Order Code RL33001
U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation:
Issues for U.S. Policy
Updated October 10, 2007
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for
U.S. Policy
Summary
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a
challenge in enlisting the full support of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
counterterrorism. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit
cooperation and how to address China’s concerns about military action (Operation
Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism
has strategically transformed bilateral relations and whether China’s support has been
valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests.
The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the
tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize — even if it did not
transform — the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush
since late 2001. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has not
participated in the counterterrorism coalition. Still, for almost four years after the
attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush and other administration officials
tended to praise the PRC’s diplomatic and other support for the war against terrorism.
Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China’s extent of cooperation in
counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick acknowledged that “China and the United States can do more
together in the global fight against terrorism” after “a good start,” in his policy speech
that called on China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in the world. The summits of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S.
concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern
about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces
in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers.
Congress has oversight over the closer ties with China as well as a range of
policy options. U.S. policy options have included bilateral law-enforcement; position
on ethnic Uighur groups that China calls “terrorist organizations”; decisions on
detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison; weapons nonproliferation; waivers of
sanctions for the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown to export security equipment;
cooperation in port security; military-to-military contacts; attention to China’s
influence in Central Asia through the SCO; and appeals to China to stop arms
transfers to Iran (suspected of ending up with the Taliban in Afghanistan).
The 110th Congress considered H.R. 1, the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The Conference Report of July 25 adopted the
House language noting that the Commission called on China to participate in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The bill became P.L. 110-53 on August 3,
2007. Also, the House passed H.Res. 497 (Ros-Lehtinen), noting that the PRC has
manipulated the campaign against terrorists to increase cultural and religious
oppression of the Muslim Uighur people and has detained and beaten Rebiya
Kadeer’s children. Passed on September 17, 2007, the resolution urged the PRC to
protect the rights of the Uighurs, release Kadeer’s children, and release a Canadian
of Uighur descent. This report will be updated as warranted.

Contents
Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Policy Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Options and Implications for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Summits and “Strategic” Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Law-Enforcement Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Uighur People and “Terrorist” Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Detained Uighurs at Guantanamo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Weapons Nonproliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Port Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Sanctions and Security Equipment Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Military-to-Military Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PRC-Origin Weapons and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation:
Issues for U.S. Policy
Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks
China has seen itself as a victim of terrorist attacks in the 1990s, thought to be
committed by some Muslim extremists (ethnic Uighur separatists) in the
northwestern Xinjiang region. Some Uighur activists reportedly received training in
Afghanistan. China’s concerns appeared to place it in a position to support
Washington and share intelligence after the attacks of September 11, 2001.1 In a
message to President Bush on September 11, PRC ruler Jiang Zemin condemned the
terrorist attacks and offered condolences. In a phone call with the President on
September 12, Jiang reportedly promised to cooperate with the United States to
combat terrorism. At the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on the same day, the PRC
(a permanent member) voted with the others for Resolution 1368 (to combat
terrorism). On September 20, Beijing said that it offered “unconditional support” in
fighting terrorism. On September 20-21, visiting Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan
promised cooperation, and Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that discussions
covered intelligence-sharing but not military cooperation. PRC counterterrorism
experts attended a “productive” initial meeting on September 25, 2001, in
Washington, D.C. On September 28, 2001, China voted with all others in the UNSC
for Resolution 1373, reaffirming the need to combat terrorism.
PRC promises of support for the U.S. fight against terrorism, however, were
qualified by other initial statements expressing concerns about U.S. military action.
China also favored exercising its decision-making authority at the UNSC, where it
has veto power. Initial commentary in official PRC media faulted U.S. intelligence
and U.S. defense and foreign policies (including that on missile defense) for the
attacks. On September 18, 2001, in a phone call with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, China reported Jiang as saying that war against terrorism required conclusive
evidence, specific targets to avoid hurting innocent people, compliance with the U.N.
Charter, and a role for the Security Council. Also, observers were appalled at the
reported gleeful anti-U.S. reactions in the PRC’s online chat rooms after the attacks.
In Tokyo, on January 21, 2002, at a conference on reconstruction aid to
Afghanistan, China pledged $1 million, in addition to humanitarian goods worth $3.6
million. But three days later, Jiang promised to visiting Afghan interim leader Hamid
Karzai additional reconstruction aid of $150 million spread over four to five years.
