develop an Active Protective System
(APS) for FCS manned ground vehicles as well as the Army’s current fleet of
combat vehicles. The APS, divided into a short-range system for dealing with urban-
33 Scott Nance, “Analyst: Advanced Networks to be Rumsfeld Legacy,” Defense Today,
Volume 26, Number 233, December 8, 2005, p. 3.
34 “Army Restructures WIN-T to Meet Future Combat System Requirements,” Inside the
Army, July 3, 2006 and Josh Rogin, “DOD: Projected WIN-T Costs Soars by $2.2 Billion,”
Federal Computer Weekly, April 10, 2007.
35 Daniel Wasserbly, “House Cuts Over $2 Billion from Joint Network Node Funding in FY-
08,” InsideDefense.com, May 28, 2007.
36 Nunn-McCurdy refers to the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment (Sen. Sam Nunn, D-GA, and
Rep. David McCurdy, D-OK) to the FY1982 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 97-86) that
calls for the termination of weapons programs when the program’s total costs grow by more
than 25% above original estimates, unless the program is certified as critical by the
Secretary of Defense or the cost growth was attributable to specified changes in the
program.
37 Testimony of Dr. James I. Finley, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) before the House Armed Services Committee, March 27, 2007.
38 Press Release: Senate Statement on the FY 08 Defense Authorization Bill, May 25, 2007,
and House Armed Services Committee, House Armed Services Committee Approves Fiscal
Year 2008 Defense Authorization Bill, May 9, 2007.
39 Daniel Wasserby, “Army to Restructure WIN-T Program After Nunn-McCurdy Breach,”
InsideDefense.com, June 25, 2007.

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CRS-10
type threats such as rocket-propelled grenades and a long-range system for dealing
with anti-tank guided missiles, has been compared to a “mini anti-ballistic missile
system.” For both systems, a suite of sensors is intended to detect an incoming threat
and then hit the incoming projectile with projectile of its own.
The APS program came under public criticism in September 2006 when a press
report alleged that the Army rejected an Israeli-developed APS called “Trophy” for
use in the FCS program, despite the system being successfully tested on U.S. combat
vehicles.40 The report further contended that the Army was favoring the APS system
in development by Raytheon over the Trophy system because of “money and
politics” and that U.S. forces in the field were suffering casualties because of this
decision.41 A GAO report however, maintains that there was no conflict of interest,
concluding that:
No officials from the offering companies participated in the evaluation and all
offers were evaluated based on the same criteria. Four proposals were evaluated
and three were determined to be comparable in terms of cost and schedule. The
winner — Raytheon — was chosen on technical merit, as being more likely to
meet APS requirements although its design had less mature technology.42
The Army contends that the Raytheon system under development can detect
and engage incoming projectiles from the front, back, sides, and the top of a vehicle
whereas the Trophy system does not detect or engage top-down projectiles thereby
creating a significant vulnerability for U.S. vehicles.43 In addition, the Trophy system
presently has a single-shot capability and once a threat is engaged from a certain
direction, the vehicle is vulnerable to a second shot from that direction. The Army
also believes that the Raytheon system will result in less collateral damage than the
Trophy system. The Army suggests that adopting the Trophy system could provide
soldiers with a “false sense of security” and also suggests that the Raytheon-
developed system is progressing favorably, noting that it is now knocking down live
warheads during testing.
FCS Program Budget
The FCS program budget has risen steadily since 1999 as the program has
evolved. DOD asked for $3.7 billion in FY2008 for FCS Research, Development,
40 Adam Ciralsky and Lisa Meyers, “Army Shuns System to Combat RPGs,” MSNBC.com,
September 5, 2006.
41 Ibid.
42 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Processes Used to Evaluate Active
Protection Systems, GAO-07-759, June 2007, Executive Summary.
43 Information from this section is from an Army FCS Briefing given on September 7, 2006.