1 See also CRS Report RL31213, China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems
with Terrorism
, by Dewardric McNeal and Kerry Dumbaugh.

CRS-2
Of this $150 million, China offered $47 million by 2003 and offered $15 million in
2004.2
Policy Analysis
The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the
tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize — even if it did not transform
— the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President Bush since late 2001. In the
short-term, U.S. security policy toward Beijing sought counterterrorism cooperation,
shifting from issues about weapons proliferation and military maritime safety (in the
wake of the EP-3/F-8 aircraft collision crisis of April 2001).3 Given the mixed state of
bilateral ties after the collision crisis, Beijing’s support met much of initial U.S.
expectations. Testifying to Congress in February 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell
praised Beijing’s diplomatic support, saying “China has helped in the war against
terrorism.”4
Concerning other support, including any cooperation by the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), the commanders of the Central and Pacific Commands, Gen. Tommy
Franks and Adm. Dennis Blair, separately confirmed in April 2002 that China did not
provide military cooperation (nor was it requested) in Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan (e.g., basing, staging, or overflight) and that its shared intelligence
was not specific enough, particularly as compared to cooperation from the
Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia.5 The Pentagon’s June 2002 report on foreign
contributions in the counterterrorism war did not include China among the 50
countries in the coalition.6 In December 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly confirmed intelligence-sharing, saying “we are sharing [counterterrorism]
information to an unprecedented extent but making judgments independently.”7
China’s long-standing relationship with nuclear-armed Pakistan was an
important factor in considering the significance of Beijing’s support, especially with
concerns about the viability of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s government.
Some said that Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States must come with PRC
acquiescence, pointing to a PRC envoy’s meeting with Musharraf on September 18,
2 “China to Offer $15m for Afghan Reconstruction,” Xinhua, April 1, 2004.
3 See CRS Report RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001:
Assessments and Policy Implications
, coordinated by Shirley Kan.
4 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Affairs Budget,
February 5, 2002.
5 Foreign Press Center Briefing, General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central
Command, Washington, April 11, 2002; Press Roundtable with Adm. Dennis Blair,
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Hong Kong, April 18, 2002.
6 Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the War Against
Terrorism,” June 14, 2002.
7 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “U.S.-East Asia Policy:
Three Aspects,” Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, December 11, 2002.

CRS-3
2001. However, on September 13, 2001, Musharraf already had agreed to fight with
the United States against bin Laden.8 The PRC has reportedly provided Pakistan with
nuclear and missile technology. China could provide intelligence about Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and any suspected technology transfers out of Pakistan to countries
like North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
In the long term, counterterrorism was initially thought by some to hold strategic
implications for the U.S.-PRC relationship. However, it has remained debatable as
to whether such cooperation has fundamentally transformed the bilateral relationship.
Policymakers watched to see whether Beijing’s leaders used the opportunity to
improve bilateral ties, especially on weapons nonproliferation problems. In his State
of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, President Bush expressed his expectation
that “in this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries.
America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before,
to achieve peace and prosperity.” Nonetheless, Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet testified to Congress in February 2002, that the 9/11 attacks did not
change “the fundamentals” of China’s approach to us.9
The PRC’s concerns about domestic attacks and any links to foreign terrorist
groups, U.S.-PRC relations, China’s international standing in a world dominated by
U.S. power (particularly after the terrorist attacks), and its image as a responsible
world power helped explain China’s supportive stance. However, Beijing also
worried about U.S. military action near China, U.S.-led alliances, Japan’s active role
in the war on terrorism, greater U.S. influence in Central and South Asia, and U.S.
support for Taiwan — all exacerbating long-standing fears of “encirclement.”
China issued a Defense White Paper in December 2002, stating that major
powers remained in competition but that since the September 2001 attacks against
the United States, countries have increased cooperation. Although this policy paper
contained veiled criticisms of the United States for its military buildup, stronger
alliances in Asia, and increased arms sales to Taiwan, it did not criticize the United
States by name as in the Defense White Paper of 2000. However, the Defense White
Papers of 2004 and 2006 again criticized the United States by name.
Options and Implications for U.S. Policy
Summits and “Strategic” Ties
The counterterrorism campaign helped to stabilize U.S.-PRC relations up to the
highest level, which faced tensions early in the Bush Administration in April 2001
8 First reported by Dan Balz, Bob Woodward, and Jeff Himmelman, “Thursday, September
13,” Washington Post, January 29, 2002; and confirmed in the 9/11 Commission’s report,
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July
22, 2004.
9 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing, Worldwide Threats: Converging
Dangers in a Post-9/11 World,
February 6, 2002.

CRS-4
with the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis and U.S. approvals of arms sales to Taiwan.
According to the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission issued in July 2004, President
Bush chaired a National Security Council meeting on the night of September 11,
2001, in which he contended that the attacks provided a “great opportunity” to
engage Russia and China. President Bush traveled to Shanghai in October 2001 for
his first meeting with then PRC President Jiang Zemin at the Leaders’ Meeting of the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Bush called the PRC an
important partner in the global coalition against terrorists but also warned Jiang that
the “war on terrorism must never be an excuse to persecute minorities.”10 On
February 21-22, 2002, the President visited Beijing (a trip postponed in October),
after Tokyo and Seoul. The President then hosted Jiang at Bush’s ranch in Crawford,
TX, on October 25, 2002, and Bush said that the two countries were “allies” in
fighting terrorism.11 By the fall of 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick
acknowledged that “China and the United States can do more together in the global
fight against terrorism” after “a good start,” in his policy speech calling on China to
be a “responsible stakeholder.”12
Law-Enforcement Cooperation
On December 6, 2001, Francis Taylor, the State Department’s Coordinator for
Counter-Terrorism, ended talks in Beijing that reciprocated the September 25
meeting in Washington, D.C. He announced that the PRC agreed to give “positive
consideration” to a long-sought U.S. request for the FBI to set up a Legal Attaché
office at the U.S. Embassy, that counterterrorism consultations would occur semi-
annually, and that the two sides would set up a Financial Counter-Terrorism Working
Group. He reported that Beijing’s cooperation has entailed coordination at the U.N.,
intelligence-sharing, law enforcement liaison, and monitoring of financial networks.13
The PRC approved the FBI office in February 2002, and the first semi-annual
meeting on terrorist financing was held at the Treasury Department in late May. The
FBI attaché arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in September 2002. In November
2005, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales met with PRC Minister of Public
Security Zhou Yongkang in Beijing. Visiting Beijing in June 2007, FBI Assistant
Director for International Operations Thomas Fuentes said that he seeks “more
information” from the PRC on terrorism.14
10 White House, “U.S., China Stand Against Terrorism,” Shanghai, China, October 19, 2001.
11 White House, “President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea,”
Crawford, Texas, October 25, 2002.
12 Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility,” September 21,
2005.
13 Department of State, press conference, Beijing, December 6, 2001.
14 Daniel Schearf, “U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations Seeks Further Cooperation with
China,” VOA News, June 13, 2007.

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Uighur People and “Terrorist” Organizations
Further questions concern the U.S. stance on the PRC’s policy toward about 10
million ethnic Uighur people in Xinjiang and what the PRC calls East Turkistan
“terrorist” organizations. Although Taylor confirmed that there are “people from western
China that are involved in terrorist activities in Afghanistan,” he rejected the view that
“all of the people of western China are indeed terrorists” and urged Beijing to deal
politically with their “legitimate” social and economic challenges and not through
counterterrorism means. Taylor also stated that the United States did not agree that
“East Turkestan” forces are terrorists. He confirmed that the U.S. military captured PRC
citizens from western China who were involved with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, while in Beijing on August 26, 2002, Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage announced that, after months of bilateral discussions, he designated
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a “terrorist” group that committed acts
of violence against unarmed civilians. China had issued a report on January 21, 2002,
saying that East Turkistan “terrorist” groups launched attacks with bin Laden’s support
since the 1990s, and ETIM was one of the groups in the report. The U.S. Embassy in
Beijing suggested that ETIM planned to attack the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.15 The
State Department designated ETIM as a terrorist organization under Executive Order
13224 (to freeze assets) but not as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (under the
Immigration and Nationality Act). In December 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly defended the action taken against ETIM as a step based on U.S. evidence that
ETIM had links to Al Qaeda and committed violence against civilians, “not as a
concession to the PRC.”16 PRC media claimed that on January 5, 2007, law
enforcement authorities destroyed a “terrorist training camp” run by ETIM in
Xinjiang, killed 18 “terrorists,” and captured 17 others. However, the civilian Public
Security police carried out the action, not the paramilitary People’s Armed Police
(PAP). Visiting Beijing in June 2007, FBI Assistant Director for International
Operations Thomas Fuentes said that the FBI is still assessing the validity of the
PRC’s claims about a terrorist threat in Xinjiang.17
The Congress and President Bush have expressed concerns about the relatives
of Rebiya Kadeer, a Uighur woman who was detained in the PRC in 1999-2005 and
was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, after she gained freedom in the
United States. In October 2006, a staff delegation of the House International
Relations Committee reported heightened congressional concerns about the
Administration’s designation of ETIM as a terrorist organization and the PRC
authorities’ beatings and detentions of Kadeer’s relatives, even during the staff
15 Philip Pan, “U.S. Warns of Plot by Group in W. China,” Washington Post, August 29,
2002.