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CRS-11
Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $99.6 million for procurement of long-lead
items for Spin Out One.44
FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585, S. 1584).
House Armed Services Committee. The House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) has recommended $2.8 billion for FCS in FY2008 — a
reduction of $867 million.45 The HASC based the reduction on a number of factors
including, “schedule and cost challenges, a history of Army changes to the program
and a serious concern about how the cost of the FCS program could affect the future
health of the Army,” further suggesting that the security environment in which FCs
exists has changed significantly “but the Army has not sufficiently adjusted the
program to accommodate this new reality.” The HASC, however, recommended
fully funding the Administration’s $99.6 million FCS procurement request so the
Army could begin procuring long-lead items intended to be fielded for Spin Out One.
The HASC also urged the Army to merge the JNN and WIN-T programs, and also
recommended funding reductions to both programs due to program delays, cost
overruns, and questions about operational testing. The committee also included a
provision requiring the Army to conduct realistic operational testing of the FCS
Network before initiating low-rate production of FCS MGVs.
Senate Armed Services Committee. The Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) recommended: “Fully funding the President’s budget request for
the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS), adding $90 million to restore FY 2008
funding for the Armed Robotic vehicles deleted in the recent [Army’s] program
restructure, and adding $25 million to accelerate the development of the FCS active
protection system.”46
In addition, the SASC included provisions to conduct a comparative live fire test
of active protection systems and an assessment of current and developing foreign and
domestic active protection systems, as well as the merger of the WIN-T and JNN
programs.47
House Appropriations Committee. The House Appropriations Committee
(HAC) recommended FY2008 FCS funding of $3.157 billion — $406 million below
the President’s request, contending that the President’s request was “in excess of
what was needed to keep the program on a reasonable development schedule.”48
44 President Bush’s FY2008 Defense Budget Submission, February 5, 2007, p. 8.
45 Information in this section is from House Armed Services Committee, “House Armed
Services Committee Approves Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization Bill,” May 9, 2007,
pp. 36-37.
46 Press Release : Senate Statement on the FY 08 Defense Authorization Bill, May 25, 2007
and House Armed Services Committee, “House Armed Services Committee Approves Fiscal
Year 2008 Defense Authorization Bill,” May 9, 2007.
47 Ibid.
48 House Committee on Appropriations, Summary: 2008 Defense Appropriations Full
(continued...)

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CRS-12
Senate Appropriations Committee.49 The Senate Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee fully funded the President’s FY2008 budget request for FCS, as well
as the initial procurement of FCS equipment required for Spin Out One.
Army’s Response to the HASC’s Proposed Cuts.50 The Army
maintains that the HASC’s proposed $867 million cut will “emasculate the FCS
program.” If this proposed cut is enacted, the Army contends that it will be required
to:
! Eliminate all Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs) except the Non-
Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C);
! Terminate all Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) except the Small
UGV (SUGV);
! Terminate the Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and field
only the Class I (platoon level) UAV;
! Terminate 20% of Systems of Systems Engineering;
! Eliminate two out of three planned FCS Spin Outs; and
! Maintain current combat systems well beyond 2040.
FCS Cost Estimates. In March 2006, GAO estimated that the current total
cost for the FCS program was $160.7 billion (then-year dollars) — an increase of
76% over the Army’s first estimate.51 In July 2006, the Department of Defense’s
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the total cost for the
development, procurement and operations of FCS had increased to more than $300
billion.52 The Army maintains that the total cost for the FCS program will be roughly
$230 billion, based on an April 2006 estimate from the FCS Program Office.53 An
August 2006 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study postulated that, given
historic cost growth in similar programs, that annual FCS costs could reach $16
48 (...continued)
Committee Markup, July 25, 2007.
49 U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Press Release, “Senate Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee Passes Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations Bill - Subcommittee
Markup,” September 11, 2007.
50 Information in this section is taken from a meeting between CRS and the Army G-8 FCS
Program Office on August 1, 2007.
51 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report “Acquisitions: Business Case and
Business Arrangements Key for Future Combat System’s Success,” GAO-06-478T, March
1, 2006, p. 8.
52 Megan Scully, “Army Sticks to its Guns, Rejects New FCS Cost Estimates,” National
Journal’s Congress Daily AM, July 13, 2006.
53 Ibid.