16 James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “U.S.-East
Asia Policy: Three Aspects,” Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, December 11, 2002.
17 Daniel Schearf, “U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations Seeks Further Cooperation with
China,” VOA News, June 13, 2007.

CRS-6
delegation’s visit in Urumqi.18 In June 2007, President Bush met with Kadeer in
Prague and criticized the PRC’s detention of her sons.19 In the 110th Congress, the
House passed H.Res. 497 (Ros-Lehtinen), noting that the PRC has manipulated the
campaign against terrorists to increase cultural and religious oppression of the
Muslim Uighur people and has detained and beaten Rebiya Kadeer’s children.
Passed on September 17, 2007, the resolution urged the PRC to protect the rights of
the Uighurs, release Kadeer’s children, and release a Canadian of Uighur descent.
Detained Uighurs at Guantanamo
A related question pertains to the fate of Uighurs captured during U.S. fighting
with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but whom are claimed by the PRC as its citizens for
legal action in China and whom PRC authorities might have sought to interrogate.
In May 2004, Amnesty International said that, in 2002, the United States allowed
PRC officials to participate in interrogations and mistreatment of ethnic Uighurs held
at the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Then, in July 2004, Amnesty International
urged the United States not to turn the 22 detained Uighurs over to China, where they
would face torture and execution in China’s campaign to repress the Uighur people
in the name of “counterterrorism.”20 Other options include sending them to a third
country and resettling them in the United States.
Starting in late 2003, the Defense Department reportedly has determined without
public announcement that 15 Uighurs at Guantanamo could be released, including
five who were picked up because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time and
10 who were considered low-risk detainees whose enemy was the PRC government.
Seven others were determined to be “enemy combatants.”21 By 2004, U.S. officials
told reporters that Uighurs detained at Guantanamo Bay had no more intelligence
value, but the United States could not find a third country to accept them, while
ruling out their return to China.22 In August 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell
confirmed the dilemma, saying that “the Uighurs are not going back to China, but
finding places for them is not a simple matter, but we are trying to find places for
them.”23 The United States has approached over 100 countries to accept the Uighurs,
and the State Department reportedly considered sending the Uighurs back to China
18 Dennis Halpin and Hans Hogrefe, “Findings of Staff Delegation Visit to Urumqi, PRC,
May 30-June 2, 2006,” Memorandum to Chairman Henry Hyde and Ranking Member Tom
Lantos, October 30, 2006.
19 White House, “President Bush Visits Prague, Czech Republic, Discusses Freedom,” June
5, 2007. Also: Rebiya Kadeer, “My Chinese Jailers,” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2007.
20 “Group Says Chinese Saw Detainees,” Washington Post, May 26, 2004; Amnesty
International, “China: Fleeing Uighurs Forced Back to “Anti-Terror” Torture and
Execution,” July 7, 2004.
21 Robin Wright, “Chinese Detainees are Men Without a Country,” Washington Post, August
24, 2005; and Asian Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2005.
22 Guy Dinmore and James Kynge, “China Torture Fears Curb Guantanamo Releases,”
Financial Times, June 23, 2004; and David Cloud and Ian Johnson, “In Post-9/11 World,
Chinese Dissidents Pose U.S. Dilemma,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2004.
23 Secretary Colin Powell, “Roundtable with Japanese Journalists,” August 12, 2004.

CRS-7
instead of allowing them be resettled in the United States.24 On April 20, 2006, the
Defense Department released a list of 558 people detained at Guantanamo, in
response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by the Associated Press.
The list confirmed that there were 22 Uighurs with PRC citizenship being held. On
May 5, 2006, the Pentagon announced the transfer from the Guantanamo Bay prison
to Albania of five Uighurs, all of whom had been determined to be “no longer enemy
combatants” during reviews in 2004-2005. The PRC then demanded that Albania
hand over those Uighurs as “terrorists.” Their plight continues to raise a question of
whether they should be resettled in the United States rather than stay confined in a
camp in Albania.25 Defense lawyers for Uighurs still held at Guantanamo Bay
complained that they suffer in captivity of nearly total isolation.26
Weapons Nonproliferation
In his 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush stressed the twin threats
of terrorism and weapons proliferation, indicating a strong stance on proliferation
problems with the PRC and others. PRC entities have reportedly transferred missile
and/or chemical weapons technology to countries that the State Department says
support terrorism, like Iran and North Korea. On numerous occasions, the
Administration has imposed sanctions for weapons proliferation by PRC entities.
However, the Administration has stressed China’s cooperation at the Six-Party Talks
on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and at the U.N. Security Council on sanctions
against Iran, rather than China’s transfers.27 China has not joined the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003. In its Final
Report issued on July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission urged that the United States
encourage China (and Russia) to join the PSI, among many recommendations. The
110th Congress considered H.R. 1, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007. The House-passed bill of January 9, 2007, noted that the
Commission called on China to participate in PSI. The Senate passed its bill on July
9 without such language. The Conference Report of July 25 adopted the House
provisions on the commission’s recommendations and on the sense of Congress that
the President should expand and strengthen the PSI. The bill became P.L. 110-53
on August 3, 2007.
24 Demetri Sevastopulo, “U.S. Fails to Find Countries to Take Uighurs,” Financial Times, October
28, 2004; “Uighurs Face Return to China from Guantanamo,” Financial Times, March 16, 2005;
“Detention Dilemma,” Washington Post (editorial), May 3, 2005; Josh White and Robin
Wright, “Detainee Cleared for Release is in Limbo at Guantanamo,” Washington Post,
December 15, 2005; Neil Lewis, “Freed From Guantanamo but Stranded Far From Home,”
New York Times, August 15, 2006; Josh White, “Lawyers Demand Release of Chinese
Muslims,” Washington Post, December 5, 2006.
25 Tim Golden, “Chinese Leave Guantanamo for Albanian Limbo,” New York Times, June
10, 2007.
26 R. Jeffrey Smith and Julie Tate, “Uighurs’ Detention Conditions Condemned,”
Washington Post, January 30, 2007.
27 See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Missiles: Policy Issues
, by Shirley Kan.

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Port Security
The Bush Administration also sought China’s cooperation in the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Launched in
January 2002, CSI looked at PRC ports (Shanghai and Shenzhen) among the top 20
foreign ports proposed for U.S. screening of manifests and inspections of containers
before U.S.-bound shipping. On July 29, 2003, China agreed to join CSI. However,
only after this U.S.-PRC agreement did the Bush Administration discuss an
agreement with Taiwan to cover the last of the 20 ports: Kaohsiung. The U.S. CSI
team became operational in Shanghai in April 2005, and that CSI program underwent
its first six-month review by late summer. That CSI program has been compared to
the CSI experience with more cooperative and efficient customs authorities in Hong
Kong, cooperation that became operational in 2002.28 In November 2005, the United
States and the PRC signed an agreement, as part of the Megaports Initiative of the
Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, to install equipment
at China’s ports to detect nuclear and other radioactive material that could be used
for nuclear weapons and “dirty bombs.”
Sanctions and Security Equipment Exports
Additional policy options have included selectively or permanently waiving
sanctions imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown (Section 902 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1990 and 1991, P.L. 101-246), which deny
exports of defense articles/services (including helicopters), crime control equipment,
and satellites. President Bush issued a waiver of those sanctions on January 9, 2002
(to export a bomb containment and disposal unit for the Shanghai fire department to
prevent terrorist bombings) and again on January 25, 2002 (to consider export
licenses for equipment to clean up chemical weapons in China left by Japan in World
War II). More presidential waivers might be considered for exports of equipment for
security of the Olympic games in Beijing in August 2008, but there are concerns
about China’s internal repression. Indeed, in May 2005, China held its first
exhibition on counterterrorism equipment, and over 200 U.S. and other foreign
companies displayed their arms and equipment.29 The PRC government has a record
of rounding up dissidents and other “undesirables” ahead of international events,
including presidential summits.