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CRS-13
billion annually, exceeding the Army’s estimates of $10 billion annually.54 The
Army has disputed CBO’s estimates, calling them “seriously flawed” suggesting that
CBO does not address the strategic environment or changing operational
requirements.55 In June 2007, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) — a nonprofit
corporation that administers three federally funded research and development centers
— reportedly concluded that the FCS program would cost $ 13 billion more than
what the Army has estimated, a conclusion that the Army has rejected.56 Some
maintain that this wide disparity in FCS cost estimates seven years into the program
has resulted in a lack of confidence that the FCS program can be conducted in a cost-
efficient manner.
Potential Issues for Congress
What are the Military Risks Resulting
from FCS Restructuring?
The Army maintains that reducing the FCS program from 18 to 14 systems will
save the Army $3.4 billion over the next six years, but will “put at risk our ability to
reach the full tactical and operational potential envisioned for FCS.”57 Some
question if this statement is rhetoric or if there will be an actual loss of combat
capability, calling into question the wisdom of potentially spending more than $160
billion for an FCS-equipped force that might not be as capable as the Army has
advertised. While the Army has provided detailed estimates on the logistics, troop,
and long-term cost savings that it believes will be derived from FCS, some feel that
the tactical benefits of FCS are less well understood. Given what is perceived as the
highly speculative nature of the original FCS (18 system) program’s tactical
capabilities, some question how the Army can quantify the military risk of
restructuring the program to 14 systems. Congress may decide to explore this issue
with the Army, possibly requiring the Army to quantify FCS operational capabilities
and the military risk resulting from its decision to restructure the FCS program.
Other Service Participation in the FCS Program
It has been reported that the Marines, Navy, and Air Force are considering
procuring FCS vehicles, sensors, and networking technologies.58 The Marines are
said to be interested in procuring a number of different types of FCS MGVs, as well
54 “The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives,” A CBO Study, August
2006, p. xii.
55 Ann Roosevelt, “Army Calls CBO’s FCS Report Seriously Flawed,” Defense Daily, Vol.
231, No. 52, September 19, 2006.
56 Daniel Wasserbly, “Study: Army FCS Program Will Cost $13 Billion More than
Estimated,” InsideDefense.com, July 30, 2007.
57 2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5, 2007, p. 9.
58 Information in this section is taken from Kris Osborn, “Other U.S. Services May Buy FCS
Technology,” DefenseNews.com, June 25, 2007.

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CRS-14
as a variety of FCS network technologies. The Navy and Air Force are also said to
be interested in the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE).
An Army official maintains that other Service acquisition of FCS vehicles and
technologies could help to reduce production, maintenance, and logistics costs for the
overall program. Congress might decide to examine the potential impact of Marine,
Navy, and Air Force procurement of FCS vehicles and technologies. Such an
examination could provide insights into cost savings as well as into how the Army’s
FCS procurement timeline might be affected by the requirements of the other
Services.
FCS and Counterinsurgency
The Army contends that FCS is specifically designed for the “Long War” and
fighting insurgencies.59 To support its position, Army leadership recently cited the
results of a computer simulation of convoy security operations in Iraq where a
computer-simulated FCS battalion was sent to rescue a convoy ambushed by
insurgents. When the simulation was conducted with the FCS battalion having
“continuous situational awareness,” the simulated enemy could take “no actions that
FCS could not see,” resulting in the FCS battalion accomplishing its mission in one
hour with no soldiers killed or wounded. When the simulation was run using a non-
FCS battalion in its place, it took the non-FCS battalion three hours and eight soldiers
killed and more than 50 wounded to accomplish the same mission against the same
enemy.
Some might argue that the Army is being overly optimistic about FCS’s ability
to achieve “continuous situational awareness,” which enables FCS to find and engage
the enemy as well as avoid potential threats that could destroy lightly armored FCS
MGVs. In terms of survivability, the Congressional Budget Office notes:
Many analysts have concluded that current technology does not permit the
construction of light-weight combat vehicles that match or surpass current
vehicles in reliability and invulnerability to enemy weapons. Furthermore, the
Army’s experience in Iraq suggests that its strategy for making lightly armored
vehicles equally as survivable as the heavily armored Abrams tank may not be
feasible. To achieve comparable survivability, U.S. combat vehicles would avoid
being targeted by exploiting superior knowledge of enemy activities. The threat
in Iraq has come primarily in urban settings from individually launched weapons,
and the ability to identify attackers’ locations may be beyond any technology
now envisioned.60
While most agree that the FCS network, as envisioned by the Army, should
provide the Army with enhanced communications, intelligence, and sensing
capabilities, some might argue that the Army is placing undue emphasis on
theoretical FCS technological capabilities in making its case for FCS relevancy in
59 Information in this section is from Ann Roosevelt, “FCS Would Bring Significant
Advantages to Future Insurgency-Type Operations, Harvey Say,” Defense Daily, January
23, 2007, and Fawzia Sheik, “Army Leaders See Future Combat System as
Counterinsurgency Tool,” InsideDefense.com, February 19, 2007.
60 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Budget Options,” February 2007, p. 8.