Military-to-Military Contacts
While there have been no counterterrorism operations with the PLA, the
Pentagon has cautiously resumed military-to-military contacts with China, limited
after a Pentagon review started and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis occurred in 2001.
For the first time under the Bush Administration, the Pentagon and the PLA again
held Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) on December 9, 2002. There were visits by
28 Interviews with CSI teams in Shanghai and Hong Kong; CRS memo, “Congressional Staff
Delegation’s Visit to China, Hong Kong (August 2005), September 14, 2005, by Shirley
Kan.
29 China’s official Xinhua news agency, May 10, 2005.

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China’s Defense Minister, General Cao Gangchuan, in October 2003 and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, in January 2004.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited China in October 2005, the first visit by a
defense secretary since William Cohen’s visit in 2000 and long sought by the PLA
for the resumption of a military relationship. Relevant legislation for congressional
oversight includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1990-1991 (P.L.
101-246); National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65); and
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163).30
However, there is a debate about the extent to which U.S. forces should help the
PLA’s modernization, including through combined exercises. Some have urged
caution in military cooperation with China on this front of counterterrorism, while
others see benefits for the relationship with China. Senator Bob Smith and
Representative Dana Rohrabacher wrote Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in late 2001,
to express concerns about renewed military contacts with China. They argued that
“China is not a good prospect for counter-terrorism cooperation,” because of
concerns that China has practiced internal repression in the name of counterterrorism
and has supplied technology to rogue regimes and state sponsors of terrorism.31 In
contrast, a 2004 report by Rand urged a program of security management with China
that includes counterterrorism as one of three components.32
As preparations intensify for the summer Olympics in Beijing in 2008, an issue
concerns the extent to which the United States, including the military, should support
security at the games to protect U.S. citizens and should cooperate with the PLA or
the paramilitary PAP, given concerns about China’s internal repression surrounding
international events. In March 2007, the PRC Minister of Public Security called for
striking hard at “hostile forces” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and
violent terrorism” and “evil cults” like the Falungong to have “stability” for the
Olympic games. A precedent was set in 2004, when various U.S. departments,
including the Department of Defense, provided security assistance for the Olympic
games in Athens, Greece, in 2004.33 On June 22, 2006, at a hearing of the House
Armed Services Committee, Brigadier General John Allen, Principal Director for
Asian and Pacific Affairs, told Congress that the Defense Department might work
with China on security cooperation for the Olympics. However, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless testified to the House Armed Services
30 CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, by Shirley
Kan.
31 Senator Bob Smith and Representative Dana Rohrabacher, letter to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, December 17, 2001.
32 Rand, “U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military
Relationship,” July 2004.
33 Such assistance included an anti-terrorism exercise held by the European Command in
March 2004; exercise scenarios created by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to defend
against weapons of mass destruction; imagery collected by the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; and defensive barriers and facilities set up by deployed U.S. naval
forces. See GAO, “Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for
Future Olympics,” May 2005.

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Committee on June 13, 2007, that China did not accept offers from the Defense
Department to assist in Olympic security.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and
2006 raised U.S. concerns. (The SCO was founded in Shanghai in June 2001 by
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.) China’s
influence in the SCO increased after the 9/11 attacks raised attention to
counterterrorism. The SCO issued a declaration on July 5, 2005, that called for a
“deadline” for the counterterrorism coalition’s “temporary” use of facilities and
military presence in SCO countries, because major military operations against
terrorists ended in Afghanistan, they claimed. U.S. armed forces were deployed at
bases in Uzbekistan until 2005 and maintains an airbase in Kyrgyzstan, raising
China’s suspicions about U.S. military deployments in Central Asia and a perceived
U.S. encirclement campaign. PRC ruler Hu Jintao also argued that Central Asian
countries can handle their own internal and regional affairs. General Richard Myers,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded on July 14, 2005, that China and
Russia were “trying to bully” the Central Asian countries. A week later, China’s
official People’s Daily accused General Myers of showing “arrogance” and U.S.
intentions to “permanently meddle” and be “strategically dominant” in Central Asia.
During the 109th Congress, on July 19, 2005, the House passed (by voice vote)
Representative Tom Lantos’s amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for FYs 2006 and 2007 (H.R. 2601). The language expressed the congressional
concern that the SCO’s declaration called for a deadline for deployments in Central
Asia and called on the President and Secretaries of Defense and State to open a
dialogue with SCO countries about the use of bases there. The House passed H.R.
2601 (by 351-78) on July 20, 2005, whereas the Senate did not vote on it.
China has worked to improve ties with Central Asian countries, including
offering military assistance. The PRC hosted a summit of SCO members in Shanghai
on June 15, 2006, that included Iran as an observer. The State Department criticized
that inclusion of Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, as running “counter” to the
international fight against terrorism. Ahead of the SCO summit in Bishkek in August
2007, the PRC’s official newspaper published an article calling for the U.S. military
to withdraw from the base in Kyrgyzstan. Also, the Deputy Speaker of the Kyrgyz
parliament said he expected pressure from Russia and China on his government
concerning the use of the Manas air base by the U.S. military.34 In August 2007, the
PLA and Russian forces held a combined counterterrorism exercise called “Peace
Mission 2007” held under the SCO’s sponsorship in Chelyabinsk in Russia’s Ural
Mountains and in Urumqi in Xinjiang. The exercise targeted what China combines
into as the “three evil forces” of “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”
34 Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], June 15, 2007; AKI Press, July 10, 2007.

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PRC-Origin Weapons and Iran
Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed greater concern about
China-origin weapons that have been found in the conflicts involving U.S. forces in
Afghanistan (and Iraq), as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its re-transfers
to anti-U.S. fighters. PRC-made weapons found in Afghanistan, mainly small arms
and ammunition, have included: man-portable anti-aircraft missiles (such as the HN-
5 missiles); armor-piercing ammunition; rocket propelled grenades; artillery rockets;
sniper rifles; and components for weapons. In late 2001, PRC-origin (produced by
the state-owned defense-industrial company, NORINCO) multiple rocket launchers
(using 107 mm rockets) were found in Afghanistan. Also, in late 2001 to spring
2002, caches of PRC-origin HN-5 missiles, ammunition, and rocket propelled
grenades were discovered. In June 2007, the Taliban used PRC-made HN-5 surface-
to-air missiles in Afghanistan. In some cases, tracing to the producer of the arms is
challenged by the intentional removal of serial numbers from the weapons or parts.
Also adding to the challenge of identifying the source of weapons is the fact that Iran
has manufactured an anti-aircraft missile, called the Misagh-1, that is similar to the
QW-1 anti-air missile made by the PRC’s state-owned, defense industrial company:
the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC).35
Even while U.S. officials have pointed to China as the origin of some of the
weaponry found in Afghanistan, another question concerns whether the supplies are
new (since Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001) or left over from the years
when various countries transferred weapons to Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan
during its Soviet occupation in the 1980s or later in the 1990s. China’s CPMIEC
exported the HN-5 anti-aircraft missiles for years, and China previously supplied
them to the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries.36 Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in August 2002 that Afghanistan is “filled with
weapons” and that “you do find things from China, but you find them from country
after country after country.” He added, “a lot of it is quite old and probably not
stable.”37 In September 2007, an Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman said that his
government seized various types of arms, including PRC weapons, but did not have
evidence of new PRC arms being transferred to the Taliban.38 Aside from the
explanation of left-over caches, PRC-made weapons are not the only type uncovered.
35 Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring: China-al Qaeda Nexus,”
Washington Times, December 21, 2001; Bill Gertz, “China-made Artillery Seized in
Afghanistan,” Washington Times, April 12, 2002; “China-trained Taliban,” Washington
Times
, June 21, 2002; Scott Baldauf, “Al Qaeda Massing for New Fight” and “How Al
Qaeda Seeks to Buy Chinese Arms,” Christian Science Monitor, August 9 and 23, 2002;
Jane’s Land-based Air Defence 2003-2004; Philip Smucker, “Taliban Uses Weapons Made
in China, Iran,” Washington Times, June 5, 2007; “Chinese Arms in the Hands of Taleban,”
editorial, Kabul Times, June 7, 2007; Bill Gertz, “China Arming Terrorists,” Washington
Times
, June 15, 2007; Demetri Sevastopuloin, “U.S. Takes China to Task Over Iraq and
Afghan Arms,” Financial Times, July 9, 2007; Jane’s Armor and Artillery 2007-2008.
36 Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, 1996-1997, and 2003-2004.