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CRS-15
counterinsurgency operations. Some suggest that effective counterinsurgency
operations are characterized by cultural awareness, interpersonal relationships, and
security provided through human presence, and are less a function of superior
technology and firepower.
A recent study that questions the effectiveness of modern “mechanized”
militaries in waging a successful counterinsurgency campaign might also have
relevance in examining FCS’s role in counterinsurgency.61 The study, citing
empirical historical evidence dating from 1800 to 2004 derived from 238
insurgencies, maintains that modern mechanized forces62 are unsuited for
counterinsurgencies by design “because their structures and associated tactics inhibit
the construction of information networks among the local population.”63 The report’s
authors further contend that modern mechanized forces:
Struggle to defeat insurgents because they rarely solve the “identification
problem” - how to sort insurgents from the noncombatant population selectively.
Built for direct combat, modern militaries are isolated from local populations by
their technology and thus are “starved” of the information that would enable
counterinsurgents to use their power selectively. As a result, these militaries
often inadvertently swell insurgent ranks while dissuading potential collaborators
through the indiscriminate application of coercive and non-coercive power.64
Given previously discussed concerns and the findings of the aforementioned study,
Congress may decide to further explore the Army’s claims regarding FCS’s
relevance in counterinsurgency operations.
61 Information in this section is from Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the
Machines: Mechanization and the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare,”
Version 2.3, May 2007.
62 The authors define modern mechanized forces as systems that combine mechanized
vehicles, aircraft, and communications technologies to destroy an adversary’s military in
direct combat. Central to this isthe pattern of force employment whereby units are employed
to destroy the largest enemy force over the largest area with the fewest men (and casualties)
in the least possible time.
63 Lyall and Wilson, p. 7.
64 Ibid., p. 3.

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CRS-16
Additional Reading
CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by
Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RL33757, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
CRS Report RL33161: The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s
Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United
States?, by Ed Bruner.
CRS Report RS21195, Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in DOD
Programs: Policy Issues for Congress, by Gary J. Pagliano and Ronald
O’Rourke.

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CRS-17
Appendix. FCS Subsystems
Manned Ground Vehicles
FCS manned ground vehicles (MGVs) are a family of eight different combat vehicles
— with some having more than one variation — that are based on a common
platform and are being designed to be air transportable by the U.S. Air Force. They
are to be equipped with a variety of passive and active protection systems and sensors
that the Army hopes will offer them the same survivability as the current heavy armor
force. In addition the Army intends for its MGVs to be highly reliable, require low
maintenance, and have fuel-efficient engines. The following are brief descriptions
of MGV types and variants. All are intended to have a range of 750 kilometers and
a top speed of 90 kilometers per hour (kph) — 55 miles per hour:65
Mounted Combat System (MCS). As envisioned, the MCS provides direct
and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) fires, is capable of providing direct fire support to
dismounted infantry, and can attack targets with BLOS fires out to a range of 8
kilometers. The MCS is intended to replace to current M-1 Abrams tank. The MCS
is to have a crew of two and might also be able to accommodate two passengers.
The MCS is to be armed with a 120 mm main gun, a .50 caliber machine gun, and
a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher.
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). As planned, the ICV consists of four
versions: the Company Commander version, the Platoon Leader verison, the Rifle
Squad version, and the Weapons Squad version. All four versions appear to be
identical from the exterior to prevent the targeting of a specific carrier version. The
Rifle Squad version is to have a two-man crew, and is to be able to transport a nine-
man infantry squad and dismount them so that they can conduct combat operations
on foot. The ICV is to mount a 30 or 40 mm cannon.
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C). The NLOS-C is to provide
networked, extended-range targeting and precision attack of both point and area
targets with a wide variety of munitions. Its primary purpose will be to provide
responsive fires to FCS Combined Arms Battalions and their subordinate units. The
NLOS is to have a two-man crew and a fully automated handling, loading, and firing
capability.
Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M). The NLOS-M is intended to provide
indirect fires in support of FCS companies and platoons. The NLOS-M is to have a
four-man crew, mount a 120mm mortar, and also carry an 81 mm mortar for
dismounted operations away from the carrier.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV). As planned, the RSV
will feature advanced sensors to detect, locate, track, and identify targets from long
ranges under all climatic conditions, both day and night. The RSV is to have a mast-
65 Information for these descriptions are taken from two Army sources: The Army’s FCS
18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004, and the FCS 2005 Flipbook, dated August
26, 2004.

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CRS-18
mounted long-range, electro-optical infra-red sensor, sensors for radio frequency
(RF) intercept and direction finding as well as a remote chemical warfare agent
detector. RSVs are to also carry four dismounted scouts, unattended ground sensors
(UGS), a Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) with various payloads, and two
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In addition to the four scouts, the RSV is to
have a two-man crew and a defensive weapons system.
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V). The C2V is intended to serve as
the “hub” for battlefield command and control. It is to provide information
management for the integrated network of communications and sensors for the FCS
brigade combat teams. The C2V is to have a crew of two and carry four staff officers
and also be capable of employing UAVs.
Medical Vehicle - Evacuation (MV-E) and Medical Vehicle -
Treatment (MV-T). There are to be two versions of the MV: the MV-E and MV-T.
The MV-E would permit combat trauma specialists to be closer to the casualty’s
point of injury as it is to move with combat forces and evacuate casualties to other
treatment facilities. The MV-T is to enhance the ability to provide Advanced Trauma
Management/Advanced Trauma Life Support forward in the battle area and both
MV-E and MV-T would be capable of conducting medical procedures and treatments
using telemedicine systems. Both would have four-man crews and the capability to
carry four patients.
FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV). The FRMV would
be the FCS Brigade Combat Team’s recovery and maintenance system. The FRMV
is to have a crew of three, plus additional space for up to three recovered crew
members.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)66
Each FCS-equipped brigade will have a number of UAVs.67 While these UAVs
are to provide a variety of capabilities to forces on the ground, some experts note that
they could also present an air space management challenge to not only manned Army
aviation assets, but also to Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other nation’s aircraft
that might be providing support to Army ground operations. The following are brief
descriptions of the Army’s four classes of UAVs:
Class I UAVs. Class I UAVs are intended to provide Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) at the platoon level. Weighing less than
15 pounds each, these Class I UAVs are intended to operate in urban and jungle
terrain and have a vertical takeoff and landing capability. They are to be used to
observe routes and targets and can provide limited communications transmissions
relay. The Class I UAV are to be controlled by dismounted soldiers and can also be
66 Unless otherwise noted, UAV information for these descriptions are taken from two Army
sources: The Army’s FCS 18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004 and the FCS 2005
Flipbook, dated August 26, 2004.
67 Sandra I. Erwin, “Army to Field Four Classes of UAVs,” National Defense, April 2003.

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controlled by selected FCS ground platforms, and have an endurance of 50 minutes
over an 8 kilometer area, and a 10,500 foot maximum ceiling.
Class IV UAVs. Class IV UAVs are intended to provide the FCS brigade
commander with a long endurance capability encompassing all functions in Class
I through Class III UAVs. It is intended to stay aloft for 72 continuous hours and
operate over a 75 kilometer radius with a maximum ceiling of 16,500 feet. It is also
planned to interface with other manned and unmanned aerial vehicles and be able to
take off and land without a dedicated airfield.
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)68
Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV). The ARV was intended to come in two
variants — the Assault variant and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition (RSTA) variant. The RSTA variant has been deferred as part of the
Army’s 2007 FCS program restructuring. The two variants were to share a common
chassis. The Assault variant is to provide remote reconnaissance capability, deploy
sensors, and employ its direct fire weapons and special munitions at targets such as
buildings, bunkers, and tunnels. It is also intended to be able to conduct battle
damage assessments, act as a communications relay, and support both mounted and
dismounted forces with direct and anti-tank fire as well as occupy key terrain.
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV). The SUGV is a small,
lightweight, manportable UGV capable of operating in urban terrain, tunnels, and
caves. The SUGV will weigh 30 pounds, operate for 6 hours without a battery
recharge, and have a one kilometer ground range and a 200 meter tunnel range. Its
modular design will permit a variety of payloads which will enable it to perform
high-risk intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and chemical
weapons or toxic industrial chemical reconnaissance.
Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE). The
MULE is a UGV that will support dismounted infantry. It is to come in three variants
sharing a common chassis — transport, countermine, and the Armed Robotic Vehicle
- Assault - Light (ARV-A-L). The transport variant is to be able to carry 1,900 to
2,400 pounds of equipment and rucksacks for dismounted infantry and follow them
in complex and rough terrain. The countermine variant is to have the capability to
detect, mark, and neutralize anti-tank mines. The ARV-A-L variant is to incorporate
a weapons package and a RSTA package to support dismounted infantry operations.
The MULE is intended to have a 100 kilometer road, and 50 kilometer cross country,
range.
68 Unless otherwise noted, information for these descriptions are taken from two Army
sources: The Army’s FCS 18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004 and the FCS 2005
Flipbook, dated August 26, 2004.