37 Briefing by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, August 9, 2002.
38 Tolu Television, Kabul, September 4, 2007.

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In the same month, another Afghan official announced that arms made in China, Iran,
and Russia were discovered in the city of Herat, near the western border with Iran.39

In its approach, the Bush Administration has focused concerns and questions on
Iran, rather than China, and how the weapons ended up in Afghanistan (some through
Iran), rather than where they were made (in China, Iran, or other countries). Focusing
on Iran, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns specifically
said on June 13, 2007: “There’s irrefutable evidence the Iranians are now
[transferring arms to the Taliban in Afghanistan], and it’s a pattern of activity.” ...
“It’s coming from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps command, which is a basic
unit of the Iranian government.” After just retiring as Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, Richard Lawless told reporters on July 6 that: “Identifying how [the
weapons] came through Iran [into Afghanistan] and who is facilitating that transit
through Iran is the key issue for us right now. It is really not the issue of where they
ultimately were manufactured.” Nonetheless, despite the primary focus on Iran, the
Administration sent demarches to Beijing. Lawless confirmed that the United States
expressed concerns to China about exercising greater care in its arms sales to Iran.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney also said at a
meeting of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on July 12,
that the United States has “repeatedly asked China to stop its transfers to Iran of
conventional weapons and technologies,” but Beijing’s response has been
“irresponsible.” He also warned, “partners do not provide weapons to people who
support those who kill our troops and those of our allies.” While in Kabul on
September 11, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte acknowledged that he
raised concerns with China about its arms sales to Iran and requested that China
refrain from signing any new arms sales contracts with Iran.40 The United Kingdom
also asked Beijing about the Taliban’s use of PRC weapons against U.K. troops in
Afghanistan.41
It is uncertain as to whether China has stopped arms transfers to Iran or
prevented any new arms sales contracts with Iran, as Negroponte urged. The PRC
has not denied its arms sales to Iran and has conveyed a sense of “business as usual.”
When questioned by reporters about PRC arms sales to Iran that have been found in
Afghanistan (and Iraq), the PRC Foreign Ministry characterized its arms sales as
“normal” military trade and cooperation with other countries. The ministry stated
China’s position that its arms sales are beyond reproach and responsible because
China follows these “principles” for arms exports: they are for legitimate self-
defense; they do not undermine international peace and stability; they do not interfere
in the internal affairs of the recipients; and they are exported only to sovereign
countries. In addition, the Foreign Ministry claimed that China has stipulated another
condition: no re-transfer to a third party without PRC permission. The ministry also
39 Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul, September 6, 2007; AFP, September 22, 2007.
40 “Iran Arming Taliban, U.S. Claims,” CNN, June 13, 2007; Richard Lawless, transcript of
interview with Asahi Shimbum and other newspapers, July 6, 2007; Demetri Sevastopuloin,
“U.S. Takes China to Task Over Iraq and Afghan Arms,” Financial Times, July 9, 2007; Jim
Wolf, “U.S. Faults China on Shipments to Iran,” Reuters, July 12, 2007; John Negroponte,
Press Roundtable in Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 11, 2007.
41 Paul Danahar, “Taleban Getting Chinese Weapons,” BBC News, September 3, 2007.

CRS-13
argued that China has complied with international laws and United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) resolutions.42
However, China can contend compliance with the letter of UNSC resolutions
because China (along with Russia) objected to UNSC sanctions targeting Iran’s arms
imports. Thus, only after diplomatic negotiations on additional sanctions against Iran
for its nuclear enrichment program (during which China and Russia objected to
banning Iran’s arms imports and export credit guarantees for doing business in
Iran),43 China voted with all other UNSC members on March 24, 2007, for
Resolution 1747, which included a ban on Iran’s arms exports (not imports).
Aside from the issue of whether the PRC has been responsive to U.S. concerns,
the complicity of China’s government in allowing or acquiescing in the arms flow to
Iran is another question. Part of that question concerns whether the PLA has been
involved. The arms manufacturers were PRC state-owned defense-industrial plants,
rather than the PLA itself, although the PLA might have a role in any vetting of the
arms exports. Regardless of whether the PRC government did or did not know about
these arms sales to Iran or PRC weapons found in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S.
demarches have now raised the problem with Beijing.
42 PRC Foreign Ministry news conferences, July 10; July 26; September 4, 2007.
43 “Nations Closer to Deal on Iran Sanctions,” AP, March 13, 2007; and Colum Lynch, “6
Powers Agree on Sanctions for Iran,” Washington Post, March 16, 2007.