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Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)69
UGS are divided into two groups — Tactical UGS and Urban UGS — and are
described as follows:
Tactical UGS. Tactical UGS include intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) sensors. These sensors are to employ a variety of sensing technologies and
integrated into the overall FCS network. They are intended to be deployed by hand,
by vehicle, or by robot and have a 48 hour endurance. They are intended to be
expendable, low-cost sensors used for such tasks as perimeter defense, surveillance,
target acquisition, and CBRN early warning.
Urban UGS. Urban UGS can also be employed by soldiers, vehicles, or robots
and are intended to provide situation awareness inside and outside of buildings for
force protection and also for previously cleared buildings and areas.
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS). NLOS-LS is to consist
of a family of missiles in a deployable, platform-independent, container launch unit
(CLU), which can be fired in an unmanned and remote mode. Each CLU is to have
a fire control system and 15 missiles consisting of Precision Attack Missiles (PAM)
and Loitering Attack Missiles (LAM).
The PAM is to have two employment modes — a direct-fire and a fast attack
mode or a boost-glide mode. The missile is intended to receive target information
prior to launch and receive and respond to target location updates while in flight.
The PAM can be fired in the laser-designated mode and transmit near real-time target
imagery prior to impact. The PAM is intended to be used against heavily armored
targets.
The LAM is to provide imagery for search, surveillance, targeting, and battle
damage assessment (BDA) and can also serve as an airborne radio retransmission
sight. LAMs are to be capable of flying long distances with significant loiter times.
LAMs are intended to be re-programmed in flight and attack, high value, fleeting
targets.
The Network70
The FCS network is considered the most crucial system of all 14 systems. The
FCS network is to consist of four interactive components — the System-of-Systems
Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE); Battle Command (BC) software;
communications and computers (CC); and intelligence, reconnaissance and
surveillance (ISR) systems.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.

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CRS-21
System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE).
The SOSCOE is to enable the integration of a variety of software packages into the
FCS network. It is intended to use commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and allow for
the integration of critical interoperability packages that translate Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and allied message formats into internal FCS message formats.
Battle Command (BC) Software. Battle Command mission applications
are to include mission planning and preparation, situational understanding, battle
command and mission execution, and warfighter-machine interface.
Mission Planning and Preparation. Consists of 16 different functions that
provide FCS units with the following automated capabilities:
! The development of deliberate, anticipatory, and rapid-response
plans;
! The ability to perform plan assessments and evaluations;
! The ability to perform terrain analysis;
! The conduct of mission rehearsals; and
! The conduct of after action reviews.
Situation Understanding. This consists of 10 different packages that allow
the user to better comprehend his surroundings. These packages employ map
information and a variety of databases that help to determine enemy locations and
capabilities, infer enemy intentions, and assess the threat to U.S. forces.
Battle Command and Execution. This package contains a variety of
planning and decision aids to help commanders make rapid, informed, and accurate
decisions during battle. These packages can also be used in the training and rehearsal
modes.
Warfighter-Machine Interface Package. This package receives soldier-
generated information and displays information across all FCS platforms for soldier
use.
Communications and Computer (CC) Systems. The Communications
and Computer network is intended to provide secure, reliable access to information
over extended distances and complex terrain. This network is not intended to rely
on a large and separate infrastructure because it is to be embedded in the FCS mobile
platforms and move with the combat units. The communications network is to
consist of a variety of systems such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS);
Wideband Network Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform systems; Network Data
Link; and the Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T).
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) Systems. The
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance System is to be a distributed and
networked array of multispectral ISR sensors intended to provide timely and accurate
situational awareness to the FCS force. In addition, the ISR system is intended to
help FCS formations avoid enemy fires while providing precision, networked fires
to the unit.

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